---
title: Mali is Speedrunning Towards Total Collapse.
description: "Just before daybreak on Saturday, April 25th, 2026, residents of the garrison town of Kati in southwestern Mali woke up to the sound of explosions and gunfire.\n\nKati is home to Mali's largest military base, so sporadic gunshots aren't unusual here. But this felt different; it didn't seem like just another drill.\n\nWhen people ventured outside, they found military checkpoints and soldiers patrolling the streets. Soon, news started to trickle in: attacks were underway in several locations across Mali. Insurgents had managed to take over some cities and even kill the country's defense minister.\n\nMali is no stranger to unrest; however, the country was clearly not prepared for this. Government spokesman Ousmane Coulibaly described it as a \"coordinated and complex\" assault.\n\nBut these attacks didn't come out of nowhere. It's not the first time that Tuareg separatists and Islamic extremists from the north have staged a major rebellion. Meanwhile, in Bamako, Mali's leadership has been hanging in the balance since a coup in 2020 deposed its president.\n\nAs the military junta tries to bring the situation under control, many are left to question how things degenerated so much, so quickly. How did a country, once hailed as a model of democracy, become a hotbed for terrorism?\n\n## 1. Fissures in the new republic\n\nTo understand how the situation in Mali got to where it is today, we have to go back to the very foundations of this country.\n\nSee, Mali is a culturally diverse nation. In the northern part of the country, you have ethnic groups such as the Tuareg, who are mostly nomadic. These groups occupy a large area of the Sahara, spanning from Libya to Niger, Algeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso.\n\nIn the central and southern parts of Mali, you have the Songhai, Dogon, Bambara, and other ethnic groups who live in sedentary communities.\n\nAlthough these different ethnic groups were united under the Mali Empire as far back as the 13th century, there has historically been tension between the peoples of the north and the south.\n\nFast forward to the colonial era, and the French-educated elites were mostly southerners. Things came to a head when this educated class took the reins after Mali gained independence in 1960.\n\nUltimately, this cemented a dynamic in which the people of the north often found themselves on the periphery of power. They have generally had little representation on the national level, and successive governments have mostly overlooked the region.\n\nA report by the Clingendael Institute published in 2015 said: \"Since 1960, the Tuareg and Arab populations have never succeeded in fitting within the new Malian state model and have been regularly marginalized from positions of power and the central 'national cake'.\"\n\nFrom the very early days of the country, the Tuaregs and other ethnic groups in northern Mali didn't feel like they should be part of the country.\n\nMany had expected the different Saharan ethnic groups to be banded into one country when France left the region. Instead, they were split arbitrarily and suddenly found themselves under the rule of people living hundreds of miles away, whom they didn't feel connected to in any way.\n\nThis created resentment for the Malian government and gave rise to the first Tuareg rebellion in 1962, just two years after the country gained independence. Tuareg rebel Alladi Ag Alla attacked two Malian police officers as they traveled in the desert in Kidal, sparking an uprising that lasted until 1964.\n\nMali's newly formed government responded to the unrest by declaring martial law in the north and brutally cracking down on the rebellion. Soldiers poisoned wells, killed livestock, and targeted entire communities in waves of violent reprisals.\n\nOver the next two to three decades, the northeast area of Mali experienced severe droughts. This, and the heavy-handed repression from the government, forced thousands of people to migrate to neighboring countries like Niger, Mauritania, Algeria, Burkina Faso, and Libya.\n\nThey largely remained in exile until 1990, when many Tuaregs started returning to their homeland after the drought finally ended. Once they were back in Mali, the old resentment for the central government started to foment, resulting in the second Tuareg rebellion.\n\nIn 1990, a small group of Tuareg rebels led by Iyad Ag Ghali attacked a police station in Menaka. This was the start of another violent revolt. The government responded to the unrest by deploying the army, and, again, they came for blood.\n\nNon-profit news agency The New Humanitarian quoted a senior parachute commander with the Malian army saying: \"The solution concerning the Tuaregs is their extermination. I have come here to take care of that, and I will not waste my bullets.\"\n\nThe second Tuareg rebellion ended in 1992, thanks to a peace deal brokered by Algerian authorities. Among other things, the National Pact outlined plans for greater regional autonomy in northern Mali and granted the area special status. According to the agreement, the government was also going to integrate Tuareg rebels into the Malian army.\n\nBut not all Tuareg rebels supported the idea of striking a peace deal with the government. This caused the movement to splinter into different factions. Some who didn't want to make peace with the government left Mali for neighboring countries.\n\nAlthough the Malian government made symbolic gestures showing it intended to keep to its word, it didn't honor all the terms of the deal. This left many former rebels embittered. That anger festered for years, until May 23, 2006, when a new rebel group, the Democratic Alliance for Change, attacked Malian army positions in Kidal and Menaka. The group was made up of battle-hardened fighters from the first Tuareg rebellion.\n\nDespite their experience, the mutiny didn't last long. The 2006 insurrection lasted less than two months. By July 2006, the rebels signed another peace treaty with the Malian government. Once again, the agreement was brokered by Algeria. And, just as in 1992, not all rebel leaders supported negotiating with the government.\n\nOne of the most prominent Tuareg leaders who didn't want a peace deal was Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. He and his group continued to orchestrate attacks against the Malian government even after the treaty took effect. In 2009, Malian authorities finally drove Bahanga and his group out of the country.\n\nAnd, as fate would have it, he ended up in Libya, where he met other Tuareg fighters exiled there. And, you guessed it, they started planning another revolt.\n\nCrucially, it's around this time that radical groups linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb started to infiltrate northern Mali. They established a base there and recruited local youth by stoking their resentment for the southern rulers of Mali.\n\nThese jihadists were armed and had battlefield experience from fighting in the Algerian Civil War. Their presence in the region would add another facet to the conflict.\n\n## 2. A year of upheavals\n\nThe peace deal between Tuareg rebels and the Malian government was a fragile one, but it held on for six years before another round of fighting broke out. The domino that unleashed this chaos was the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.\n\nSee, both Gaddafi and the Libyan National Transitional Council had hired and armed Tuareg mercenaries during the civil war that followed the Arab Spring.\n\nWhen Gaddafi was killed in August 2011 and his regime fell, Bahanga and hundreds of Tuareg mercenaries turned their attention to Mali. They had a score to settle with the Malian government and local militia groups that did Bamako's bidding.\n\nDuring this time, several rebel groups were formed in northern Mali. One of the most important of these groups was the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, or MNLA. According to Al-Jazeera, the group was composed of about 800 to 4,000 Tuareg fighters returning from Libya.\n\nSeveral local Arab leaders were also part of the MNLA. Within just weeks of its formation, the size of the group grew, as about 500 to 1,500 Tuaregs deserted the Malian army to join it. Several recruits also took up arms and sided with the MNLA.\n\nIn a press statement released after it was formed, the MNLA declared its intention to create an independent nation for the Tuaregs and the other Saharan ethnic groups. The word Azawad is the Tuareg name for the area encompassing Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. Now, the name took on a new meaning; it was used to refer to all the areas historically linked to the Tuareg, from Mali to Niger and Algeria.\n\nAnother important group that was founded at this time was Ansar Dine. The group was created by Iyad ad Ghali, a veteran of the first Tuareg rebellion in 1990. Unlike the MNLA, Ansar Dine's goal was not to secede from Mali. Instead, they wanted to enforce a strict interpretation of Islamic laws, known as Sharia, throughout the country.\n\nNot everyone in northern Mali supported the MNLA or other rebel groups. In fact, Tommy Miles, a historian on Francophone West Africa, claims the MNLA didn't even have the support of many ethnic groups in northern Mali. He told Relief Web that many locals viewed the group's formation as a thinly veiled attempt by some Tuareg leaders to dominate their communities.\n\nAlthough Mali's government under President Amadou Toumani Touré knew that armed groups from Algeria and Libya had made a foray into Mali and were establishing a foothold in the country, the authorities didn't do anything about it for some reason, until it was too late.\n\nThe first clear sign of an impending security crisis in Mali came in January 2012, when the MNLA joined forces with Ansar Dine to attack the government. That attack came just days later in Menaka.\n\nAfter this initial attack, the fighting spread to several parts of northern Mali. And, to everyone's surprise, the rebels appeared to be gaining the upper hand, with the death toll of military casualties steadily rising.\n\nAmnesty International and other human rights groups accused the government of targeting civilians in indiscriminate attacks and intentionally damaging properties belonging to Tuaregs and Arabs.\n\nBy March, the rebels had successfully taken control of some towns in the north. They even attempted to invade Kidal, a major city and the capital of the Kidal Region.\n\nBy now, most Malians were fed up with the government's handling of the security crisis. Despite the seriousness of the situation, President Touré downplayed it, insisting the rebellion was a spillover from the war in Libya. Despite the unrest, he announced that the nation would go ahead with planned presidential elections within a few months.\n\nBy March 2012, soldiers in Bamako and Gao were openly protesting against the government over the lack of resources to fight the rebels. In just a matter of days, a group of soldiers launched a coup, toppling Touré.\n\nThe uncertainty in Mali following the coup emboldened the Tuareg separatists and Islamic extremists. By April, the rebels had taken control of Gao, the capital of the Gao Region and one of the most important historic towns. Many soldiers also deserted the military to join the rebels.