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      <title>Burkina Faso: The West African Dictatorship That Loves Russia.</title>
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      <description>Once a relatively stable West African state, Burkina Faso has in recent years fallen into a quagmire of violence that it just can&apos;t seem to escape from. The nation known in the past for its strong African pride is in total chaos, as one of the world&apos;s fastest growing radical Islamic insurgencies ravages the country, leaving millions displaced and tens of thousands dead.

Burkina Faso is a hot mess right now. It had two coups in a single year in 2022. A military captain in his mid-30s is currently running the country. Russian flags fly in the capital. And amongst it all is a proud and brave people doing what they can and that will not go quietly.

So what has pushed the country to the edge of collapse? How did a promise from 40 years ago start a new wave revolution in the 2020s? And why are AI videos of Beyonce singing about the leader all over the internet?

Welcome to a nation that simply refuses to play by the established rules. This is the story of Burkina Faso. What it is, what it once hoped to be, how it all fell apart, the man promising to fix it, and whether that promise is really working.

## The Land of Upright People

So, what is there to know about Burkina Faso?

Well it&apos;s located in the Western part of the narrow band that crosses Africa known to many as the Sahel. It perches on top of Ghana like the tip of a mushroom, and going clockwise from there it borders the Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Benin, and Togo. And one thing you need to know is that this is not an easy part of the world to live in right now.

Overall Burkina Faso is 274,200 square kilometres in size, that&apos;s around 105,000 square miles, making it a little bigger than the great state of Michigan. But they don&apos;t have lame names for their cities like &quot;Detroit&quot; and &quot;Marquette,&quot; here we have cool names like the capital of Ouagadougou and the nation&apos;s second city, Bobo-Dioulasso. Today this country that houses around 24.4 million people (and rising) used to be known in colonial times as Upper Volta, because it was the area north of the small southeastern Ghanaian region of Volta and its river, which was also creatively named… the Volta.

Just like pretty much everywhere in Africa, Burkina Faso is a patchwork of differing ethnicities, religions, and languages. Mooré is spoken by about 52.5% of the population – a little over 12 million people – whilst the Francophone population sits around 22.8%, equating to around 5.5 million. Other languages include Bobo, Samo, Marka, and Fulani, which is used as a lingua franca… which is kind of ironic in a country where French is already spoken, but there&apos;s probably a reason for that which we&apos;ll get to later.

You see the citizens of Burkina Faso – also known as the Burkinabe – are a fiercely independent and proud people. In fact Burkina Faso literally means &quot;land of the upright people.&quot; They&apos;re also a young people, and we mean that in more ways than one. The country only gained its independence in 1960, the average life expectancy is just over 60, and the median age in the country is 18. Burkina Faso has one of the youngest populations on the planet today.

As a nation it&apos;s also growing in both financial and population terms. From a GDP perspective, Burkina Faso – for all its chaos over the years – has almost never failed to grow economically. Since 1980, the nation has only experienced three years of negative economic growth, and most years it experiences a significant GDP percentage rise of around 5% – with some years as high as 11%. GDP per capita is 3.29 times higher than it was in 1980, and the country even has the largest gold reserves in all of Africa. Burkina Faso is Africa&apos;s fourth largest gold producer too, churning more than 57 tons of the stuff in 2023, and nationalisation efforts are ongoing to ensure that natural wealth stays in the country.

And that&apos;s important, because Burkina Faso is a country that is rich in gold and poor in basically everything else. Over 41% of Burkinabe citizens still live below the national poverty line even though it represents a huge drop from almost 88% in the late 1990s. The economy is vulnerable to economic shocks because overwhelmingly its main exports are cotton and gold. Just under half the population don&apos;t have access to clean water, only 21.7% of people had access to electricity in 2023, and there are only 1.46 doctors per 10,000 people. The reality is that living in Burkina Faso today for a lot of people is desperately hard, and it&apos;s not just due to the poverty or lack of services. The country is at war.

A radical Islamic jihadist insurgency has been raging in the nation since the mid-2010s which has only continued to grow with time. As of 2026 the recognised government has control of less than half the country. The insurgency has curbed media access and government restrictions have made the crisis even harder to get information about. The result is displacement, violence, death, and fear.

So the question then is just how did we end up here? Well to understand where Burkina Faso is and where it&apos;s going, we need to look at where it has been.

## Speedrunning African History

Burkina Faso&apos;s history – just like many countries across the world but certainly in Africa – goes back many thousands of years to the formation of early agricultural settlements. Now, as per most historical overviews when a country has thousands of years of history to unpack, we&apos;re going to be glossing over a lot of really interesting pre-colonial history.

The Bura culture was an Iron Age civilisation centred on the lower Niger River valley in what is now Niger and Burkina Faso from roughly the 3rd to the 13th centuries. Around 1000 AD the Mossi kingdoms – also known as the Mossi empire – would first establish themselves here. They were a group of kingdoms within modern day Burkina Faso that dominated the upper Volta river region. The largest Mossi kingdom was called Ouagadougou, which the observant among you will remember is the name of the nation&apos;s modern capital. The Mossi kingdoms lasted for around 900 years, with significant connections to the Mali empire, as well as the Fula kingdoms (which were jihadist kingdoms that first emerged in the 18th century) – this is where the Fulani language emerged that is the lingua franca in Burkina Faso today, and the Fulani people are a significant ethnic group within the country. The Mossi kingdoms would last until the late 1890s when that great spectre of European colonialism would arrive on the back of French warships. In 1884 at the Berlin conference, the European nations had divided up Africa during the infamous scramble for the continent, and within just a few decades what was an incredibly complex and varied system of tribes and alliances across the continent would be reduced to mostly European territory enforced at the barrel of a gun.

The French would come out of the scramble particularly strongly, establishing colonies in the territory that currently makes up the nations of: Benin, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Algeria, Tunisia, Djibouti, Madagascar, most of Chad, most of the Central African Republic, most of the Republic of Congo, most of Gabon, some of Libya, some of Morocco, and of course Burkina Faso. They would also add Togo and Cameroon after the German defeat in World War One led to a colony transfer, which meant French colonies made up almost 40% of Africa&apos;s landmass in the early 20th century.

Burkina Faso had been invaded and made a French protectorate in 1898, but it wasn&apos;t a standalone region yet, more of a combined one with the territories of upper Senegal and Niger. However that didn&apos;t mean that there weren&apos;t people who lived here who were fiercely protective of their home and didn&apos;t take kindly to European settlers siphoning money and resources out of it. From 1915 to 1917 an anti-colonial rebellion in modern Burkina Faso and Mali took place called the Volta-Bani War. Despite the African forces mustering up to 20,000 fighters at its peak and winning initial engagements, it would eventually be crushed under the boot of French munitions.

But it wasn&apos;t all bad though, in 1919 French Upper Volta was officially created which established the territory which would go on to be modern Burkina Faso, although the borders were a bit different. For all intents and purposes this is where Upper Volta began and thus Burkina Faso&apos;s path to statehood. Unfortunately the region – which was created for various economic reasons – failed to thrive, and after failed attempts to promote cotton as an export crop, Upper Volta was officially dissolved in 1932. However do not despair, as World War Two&apos;s aftermath would see Upper Volta revived in 1947 following post-war anti-colonial movements. Not only would this officially establish the modern borders of Burkina Faso, but it would also be the second time that the future Burkinabe would try to take hold of their own destiny, which was an important founding ethos of the state. Independence, sovereignty, self-reliance. These were the founding pillars on which a national identity would soon sit.

By 1958, Upper Volta gained self-governance status and joined the Franco-African Community, fully gaining its independence in 1960. Which is kind of wild when you think about it. It&apos;s like Burkina Faso was going for the &quot;any percent&quot; speedrun record for getting colonised, going from pre-colonial to colonial to post-colonial in just 62 years, less than a single lifetime. Compare that to another African nation like Cape Verde which the Portuguese had held for half a millennia whilst other future nations were serving as colonies for hundreds of years. But that actually really matters for the Burkinabe, where some still remembered pre-colonial times during the French occupation. This helped reinforce that fiercely independent mindset, because as far as the people who lived here were concerned, French colonisation was just the most recent speck on a lengthy timeline.

So then, 1960. A glistening wave of independence has swept over the Upper Volta. From here it would be nothing but smooth sailing, right?

Well actually… no.

Because remember when we said Burkina Faso was speedrunning colonialism? It also decided it wasn&apos;t hanging around much in the post-colonial period either. And soon all the realities of hard-fought independence were coming to the fore. In 1960, Maurice Yaméogo was made the new president of Upper Volta which was set to be a democratic state. However the country soon devolved into one party rule, dictatorship, and corruption. There&apos;s a lot more to it than just that, but long story short, Upper Volta would experience what we&apos;re calling &quot;Coup Number One&quot; by 1966 (hint, there will be more) and this ended the nation&apos;s speed-date with civilian rule. The army took over, forming a military government under the control of Lieutenant Colonel Sangoulé Lamizana and the constitution was suspended.

The nation would live under this military rule for the next decade, but in 1976 a new constitution was brought forward to re-establish civilian governance following a four-year transition period. Lamizana remained, being re-elected as Upper Volta President in 1978. But you should know by now that in 20th century post-colonial Africa the average term of an elected president was about five minutes, and in 1980 &quot;Coup Number Two&quot; would come. Actually it makes sense to call it coup number two because it was a bit shit. The incredibly unimpressed looking Colonel Saye Zerbo overthrew Lamizana in a bloodless coup that re-established military junta rule over the country.

And that&apos;s all we have to say about him because he was almost immediately ousted in 1982 during &quot;Coup Number Three.&quot; Zerbo was overthrown by Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo and the Council of Popular Salvation (which sounds like the name of an excellent folk band from the 60s). But instead of bringing the country together, all it really did was usher in an era of power struggles and political unrest. Such instability had the nation at a fever pitch. This new country had had three coups in six years. Someone needed to take the reins, someone with bold new ideas about Upper Volta and its place in the world.

Someone like Thomas Sankara.

And with &quot;Coup Number Four&quot; taking place a year later in 1983, that&apos;s exactly what happened.

Sankara was not even a senior officer in the army, at the junior rank of Captain and at a mere 33 years old, he became one of the youngest leaders in the entire world. He had been made President in 1983 but disputes amongst the power structure led to his house arrest, at which point a coup was organised on his behalf.

Sankara was a revolutionary in every sense of the word. Between his red military beret being permanently glued to his scalp and his pan-African, Marxist, anti-imperialist stance, he commanded attention, and as a result many saw him as something akin to Africa&apos;s Che Guevara. Sankara&apos;s rule would usher in an unprecedented series of social, ecological, and economic reforms that were part of what he referred to as the &quot;people&apos;s democratic revolution&quot; (although to be frank it was about as democratic as a ham sandwich.) Still what it certainly was, was a revolution for the people. His government would prioritise public health, anti-corruption efforts, education, women&apos;s rights, and economic self-reliance. This is one of those rare instances of an undemocratic leader who chooses to try and lift the nation up instead of robbing it blind. And to a people who had faced little other than corrupt instability and colonialism with extra steps since independence, it&apos;s easy to see why he was popular.

For one, the man lived and breathed Burkina Faso. Sankara was the one who renamed the country Burkina Faso in 1984, and he even personally wrote the national anthem. Many of his policy choices were extremely popular and genuinely positive for the nation. He sold the government&apos;s fleet of luxury cars and reduced ministers&apos; salaries across the board including his own. He initiated a nation-wide literacy campaign, increasing the literacy rate from 13% in 1983 to 73% in just four years. He started an initiative that planted 10 million trees in the nation to help stave off desertification, and he introduced widespread vaccination campaigns significantly lowering child mortality. He also banned female genital mutilation, forced marriage, and polygamy, championing women&apos;s rights as crucial to the overall revolution. He stated that:

&gt; &quot;Comrades, there is no true social revolution without the liberation of women.&quot;

Supporters largely remember the era as a bold attempt to empower ordinary Burkinabè and a break from colonial dependency. This is everything the country had always wanted. A country run by Africans, for Africans.

But Sankara had his downsides too. History might sand off the sharper edges of political figures over time, but some of his actions were questionable at best, and illegal at worst. Because he was a fierce anti-imperialist, Sankara refused all foreign aid to enter Burkina Faso, including financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund. Sankara&apos;s reasoning for this was that supranational organisations like the IMF are little more than colonialism in disguise. In one sense he is right, foreign aid is used all the time to prop up a meagre existence for citizens whilst corrupt politicians had their noses in the trough, but Sankara wasn&apos;t corrupt, and some of that money could have really helped a lot of Burkinabe. But he was wary of an African nation owing anything to anyone, even if it meant greater poverty for his citizens now. He is reported to have said:

&gt; &quot;He who feeds you, controls you.&quot;

And that pretty much gets the sentiment across. Sankara also had more authoritarian tendencies, including political repression, revolutionary tribunals, and arbitrary detention of political opponents. For all the good Sankara did for his nation in a short time (and there was a lot of it), we shouldn&apos;t forget the brutality either.

Ultimately his reign would be cut short by &quot;Coup Number Five&quot; in 1987 where he would be killed. The coup was organised by Blaise Compaoré (who helped organise the 1983 coup that brought Sankara to power in the first place) claiming Sankara had hurt the nation&apos;s economy and foreign relations. Compaoré&apos;s rule was a more stable one, but not a better one, reversing Sankara&apos;s economic policies and building a more conventional African state backed by Western donors. He would remain in power for the next 27 years, even surviving a few coup attempts along the way. He held elections in 1990, allowed political parties to return, and introduced new democratic reforms, but his elections were not free or fair, and with his thumb on the scale people boycotted it. The Burkinabe spirit would show itself again in 1998 though, when after the state&apos;s extrajudicial killing of journalist Norbert Zongo, tens of thousands of citizens took to the streets in protest. Compaoré relented by adding term limits to the constitution. He would give up further concessions after more unrest in 2011. His power was waning.

In 2014 he tried to do something about that, which backfired immediately. You remember those term limits he introduced? Yeah those pesky things were getting in the way of Compaoré becoming president for life, and so when he tried to get rid of them, a popular uprising ensued that quickly turned into a revolution, which also sort of counts as &quot;Coup Number Six.&quot; The country&apos;s national assembly building was burned and looted by protesters. And soon, a transitional government paved the way for democratic renewal. This was one of the first glimmers of hope that the Burkinabe had since Sankara was in charge. This revolution was justice for his murder, and the murder of Norbert Zongo. It was Sankara who called the country the land of the upright people. Well here were the people standing upright, and they were taking it back.

But they weren&apos;t the only ones who wanted it. At the same time in 2015, a radical jihadist insurgency that had been spreading through the Maghreb reached Burkina Faso. They were affiliated with the likes of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, so let&apos;s just say they weren&apos;t &quot;everyone hold hands and just get along&quot; types of people. The first attack was on a gendarmerie that year. It wouldn&apos;t be the last.

Meanwhile the transitionary council was facing its own internal crisis, as the infamous Presidential Security Regiment (the armed wing of ex-president Compaoré&apos;s regime) interrupted a government council meeting and took the transitionary government hostage. On national television a spokesman declared a coup, dissolved the government and the parliament, and removed the president. But the Burkinabe&apos;s indomitable spirit rose again to meet the challenge. Crowds reacted with anger, broadly mobilising and launching a general strike that paralysed the country. The regular army sided with the people, and the coup was thwarted. By the end of 2015 genuine democratic presidential and legislative elections took place in which Roch Marc Christian Kaboré became president. Under Kaboré&apos;s government things started to improve in some areas, the number of paved roads in the country increased by over 25%, and free healthcare for children up to five years old was implemented.

But there was a jihadist insurgency-shaped elephant in the room, which was getting worse. The nation had been relatively stable for the last three decades under Compaoré, so nobody expected it when in 2016 the insurgency struck right in the heart of the nation. Ouagadougou. Specifically the Splendid Hotel and Cappuccino restaurant. 28 people were killed, and 56 were wounded in the siege. Come 2018 and there was an attack on a French embassy as well as a military HQ. By 2019, the insurgency was starting to get out of control in Burkina Faso, spreading from the north of the nation to the east. Al-Qaeda, ISIS, homegrown terror cells, militias, and rebel groups were all fighting and wrestling for control of the nation. After all, those gold mines would make a worthy prize for any warlord. In the five years before Kaboré came to power, Burkina Faso saw just 55 fatalities related to conflict. In the five years after there were 4,939, which is an increase of almost 9,000 PERCENT. By 2022 the number of killed hit 10,000. Two million people, just under 10% of the country&apos;s population were displaced. Famine was growing, massacres were common. Atrocities in the countryside terrorised the locals and terrified those in the cities that they would be next. The government was losing its grip on the country; it couldn&apos;t even hold voter registration in more than 17% of the nation&apos;s municipalities.

