---
title: "Taiwan: Bastion of Democracy or Rogue State?"
description: "When you think of Taiwan, what springs to mind? Do you imagine a 36,000 km² island country off the coast of China that unashamedly shines the torch for freedom and democracy, much to the chagrin of said neighbour, which is practically snarling and frothing at the mouth over the prospect of getting its hands on it, and snuffing that bright torch out? Or, do you picture a rogue separatist state that spits in the face of the island's rightful governors, and denies its citizens the joy of returning to the loving embrace of their motherland?\n\nWhichever side you happen to fall on, the simple fact that such a dichotomy exists at all is nothing short of fascinating, and musing upon it naturally gets your noggin' joggin' and leaves you with a burning desire to know the full ins and outs of the peculiar situation in Taiwan. So, get comfy, because this is a long one, and let's begin.\n\n## Early History\n\nLet us begin by delving into Taiwan's history and discovering 'why it is the way it is,' so to speak, and in the name of fastidiousness, let's take it back to the very beginning — prehistory to be precise.\n\nHuman habitation of Taiwan is currently believed to date back 30 or so thousand years, with the current oldest material evidence being chipped stone tools from the Palaeolithic Changbin Culture, dated between five and 15 thousand years ago, and human remains such as the 'Liangdao Man' skeleton, which was found on one of Taiwan's outlying islands, and has been carbon dated as being around 8,000 years old.\n\nIt is also known that around 3,000 BC, the Changbin Culture began to give way to the Neolithic Dapenkeng Culture, who developed early agriculture, cultivating both rice and millet, and also began to engage in local cross-cultural maritime trade, evident by the discovery of Taiwanese jade dated to this period in the Philippines. They also began making extensive use of pottery and earthenware, with it becoming something of a defining characteristic of the culture among scholars.\n\nEventually, the Dapenkeng Culture itself began to be succeeded by other cultures such as the Tahu and Yingpu, which continued to develop and advance the island's prehistoric society. These subsequent cultures introduced new technologies and practices, including more sophisticated pottery techniques and the use of metals. The Tahu Culture, for example, is noted for its distinct pottery styles and expanded agricultural practices, and the Yingpu Culture further advanced the use of metal tools and engaged in more complex social and trade networks.\n\nAs for when China first came into the picture, that's surprisingly hard to place. The *Zhu Fan Zhi*, or *A Description of Barbarian Nations, Records of Foreign People*, written in the 13th century AD by Zhao Rukuo refers to a place called 'Liuqiu,' which historians Friedrich Hirth and William Rockhill, writing in 1911, as well as Yang Bowen, writing in 1996, all agree refers to Taiwan. It also has some surprisingly in-depth commentary on Liuqiu's culture at the time, commenting on everything from fashion, to designs of arms and armour, through to taxation, cuisine, and the proliferation of banditry on the island — a valuable resource for certain if it is indeed Taiwan to which the text refers.\n\nAround the same time Taiwan was also repeatedly visited by an explorer by the name of Wang Dayuan, and in 1349 he wrote the first **confirmed** account of a Chinese visit to the island. He goes into great detail in this account, discussing the topography, peoples, cultures, and technologies that he encountered. He does note one detail of interest: he found no Chinese settlers on Taiwan proper, but found many on Penghu, an archipelago of 90 islands 50 km off its west coast.\n\nBut while the date of first contact between China and Taiwan might be unclear, what is perfectly clear is that by the later Ming Dynasty, i.e., the early 16th century, an increasing number of Chinese fishermen, traders, and pirates were making the trip to Southwestern Taiwan, with these trips seemingly being frequent enough that traders from Fujian were able to pick up the indigenous Formosan languages — 'Formosan' being a Portuguese-derived term for the indigenous, non-Chinese cultures of Taiwan that arose from those earlier Neolithic and Palaeolithic cultures we just discussed.\n\nBut just why would a Portuguese-derived term be used to describe the natives of Taiwan? The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is colonialism, because in addition to receiving increasing attention from the Chinese in the 16th century, Taiwan also began to attract the attention of the Europeans. The Portuguese were the first to arrive in 1544, and they dubbed the island 'Formosa,' or 'Beautiful,' hence the term transforming into one used to denote those indigenous to the island. And just to be fastidious, while we 'have' to use the term Formosan to accurately explain the story of Taiwan, it is not one preferred by all, with some preferring 'Austronesian Taiwanese,' 'Taiwanese Aborigines,' 'Takasago People,' 'Gaoshan People,' or simply just 'Native Taiwanese' — just something to bear in mind as we continue.\n\nBringing it back to colonialism, however, 1624 saw the Dutch East India Company establish a permanent presence at Anping on Taiwan's Southwest Coast, constructing Fort Zeelandia and taking over and forming a colony out of all of Taiwan's Southern Coast, which became known as The Governorate of Formosa, and lasted through to 1668. While in control the Dutch attempted to convert the indigenous population to Christianity, founding schools to teach Romanized scripts of Formosan languages — chief among which was, naturally, the Bible.\n\nMeanwhile, the Spanish, viewing the Dutch presence as a threat to their colony in the Philippines, established a settlement in northern Taiwan in 1626, building Fort San Salvador at Keelung. The Spanish settlement struggled with disease and resistance from indigenous groups however, and was eventually conquered and absorbed by the Dutch in 1642.\n\nThough they only had another 26 years in control of Taiwan, the Dutch made one **big** choice that would go on to permanently affect the island's future: they encouraged Chinese immigration, particularly from Fujian, in order to boost their workforce, most notably in the areas of rice and sugarcane cultivation.\n\nAs for who booted them off of Taiwan, that would be Zheng Cheng Gong, better known as Koxinga, a Ming General, who following the dynasty's collapse in 1644, remained loyal, and invaded Taiwan in 1661 for two reasons: firstly, to use it as a base of operations for continued resistance against the Qing Dynasty, which had militarily won control of China in 1644, and secondly to expand the Chinese domain more generally, although he described it in the following, slightly dubious way:\n\n> \"Hitherto this island had always belonged to China, and the Dutch had doubtless been permitted to live there, seeing that the Chinese did not require it for themselves; but requiring it now, it was only fair that Dutch strangers, who came from far regions, should give way to the masters of the island.\"\n\nIf, upon hearing that, you find yourself bemused, as the Chinese then on Taiwan weren't **exactly** indigenous themselves, don't worry, you're not the only one to think that way.\n\nAnd further still, if you also happen to currently be thinking to yourself \"boy, history really is cyclical isn't it\" after hearing the whole 'Taiwan becoming a holdout against a greater force that militarily conquered the Chinese Mainland' business, don't worry, you also aren't the only person to make that connection either.\n\nFollowing his conquest, Koxinga began turning his 'Kingdom of Tungning,' as his rule over Taiwan would come to be known, into a real force for threatening the nascent Qing Dynasty back home. To do that however, he would need money, and so he took measures to significantly shore up Taiwan's economy, with particular focuses being agriculture, with both rice and sugarcane plantations being enormously expanded, and deerskins, for which the Japanese were always willing to pay handsomely.\n\nAnd with that money he bought (literally) boatloads of Western guns, paid British artillery gurus to come over and train his troops, built a vast road network that could move his forces around quicker, and fortifications, so that they could fight more fiercely whence the Qing arrived.\n\nFollowing Koxinga's death in 1662, his son Zheng Jing took up his mantle, and carried on with business as usual. Unfortunately, he was not the man his father was, and between internal strife he couldn't repress effectively, and an ever more fearsome Qing naval blockade that began to destroy his export-based economy, Taiwan began to fall to pieces.\n\nThe Qing, for their part, took their time before delivering the *coup de grâce*. They knew that the Ming holdout on the other side of the Taiwan Strait was spiralling down a pit of collapse from which he would never be able to pull himself out, and so they opted to wait until things were **really** bad over there before launching their attack.\n\nCome the 8th of July 1683, that time had finally arrived, and the Qing despatched Shi Lang, one of Koxinga's old admirals who had defected back in 1646, to lead an invasion of Taiwan and stamp out the Kingdom of Tungning once and for all. He commanded a force of 300 warships and 20,000 soldiers, and quickly decimated the bulk of the Tungning Navy at the Battle of Penghu, which was won a mere seven days later. Then, it was a simple matter of putting his troops ashore, and after a short campaign, marching to receive Zheng's surrender, which was formally issued on the 3rd of October.\n\nFollowing that, Taiwan was finally properly absorbed into China after (at least) three centuries of Chinese involvement and interest in it. History could have been very different however, as Emperor Xuanye actually didn't want to occupy Taiwan at first, believing that it would be an economic net negative to his Empire. He was however, eventually convinced otherwise by Shi Lang, who following the conquest had become one of his most trusted aides, and thus Taiwan was formally integrated into the Chinese Empire as a prefecture of Fujian province in 1684.\n\nBecause Shi Lang had become so trusted, a noble rank soon came his way, specifically 'Hou,' which was roughly equivalent to a Western Marquess. And what kind of a noble would he be without land? Well, none of course! And what better land to give him than some of the stuff he had just conquered, to save the feathers of any pre-established nobles on the mainland from being ruffled. Thus, he gained personal control of Southern Taiwan, under the authority of his Emperor.\n\nAnd here's something else to pay extra attention to, because what you suspect likely happened next was not what happened — as the 'Chinese-ification' of Taiwan under Shi Lang was actually **very** limited. Instead, eager to keep his newfound personal gold mine very much his own, Shi Lang went out of his way to segregate Taiwan from the rest of the Empire, outright forbidding the Chinese peasantry from approaching the island without pre-cleared permission, and when mainlanders were occasionally allowed to make the move over to bolster his workforce, they were specifically banned from bringing their families with them — meaning that the vast majority would eventually return to the mainland.\n\nThis isn't to say that Taiwan wasn't Chinese-ified at all, because naturally, its elite structures: its leadership, its laws, etc., all quickly became very Chinese **very** quickly, but this wasn't enough to facilitate a full cultural transformation, and so Taiwan's common folk maintained their native identity for far longer than one would normally see in other conquered and assimilated territories. More proactive efforts to 'Chinese-ify' Taiwan were made following Shi Lang's death in 1696, but by that time the damage had been done — the indigenous population had had more than a decade to establish a reformed cultural identity within the framework of Chinese rule, and now it would prove to be a damned hard thing to uproot. Chinese efforts over the centuries would naturally flip-flop between both the carrot, the stick, and sometimes a bit of both, and certainly, these efforts had their successes, and Taiwan did indeed become more Chinese-ified as the years rolled on — but the effort was **never** fully successful during the Imperial Period, and indigenous dissent and even rebellion remained common.\n\nFor a specific example, consider the Zhu Yigui Rebellion of 1721, which saw the titular man, originally a duck farmer by trade, and of the Hokkien indigenous group, don the mantle of a General after a crippling rise in taxes, marshal a peasant army under him, and then march on, and successfully capture the city of Kua Chin Na, modern Gangshan District of Kaohsiung City, after which further embittered Aboriginal Taiwanese of all flavours started to rally behind him by the thousand. His rebellion was eventually put down the following year, and Chinese rule returned to the land, but the cost, both in terms of men and money was simply vast.\n\nThen there were the many, **many** Chinese settler revolts, which again, did not exactly do wonders for cultural unity on Taiwan. Take the Lin Shuangwen rebellion of 1786 through 1788. This time the titular rebel was a settler from Zhangzhou, and he took to the sword in response to the banning of the 'Heaven and Earth Society,' a secret religious organisation that maintained loyalty to the long since ousted Ming Dynasty. It took nearly two years, 40,000 troops, and junks full of cash to put down.\n\nCome the 19th century, insurrection of all stripes had become so common in Taiwan, that a new phrase started circulating to surmise the situation: \"Every three years an uprising; every five years a rebellion.\"\n\nDespite all of that however, the Qing managed to keep a grip on Taiwan, and come the late 19th Century, for all the problems it caused them, the island was a valuable part of the Empire, being economically profitable thanks to enormous investment in its agricultural sector and infrastructure. But then, yet again, just as it had back in the 17th century, Taiwan would suddenly find itself once more as naught but a football destined to be kicked between competing powers.\n\n## Modern History\n\nIt all began in 1894 following the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War. Here's a quick overview just so you have a working reference:\n\nKorea was slap bang between China and Japan, and had been a client state of China for a little over five centuries. Japan started getting its act together after coming out of two and a half centuries of isolation and began to modernise, then, having modernised, Japan quite fancied itself one of those Empire things that all the geo-political big boys of the day had, and reckoned that Korea was a cracking colonial candidate. China found such ambitions on Korea irksome and a war kicked off. Said war was an absolute cakewalk for the Japanese, as they'd spent a fortune modernising their military, while the Qing had spent over two centuries neglecting theirs.\n\nQing Emperor Zaitian then proceeded to bend himself over a barrel and tell Japanese Emperor Mutsuhito he can do what he likes just please stop the fighting. Mutsuhito proceeded to make Korea 'independent,' i.e., start marking it as a vassal under his control, and seized control of Taiwan as a cheeky little bonus prize; because why not at that point — what's Zaitian going to do to stop him?\n\nWhen Japan's control of Taiwan formally began in 1895, following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, it did what most aspiring Imperial powers do when they get their hands on their first colonies: go **really** overboard with its efforts to try and make it a model colony.\n\nThis saw huge investment in infrastructure, agriculture, and industry, both to exploit its resources with maximum efficiency, but also to better control it. Take the agricultural investment for example: this, of course, earned the Japanese plenty of money, but as lots of this investment was geared towards industrial scale production of 'cash crops' such as fruits and tea, they were also making Taiwan dependent upon Japan for its basic foods and goods. And isn't the prospect of a rebellion suddenly all the harder when Japan has its hand on the food faucet, and will happily close it at the first sign of violence?\n\nIt's a similar story with the infrastructure investment: sure, new roads are primarily built to expedite industrial production, but should the Taiwanese get any funny ideas about independence, those exact same roads will also allow the Imperial Japanese Army a much easier time of marching in to put it down.\n\nNote, this was nothing unique to Japan; it's exactly what the Europeans did when going into Africa, Asia, and the Americas — build systems that both made colonies more profitable, and easier to control.\n\nBeyond that however, another vital medium of colonial control is manufacturing popular consent, i.e., making your subjects love you, or even better, making them think they **are** you, thus reducing the chances of rebellion to near nil — something that the Chinese Qing before the Japanese were **very** aware of as we know, as much as they largely failed to ever pull it off.\n\nTo try and achieve this, the Japanese introduced a comprehensive education system, one that naturally mandated Japanese language and values while marginalizing Chinese cultural elements. For example, schools taught Japanese history and promoted Shinto practices, with the goal of fostering loyalty to the Japanese emperor. The Japanese also implemented policies to suppress traditional Chinese customs, such as foot-binding, and encouraged the adoption of Japanese attire and lifestyles.\n\nThis wasn't the Taiwanese's first rodeo however, and so, many secretly retained their cultural identity, showing up and coming generations how things were **really** to be done behind closed doors when they were away from the prying ears of the Japanese authorities. Some, such as Tang Jing Song, the last Qing Governor of Taiwan, even started armed resistance efforts against the Japanese, with Tang declaring the independent Republic of Formosa in 1895. Such efforts were short-lived and unsuccessful however, with the aforementioned Republic of Formosa lasting a mere 151 days before being crushed by the Japanese.