\n\nAccording to Al-Jazeera, as of March 2012, the number of Malian soldiers who had either been killed, taken captive, or deserted the force stood at around 1,000.\n\nOn April 6, the MNLA declared an end to the war, saying they had achieved their objectives. The group also announced the formation of an independent Azawad nation, the size of Spain or France.\n\nMali's transitional government firmly rejected the idea of splitting the nation, but they clearly had their hands full. In May 2012, the military junta announced Diancounda Traore as interim president of Mali. But many didn't support the transition deal. Days later, a group of protesters burst into Traore's office and attacked him. He sustained injuries to the head and was left unconscious, but luckily, he survived.\n\n## 3. The changing faces of power\n\nAlthough the MNLA and Ansar Dine collaborated in the attacks, they ironically still pursued different objectives that contradicted each other. On the one hand, the MNLA wanted to create an independent Azawad nation, while Ansar Dine wanted to impose sharia law on Mali without splitting the state.\n\nThe two groups managed to reach a compromise, however, agreeing that Sharia law would be imposed in the newly formed Azawad nation. When it finally came time to put this agreement into effect, tensions arose between the two groups. MNLA fighters didn't like the idea of Sharia law being introduced in their territory. So, there was a split in the union.\n\nBy November 2012, Ansar Dine and their al-Qaeda-affiliated allies had successfully pushed the MNLA out of major towns in northern Mali. Seeing their grip on power slipping away, the MNLA abandoned their plans for an Azawadi state and signed a peace deal with the government.\n\nAt the end of 2012, Ansar Dine and its affiliates were thought to have a 3,000-strong force, and their attacks grew bolder, advancing southward in Mali and ravaging towns.\n\nThe United Nations Security Council had approved a plan for an international mission to help Mali take back control of its territory from jihadists. Still, deployment was only going to happen in about eight months. Meanwhile, the situation was getting very desperate. When jihadists took over the town of Konna, about 600 kilometers from Bamako, Malian authorities knew they had to act quickly. So, they requested France's assistance.\n\nThis led to Operation Serval, in which French and African forces successfully evacuated Ansar Dine and its affiliates from major towns in northern Mali. This operation was launched in January 2013.\n\nAfter a month of intense fighting, many rebels escaped to other countries, while others retreated to the Adrar des Ifoghas mountain range in northeastern Mali.\n\nFollowing this defeat, Islamic militant groups in northern Mali changed their strategy. They started conducting kidnappings, suicide bombings, and guerrilla attacks rather than trying to occupy towns. Sometimes, they would cross into Mali from neighboring countries like Niger to conduct attacks and then escape.\n\nThe MNLA fought on the side of the Malian and allied forces against Ansar Dine and other jihadist groups during Operation Serval. When the fighting subsided, the group was in control of Kidal, and initially, they refused to disarm and hand over the city.\n\nHowever, they changed course, and, in June 2013, the MNLA signed a peace deal with the Malian government. This agreement came just weeks before the presidential elections that saw a new leader, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, ascend to power.\n\nBut the peace didn't last. By September 2013, there were new clashes between the MNLA and the Malian government. Both sides accused each other of initiating the attacks.\n\nThere was sporadic fighting between both sides for two years, until the radical Islamists and Tuareg militant groups signed another peace deal with the government. But, you guessed it, just a few weeks later, there would be more fighting in Mali. According to The New Humanitarian, the fighting was at a level not seen since Malian and allied forces pushed jihadist groups out of northern Mali in 2013.\n\nRebel attacks continued through the years, and new Tuareg and jihadist groups emerged to pick up arms. 2017 saw one of the most significant developments in the conflict as Ghali's Ansar Dine joined forces with four other Islamic extremist groups to form the Jihadist Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM).\n\nIn 2018, JNIM terrorists started staging attacks in other parts of Mali outside the north. This was a major milestone in the conflict, and it inevitably spurred the end of Keita's reign as people grew even more unhappy with the government's handling of the situation and the blatant corruption of the regime.\n\nIn 2018, Keita won the presidential elections, extending his tenure. But, just two years later, in 2020, he would be toppled amid massive protests across the country.\n\nWhen the dust finally settled in Bamako, Mali had a new leader — Bah Ndaw — and Special Forces Colonel Assimi Goita, who led the coup, became Mali's vice president.\n\nMany felt Goita had all the power and Ndaw was only a ceremonial head. And, they were proven right in May 2021, when Goita had Ndaw and the country's prime minister detained and stripped of their powers. He became Mali's de facto leader and remains so to this day.\n\nThe security crisis in Mali has steadily worsened since government and allied forces pushed back rebels in 2012. Authorities have tried to mediate with some terrorist groups, but those who weren't part of these discussions continued to conduct attacks.\n\nIt was clear that something drastic had to be done. In January 2021, the French launched another campaign against the rebels, but it wasn't as successful as their last one for various reasons.\n\nGoita decided it was time to pivot, inviting mercenaries from Russia's Wagner Group to help deal with the conflict. By 2022, there were hundreds of Wagner fighters in Mali.\n\nCanada, France, and other European allies, who had been helping Mali deal with the insurrection, opposed bringing Wagner into the country. And, by February 2022, these countries pulled both their forces and their support for the Malian government. This only pushed Goita to deepen his ties with Russia.\n\nNow emboldened by the evacuation of foreign forces, jihadist militants took over more territories in northern Mali. There were several clashes between Malian and Wagner soldiers and terrorist groups like JNIM.\n\nBetween 2023 and 2024, fighting intensified between the two sides, with the government successfully reclaiming major towns from rebel control. Sometimes, the jihadists recaptured these areas shortly afterward. Things pretty much remained like this for years.\n\n## 4. A new wave of violence\n\nIn late 2024, there was a major development in the war as different Tuareg rebel groups came together to form the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Just like before, these groups had one demand — an independent Azawad state.\n\nSince 2024, there have been frequent attacks by both Tuareg separatists and Islamic extremists, targeting both the Malian military and civilians. The group has been increasingly bringing violence to urban areas. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, about 20 percent of JNIM attacks recorded in 2025 happened in the southern and western portion of Mali.\n\nThis marked a dramatic shift as most JNIM and FLA attacks usually happened in rural parts of northern Mali. It also showed that the terrorists were becoming more daring and taking the fight to the joint Malian-Russian forces. But that's not all, the level of sophistication and coordination of these attacks was remarkable. Sometimes, the terrorists launched simultaneous raids on cities hundreds of kilometers apart. Even Mali's capital, Bamako, was not spared.\n\nIn August, JNIM imposed a blockade on the Malian cities of Kayes and Nioro du Sahel, effectively prohibiting residents from leaving or entering them. The group also banned all fuel imports into Mali and began targeting trucks bringing petrol into the country from Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast.\n\nSee, Mali is a landlocked nation, so it imports fuel by road, and these truck convoys are highly vulnerable. The decision to cut off fuel imports into the country wasn't a rash move by the extremists, but a calculated strategy to bring the country to its knees.\n\nSince the JNIM announced a ban on fuel imports in September 2025, the group has effectively blocked major highways and carried out multiple attacks on trucks carrying fuel to Bamako and other parts of the country.\n\nAccording to Human Rights Watch, the attacks on fuel supplies are \"triggering severe shortages that have halted transport, disrupted electricity, caused prices to spike, and paralyzed daily life in the capital, Bamako, and elsewhere.\"\n\nIn October 2025, Bamako came to a standstill due to a severe fuel shortage. Businesses and petrol stations had to shut down. They reopened only weeks later, after the government sent soldiers to escort 300 trucks from the Ivory Coast to replenish the city's supply.\n\nWhile the government's deployment of soldiers to escort these trucks has generally been effective, it hasn't always had the desired effect.\n\nCase in point, in January 2026, jihadist fighters attacked a convoy of 40 trucks transporting fuel to the city of Kayes in western Mali, and beheaded 12 truck drivers. Although the military was escorting the trucks, soldiers could do little to stop the attack.\n\nThat wasn't even the most brazen attack by the jihadists. In July 2025, the group carried out a series of attacks along Mali's borders with Senegal and Mauritania. JNIM claimed it killed several soldiers, destroyed over 100 military vehicles, and took control of three army barracks. For its part, the Malian army said it killed up to 80 terrorists in the attack.\n\nBack then, Yvan Guichaoua, a researcher at the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies, told the BBC that the frequency of these attacks was unprecedented.\n\nIt's worth pointing out here that the uptick in attacks by jihadists and Tuareg nationalists seems to coincide with Russia's decision to take a hands-off approach in Mali. In June 2025, the Wagner Group officially left Mali, handing over its role to the Moscow-backed Africa Corps.\n\nIt's unclear what precipitated this change. However, following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russia's defense ministry took control over the group and rebranded it as Africa Corps. The war in Ukraine may have also forced Russia to call back some mercenaries from Mali. Meanwhile, an unnamed diplomatic source told France 24 that most Wagner mercenaries in Mali were simply integrated into the Africa Corps.\n\nThe change from Wagner to Africa Corps wasn't just superficial. The group is now more focused on training Malian soldiers and conducting drone attacks, rather than going into combat.\n\nAccording to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, the number of battles involving Russian mercenaries dropped from 537 to 402 between 2024 and 2025. As of March, the Africa Corps had been involved in just 24 clashes in 2026.\n\nSince 2025, a wave of audacious attacks by JNIM and FLA has exposed the ineffectiveness of Mali's military junta. Despite increasing military checkpoints and conducting numerous raids on terrorists, the results have not been what Malians expect.