Burkina Faso was burning. On its knees. Just like it was 40 years prior. Back then someone like Thomas Sankara was able to step through the chaos and be the light in the dark that the Burkinabe needed. But who would lead them now?

Well let&apos;s introduce you to &quot;Coup Number Seven.&quot; In January of 2022, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba seized power, deposing President Kaboré. And to be honest that&apos;s all you need to know about him because he was unable to deal with the insurgency. I&apos;m sure you can tell what&apos;s coming next. Magic &quot;Coup Number Eight&quot; arrived – the rarely seen double coup in a single year. A quite impressive feat for any country. The successive coups ousting the democratically elected government – even in the midst of the impending military crisis – got Burkina Faso kicked out of the African Union, and they left the regional ECOWAS group after getting sanctioned.

So then, who was going to take charge of the nation? Who would be the hero that Burkina Faso needed in its darkest hour?

… Nostalgia is a hell of a drug isn&apos;t it?

## The (Other) Man in the Beret

Enter Captain Ibrahim Traoré. Just 34 years old when he came to power in 2022, and doesn&apos;t that beret look familiar? Never takes it off.

As you might be able to tell, Traoré is no regular military strongman. He either is a genuine Sankara acolyte despite being born after Sankara&apos;s death, or as a young military captain, he was smart enough to connect himself to the most popular leader that Burkina Faso has ever had. It would be a bit like in 30 years if a loud, fake-tanned gameshow host called Ronald Grump ran for President… minus the popular part I suppose.

But he was also smart to not only mirror both Sankara&apos;s look and rise to power, but also his policies too. Traoré (or Sankara 2.0 if you prefer) has a fierce anti-western and anti-imperialist stance, go figure. And much like his predecessor he&apos;s willing to take bold action on his principles. He ended pretty much all cooperation with France, including expelling French troops from the country in 2023. Instead Traoré chose the regional powers of Mali and Niger to ally with. Together the three nations left the ECOWAS regional bloc and the G5 Sahel security alliance. And to be honest we can understand that second one because the words &quot;Sahel security alliance&quot; sounds as effective as the &quot;Vacuum Cleaners for Chernobyl Association.&quot; Have you seen the Sahel lately? It&apos;s not helping.

Traoré has also cultivated a new relationship for the nation – Russia – as evidenced by pictures of Traoré towering over diminutive KGB manlet Vladimir Putin when they met. This alliance is somewhat logical if you consider the pseudo-Marxist ideology of Sankara, Russia&apos;s growing presence in Africa, and the deep animosity for France that drives Traoré&apos;s contemporary anti-western views. Instead of French troops, Russian Wagner mercenaries would help out Burkinabe forces in the region. Initially the government denied it was hiring Wagner mercenaries to try and take back control of large proportions of the country. Wagner were already in Mali and Niger at the time before the organisation was subsumed into the Russian armed forces. Since though, Traoré has stated that Russian instructors will train its soldiers, and that Russian troops could be deployed to help quell the insurgency if required. Because nothing screams anti-imperialist like needing a foreign superpower&apos;s troops to fight your enemies.

Traoré first started to catch the attention of other African citizens when he spoke at the Russia-Africa summit in 2023. In the speech he was critical of Africa&apos;s leaders, telling them to:

&gt; &quot;… stop behaving like puppets who dance every time the imperialists pull the strings.&quot;

Of course Moscow loves that kind of political rhetoric because it plays into its own narratives of anti-westernism, even if they are in part trying to impose their own imperialism on the likes of Georgia and Ukraine, among others. But Traoré didn&apos;t care, his beef wasn&apos;t with Russia it was with the west, and could you blame him? For pan-Africanists like Traoré, for centuries western countries and companies had arrived on Africa&apos;s shores pilfering its people, plundering its profits, and propping up politicians so corrupt that if integrity was the national currency they couldn&apos;t afford a bus ticket. From that perspective, anything looks better than a western alliance that seems to have a vested interest in keeping Africa poor. African people have for the most part watched the ill-gotten gains of elites that came with western foreign investment. All that money gets spent, all those resources mined out of the ground, and Africa is still desperately poor. The west isn&apos;t helping them, if anything it was still stealing from them. And so a strange bedfellow in Moscow was found, and a voice for that anger was found in Traoré.

Traoré even attended commemorations in Russia in 2025 to mark the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in World War Two amongst a bunch of other world leaders. I told you he never takes the beret off. He would later post on X that he – along with military leaders from neighbouring Mali and Niger – were inspired by it to combat terrorism and imperialism on their home soil. Geopolitics creates some interesting crossovers sometimes, but a pan-Africanist Russophile is definitely one that I&apos;m certain not many had on their bingo card back in 2022 when assessing who might be next to take over.

And you know what?

Traoré is extremely popular, not just in his own country, but across Africa and even in certain African expat communities across the world. He is the one who has spearheaded the ongoing nationalisation campaign of the nation&apos;s gold mines and its burgeoning gold reserve. For Traoré it&apos;s crucial that Burkina Faso starts to see benefits from the immense material wealth that it has. Traoré has set up a state-owned mining company and requires foreign firms to both give it a 15% stake in their local operations and to transfer skills to Burkinabé people. This rule even applies for the Russian company Nordgold which was granted a fat new contract and mining license after Traoré came to power.

Traoré has another thing going for him, the narrative. As a young leader of an extremely young country, he more than most knows the power that social media can have on shifting public narratives. Remember Traoré only got the support to launch his coup because of the purported inability of five-second-president Damiba to deal with the continuing Islamist insurgency. Traoré needs to make sure he&apos;s not deposed the same way, and a key way to stay in power even in difficult military circumstances is popular support. We&apos;ve seen how coups can fail if the population rises up, Burkina Faso itself from 2015 is an excellent example. That also tells us that the Burkinabe spirit – as positive as it is – can be used as a political weapon to keep Traoré in power.

One key way of keeping that support is through slick social media campaigns. Pages like &quot;Traoré Vision&quot; or &quot;Traoré Builds Africa&quot; promote a charismatic leader who is &quot;shocking the West&quot; and pursuing &quot;secret masterplan&quot; to transform Burkina Faso into a pan-African economic powerhouse. Secret master plans that only these highly publicised social media accounts seem to know about. How weird. Meanwhile AI-generated videos of music stars like R Kelly, Rihanna, Justin Bieber, and Beyoncé are seen immortalising him through song. Although I&apos;d be careful on the R Kelly endorsement next time Ibrahim. But its not all silly celebrity AI slop. AI-generated images have also depicted mass fictional demonstrations in Nairobi, Harare, Kampala and even New York&apos;s Times Square in support for the Traoré regime. That has the potential to be genuinely dangerous if deployed at the wrong moment.

His appeal is even still growing, including among Afro-Caribbean citizens of western nations. According to Beverly Ochieng, a senior researcher at global consultancy firm Control Risks, Traoré has captured the revolutionary pan-Africanist zeitgeist, stating:

&gt; &quot;Traoré&apos;s impact is huge. I have even heard politicians and authors in countries like Kenya [in East Africa] say: &apos;This is it. He is the man&apos;. His messages reflect the age we are living in, when many Africans are questioning the relationship with the West, and why there is still so much poverty in such a resource-rich continent.&quot;

And yet… it&apos;s not all rosy for Traoré. Naturally French President Macron isn&apos;t keen, describing Traoré as a:

&gt; &quot;… baroque alliance between self-proclaimed pan-Africans and neo-imperialists.&quot;

He&apos;s referring to China and Russia here who both are heavily invested in influencing Africa. Traoré must know that Moscow and Beijing see his regime as an alliance of convenience in a geopolitically important region, but Ouagadougou has put a lot of eggs in the Russia basket. The insurgency isn&apos;t going overly well, maybe dispelling those French troops was a bad idea practically even if it aligned politically. Russia&apos;s ability to actually support Burkina Faso is waning by the day as Ukraine and Russia grind each other down to powder in Europe. It would be interesting to know Traoré&apos;s opinions on the Africans who have been kidnapped by Russia through fake job offers and pressganged into military service. Naturally it could cause tensions between the nations, after all the only thing they have in common is their hatred of the west.

The nation&apos;s focus on Traoré through social media is largely a distraction from the insurgency continuing to get worse, like a band-aid stuck over the bleeding stump of a traumatic amputation. You can only hide that kind of thing from your citizens for so long, and people might start to feel differently about his junta if bullets start flying in their home towns. Although some assert that this new social media strategy effectively recruits citizens themselves to police and spread propaganda both online and in person. Justin Yarga, an exiled Burkinabe journalist based in Sweden stated that:

&gt; &quot;I remember people responding to our investigation by saying, &apos;We don&apos;t care—even if it&apos;s propaganda. All that matters is that they&apos;re [meaning Traoré&apos;s government] right about France.&apos;&quot;

Traoré has to be careful, because he came to power on the assumption and vow that he would end the insurgency and end it quickly. He promised sure defeat for the jihadists within six months and elections within a year. None of that happened, but that&apos;s hardly surprising, this is bigger than Traoré. All across the Sahel and Maghreb jihadist violence is on the rise. Of course Traoré knew that being a military man, but it sounded good on TV – perhaps he just didn&apos;t think ahead to what might happen if he overpromised and underdelivered. Six months after taking control he stated that elections were not a priority for the country. Understandable with a war on your front porch, but Traoré&apos;s authoritarian tendencies paint a stark picture about the direction Burkina Faso is going. Under certain laws passed by the Traoré regime, the government is now able to strip Burkinabe citizenship from individuals who publicly criticize the President. But that&apos;s not going to help him if he can&apos;t get the damn insurgency under control.

Traoré might be a charismatic and principled leader – at least on the surface – but this game isn&apos;t really about leaders. It&apos;s about building institutions of accountability and finding the right balance of power, even among military juntas or dictatorships in order to make the country secure. So for all of the positives people can ascribe to Traoré, if the situation gets bad enough we may well see &quot;Coup Number Nine&quot; soon enough.

So given all of that then, how is Burkina Faso doing today?

Let&apos;s just say … not great.

## The Basket Case of West Africa

According to Paul Melly, an expert on the Sahel region at geopolitical thinktank Chatham House, an estimated 70% of the country under the control of armed groups, terrorists, radical Islamists, militias, and more. At least that was the assessment as of late 2025. Other firms put the number closer to 60% but either way the majority of the country is just straight up out of the government&apos;s control, which of course doesn&apos;t bode overly well for Traoré given his promises. Burkina Faso now represents the epicentre of a wider Islamic jihadist problem that currently exists in West Africa. But just how this conflict is bigger than Traoré, it&apos;s bigger than the nation itself as well, and that&apos;s kind of a problem. Jihadists can move across borders from one nation to another when things get dicey, and without sufficient cross-border security arrangements this will forever be a never-ending game of whack-a-mole – just with fewer high scores and more vests rigged with Semtex.

Large swathes of the country are totally cut off right now, which effectively leaves the citizens to fend for themselves, and whilst the Burkinabe have spirit, unfortunately they lose more fights than they win and it&apos;s not close. On August the 24th 2024, militants attacked the northern town of Barsalogho, killing hundreds of civilians, it&apos;s just one massacre of many. Not even NGOs can get access to some areas and only military aid can reach a few villages sparingly. Others get nothing and end up getting slaughtered by the Islamists all the same. Food insecurity is rising; millions have been displaced amounting to a little under 10% of the population and to be honest it&apos;s a miracle that number isn&apos;t higher.

When its not the jihadists killing civilians though the government seems to be able to step in and fulfil that role just fine. International human rights groups as well as the European Union and UN have accused Burkina Faso of serious human rights violations, including the indiscriminate killings and forced disappearances of dozens of civilians. Some civilians have started joining citizens militias known as the VDP or Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland. They do what they can, but their training is minimal and because they&apos;re not soldiers they&apos;re naturally undisciplined, it also further blurs the already hazy lines between combatant and civilian that exists here.

And to be honest all of this is a deeply embarrassing crisis for Ouagadougou that they simply can&apos;t seem to handle. And so in the absence of being able to deal with the insurgency, Burkina Faso has also started to see a major free press crackdown. In 2022 for example Burkina Faso suspended French broadcaster Radio France International and later France 24, whilst journalists for the French newspapers Le Monde and Liberation were expelled from the country. But its not just French media getting the chop here. Despite the free press being described as &quot;robust&quot; in Burkina Faso, in April of 2024, the country suspended a group of foreign media outlets – including the BBC – over their coverage of a report accusing the Burkinabè army of killing 223 civilians. Because nothing says Pan-Africanism like an African nation needlessly causing the deaths of its own citizens. Meanwhile some outspoken critics of the government have been sent to the front lines to go fight the jihadists. Dissent is increasingly not tolerated within the country as Traoré&apos;s digital cult of personality continues to grow. On social media valid critical questions asked about Traoré and his leadership are shouted down, seen as damn near sacrilege even at a time of great national uncertainty. Ultimately the state eventually won&apos;t even need to censor the media anymore if Burkinabe citizens can just do it for them.

Political parties are still outlawed as of 2026 and of course until the fighting is under control there are slim chances of any elections any time soon. Russia is still playing its part from the shadows with security cooperation, military training and a healthy dose of Russian propaganda to help launder the country&apos;s image. Russian-linked forces are present across the region, but they don&apos;t seem to be making much of a military dent anywhere at the moment, let alone here.

So as we see the nation descend into chaos, its poignant to remember what&apos;s important. Burkina Faso is a proud place filled with a proud people, who time after time have chosen to stand up for themselves when faced with overwhelming systemic corruption, military dictatorships, and the hardships of African history. Where the country goes from here is anybody&apos;s guess. Complete collapse? Consolidation and a military victory? Another coup? Let&apos;s be honest it&apos;ll probably be another coup. But anything&apos;s possible. Here&apos;s hoping that somehow Burkina Faso, this beautiful country that is only capable of doing anything at breakneck speeds, can one day reach a peaceful, sustained, and democratic political future. It&apos;s the least the Burkinabe deserve. But to do that the fighting and the bloodshed has to be ended. Not delayed, not turned back, ended. Because if it doesn&apos;t, then the pan-African dream revived for the modern day will become a living nightmare very quickly.

## Key Takeaways

- Burkina Faso experienced two coups in 2022 and is now ruled by 34-year-old Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who models himself on revolutionary leader Thomas Sankara.
- Traoré has expelled French troops, allied with Russia, and nationalized gold mines, yet armed groups control an estimated 60-70% of the country as of late 2025.
- The jihadist insurgency has caused conflict deaths to surge from 55 in five pre-2015 years to over 10,000 by 2022, displacing nearly 10% of the population.
- Traoré uses extensive social media campaigns and AI-generated celebrity videos to build a cult of personality, while cracking down on press freedom and political dissent.
- Despite promises to defeat jihadists within six months and hold elections within a year, Traoré has delivered neither and outlawed political parties through 2026.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What does Burkina Faso mean and why is it significant?

Burkina Faso literally means &apos;land of the upright people.&apos; It was renamed from Upper Volta by Thomas Sankara in 1984, and the name reflects the fiercely independent and proud nature of the Burkinabe people.

### How many coups has Burkina Faso experienced since independence?

According to the article, Burkina Faso has experienced at least eight coups since independence in 1960, with two coups occurring in a single year in 2022. The article also suggests a potential &apos;Coup Number Nine&apos; could occur if conditions worsen.

### Who is Ibrahim Traore and how did he come to power?

Ibrahim Traore is a military captain who came to power in 2022 at age 34 through &apos;Coup Number Eight,&apos; ousting Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. Traore launched his coup due to Damiba&apos;s purported inability to deal with the continuing Islamist insurgency.

### What is the current security situation in Burkina Faso?

As of late 2025, an estimated 60-70% of Burkina Faso is under the control of armed groups, terrorists, radical Islamists, and militias. The country represents the epicentre of a wider Islamic jihadist problem in West Africa, with millions displaced and frequent massacres occurring.