\n\nAs in any colony however, some Taiwanese rolled with the changes, adapted to the new order, and decided to toe the line — making full use of the new opportunities even if it meant surrendering their identity in the process.\n\nAs a result of this mixed response from the populace, the Japanese found themselves with a Taiwan more subjugated than the Qing's ever managed to achieve, but one which by no means had fully surrendered itself under the crushing weight of their boot.\n\nThen, after a few decades of this new status quo, WWII broke out, which would go on to have a substantial effect on Taiwan: its men were conscripted, its factories and workers were pushed to breaking point, and its natural resources were stripped bare. Then, as if that wasn't bad enough, as the war progressed and things started to go badly for Japan, food shortages, inflation, and collapsing living standards became the norm.\n\nBut before we can begin explaining the fallout and consequences, we must head back to the Chinese Mainland in the year 1912, because there, something truly epoch-defining happened — something that you **must** know about in order for Taiwan's post-WWII history to make sense: 2,132 years of Imperial Rule came to an end.\n\nThe end of Imperial China was precipitated by a combination of internal strife and external pressures. Internally, corruption, inefficiency, and inability to reform plagued the Qing administration, and externally, they faced relentless pressure from foreign powers, resulting in humiliating defeats and unequal treaties that eroded national sovereignty and fostered widespread resentment; think the loss of Hong Kong to the British in 1841, the loss of Qingdao to the Germans in 1898, and you get the idea.\n\nAs a result of all of that, China went into the 20th century a powder keg ready to blow — and the spark that set it off would be the start of the Wuchang Uprising on the 10th of October 1911. That particular uprising was a small-scaled thing; 12,000 troops battling it out across all sides, but it was a battle that the Qing lost — and with the momentum of victory the uprising soon snowballed into the full blown Xinhai Revolution, at the head of which sat a fella you might have heard of by the name of Sun Yat Sen, who led the nationalist Guomindang (GMD) party. This rebellion was successful, and Qing rule formally came to an end when Puyi, the last Emperor, formally abdicated on the 12th of February 1912, and with that, Imperial China became the Republic of China (ROC), under the leadership of the GMD.\n\nWell, it was **kind of** under the leadership of the GMD anyway, because what actually followed the formation of the Republic was two **very** difficult decades for Sun Yat Sen, and his eventual successor Chiang Kai-shek. Here's the CliffsNotes version:\n\nChina falls apart following the end of Qing rule, and Warlords, most of whom were Qing Army officers who just didn't disband their forces, carve the country up amongst themselves. The GMD takes until 1928 putting them all down and reunifying China. Then, just as that's nearly done, in 1927, oh no, Communism! Mao Zedong and his mates appear, rifles in hand, screaming something about \"From each according to his ability\" and the Chinese Civil War begins. As the Civil War is raging, the Japanese, having long since gone a tad overboard with the whole Empire building thing, invade China in 1937; Chiang and Mao then kiss and make up temporarily, mutually agreeing that killing each other can wait in favour of killing the Japanese. Two atomic bombs convince Japan to give its Empire building up as a bad job. Chiang and Mao remember they despise each other, and the killing begins afresh from August 1945 in the second stage of the Chinese Civil War.\n\nAnd with that explanation of wider events complete, Taiwan now comes back into the story, because the culmination of that second stage of the Civil War is basically what creates the situation as it stands today.\n\nYou see, as you no doubt guessed from the whole China still being Communist today thing, Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD lost the Civil War, specifically in December 1949.\n\nThe loss was the result of a combination of strategic errors, internal corruption, and the effective tactics of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Chiang's leadership was inflexible and often ineffective, with poor strategic decisions during key battles such as the Huaihai Campaign of November 1948 through to January 1949, which he lost, badly, and as a result lost control of **huge** swathes of land north of the Yangtze River and suffered over half a **million** casualties in the process.\n\nAdditionally, his reluctance to delegate authority stifled the ROC's ability to respond swiftly to changing battlefield conditions, something which again is demonstrated by the Huaihai Campaign, where his insistence on maintaining direct control over military operations created slow responses and constant missed opportunities, which led to Communist forces, which were of significantly lower quality on paper thanks to the **vast** amount of military hardware that the US funnelled to Chiang, outmanoeuvring and crushing him at every turn.\n\nThen there was the corruption. Nationalist soldiers were often poorly fed and paid after their leaders siphoned resources off for themselves, resulting in low morale and high desertion rates. In stark contrast, the Communist forces were highly motivated and dedicated to their cause, benefiting from better organization and morale. The Nationalist government also failed to gain widespread public support, suffering from economic mismanagement that led to hyperinflation and widespread poverty. This eroded public confidence in the ROC, while the Communists, through land reforms and policies appealing to the rural population, garnered significant grassroots support.\n\nSoviet support also played a crucial role in the Communist victory, because just as how the US was backing Chiang, they too were supporting Mao, providing him with military equipment and strategic guidance, which bolstered their capabilities and sustained their military campaigns. Note, it was **way** less than the Nationalists were receiving however — and thus this would have been but a moot point were it not for Chiang's ungodly incompetence in managing his own military effort.\n\nAs a result of this catastrophic defeat, Chiang, senior ROC leadership, over two million soldiers, and many **many** more civilians made for Taiwan over the course of four months, as it stood unmolested as last bastion of Nationalist control in China. This plan had been intended to be a short-lived one, with Chiang planning to regroup and re-equip his forces, before returning to reconquer the Mainland with a plan he called 'Project National Glory.'\n\nBut that never happened, and equally, neither did the People's Liberation Army Navy, the Communist Navy, ever appear over the horizon carrying a vast amphibious force that would land on Taiwan and deliver the final killing blow to the ROC. Instead, a stalemate broke out. Chiang had by far the better navy, and would have had no problems at pushing the Communist Navy aside and plonking his troops back down on the Mainland, but in the inverse, while the Communist Navy was frankly laughable, and could never hope to land on Taiwan, their vast indomitable peasant army was legitimately terrifying, and would have had no bother at all stamping out any attempted landing that Chiang attempted.\n\nIt took Chiang quite a while to accept this fact, as he did suffer from quite the perishing ego complex, but when he did, he took the only option that was open to him: keep on making noises about reclamation, but secretly, just be glad that he had **any** land left to govern at all, count his blessings, and make the most of it.\n\nThis saw him do two things: firstly, spend, spend, **spend** on defence, turning Taiwan into an island so unassailable, that it didn't matter what the Communists got up to; Taiwan would remain his, and secondly, to attempt to 'Chinese-ify' the island's populace, which, as we have discussed in depth, was far from homogeneous or indigenous at that point — even with the enormous Chinese influx at the end of the Civil War.\n\nThis saw his government enforce the use of Mandarin as the official language, which aimed to replace Japanese, which was still a dominant language thanks to 50 years of only recently ended Japanese colonisation, as well as indigenous languages. Further still, the speaking of both was also strictly outlawed in official settings such as government offices, schools, military installations, and the like.\n\nHe then set about renaming everything, with the names of streets, a lot of which had been either built or changed during the Japanese occupation being a particular point of focus. For example, Tōkō Street in Taoyuan City became Sun Yat Sen Street, Jinsen Road in Taipei became Ren'ai Road, after the Confucian virtue of co-humanity, and Shōwa Road, also in Taipei, became Xinyi Road, roughly meaning 'faithfulness' or 'integrity.'\n\nHe also massively shook-up education and cultural policies, mandating a Chinese-centric curriculum that emphasised Chinese history, culture, and Confucian values and more broadly mandating traditional Chinese customs, festivals, and practices.\n\nTaiwan's Chinese population, both that which arrived before and after the Civil War were naturally chuffed to bits with this, but the indigenous population was far more reluctant to embrace the changes. Not only because of the obvious erosion of their own culture that these policies were a harbinger to, but because they were also **very** much aware of what Chiang's government was capable of when its ire was invoked.\n\nTake the 'February 28th Massacre' for example, which began on the titular day in 1947 — back when Taiwan was just an afterthought in the ROC's mind; merely one of many territories it controlled, and thus was far from being its main focus. It started in Taipei, when Officers of the State Monopoly Bureau, in what can only be described as a blood frenzy, struck down and savagely beat an indigenous widow they suspected of selling illegal cigarettes, before they then turned their guns on the gathered crowd, which, naturally, was none too happy about their conduct to put it mildly.\n\nOne among the crowd was killed outright, and many more were wounded, so naturally, in response, a protest began to assemble, which the GMD police forces fired on without hesitation, thus beginning a crescendo of violence which would see potentially as many as 28 **thousand** protestors killed come its conclusion on the 16th of May.\n\nBut the indigenous population weren't the only ones who learned from the Massacre, so did the GMD, and they'd be damned if they were going to allow such a situation arise again — lest they find themselves pushed out of the last bastion of their control by an insurrection from within.\n\nThus began the period known as the 'White Terror,' which began with the declaration of Martial Law on the 19th of May 1949, just as GMD forces began trickling over to Taiwan when it became clear their defeat in the Civil War was imminent. Ultimately, it would go on to last just shy of 40 years, not coming to an end until the 15th of July 1987; when that martial law was finally lifted — and during that time, the government enjoyed full and sweeping powers to arrest, detain, and execute individuals without due process.\n\nThe fear of communist infiltration was used to justify extensive surveillance and the creation of a vast network of informants and secret police, tasked with rooting out subversive activities. This network extended into all aspects of Taiwanese society, from urban centres to rural communities, ensuring that the government's presence was felt everywhere.\n\nArrests were also often arbitrary, and those detained were frequently subjected to brutal interrogation methods to extract confessions. The lack of transparency and judicial oversight meant that many were imprisoned or executed based on dubious charges or coerced admissions of guilt. Trials, when they occurred, were conducted by military tribunals that operated without the standards of fairness or impartiality found in civilian courts.\n\nCensorship was another cornerstone of the White Terror. The government exercised tight control over the media, educational institutions, and cultural outputs. Publications that did not align with the GMD were banned, and authors, journalists, and academics who expressed dissenting views were silenced through intimidation, imprisonment, or sometimes just good old-fashioned murder.\n\nUltimately, when all was said and done, the White Terror saw over 140,000 people imprisoned and as many as 4,000 executed.\n\nBut then, in this period, when liberty and freedom in Taiwan stood at an all-time low, its economy started to do well, like, **really** well, in a period that economists now call the 'Taiwan Miracle.' This period of rapid economic growth transformed Taiwan from an agrarian society into a major global industrial power. Economists seem reluctant to place 'exact' dates on it, for some reason, so if you're wondering about a timeframe, call it the '1960s-1990s' and you'll be about right.\n\nThe groundwork for this transformation was laid by a combination of favourable government policies, strategic economic planning, and a highly motivated and educated workforce.\n\nIt began when the GMD implemented significant land reforms, ones aimed at breaking up large landholdings and redistributing land to tenant farmers. This effectively doubled the land ownership among Taiwanese farmers, which not only alleviated rural poverty, but also created a new class of new money middle-class entrepreneurs, all eager to keep the financial ball rolling and weigh their pots of gold down even further. Bizarrely too, the former landowners actually ended up better off for it as well, as they were **handsomely** compensated by the government for their loss of land, and so, with agriculture now being a no-go for them, where did they put their cash? That's right, **industry**.\n\nThus, like a lottery winner that avoids the hedonistic delights that lay within the Ferrari dealership, Taiwan, from top to bottom, was now a country that had come into a bit of cash and was doing the smart thing with it.\n\nTaiwan initially focused on labour-intensive industries such as textiles and electronics, which leveraged the island's abundant and relatively cheap labour force, with the government also encouraging export-oriented production. This strategy was supported by the establishment of export processing zones, which provided tax incentives and infrastructure to attract foreign investment and further boost exports.\n\nThis then lifted the situation of the Taiwanese worker too, just like the newly minted middle-class farmer and former landowner turned industrialists before them.\n\nEager to keep this ball rolling, the GMD, with all the juicy juicy tax revenue that this boom created, then started investing **heavily** in education — compulsory education was extended to nine years in length, and then 12 years, on par with advanced western economies, and furthermore, an emphasis on technical and vocational training was also made. This ensured a steady supply of skilled workers who could meet the demands of a rapidly industrializing economy, and Taiwan only got richer still as a result.\n\nSo successful was Taiwan's economy, that come the 1990s, just after the end of the White Terror, it had emerged as one of the \"Four Asian Tigers,\" alongside South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong — all of which were defined by rapid industrialization, high growth rates, and significant increases in living standards. For Taiwan, its GDP grew at an average annual rate of pushing 9 percent from the 1960s to the 1990s.\n\nAnd how do you think the new, richer and better educated Taiwan felt about the whole martial law slash dictatorship business? Yep — they were none too chuffed about it to say the least, and so, as Taiwan did ever better, momentum in favour of democratising and liberalising Taiwan was steadily building.\n\nThese sentiments would come to a head with the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979, which saw pro-democracy activists organizing a rally to commemorate Human Rights Day. The government's harsh response, including mass arrests and the prosecution of leading dissidents, drew widespread condemnation both domestically and internationally. This event served as a catalyst for the burgeoning democracy movement, galvanizing support and highlighting the need for political reform.\n\nChiang Ching-kuo, who (eventually) succeeded his father Chiang Kai-shek as President in 1978 following his death in 1975 could see clear as day that the current way of doing things was unsustainable, and with his only other option being to clamp down **big** style as his father had when he first retreated to the island, which he **really** did not have the political capital within the GMD to do, he chose instead to begin winding down authoritarian rule, allowing greater individual political freedoms, which resulted in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), an ever so left of centre nationalist party, being formed to become Taiwan's first ever opposition party.\n\nFrom there democratisation carried on a steady peace. Martial Law was lifted on the 15th of July 1987 after 38 long years, which was then followed by Taiwan's first **ever** free election on the 22nd of December 1991. It was an election for Taiwan's then highest legislature, the National Assembly, and with a voter turnout of 68.3% returned a stonking victory for the GMD, who secured 254 out of 325 seats, with 66 of the rest being taken by the DPP, and the final five being split between three seats which went to the Democratic Non-Partisan Alliance, a coalition of non-affiliated independents, and two pure independents.