\n\nCurrently, JNIM controls a vast area of Mali — from the north through to the central, western, and southern parts of the country. This is the largest territory they have been able to wrestle from the state in more than a decade. And, it's a major indication of the direction that the war is going.\n\nCompared with two years ago, the Malian government has clearly lost its grip on the nation's security. Terrorists seem to be able to launch attacks anywhere, even in areas in southern Mali that they have historically not had any presence in.\n\n## 5. April 2026 attacks\n\nOn April 25, 2026, JNIM and FLA dealt a major blow to the Malian government after orchestrating a series of well-coordinated attacks across four major cities in Mali, including in Bamako, the country's capital, and Kati, where its largest military base is located.\n\nDuring the attacks, the terrorists targeted the home of Mali's defense minister Sadio Camara with a suicide car bomb, killing him, one of his wives, and two of his grandchildren. Elsewhere in Kati, they also injured Mali's intelligence chief Modibo Koné and top military commander General Oumar Diarra.\n\nCamara was one of the most important figures in the Malian government and is believed to have played a key role in bringing Russian mercenaries into the country. According to some, he was viewed as a potential candidate to lead Mali in the future.\n\nIn less than 24 hours after the attack, JNIM and FLA rebels claimed they had captured several places in the north of the country, including Kidal and Gao. The FLA and multiple media outlets say that in Kidal, Russian mercenaries were forced to surrender after being trapped in their camp. The rebels subsequently allowed them to leave the city.\n\nHowever, Russia's defense ministry tells the story differently, claiming that the Africa Corps thwarted a coup in Kidal, and they fought for over 24 hours while being fully surrounded.\n\nAs of Sunday, April 26, fighting was still ongoing in parts of Mali, as terrorists battled for control over key territories with Russian and Malian forces. Mali's army appears to have been caught off guard, but it quickly regrouped. Authorities imposed curfews, set up roadblocks at strategic points, and increased patrols.\n\nIn a statement, Mali's army said it had successfully pushed back the attack in some cities and killed hundreds of terrorists. Just a day after the initial attacks, the Africa Corps claimed over 1,000 insurgents had been killed.\n\nThe Malian army and Africa Corps soldiers have continued to hunt JNIM and FLA fighters. On May 1st, authorities reported that more than 200 militants had been killed in targeted airstrikes while they were allegedly preparing for a new wave of attacks.\n\nDespite this show of strength, al-Jazeera reporter Nicolas Haque claimed the assault had spread panic through the ranks of Mali's military.\n\nThe fact that Kati, one of the most well-defended places in Mali, could be overrun by terrorists speaks volumes about the state of things in the country. Mali is currently in the throes of the most critical security challenge it has faced in over a decade, and the rebels have shown that their reach extends to the central and southern parts of the country as well, not just the north.\n\nInitially, many thought Goita had also been killed, but he dispelled these rumors two days later, when he appeared on national TV to speak about the attacks, assuring the nation that everything was \"under control.\"\n\nMeanwhile, on Wednesday, April 29, a spokesperson for the FLA told AFP that the fall of Mali's ruling junta is inevitable. The group maintains that its objective is to conquer other parts of northern Mali, ostensibly to achieve its long-standing goal of creating an independent Azawad nation.\n\nOn Twitter, or X, the Africa Corps claimed that approximately 10,000 to 12,000 militants took part in the attacks on the 25th and 26th of April. If this figure is accurate, it's alarming because during the 2012 uprising, the number of Tuareg separatists and jihadists was estimated to be around 3,000 to 9,000.\n\nIt would mean that, over the past decade, the ranks of both groups have swelled, despite sustaining casualties from clashes with the authorities over the past decade. Some experts believe both groups have recruited thousands of young men in recent years.\n\nFLA spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramandane told the BBC that the group had been planning its recent attack for some time. \"We had been working on this operation for a long time, in a well-planned manner, and in fact, in alliance with [JNIM].\"\n\nAccording to Africa Corps, Ukrainian and European mercenaries participated in the attacks against Malian forces using surface-to-air missiles. However, the paramilitary organization has not provided any concrete evidence to back this up.\n\nTo date, the only evidence we have of this is a video shared by the Africa Corps where a supposed JNIM fighter named Hama Cissé says they were trained by foreign instructors, who also coordinated the attacks.\n\nIn the aftermath of the uprising, Malian authorities have arrested dozens of military officers, politicians, and members of the public, accusing them of colluding with the terrorists.\n\nMeanwhile, JNIM spokesman Abu Hudheifah al-Bambari announced that the group had commenced a siege of Bamako. On May 7th, he said they would allow only civilians who need medical assistance to enter and leave the city.\n\nReporting on the situation, Haque said: \"These are Al-Qaeda fighters that have pointed 12.7mm machine guns on their motorbikes, stopping any outgoing or incoming traffic.\"\n\nDespite this blockade, on May 1st, the Africa Corps released a statement on Twitter claiming they had escorted over 800 fuel trucks to Bamako.\n\nMore than two weeks have passed since the initial attacks, and the terrorists are still launching offensives against military positions in Mali. In one of these raids, they managed to take over a military base in Hombori, central Mali.\n\nOn Wednesday, May 6th, JNIM fighters also attacked two villages in central Mali, leaving several people dead. On the same day, members of the group stormed a prison near Bamako housing many Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants.\n\n## 6. The humanitarian toll of the conflict\n\nMali is bleeding, and the people who feel the pain the most are the millions of Malians caught between the two sides of this war.\n\nAfter the first day of fighting during the recent attacks by the Tuareg separatists and jihadists, the death toll stood at about 23 people. No doubt that number has continued to climb since then. According to UNICEF, children were among the dead and injured victims of the fighting.\n\nIn a statement released on May 5th, Seif Magango, the spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said there had been concerning reports of abductions and extrajudicial killings in the days following the latest terrorist attacks.\n\n\"On 2 May, lawyer and politician Mountaga Tall was abducted from his house by two hooded men and taken to an unidentified location. His wife was physically assaulted as she tried to record the abduction on her mobile phone, and her phone was confiscated. Three relatives of the exiled politician Oumar Mariko were also reportedly abducted a day earlier. Their whereabouts remain unknown.\"\n\nThe UNHCR has also revealed that people could suffer from extreme hunger as the JNIM blockade prevents them from getting vital supplies. The agency cited a statement from the mayor of the village of Diafarabe in central Mali saying that the village had exhausted its food supply and people may start dying of hunger if nothing is done within 48 hours.\n\nThe people of Mali have had to bear the brunt of the fighting between the government and rebels for decades. And, both sides have been guilty of grave human rights abuses.\n\nAccording to a report by the UN Secretary-General, during the fighting in 2012, Islamic militant groups perpetrated sexual violence against children in the areas under their control. They also killed or maimed children and recruited them to join their ranks.\n\nThese groups curtailed the freedom of locals in various ways, including banning music, prohibiting women from public spaces, and imposing strict dress codes, among other things.\n\nIn the past, jihadists used to kidnap foreign nationals to raise money through ransom payments. However, cattle-rustling is now one of their main ways of earning money. They also tax locals in the areas they control. Again, locals are the ones who suffer the consequences of all these acts.\n\nIt used to be the case that Tuareg separatists and Islamic fighters were primarily responsible for the atrocities against civilians. But since Russian fighters entered the picture, they have also been guilty of this.\n\nIn 2022, the UN accused the Wagner group of serious human rights violations in Mali, including extrajudicial killings. In one shocking incident, the group reportedly killed more than 500 people.\n\nMeanwhile, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies reported that between 2024 and 2025, the Malian army and its Russian counterparts were responsible for the deaths of over 2,000 civilians. This is far more than the number of casualties JNIM racked up in the same time period.\n\nI should state here that Malian forces are just as guilty of violence against civilians. Human rights groups say they often take out their frustrations with jihadists on Fulani communities in the country, even if members of these communities are not necessarily affiliated with these terrorist groups or support them.\n\nIf the current security situation in Mali doesn't improve, millions of Malians could be displaced from their homes again. Back in 2012, the UN Refugee Agency said nearly 150,000 Malians had fled to neighboring countries to seek refuge. Meanwhile, over 400,000 people had been displaced internally in the country.\n\n## 7. What's the way forward for Mali?\n\nWhen Goita took power in Mali in 2021, he promised to resolve the security crisis and bring peace to Mali. So far, he has failed woefully at this task. Some are already questioning whether the military junta is even capable of achieving this, because, despite the support of foreign mercenaries, the terrorists seem to have only become stronger and are growing more audacious with their attacks.\n\nMali has experienced a cycle of repeated violence since it gained independence in 1960. And, the root of the problem has always been the same — Tuaregs and other peoples from the north of the country feel the government doesn't represent them, and that the authorities have largely ignored their duty to develop the region.\n\nAfter decades of intense battles, it's clear that violence is not the solution. But, it appears to be the preferred weapon for both sides, as dialogue has also proven unsuccessful. Today, large swathes of Mali are under the influence of terrorists. In fact, it is the fifth nation most affected by terrorism in the world, just behind Niger and Burkina Faso.\n\nIronically, these three countries have experienced coups in recent years, and they've all banded together to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), rejecting France and turning to Russia. The JNIM has a strong presence in all three nations, too.