### How has Ibrahim Traore&apos;s government approached foreign relations differently from previous governments?

Traore ended almost all cooperation with France, including expelling French troops in 2023, and instead allied with Mali, Niger, and Russia. He left the ECOWAS regional bloc and the G5 Sahel security alliance, and has cultivated a relationship with Russia including Russian military instructors and potential troop deployments.

### What social media strategies has the Traore regime used to maintain popularity?

The Traore regime uses slick social media campaigns through pages like &apos;Traore Vision&apos; and &apos;Traore Builds Africa,&apos; promotes AI-generated videos of music stars like Beyoncé and Rihanna singing about him, and has deployed AI-generated images depicting fictional demonstrations of international support. These campaigns promote him as &apos;shocking the West&apos; and pursuing a &apos;secret masterplan&apos; to transform Burkina Faso.

### What were some of Thomas Sankara&apos;s key reforms and policies?

Sankara initiated widespread reforms including: selling government luxury cars and reducing minister salaries; a nationwide literacy campaign that increased literacy from 13% to 73% in four years; planting 10 million trees to combat desertification; widespread vaccination campaigns; banning female genital mutilation, forced marriage, and polygamy; and pursuing economic self-reliance while refusing all foreign aid including from the IMF.

### What is the status of political parties and elections in Burkina Faso as of 2026?

As of 2026, political parties are outlawed in Burkina Faso. Traore had promised elections within a year of taking power but later stated elections were not a priority. The article notes there are slim chances of elections anytime soon until the fighting is under control.

### What human rights concerns have been raised about the Traore regime?

International human rights groups, the EU, and UN have accused Burkina Faso of serious human rights violations including indiscriminate killings and forced disappearances of civilians. The government can strip citizenship from individuals who publicly criticize the President, some critics have been sent to front lines to fight jihadists, and there has been a major crackdown on free press including suspending BBC, Radio France International, France 24, and expelling journalists.

### What is Burkina Faso&apos;s economic situation regarding gold and poverty?

Burkina Faso has the largest gold reserves in Africa and is Africa&apos;s fourth largest gold producer, churning more than 57 tons in 2023. GDP per capita is 3.29 times higher than in 1980. However, over 41% of citizens still live below the national poverty line, the economy is vulnerable due to dependence on cotton and gold exports, just under half the population lacks clean water, only 21.7% had electricity access in 2023, and there are only 1.46 doctors per 10,000 people.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Burkina Faso: The West African Dictatorship That Loves Russia.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=59CjHILijHw)
- [Hero image source](https://images.rawpixel.com/editor_1024/czNmcy1wcml2YXRlL3Jhd3BpeGVsX2ltYWdlcy93ZWJzaXRlX2NvbnRlbnQvbHIvdXB3azYxNjkzODU2LXdpa2ltZWRpYS1pbWFnZS1rb3dsbDVsMS5qcGc.jpg) by openverse, cc0.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Zheleznogorsk/Krasnoyarsk-26: Siberia’s Secret Nuclear City</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/zheleznogorsk-krasnoyarsk-26-siberia-secret-nuclear-city</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/zheleznogorsk-krasnoyarsk-26-siberia-secret-nuclear-city</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Imagine you are living in Soviet Russia in the 1960s. One day, you are summoned by your department supervisor to discuss an important matter. You brace for the worst, and you get the worst, when you are told in dry and unflinching terms: &quot;Comrade, pack your bags. You are leaving for Siberia.&quot;

In panic, your mind starts to race. Have you done something wrong? Why do you deserve this? It turns out, you are not being punished. This is a promotion.

You are heading to a city where you will have access to goods, amenities and luxuries which your fellow nationals elsewhere can only dream of. And a sweet salary to match that sweet life.

This is a special and exclusive location.

So special, in fact, no one ever heard, nor will hear about it.

So exclusive, it&apos;s not even on the map.

And there are another couple of catches.

You will be constantly monitored by the military, the police and the KGB. Your freedom of movement will be severely curtailed. And you will have to work in a highly dangerous, poisonous, potentially lethal environment, as you contribute to the construction of devices which could bring about the end of the world.

Congratulations, you have been hired to work in Krasnoyarsk-26, Siberia&apos;s secret nuclear city.

## Citizens of ZATO

Our destination today is Krasnoyarsk-26, known since 1994 as Zheleznogorsk. It has also been known as &quot;Soc City&quot; or &quot;PO-9&quot;. It is located on the eastern bank of the Yenisei River, within the oblast, or administrative region, of Krasnoyarsk Krai, in central Siberia.

But before we reach your future workplace, my dear comrades, let me give you a briefing about Soviet secret cities.

Before the onset of WWII, or &quot;Great Patriotic War&quot;, the Soviet military-industrial complex funded the construction of new towns and cities entirely dedicated to the development of weapons. After Operation Barbarossa was unleashed in June 1941, the construction of these manufacturing towns accelerated, with new centres being founded East of Urals, beyond the reach of the Axis.

After the end of that very hot conflict, the onset of the Cold War pitched the opposing Western and Eastern Blocs in a perpetual nuclear arms race. Josef Stalin decided to resurrect the concept of purposefully built towns, creating dozens of centres of excellence dedicated to research and development of new armaments.

Some were designated as &quot;Naukograds&quot; — science towns — or &quot;Akademgorodok&quot; — academic cities. Others became known as &quot;ZATOs&quot; — a Russian acronym which can be translated as &quot;closed administrative-territorial formations&quot;.

In simpler terms, the ZATOs were secret cities, removed from all maps and guides, and kept out of bounds to all foreigners and most Soviet citizens. They didn&apos;t even have a name, but were simply identified by a postal code, composed by the name of the Oblast, or administrative region, followed by a number.

For example: Krasnoyarsk-26!

The numbers theoretically indicated the distance in kilometres from the main administrative city of the oblast, but were often assigned at random, or changed at will, to further shed confusion about their whereabouts.

Some of you may think: &quot;hang on! Surely the building contractors knew where these cities were located!&quot;

I have to sadly inform you that Stalin&apos;s public tender process did not exactly follow modern procurement practices. Except for one principle: give the contract to the lowest bidder. Which, in Stalin&apos;s case, translated to slave labour, provided by the Gulag system.

Once these ZATOs were completed, they would be dedicated mainly to research, development and manufacturing in the fields of space exploration, military intelligence, and mostly, weapons of mass destruction.

Now, we should clarify that the Soviets were not the first to come up with this concept. Back in 1915, the British Government developed the townships of Eastriggs and Gretna, entirely dedicated to the production of cordite for ammunition — and completely secret!

Later, the US would adopt the same approach to house the personnel involved in the Manhattan Project.

Many Soviet ZATOs, in fact, were conceived along the model of the American &quot;factory towns&quot;, residential centres developed for, and occupied by, the personnel of a single employer. As such, Soviet secret cities came with their own schools, hospitals, power plants, restaurants, shops and other amenities, offering to their inhabitants — often in the tens of thousands — a standard of living considerably better than the one endured by the general population.

But you could say they lived in a gilded cage. The ZATOs were surrounded by fences, walls, and guard posts. The entry and exit to cities was regulated by armed personnel, and all inhabitants were under heavy surveillance of the Soviet security services, be it the NKVD or its successor the KGB.

As you may expect, even after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is still difficult to survey the exact number and location of these secret cities. I mean, the clue is in the name.

Nonetheless, one estimate places the number at 38, of which 17 are categorised as &quot;gorsovets&quot;, or larger centres with population above 20,000, which include both urban facilities and rural locations. The remaining 21 are &quot;PGTs&quot; or &quot;Urban-Type Settlements&quot;, which house fewer than 20,000 citizens and do not include rural areas.

It is now time to make a stop at our &quot;gorsovet&quot; of choice, Krasnoyarsk-26, and learn about its history.

## Life of Luxury (and Plutonium)

Krasnoyarsk-26 was founded in 1950, following the blueprints drawn up by the Governmental Construction Design Institute-11 in Leningrad.

The orders for its construction were given directly by Josef Stalin and Lavrenti Beria, head of the feared security apparatus, the NKVD. In their plans, the secret town would house the staff to be employed at the Mining and Chemical Combine, or MCC, another planned facility to be built 10 km to the north of Krasnoyarsk-26.

A work force of 70,000 GULAG prisoners converged on the banks of the Yenisei. These enslaved labourers included political dissidents, farmers and prisoners of war from Germany, Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Spain and Finland.

The essential infrastructure of the town was completed in 1954, but the prisoners continued to toil away at the construction of the town and the MCC plant until 1964. The work at MCC was particularly gruesome and back-breaking, as it involved digging out rock from inside a granite mountain.

It was the combined presence of the mountain and the river which convinced Stalin and Beria to select this location. You see, in spite of that boring and harmless title, &quot;Mining Chemical Combine&quot;, the plant was anything but: it was dedicated to the production of plutonium-239 to arm the Soviet Union&apos;s nuclear arsenal.

The granite mountain would protect from enemy strikes the MCC, housed in tunnels and chambers excavated up to 250 metres beneath ground level. And the waters of the Yenisei would be used to cool the reactors generating the plutonium.

The first reactor, AD, was brought into operation on August 25th, 1958. Two more reactors, ADE-1 and ADE-2, were completed in 1961 and 1964 respectively. The first two are described as graphite-moderated reactors, cooled with light water canalised from the nearby river. The contaminated water was then piped back into the Yenisei. The third reactor was cooled via a closed-loop system, meaning that it did not discharge directly into the river.

The end product of the MCC was plutonium dioxide, which was then shipped to the chemical and metallurgical plants in two other &quot;secret towns&quot;, Chelyabinsk-65 and Tomsk-7. There, the plutonium dioxide was converted to metal, ready to be used in nuclear warheads. According to US estimates, the MCC originated more than 40 tons of weapons-grade plutonium, one-third of the total used by the Soviet military-industrial complex.

This process produced large amounts of radioactive waste, of course. The majority was transported to a storage site in Severny, some 55 km to the south west, close to the capital of the oblast. However, part of the waste was processed directly at MCC, and disposed of inside deep waste injection wells.

Reactors AD and ADE-1 were shut down in 1992, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. As per ADE-2, it&apos;s a more complicated story, as we&apos;ll learn later.

So, during the decades in which all reactors were in operation, the residents of Krasnoyarsk-26 went to work every day into the bowels of a granite mountain, handling highly radioactive isotopes. Sure, they worked hard but they were also awarded a standard of living which other Soviet citizens could only dream of.

Their town offered the best housing in the nation, the best clothes, the best food — even chocolate, a rare luxury!

Residents enjoyed 36 days of paid holidays per year — if they worked at ground level. Those who had to routinely descend below the mountain were given 48 days of leave. It is not clear whether the inhabitants of Krasnoyarsk-26 were allowed to routinely leave the confines of their &quot;ZATO&quot; during these periods of leave.

But even if they couldn&apos;t, the town offered enough amenities and distractions to keep them well entertained. For example, the residential area of the secret city boasted an artificial lake with three beaches, and a movie theatre showing brand new Soviet films the day after they opened in Moscow.

## Stream of Running Death

The USSR inevitably collapsed onto itself in December of 1991 and the ever present danger of the Cold War became a past memory. Weapons-grade plutonium was not so much in demand any longer, and the Mining and Chemical Combine at Krasnoyarsk-26 scaled down operations.

In 1992, reactors AD and ADE-1 were closed down. Two years later, the once secret town was revealed to the world, and renamed Zheleznogorsk. Then, in 1995, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation cancelled its plutonium orders from MCC. The remaining reactor, ADE-2, was then reconverted into producing electricity for civilian use, essentially becoming the main source of power and heating for Zheleznogorsk.

Over the previous 36 years, the MCC plant had produced enough plutonium-dioxide to power more than 10,000 nuclear warheads.

Naturally, the scaling down of operations at MCC combined with the dissolution of the USSR, had a significant impact on the livelihood of the local citizens. The residents of Krasnoyarsk-26, now Zheleznogorsk, were no longer confined to a life of luxurious captivity, but this meant they were also stripped of their privileges. Wages were severely reduced, very often delayed. The previously state-of-the-art facilities went into a steep decline. The remaining reactor at MCC itself could not be operated continuously, resulting in frequent power outages. The town was left without heating for extended periods of time — and we are talking about Siberia here!

The healthcare infrastructure was particularly hit hard by cuts in funding, with medical services limited to emergency surgery.

Now, the availability of good healthcare service in such an area is kind of a key point. You may bury your nuclear reactors 250 metres beneath a granite mountain, and you can pump radioactive waste further underground … but if you use the nearby river as a cooling system, sooner or later radiation poisoning is going to leak out.

In 1990, the Soviet Union&apos;s State Committee for Nature Protection set up a commission in charge of evaluating the effects of radiation due to plutonium on the inhabitants of the area. The commission reached the conclusion that the MCC had no major impact on health.

As you may expect, this is not exactly the case.

In the years following the commission&apos;s report, many independent researchers have found evidence of contamination in and around Krasnoyarsk-26. More worryingly, they have found evidence of its consequences.

One of those researchers was Vladimir Mazharov, from the Institute of Complex Problems of Hygiene and Occupational Diseases, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Mazharov compared healthcare statistics from three districts closest to the MCC against a control group of areas elsewhere in the Krasnoyarsk oblast.

He also compared the incidence of disease in the population of the area, before and after 1958, when the facility started to produce plutonium.

Mazharov found that the mortality rate due to solid and haematological tumours for the area in the early 1950s was 88.9 per 100,000 people. After the MCC began its operations, the mortality rate increased to 134.4 per 100,000.

By comparison, the mortality rate in the control areas remained stable.

The increase in mortality rate was particularly staggering when it came to cases of breast cancer, soaring from 1.9 to 10.9 per 100,000 women. Besides breast cancer, it appears that radioactivity generated by the MCC was responsible for increased incidence in lung, thyroid, bone and skin cancers.

Mazharov also noted an increase in cases of complicated pregnancies and birth defects, mostly concentrated along the basin of the river Yenisei, downstream from Krasnoyarsk-26. This resulted in frequent genetic disorders and immunodeficiencies reported amongst the locals.

The researcher&apos;s conclusion was that the effects of living downstream from the MCC plant were &quot;clearly unfavourable&quot;.

The increase in incidence of cancers is hardly a surprise, especially if you look at the research conducted by Irina Osokina, Chief of Endocrinology at the Institute for Medical Problems of the North, in Krasnoyarsk. Her 1996 studies demonstrated how plutonium contamination in the area surrounding the MCC was between 8 and 17 times higher than the contamination resulting from nuclear weapons tests.

Another researcher who has been focusing on the pernicious impact of MCC on the Yenisei river is Alexander Bolsunovsky, from the Krasnoyarsk Institute of Biophysics.

In the mid-to-late 1990s, Bolsunovsky carried out several fact-finding expeditions finding that the sands of the riverbed, the river islands and the floodplains by the banks were heavily contaminated with isotopes resulting from nuclear fissions, such as plutonium-239, cesium-137 and strontium-90.

Evidence of contamination was found in the two closest villages to Krasnoyarsk-26, Atamanovo and Bolshoi Balchug. Here, researchers from the Russian Academy of Sciences surveyed the presence of the radioactive isotope caesium-137. Its concentration was 1,000 times higher compared to the readings following the Chernobyl accident.

So, you would expect the villages closest to the MCC to be heavily exposed to contamination. But exposure to radioactive waste has transformed the nearby river into a &quot;stream of running death&quot; — to borrow a line from &quot;Radioactive Toy&quot;, by band Porcupine Tree. Dangerous amounts of radiation have been detected in Yeniseysk, a town of 22,000 inhabitants more than 300 km to the north of the MCC plant!

An island close to Yeniseysk, Gorodskoi, is particularly contaminated. According to Dr Vitaly Kovalenko, Regional Sanitary Centre of Krasnoyarsk, the soil on the small island emitted radiation levels of 48 becquerels per kilo. The standard radiation levels for the soil in the region are 0.3 becquerels per kilo.

But radioactive contamination travelling downstream did not stop at Gorodskoi, and was detected as far as 1,400 km away from the MCC. The Siberian Institute of Biophysics found radioactive particles in campsites along the riverbanks. Here, the institute&apos;s experts estimated that a camper enjoying the great outdoors would absorb a year&apos;s worth of radiation in just three hours!