\n\nThis was then followed by the first free Presidential Election in 1991, which with a voter turnout of 76% saw the incumbent Lee Teng-hui, who had originally been installed as president by the GMD following Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988, retain the position after winning 54% of the vote.\n\nIt's hard to say **exactly** when Taiwan actually became a true democracy, if for no other reason than the fact that such a thing is **very** subjective, with us all having our own personal metrics on how many democratic processes a state has to have to be considered an outright democracy; but while the nitty gritty pedantries are up for debate — what is irrefutable is that in 1979, during the Kaohsiung Incident, Taiwan was blatantly **not** a democracy, and when Lee returned to the presidential big chair with a freely elected mandate, at the head of a freely elected legislature, it absolutely was.\n\nSince then, power has basically just rotated between the GMD and the DPP, with them both having marked differences in their attitudes to the Mainland, although, do note that these are just general trends; they are both enormous bureaucracies, and therefore individual opinions from members, employees, and candidates do vary somewhat — albeit within a general overarching bracket.\n\nOf the two, the DPP is the far more hardline when it comes to Taiwanese sovereignty, making no apologies for emphasising and fighting to protect the island's distinct identity. They outright reject Beijing's claims over the island and argue that the only people who should determine its future should be its current citizens; citizens who have seen fit to award them the presidency since 2016, with the election of Tsai Ing-wen that year, and later the election of Lai Ching-te in 2024.\n\nIn contrast, the GMD, rather ironically given their history, advocates for closer ties with Beijing, emphasizing dialogue and economic cooperation to ensure peace and stability. Note however, they do **not** support unification, but instead are better considered as 'status-quo-ists,' sorts who are quite partial to what Taiwan already has going on and believe that engaging economic and diplomatically with Beijing will help to reduce the risk of conflict, and as a result, armed regime change in Taiwan. As for when they've held power, they controlled the free presidency from the end of the dictatorial period, as we have already said, through to 2000, at which point the presidential reins were handed to the DPP for eight years via Chen Shui-bian, flipped back to them for another eight under Ma Ying-jeou, before returning to DPP from 2016 to the present day, as we just discussed.\n\nAnd that, pretty much, is the full story of how the current situation in Taiwan came to be. So, now that we know how it was created, let's now explore the current situation in more depth — starting with Taiwan's perspective on it all.\n\n## Taipei's Perspective\n\nIn trying to understand modern Taiwan's perspective on the situation, it is vital to understand that Taiwan doesn't **exactly** consider itself Chinese anymore, kind of, allow us to explain. It **is** still called the Republic of China, is made up of 95% ethnic Han Chinese citizens, and Chinese dialects are still **the** dominant languages, but such considerations are only surface level, and in reality, there is far more nuance and complexity to modern Taiwanese identity than just the flavour of blood pumping through its citizens' veins.\n\nFortunately for us today however, we have some cracking hard data we can use to help explain this to you, because the matter of identity is **very** heavily researched and documented in Taiwan. As for exactly how well documented, an answer to that question comes from Hsin-I Sydney Yueh, an Associate Professor of Communication Studies at Northeastern State University, who wrote the following in an October 2020 paper titled *What is Taiwanese identity*:\n\n> \"No country conducts surveys on its people's identity as frequently as Taiwan. Since 1992, the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in Taiwan has been recording changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity every year. The reports tell us how many people identify themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both. In addition, similar surveys of Taiwanese identity have been conducted by many poll centers, especially during election years.\"\n\nSo, just what do these comprehensive surveys tell us?\n\nWell, interestingly, they show that a major point of contention in Taiwan is not the matter of GMD vs CPC allegiances as you may first imagine it, but actually between being 'Chinese, but not Communist,' and being 'Taiwanese' as its own unique identity, quoting Yueh's paper again:\n\n> \"Since the first direct presidential election in 1996, every such election in Taiwan has witnessed identity politics between the Republic of China … and Taiwan. Although the name (Republic of China, ROC) has been rejected by the international community due to the One China policy, a great number of Taiwanese still regard (that) name as part of their national identity. However, this ROC identity should not be mistakenly interpreted as an acceptance of the unification proposed by the People's Republic of China (PRC). In fact, Taiwanese people's hostility toward the PRC reached a new peak in 2020, as did the number of pro-Taiwan independence supporters. This is a sign that Taiwanese people have gradually alienated themselves from a Chinese national identity … Taiwanese people have formed a consensus that they are citizens of an independent country that has achieved autonomy and democracy in the past two decades.\"\n\nBut if a new 'Taiwanese' national identity is beginning to form separate from the Communist versus Republican binary of old, what **exactly** do people who buy into this view see themselves as?\n\nWell, that, in a nutshell, can best be surmised as the whole lot of Taiwan's demographics being chucked in a pot and mixed together: a new cultural perspective made out of equi-parts Chinese and Indigenous ways of doing things, that come together to make something truly unique.\n\nAs for how this unique cultural brew manifests in the real world, Yueh explains that by highlighting three key ways, the first of which is a move away from the use of Chinese as the national language:\n\n> \"In 2018 … Congress passed a bill that legally defines all the languages used in Taiwan as national languages. (Which) shows the government's efforts to promote linguistic diversity and eliminate language-based discrimination. Although such linguistic justice arrived late, the teaching and promotion of mother tongues are now encouraged without restrictions. A recent achievement can be found in the 2020 Golden Melody Award, a reputed music award in Taiwan: The music album 'Kinakaian' (mother tongue), created by the indigenous musician Aljenljeng Tjaluvie in Paiwan, won the Best Album Award among 21 albums across different language categories … Getting on a Metro train in Taipei … passengers will (now) hear the station names broadcast in four different languages, namely Taiwan Mandarin, Taiwan Hokkien, Hakka, and English.\"\n\nThe next way that Yueh highlights is through the evolution of a unique Taiwanese culinary culture:\n\n> \"Taiwanese national identity is (also) shaped by a rich and innovative food culture. For instance, bubble tea is consumed as a nostalgic symbol by many overseas Taiwanese students in California, USA. This Taiwanese invention … (has) unexpectedly become an identity symbol for many Asian Americans. Moreover, similar tea cultures facilitate international friendships and recognition. The Milk Tea Alliance was formed in April 2020 when Thai netizens and Chinese netizens triggered an Internet war over a famous Thai actor. Netizens from Taiwan and Hong Kong supported Thais, not only because they were all milk tea consumers, but also because they had developed a shared anti-Beijing political view. Later in 2020, Indian netizens joined the alliance because of their border dispute with China.\"\n\nYueh then moves on from the international dimension, and goes on to explain how Taiwan's culinary cuisine affects things domestically:\n\n> \"In recent years, Taiwan's netizens have developed parodic discourses about food, and deliberately caused heated debates. They argue over which night market sells the best fried chicken steak; which way is most authentic to make a zongzi, youfan, or bawan; which city has the poorest cuisine culture; or which city has the sweetest drinks. Taiwan's netizens from the North to the South enthusiastically participate in the domestic Internet wars. The mentioning of all the small shops and local food stands accumulates a collective cultural map, which is a fast way to establish a Taiwanese national identity.\"\n\nYueh then discusses the third aspect that has helped to foster a unique Taiwanese culture: politics. But not in a \"yeah we're not Communist\" way, an aspect, which, of course, has been present in Taiwan since all the way back in 1949, but more in the unique quirks and features of how democracy is done on the island — something that, naturally, has only been able to develop recently given when totalitarianism was toppled:\n\n> \"Taiwanese politicians tend to exaggerate when expressing their emotions in public. For example, unlike a solemn apology, which is often seen as the norm in press conferences in the United States, a public apology in Taiwan might involve tears, kneeling down, wailing, and other affective performances. This emphasis on one's helplessness, vulnerability, and powerlessness in such public performances is somehow expected or even encouraged by the viewers. For many Taiwanese, showing one's soft side is a way to shorten the distance and arouse others' empathy and compassion.\"\n\nShe then goes on to offer insight into this matter, discussing the 'cutesy' aspect of Taiwanese politics:\n\n> \"… Cute elements have been installed as part of political campaigning since the 1998 Taipei mayoral election. This trend of cuteness can be found in the 2020 presidential election as well. All of the first-round candidates launched cartoon personified stickers for social media. They also designed cute and humorous campaigning commodities that aimed to affectively appeal to young voters. The constant use of cute commodities in the campaigns increases the candidates' image of approachability. Through the consumption of the commodities, political participation has become a fun game and an easy everyday practice for Taiwanese voters. This underexplored field in Taiwan's politics and democracy reveals a unique mode of political participation that facilitates the formation of Taiwanese identity.\"\n\nThrough Yueh's paper then, which was **very** well received when published, it is evident that a unique Taiwanese identity certainly does exist. But just in the spirit of intellectual rigor, let's also dig into what another paper on the matter has to say — lest we end up rendering our conclusions today in a vacuum. Specifically, let us take a look at *The Evolution of a Taiwanese National Identity*, published by Gang Lin, a program associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center's Asia Program back in 2003.\n\nAnd if you're concerned about the age of this one, don't worry, we picked an older paper to show you here specifically because that leap in time adds wider context, for example:\n\n> \"Culturally, an ethnic division between native Taiwanese and those who came from the mainland during the 1940s has arisen because of their different historical experiences and even their languages. Politically, the two ethnic groups tend to have different ideas about the future relationship (unification vs. independence) between Taiwan and mainland China. In recent years, the growth of a new and inclusive Taiwanese identity, as well as education and intermarriages, has helped reduce cultural cleavage between ethnic groups. Many Taiwanese people now define themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese.\"\n\nThrough this, we can specifically pinpoint the beginning of contemporary 'Taiwanese-ness,' for want of a better term, as opposed to just 'Chinese, but not Communist,' to the late 1990s and early 2000s.\n\nUnlike Yueh however, Gang takes the time to delve into more of the **why** of the matter as opposed to just the **what**:\n\n> \"… a sense of identity apart from that of mainland China has existed in Taiwan for more than a century. While 50 years of Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945) contributed to the development of distinct habits and attitudes of the Taiwanese people, the arrival of the (GMD) government and its ill-disciplined soldiers from the mainland quickly disillusioned native Taiwanese. The traumatic February 28 incident, when thousands of Taiwanese were slaughtered by the (GMD) military, left searing memories in the consciousness of native residents, and became the first marker in the development of a modern Taiwanese identity.\"\n\nFrom there, Gang goes on to explain further how this modern identity developed:\n\n> \"Despite … Chiang Kai-shek's efforts at culturally redefining Taiwan's inhabitants as Chinese, a spontaneous movement of literary nativization by a group of indigenous writers emerged in the 1960s …. the 1979 Kaohsiung incident, resulting from a mass demonstration and (GMD) crackdown, was (also) another marker in the evolution of a Taiwanese identity.\"\n\nAccording to Gang however, there was one little development that changed it all, and started to bring these groups together as a unified cultural front: Democracy:\n\n> \"Taiwan's democratization in 1986 has accelerated the development of a new and more inclusive national identity on the island ... Under the leadership of … President Lee Teng-hui, a memorial to the victims of the February 28 incident was built in Taipei, and a 'new Taiwanese' identity began to incorporate those residents coming from the mainland in the late 1940s as well as their offspring. While a separate Taiwanese identity has continued to develop under the Chen Shui-bian administration … its specific definition might be changed in the future.\"\n\nBut while Gang's work is certainly useful for helping to both confirm and expand upon what we saw earlier from Yueh, that last little comment of his, the one about the specific definition of Taiwanese identity being malleable serves as a handy segue into something **very** important that we need to make clear.\n\nTaiwan, fundamentally, is an island, country, whatever you want to call it, of individuals, all with their own separate thoughts, ideas, and impetuses into action. Therefore, as much as 'New Taiwanese-ism' is something critical for us to understand, we must not make the mistake of assuming that it is a cultural identity that **all** of them buy into… because of course they don't — you won't find a **single** nation on earth with citizens who all think in lockstep.\n\nTo demonstrate this, consider the pro-Beijing camp in Taiwan, which, while tiny, absolutely exists. But rather than considering this angle through academic papers, let's instead put a human face on this, and pick out a specific Taiwanese citizen who holds this position: Harry Chen, a retired businessman who firmly believes that Taiwan is still a part of China, and that the island would be much better if it gave autonomy up as a bad job, and agreed to be integrated into China as a province, saying the following:\n\n> \"What normal people want in life is good living, peace and happiness. People who want independence, that's bullsh*t — they're lying to themselves.\"\n\nTo him, and others who share his opinion, all of whom notably tend to be on the older end of the age slider, unification with the mainland simply offers a better standard of life for all in Taiwan.\n\nBut while it is important to note that pro-unifiers such as Chen exist, don't make the mistake of overthinking the popularity of the position, because as we have already said, it's… 'niche,' to say the least, as demonstrated by polling data. For example, in 2023, the National Chengchi University Election Study Center found that immediate unification was only 1.2% in 2023, and another from 2024 found that 87.4% of respondents preferred to maintain some form of the status quo regarding cross-strait relations. Similarly, a Pew Research Center poll in January 2024 revealed that 67% of Taiwanese identify as primarily Taiwanese, 28% as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and only 3% as primarily Chinese… not exactly great figures for the pro-Beijing camp.\n\nThis is reflected in electoral results too. Take the People First Party, which, having been founded in the year 2000 by James Soong, who while running as an independent Presidential candidate that same year, prior to the party's foundation, advocated for a gradual union between Taiwan and the Mainland by first signing a non-aggression pact, and eventually forming a cross strait union similar to the European Union, which lead to his party being commonly perceived as a pro-unification one… it currently has a whopping zero seats in the legislature, zero municipal mayors, zero city mayors, zero magistrates, and a mere two councillors… out of a total of 912.\n\nSo yeah, fair to say that between its blossoming unique identity, and its complete rejection of the idea at the polls, Taiwan isn't exactly chomping at the bit to unify with the Mainland.\n\n## Beijing's Perspective\n\nAs for Beijing's perspective on it all, well, as most of you will no doubt be aware from the news, Beijing is quite keen to get its hands on Taiwan, but how do they justify this claim, and above all else, what have they done, and what are they doing, to make it a reality?\n\nUltimately, it is important to note that we don't know **the** reason, and likely, there isn't even a single motivation anyway — the Chinese State is an **enormous** entity, and therefore there exists an enormous plethora of individual opinions within it, although, naturally, they are all within the same ballpark of one another, at least as publicly expressed.