\n\nToday, it's not just the threat from Tuareg separatists and jihadists that Malians have to worry about; the military junta has been equally repressive. In 2025, Goita dissolved all political parties and suspended civic and political organizations. The military has also responded violently to protests against the government.\n\nAt the moment, there's no clear roadmap to return Mali to civilian rule or to bring peace to the nation. Originally, the plan was that Mali would transition to civilian rule in 2024. Instead, Goita has been tightening his grip on power. In July 2025, he named himself president of Mali for a five-year term, renewable indefinitely. And, following Camara's death, the leader of the junta has named himself Mali's defense minister. It's left to be seen if he'd do any better than Camara did.\n\nSo, what's the way forward for Mali? Well, negotiating a ceasefire agreement seems to be the only logical path. Tuareg and jihadist fighters have sown deep roots in the region, and they have become more powerful, wielding sophisticated weapons. During the latest attacks, the militants used drones, IEDs with long-range capabilities, and even Elon Musk's Starlink. If the past is any indication of what is to come, they're only going to get stronger.\n\nMeanwhile, after over five years of operating in the country, Russian mercenaries are no closer to resolving this security crisis. Some security experts have theorized that Mali may end its alliance with Russia and turn to Turkey for assistance in dealing with the situation.\n\nWhatever the case, something has to be done and quickly. Otherwise, Mali would fall into the hands of Islamic extremists, and the entire West Africa could be forced to pay the price for the epic failures of successive Malian governments.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n\n- Mali's April 2026 attacks by JNIM and FLA rebels killed Defense Minister Sadio Camara and exposed critical security failures across the country.\n- Decades of northern marginalization since 1960 independence fueled repeated Tuareg rebellions, with peace deals consistently broken by Malian governments.\n- The 2011 fall of Gaddafi sent heavily armed Tuareg mercenaries back to Mali, sparking the 2012 rebellion and subsequent coup against President Touré.\n- Russia's 2025 transition from Wagner to Africa Corps reduced direct combat involvement, coinciding with dramatically escalated jihadist and separatist attacks.\n- Both rebel groups and government forces, including Russian mercenaries, have committed severe human rights abuses, with over 2,000 civilian deaths attributed to army and Russian forces in 2024-2025.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What triggered the April 25, 2026 coordinated attacks in Mali?\n\nThe April 25, 2026 attacks were orchestrated by JNIM and FLA, who had been planning the operation for a long time in alliance with each other. The attacks targeted four major cities including Bamako and Kati, where Mali's largest military base is located. The insurgents used sophisticated weapons including drones, IEDs with long-range capabilities, and Starlink. The FLA spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramandane stated, 'We had been working on this operation for a long time, in a well-planned manner, and in fact, in alliance with [JNIM].'\n\n### Who was killed in the April 25, 2026 attacks and what was their significance?\n\nMali's defense minister Sadio Camara was killed during the attacks when terrorists targeted his home with a suicide car bomb. He was killed along with one of his wives and two of his grandchildren. Camara was one of the most important figures in the Malian government and is believed to have played a key role in bringing Russian mercenaries into the country. According to some, he was viewed as a potential candidate to lead Mali in the future. Additionally, Mali's intelligence chief Modibo Koné and top military commander General Oumar Diarra were injured in Kati.\n\n### What is the historical root cause of conflict between northern and southern Mali?\n\nThe historical root cause stems from colonial-era dynamics where French-educated elites were mostly southerners who took power after independence in 1960. This cemented a dynamic where northern peoples, particularly the Tuareg, found themselves on the periphery of power with little national representation. A 2015 Clingendael Institute report stated: 'Since 1960, the Tuareg and Arab populations have never succeeded in fitting within the new Malian state model and have been regularly marginalized from positions of power and the central 'national cake'.' Many Saharan ethnic groups had expected to be banded into one country when France left, but were instead split arbitrarily under distant rule.\n\n### How did the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya contribute to Mali's crisis?\n\nThe fall of Gaddafi in August 2011 unleashed chaos in Mali. Both Gaddafi and the Libyan National Transitional Council had hired and armed Tuareg mercenaries during the civil war. When Gaddafi's regime fell, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga and hundreds of Tuareg mercenaries turned their attention to Mali, where they had a score to settle with the Malian government. The MNLA (Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) was formed, composed of about 800 to 4,000 Tuareg fighters returning from Libya. Within weeks, about 500 to 1,500 Tuaregs deserted the Malian army to join it.\n\n### What is the difference between the MNLA and Ansar Dine's objectives?\n\nThe MNLA (Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) sought to create an independent nation for Tuaregs and other Saharan ethnic groups called Azawad, encompassing Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. In contrast, Ansar Dine, founded by Iyad ad Ghali, did not want to secede from Mali but instead wanted to enforce a strict interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia) throughout the entire country. The two groups collaborated in attacks but their contradictory objectives eventually led to a split when they tried to implement Sharia in the newly declared Azawad nation, which MNLA fighters opposed.\n\n### How has Russia's involvement in Mali changed from Wagner to Africa Corps?\n\nIn June 2025, the Wagner Group officially left Mali and was replaced by the Moscow-backed Africa Corps. This followed the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, after which Russia's defense ministry took control and rebranded the group. The change was substantive: Africa Corps became more focused on training Malian soldiers and conducting drone attacks rather than direct combat. According to ACLED data, battles involving Russian mercenaries dropped from 537 to 402 between 2024 and 2025, and as of March 2026, Africa Corps had been involved in just 24 clashes. The war in Ukraine may have forced Russia to call back some mercenaries.\n\n### What humanitarian impacts have resulted from JNIM's fuel blockade?\n\nJNIM imposed a blockade on Malian cities beginning in August 2025, prohibiting residents from leaving or entering Kayes and Nioro du Sahel, and banning all fuel imports. According to Human Rights Watch, attacks on fuel supplies are 'triggering severe shortages that have halted transport, disrupted electricity, caused prices to spike, and paralyzed daily life in the capital, Bamako, and elsewhere.' In October 2025, Bamako came to a standstill due to severe fuel shortage with businesses and petrol stations shutting down. The UNHCR revealed that people could suffer from extreme hunger as the blockade prevents vital supplies. The mayor of Diafarabe stated the village had exhausted its food supply and people may start dying of hunger within 48 hours.\n\n### What human rights abuses have been committed by all sides in the conflict?\n\nMultiple parties have committed grave abuses: Islamic militant groups perpetrated sexual violence against children, killed or maimed children, recruited child soldiers, banned music, prohibited women from public spaces, and imposed strict dress codes. The UN accused the Wagner Group in 2022 of serious violations including extrajudicial killings, with one incident reportedly killing more than 500 people. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies reported that between 2024-2025, the Malian army and Russian counterparts were responsible for over 2,000 civilian deaths—far more than JNIM. Malian forces also target Fulani communities regardless of actual terrorist affiliation. Following the April 2026 attacks, there were reports of abductions and extrajudicial killings, including the abduction of lawyer and politician Mountaga Tall.\n\n### How has Assimi Goita consolidated power since the 2020 coup?\n\nAssimi Goita led the 2020 coup that toppled Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. He initially became vice president under Bah Ndaw in the transitional government, but had Ndaw and the prime minister detained and stripped of powers in May 2021, becoming de facto leader. In 2025, Goita dissolved all political parties and suspended civic and political organizations. In July 2025, he named himself president of Mali for a five-year term, renewable indefinitely. Following Defense Minister Sadio Camara's death in April 2026, Goita named himself defense minister as well. The original plan for transition to civilian rule in 2024 was abandoned as Goita tightened his grip on power.\n\n### What is the current territorial control situation in Mali as of 2025-2026?\n\nJNIM currently controls a vast area of Mali—from the north through to the central, western, and southern parts of the country. This represents the largest territory they have wrestled from the state in more than a decade. About 20 percent of JNIM attacks recorded in 2025 happened in the southern and western portion of Mali, marking a dramatic shift from historically rural northern attacks. Following the April 25-26, 2026 attacks, JNIM and FLA claimed capture of several northern places including Kidal and Gao. The militants have demonstrated ability to launch attacks anywhere, including areas in southern Mali where they historically had no presence.\n\n## Sources\n\n- [Original Places video: Mali is Speedrunning Towards Total Collapse.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ow1GlCq_6ZQ)\n- [https://afrique-europe-interact.net/index.php?article_id=693](https://afrique-europe-interact.net/index.php?article_id=693)\n- [https://x.com/TheAfricaCorps/status/2048360125509869674](https://x.com/TheAfricaCorps/status/2048360125509869674)\n- [https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2052476051469590698](https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2052476051469590698)\n- [https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2049780359336763836](https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2049780359336763836)\n- [https://x.com/TheAfricaCorps/status/2050185023555264838](https://x.com/TheAfricaCorps/status/2050185023555264838)\n- [https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/international/2026/05/08/deadly-double-attack-hits-2-central-mali-villages-as-violence-spreads.html](https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/international/2026/05/08/deadly-double-attack-hits-2-central-mali-villages-as-violence-spreads.html)\n- [https://docs.un.org/en/S/2014/267](https://docs.un.org/en/S/2014/267)\n- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/Op_Serval.png) by Dmanrock29 / openverse, by-sa.\n\n## Related Coverage"
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---