Unsurprisingly, radioactive debris and particles have been detected also in the local flora and fauna.

In August 1998, the Washington Post visited the banks of the Yenisei, and found that most of the locals relied on fishing and foraging for their sustenance. And while they had been warned about the danger of radioactive poisoning, they had no choice but to continue fishing in the river, or collecting mushrooms near its banks.

Biophysicist Bolsunovsky also clarified how radiation poisoning had invaded the Yenisei basin. The most obvious explanation is that the plant cooled its reactors with water pumped from the river, which was then discharged back into the Yenisei. In addition to that, the MCC also bored deep holes into the ground, injecting into them millions of cubic metres of radioactive waste.

According to research published in 1996 by Donald J. Bradley, US Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, these injections released 1 billion curies of radioactivity into the Earth. In 1996, 450 million curies could still be detected.

To understand that level of radiation, Bradley used the Chernobyl disaster as comparison. The April 1986 accident released 5.8 million curies. In other words, the radioactivity in the caverns underneath the MCC is 172 times stronger than the one released at Chernobyl!

While the caverns should do a good job of containing it, Bolsunovsky argued that the radioactive waste may leak into nearby layers of coal, and from there make its way into the Yenisei.

## The Last Reactor

The research findings on radiation poisoning and its impact on cancer rates were duly contested by MCC administration throughout the 1990s.

The Russian government, however, was well aware of the dangers of contamination.

And so was the US government.

You see, since the fall of the Soviet Union, both administrations had started cooperating on shutting down plutonium-producing plants.

What kept them awake at night was the ever lingering spectre of accidents in an ageing reactor. Or even worse: the possibility that some of the plutonium produced near Zheleznogorsk might be sold on the black market to terrorist groups or rogue governments.

This was a serious threat, as workers and technicians employed at the MCC plant were growing increasingly disgruntled, due to poor salaries and labour conditions.

By the end of 1992, the ADE-2 was only one of three plutonium-producing reactors still in function in Russia.

As mentioned earlier, just closing it down was not an option, as it powered all electricity and heating for the newly rebranded Zheleznogorsk.

The solution to the problem was to replace or convert the current reactor … but how?

In autumn of 1993, the first proposal came from Evgeny Velikhov, Director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy. His plan was to replace the nuclear reactor with gas-turbine generators, which would be installed by an unnamed manufacturer of jet engines and GazProm, Russia&apos;s national gas provider. The total cost for the operation would be relatively affordable, $25 million!

This plan was supported by physicist and government advisor, Prof Frank von Hippel, and later endorsed by US Vice President Al Gore, and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

On June 23, 1994, the two leaders signed a formal agreement, calling for the ADE-2 reactor to be replaced by a non-plutonium based power source by the year 2000.

But all hopes of quickly resolving this issue were dashed by GazProm. Their offer to install a gas-turbine for $25 million morphed into a pitch to replace the MCC reactor with a coal-fired power plant. The estimated bill: $300 million!

The solution suddenly became too costly for both the American and Russian governments, and an alternative needed to be found.

Enter the US Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. Their proposed option, &quot;core conversion&quot;, consisted of keeping the ADE-2 reactor. They would replace the type of fuel used instead.

Until that moment, the MCC reactor was fed with uranium. As a byproduct of the reaction, the plant produced highly radioactive plutonium isotope, which came with its host of problems, from contamination to potential reuse in &quot;rogue&quot; nuclear weapons. The new plan called for the uranium fuel to be replaced by enriched uranium dioxide, dispersed in a solid aluminium matrix.

The by-product and waste material resulting from this type of fuel would have been much more stable, safer, easier and cheaper to store.

And to make the revamped reactor even more secure, this plan also envisaged the installation of emergency cooling systems and a new reactor core design. This design included the use of erbium-167, a rare isotope with the even rarer property of absorbing neutrons, thus stabilising the reactor and preventing Chernobyl-style accidents.

The US government liked the proposal of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and their pals at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. What they liked most was the price tag: $160 million in total to convert three reactors, including our &quot;old friend&quot; in Zheleznogorsk.

That&apos;s $53 million a pop per reactor, of which Washington would be paying half of the bill.

After initial feasibility studies, in September 1997, Gore and Chernomyrdin formally signed a reactor-conversion agreement. At this stage, however, the plan was thrown off course by what Prof Hippel and energy policy analyst Prof Matthew Bunn described as &quot;a particularly nasty turf war over whether the Department of Defense or Department of Energy should finance and control the conversion effort&quot;.

The DoD eventually had the upper hand, but the whole tug-o-war delayed the project by one year, &quot;a delay which seriously eroded the already difficult relationship between the US government and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy&quot;.

Another point of friction was the choice of what type of enriched uranium dioxide should be used in the converted reactor. The Russian project managers preferred using weapons-grade uranium, as this was a tried-and-tested fuel.

Their US counterparts argued that one of the points of the entire project was to avoid the risk of using weapons-grade uranium in the first place! How about using low-enriched uranium, or LEU as an alternative?

The ongoing debate caused further delays, taking us to 1999. The Americans and the Russians reached a compromise, by which weapons-grade uranium would be used as fuel to begin with, but it would be replaced with LEU at a later stage.

By the end of the year, however, two major setbacks put the entire project in jeopardy. Following an economic crisis in August 1998, the Russian government had to admit that they could not foot half of the bill, as initially agreed.

In addition to that, the US Department of Defence and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy had to contend with a complex licensing snag. The design for the new converted reactor had to receive a safety licence from Russia&apos;s State Atomic Inspectorate, or GAN.

But one of GAN&apos;s officials, Alexander Dmitriev, raised some concerns about the capability of the erbium isotope to stabilise the reactor, therefore believing the new design to be unsafe.

It had been six years since the initial plan to replace the ADE-2 reactor, and all valiant efforts to reach a solution appeared to crash and burn. That&apos;s when the Ministry of Atomic Energy surprised everybody by ditching their original idea for reactor conversion.

Their new pitch was to simply shut down ADE-2 and replace it with a coal-fired plant.

The US Government agreed in principle, but another year of delays followed, as the Department of Defence handed the project back over to the Department of Energy.

Actual work started only in May 2003, when the DoE awarded $466 million to their contractors Washington Group International and Raytheon Technical Services. If that price tag appears rather steep, it&apos;s because it also included the shut down of the two reactors at Seversk. So, a bargain, really!

On April 15, 2010, the almost never-ending saga of the last remaining plutonium-producing reactors in Russia reached its natural conclusion. On that date, MCC spokesperson Yelena Golovinkina announced that the ADE-2 reactor &quot;was shut down today at 0400 GMT … The closure of the ADE-2 reactor has major international significance. It is the last active military plutonium producer in the world&quot;.

## A Breakthrough?

At the time of writing, the Mining and Chemical Combine, MCC, is still in operation, although the facility does not directly generate energy any longer. As a subsidiary of Rosatom, Russia&apos;s state nuclear authority, the plant focuses on producing fuel to be used by other facilities, such as the BN-800 fast neutron reactor, at the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant, Sverdlovsk district.

This more recent production line, located 200 metres underground, went into operation at the end of 2014 and is dedicated to generating so-called MOX fuel, a mixture of plutonium and uranium dioxides. The new line was built as part of Russia&apos;s &quot;Breakthrough initiative&quot;, aimed at enabling a closed nuclear fuel cycle, which would ultimately eliminate the production of radioactive waste.

To put it in terms so simple that I can hear the nuclear physicists baying for blood: in a closed nuclear fuel cycle, radioactive waste can be recycled and reused as fuel itself, therefore eliminating the costs and risks associated with the storage and disposal of said waste.

The &quot;Breakthrough&quot; of the &quot;Breakthrough initiative&quot;, however, appears to be still distant in the future, at least as far as the operations in Zheleznogorsk are concerned.

As of November 2019, the MOX production lines at MCC were still producing liquid radioactive waste, which was then being piped and pumped underground at the Severny landfill, in Krasnoyarsk. Every year, the Combine would dispose of 35,000 cubic metres of low- and medium-level radioactive waste.

At the end of 2019, local environmentalist groups were concerned that the underground waste may migrate through soil and contaminate adjacent aquifers — a risk which may be augmented by seismic activity.

These concerns prompted the MCC to organise a technical tour of the Severny landfills, for the benefit of journalists and the public. The tour was joined by observers of the Bellona Foundation, a non-profit organisation dedicated to tackling environmental issues. Their conclusion was: &quot;The impression we gained from the staff and of the landfill itself was very favourable&quot;.

That reassuring note concludes our exploration of Krasnoyarsk-26, secret nuclear city and home to the last plutonium reactor in Russia, one of the last vestiges of the Cold War. We do hope that the MCC production lines and the Severny landfill will not be the source of further radiation poisoning in the future, and that seems to be the case.

We also have to acknowledge, however, that the situation may have evolved since the end of 2019, and if you have more up to date information, or a direct experience of visiting these locations, please feel free to share your knowledge.

## Key Takeaways

- Krasnoyarsk-26, now Zheleznogorsk, was a secret Soviet city built for nuclear weapons production.
- Residents of Krasnoyarsk-26 enjoyed high living standards but were heavily monitored and restricted.
- The Mining and Chemical Combine produced plutonium, causing significant radiation contamination in the Yenisei River.
- Shutting down the last plutonium reactor involved complex international negotiations and technical challenges.
- The city&apos;s current operations focus on producing MOX fuel, aiming for a closed nuclear fuel cycle.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What was the original name of Zheleznogorsk?

The original name of Zheleznogorsk was Krasnoyarsk-26.

### When was Krasnoyarsk-26 founded?

Krasnoyarsk-26 was founded in 1950.

### What was the primary purpose of the Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC) in Krasnoyarsk-26?

The primary purpose of the MCC was the production of plutonium-239 for the Soviet Union&apos;s nuclear arsenal.

### How many reactors were initially built at the MCC?

Three reactors were built at the MCC: AD, ADE-1, and ADE-2.

### What was the impact of the MCC on the health of local residents?

Researchers found evidence of increased mortality rates due to cancers and birth defects among residents living near the MCC, particularly along the Yenisei River.

### What was the &apos;Breakthrough initiative&apos; mentioned in the article?

The &apos;Breakthrough initiative&apos; aimed to enable a closed nuclear fuel cycle, recycling radioactive waste as fuel to eliminate the costs and risks associated with storage and disposal.

### What was the significance of the shutdown of the ADE-2 reactor in 2010?

The shutdown of the ADE-2 reactor in 2010 marked the closure of the last active military plutonium producer in the world.

### How did the residents of Krasnoyarsk-26 live compared to other Soviet citizens?

Residents of Krasnoyarsk-26 enjoyed a higher standard of living with access to better housing, food, and amenities, along with generous paid holidays, in exchange for working in a highly dangerous environment.

### What were the environmental concerns related to the Severny landfill in Krasnoyarsk?

Environmental concerns included the potential migration of underground waste through soil, contaminating adjacent aquifers, and the risk of seismic activity exacerbating this issue.

### What was the role of the Yenisei River in the operations of the MCC?

The Yenisei River was used to cool the reactors at the MCC, with contaminated water being discharged back into the river, leading to significant radioactive contamination downstream.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Zheleznogorsk/Krasnoyarsk-26: Siberia’s Secret Nuclear City](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=10VYrcw4aTs)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/57/Aerial_landscape_view_%282017%29.jpg) by Saga1111 / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Most Extreme Prison in Russia</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/most-extreme-prison-russia-black-dolphin</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/most-extreme-prison-russia-black-dolphin</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>What&apos;s the only thing worse than a life sentence in a maximum-security prison? That&apos;s right, a life sentence in a Russian maximum-security prison. To be locked away inside a vault in the middle of the tundra, miles away from civilisation in one of the most dangerous nations in the world, it doesn&apos;t bear thinking about.

And yet for a select few, this isn&apos;t just a thought, but a reality. These places often represent no escape, no freedom and no hope. This is the story of one of those institutions. We&apos;re going to show you the monsters who are held in this place. When we tell you what they&apos;ve done, you&apos;ll be glad they&apos;re there for life.

This is a prison where the only thing worse than the frozen conditions outside are the inmates inside. Russia&apos;s supermax prison. A modern-day gulag.

Black Dolphin.

## What is &quot;Black Dolphin&quot;?

Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s was a hard place to live. Post-Soviet collapse and economic insecurity gripped the nation leading many to misery, alcoholism and a life of crime.

By that we don&apos;t just mean stealing a loaf of bread to feed your children kind of crime; but vicious, brutal, violent crime. Between 1988 and 1994, the Russian homicide rate more than tripled. By 2003, the country had one of the highest murder rates in the world.

As such, Russia needed a place to put the worst of the worst and lock away the key. And they found their solution in the prison known as IK-6. Originally an 18th century prison colony for those sentenced to hard labour, in 2000, IK-6 was updated to house Russia&apos;s violent criminal epidemic. Far away from the large cities in Western Russia, it was a suitable place to isolate criminals away.

Today, the facility is thought to house some 700 inmates in its maximum-security section – although given the secretive nature of Russia&apos;s penal system, it&apos;s hard to get accurate numbers. If we take the often-reported figure of 700 as true, though, that means they have collectively committed 3,500 murders - an average of five murders per inmate. Imagine having killed four people and being sent to a prison where that is considered &quot;below par&quot;.

Why the name &apos;Black Dolphin&apos; though? It seems a strange thing to call a prison, especially one that&apos;s situated in a landlocked region.

Well, Russian prisons being nicknamed after animals is a surprisingly common practice, just ask inmates at Polar Owl, White Swan, and Red Eagle prisons. But Black Dolphin&apos;s name also comes from something you wouldn&apos;t expect from a modern-day gulag, art. There is a sculpture just outside of the prison of, you guessed it, a black dolphin, made by the prisoners themselves, representing an interesting contrast. Dolphins are often symbols of freedom and black ones are exceptionally rare. In a way, the name of the prison could be said to translate to &quot;rare freedom&quot;, which makes sense given that the only way to leave Black Dolphin is in a body bag.

## Conditions at Black Dolphin

Black Dolphin is a pretty rough place to be sentenced. The concept of rehabilitating criminals so they can reintegrate back into society is absent, but considering the nature of their crimes, that may well be a good thing. From robberies, to murders, to various kinds of assault and even terrorism, this place houses the very worst Russia has to offer. As such, efforts are focussed on stopping anyone ever getting out.

We don&apos;t know just how big in terms of size Black Dolphin is. Russian prisons are often shrouded in bureaucracy and state secrecy for security purposes, and because the prison has only very rarely been entered by journalists, attempts to estimate the true size of the colony is difficult. As a result, no concrete numbers appear online. So, we went on Google Maps to take a look for ourselves.

Whilst you can&apos;t see much from the street view, we can gauge where the prison&apos;s grounds start and end based on the lack of permanent businesses in this rectangular area. The only identifiable things that aren&apos;t prisons between these four streets are a hospital and a dentist, in accordance with what prisoners are entitled to under Russian law. But a large amount of this area likely isn&apos;t the prison itself, with residential buildings and the wall and barbed wire coming to an end along the Southern side. Given that, we approximately measured everything inside the walls at around 40,000 square metres. That&apos;s pretty spacious for just 700 inmates, but given there are lower security facilities on site for more than the 700 infamous ones held there permanently in a settlement style &quot;open prison&quot; system, size-wise it&apos;s about average.

The perimeter has several walls and fences all topped with a generous amount of barbed wire, the tallest wall, according to one of the guards in a rare National Geographic feature inside the prison, is several times the height of an average human, any potential escapee would have a very difficult and sharp time in trying to scale them. Believe it or not, there is even a gift shop, a building just outside the entrance bears a sign saying &quot;souvenirs&quot; in Cyrillic. Well, that&apos;s next Valentine&apos;s Day sorted.

But it&apos;s also the internal design and the policies of the maximum-security section that make it so secure. Cells are locked behind several separate sets of steel doors. Two inmates to a cell is standard, but more dangerous inmates get their own. For prisoners kept in the same cell, their interactions with each other are limited to stop escape attempts and the formation of partnerships. The cells are often small and cramped and the &quot;cage within a cage&quot; structure ensures that if a prisoner did somehow breach the first layer, they would still be confined by the second.