\n\nFor an outline of the 'general' position, let's turn to none other than the big man himself, Xi Jinping, and his musings on the topic in *The Governance of China, Volumes 1 – 4*, a published amalgamation of his major works from the 15th of November 2012 to the 13th of June 2014, including speeches, talks, interviews, instructions, and personal correspondences.\n\nHe begins by establishing his view that Taiwan is indeed 'Chinese,' something that, as we have seen at length, isn't **really** the case no matter how many Chinese characters are written all over the gaff:\n\n> \"Due to history and present circumstances, there are many thorny problems for the moment between our two sides, but this will pass … the people on both sides of the Straits are one family with shared blood, culture, bonds, and aspirations, all of which serve as an important force for promoting our mutual understanding and common progress.\"\n\nHe then goes on to explain this further:\n\n> \"I am impressed by our compatriots in Taiwan for their worship of the ancestors, their love for the homeland, and their honesty, frankness, diligence and hard work. The closeness between us is rooted in our blood, our history and culture. We all believe that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are members of one Chinese nation, and we all inherit and pass on Chinese culture. During the 50 years when Taiwan was occupied by the Japanese aggressors, our fellow Taiwanese maintained a strong sense of national consciousness and deep feelings for Chinese culture, regarding themselves first and foremost as members of the Chinese nation. Such consciousness and feelings are inherent and natural, and can never be erased.\"\n\nFrom there, and make extra special note of this because it's a **big** point, he goes on to discuss unification, claiming that it is something he only wishes to achieve peacefully:\n\n> \"The Chinese mainland is strong in its resolution and clear in its policies and principles for peaceful development on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. We will maintain the continuity of our fundamental strategy towards Taiwan, continue to implement effective policies, and keep moving our relations forward so as to bring benefits to the people on both sides. The Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits should strengthen solidarity and cooperation, and jointly work towards realizing the Chinese Dream, a great renewal of the Chinese nation.\"\n\nAnd if you're after an explicit denunciation of Taiwanese independence, here it is from later on in the book:\n\n> \"Forces and activities for 'Taiwan independence' remain a real threat to the peace of the Taiwan Straits. It is therefore incumbent upon us to oppose and contain any rhetoric or move for 'Taiwan independence' without any compromise.\"\n\nAnd although that is as explicit as he gets in saying it in the book, notice how in that extract he puts the onus on Taiwan as the aggressor in the current situation? We'll come back to analyse that claim later.\n\nLet's stay on the matter of a potential unification for now however, as Xi also outlines how he would see such a process as happening, or again, at least how he claims to:\n\n> \"The framework of the concept is: Under the premise of national reunification, the mainland keeps practicing socialism, while Taiwan … retain(s) their original capitalist system and ways of life for a long time while enjoying a high degree of autonomy.\"\n\nHere he is referring to the 'One Country, Two Systems' model, which has already been applied in both Hong Kong and Macao, following their handovers in 1997 and 1999, by the UK and Portugal respectively. In a nutshell, this model gives the incoming territory autonomy to act as a 'proto-nation' of sorts, with its own passports, border controls, laws, currency, police forces, etc., basically **everything** except defence, and naturally, Beijing ultimately retains a veto over the whole lot.\n\nFurthermore, officially at least, this model also has a time limit, with both Hong Kong and Macao being given a 50-year time from their handovers before 'integration' into the Mainland can be considered. In reality however, the model is likely to last as long as the CPC's regime does, because with Macao and Hong Kong both being **hugely** profitable gambling and financial centres respectively, specifically due to their devolved status, it would make absolutely no sense to fully integrate them — although note, most commentators expect them to, and believe they are, being 'Mainland-ified' within that base semi-autonomous framework.\n\nThe broader implications of this model, i.e. that there is only one sovereign state known as 'China,' of which the PRC is the legitimate ruler of, and any 'Chinese' entity that rejects that paradigm is a rogue element that needs to be brought to heel and back into the fold is known as the 'One China Principle' by the PRC.\n\nAnd now, with that established, let's rewind the tape a bit and take a moment to evidence the claim we opened this chapter with; that there is some slight difference in opinion within the CPC on the matter of Taiwan in the minutia, but that they all very much sing from the same general song sheet as one another, and to do that, we shall take a look at what some other Mainland officials have to say besides Xi Jinping.\n\nFirst there is Director of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, who maintains the same general \"unification is going to happen, but totally peacefully we swear\" attitude as Xi, as demonstrated by the following extract from a March 2024 press conference:\n\n> \"(Though) separation has no future, major powers should not confront each other, and the Cold War must not be revived.\"\n\nNext consider Wang Wenbin, who currently serves as a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who very much toes the party line and openly dismisses the role of democracy in deciding Taiwan's future, quoting a 2023 press conference:\n\n> \"Regardless of the results of Taiwan's elections, the basic fact that Taiwan is part of China will not change; the international community's prevailing consensus on the one-China principle will not change.\"\n\nThen there is Mao Ning, a Deputy Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — and yes, if you are wondering, supposedly there is a family connection to **that** Mao, but she has been scant on the details. Her tone is overall a bit more… fiery, than that of Xi, as demonstrated by the following, which she said in a press conference in January 2024:\n\n> \"The Taiwan issue is absolutely not a matter of democracy but a matter of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 'Taiwan independence' forces, under the guise of 'democracy,' are disguising their sinister intention to split the country, and their scheme is doomed to fail … Taiwan's return to China is an important part of the international order after World War II.\"\n\nGiven her role, she has also given more lip service to the international dimension of the debate than Xi has, saying the following in 2023:\n\n> \"The Taiwan issue is purely an internal affair of China, and no country has the right to interfere. We urge the US to adhere to the one-China principle and not send any wrong signals to the 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces.\"\n\nIn particular for her, invoking the One China Principle with foreign nations is a common tactic, as demonstrated by this quote from the January 2024 press conference again:\n\n> \"A total of 182 countries worldwide have established diplomatic relations with China based on the one-China principle. Nauru's decision to re-establish diplomatic ties with China and stand on the side of the international majority is a correct choice in its long-term interests and will open a brighter future for its development.\"\n\nTo Mao, having diplomatic relations with the PRC and not Taiwan is considered as, or at least used as, an endorsement of the PRC as the 'real' China and recognition of Taiwan as a 'rogue' breakaway state. For some nations, such as Russia or North Korea, this no doubt is **exactly** what they mean by this, but to claim it as a uniform instance — bit of a stretch isn't it. Take the US for example, do we **really** believe that they think the PRC is the legitimate Chinese government, what with all the sabre rattling between them, and the **enormous** arms sales to, and otherwise very cordial relations with, Taiwan? Or do we simply think that they **have** to acknowledge the PRC, at least formally, in order to keep the growing power sweet and maintain access to its dirt-cheap factories?\n\nBut there is a problem with the mostly peaceful rhetoric of the CPC: its actions display a clear willingness to actively plan for and consider military solutions. To demonstrate this point, let's take one month, specifically April 2023, and take a look at just how many military exercises and activities the PRC carried out around Taiwan in that month.\n\nAnd how many do you think there were? Just how many could the PRC fit into a mere 30 days?\n\nAccording to 'China Power Project,' an affiliate of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a nonprofit policy research organization, there were a whopping 84. You didn't misread that, 84 whole incidents in a single month.\n\nAnd to show you the kind of thing included in that number, among it are relatively minor things such as a combined arms brigade under the PLA's 72nd Army Group holding amphibious assault exercises on the 4th of April in an undisclosed location, that in a press release were said as being conducted by, \"forces facing the island of Taiwan,\" all the way through to more major incidents such as a live fire exercise on the 8th of April that had 9 vessels and 71 aircraft taking part, with 45 of those aircraft crossing into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone. As for the live fire aspect of that operation, it came from a PLA amphibious landing ship that discharged live rounds just 30 miles northwest of the Matsu Islands. This operation too was specifically cited as being aimed at Taiwan, as it was, supposedly:\n\n> \"A serious warning against 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces' collusion and provocation with external forces, and a necessary action to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.\"\n\nAnd don't forget, these incidents are happening near as damn it **all** the time, so we think we are safe in saying we can take Beijing's claims about wanting to peacefully unify with a slight pinch of salt — we're sure they'd **want** to do it that way make no mistake, as it'd be cheaper, less bloody, and have **far** less international fallout, but the facts are, they clearly haven't ruled out the military option, and are getting ready to use it should they feel they have to.\n\nAnd that realisation presents us with just one last question we need to answer: will Beijing do it? Will they take the leap, push the proverbial big red button, and try to take Taiwan by force?\n\n## Will Beijing Do It?\n\nAlthough the question is **very** pertinent, it is, in some regards, one we shouldn't even entertain answering, purely because the ungodly number of variables at play make it one that is, despite what many pundits would have you believe, outright impossible to ever be able to answer with any degree of certainty.\n\nBut nonetheless, it is a question worth musing upon, if for no other reason than the fact that answering the question forces you to **really** consider the aforementioned variables, and so, despite producing an answer that will almost certainly be wrong, there is still some utility to be found by answering it — even if only to assist your wider considerations on the matter.\n\nAs for our two cents' worth on the matter, we would have to answer… **maybe**. Make no mistake, we certainly don't believe an invasion is imminent, partly because the PLA, despite its enormous efforts to modernise of late, simply isn't in a position to execute the operation with any degree of certainty at present, and also partly due to the fact that the international reaction, both in sanctions, which would devastate China's export-orientated economy, and in military response, which could easily escalate into a regional war, if not even a world war, simply makes the present risks to Beijing far too great to ever consider a military solution.\n\nThe key phrase there, however, was **present** risks. If the global order was to change, and say, a combination of an utterly absurd national debt and an increasingly polarised society caused the US to fracture and collapse, well, suddenly the odds would be looking a lot more favourable for Beijing, wouldn't they — particularly if that collapse was so great that key regional allies such as Japan and South Korea ended up being dragged down with it. Add a bit of nationalistic zeal and maybe a domestic crisis or two into the mix for which they would need a scapegoat, and maybe, just maybe, Beijing then would go for it — at least as we see it.\n\nBut that's just how we see it, and as we have already said, history will almost certainly prove us wrong — ultimately, only time will tell.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n\n- Taiwan's history of colonization and cultural blending has led to a unique identity.\n- Taiwan's democratic transition began with the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979.\n- Taiwan's economy flourished during the 'Taiwan Miracle' from the 1960s to the 1990s.\n- Beijing claims Taiwan as part of China, advocating for peaceful unification.\n- Military exercises by China indicate a willingness to consider forceful reunification.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What is the earliest evidence of human habitation in Taiwan?\n\nThe earliest evidence of human habitation in Taiwan dates back approximately 30,000 years, with the oldest material evidence being chipped stone tools from the Palaeolithic Changbin Culture, dated between five and 15 thousand years ago. Additionally, human remains such as the 'Liangdao Man' skeleton, found on one of Taiwan’s outlying islands, have been carbon dated to around 8,000 years old.\n\n### When did the Dutch establish their presence in Taiwan?\n\nThe Dutch East India Company established a permanent presence in Taiwan in 1624, constructing Fort Zeelandia and forming a colony out of all of Taiwan’s Southern Coast, which became known as The Governorate of Formosa.\n\n### What was the significance of Koxinga's conquest of Taiwan in 1661?\n\nKoxinga's conquest of Taiwan in 1661 was significant because it established the Kingdom of Tungning, which became a base of operations for continued resistance against the Qing Dynasty. Koxinga also focused on expanding Taiwan's economy, particularly in agriculture and deerskins, to fund his military efforts.\n\n### How did the Qing Dynasty eventually take control of Taiwan?\n\nThe Qing Dynasty took control of Taiwan in 1683 when Shi Lang, one of Koxinga's old admirals who had defected, led an invasion force of 300 warships and 20,000 soldiers. After defeating the Tungning Navy and marching to receive Zheng's surrender, Taiwan was formally integrated into the Chinese Empire as a prefecture of Fujian province in 1684.\n\n### What was the impact of Japanese rule on Taiwan's economy and society?\n\nJapanese rule from 1895 to 1945 saw significant investment in Taiwan's infrastructure, agriculture, and industry. The Japanese implemented policies to suppress traditional Chinese customs and encouraged the adoption of Japanese language and values, aiming to foster loyalty to the Japanese emperor. However, many Taiwanese secretly retained their cultural identity.\n\n### What was the February 28th Massacre and its significance?\n\nThe February 28th Massacre began on February 28, 1947, when officers of the State Monopoly Bureau beat an indigenous widow and fired on a gathered crowd, leading to widespread violence. The event resulted in potentially as many as 28,000 protestors killed and marked a turning point in Taiwanese resistance to GMD rule.\n\n### What was the 'White Terror' period in Taiwan?\n\nThe 'White Terror' period in Taiwan began with the declaration of Martial Law on May 19, 1949, and lasted until July 15, 1987. During this time, the government enjoyed full and sweeping powers to arrest, detain, and execute individuals without due process, leading to over 140,000 people imprisoned and as many as 4,000 executed.\n\n### What is the 'Taiwan Miracle' and when did it occur?\n\nThe 'Taiwan Miracle' refers to the period of rapid economic growth that transformed Taiwan from an agrarian society into a major global industrial power. This period occurred roughly from the 1960s to the 1990s and was characterized by significant land reforms, investment in education, and a focus on labour-intensive industries.\n\n### What is the 'One Country, Two Systems' model proposed by China for Taiwan?\n\nThe 'One Country, Two Systems' model proposes that under the premise of national reunification, the mainland would keep practicing socialism while Taiwan would retain its original capitalist system and ways of life for a long time while enjoying a high degree of autonomy. This model has been applied in Hong Kong and Macao.\n\n### What is the current perspective of Taiwanese people on unification with China?\n\nThe majority of Taiwanese people prefer to maintain the status quo regarding cross-strait relations. Polling data shows that only a small percentage support immediate unification, with most preferring to maintain Taiwan's autonomy and democracy. The pro-Beijing camp is relatively small and largely unpopular.\n\n## Sources\n\n- [Original Places video: Taiwan: Bastion of Democracy or Rogue State?](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EducBQP3o8Y)\n- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/11.24_%E5%89%AF%E7%B8%BD%E7%B5%B1%E8%88%87%E3%80%8C%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E6%9D%8E%E7%99%BB%E8%BC%9D%E4%B9%8B%E5%8F%8B%E6%9C%83%E3%80%8D%E6%9C%83%E9%95%B7%E6%B8%A1%E9%82%8A%E5%88%A9%E5%A4%AB%EF%BC%8C%E6%96%BC%E6%9C%83%E4%B8%AD%E4%BA%A4%E6%B5%81_%2830401835193%29.jpg) by 總統府 / openverse, by.\n\n## Related Coverage"
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datePublished: 2026-07-01
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  - name: Simon Whistler
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---