<!-- aeo:section start="lede" -->
Just before daybreak on Saturday, April 25th, 2026, residents of the garrison town of Kati in southwestern Mali woke up to the sound of explosions and gunfire.

Kati is home to Mali's largest military base, so sporadic gunshots aren't unusual here. But this felt different; it didn't seem like just another drill.

When people ventured outside, they found military checkpoints and soldiers patrolling the streets. Soon, news started to trickle in: attacks were underway in several locations across Mali. Insurgents had managed to take over some cities and even kill the country's defense minister.

Mali is no stranger to unrest; however, the country was clearly not prepared for this. Government spokesman Ousmane Coulibaly described it as a "coordinated and complex" assault.

But these attacks didn't come out of nowhere. It's not the first time that Tuareg separatists and Islamic extremists from the north have staged a major rebellion. Meanwhile, in Bamako, Mali's leadership has been hanging in the balance since a coup in 2020 deposed its president.

As the military junta tries to bring the situation under control, many are left to question how things degenerated so much, so quickly. How did a country, once hailed as a model of democracy, become a hotbed for terrorism?

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<!-- aeo:section start="1-fissures-in-the-new-republic" -->
## 1. Fissures in the new republic

To understand how the situation in Mali got to where it is today, we have to go back to the very foundations of this country.

See, Mali is a culturally diverse nation. In the northern part of the country, you have ethnic groups such as the Tuareg, who are mostly nomadic. These groups occupy a large area of the Sahara, spanning from Libya to Niger, Algeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso.

In the central and southern parts of Mali, you have the Songhai, Dogon, Bambara, and other ethnic groups who live in sedentary communities.

Although these different ethnic groups were united under the Mali Empire as far back as the 13th century, there has historically been tension between the peoples of the north and the south.

Fast forward to the colonial era, and the French-educated elites were mostly southerners. Things came to a head when this educated class took the reins after Mali gained independence in 1960.

Ultimately, this cemented a dynamic in which the people of the north often found themselves on the periphery of power. They have generally had little representation on the national level, and successive governments have mostly overlooked the region.

A report by the Clingendael Institute published in 2015 said: "Since 1960, the Tuareg and Arab populations have never succeeded in fitting within the new Malian state model and have been regularly marginalized from positions of power and the central 'national cake'."

From the very early days of the country, the Tuaregs and other ethnic groups in northern Mali didn't feel like they should be part of the country.

Many had expected the different Saharan ethnic groups to be banded into one country when France left the region. Instead, they were split arbitrarily and suddenly found themselves under the rule of people living hundreds of miles away, whom they didn't feel connected to in any way.

This created resentment for the Malian government and gave rise to the first Tuareg rebellion in 1962, just two years after the country gained independence. Tuareg rebel Alladi Ag Alla attacked two Malian police officers as they traveled in the desert in Kidal, sparking an uprising that lasted until 1964.

Mali's newly formed government responded to the unrest by declaring martial law in the north and brutally cracking down on the rebellion. Soldiers poisoned wells, killed livestock, and targeted entire communities in waves of violent reprisals.

Over the next two to three decades, the northeast area of Mali experienced severe droughts. This, and the heavy-handed repression from the government, forced thousands of people to migrate to neighboring countries like Niger, Mauritania, Algeria, Burkina Faso, and Libya.

They largely remained in exile until 1990, when many Tuaregs started returning to their homeland after the drought finally ended. Once they were back in Mali, the old resentment for the central government started to foment, resulting in the second Tuareg rebellion.

In 1990, a small group of Tuareg rebels led by Iyad Ag Ghali attacked a police station in Menaka. This was the start of another violent revolt. The government responded to the unrest by deploying the army, and, again, they came for blood.

Non-profit news agency The New Humanitarian quoted a senior parachute commander with the Malian army saying: "The solution concerning the Tuaregs is their extermination. I have come here to take care of that, and I will not waste my bullets."

The second Tuareg rebellion ended in 1992, thanks to a peace deal brokered by Algerian authorities. Among other things, the National Pact outlined plans for greater regional autonomy in northern Mali and granted the area special status. According to the agreement, the government was also going to integrate Tuareg rebels into the Malian army.

But not all Tuareg rebels supported the idea of striking a peace deal with the government. This caused the movement to splinter into different factions. Some who didn't want to make peace with the government left Mali for neighboring countries.

Although the Malian government made symbolic gestures showing it intended to keep to its word, it didn't honor all the terms of the deal. This left many former rebels embittered. That anger festered for years, until May 23, 2006, when a new rebel group, the Democratic Alliance for Change, attacked Malian army positions in Kidal and Menaka. The group was made up of battle-hardened fighters from the first Tuareg rebellion.

Despite their experience, the mutiny didn't last long. The 2006 insurrection lasted less than two months. By July 2006, the rebels signed another peace treaty with the Malian government. Once again, the agreement was brokered by Algeria. And, just as in 1992, not all rebel leaders supported negotiating with the government.

One of the most prominent Tuareg leaders who didn't want a peace deal was Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. He and his group continued to orchestrate attacks against the Malian government even after the treaty took effect. In 2009, Malian authorities finally drove Bahanga and his group out of the country.

And, as fate would have it, he ended up in Libya, where he met other Tuareg fighters exiled there. And, you guessed it, they started planning another revolt.

Crucially, it's around this time that radical groups linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb started to infiltrate northern Mali. They established a base there and recruited local youth by stoking their resentment for the southern rulers of Mali.

These jihadists were armed and had battlefield experience from fighting in the Algerian Civil War. Their presence in the region would add another facet to the conflict.

<!-- aeo:section end="1-fissures-in-the-new-republic" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="2-a-year-of-upheavals" -->
## 2. A year of upheavals

The peace deal between Tuareg rebels and the Malian government was a fragile one, but it held on for six years before another round of fighting broke out. The domino that unleashed this chaos was the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.

See, both Gaddafi and the Libyan National Transitional Council had hired and armed Tuareg mercenaries during the civil war that followed the Arab Spring.

When Gaddafi was killed in August 2011 and his regime fell, Bahanga and hundreds of Tuareg mercenaries turned their attention to Mali. They had a score to settle with the Malian government and local militia groups that did Bamako's bidding.

During this time, several rebel groups were formed in northern Mali. One of the most important of these groups was the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, or MNLA. According to Al-Jazeera, the group was composed of about 800 to 4,000 Tuareg fighters returning from Libya.

Several local Arab leaders were also part of the MNLA. Within just weeks of its formation, the size of the group grew, as about 500 to 1,500 Tuaregs deserted the Malian army to join it. Several recruits also took up arms and sided with the MNLA.

In a press statement released after it was formed, the MNLA declared its intention to create an independent nation for the Tuaregs and the other Saharan ethnic groups. The word Azawad is the Tuareg name for the area encompassing Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. Now, the name took on a new meaning; it was used to refer to all the areas historically linked to the Tuareg, from Mali to Niger and Algeria.

Another important group that was founded at this time was Ansar Dine. The group was created by Iyad ad Ghali, a veteran of the first Tuareg rebellion in 1990. Unlike the MNLA, Ansar Dine's goal was not to secede from Mali. Instead, they wanted to enforce a strict interpretation of Islamic laws, known as Sharia, throughout the country.

Not everyone in northern Mali supported the MNLA or other rebel groups. In fact, Tommy Miles, a historian on Francophone West Africa, claims the MNLA didn't even have the support of many ethnic groups in northern Mali. He told Relief Web that many locals viewed the group's formation as a thinly veiled attempt by some Tuareg leaders to dominate their communities.

Although Mali's government under President Amadou Toumani Touré knew that armed groups from Algeria and Libya had made a foray into Mali and were establishing a foothold in the country, the authorities didn't do anything about it for some reason, until it was too late.

The first clear sign of an impending security crisis in Mali came in January 2012, when the MNLA joined forces with Ansar Dine to attack the government. That attack came just days later in Menaka.

After this initial attack, the fighting spread to several parts of northern Mali. And, to everyone's surprise, the rebels appeared to be gaining the upper hand, with the death toll of military casualties steadily rising.

Amnesty International and other human rights groups accused the government of targeting civilians in indiscriminate attacks and intentionally damaging properties belonging to Tuaregs and Arabs.

By March, the rebels had successfully taken control of some towns in the north. They even attempted to invade Kidal, a major city and the capital of the Kidal Region.

By now, most Malians were fed up with the government's handling of the security crisis. Despite the seriousness of the situation, President Touré downplayed it, insisting the rebellion was a spillover from the war in Libya. Despite the unrest, he announced that the nation would go ahead with planned presidential elections within a few months.

By March 2012, soldiers in Bamako and Gao were openly protesting against the government over the lack of resources to fight the rebels. In just a matter of days, a group of soldiers launched a coup, toppling Touré.