The guards enforce a strict routine in the max-sec wing. Inmates are under 24-hour surveillance by security cameras and guards do their rounds every 15 minutes in order to ensure that prisoners are abiding by the rules. Such rules include no sitting or lying down on their beds, with inmates spending the majority of the day, around 16 hours, on their feet. Prisoners are allowed to exercise every day in a slightly larger cage but that is the only time they are allowed out of their cells on a regular basis. There is no exercise equipment, just a steel and concrete pit for walking. And allowing the prisoners to exercise isn&apos;t out of the goodness of the guard&apos;s hearts mind you, as during this time, cells are thoroughly searched for contraband.

Every aspect of Black Dolphin and its policies are all about control. You might say &quot;so what? That&apos;s no different to any other maximum-security prison&quot; and whilst that is true, Black Dolphin takes this to the extreme. The best example is how prisoners are transported. Whenever an inmate is moved, several security protocols are implemented. Firstly, prisoners are blindfolded, so they can&apos;t visually map the layout or spot avenues for escape, and it also allows them to be fully controlled by the guards as they can&apos;t see where they&apos;re going. Once handcuffed through the food slot in the cell door and blindfolded, the prisoner&apos;s arms are raised behind them above their hips, forcing them to bend at the waist as they walk. Nothing is left to fate. There is a precisely ZERO percent chance an inmate could turn being blindfolded, handcuffed and bent at the waist into an advantageous position.

And interactions with the guards cement this degree of control. When a prison officer makes a command towards an inmate, they must respond with the words &quot;yes, sir&quot;. Any other response leads to punishment. Some guards in the prison are dog handlers, their persistent barking at the prisoners is a common theme in the National Geographic documentary on Black Dolphin and likely acts as an &quot;extra incentive&quot; for inmates to behave themselves.

The prison is also designed to keep inmates inactive, unstimulated and tired. The walls are bare and prisoners are allowed very few amenities other than books, newspapers, religious texts, or a radio. The lights are always kept on even when the prisoners sleep for monitoring, reducing the quality of sleep. They&apos;re fed three or four times a day depending on which sources you read but what doesn&apos;t change is the menu. Soup all year round. A cost-effective choice which gives just enough nourishment to keep them alive. Prisoners are fed in their cells and monitored as they eat, with on average 5 murders per inmate, you wouldn&apos;t even trust these guys with a spoon. There is a basic central heating system that is just enough to live in severe discomfort during wintertime where it can reach many degrees below freezing. Thin blankets on top of a thinner mattress are the sleeping arrangements, ensuring that prisoners very rarely have the energy to resist their confinement. Even basic hygiene is controlled. Prisoners must groom themselves on a specific schedule. Inmates are only allowed electric shavers to groom themselves as regular blades are considered too dangerous, whilst soap and toilet paper are only provided in limited amounts.

Well-behaved inmates are sometimes afforded greater luxuries, like engaging in cleaning their cells or even small maintenance jobs, but nothing that could allow for the prisoners to escape. It&apos;s also unclear whether the very limited few who are allowed to leave their cells are subjected to the same bent over, handcuffed and blindfolded routine as when prisoners are moved.

Prisoners who do break the rules could find themselves losing their limited privileges or even being placed in an isolation cell, where there is no bed whatsoever provided during the day (not that this makes much of a difference if you&apos;re not even allowed to sit on the damn thing). However, there are also purportedly darker consequences for rule-breakers. The prison has attracted controversy over the years for the way in which prisoners are allegedly treated. Human rights campaigners have compared the prison to the Soviet era gulags in terms of the treatment and the conditions.

In Black Dolphin itself, the prison has been accused of attacking and beating prisoners who do not comply with the rules. Despite the lack of sharp objects they&apos;re afforded, prisoners have been known to harm themselves in protest of their living conditions. It&apos;s bold of the prisoners to assume that the Russian prison system would care about this however as due to the nature of their crimes, those serving sentences at Black Dolphin are barely considered human beings. Lieutenant Denis Avsyuk, who oversees Black Dolphin, told National Geographic that the prison is full of &quot;maniacs, paedophiles and terrorists&quot; which to be fair is a perfectly apt description. When talking specifically about the prisoners Mr Avsyuk did not pull any punches, stating: &quot;To call them people - it makes your tongue bend back just to say it. I have never felt any sympathy for them.&quot;

At this point, you may be wondering if the Russian state hasn&apos;t recently tried to put these inmates to good use – sending them to die on the battlefields of Ukraine. After all, Moscow has heavily recruited from prisons during the conflict, even going so far as to release multiple murderers.

As to whether any of them came from Black Dolphin, though, it&apos;s impossible to say. We couldn&apos;t find any information about fighters recruited from this specific prison – which probably makes sense, given its notoriety. What we have seen reported, is that according to Pravda, several members of Ukraine&apos;s Azov Battalion – who became internationally famous defending the Azovstal Iron and Steel works during the siege of Mariupol – were sentenced to Black Dolphin after being captured.

## The Inmates of Black Dolphin – A Cesspit of Depravity

So, that&apos;s the prison itself, but what about the inmates? Who are the monsters here who committed crimes so terrible that Russia would lock them up and throw away the key? These are not the kinds of people you would be bringing home to your parents…largely because Black Dolphin doesn&apos;t do visitors, but I digress.

Housed in Black Dolphin is Ramses Lobazanovich Gaichayev, a Chechen serial killer who committed mass murder among other depraved crimes. With the help of four accomplices, Gaichayev robbed, assaulted and killed at least 10 different people between 1997 and 1999, in two small settlements near the Georgian border. His and his accomplices&apos; crimes were so severe and alongside the fact all of their victims were ethnic Russians, that Russian prosecutors petitioned to have Gaichayev and his cronies tried for genocide, but it didn&apos;t stick. Gaichayev didn&apos;t get off easy though as he was sentenced to death, but because of the Russian moratorium on the death penalty that came into place in 1996, it was never carried out. His sentence was automatically commuted to life and as far as we know, he is still in Black Dolphin today.

Andrei Fyodorovich Melyukh is a serial killer held at Black Dolphin known as The Brick Maniac. From 2000 to 2002 he killed ten people in a series of robberies and murders where he deliberately targeted the elderly by striking them in the head with a brick before stealing their belongings. On more than one occasion his victims survived the attacks but were unable to identify him, until a 75-year-old woman he attacked one day didn&apos;t lose consciousness and was able to call for help. Melyukh was arrested later that day. He tried to appeal his conviction but was denied and was still in Black Dolphin as of 2022, with no newer records since. Yeah, I think it was wise to keep a guy nicknamed &quot;the brick maniac&quot; in jail.

Don&apos;t worry though, it gets worse. Kegashbek Shamshievich Orunbayev is a Kyrgyzstani-Russian serial killer, cannibal and necrophile. Orunbayev was convicted of murdering six women between 1991 and 2012 in two regions near the Kazakhstan and Mongolia borders respectively. Not much is known about his first murder but one of the following ones only landed him a measly eight years in prison. He was released in 2006, but a year later in 2007 he would strangle a woman to death for rejecting his sexual advances while he was drunk. Orunbayev would confess that all six murders happened this way. He is also serving life in Black Dolphin.

Those are clearly some of the most brutal people to ever grace mother Russia, but what about the more well-known cases? Black Dolphin has several more high-profile criminals housed within. Said Dzhaparovich Amirov is a Russian economist, former politician and was the mayor of the Caucus city of Makhachkala from 1998 to 2013. He is considered a terrorist by the Russian government, detained on suspicion of having ordered the murder of a Russian state investigator in 2011. Amirov wasn&apos;t the most popular guy when in office, surviving as many as 15 attempts on his life. He was accused over the years by the Russian state of many crimes including being connected to organised crime, planning terrorist acts and commissioning contract killings, for which he was eventually sentenced to life at Black Dolphin in 2015. Amirov maintains his innocence, claiming he became the victim in a political game.

However, the most famous prisoner at Black Dolphin may not currently be a prisoner there at all. And considering that for 99% of inmates the only way out of Black Dolphin is in a body bag, that makes it all the more impressive. I&apos;m talking about Alexander Alexandrov, an Orenburg local who in 2016 was the first person to successfully escape the inescapable Black Dolphin, according to a report by RadioFreeEurope.

Well… sort of.

You see, the Russian penal system has a specific classification system for its prisoners. The first is the &quot;settlement&quot; classification where there are lighter detention conditions, prisoners must &quot;clock in&quot; at a settlement colony but can leave at certain times and even wear civilian clothes. This is a lot like the &quot;open prisons&quot; we have in the West where inmates are monitored but can come and go. Alexandrov was likely in the &quot;settlement&quot; category, which would make sense considering he was originally only convicted of robbery, which while clearly bad, makes him look like Mother Theresa at Black Dolphin. On October 22nd 2016, Alexandrov was working at a cinder block production facility on the site of the colony, when he simply walked out and did not report back. This case is bizarre as Alexandrov was due to be released in only another 9 months in mid-2017.

There is no confirmed public information that he was ever caught. The authorities launched a large-scale manhunt to find him, but any follow-up on his whereabouts or recapture has gone largely unreported. One version of events suggests that he got an additional four years for his escape attempt, but this could not be corroborated. For all intents and purposes, he may well have gotten away with it and become the first person to escape Black Dolphin, quite the legacy for a lowly street criminal.

## Conclusion

Overall, the story of Black Dolphin is one where its legacy only has gotten more notorious the longer it has existed. It&apos;s hard to imagine that there is a prison built in the 1700s that is a worse place to be sentenced to today than when it was first used. It truly is a vault for Russia&apos;s monsters. Despite Alexander&apos;s infamous escape, nobody has really been able to escape from maximum-security section of the prison itself. One thing is for sure though, Black Dolphin is a truly unique institution. And for those locked up there, every day is a fight for survival. Sink or swim.

Most sink.

## Key Takeaways

- Black Dolphin is a Russian maximum-security prison housing the worst criminals.
- The prison is designed for extreme control and isolation, with harsh conditions.
- Inmates at Black Dolphin have committed an average of five murders each.
- The prison&apos;s name, Black Dolphin, symbolizes rare freedom, as escape is nearly impossible.
- Notorious inmates include serial killers and high-profile criminals like Said Amirov.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the nickname of the Russian supermax prison?

The Russian supermax prison is nicknamed &apos;Black Dolphin&apos;.

### How many inmates are thought to be housed in the maximum-security section of Black Dolphin?

The facility is thought to house some 700 inmates in its maximum-security section.

### What is the average number of murders committed by each inmate at Black Dolphin?

If we take the often-reported figure of 700 inmates as true, that means they have collectively committed 3,500 murders - an average of five murders per inmate.

### What is the significance of the name &apos;Black Dolphin&apos;?

The name &apos;Black Dolphin&apos; comes from a sculpture of a black dolphin made by the prisoners themselves, symbolizing &apos;rare freedom&apos;.

### What are the conditions like inside Black Dolphin?

Conditions at Black Dolphin are extremely harsh, with a focus on control and security. Inmates are under 24-hour surveillance, spend most of the day on their feet, and are fed soup all year round. The cells are small and cramped, and the prison is designed to keep inmates inactive and tired.

### Who is Ramses Lobazanovich Gaichayev and why is he in Black Dolphin?

Ramses Lobazanovich Gaichayev is a Chechen serial killer who committed mass murder and other depraved crimes. He was sentenced to death, which was commuted to life in prison due to a moratorium on the death penalty.

### What is the story of Alexander Alexandrov&apos;s escape from Black Dolphin?

Alexander Alexandrov was the first person to successfully escape from Black Dolphin in 2016. He was working at a cinder block production facility when he walked out and did not report back. He was due to be released in only another 9 months.

### What is the history of Black Dolphin prison?

Black Dolphin, originally known as IK-6, was an 18th-century prison colony for those sentenced to hard labor. In 2000, it was updated to house Russia&apos;s violent criminal epidemic, isolating criminals far away from large cities in Western Russia.

### What kind of crimes have the inmates of Black Dolphin committed?

The inmates of Black Dolphin have committed a range of severe crimes, including robberies, murders, assaults, terrorism, and even cannibalism and necrophilia.

### What is the size of Black Dolphin prison?

The approximate size of Black Dolphin, based on Google Maps measurements, is around 40,000 square meters.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Most Extreme Prison in Russia](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=USG6_0RuvTY)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/db/Pereslavl-Zalessky_-_Sretensky_Monastery_-_Western_service_building_-_2025-05-08_-_p4.jpg) by Александр Сигачёв / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Afghanistan is Now So Much Worse Than You Think.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/afghanistan-is-now-so-much-worse-than-you-think</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/afghanistan-is-now-so-much-worse-than-you-think</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Afghanistan. A land of mountains, fertile valleys, and ancient trade routes. A land that has long lived in the nightmares of those who sought to tame it — the Persians, the British, the Russians, the Americans. All have tried, all have failed. This is a place of bloodshed, going back as long as anybody can recall.

In 2001, the Al-Qaeda-friendly Taliban were driven from power as coalition forces led by the United States ushered in a brave, bold new Afghanistan. Aid poured into the country, elections were held, roads were built, girls were welcomed back into schools. It was still a long way from the dizzying days of the liberal 1970s, but it felt like Afghanistan was finally moving forward.

Fast-forward twenty years, and with the United States and its allies now departed, the rejuvenated Taliban barrelled practically unopposed towards Kabul. In just ten days, they swept through the country as the western-backed government crumbled with spectacular ease. On 15th August 2021, the Taliban entered the capital as President Ashraf Ghani fled.

Almost $150 billion was spent on rebuilding and strengthening Afghanistan, as well as more than $2 trillion on war efforts. But much of it came to nothing. Once again, the grip of the Taliban tightened around Afghan throats.

At first, there was some hopeful optimism. Maybe it wouldn&apos;t be so bad this time around. Maybe they won&apos;t be as harsh with the global community now looking on. But the reality is much worse than you think.

Over the last five years, Afghanistan has been sliding backwards at an alarming speed. Per-capita income has stagnated, unemployment is high, and many households rely on humanitarian assistance to survive. Millions of Afghans continue to struggle to feed themselves, with the World Food Programme estimating that roughly 17.4 million people could face severe hunger during 2026.

Suddenly, families are selling children just to feed others. Others are selling organs. More than 2 million girls have been excluded from education beyond primary school, while women face restrictions on employment, movement, public life, and even access to healthcare, which itself is unravelling. You&apos;ve got the Afghan branch of ISIS carrying out terrorist attacks. Drought, water shortages, vast numbers of displaced people, sanctions, banking restrictions, and just about everything else you&apos;d expect to see in a country teetering on the verge of collapse.

## Chaos at the Airport

The noose was tightening. By the 14th August 2021, all routes out of Kabul led into the clutches of the Taliban, who were steamrolling towards the capital. Fear was rampant on the streets and many rushed to the only place where hope of escape remained – the Hamid Karzai International Airport.

Tens of thousands poured towards the refuge as governments from around the world put the finishing touches to an evacuation process that was shambolic at best. Western intelligence experts had predicted it would be weeks, maybe even months, until the Afghan army and government collapsed in the face of Taliban advances. It took just ten days.

Suddenly, with the Taliban now at the gates of Kabul, governments were panicking and doing everything they could to get their people out of a country that was splintering. But it wasn&apos;t just foreign citizens who wanted out. Thousands who had worked with the allies, many of whom had been promised help, desperately tried to flee. The fear of what would happen when the Taliban retook the country was palpable and led to the chaotic situation unfolding at the airport. You remember images of the U.S. helicopter lifting off from the embassy in Saigon in 1975? This was Kabul 2021, and people were equally terrified.

It was bedlam. Tens of thousands of Afghans surged towards the airport. Interpreters, aid workers, journalists, former soldiers, and ordinary families all converged on the same place. Some clutched passports and paperwork, others carried nothing at all. The images stunned the world, and showed the level of panic that was gripping Afghanistan.

Crowds flooded the runways, people chased departing aircraft, and several men fell to their deaths after clinging to a U.S. Air Force transport plane as it took off. For many watching around the world, it looked less like an orderly withdrawal and more like the collapse of an entire state.

Over the next seventeen days, the airport became the centre of one of the largest air evacuations in history. American, British, and other governments worked around the clock as military aircraft landed and departed every few minutes.