<!-- aeo:section start="lede" -->
When you think of Taiwan, what springs to mind? Do you imagine a 36,000 km² island country off the coast of China that unashamedly shines the torch for freedom and democracy, much to the chagrin of said neighbour, which is practically snarling and frothing at the mouth over the prospect of getting its hands on it, and snuffing that bright torch out? Or, do you picture a rogue separatist state that spits in the face of the island's rightful governors, and denies its citizens the joy of returning to the loving embrace of their motherland?

Whichever side you happen to fall on, the simple fact that such a dichotomy exists at all is nothing short of fascinating, and musing upon it naturally gets your noggin' joggin' and leaves you with a burning desire to know the full ins and outs of the peculiar situation in Taiwan. So, get comfy, because this is a long one, and let's begin.

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## Early History

Let us begin by delving into Taiwan's history and discovering 'why it is the way it is,' so to speak, and in the name of fastidiousness, let's take it back to the very beginning — prehistory to be precise.

Human habitation of Taiwan is currently believed to date back 30 or so thousand years, with the current oldest material evidence being chipped stone tools from the Palaeolithic Changbin Culture, dated between five and 15 thousand years ago, and human remains such as the 'Liangdao Man' skeleton, which was found on one of Taiwan's outlying islands, and has been carbon dated as being around 8,000 years old.

It is also known that around 3,000 BC, the Changbin Culture began to give way to the Neolithic Dapenkeng Culture, who developed early agriculture, cultivating both rice and millet, and also began to engage in local cross-cultural maritime trade, evident by the discovery of Taiwanese jade dated to this period in the Philippines. They also began making extensive use of pottery and earthenware, with it becoming something of a defining characteristic of the culture among scholars.

Eventually, the Dapenkeng Culture itself began to be succeeded by other cultures such as the Tahu and Yingpu, which continued to develop and advance the island's prehistoric society. These subsequent cultures introduced new technologies and practices, including more sophisticated pottery techniques and the use of metals. The Tahu Culture, for example, is noted for its distinct pottery styles and expanded agricultural practices, and the Yingpu Culture further advanced the use of metal tools and engaged in more complex social and trade networks.

As for when China first came into the picture, that's surprisingly hard to place. The *Zhu Fan Zhi*, or *A Description of Barbarian Nations, Records of Foreign People*, written in the 13th century AD by Zhao Rukuo refers to a place called 'Liuqiu,' which historians Friedrich Hirth and William Rockhill, writing in 1911, as well as Yang Bowen, writing in 1996, all agree refers to Taiwan. It also has some surprisingly in-depth commentary on Liuqiu's culture at the time, commenting on everything from fashion, to designs of arms and armour, through to taxation, cuisine, and the proliferation of banditry on the island — a valuable resource for certain if it is indeed Taiwan to which the text refers.

Around the same time Taiwan was also repeatedly visited by an explorer by the name of Wang Dayuan, and in 1349 he wrote the first **confirmed** account of a Chinese visit to the island. He goes into great detail in this account, discussing the topography, peoples, cultures, and technologies that he encountered. He does note one detail of interest: he found no Chinese settlers on Taiwan proper, but found many on Penghu, an archipelago of 90 islands 50 km off its west coast.

But while the date of first contact between China and Taiwan might be unclear, what is perfectly clear is that by the later Ming Dynasty, i.e., the early 16th century, an increasing number of Chinese fishermen, traders, and pirates were making the trip to Southwestern Taiwan, with these trips seemingly being frequent enough that traders from Fujian were able to pick up the indigenous Formosan languages — 'Formosan' being a Portuguese-derived term for the indigenous, non-Chinese cultures of Taiwan that arose from those earlier Neolithic and Palaeolithic cultures we just discussed.

But just why would a Portuguese-derived term be used to describe the natives of Taiwan? The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is colonialism, because in addition to receiving increasing attention from the Chinese in the 16th century, Taiwan also began to attract the attention of the Europeans. The Portuguese were the first to arrive in 1544, and they dubbed the island 'Formosa,' or 'Beautiful,' hence the term transforming into one used to denote those indigenous to the island. And just to be fastidious, while we 'have' to use the term Formosan to accurately explain the story of Taiwan, it is not one preferred by all, with some preferring 'Austronesian Taiwanese,' 'Taiwanese Aborigines,' 'Takasago People,' 'Gaoshan People,' or simply just 'Native Taiwanese' — just something to bear in mind as we continue.

Bringing it back to colonialism, however, 1624 saw the Dutch East India Company establish a permanent presence at Anping on Taiwan's Southwest Coast, constructing Fort Zeelandia and taking over and forming a colony out of all of Taiwan's Southern Coast, which became known as The Governorate of Formosa, and lasted through to 1668. While in control the Dutch attempted to convert the indigenous population to Christianity, founding schools to teach Romanized scripts of Formosan languages — chief among which was, naturally, the Bible.

Meanwhile, the Spanish, viewing the Dutch presence as a threat to their colony in the Philippines, established a settlement in northern Taiwan in 1626, building Fort San Salvador at Keelung. The Spanish settlement struggled with disease and resistance from indigenous groups however, and was eventually conquered and absorbed by the Dutch in 1642.

Though they only had another 26 years in control of Taiwan, the Dutch made one **big** choice that would go on to permanently affect the island's future: they encouraged Chinese immigration, particularly from Fujian, in order to boost their workforce, most notably in the areas of rice and sugarcane cultivation.

As for who booted them off of Taiwan, that would be Zheng Cheng Gong, better known as Koxinga, a Ming General, who following the dynasty's collapse in 1644, remained loyal, and invaded Taiwan in 1661 for two reasons: firstly, to use it as a base of operations for continued resistance against the Qing Dynasty, which had militarily won control of China in 1644, and secondly to expand the Chinese domain more generally, although he described it in the following, slightly dubious way:

> "Hitherto this island had always belonged to China, and the Dutch had doubtless been permitted to live there, seeing that the Chinese did not require it for themselves; but requiring it now, it was only fair that Dutch strangers, who came from far regions, should give way to the masters of the island."

If, upon hearing that, you find yourself bemused, as the Chinese then on Taiwan weren't **exactly** indigenous themselves, don't worry, you're not the only one to think that way.

And further still, if you also happen to currently be thinking to yourself "boy, history really is cyclical isn't it" after hearing the whole 'Taiwan becoming a holdout against a greater force that militarily conquered the Chinese Mainland' business, don't worry, you also aren't the only person to make that connection either.

Following his conquest, Koxinga began turning his 'Kingdom of Tungning,' as his rule over Taiwan would come to be known, into a real force for threatening the nascent Qing Dynasty back home. To do that however, he would need money, and so he took measures to significantly shore up Taiwan's economy, with particular focuses being agriculture, with both rice and sugarcane plantations being enormously expanded, and deerskins, for which the Japanese were always willing to pay handsomely.

And with that money he bought (literally) boatloads of Western guns, paid British artillery gurus to come over and train his troops, built a vast road network that could move his forces around quicker, and fortifications, so that they could fight more fiercely whence the Qing arrived.

Following Koxinga's death in 1662, his son Zheng Jing took up his mantle, and carried on with business as usual. Unfortunately, he was not the man his father was, and between internal strife he couldn't repress effectively, and an ever more fearsome Qing naval blockade that began to destroy his export-based economy, Taiwan began to fall to pieces.

The Qing, for their part, took their time before delivering the *coup de grâce*. They knew that the Ming holdout on the other side of the Taiwan Strait was spiralling down a pit of collapse from which he would never be able to pull himself out, and so they opted to wait until things were **really** bad over there before launching their attack.

Come the 8th of July 1683, that time had finally arrived, and the Qing despatched Shi Lang, one of Koxinga's old admirals who had defected back in 1646, to lead an invasion of Taiwan and stamp out the Kingdom of Tungning once and for all. He commanded a force of 300 warships and 20,000 soldiers, and quickly decimated the bulk of the Tungning Navy at the Battle of Penghu, which was won a mere seven days later. Then, it was a simple matter of putting his troops ashore, and after a short campaign, marching to receive Zheng's surrender, which was formally issued on the 3rd of October.

Following that, Taiwan was finally properly absorbed into China after (at least) three centuries of Chinese involvement and interest in it. History could have been very different however, as Emperor Xuanye actually didn't want to occupy Taiwan at first, believing that it would be an economic net negative to his Empire. He was however, eventually convinced otherwise by Shi Lang, who following the conquest had become one of his most trusted aides, and thus Taiwan was formally integrated into the Chinese Empire as a prefecture of Fujian province in 1684.

Because Shi Lang had become so trusted, a noble rank soon came his way, specifically 'Hou,' which was roughly equivalent to a Western Marquess. And what kind of a noble would he be without land? Well, none of course! And what better land to give him than some of the stuff he had just conquered, to save the feathers of any pre-established nobles on the mainland from being ruffled. Thus, he gained personal control of Southern Taiwan, under the authority of his Emperor.

And here's something else to pay extra attention to, because what you suspect likely happened next was not what happened — as the 'Chinese-ification' of Taiwan under Shi Lang was actually **very** limited. Instead, eager to keep his newfound personal gold mine very much his own, Shi Lang went out of his way to segregate Taiwan from the rest of the Empire, outright forbidding the Chinese peasantry from approaching the island without pre-cleared permission, and when mainlanders were occasionally allowed to make the move over to bolster his workforce, they were specifically banned from bringing their families with them — meaning that the vast majority would eventually return to the mainland.

This isn't to say that Taiwan wasn't Chinese-ified at all, because naturally, its elite structures: its leadership, its laws, etc., all quickly became very Chinese **very** quickly, but this wasn't enough to facilitate a full cultural transformation, and so Taiwan's common folk maintained their native identity for far longer than one would normally see in other conquered and assimilated territories. More proactive efforts to 'Chinese-ify' Taiwan were made following Shi Lang's death in 1696, but by that time the damage had been done — the indigenous population had had more than a decade to establish a reformed cultural identity within the framework of Chinese rule, and now it would prove to be a damned hard thing to uproot. Chinese efforts over the centuries would naturally flip-flop between both the carrot, the stick, and sometimes a bit of both, and certainly, these efforts had their successes, and Taiwan did indeed become more Chinese-ified as the years rolled on — but the effort was **never** fully successful during the Imperial Period, and indigenous dissent and even rebellion remained common.

For a specific example, consider the Zhu Yigui Rebellion of 1721, which saw the titular man, originally a duck farmer by trade, and of the Hokkien indigenous group, don the mantle of a General after a crippling rise in taxes, marshal a peasant army under him, and then march on, and successfully capture the city of Kua Chin Na, modern Gangshan District of Kaohsiung City, after which further embittered Aboriginal Taiwanese of all flavours started to rally behind him by the thousand. His rebellion was eventually put down the following year, and Chinese rule returned to the land, but the cost, both in terms of men and money was simply vast.

Then there were the many, **many** Chinese settler revolts, which again, did not exactly do wonders for cultural unity on Taiwan. Take the Lin Shuangwen rebellion of 1786 through 1788. This time the titular rebel was a settler from Zhangzhou, and he took to the sword in response to the banning of the 'Heaven and Earth Society,' a secret religious organisation that maintained loyalty to the long since ousted Ming Dynasty. It took nearly two years, 40,000 troops, and junks full of cash to put down.

Come the 19th century, insurrection of all stripes had become so common in Taiwan, that a new phrase started circulating to surmise the situation: "Every three years an uprising; every five years a rebellion."

Despite all of that however, the Qing managed to keep a grip on Taiwan, and come the late 19th Century, for all the problems it caused them, the island was a valuable part of the Empire, being economically profitable thanks to enormous investment in its agricultural sector and infrastructure. But then, yet again, just as it had back in the 17th century, Taiwan would suddenly find itself once more as naught but a football destined to be kicked between competing powers.

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<!-- aeo:section start="modern-history" -->
## Modern History

It all began in 1894 following the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War. Here's a quick overview just so you have a working reference:

Korea was slap bang between China and Japan, and had been a client state of China for a little over five centuries. Japan started getting its act together after coming out of two and a half centuries of isolation and began to modernise, then, having modernised, Japan quite fancied itself one of those Empire things that all the geo-political big boys of the day had, and reckoned that Korea was a cracking colonial candidate. China found such ambitions on Korea irksome and a war kicked off. Said war was an absolute cakewalk for the Japanese, as they'd spent a fortune modernising their military, while the Qing had spent over two centuries neglecting theirs.

Qing Emperor Zaitian then proceeded to bend himself over a barrel and tell Japanese Emperor Mutsuhito he can do what he likes just please stop the fighting. Mutsuhito proceeded to make Korea 'independent,' i.e., start marking it as a vassal under his control, and seized control of Taiwan as a cheeky little bonus prize; because why not at that point — what's Zaitian going to do to stop him?

When Japan's control of Taiwan formally began in 1895, following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, it did what most aspiring Imperial powers do when they get their hands on their first colonies: go **really** overboard with its efforts to try and make it a model colony.

This saw huge investment in infrastructure, agriculture, and industry, both to exploit its resources with maximum efficiency, but also to better control it. Take the agricultural investment for example: this, of course, earned the Japanese plenty of money, but as lots of this investment was geared towards industrial scale production of 'cash crops' such as fruits and tea, they were also making Taiwan dependent upon Japan for its basic foods and goods. And isn't the prospect of a rebellion suddenly all the harder when Japan has its hand on the food faucet, and will happily close it at the first sign of violence?

It's a similar story with the infrastructure investment: sure, new roads are primarily built to expedite industrial production, but should the Taiwanese get any funny ideas about independence, those exact same roads will also allow the Imperial Japanese Army a much easier time of marching in to put it down.