The uncertainty in Mali following the coup emboldened the Tuareg separatists and Islamic extremists. By April, the rebels had taken control of Gao, the capital of the Gao Region and one of the most important historic towns. Many soldiers also deserted the military to join the rebels.

According to Al-Jazeera, as of March 2012, the number of Malian soldiers who had either been killed, taken captive, or deserted the force stood at around 1,000.

On April 6, the MNLA declared an end to the war, saying they had achieved their objectives. The group also announced the formation of an independent Azawad nation, the size of Spain or France.

Mali's transitional government firmly rejected the idea of splitting the nation, but they clearly had their hands full. In May 2012, the military junta announced Diancounda Traore as interim president of Mali. But many didn't support the transition deal. Days later, a group of protesters burst into Traore's office and attacked him. He sustained injuries to the head and was left unconscious, but luckily, he survived.

<!-- aeo:section end="2-a-year-of-upheavals" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="3-the-changing-faces-of-power" -->
## 3. The changing faces of power

Although the MNLA and Ansar Dine collaborated in the attacks, they ironically still pursued different objectives that contradicted each other. On the one hand, the MNLA wanted to create an independent Azawad nation, while Ansar Dine wanted to impose sharia law on Mali without splitting the state.

The two groups managed to reach a compromise, however, agreeing that Sharia law would be imposed in the newly formed Azawad nation. When it finally came time to put this agreement into effect, tensions arose between the two groups. MNLA fighters didn't like the idea of Sharia law being introduced in their territory. So, there was a split in the union.

By November 2012, Ansar Dine and their al-Qaeda-affiliated allies had successfully pushed the MNLA out of major towns in northern Mali. Seeing their grip on power slipping away, the MNLA abandoned their plans for an Azawadi state and signed a peace deal with the government.

At the end of 2012, Ansar Dine and its affiliates were thought to have a 3,000-strong force, and their attacks grew bolder, advancing southward in Mali and ravaging towns.

The United Nations Security Council had approved a plan for an international mission to help Mali take back control of its territory from jihadists. Still, deployment was only going to happen in about eight months. Meanwhile, the situation was getting very desperate. When jihadists took over the town of Konna, about 600 kilometers from Bamako, Malian authorities knew they had to act quickly. So, they requested France's assistance.

This led to Operation Serval, in which French and African forces successfully evacuated Ansar Dine and its affiliates from major towns in northern Mali. This operation was launched in January 2013.

After a month of intense fighting, many rebels escaped to other countries, while others retreated to the Adrar des Ifoghas mountain range in northeastern Mali.

Following this defeat, Islamic militant groups in northern Mali changed their strategy. They started conducting kidnappings, suicide bombings, and guerrilla attacks rather than trying to occupy towns. Sometimes, they would cross into Mali from neighboring countries like Niger to conduct attacks and then escape.

The MNLA fought on the side of the Malian and allied forces against Ansar Dine and other jihadist groups during Operation Serval. When the fighting subsided, the group was in control of Kidal, and initially, they refused to disarm and hand over the city.

However, they changed course, and, in June 2013, the MNLA signed a peace deal with the Malian government. This agreement came just weeks before the presidential elections that saw a new leader, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, ascend to power.

But the peace didn't last. By September 2013, there were new clashes between the MNLA and the Malian government. Both sides accused each other of initiating the attacks.

There was sporadic fighting between both sides for two years, until the radical Islamists and Tuareg militant groups signed another peace deal with the government. But, you guessed it, just a few weeks later, there would be more fighting in Mali. According to The New Humanitarian, the fighting was at a level not seen since Malian and allied forces pushed jihadist groups out of northern Mali in 2013.

Rebel attacks continued through the years, and new Tuareg and jihadist groups emerged to pick up arms. 2017 saw one of the most significant developments in the conflict as Ghali's Ansar Dine joined forces with four other Islamic extremist groups to form the Jihadist Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM).

In 2018, JNIM terrorists started staging attacks in other parts of Mali outside the north. This was a major milestone in the conflict, and it inevitably spurred the end of Keita's reign as people grew even more unhappy with the government's handling of the situation and the blatant corruption of the regime.

In 2018, Keita won the presidential elections, extending his tenure. But, just two years later, in 2020, he would be toppled amid massive protests across the country.

When the dust finally settled in Bamako, Mali had a new leader — Bah Ndaw — and Special Forces Colonel Assimi Goita, who led the coup, became Mali's vice president.

Many felt Goita had all the power and Ndaw was only a ceremonial head. And, they were proven right in May 2021, when Goita had Ndaw and the country's prime minister detained and stripped of their powers. He became Mali's de facto leader and remains so to this day.

The security crisis in Mali has steadily worsened since government and allied forces pushed back rebels in 2012. Authorities have tried to mediate with some terrorist groups, but those who weren't part of these discussions continued to conduct attacks.

It was clear that something drastic had to be done. In January 2021, the French launched another campaign against the rebels, but it wasn't as successful as their last one for various reasons.

Goita decided it was time to pivot, inviting mercenaries from Russia's Wagner Group to help deal with the conflict. By 2022, there were hundreds of Wagner fighters in Mali.

Canada, France, and other European allies, who had been helping Mali deal with the insurrection, opposed bringing Wagner into the country. And, by February 2022, these countries pulled both their forces and their support for the Malian government. This only pushed Goita to deepen his ties with Russia.

Now emboldened by the evacuation of foreign forces, jihadist militants took over more territories in northern Mali. There were several clashes between Malian and Wagner soldiers and terrorist groups like JNIM.

Between 2023 and 2024, fighting intensified between the two sides, with the government successfully reclaiming major towns from rebel control. Sometimes, the jihadists recaptured these areas shortly afterward. Things pretty much remained like this for years.

<!-- aeo:section end="3-the-changing-faces-of-power" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="4-a-new-wave-of-violence" -->
## 4. A new wave of violence

In late 2024, there was a major development in the war as different Tuareg rebel groups came together to form the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Just like before, these groups had one demand — an independent Azawad state.

Since 2024, there have been frequent attacks by both Tuareg separatists and Islamic extremists, targeting both the Malian military and civilians. The group has been increasingly bringing violence to urban areas. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, about 20 percent of JNIM attacks recorded in 2025 happened in the southern and western portion of Mali.

This marked a dramatic shift as most JNIM and FLA attacks usually happened in rural parts of northern Mali. It also showed that the terrorists were becoming more daring and taking the fight to the joint Malian-Russian forces. But that's not all, the level of sophistication and coordination of these attacks was remarkable. Sometimes, the terrorists launched simultaneous raids on cities hundreds of kilometers apart. Even Mali's capital, Bamako, was not spared.

In August, JNIM imposed a blockade on the Malian cities of Kayes and Nioro du Sahel, effectively prohibiting residents from leaving or entering them. The group also banned all fuel imports into Mali and began targeting trucks bringing petrol into the country from Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast.

See, Mali is a landlocked nation, so it imports fuel by road, and these truck convoys are highly vulnerable. The decision to cut off fuel imports into the country wasn't a rash move by the extremists, but a calculated strategy to bring the country to its knees.

Since the JNIM announced a ban on fuel imports in September 2025, the group has effectively blocked major highways and carried out multiple attacks on trucks carrying fuel to Bamako and other parts of the country.

According to Human Rights Watch, the attacks on fuel supplies are "triggering severe shortages that have halted transport, disrupted electricity, caused prices to spike, and paralyzed daily life in the capital, Bamako, and elsewhere."

In October 2025, Bamako came to a standstill due to a severe fuel shortage. Businesses and petrol stations had to shut down. They reopened only weeks later, after the government sent soldiers to escort 300 trucks from the Ivory Coast to replenish the city's supply.

While the government's deployment of soldiers to escort these trucks has generally been effective, it hasn't always had the desired effect.

Case in point, in January 2026, jihadist fighters attacked a convoy of 40 trucks transporting fuel to the city of Kayes in western Mali, and beheaded 12 truck drivers. Although the military was escorting the trucks, soldiers could do little to stop the attack.

That wasn't even the most brazen attack by the jihadists. In July 2025, the group carried out a series of attacks along Mali's borders with Senegal and Mauritania. JNIM claimed it killed several soldiers, destroyed over 100 military vehicles, and took control of three army barracks. For its part, the Malian army said it killed up to 80 terrorists in the attack.

Back then, Yvan Guichaoua, a researcher at the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies, told the BBC that the frequency of these attacks was unprecedented.

It's worth pointing out here that the uptick in attacks by jihadists and Tuareg nationalists seems to coincide with Russia's decision to take a hands-off approach in Mali. In June 2025, the Wagner Group officially left Mali, handing over its role to the Moscow-backed Africa Corps.

It's unclear what precipitated this change. However, following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russia's defense ministry took control over the group and rebranded it as Africa Corps. The war in Ukraine may have also forced Russia to call back some mercenaries from Mali. Meanwhile, an unnamed diplomatic source told France 24 that most Wagner mercenaries in Mali were simply integrated into the Africa Corps.

The change from Wagner to Africa Corps wasn't just superficial. The group is now more focused on training Malian soldiers and conducting drone attacks, rather than going into combat.

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, the number of battles involving Russian mercenaries dropped from 537 to 402 between 2024 and 2025. As of March, the Africa Corps had been involved in just 24 clashes in 2026.