Parents passed babies over razor wire to waiting soldiers, hoping they might find safety on the other side. Families stood for days in sewage-filled canals outside airport gates, often under the threat of violence, while Taliban fighters and foreign troops struggled to control the crowds. In total, around 123,000 people were evacuated before the final deadline arrived.

Yet the operation ended in tragedy when an ISIS-K suicide bomber struck Abbey Gate on 26 August, killing at least 170 Afghan civilians and 13 American service members. Four days later, the last U.S. aircraft disappeared into the night sky. Twenty years, thousands of lives, and around $150 billion had been spent trying to build a new Afghanistan. Structurally, the country was in a much better state, but as the Taliban regained complete control, much of its population feared for the future.

## Ancient Blood

Afghanistan has long had a painful and tumultuous history. With its position at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, it has, for thousands of years, been a meeting point for empires, religions, trade routes, and armies.

Go back 4,000 years, and you&apos;ll find an area known as Bactria, which covered parts of Afghanistan, southern Uzbekistan, and western Tajikistan. Bactria was on the major trade routes and its merchants carried goods, ideas, religions, and technologies through the region centuries before the Silk Road reached its peak.

Fast-forward to the 4th Century BC, and the unstoppable tide of Alexander the Great and his armies crushed Bactrian resistance. But Alexander&apos;s death soon led to more turmoil when his heir in the region was defeated, with much back and forth leading to the creation of the Greco-Bactrian and Indo-Greek Kingdoms.

These were eventually replaced by the Parthian Empire, which was soon replaced by the Kushan Empire, and all of this before we&apos;d even got into the AD era. From the 7th century onwards, Arab armies brought Islam to the region. Over several centuries, Afghanistan gradually became predominantly Muslim, but still with plenty of chopping and changing that saw the Ghaznavid Empire and later the Ghurid Empire expanding into modern-day Iran, Pakistan, and northern India.

Then the dreaded beast from Mongolia arrived. The Mongols, led by Genghis Khan, savaged the region on a scale that is difficult to comprehend. While Afghanistan had endured countless invasions before, the Mongol campaigns of the early 13th century devastated entire cities, depopulated large areas, and permanently altered the region&apos;s development.

Balkh was one of the oldest cities in the world and an important centre of culture, trade, and religion, but the city suffered immense destruction, with medieval chroniclers describing widespread slaughter after its capture. Bamyan suffered especially harsh treatment after a grandson of Genghis Khan was killed during the siege. Contemporary accounts describe the city being virtually annihilated, with inhabitants and even animals reportedly slaughtered in retaliation.

The number killed during this period is notoriously difficult because chroniclers were well-known exaggerators, but a reasonable estimate would put the number at between 500,000 and 2 million deaths.

Over the following centuries, Afghanistan was controlled by various regional powers, including the descendants of the Mongols and the empire of Timur. Modern Afghanistan is often traced to 1747, when Ahmad Shah Durrani united various Afghan tribes and established the Durrani Empire. But even while a rough idea of what would one day become Afghanistan was emerging, the region remained incredibly fragmented. Tribal identities and local power structures were often much stronger than central government authority, and, as we&apos;ll see, in that way, not much has changed.

And so we come to the first great modern empire that tried to tame Afghanistan and failed miserably. By the 1830s, the British Empire was flying. It was still years away from its peak, but it had emerged as the dominant global empire spanning roughly 13–18 million square kilometres (about 5–7 million square miles). To put that into a global percentage, it represented around 10-12% of land territory on Earth.

The problem for Britain was that there was another immense Empire looking to flex its muscles: Russia. The British were worried that increasing Russian influence in Afghanistan could cause trouble for British India, which lay to the south. So it was decided that the best course of action would be to invade and set up a comfortable buffer state that would look independent but was very much controlled by the British behind the scenes.

Like the other invasions that we&apos;ll be coming to, this one initially went very well. British and East India Company forces marched through southern Afghanistan in 1839 and captured Kandahar, Ghazni, and Kabul with relative ease. But two years later, things exploded as the country revolted. With negotiations having failed, in January 1842, around 16,000 people—roughly 4,500 British soldiers and 12,000 camp followers—left Kabul after agreeing to withdraw.

Yet this wasn&apos;t a simple withdrawal. The nearest British garrison was in Jalalabad, 140 km (90 miles) away, a journey that required trudging through mountain passes in winter. The column was harassed relentlessly by Afghans along the way who gradually chipped away at the British numbers. Slowly, the column was whittled down. Only one man, William Brydon, an assistant surgeon in the Bengal Army, made it to the Jalalabad region– though about 115 British officers, soldiers, wives and children were captured or taken as hostages and survived to be subsequently released.

When a search party found the wretched skeleton of a man with his bloodstained uniform, one member asked, &apos;Where is the army?&apos; To which Brydon famously replied, &apos;I am the army&apos;.

The British had learnt a painful lesson, but one they couldn&apos;t accept. In 1878, again with nervousness over Russia in the air, Britain invaded again. And this went pretty much exactly the same. Initial success, followed by a massive uprising. On 27th July 1880, 2,476 British and Indian troops under Brigadier-general George Burrows faced down 25,000 Afghans at the Battle of Maiwand. And lost, badly. Roughly half the British force died that day, and while they would have their revenge a few months later, at the Battle of Kandahar, it became a symbol of Afghan defiance.

Britain withdrew most troops but installed Abdur Rahman Khan as ruler. Afghanistan remained internally independent, but Britain controlled its foreign policy. And that brings us into the 20th Century.

## The Taliban Returns

The dramatic scenes at the airport made the headlines, but the change was immediately severe and often unseen across Afghanistan.

For twenty years, Afghanistan had become heavily dependent on foreign money. According to the World Bank, Afghanistan received approximately $77 billion in official development assistance between 2001 and 2019 alone, and the U.S. alone ploughing in roughly $132.5 billion for reconstruction and relief efforts, including security forces, governance, infrastructure, education, health, and development projects.

In 2021, when the Taliban reached Kabul, foreign aid was about 40% of Afghanistan&apos;s GDP. Let&apos;s just think about that for a moment. At that time, Afghanistan&apos;s GDP was approximately $20 billion, meaning that foreign money coming in was equal to about $8 billion per year. Most developed countries receive foreign aid equal to well below 1% of GDP and even many developing countries receive only a few percent. Afghanistan&apos;s figure of roughly 40% placed it among the most aid-dependent countries in modern history.

And all this money was used to, essentially, run the country. Years of war meant that industrial production was limited, exports were relatively small, and tax collection remained weak. Large parts of the country were rural and poor, and even if they could contribute something, it wasn&apos;t going to be much.

Afghanistan wasn&apos;t spending a lot compared to, say, western countries, but it was still spending money. Schools, roads, and hospitals were being built. Teachers, administrators, and soldiers needed paying. And here&apos;s where things get even worse, because that figure of 40% is related to the entire nationwide economy, but around 75% of public spending came from foreign grants.

That meant many government workers, soldiers, civil servants, police officers, and even healthcare professionals were being paid with money coming from abroad – while international organisations employed huge numbers of people directly or indirectly. The system was deeply flawed, for obvious reasons, and often corrupt, but it kept the country functioning – just about.

When the Taliban returned to power, much of that system disappeared almost overnight and Afghanistan experienced one of the sharpest economic collapses in the modern world. International donors suspended most development assistance, the World Bank and IMF halted major funding programmes, and roughly $9 billion in Afghan central bank reserves were frozen overseas.

The consequences were shockingly immediate. Afghanistan&apos;s economy contracted by around 20–21% in 2021 alone, one of the largest single-year economic declines recorded anywhere in recent decades. The banking system entered a liquidity crisis, businesses struggled to access cash, and many government employees lost their salaries as state revenues collapsed. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported that within a single year, a decade of economic gains had effectively been wiped out.

Within months, millions of Afghans were facing acute food insecurity. Families that had previously survived on modest incomes found themselves unable to afford basic necessities. Prices rose while employment opportunities collapsed and humanitarian organisations warned that entire communities were being pushed towards oblivion.

By early 2022, 95% of households were experiencing insufficient food consumption and food insecurity, while at least 55% of the population was &quot;expected to be in crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity,&quot; according to the UN. 82% of families had lost some or all of their income since August 2021, and nearly one in five households reported sending children to work to help cover costs.

There were countless horrendous stories around Afghanistan, but one which really hit the headlines was a small village on the outskirts of Herat that came to be known as &quot;one kidney village&quot; because many residents had sold a kidney to survive deepening poverty.

According to The Time of India:

&gt; Some parents said they underwent surgery simply to feed their children or avoid eviction. In several cases, multiple members of the same family had sold kidneys.

Where were the kidneys going? Well, that takes us down another dark alleyway. Despite being officially outlawed, Afghanistan had a thriving illegal organ donor trade. It existed before the Taliban returned, but the post-2021 economic collapse made it far worse.

The basic pattern is brutal: poor Afghans sell a kidney sometimes for as little as $1,500. Buyers are usually wealthier patients who need transplants and cannot wait and brokers connect both parties. Hospitals perform the surgery, often relying on &quot;consent&quot; forms while rarely investigating whether poverty, debt, or coercion have anything to do with that so-called consent.

Al Jazeera and AFP reported that wealthy patients travelled to Herat from across Afghanistan, and sometimes from India and Pakistan, while a 2021 report revealed that Loqman Hakim Hospital had carried out more than 1,000 kidney transplants in five years. The whole industry is horrific, and sadly increasingly common.

## The Soviet Quagmire

But horrific and Afghanistan have a long history. For thousands of years, people have fought and died in its mountains and on its plains, and in its cities. Yet for nearly eighty years, from the start of the 20th Century until Russia finally got its hands on the country, Afghanistan prospered – well, sort of at least.

The country stayed neutral in both world wars, and had a series of relatively stable leaders who led the country in a modernisation drive from almost completely rural to tentative growth and wealth. Not everything was smooth sailing, and leaders had to learn to balance progress with the deep conservative and tribal values that many hung grimly onto.

Mohammad Zahir Shah ruled for forty years between 1933 and 1973 and this became one of the most stable periods in Afghan history. Neutrality during World War II meant that Afghanistan escaped devastation, and as the Cold War began, leaders carefully played both sides to maximise gains. The Soviets built roads, airfields, and technical projects, while the Americans funded agricultural development, irrigation schemes, and infrastructure.

One of the most famous projects was the massive Helmand Valley development effort, often compared to America&apos;s Tennessee Valley Authority. This ambitious project included the construction of two dams, irrigation, flood control, and roads, as well as widespread education, healthcare, and agricultural reform. This was a huge undertaking, costing $80 million between 1960 and 1971 (around $690 million today).

To cut a long story short, it was far from successful, mainly because American engineers assumed that the soil would be similar to the U.S. Southwest – which it wasn&apos;t – leading to poor drainage that caused widespread waterlogging and salt accumulation that left vast sections of farmland unproductive. And a quick side note, in the areas that it did work, in a few decades, these irrigation initiatives would be vital in supporting Afghanistan&apos;s booming opium trade.

By the 1960s, parts of Kabul looked surprisingly modern. Universities expanded, women attended schools, and foreign tourists visited, with the &quot;hippie trail&quot; bringing thousands of Western backpackers through Afghanistan on their way to India.

This period also brought huge change as the country experimented with elections, a parliament, greater press freedom, and political participation. Although political parties were not fully legalised, various ideological groups emerged, including liberals, Islamists, communists, and nationalists. Universities became centres of intense political debate and future communist leaders and future Islamist leaders often attended the same campuses.

But things soured as the 1970s progressed. First, the monarchy was scrapped, with Afghanistan being a republic, but increasingly factionalism began to pull the country apart. Some wanted to be more closely aligned with Iran, others the Soviet Union, and others the west.

Everything exploded in April 1978. After the assassination of a communist activist, the People&apos;s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) launched a military coup known as the Saur Revolution. President Daoud and much of his family were killed and communists seized power. What came next was similar to what had been seen in other communist take-overs. Radical land reforms that became deeply unpopular, restrictions on other political parties – violence. Thousands were imprisoned or killed, and entire provinces erupted in rebellion.

It seemed as if Afghanistan was about to tip into full-blown civil war, but thankfully for the communists, this provided the perfect excuse for Russia, now of course the Soviet Union, to finally make its move. However, things weren&apos;t exactly cut and dry for the communists.

To begin with, the Soviets didn&apos;t trust Hafizullah Amin, Afghanistan&apos;s communist leader. He was thought of as unreliable, and his friendly overtures towards the United States made him few friends in Moscow. But then this whole messy situation got messier when the U.S. ambassador, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped – perhaps by police officers working with the Afghan government, perhaps a group closely aligned with the Soviet Union.

Dubs was being held at the Kabul Hotel when Afghan forces attempted a rescue which, to put it nicely, was completely botched, but also had the air of a complete set-up that left Dubs dead with several bullets in his head. The whole episode remains mysterious to this day because all the assailants were also shot, but what emerged was a poisoned relationship between Afghanistan and the United States.

As this was going on, Afghanistan was fracturing. Discontent with the communists was exploding across the country, and Amin repeatedly asked for Soviet military assistance. And finally he got it, but not in the style he was expecting.

On 25th December 1979, Soviet trucks and other military vehicles rolled across the border, under the pretext of helping the communist government. Two days later, 700 Soviet troops dressed in Afghan uniforms, occupied major governmental, military and media buildings in Kabul, including their primary target, the Tajbeg Palace, where Amin was all but in hiding. Exactly how it happened has never been revealed, but Hafizullah Amin, Afghanistan&apos;s leader, was assassinated by Soviet soldiers.

Babrak Karmal was quickly installed as leader, a man loyal to Moscow, and a man the Soviets believed would be able to stabilise the country. But that was their first massive miscalculation. Their second was the assumption that their stay in Afghanistan would be a short one. They assumed they could secure the cities and build up the military quickly – six months, a year tops.

But like so many before them, Afghanistan turned into a place of nightmares. The Afghan rebellion was fierce from the very beginning. The term Mujahideen means &apos;those who struggle&apos; and is often used as if there was some large, well-organised resistance, but in reality, this was a patchwork of tribes and groups that often disliked each other, but hated the Soviets more.

The Mujahideen remained in control of most of the country outside the major towns and cities. Soviet tactics relied on air power, armoured columns, search-and-destroy operations, and punishment raids against villages suspected of supporting rebels. Mountain valleys became killing grounds. Villages were bombed, crops destroyed, and civilians forced to flee.

Afghanistan became one of the world&apos;s largest refugee crises. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 400,000 Afghans had fled to Pakistan by the end of 1979, with another 200,000 in Iran. At the height of the war, around 3.5 million Afghans were in Pakistan and another 2 million in Iran.

Pakistan&apos;s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) became the main pipeline for foreign support. The United States, Saudi Arabia, China, Britain, and others backed the resistance in different ways and a CIA programme, known as Operation Cyclone, supplied money and weapons through Pakistan.

The war changed sharply after the Mujahideen began receiving Stinger anti-aircraft missiles in 1986. Soviet aircraft and helicopters no longer had the same freedom and the psychological damage was huge – the Soviets were soon looking for a way out.

As the war dragged on, the costs mounted dramatically. Estimates vary, but at least 500,000 Afghan civilians were killed, while some researchers place the total death toll well above one million. Thousands of villages were destroyed, farmland was littered with mines, and an entire generation grew up surrounded by violence.

The Soviet Union also paid a heavy price, officially losing more than 14,000 soldiers, with tens of thousands more wounded, disabled, or suffering from illness and psychological trauma. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he inherited what he later described as a &quot;bleeding wound&quot; and he made it clear the Soviet Union needed to get out as quickly as possible.

Soviet troops began leaving in May 1988, and on 15th February 1989 the last Soviet commander, Boris Gromov, crossed the Friendship Bridge back into Soviet territory. For Moscow, the war was over. For Afghanistan, it was just the start of another cycle of horror.

The Soviet-backed government survived until 1992, but after its collapse, the victorious Mujahideen factions turned on each other, plunging the country into civil war. Kabul&apos;s population plummeted from 2 million to around 500,000 as the capital became a horrifying battleground. Entire neighbourhoods were reduced to rubble, with some estimates putting the death toll in the city alone at 25,000 during this period. By the mid-1990s, Kabul resembled images of Dresden or Tokyo during the very worst bombings of World War II.