Note, this was nothing unique to Japan; it's exactly what the Europeans did when going into Africa, Asia, and the Americas — build systems that both made colonies more profitable, and easier to control.

Beyond that however, another vital medium of colonial control is manufacturing popular consent, i.e., making your subjects love you, or even better, making them think they **are** you, thus reducing the chances of rebellion to near nil — something that the Chinese Qing before the Japanese were **very** aware of as we know, as much as they largely failed to ever pull it off.

To try and achieve this, the Japanese introduced a comprehensive education system, one that naturally mandated Japanese language and values while marginalizing Chinese cultural elements. For example, schools taught Japanese history and promoted Shinto practices, with the goal of fostering loyalty to the Japanese emperor. The Japanese also implemented policies to suppress traditional Chinese customs, such as foot-binding, and encouraged the adoption of Japanese attire and lifestyles.

This wasn't the Taiwanese's first rodeo however, and so, many secretly retained their cultural identity, showing up and coming generations how things were **really** to be done behind closed doors when they were away from the prying ears of the Japanese authorities. Some, such as Tang Jing Song, the last Qing Governor of Taiwan, even started armed resistance efforts against the Japanese, with Tang declaring the independent Republic of Formosa in 1895. Such efforts were short-lived and unsuccessful however, with the aforementioned Republic of Formosa lasting a mere 151 days before being crushed by the Japanese.

As in any colony however, some Taiwanese rolled with the changes, adapted to the new order, and decided to toe the line — making full use of the new opportunities even if it meant surrendering their identity in the process.

As a result of this mixed response from the populace, the Japanese found themselves with a Taiwan more subjugated than the Qing's ever managed to achieve, but one which by no means had fully surrendered itself under the crushing weight of their boot.

Then, after a few decades of this new status quo, WWII broke out, which would go on to have a substantial effect on Taiwan: its men were conscripted, its factories and workers were pushed to breaking point, and its natural resources were stripped bare. Then, as if that wasn't bad enough, as the war progressed and things started to go badly for Japan, food shortages, inflation, and collapsing living standards became the norm.

But before we can begin explaining the fallout and consequences, we must head back to the Chinese Mainland in the year 1912, because there, something truly epoch-defining happened — something that you **must** know about in order for Taiwan's post-WWII history to make sense: 2,132 years of Imperial Rule came to an end.

The end of Imperial China was precipitated by a combination of internal strife and external pressures. Internally, corruption, inefficiency, and inability to reform plagued the Qing administration, and externally, they faced relentless pressure from foreign powers, resulting in humiliating defeats and unequal treaties that eroded national sovereignty and fostered widespread resentment; think the loss of Hong Kong to the British in 1841, the loss of Qingdao to the Germans in 1898, and you get the idea.

As a result of all of that, China went into the 20th century a powder keg ready to blow — and the spark that set it off would be the start of the Wuchang Uprising on the 10th of October 1911. That particular uprising was a small-scaled thing; 12,000 troops battling it out across all sides, but it was a battle that the Qing lost — and with the momentum of victory the uprising soon snowballed into the full blown Xinhai Revolution, at the head of which sat a fella you might have heard of by the name of Sun Yat Sen, who led the nationalist Guomindang (GMD) party. This rebellion was successful, and Qing rule formally came to an end when Puyi, the last Emperor, formally abdicated on the 12th of February 1912, and with that, Imperial China became the Republic of China (ROC), under the leadership of the GMD.

Well, it was **kind of** under the leadership of the GMD anyway, because what actually followed the formation of the Republic was two **very** difficult decades for Sun Yat Sen, and his eventual successor Chiang Kai-shek. Here's the CliffsNotes version:

China falls apart following the end of Qing rule, and Warlords, most of whom were Qing Army officers who just didn't disband their forces, carve the country up amongst themselves. The GMD takes until 1928 putting them all down and reunifying China. Then, just as that's nearly done, in 1927, oh no, Communism! Mao Zedong and his mates appear, rifles in hand, screaming something about "From each according to his ability" and the Chinese Civil War begins. As the Civil War is raging, the Japanese, having long since gone a tad overboard with the whole Empire building thing, invade China in 1937; Chiang and Mao then kiss and make up temporarily, mutually agreeing that killing each other can wait in favour of killing the Japanese. Two atomic bombs convince Japan to give its Empire building up as a bad job. Chiang and Mao remember they despise each other, and the killing begins afresh from August 1945 in the second stage of the Chinese Civil War.

And with that explanation of wider events complete, Taiwan now comes back into the story, because the culmination of that second stage of the Civil War is basically what creates the situation as it stands today.

You see, as you no doubt guessed from the whole China still being Communist today thing, Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD lost the Civil War, specifically in December 1949.

The loss was the result of a combination of strategic errors, internal corruption, and the effective tactics of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Chiang's leadership was inflexible and often ineffective, with poor strategic decisions during key battles such as the Huaihai Campaign of November 1948 through to January 1949, which he lost, badly, and as a result lost control of **huge** swathes of land north of the Yangtze River and suffered over half a **million** casualties in the process.

Additionally, his reluctance to delegate authority stifled the ROC's ability to respond swiftly to changing battlefield conditions, something which again is demonstrated by the Huaihai Campaign, where his insistence on maintaining direct control over military operations created slow responses and constant missed opportunities, which led to Communist forces, which were of significantly lower quality on paper thanks to the **vast** amount of military hardware that the US funnelled to Chiang, outmanoeuvring and crushing him at every turn.

Then there was the corruption. Nationalist soldiers were often poorly fed and paid after their leaders siphoned resources off for themselves, resulting in low morale and high desertion rates. In stark contrast, the Communist forces were highly motivated and dedicated to their cause, benefiting from better organization and morale. The Nationalist government also failed to gain widespread public support, suffering from economic mismanagement that led to hyperinflation and widespread poverty. This eroded public confidence in the ROC, while the Communists, through land reforms and policies appealing to the rural population, garnered significant grassroots support.

Soviet support also played a crucial role in the Communist victory, because just as how the US was backing Chiang, they too were supporting Mao, providing him with military equipment and strategic guidance, which bolstered their capabilities and sustained their military campaigns. Note, it was **way** less than the Nationalists were receiving however — and thus this would have been but a moot point were it not for Chiang's ungodly incompetence in managing his own military effort.

As a result of this catastrophic defeat, Chiang, senior ROC leadership, over two million soldiers, and many **many** more civilians made for Taiwan over the course of four months, as it stood unmolested as last bastion of Nationalist control in China. This plan had been intended to be a short-lived one, with Chiang planning to regroup and re-equip his forces, before returning to reconquer the Mainland with a plan he called 'Project National Glory.'

But that never happened, and equally, neither did the People's Liberation Army Navy, the Communist Navy, ever appear over the horizon carrying a vast amphibious force that would land on Taiwan and deliver the final killing blow to the ROC. Instead, a stalemate broke out. Chiang had by far the better navy, and would have had no problems at pushing the Communist Navy aside and plonking his troops back down on the Mainland, but in the inverse, while the Communist Navy was frankly laughable, and could never hope to land on Taiwan, their vast indomitable peasant army was legitimately terrifying, and would have had no bother at all stamping out any attempted landing that Chiang attempted.

It took Chiang quite a while to accept this fact, as he did suffer from quite the perishing ego complex, but when he did, he took the only option that was open to him: keep on making noises about reclamation, but secretly, just be glad that he had **any** land left to govern at all, count his blessings, and make the most of it.

This saw him do two things: firstly, spend, spend, **spend** on defence, turning Taiwan into an island so unassailable, that it didn't matter what the Communists got up to; Taiwan would remain his, and secondly, to attempt to 'Chinese-ify' the island's populace, which, as we have discussed in depth, was far from homogeneous or indigenous at that point — even with the enormous Chinese influx at the end of the Civil War.

This saw his government enforce the use of Mandarin as the official language, which aimed to replace Japanese, which was still a dominant language thanks to 50 years of only recently ended Japanese colonisation, as well as indigenous languages. Further still, the speaking of both was also strictly outlawed in official settings such as government offices, schools, military installations, and the like.

He then set about renaming everything, with the names of streets, a lot of which had been either built or changed during the Japanese occupation being a particular point of focus. For example, Tōkō Street in Taoyuan City became Sun Yat Sen Street, Jinsen Road in Taipei became Ren'ai Road, after the Confucian virtue of co-humanity, and Shōwa Road, also in Taipei, became Xinyi Road, roughly meaning 'faithfulness' or 'integrity.'

He also massively shook-up education and cultural policies, mandating a Chinese-centric curriculum that emphasised Chinese history, culture, and Confucian values and more broadly mandating traditional Chinese customs, festivals, and practices.

Taiwan's Chinese population, both that which arrived before and after the Civil War were naturally chuffed to bits with this, but the indigenous population was far more reluctant to embrace the changes. Not only because of the obvious erosion of their own culture that these policies were a harbinger to, but because they were also **very** much aware of what Chiang's government was capable of when its ire was invoked.

Take the 'February 28th Massacre' for example, which began on the titular day in 1947 — back when Taiwan was just an afterthought in the ROC's mind; merely one of many territories it controlled, and thus was far from being its main focus. It started in Taipei, when Officers of the State Monopoly Bureau, in what can only be described as a blood frenzy, struck down and savagely beat an indigenous widow they suspected of selling illegal cigarettes, before they then turned their guns on the gathered crowd, which, naturally, was none too happy about their conduct to put it mildly.

One among the crowd was killed outright, and many more were wounded, so naturally, in response, a protest began to assemble, which the GMD police forces fired on without hesitation, thus beginning a crescendo of violence which would see potentially as many as 28 **thousand** protestors killed come its conclusion on the 16th of May.

But the indigenous population weren't the only ones who learned from the Massacre, so did the GMD, and they'd be damned if they were going to allow such a situation arise again — lest they find themselves pushed out of the last bastion of their control by an insurrection from within.

Thus began the period known as the 'White Terror,' which began with the declaration of Martial Law on the 19th of May 1949, just as GMD forces began trickling over to Taiwan when it became clear their defeat in the Civil War was imminent. Ultimately, it would go on to last just shy of 40 years, not coming to an end until the 15th of July 1987; when that martial law was finally lifted — and during that time, the government enjoyed full and sweeping powers to arrest, detain, and execute individuals without due process.

The fear of communist infiltration was used to justify extensive surveillance and the creation of a vast network of informants and secret police, tasked with rooting out subversive activities. This network extended into all aspects of Taiwanese society, from urban centres to rural communities, ensuring that the government's presence was felt everywhere.

Arrests were also often arbitrary, and those detained were frequently subjected to brutal interrogation methods to extract confessions. The lack of transparency and judicial oversight meant that many were imprisoned or executed based on dubious charges or coerced admissions of guilt. Trials, when they occurred, were conducted by military tribunals that operated without the standards of fairness or impartiality found in civilian courts.

Censorship was another cornerstone of the White Terror. The government exercised tight control over the media, educational institutions, and cultural outputs. Publications that did not align with the GMD were banned, and authors, journalists, and academics who expressed dissenting views were silenced through intimidation, imprisonment, or sometimes just good old-fashioned murder.

Ultimately, when all was said and done, the White Terror saw over 140,000 people imprisoned and as many as 4,000 executed.

But then, in this period, when liberty and freedom in Taiwan stood at an all-time low, its economy started to do well, like, **really** well, in a period that economists now call the 'Taiwan Miracle.' This period of rapid economic growth transformed Taiwan from an agrarian society into a major global industrial power. Economists seem reluctant to place 'exact' dates on it, for some reason, so if you're wondering about a timeframe, call it the '1960s-1990s' and you'll be about right.

The groundwork for this transformation was laid by a combination of favourable government policies, strategic economic planning, and a highly motivated and educated workforce.

It began when the GMD implemented significant land reforms, ones aimed at breaking up large landholdings and redistributing land to tenant farmers. This effectively doubled the land ownership among Taiwanese farmers, which not only alleviated rural poverty, but also created a new class of new money middle-class entrepreneurs, all eager to keep the financial ball rolling and weigh their pots of gold down even further. Bizarrely too, the former landowners actually ended up better off for it as well, as they were **handsomely** compensated by the government for their loss of land, and so, with agriculture now being a no-go for them, where did they put their cash? That's right, **industry**.

Thus, like a lottery winner that avoids the hedonistic delights that lay within the Ferrari dealership, Taiwan, from top to bottom, was now a country that had come into a bit of cash and was doing the smart thing with it.

Taiwan initially focused on labour-intensive industries such as textiles and electronics, which leveraged the island's abundant and relatively cheap labour force, with the government also encouraging export-oriented production. This strategy was supported by the establishment of export processing zones, which provided tax incentives and infrastructure to attract foreign investment and further boost exports.

This then lifted the situation of the Taiwanese worker too, just like the newly minted middle-class farmer and former landowner turned industrialists before them.

Eager to keep this ball rolling, the GMD, with all the juicy juicy tax revenue that this boom created, then started investing **heavily** in education — compulsory education was extended to nine years in length, and then 12 years, on par with advanced western economies, and furthermore, an emphasis on technical and vocational training was also made. This ensured a steady supply of skilled workers who could meet the demands of a rapidly industrializing economy, and Taiwan only got richer still as a result.

So successful was Taiwan's economy, that come the 1990s, just after the end of the White Terror, it had emerged as one of the "Four Asian Tigers," alongside South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong — all of which were defined by rapid industrialization, high growth rates, and significant increases in living standards. For Taiwan, its GDP grew at an average annual rate of pushing 9 percent from the 1960s to the 1990s.

And how do you think the new, richer and better educated Taiwan felt about the whole martial law slash dictatorship business? Yep — they were none too chuffed about it to say the least, and so, as Taiwan did ever better, momentum in favour of democratising and liberalising Taiwan was steadily building.

These sentiments would come to a head with the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979, which saw pro-democracy activists organizing a rally to commemorate Human Rights Day. The government's harsh response, including mass arrests and the prosecution of leading dissidents, drew widespread condemnation both domestically and internationally. This event served as a catalyst for the burgeoning democracy movement, galvanizing support and highlighting the need for political reform.

Chiang Ching-kuo, who (eventually) succeeded his father Chiang Kai-shek as President in 1978 following his death in 1975 could see clear as day that the current way of doing things was unsustainable, and with his only other option being to clamp down **big** style as his father had when he first retreated to the island, which he **really** did not have the political capital within the GMD to do, he chose instead to begin winding down authoritarian rule, allowing greater individual political freedoms, which resulted in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), an ever so left of centre nationalist party, being formed to become Taiwan's first ever opposition party.