Since 2025, a wave of audacious attacks by JNIM and FLA has exposed the ineffectiveness of Mali's military junta. Despite increasing military checkpoints and conducting numerous raids on terrorists, the results have not been what Malians expect.

Currently, JNIM controls a vast area of Mali — from the north through to the central, western, and southern parts of the country. This is the largest territory they have been able to wrestle from the state in more than a decade. And, it's a major indication of the direction that the war is going.

Compared with two years ago, the Malian government has clearly lost its grip on the nation's security. Terrorists seem to be able to launch attacks anywhere, even in areas in southern Mali that they have historically not had any presence in.

<!-- aeo:section end="4-a-new-wave-of-violence" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="5-april-2026-attacks" -->
## 5. April 2026 attacks

On April 25, 2026, JNIM and FLA dealt a major blow to the Malian government after orchestrating a series of well-coordinated attacks across four major cities in Mali, including in Bamako, the country's capital, and Kati, where its largest military base is located.

During the attacks, the terrorists targeted the home of Mali's defense minister Sadio Camara with a suicide car bomb, killing him, one of his wives, and two of his grandchildren. Elsewhere in Kati, they also injured Mali's intelligence chief Modibo Koné and top military commander General Oumar Diarra.

Camara was one of the most important figures in the Malian government and is believed to have played a key role in bringing Russian mercenaries into the country. According to some, he was viewed as a potential candidate to lead Mali in the future.

In less than 24 hours after the attack, JNIM and FLA rebels claimed they had captured several places in the north of the country, including Kidal and Gao. The FLA and multiple media outlets say that in Kidal, Russian mercenaries were forced to surrender after being trapped in their camp. The rebels subsequently allowed them to leave the city.

However, Russia's defense ministry tells the story differently, claiming that the Africa Corps thwarted a coup in Kidal, and they fought for over 24 hours while being fully surrounded.

As of Sunday, April 26, fighting was still ongoing in parts of Mali, as terrorists battled for control over key territories with Russian and Malian forces. Mali's army appears to have been caught off guard, but it quickly regrouped. Authorities imposed curfews, set up roadblocks at strategic points, and increased patrols.

In a statement, Mali's army said it had successfully pushed back the attack in some cities and killed hundreds of terrorists. Just a day after the initial attacks, the Africa Corps claimed over 1,000 insurgents had been killed.

The Malian army and Africa Corps soldiers have continued to hunt JNIM and FLA fighters. On May 1st, authorities reported that more than 200 militants had been killed in targeted airstrikes while they were allegedly preparing for a new wave of attacks.

Despite this show of strength, al-Jazeera reporter Nicolas Haque claimed the assault had spread panic through the ranks of Mali's military.

The fact that Kati, one of the most well-defended places in Mali, could be overrun by terrorists speaks volumes about the state of things in the country. Mali is currently in the throes of the most critical security challenge it has faced in over a decade, and the rebels have shown that their reach extends to the central and southern parts of the country as well, not just the north.

Initially, many thought Goita had also been killed, but he dispelled these rumors two days later, when he appeared on national TV to speak about the attacks, assuring the nation that everything was "under control."

Meanwhile, on Wednesday, April 29, a spokesperson for the FLA told AFP that the fall of Mali's ruling junta is inevitable. The group maintains that its objective is to conquer other parts of northern Mali, ostensibly to achieve its long-standing goal of creating an independent Azawad nation.

On Twitter, or X, the Africa Corps claimed that approximately 10,000 to 12,000 militants took part in the attacks on the 25th and 26th of April. If this figure is accurate, it's alarming because during the 2012 uprising, the number of Tuareg separatists and jihadists was estimated to be around 3,000 to 9,000.

It would mean that, over the past decade, the ranks of both groups have swelled, despite sustaining casualties from clashes with the authorities over the past decade. Some experts believe both groups have recruited thousands of young men in recent years.

FLA spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramandane told the BBC that the group had been planning its recent attack for some time. "We had been working on this operation for a long time, in a well-planned manner, and in fact, in alliance with [JNIM]."

According to Africa Corps, Ukrainian and European mercenaries participated in the attacks against Malian forces using surface-to-air missiles. However, the paramilitary organization has not provided any concrete evidence to back this up.

To date, the only evidence we have of this is a video shared by the Africa Corps where a supposed JNIM fighter named Hama Cissé says they were trained by foreign instructors, who also coordinated the attacks.

In the aftermath of the uprising, Malian authorities have arrested dozens of military officers, politicians, and members of the public, accusing them of colluding with the terrorists.

Meanwhile, JNIM spokesman Abu Hudheifah al-Bambari announced that the group had commenced a siege of Bamako. On May 7th, he said they would allow only civilians who need medical assistance to enter and leave the city.

Reporting on the situation, Haque said: "These are Al-Qaeda fighters that have pointed 12.7mm machine guns on their motorbikes, stopping any outgoing or incoming traffic."

Despite this blockade, on May 1st, the Africa Corps released a statement on Twitter claiming they had escorted over 800 fuel trucks to Bamako.

More than two weeks have passed since the initial attacks, and the terrorists are still launching offensives against military positions in Mali. In one of these raids, they managed to take over a military base in Hombori, central Mali.

On Wednesday, May 6th, JNIM fighters also attacked two villages in central Mali, leaving several people dead. On the same day, members of the group stormed a prison near Bamako housing many Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants.

<!-- aeo:section end="5-april-2026-attacks" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="6-the-humanitarian-toll-of-the-conflict" -->
## 6. The humanitarian toll of the conflict

Mali is bleeding, and the people who feel the pain the most are the millions of Malians caught between the two sides of this war.

After the first day of fighting during the recent attacks by the Tuareg separatists and jihadists, the death toll stood at about 23 people. No doubt that number has continued to climb since then. According to UNICEF, children were among the dead and injured victims of the fighting.

In a statement released on May 5th, Seif Magango, the spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said there had been concerning reports of abductions and extrajudicial killings in the days following the latest terrorist attacks.

"On 2 May, lawyer and politician Mountaga Tall was abducted from his house by two hooded men and taken to an unidentified location. His wife was physically assaulted as she tried to record the abduction on her mobile phone, and her phone was confiscated. Three relatives of the exiled politician Oumar Mariko were also reportedly abducted a day earlier. Their whereabouts remain unknown."

The UNHCR has also revealed that people could suffer from extreme hunger as the JNIM blockade prevents them from getting vital supplies. The agency cited a statement from the mayor of the village of Diafarabe in central Mali saying that the village had exhausted its food supply and people may start dying of hunger if nothing is done within 48 hours.

The people of Mali have had to bear the brunt of the fighting between the government and rebels for decades. And, both sides have been guilty of grave human rights abuses.

According to a report by the UN Secretary-General, during the fighting in 2012, Islamic militant groups perpetrated sexual violence against children in the areas under their control. They also killed or maimed children and recruited them to join their ranks.

These groups curtailed the freedom of locals in various ways, including banning music, prohibiting women from public spaces, and imposing strict dress codes, among other things.

In the past, jihadists used to kidnap foreign nationals to raise money through ransom payments. However, cattle-rustling is now one of their main ways of earning money. They also tax locals in the areas they control. Again, locals are the ones who suffer the consequences of all these acts.

It used to be the case that Tuareg separatists and Islamic fighters were primarily responsible for the atrocities against civilians. But since Russian fighters entered the picture, they have also been guilty of this.

In 2022, the UN accused the Wagner group of serious human rights violations in Mali, including extrajudicial killings. In one shocking incident, the group reportedly killed more than 500 people.

Meanwhile, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies reported that between 2024 and 2025, the Malian army and its Russian counterparts were responsible for the deaths of over 2,000 civilians. This is far more than the number of casualties JNIM racked up in the same time period.

I should state here that Malian forces are just as guilty of violence against civilians. Human rights groups say they often take out their frustrations with jihadists on Fulani communities in the country, even if members of these communities are not necessarily affiliated with these terrorist groups or support them.

If the current security situation in Mali doesn't improve, millions of Malians could be displaced from their homes again. Back in 2012, the UN Refugee Agency said nearly 150,000 Malians had fled to neighboring countries to seek refuge. Meanwhile, over 400,000 people had been displaced internally in the country.

<!-- aeo:section end="6-the-humanitarian-toll-of-the-conflict" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="7-what-s-the-way-forward-for-mali" -->
## 7. What's the way forward for Mali?

When Goita took power in Mali in 2021, he promised to resolve the security crisis and bring peace to Mali. So far, he has failed woefully at this task. Some are already questioning whether the military junta is even capable of achieving this, because, despite the support of foreign mercenaries, the terrorists seem to have only become stronger and are growing more audacious with their attacks.

Mali has experienced a cycle of repeated violence since it gained independence in 1960. And, the root of the problem has always been the same — Tuaregs and other peoples from the north of the country feel the government doesn't represent them, and that the authorities have largely ignored their duty to develop the region.

After decades of intense battles, it's clear that violence is not the solution. But, it appears to be the preferred weapon for both sides, as dialogue has also proven unsuccessful. Today, large swathes of Mali are under the influence of terrorists. In fact, it is the fifth nation most affected by terrorism in the world, just behind Niger and Burkina Faso.