It was also a time of mass killings, torture, kidnapping, looting, and sexual violence. Many began to lose faith that any of the warlords promising the earth would ever deliver peace, and out of that chaos emerged the Taliban, a new militia created and supported by Pakistan and the ISI that followed a strict Islamic code. They made gains around the country, taking first Kandahar, then Herat, and by 1996, controlled Kabul and many of the major cities.

## Backward Steps

And so, we come to two points in Afghanistan&apos;s history where exactly the same thing has happened. The Taliban has gained control.

In 1996, many welcomed these new religious overlords who promised to finally bring an end to the bedlam that the country had been in since the 1970s. Once in power, though, their rule became brutally restrictive.

Women were largely removed from public life, girls&apos; education was shut down, music and television were banned, men were forced to grow beards, and the religious police patrolled daily life.

Public punishment became one of the defining images of the first Taliban state. Kabul&apos;s football stadium, once a place for sport, became the setting for executions and amputations. In 1999, secretly filmed footage emerged that showed a woman in a blue burka being dragged onto the pitch and then executed with three bullets to the back of her head. Her name, it later emerged, was Zarmina, or Zareena. The mother of 7 had been accused of beating her husband to death with a hammer two years prior and her death was the first female execution under Taliban rule.

Hundreds were executed through the Taliban&apos;s judicial system, while many thousands were killed in massacres, reprisals, and ethnic violence after the wider civil war. While everybody suffered at the hands of the infamous &apos;Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice&apos;, the effect on women was catastrophic. Within months of taking Kabul in 1996, the Taliban introduced rules that transformed everyday life. Women generally could not work outside the home, attend secondary school, let alone university. Travelling without a male guardian was out of the question, as was appearing in public without full-body covering.

Many female doctors, teachers, civil servants, lawyers, and academics suddenly lost their jobs. At the time, women made up roughly 25% of Afghanistan&apos;s civil service workforce, and in Kabul many schools relied almost entirely on female teachers. When the ban took effect, thousands of women lost their livelihoods immediately, and numerous schools closed because there were no teachers left. For those widows who had lost a husband during the civil war or the Soviet invasion - with one UN estimate putting that figure at 10,000 in Kabul - this meant their only source of income suddenly evaporated.

For young girls, their futures changed overnight. To be brutally fair, options were limited well before the Taliban, especially as the country was being torn apart by the civil war. But the new draconian prohibitions on female education meant that a narrow scope became virtually nonexistent. Instead of going to secondary school and then university before finding a decently paid job, their lives would now be restricted to marriage and childbirth, while often being kept behind closed doors. By 2001, female literacy was estimated at around 5%, among the lowest rates in the world, and millions of girls had spent the previous five years with little or no access to formal education.

Yet, quite remarkably, many families resisted. A 1997 report found that aid organisations were secretly supporting 125 girls&apos; schools and 87 co-educational schools and home schools across Afghanistan. By 2001, humanitarian agencies estimated approximately 45,000 children were attending clandestine schools, often hidden inside private homes. Considering the expected punishment for something like secretly educating women, these acts were astonishingly brave.

So, how does this all compare with Taliban 2.0? Well, initially the group preached repentance, promising the world that things would be different under their rule this time. At their first press conference after taking Kabul, Taliban spokesmen tried to present a softer image – promising amnesty, saying that women would have rights &quot;within Islamic law,&quot; and claiming Afghanistan would not be used as a base for attacks against other countries.

But that was mostly bluster in the face of international scrutiny. Human Rights Watch reported that the Taliban intensified their crackdown through 2024, with Afghanistan becoming the only country where girls and women were, once again, banned from secondary school and university – while also experiencing severe barriers to employment, movement, speech, and assembly. If you are a woman in Afghanistan, life today looks remarkably similar to what it did in 1996. UNESCO reported in August 2025 that almost 2.2 million Afghan girls were barred from education beyond primary level.

Yet there is one cruel twist that makes today even worse. In 1996, the country was a shattered wreckage and hope had long drained out of the Afghan people. But the U.S. invasion and establishment of a democratic government was supposed to herald in a new era. With new schools, universities, and ideas emerging, a woman&apos;s world in Afghanistan was filled with more possibilities than ever before.

Today, those possibilities have largely been crushed under the repressive Taliban boot. In a matter of just a few years, women have gone from thinking about higher education, starting a business, and travelling and working abroad, to being told to forget all of that. Your place is at home. And never forget that.

In December 2024, Taliban authorities reportedly banned women from medical education, deepening fears of a future healthcare shortage, which is especially damaging in Afghanistan because many women cannot seek care from male medical staff in conservative settings.

The morality police have roared back to life. With women, it&apos;s about clothing, movement, public visibility, and work, but men have also faced pressure over beard length, prayer attendance, dress, and public behaviour. However, this time there seems to be more pushback. In early June 2026, at least 30 women were reportedly arrested in Herat for violating dress rules, leading to a large protest that was violently dispersed by the Taliban.

Freedom is being slowly squeezed from the Afghan people. Journalists, activists, former government employees, and critics have faced detention, enforced disappearance, torture, and extrajudicial killings. In the first half of 2025 alone, Afghan human rights monitors recorded 251 people who were reportedly extrajudicially executed, mysteriously killed, or wounded by Taliban forces or associated groups.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan documented at least 231 cases of corporal punishment between April and June 2025, including public floggings for offences such as adultery, alcohol consumption, and homosexuality. Detainees have reported torture methods including electric shocks, waterboarding, beatings, and threats against family members. So much for a progressive Taliban.

## The Towers Fall

The recent, modern history of Afghanistan, for most outsiders at least, begins at 8.46 am on 11th September 2001 when American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre. 17 minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175 slammed into the South Tower and any remaining doubts about a possible accident immediately evaporated.

Of course, on that day, as New York became a city of rubble and chaos and death, there was nothing immediately to link the terrorist attack with Afghanistan, but within days, the eyes of the U.S. government had fallen on Osama bin Laden and his believed hiding place in Afghanistan. Less than a month later, on 7th October, President George W. Bush announced that U.S. operations in Afghanistan had begun. And the fate of this beleaguered country took another dramatic turn.

This is the period that was sandwiched between the two Taliban eras. A period that both devastated the country even further, but also allowed the Afghans to dream of something different. As with the British and the Soviets, when the Americans and allies arrived in October 2001, the official leaders of the country were quickly toppled. Operation Enduring Freedom had begun with a walk in the park, but the words Enduring and Freedom rarely go well together in Afghanistan.

But let&apos;s not get ahead of ourselves. To begin with, there was genuine hope. Schools reopened, refugees returned, businesses reopened, and international aid flooded the country. The effect was immediate. In March 2002 alone, around three million children returned to classrooms, roughly one-third of them girls, many of whom had never attended school before. The country had a buzz to it, but it didn&apos;t take long for things to swerve off course.

One of the earliest issues was rampant corruption. With the foreign community writing what amounted to blank cheques, money arrived faster than Afghan institutions could absorb it. Government officials syphoned off huge sums, sometimes setting up ghost businesses or even schools. On paper, things were going well, but if you actually dug into some of the new constructions, you would go there and see nothing but a pile of rubble.

In 2011, a massive scandal broke that implicated the heads of the Kabul Bank in a Ponzi scheme that reached close to $1 billion and saw them spending lavishly, while giving out huge under the table loans to family and friends. The whole thing was about as filthy as you could get and involved family members of President Karzai. Three years later, investigators had recovered only about 10% of the stolen money. That was the big one, but these kinds of stories were common throughout Afghanistan, and played a major part in slowly destroying the legitimacy of the central government.

And then you had the Taliban that continued to lurk in the shadows. Initially pushed into the mountains and over the border into Pakistan, the Taliban returned with a vengeance just a few years later. By 2007, despite 40,000 foreign troops in the country, Afghanistan was said to be under real threat of falling into Taliban hands once again.

The next seven years were a savage war of attrition that took a toll on both sides. But it was clear that Taliban resolve was stronger. The foreign troops, like the Soviets before them, needed to get out of Afghanistan, but the Taliban wasn&apos;t going anywhere. On 2nd May, the U.S. finally got its man. Bin Laden was killed, but not in Afghanistan, in Pakistan. There was rejoicing, yet for troops in Afghanistan, the bloody grind continued as if nothing had changed.

In 2014, the U.S. and the British ended formal operations in the country, but the reality is that foreign fighters were in Afghanistan right up until 2021, desperately trying to prop up an Afghan army that repeatedly showed itself to be inept in the face of hostile aggression.

But at this point, another player arrives on the scene to complicate the situation – Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS–K). Yes, if things couldn&apos;t possibly get any worse for Afghanistan, the country now has its own homegrown branch of the group that caused so much chaos in Iraq, Syria, and around the world.

The group was officially established in 2015, mainly composed of disillusioned Taliban fighters and foreign jihadists from Central Asia. And you might assume that the Taliban and ISIS might be on friendly terms, but no, they hate each other. At one point in 2015, ISIS-K controlled large parts of eastern Afghanistan, particularly in Nangarhar Province, and the group became notorious for its brutality even among Afghan insurgent groups.

Yet most of their attacks have come through suicide bombings, car bombings, rocket attacks, and assassinations. They&apos;re not picky. Over the years, ISIS-K has gone after just about everybody in Afghanistan, sowing seeds of fear that even the Taliban didn&apos;t come with. You now had a rather bizarre situation where an insurgency was fighting and an insurgency, and both of them were fighting the government.

One of the most horrifying incidents occurred in May 2020 when gunmen attacked a maternity hospital in Kabul operated by Médecins sans Frontières. 24 were killed, including mothers, newborn babies, and healthcare workers. It was shocking, even by Afghan standards. A year later, on 8th May 2021, a massive car bomb exploded outside the Sayed al-Shuhada School in western Kabul. As students and teachers scrambled to escape, two further devices detonated, with 90 killed and 240 injured.

And on 26th August 2021, as thousands of Afghans crowded outside Kabul airport hoping to escape Taliban rule, an ISIS-K suicide bomber detonated explosives at Abbey Gate, killing 170 Afghan civilians and 13 US service members.

With Afghanistan now standing alone, the situation was much more complicated than many perceived. By ISIS standards, the Taliban were moderates, but also a group that brought back painful memories. Afghanistan&apos;s current chapter was about to begin.

## Hunger, Repression, Violence

As the date ticks up to the modern day, there are not a lot of positives coming out of Afghanistan. For war-weary civilians, the situation is perilously close to becoming tragic, with an estimated 17 million people—nearly half the population—facing acute food insecurity, and 4.7 million with emergency levels of hunger.

Some are choosing the unimaginable. Alarming reports are emerging from Afghanistan about the increased number of children being sold by families to stave off starvation. One woman spoke to a representative of World Vision and said:

&gt; We are starving; all of us. We don&apos;t have anything to eat, and we survive picking food from the garbage. That&apos;s why it&apos;s better to sell one of my daughters so that my other four children can survive.

She also said that she sold her three-year-old daughter, Jamila, for just $600.

The difficult truth is that nobody knows exactly how many Afghan children are being sold. In 2021, UNICEF warned that it had received credible reports of families offering daughters as young as 20 days old for future marriage in exchange for a bride price or dowry. Even before the Taliban takeover, UNICEF partners recorded 183 child marriages and 10 cases involving the sale of children in just two western provinces, Herat and Badghis, during 2018–2019. The children involved ranged from 6 months to 17 years old, but UNICEF stressed that these were only known examples and that real figures are likely much higher.

The system behind it is equally complex. It&apos;s thought that most child sales are for adoption purposes, rather than direct marriage. In Afghanistan, adoption is taboo, but demand is high, and when people are on the brink of starvation, apparently you never need to look too hard to find a family willing to sell a child.

The country&apos;s economy remains slumped. Despite modest GDP gains, population growth means that the country is slipping further back from where it needs to be. More than 80% of households are in debt, while nearly three quarters rely on negative coping strategies, selling tools, livestock, or sending their children to work, to manage getting through the day. Nearly five million Afghans have returned to the country since 2023, many arriving in communities already facing severe economic hardship. It&apos;s a cycle that only seems to be worsening.

Like other areas in the region, Afghanistan is suffering from climate insecurity, with 64% of the country affected by drought on a regular basis. Access to adequate drinking water has also dropped sharply, from nearly 60% to close to 40%. Since 1969, Afghanistan has experienced eight major droughts, including crises in 2018 and 2021 that affected more than 13 million and 11 million people respectively. Meanwhile, glaciers in the Hindu Kush mountains have shrunk by nearly 40% over the past four decades, threatening one of the country&apos;s most important sources of freshwater.

Afghanistan, perhaps more than anywhere else on the planet, is desperate for international aid, but since 2021, and the Taliban takeover, aid has plummeted. According to CSIS, international humanitarian funding fell from approximately $3.8 billion in 2022 to $1.9 billion in 2023 — a decline of roughly 50% in a single year. By 2024, the UN&apos;s humanitarian appeal for Afghanistan had received only about 31% of the funding required, forcing many programmes to close or scale back.

Then you have the violence that continues to plague many parts of the country. Since the Taliban took over Afghanistan, ISIS–K have claimed responsibility for hundreds of attacks, many inside Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. They range from suicide bombings to car bombings, shootings in the street to kidnappings that end in the most horrifying way – a beheading and a video.

But now Afghanistan has yet another enemy to worry about – Pakistan. Everything here revolves around the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), often called the Pakistani Taliban, who are separate from the Afghan Taliban, but share ideological roots and historical connections. The TTP, designated a terrorist organisation by the UN, wants to create its own state in Pakistan and frequently unleashes attacks on soldiers, police, the government, civilians, kids – just about anybody.

Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban government of allowing TTP fighters to operate from Afghan territory, an accusation that is officially denied, but unofficially, it&apos;s pretty clear what&apos;s going on. The Afghan Taliban has repeatedly told Pakistan that it aims to clamp down on the Pakistani Taliban, without ever really doing anything. And Pakistan has lost patience.

On 21st December 2024, TTP militants attacked a Pakistani military position in South Waziristan, killing 16 Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan responded with airstrikes against targets inside Afghanistan that it said were militant camps, but that the Taliban claimed were nothing more than residential buildings and that civilians, including children, were among the dead.

At the same time, Pakistan launched a major deportation campaign against Afghan refugees, and by 2025, more than one million Afghans had been expelled from Pakistan, creating enormous pressure on Afghanistan&apos;s already fragile economy.

Things really got heated on 9th October 2025 when Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Kabul, Khost, Jalalabad, and Paktika, targeting the TTP. Two days later, the Taliban responded by launching an attack on multiple Pakistani military posts along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. The fighting continued for another week, before a ceasefire came into effect.

At peace talks in Doha, a representative from Pakistan threatened to &apos;obliterate the Taliban.&apos; Big words, but if the U.S. and Britain couldn&apos;t do it for nearly 20 years, it&apos;s difficult to see how far Pakistan would get. Talks got precisely nowhere, and since then, the situation between the two countries has been as tense as it gets. The border remains closed, badly affecting the Afghan economy much more than the Pakistani, and further airstrikes have occurred as recently as 10th June 2026.

And to round out this dizzyingly bizarre set of circumstances, it was announced in May 2026 that Afghanistan and Russia had signed a military cooperation agreement. Not many were expecting something like this. Many in the Taliban are former Mujahideen, who, of course, famously fought off the Soviet Union in the 1980s. So what are these two up to together?

We&apos;re not sure. We do know that Russia removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations a year – for good behaviour, I guess? And has also become the only country in the world to formally recognise the Taliban government. But what else lies behind this agreement is highly debatable. Some say it will be to help service Soviet-era machinery still being used in Afghanistan. Others believe it&apos;s more to do with stemming ISIS attacks. Or is it another Russian agreement that means that suddenly foreign soldiers start appearing on the Russia/Ukraine frontline? All we can really say is, watch this space.

## So Much Worse Than You Think

Afghanistan is now a country sliding backward at an alarming rate. With military tensions with Pakistan building, continued ISIS-K attacks, a collapsing economy, widespread poverty, malnutrition, and drought to contend with, it feels like Afghanistan is entering a defining era. Yes, this country has been through hell and back on countless occasions, and yes, its people are some of the most resilient on Earth, but how much more can they withstand?