From there democratisation carried on a steady peace. Martial Law was lifted on the 15th of July 1987 after 38 long years, which was then followed by Taiwan's first **ever** free election on the 22nd of December 1991. It was an election for Taiwan's then highest legislature, the National Assembly, and with a voter turnout of 68.3% returned a stonking victory for the GMD, who secured 254 out of 325 seats, with 66 of the rest being taken by the DPP, and the final five being split between three seats which went to the Democratic Non-Partisan Alliance, a coalition of non-affiliated independents, and two pure independents.

This was then followed by the first free Presidential Election in 1991, which with a voter turnout of 76% saw the incumbent Lee Teng-hui, who had originally been installed as president by the GMD following Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988, retain the position after winning 54% of the vote.

It's hard to say **exactly** when Taiwan actually became a true democracy, if for no other reason than the fact that such a thing is **very** subjective, with us all having our own personal metrics on how many democratic processes a state has to have to be considered an outright democracy; but while the nitty gritty pedantries are up for debate — what is irrefutable is that in 1979, during the Kaohsiung Incident, Taiwan was blatantly **not** a democracy, and when Lee returned to the presidential big chair with a freely elected mandate, at the head of a freely elected legislature, it absolutely was.

Since then, power has basically just rotated between the GMD and the DPP, with them both having marked differences in their attitudes to the Mainland, although, do note that these are just general trends; they are both enormous bureaucracies, and therefore individual opinions from members, employees, and candidates do vary somewhat — albeit within a general overarching bracket.

Of the two, the DPP is the far more hardline when it comes to Taiwanese sovereignty, making no apologies for emphasising and fighting to protect the island's distinct identity. They outright reject Beijing's claims over the island and argue that the only people who should determine its future should be its current citizens; citizens who have seen fit to award them the presidency since 2016, with the election of Tsai Ing-wen that year, and later the election of Lai Ching-te in 2024.

In contrast, the GMD, rather ironically given their history, advocates for closer ties with Beijing, emphasizing dialogue and economic cooperation to ensure peace and stability. Note however, they do **not** support unification, but instead are better considered as 'status-quo-ists,' sorts who are quite partial to what Taiwan already has going on and believe that engaging economic and diplomatically with Beijing will help to reduce the risk of conflict, and as a result, armed regime change in Taiwan. As for when they've held power, they controlled the free presidency from the end of the dictatorial period, as we have already said, through to 2000, at which point the presidential reins were handed to the DPP for eight years via Chen Shui-bian, flipped back to them for another eight under Ma Ying-jeou, before returning to DPP from 2016 to the present day, as we just discussed.

And that, pretty much, is the full story of how the current situation in Taiwan came to be. So, now that we know how it was created, let's now explore the current situation in more depth — starting with Taiwan's perspective on it all.

<!-- aeo:section end="modern-history" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="taipei-s-perspective" -->
## Taipei's Perspective

In trying to understand modern Taiwan's perspective on the situation, it is vital to understand that Taiwan doesn't **exactly** consider itself Chinese anymore, kind of, allow us to explain. It **is** still called the Republic of China, is made up of 95% ethnic Han Chinese citizens, and Chinese dialects are still **the** dominant languages, but such considerations are only surface level, and in reality, there is far more nuance and complexity to modern Taiwanese identity than just the flavour of blood pumping through its citizens' veins.

Fortunately for us today however, we have some cracking hard data we can use to help explain this to you, because the matter of identity is **very** heavily researched and documented in Taiwan. As for exactly how well documented, an answer to that question comes from Hsin-I Sydney Yueh, an Associate Professor of Communication Studies at Northeastern State University, who wrote the following in an October 2020 paper titled *What is Taiwanese identity*:

> "No country conducts surveys on its people's identity as frequently as Taiwan. Since 1992, the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in Taiwan has been recording changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity every year. The reports tell us how many people identify themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both. In addition, similar surveys of Taiwanese identity have been conducted by many poll centers, especially during election years."

So, just what do these comprehensive surveys tell us?

Well, interestingly, they show that a major point of contention in Taiwan is not the matter of GMD vs CPC allegiances as you may first imagine it, but actually between being 'Chinese, but not Communist,' and being 'Taiwanese' as its own unique identity, quoting Yueh's paper again:

> "Since the first direct presidential election in 1996, every such election in Taiwan has witnessed identity politics between the Republic of China … and Taiwan. Although the name (Republic of China, ROC) has been rejected by the international community due to the One China policy, a great number of Taiwanese still regard (that) name as part of their national identity. However, this ROC identity should not be mistakenly interpreted as an acceptance of the unification proposed by the People's Republic of China (PRC). In fact, Taiwanese people's hostility toward the PRC reached a new peak in 2020, as did the number of pro-Taiwan independence supporters. This is a sign that Taiwanese people have gradually alienated themselves from a Chinese national identity … Taiwanese people have formed a consensus that they are citizens of an independent country that has achieved autonomy and democracy in the past two decades."

But if a new 'Taiwanese' national identity is beginning to form separate from the Communist versus Republican binary of old, what **exactly** do people who buy into this view see themselves as?

Well, that, in a nutshell, can best be surmised as the whole lot of Taiwan's demographics being chucked in a pot and mixed together: a new cultural perspective made out of equi-parts Chinese and Indigenous ways of doing things, that come together to make something truly unique.

As for how this unique cultural brew manifests in the real world, Yueh explains that by highlighting three key ways, the first of which is a move away from the use of Chinese as the national language:

> "In 2018 … Congress passed a bill that legally defines all the languages used in Taiwan as national languages. (Which) shows the government's efforts to promote linguistic diversity and eliminate language-based discrimination. Although such linguistic justice arrived late, the teaching and promotion of mother tongues are now encouraged without restrictions. A recent achievement can be found in the 2020 Golden Melody Award, a reputed music award in Taiwan: The music album 'Kinakaian' (mother tongue), created by the indigenous musician Aljenljeng Tjaluvie in Paiwan, won the Best Album Award among 21 albums across different language categories … Getting on a Metro train in Taipei … passengers will (now) hear the station names broadcast in four different languages, namely Taiwan Mandarin, Taiwan Hokkien, Hakka, and English."

The next way that Yueh highlights is through the evolution of a unique Taiwanese culinary culture:

> "Taiwanese national identity is (also) shaped by a rich and innovative food culture. For instance, bubble tea is consumed as a nostalgic symbol by many overseas Taiwanese students in California, USA. This Taiwanese invention … (has) unexpectedly become an identity symbol for many Asian Americans. Moreover, similar tea cultures facilitate international friendships and recognition. The Milk Tea Alliance was formed in April 2020 when Thai netizens and Chinese netizens triggered an Internet war over a famous Thai actor. Netizens from Taiwan and Hong Kong supported Thais, not only because they were all milk tea consumers, but also because they had developed a shared anti-Beijing political view. Later in 2020, Indian netizens joined the alliance because of their border dispute with China."

Yueh then moves on from the international dimension, and goes on to explain how Taiwan's culinary cuisine affects things domestically:

> "In recent years, Taiwan's netizens have developed parodic discourses about food, and deliberately caused heated debates. They argue over which night market sells the best fried chicken steak; which way is most authentic to make a zongzi, youfan, or bawan; which city has the poorest cuisine culture; or which city has the sweetest drinks. Taiwan's netizens from the North to the South enthusiastically participate in the domestic Internet wars. The mentioning of all the small shops and local food stands accumulates a collective cultural map, which is a fast way to establish a Taiwanese national identity."

Yueh then discusses the third aspect that has helped to foster a unique Taiwanese culture: politics. But not in a "yeah we're not Communist" way, an aspect, which, of course, has been present in Taiwan since all the way back in 1949, but more in the unique quirks and features of how democracy is done on the island — something that, naturally, has only been able to develop recently given when totalitarianism was toppled:

> "Taiwanese politicians tend to exaggerate when expressing their emotions in public. For example, unlike a solemn apology, which is often seen as the norm in press conferences in the United States, a public apology in Taiwan might involve tears, kneeling down, wailing, and other affective performances. This emphasis on one's helplessness, vulnerability, and powerlessness in such public performances is somehow expected or even encouraged by the viewers. For many Taiwanese, showing one's soft side is a way to shorten the distance and arouse others' empathy and compassion."

She then goes on to offer insight into this matter, discussing the 'cutesy' aspect of Taiwanese politics:

> "… Cute elements have been installed as part of political campaigning since the 1998 Taipei mayoral election. This trend of cuteness can be found in the 2020 presidential election as well. All of the first-round candidates launched cartoon personified stickers for social media. They also designed cute and humorous campaigning commodities that aimed to affectively appeal to young voters. The constant use of cute commodities in the campaigns increases the candidates' image of approachability. Through the consumption of the commodities, political participation has become a fun game and an easy everyday practice for Taiwanese voters. This underexplored field in Taiwan's politics and democracy reveals a unique mode of political participation that facilitates the formation of Taiwanese identity."

Through Yueh's paper then, which was **very** well received when published, it is evident that a unique Taiwanese identity certainly does exist. But just in the spirit of intellectual rigor, let's also dig into what another paper on the matter has to say — lest we end up rendering our conclusions today in a vacuum. Specifically, let us take a look at *The Evolution of a Taiwanese National Identity*, published by Gang Lin, a program associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center's Asia Program back in 2003.

And if you're concerned about the age of this one, don't worry, we picked an older paper to show you here specifically because that leap in time adds wider context, for example:

> "Culturally, an ethnic division between native Taiwanese and those who came from the mainland during the 1940s has arisen because of their different historical experiences and even their languages. Politically, the two ethnic groups tend to have different ideas about the future relationship (unification vs. independence) between Taiwan and mainland China. In recent years, the growth of a new and inclusive Taiwanese identity, as well as education and intermarriages, has helped reduce cultural cleavage between ethnic groups. Many Taiwanese people now define themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese."

Through this, we can specifically pinpoint the beginning of contemporary 'Taiwanese-ness,' for want of a better term, as opposed to just 'Chinese, but not Communist,' to the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Unlike Yueh however, Gang takes the time to delve into more of the **why** of the matter as opposed to just the **what**:

> "… a sense of identity apart from that of mainland China has existed in Taiwan for more than a century. While 50 years of Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945) contributed to the development of distinct habits and attitudes of the Taiwanese people, the arrival of the (GMD) government and its ill-disciplined soldiers from the mainland quickly disillusioned native Taiwanese. The traumatic February 28 incident, when thousands of Taiwanese were slaughtered by the (GMD) military, left searing memories in the consciousness of native residents, and became the first marker in the development of a modern Taiwanese identity."

From there, Gang goes on to explain further how this modern identity developed:

> "Despite … Chiang Kai-shek's efforts at culturally redefining Taiwan's inhabitants as Chinese, a spontaneous movement of literary nativization by a group of indigenous writers emerged in the 1960s …. the 1979 Kaohsiung incident, resulting from a mass demonstration and (GMD) crackdown, was (also) another marker in the evolution of a Taiwanese identity."

According to Gang however, there was one little development that changed it all, and started to bring these groups together as a unified cultural front: Democracy:

> "Taiwan's democratization in 1986 has accelerated the development of a new and more inclusive national identity on the island ... Under the leadership of … President Lee Teng-hui, a memorial to the victims of the February 28 incident was built in Taipei, and a 'new Taiwanese' identity began to incorporate those residents coming from the mainland in the late 1940s as well as their offspring. While a separate Taiwanese identity has continued to develop under the Chen Shui-bian administration … its specific definition might be changed in the future."

But while Gang's work is certainly useful for helping to both confirm and expand upon what we saw earlier from Yueh, that last little comment of his, the one about the specific definition of Taiwanese identity being malleable serves as a handy segue into something **very** important that we need to make clear.

Taiwan, fundamentally, is an island, country, whatever you want to call it, of individuals, all with their own separate thoughts, ideas, and impetuses into action. Therefore, as much as 'New Taiwanese-ism' is something critical for us to understand, we must not make the mistake of assuming that it is a cultural identity that **all** of them buy into… because of course they don't — you won't find a **single** nation on earth with citizens who all think in lockstep.

To demonstrate this, consider the pro-Beijing camp in Taiwan, which, while tiny, absolutely exists. But rather than considering this angle through academic papers, let's instead put a human face on this, and pick out a specific Taiwanese citizen who holds this position: Harry Chen, a retired businessman who firmly believes that Taiwan is still a part of China, and that the island would be much better if it gave autonomy up as a bad job, and agreed to be integrated into China as a province, saying the following:

> "What normal people want in life is good living, peace and happiness. People who want independence, that's bullsh*t — they're lying to themselves."

To him, and others who share his opinion, all of whom notably tend to be on the older end of the age slider, unification with the mainland simply offers a better standard of life for all in Taiwan.

But while it is important to note that pro-unifiers such as Chen exist, don't make the mistake of overthinking the popularity of the position, because as we have already said, it's… 'niche,' to say the least, as demonstrated by polling data. For example, in 2023, the National Chengchi University Election Study Center found that immediate unification was only 1.2% in 2023, and another from 2024 found that 87.4% of respondents preferred to maintain some form of the status quo regarding cross-strait relations. Similarly, a Pew Research Center poll in January 2024 revealed that 67% of Taiwanese identify as primarily Taiwanese, 28% as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and only 3% as primarily Chinese… not exactly great figures for the pro-Beijing camp.

This is reflected in electoral results too. Take the People First Party, which, having been founded in the year 2000 by James Soong, who while running as an independent Presidential candidate that same year, prior to the party's foundation, advocated for a gradual union between Taiwan and the Mainland by first signing a non-aggression pact, and eventually forming a cross strait union similar to the European Union, which lead to his party being commonly perceived as a pro-unification one… it currently has a whopping zero seats in the legislature, zero municipal mayors, zero city mayors, zero magistrates, and a mere two councillors… out of a total of 912.

So yeah, fair to say that between its blossoming unique identity, and its complete rejection of the idea at the polls, Taiwan isn't exactly chomping at the bit to unify with the Mainland.

<!-- aeo:section end="taipei-s-perspective" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="beijing-s-perspective" -->
## Beijing's Perspective

As for Beijing's perspective on it all, well, as most of you will no doubt be aware from the news, Beijing is quite keen to get its hands on Taiwan, but how do they justify this claim, and above all else, what have they done, and what are they doing, to make it a reality?