Ironically, these three countries have experienced coups in recent years, and they've all banded together to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), rejecting France and turning to Russia. The JNIM has a strong presence in all three nations, too.

Today, it's not just the threat from Tuareg separatists and jihadists that Malians have to worry about; the military junta has been equally repressive. In 2025, Goita dissolved all political parties and suspended civic and political organizations. The military has also responded violently to protests against the government.

At the moment, there's no clear roadmap to return Mali to civilian rule or to bring peace to the nation. Originally, the plan was that Mali would transition to civilian rule in 2024. Instead, Goita has been tightening his grip on power. In July 2025, he named himself president of Mali for a five-year term, renewable indefinitely. And, following Camara's death, the leader of the junta has named himself Mali's defense minister. It's left to be seen if he'd do any better than Camara did.

So, what's the way forward for Mali? Well, negotiating a ceasefire agreement seems to be the only logical path. Tuareg and jihadist fighters have sown deep roots in the region, and they have become more powerful, wielding sophisticated weapons. During the latest attacks, the militants used drones, IEDs with long-range capabilities, and even Elon Musk's Starlink. If the past is any indication of what is to come, they're only going to get stronger.

Meanwhile, after over five years of operating in the country, Russian mercenaries are no closer to resolving this security crisis. Some security experts have theorized that Mali may end its alliance with Russia and turn to Turkey for assistance in dealing with the situation.

Whatever the case, something has to be done and quickly. Otherwise, Mali would fall into the hands of Islamic extremists, and the entire West Africa could be forced to pay the price for the epic failures of successive Malian governments.

<!-- aeo:section end="7-what-s-the-way-forward-for-mali" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways

- Mali's April 2026 attacks by JNIM and FLA rebels killed Defense Minister Sadio Camara and exposed critical security failures across the country.
- Decades of northern marginalization since 1960 independence fueled repeated Tuareg rebellions, with peace deals consistently broken by Malian governments.
- The 2011 fall of Gaddafi sent heavily armed Tuareg mercenaries back to Mali, sparking the 2012 rebellion and subsequent coup against President Touré.
- Russia's 2025 transition from Wagner to Africa Corps reduced direct combat involvement, coinciding with dramatically escalated jihadist and separatist attacks.
- Both rebel groups and government forces, including Russian mercenaries, have committed severe human rights abuses, with over 2,000 civilian deaths attributed to army and Russian forces in 2024-2025.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### What triggered the April 25, 2026 coordinated attacks in Mali?

The April 25, 2026 attacks were orchestrated by JNIM and FLA, who had been planning the operation for a long time in alliance with each other. The attacks targeted four major cities including Bamako and Kati, where Mali's largest military base is located. The insurgents used sophisticated weapons including drones, IEDs with long-range capabilities, and Starlink. The FLA spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramandane stated, 'We had been working on this operation for a long time, in a well-planned manner, and in fact, in alliance with [JNIM].'

### Who was killed in the April 25, 2026 attacks and what was their significance?

Mali's defense minister Sadio Camara was killed during the attacks when terrorists targeted his home with a suicide car bomb. He was killed along with one of his wives and two of his grandchildren. Camara was one of the most important figures in the Malian government and is believed to have played a key role in bringing Russian mercenaries into the country. According to some, he was viewed as a potential candidate to lead Mali in the future. Additionally, Mali's intelligence chief Modibo Koné and top military commander General Oumar Diarra were injured in Kati.

### What is the historical root cause of conflict between northern and southern Mali?

The historical root cause stems from colonial-era dynamics where French-educated elites were mostly southerners who took power after independence in 1960. This cemented a dynamic where northern peoples, particularly the Tuareg, found themselves on the periphery of power with little national representation. A 2015 Clingendael Institute report stated: 'Since 1960, the Tuareg and Arab populations have never succeeded in fitting within the new Malian state model and have been regularly marginalized from positions of power and the central 'national cake'.' Many Saharan ethnic groups had expected to be banded into one country when France left, but were instead split arbitrarily under distant rule.

### How did the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya contribute to Mali's crisis?

The fall of Gaddafi in August 2011 unleashed chaos in Mali. Both Gaddafi and the Libyan National Transitional Council had hired and armed Tuareg mercenaries during the civil war. When Gaddafi's regime fell, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga and hundreds of Tuareg mercenaries turned their attention to Mali, where they had a score to settle with the Malian government. The MNLA (Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) was formed, composed of about 800 to 4,000 Tuareg fighters returning from Libya. Within weeks, about 500 to 1,500 Tuaregs deserted the Malian army to join it.

### What is the difference between the MNLA and Ansar Dine's objectives?

The MNLA (Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) sought to create an independent nation for Tuaregs and other Saharan ethnic groups called Azawad, encompassing Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. In contrast, Ansar Dine, founded by Iyad ad Ghali, did not want to secede from Mali but instead wanted to enforce a strict interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia) throughout the entire country. The two groups collaborated in attacks but their contradictory objectives eventually led to a split when they tried to implement Sharia in the newly declared Azawad nation, which MNLA fighters opposed.

### How has Russia's involvement in Mali changed from Wagner to Africa Corps?

In June 2025, the Wagner Group officially left Mali and was replaced by the Moscow-backed Africa Corps. This followed the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, after which Russia's defense ministry took control and rebranded the group. The change was substantive: Africa Corps became more focused on training Malian soldiers and conducting drone attacks rather than direct combat. According to ACLED data, battles involving Russian mercenaries dropped from 537 to 402 between 2024 and 2025, and as of March 2026, Africa Corps had been involved in just 24 clashes. The war in Ukraine may have forced Russia to call back some mercenaries.

### What humanitarian impacts have resulted from JNIM's fuel blockade?

JNIM imposed a blockade on Malian cities beginning in August 2025, prohibiting residents from leaving or entering Kayes and Nioro du Sahel, and banning all fuel imports. According to Human Rights Watch, attacks on fuel supplies are 'triggering severe shortages that have halted transport, disrupted electricity, caused prices to spike, and paralyzed daily life in the capital, Bamako, and elsewhere.' In October 2025, Bamako came to a standstill due to severe fuel shortage with businesses and petrol stations shutting down. The UNHCR revealed that people could suffer from extreme hunger as the blockade prevents vital supplies. The mayor of Diafarabe stated the village had exhausted its food supply and people may start dying of hunger within 48 hours.

### What human rights abuses have been committed by all sides in the conflict?

Multiple parties have committed grave abuses: Islamic militant groups perpetrated sexual violence against children, killed or maimed children, recruited child soldiers, banned music, prohibited women from public spaces, and imposed strict dress codes. The UN accused the Wagner Group in 2022 of serious violations including extrajudicial killings, with one incident reportedly killing more than 500 people. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies reported that between 2024-2025, the Malian army and Russian counterparts were responsible for over 2,000 civilian deaths—far more than JNIM. Malian forces also target Fulani communities regardless of actual terrorist affiliation. Following the April 2026 attacks, there were reports of abductions and extrajudicial killings, including the abduction of lawyer and politician Mountaga Tall.

### How has Assimi Goita consolidated power since the 2020 coup?

Assimi Goita led the 2020 coup that toppled Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. He initially became vice president under Bah Ndaw in the transitional government, but had Ndaw and the prime minister detained and stripped of powers in May 2021, becoming de facto leader. In 2025, Goita dissolved all political parties and suspended civic and political organizations. In July 2025, he named himself president of Mali for a five-year term, renewable indefinitely. Following Defense Minister Sadio Camara's death in April 2026, Goita named himself defense minister as well. The original plan for transition to civilian rule in 2024 was abandoned as Goita tightened his grip on power.

### What is the current territorial control situation in Mali as of 2025-2026?

JNIM currently controls a vast area of Mali—from the north through to the central, western, and southern parts of the country. This represents the largest territory they have wrestled from the state in more than a decade. About 20 percent of JNIM attacks recorded in 2025 happened in the southern and western portion of Mali, marking a dramatic shift from historically rural northern attacks. Following the April 25-26, 2026 attacks, JNIM and FLA claimed capture of several northern places including Kidal and Gao. The militants have demonstrated ability to launch attacks anywhere, including areas in southern Mali where they historically had no presence.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
## Sources

- [Original Places video: Mali is Speedrunning Towards Total Collapse.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ow1GlCq_6ZQ)
- [https://afrique-europe-interact.net/index.php?article_id=693](https://afrique-europe-interact.net/index.php?article_id=693)
- [https://x.com/TheAfricaCorps/status/2048360125509869674](https://x.com/TheAfricaCorps/status/2048360125509869674)
- [https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2052476051469590698](https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2052476051469590698)
- [https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2049780359336763836](https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2049780359336763836)
- [https://x.com/TheAfricaCorps/status/2050185023555264838](https://x.com/TheAfricaCorps/status/2050185023555264838)
- [https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/international/2026/05/08/deadly-double-attack-hits-2-central-mali-villages-as-violence-spreads.html](https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/international/2026/05/08/deadly-double-attack-hits-2-central-mali-villages-as-violence-spreads.html)
- [https://docs.un.org/en/S/2014/267](https://docs.un.org/en/S/2014/267)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/Op_Serval.png) by Dmanrock29 / openverse, by-sa.

<!-- aeo:section end="sources" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->