Ultimately, it is important to note that we don't know **the** reason, and likely, there isn't even a single motivation anyway — the Chinese State is an **enormous** entity, and therefore there exists an enormous plethora of individual opinions within it, although, naturally, they are all within the same ballpark of one another, at least as publicly expressed.

For an outline of the 'general' position, let's turn to none other than the big man himself, Xi Jinping, and his musings on the topic in *The Governance of China, Volumes 1 – 4*, a published amalgamation of his major works from the 15th of November 2012 to the 13th of June 2014, including speeches, talks, interviews, instructions, and personal correspondences.

He begins by establishing his view that Taiwan is indeed 'Chinese,' something that, as we have seen at length, isn't **really** the case no matter how many Chinese characters are written all over the gaff:

> "Due to history and present circumstances, there are many thorny problems for the moment between our two sides, but this will pass … the people on both sides of the Straits are one family with shared blood, culture, bonds, and aspirations, all of which serve as an important force for promoting our mutual understanding and common progress."

He then goes on to explain this further:

> "I am impressed by our compatriots in Taiwan for their worship of the ancestors, their love for the homeland, and their honesty, frankness, diligence and hard work. The closeness between us is rooted in our blood, our history and culture. We all believe that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are members of one Chinese nation, and we all inherit and pass on Chinese culture. During the 50 years when Taiwan was occupied by the Japanese aggressors, our fellow Taiwanese maintained a strong sense of national consciousness and deep feelings for Chinese culture, regarding themselves first and foremost as members of the Chinese nation. Such consciousness and feelings are inherent and natural, and can never be erased."

From there, and make extra special note of this because it's a **big** point, he goes on to discuss unification, claiming that it is something he only wishes to achieve peacefully:

> "The Chinese mainland is strong in its resolution and clear in its policies and principles for peaceful development on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. We will maintain the continuity of our fundamental strategy towards Taiwan, continue to implement effective policies, and keep moving our relations forward so as to bring benefits to the people on both sides. The Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits should strengthen solidarity and cooperation, and jointly work towards realizing the Chinese Dream, a great renewal of the Chinese nation."

And if you're after an explicit denunciation of Taiwanese independence, here it is from later on in the book:

> "Forces and activities for 'Taiwan independence' remain a real threat to the peace of the Taiwan Straits. It is therefore incumbent upon us to oppose and contain any rhetoric or move for 'Taiwan independence' without any compromise."

And although that is as explicit as he gets in saying it in the book, notice how in that extract he puts the onus on Taiwan as the aggressor in the current situation? We'll come back to analyse that claim later.

Let's stay on the matter of a potential unification for now however, as Xi also outlines how he would see such a process as happening, or again, at least how he claims to:

> "The framework of the concept is: Under the premise of national reunification, the mainland keeps practicing socialism, while Taiwan … retain(s) their original capitalist system and ways of life for a long time while enjoying a high degree of autonomy."

Here he is referring to the 'One Country, Two Systems' model, which has already been applied in both Hong Kong and Macao, following their handovers in 1997 and 1999, by the UK and Portugal respectively. In a nutshell, this model gives the incoming territory autonomy to act as a 'proto-nation' of sorts, with its own passports, border controls, laws, currency, police forces, etc., basically **everything** except defence, and naturally, Beijing ultimately retains a veto over the whole lot.

Furthermore, officially at least, this model also has a time limit, with both Hong Kong and Macao being given a 50-year time from their handovers before 'integration' into the Mainland can be considered. In reality however, the model is likely to last as long as the CPC's regime does, because with Macao and Hong Kong both being **hugely** profitable gambling and financial centres respectively, specifically due to their devolved status, it would make absolutely no sense to fully integrate them — although note, most commentators expect them to, and believe they are, being 'Mainland-ified' within that base semi-autonomous framework.

The broader implications of this model, i.e. that there is only one sovereign state known as 'China,' of which the PRC is the legitimate ruler of, and any 'Chinese' entity that rejects that paradigm is a rogue element that needs to be brought to heel and back into the fold is known as the 'One China Principle' by the PRC.

And now, with that established, let's rewind the tape a bit and take a moment to evidence the claim we opened this chapter with; that there is some slight difference in opinion within the CPC on the matter of Taiwan in the minutia, but that they all very much sing from the same general song sheet as one another, and to do that, we shall take a look at what some other Mainland officials have to say besides Xi Jinping.

First there is Director of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, who maintains the same general "unification is going to happen, but totally peacefully we swear" attitude as Xi, as demonstrated by the following extract from a March 2024 press conference:

> "(Though) separation has no future, major powers should not confront each other, and the Cold War must not be revived."

Next consider Wang Wenbin, who currently serves as a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who very much toes the party line and openly dismisses the role of democracy in deciding Taiwan's future, quoting a 2023 press conference:

> "Regardless of the results of Taiwan's elections, the basic fact that Taiwan is part of China will not change; the international community's prevailing consensus on the one-China principle will not change."

Then there is Mao Ning, a Deputy Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — and yes, if you are wondering, supposedly there is a family connection to **that** Mao, but she has been scant on the details. Her tone is overall a bit more… fiery, than that of Xi, as demonstrated by the following, which she said in a press conference in January 2024:

> "The Taiwan issue is absolutely not a matter of democracy but a matter of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 'Taiwan independence' forces, under the guise of 'democracy,' are disguising their sinister intention to split the country, and their scheme is doomed to fail … Taiwan's return to China is an important part of the international order after World War II."

Given her role, she has also given more lip service to the international dimension of the debate than Xi has, saying the following in 2023:

> "The Taiwan issue is purely an internal affair of China, and no country has the right to interfere. We urge the US to adhere to the one-China principle and not send any wrong signals to the 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces."

In particular for her, invoking the One China Principle with foreign nations is a common tactic, as demonstrated by this quote from the January 2024 press conference again:

> "A total of 182 countries worldwide have established diplomatic relations with China based on the one-China principle. Nauru's decision to re-establish diplomatic ties with China and stand on the side of the international majority is a correct choice in its long-term interests and will open a brighter future for its development."

To Mao, having diplomatic relations with the PRC and not Taiwan is considered as, or at least used as, an endorsement of the PRC as the 'real' China and recognition of Taiwan as a 'rogue' breakaway state. For some nations, such as Russia or North Korea, this no doubt is **exactly** what they mean by this, but to claim it as a uniform instance — bit of a stretch isn't it. Take the US for example, do we **really** believe that they think the PRC is the legitimate Chinese government, what with all the sabre rattling between them, and the **enormous** arms sales to, and otherwise very cordial relations with, Taiwan? Or do we simply think that they **have** to acknowledge the PRC, at least formally, in order to keep the growing power sweet and maintain access to its dirt-cheap factories?

But there is a problem with the mostly peaceful rhetoric of the CPC: its actions display a clear willingness to actively plan for and consider military solutions. To demonstrate this point, let's take one month, specifically April 2023, and take a look at just how many military exercises and activities the PRC carried out around Taiwan in that month.

And how many do you think there were? Just how many could the PRC fit into a mere 30 days?

According to 'China Power Project,' an affiliate of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a nonprofit policy research organization, there were a whopping 84. You didn't misread that, 84 whole incidents in a single month.

And to show you the kind of thing included in that number, among it are relatively minor things such as a combined arms brigade under the PLA's 72nd Army Group holding amphibious assault exercises on the 4th of April in an undisclosed location, that in a press release were said as being conducted by, "forces facing the island of Taiwan," all the way through to more major incidents such as a live fire exercise on the 8th of April that had 9 vessels and 71 aircraft taking part, with 45 of those aircraft crossing into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone. As for the live fire aspect of that operation, it came from a PLA amphibious landing ship that discharged live rounds just 30 miles northwest of the Matsu Islands. This operation too was specifically cited as being aimed at Taiwan, as it was, supposedly:

> "A serious warning against 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces' collusion and provocation with external forces, and a necessary action to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity."

And don't forget, these incidents are happening near as damn it **all** the time, so we think we are safe in saying we can take Beijing's claims about wanting to peacefully unify with a slight pinch of salt — we're sure they'd **want** to do it that way make no mistake, as it'd be cheaper, less bloody, and have **far** less international fallout, but the facts are, they clearly haven't ruled out the military option, and are getting ready to use it should they feel they have to.

And that realisation presents us with just one last question we need to answer: will Beijing do it? Will they take the leap, push the proverbial big red button, and try to take Taiwan by force?

<!-- aeo:section end="beijing-s-perspective" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="will-beijing-do-it" -->
## Will Beijing Do It?

Although the question is **very** pertinent, it is, in some regards, one we shouldn't even entertain answering, purely because the ungodly number of variables at play make it one that is, despite what many pundits would have you believe, outright impossible to ever be able to answer with any degree of certainty.

But nonetheless, it is a question worth musing upon, if for no other reason than the fact that answering the question forces you to **really** consider the aforementioned variables, and so, despite producing an answer that will almost certainly be wrong, there is still some utility to be found by answering it — even if only to assist your wider considerations on the matter.

As for our two cents' worth on the matter, we would have to answer… **maybe**. Make no mistake, we certainly don't believe an invasion is imminent, partly because the PLA, despite its enormous efforts to modernise of late, simply isn't in a position to execute the operation with any degree of certainty at present, and also partly due to the fact that the international reaction, both in sanctions, which would devastate China's export-orientated economy, and in military response, which could easily escalate into a regional war, if not even a world war, simply makes the present risks to Beijing far too great to ever consider a military solution.

The key phrase there, however, was **present** risks. If the global order was to change, and say, a combination of an utterly absurd national debt and an increasingly polarised society caused the US to fracture and collapse, well, suddenly the odds would be looking a lot more favourable for Beijing, wouldn't they — particularly if that collapse was so great that key regional allies such as Japan and South Korea ended up being dragged down with it. Add a bit of nationalistic zeal and maybe a domestic crisis or two into the mix for which they would need a scapegoat, and maybe, just maybe, Beijing then would go for it — at least as we see it.

But that's just how we see it, and as we have already said, history will almost certainly prove us wrong — ultimately, only time will tell.

<!-- aeo:section end="will-beijing-do-it" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways

- Taiwan's history of colonization and cultural blending has led to a unique identity.
- Taiwan's democratic transition began with the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979.
- Taiwan's economy flourished during the 'Taiwan Miracle' from the 1960s to the 1990s.
- Beijing claims Taiwan as part of China, advocating for peaceful unification.
- Military exercises by China indicate a willingness to consider forceful reunification.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the earliest evidence of human habitation in Taiwan?

The earliest evidence of human habitation in Taiwan dates back approximately 30,000 years, with the oldest material evidence being chipped stone tools from the Palaeolithic Changbin Culture, dated between five and 15 thousand years ago. Additionally, human remains such as the 'Liangdao Man' skeleton, found on one of Taiwan’s outlying islands, have been carbon dated to around 8,000 years old.

### When did the Dutch establish their presence in Taiwan?

The Dutch East India Company established a permanent presence in Taiwan in 1624, constructing Fort Zeelandia and forming a colony out of all of Taiwan’s Southern Coast, which became known as The Governorate of Formosa.

### What was the significance of Koxinga's conquest of Taiwan in 1661?

Koxinga's conquest of Taiwan in 1661 was significant because it established the Kingdom of Tungning, which became a base of operations for continued resistance against the Qing Dynasty. Koxinga also focused on expanding Taiwan's economy, particularly in agriculture and deerskins, to fund his military efforts.

### How did the Qing Dynasty eventually take control of Taiwan?

The Qing Dynasty took control of Taiwan in 1683 when Shi Lang, one of Koxinga's old admirals who had defected, led an invasion force of 300 warships and 20,000 soldiers. After defeating the Tungning Navy and marching to receive Zheng's surrender, Taiwan was formally integrated into the Chinese Empire as a prefecture of Fujian province in 1684.

### What was the impact of Japanese rule on Taiwan's economy and society?

Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945 saw significant investment in Taiwan's infrastructure, agriculture, and industry. The Japanese implemented policies to suppress traditional Chinese customs and encouraged the adoption of Japanese language and values, aiming to foster loyalty to the Japanese emperor. However, many Taiwanese secretly retained their cultural identity.

### What was the February 28th Massacre and its significance?

The February 28th Massacre began on February 28, 1947, when officers of the State Monopoly Bureau beat an indigenous widow and fired on a gathered crowd, leading to widespread violence. The event resulted in potentially as many as 28,000 protestors killed and marked a turning point in Taiwanese resistance to GMD rule.

### What was the 'White Terror' period in Taiwan?

The 'White Terror' period in Taiwan began with the declaration of Martial Law on May 19, 1949, and lasted until July 15, 1987. During this time, the government enjoyed full and sweeping powers to arrest, detain, and execute individuals without due process, leading to over 140,000 people imprisoned and as many as 4,000 executed.

### What is the 'Taiwan Miracle' and when did it occur?

The 'Taiwan Miracle' refers to the period of rapid economic growth that transformed Taiwan from an agrarian society into a major global industrial power. This period occurred roughly from the 1960s to the 1990s and was characterized by significant land reforms, investment in education, and a focus on labour-intensive industries.

### What is the 'One Country, Two Systems' model proposed by China for Taiwan?

The 'One Country, Two Systems' model proposes that under the premise of national reunification, the mainland would keep practicing socialism while Taiwan would retain its original capitalist system and ways of life for a long time while enjoying a high degree of autonomy. This model has been applied in Hong Kong and Macao.

### What is the current perspective of Taiwanese people on unification with China?

The majority of Taiwanese people prefer to maintain the status quo regarding cross-strait relations. Polling data shows that only a small percentage support immediate unification, with most preferring to maintain Taiwan's autonomy and democracy. The pro-Beijing camp is relatively small and largely unpopular.

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## Sources

- [Original Places video: Taiwan: Bastion of Democracy or Rogue State?](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EducBQP3o8Y)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/11.24_%E5%89%AF%E7%B8%BD%E7%B5%B1%E8%88%87%E3%80%8C%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E6%9D%8E%E7%99%BB%E8%BC%9D%E4%B9%8B%E5%8F%8B%E6%9C%83%E3%80%8D%E6%9C%83%E9%95%B7%E6%B8%A1%E9%82%8A%E5%88%A9%E5%A4%AB%EF%BC%8C%E6%96%BC%E6%9C%83%E4%B8%AD%E4%BA%A4%E6%B5%81_%2830401835193%29.jpg) by 總統府 / openverse, by.

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## Related Coverage
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