For thousands of years, this crossroads between east and west, this mountainous monster has been fought over and died for. This is a land of bloodshed, a place where empires come with their heads held high and leave with their tails between their legs. But today, the country is straining horribly under the yoke of terrible luck, climate insecurity, and extremism. Hunger, violence, repression, shattered dreams, a place where hope is fading fast.

## Key Takeaways

- Afghanistan has historically been a challenging region for foreign powers, with multiple empires failing to control it.
- The Taliban&apos;s return to power in 2021 led to a rapid economic collapse and severe humanitarian crisis.
- Millions of Afghans face acute food insecurity, leading to desperate measures like selling children or organs.
- Women and girls in Afghanistan face severe restrictions on education, employment, and public life under Taliban rule.
- The country is plagued by ongoing violence from ISIS-K and tensions with Pakistan, complicating its path forward.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What was the economic impact of the Taliban&apos;s return to power in Afghanistan?

When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, Afghanistan experienced one of the sharpest economic collapses in the modern world. The economy contracted by around 20–21% in 2021 alone, leading to widespread food insecurity and poverty. Millions of Afghans faced acute food insecurity, and many families resorted to selling children or organs to survive.

### How did the international community respond to the Taliban&apos;s takeover in Afghanistan?

Following the Taliban&apos;s takeover, international donors suspended most development assistance, and the World Bank and IMF halted major funding programs. Approximately $9 billion in Afghan central bank reserves were also frozen overseas, exacerbating the economic crisis.

### What was the situation at Hamid Karzai International Airport during the Taliban&apos;s takeover?

During the Taliban&apos;s takeover, tens of thousands of Afghans surged towards Hamid Karzai International Airport in a desperate attempt to flee the country. The scene was chaotic, with people clinging to departing aircraft and several falling to their deaths. The airport became the center of one of the largest air evacuations in history, with around 123,000 people evacuated before the final deadline.

### What is the current state of education for girls in Afghanistan under the Taliban?

Under the Taliban&apos;s rule, over 2 million girls have been excluded from education beyond primary school. The Taliban has intensified its crackdown on female education, making Afghanistan the only country where girls and women are banned from secondary school and university.

### What are the main challenges facing Afghanistan&apos;s economy today?

Afghanistan&apos;s economy is facing severe challenges, including a collapse in foreign aid, widespread poverty, malnutrition, and drought. The country is also dealing with military tensions with Pakistan, continued ISIS-K attacks, and a struggling economy that has led to high levels of food insecurity and unemployment.

### How has the Taliban&apos;s rule affected women in Afghanistan?

The Taliban&apos;s rule has severely restricted women&apos;s rights and freedoms. Women face restrictions on employment, movement, public life, and even access to healthcare. The morality police have enforced strict dress codes and public behavior rules, leading to arrests and protests.

### What is the situation with ISIS-K in Afghanistan?

ISIS-K (Islamic State Khorasan Province) has been carrying out terrorist attacks in Afghanistan since its establishment in 2015. The group is known for its brutality and has targeted various groups, including civilians, government officials, and even the Taliban. ISIS-K&apos;s presence has added to the instability and violence in the country.

### What is the current state of humanitarian aid in Afghanistan?

Humanitarian aid to Afghanistan has significantly decreased since the Taliban&apos;s takeover. International funding fell from approximately $3.8 billion in 2022 to $1.9 billion in 2023. The UN&apos;s humanitarian appeal for Afghanistan has received only about 31% of the required funding, leading to the closure or scaling back of many programs.

### What are the main causes of food insecurity in Afghanistan?

Food insecurity in Afghanistan is caused by a combination of factors, including economic collapse, drought, water shortages, and the displacement of millions of people. The World Food Programme estimates that roughly 17.4 million people could face severe hunger during 2026.

### How has the Taliban&apos;s rule affected the healthcare system in Afghanistan?

The Taliban&apos;s rule has led to a deterioration of the healthcare system in Afghanistan. Women have been banned from medical education, leading to fears of a future healthcare shortage. Many women cannot seek care from male medical staff in conservative settings, further complicating access to healthcare.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Afghanistan is Now So Much Worse Than You Think.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zL1ZtVB5yno)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/57/Aerial_landscape_view_%282017%29.jpg) by Saga1111 / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Alnwick Poison Garden: The Deadliest Plants in the World</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/alnwick-poison-garden-deadliest-plants-world</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/alnwick-poison-garden-deadliest-plants-world</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Have you ever stopped to think just how many dangerous things there are in the world? War, famine, illness and more all help remind us every day that our time on this earth is limited. But what about the deadly things we don&apos;t regularly hear about? Creeping in from the sidelines, slowly over days, months and years until you barely even notice it at all.

Today we&apos;re taking you away to a place that brings these lesser-known killers out of the shadows and into the light. Unfortunately, in this instance, that only makes them stronger. We&apos;re talking of course about plants. But not just any old plants, a collection of plants so dangerous permission is required from the British government just to grow and house them.

Let&apos;s take a look at how one slightly quirky aristocrat managed to build a national tourist attraction based on her two favourite things, nature and death.

It&apos;s a little slice of death in the middle of the English countryside, what&apos;s not to like?

Alnwick Castle. The Poison Garden.

## Origins of the Garden – A Duchess&apos;s Dark Fantasy

The Duchess says people have always had a macabre fascination with death. But how did this garden full of poisonous and otherwise highly dangerous plants come to be? Well for that we need to thank the British extended royal family. In 1995, Jane Percy became Duchess of Northumberland. At the time the land that has since become the Poison Garden was on the Alnwick Castle estate. It wasn&apos;t being used for anything in particular. It was a defunct forestry with rows of Christmas trees. So, the Duchess&apos;s husband, the Duke of Northumberland and the very normally named Ralph George Algernon Percy asked her to do something with the area. The Duchess herself admits that the idea of the garden was at least born in part out of spite. She is quoted as having said &quot;I think he thought, &apos;That will keep her quiet, she&apos;ll just plant a few roses and that&apos;ll be it&apos;&quot;. Little did the duke know that his potentially offhanded comment to keep his wife busy would spawn into a national tourist attraction.

It is clear that there were several other influences on the Duchess that spawned the idea of the Poison Garden. For example, it&apos;s very evident that the Duchess is very fond of nature. She had visited the world-renowned gardens at the Villa Medici in Tuscany, with its beautiful shades of green from a wide variety of different flowers and plants cascading across the Italian landscape with beautiful views of the rolling hills. Perhaps she thought a similar garden, set in the idyllic English countryside could also draw people in from far and wide. It&apos;s also very well known that another influence on the garden&apos;s creation was the Duchess&apos;s fascination with the dark, the deadly and the macabre. Another site she visited that purportedly inspired the creation of the Poison Garden was Soutra Aisle, the archaeological site of the largest hospital in medieval Scotland. The thought of any medieval hospital without antibiotics or anaesthetics is enough to make a person&apos;s skin crawl.

But evidently such thoughts fascinated the Duchess to such an extent that she wanted to make a garden that mixed her love of nature with her love of all things deadly. She hired Jacques Wirtz, landscape architect who had previously worked on the gardens at the French president&apos;s residence and by 2005, she had dedicated &quot;her life&apos;s work&quot; to the garden.

The Duchess regards her interest in deadly plants as normal, citing the use of &quot;killing jars&quot; used by children in Victorian times – jars containing laurel (a very common hedging plant) to kill spiders and butterflies while leaving the insect&apos;s body intact. The Duchess is rightly undeterred by such comparisons. She&apos;s been quoted as saying &quot;most plants that kill are quite interesting&quot; and &quot;the story of how plants can cure, I find pretty boring, really. Much better to know how a plant kills.&quot; And to a degree she&apos;s right. The Poison Garden is a truly different experience to every other garden you may ever find yourself in. Who really cares that a natural form of aspirin comes from the bark of a willow tree? Nobody. But the focus on the more dangerous aspects of the garden is what draws in tourists from around the country. The Duchess has even told the tour guides at the garden to focus on the &quot;guts and gore&quot; of the plants housed there. Even the front gate of the garden has a large skull and crossbones, stating &quot;THESE PLANTS CAN KILL&quot; in large enough letters that anybody unfortunate enough to accidentally touch one of the plants should really know better.

Even those who visit the garden today have a similar passion for deadly plants. The Smithsonian Institute interviewed a female tourist who was visiting about why she liked the garden and might have given the most British response to such an enquiry when she said &quot;My fascination is how to murder your husband. Sorry Jim.&quot;

## The Plants – The Good, the Bad and the Deadly

The plants at the Poison Garden, as you can imagine, are strictly off-limits. Whilst you can look at them, touching and more is certainly not advisable. As you go through a tour of the garden the guides will tell you a bit about the plants, how the garden cultivates them and the other purposes they have such as medicinal research and education, as well as the more deadly side. 100% of the plants in this garden are poisonous, according to the head tour guide John Knox. The plants run the gamut from minorly annoying plants like stinging nettles that only require gloves to tend to, all the way up to the deadliest plants that require hazmat suits and facemasks to even go near. The garden continues its yearly botanical research through its cultivation efforts, with the staff at the garden needing to destroy the plants at the end of their season every year for security purposes. You can&apos;t just stick them in the communal compost heap, or some lunatic with a bad idea and a grudge is going to do something very stupid. It&apos;s important for them to be destroyed as most of the plants are easy to grow with regular sunlight and water. They are plants after all. They can grow in your garden.

In fact, many do. Alnwick Castle plays host to highly poisonous plants that can be found wildly or in people&apos;s gardens throughout the UK. Many people are totally oblivious to the very real danger that could be right outside their window, which also is why the education element of the garden is crucial for those visiting.

### Laburnum and Yew

Our first contestant is the laburnum tree, also known as the golden chain tree, so called because of its hanging yellow flowers. The BBC considers this the second most poisonous tree in the UK owing to the poison within it named cytisine. A tour guide named Dean Smith laid out just how dangerous this tree really is, quoting here: &quot;The tree is so poisonous that if one of the branches was to fall to the floor, lay there for several months and the dog later comes along, picks it up to hold as a stick on a walk, chances are the dog won&apos;t finish the walk.&quot; Not to be outdone, the garden also has the most poisonous tree, the humble European yew, whose leaves are so poisonous that even eating a handful of them can be fatal for both humans and animals.

### Rhododendron

There are also rhododendrons, that plant with flowers your mum likes but you can&apos;t spell. A person is unlikely to actually successfully eat the leaves of one of these as according to reports they taste disgusting, but if you did, the grayanotoxane within them attacks your immune system. It can lead to nausea, vomiting, excessive salivation, sweating, a burning sensation in the mouth, dizziness and weakness. Eating rhododendron in larger quantities can also lead to low blood pressure, irregular heartbeat, blurred vision, diarrhoea, seizures, coma and death. They are so poisonous, that if several rhododendrons grow near enough to each other, the soil becomes poisonous to the point that only rhododendrons can grow there. Bees who pollinate their rhododendrons make a honey that has hallucinogenic properties at low doses. It&apos;s no joke.

### Laurel

There&apos;s also *Prunus laurocerasus*, also known as laurel. Its leaves contain cyanide ions and cyanide glycosides. Even touching these plants by themselves will not harm you, as long as you wash your hands afterwards. However, if parts of the plant are mashed together and broken down, say by a predator ingesting the plant…or an unsuspecting gardener pruning his bush…they mix together to form cyanide gas. In a well-ventilated area this might not be an issue, but in a greenhouse or the trunk of a car taking the hedge cuttings to the local tip, it can be exceedingly harmful. That&apos;s one hell of an evolutionary feature.

### Aconitum

One of the most poisonous subsets of plants on display at the garden are aconitum. The garden plays host to two kinds of aconitum, known as Monkshood and Wolfsbane. They contain the toxin aconitine which is very deadly even in small amounts and best of all they can be found across southern England and Europe. These plants, unlike some of the others discussed so far that are native to the UK, should not be touched under any circumstances, as the toxin can be absorbed through the skin. In significant enough amounts this can lead to cardiovascular issues, muscle weakness, paralysis and death. This is why it&apos;s always wise to look up a plant beforehand if you have any intention of interacting with it.

### Rhubarb

Now whilst there is no other use for aconitum, there are other plants in the garden that many people cook and eat today. We spoke about stinging nettles of course which when boiled can make a nice soup, but another one you might find in your grandma&apos;s vegetable patch is rhubarb. Now we all know the stems of rhubarb are both delicious and good for you, but what&apos;s not so good for you are the leaves. The leaves contain oxalic acid, which also happens to be the main ingredient in paint stripper. Fun sidenote, this is something that the British government in WW1 didn&apos;t know so recommended that the general public replace cabbage with rhubarb leaves owing to supply chain issues caused by the global conflict.

### Gympie-Gympie

They must also have some pretty exotic and mega-dangerous plants too, right? You know they do. And one that is on display at the Poison Garden you may know very well: the indigenous Australian and Indonesian *Dendrocnide moroides*, AKA, the gympie-gympie tree. Or its less funny moniker, the suicide plant. Now whilst it has an undoubtedly amusing name, this plant is no laughing matter. As well as being poisonous, it is venomous. It has tiny fine hairs on it called trichomes, that even with a minor glancing brush will implant themselves under your skin, break off and inject you with a highly potent venom. This venom is notorious for causing agonising pain for weeks and months, if not years if you are badly enough stung. Lead tour guide John Knox stated being stung by it is like being electrocuted and set on fire at the same time. The toxin the plant produces has a strong resemblance to scorpion venom and there are stories of animals like horses being stung by this plant hurling themselves off cliffs to their deaths, hence its nickname. It is so dangerous that even in the Poison Garden, where deadly plants are regularly left out in the breeze, it is kept in a glass case.

### Castor Oil Plant and Ricin

Ok, so gympie-gympie might be severely painful, but it&apos;s not necessarily deadly if you can handle the excruciating pain. What other poisons are there in the garden that are truly life-threatening? Well, here we actually come to one of the most lethal poisons of them all, and that is ricin, which actually comes from *Ricinus communis*, commonly known as castor oil plants. The castor beans contain seeds and these seeds contain ricin. It is considered one of the deadliest naturally occurring poisons in the world. If it finds its way into your body you are likely to experience nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhoea, liver damage, kidney damage, spleen damage and severe or even total organ failure. What&apos;s worse, there is no antidote for ricin poisoning, with medicinal treatment being purely supportive. Ricin makes the castor oil plant the most poisonous in the world according to the Guinness Book of World Records. It&apos;s not hard to see why either, as a report by Cornell University suggests that one single milligram of ricin can kill a grown adult.

### Tobacco

But even that is not the deadliest or most dangerous plant in the entirety of the Poison Garden. The true culprit to take that crown kills 78,000 people in the UK every year. With eight million global casualties. This hyper-dangerous super killer? It&apos;s tobacco.

## How Dangerous is The Poison Garden Really?

Now there is a question that I&apos;m sure enters many people&apos;s minds when they first hear about the Poison Garden. Just how dangerous is it? Well, that&apos;s actually a more complicated question than you might originally think. Obviously, the plants are dangerous, there is no disputing that and there could be concern over how some of these plants are glorified and could go on to be used by those with bad intentions. Ricin has been used several times as a bio-weapon. In the UK in 1978 an umbrella tip was dipped in ricin and used to assassinate Bulgarian BBC journalist Georgi Markov in what must be the only assassination via umbrella ever recorded. Serial poisoner Graham Young used berries from the *Atropa belladonna*, known as &quot;deadly nightshade&quot;, to squeeze poison into tea intended for his sister and mother at the age of just 14. The plant is on display in the garden.

But in reality, those with a warped enough sense of reality who wish to poison others will find the means to do so regardless of the Poison Garden&apos;s existence. In fact, one of the primary functions of the Poison Garden is to educate the general public on dangerous plants and research them to hopefully find real-world benefits for some of these killers. In fact, as the staff of the Poison Garden may tell you, many of the plants housed there have incredible medicinal qualities.

Take for example, the yew tree, that as we mentioned earlier is the most poisonous tree in the UK. The poison in the tree can kill you in just 20 minutes, but the tree also produces a substance called paclitaxel, or Taxol, that is used in breast cancer treatments. Similarly, hellebore which is also present in the garden was once given to children ground up in porridge to kill tapeworms. Now if the dose was too high you certainly wouldn&apos;t have a tapeworm problem anymore, you just also wouldn&apos;t have a child anymore either. The head gardener at Alnwick Castle, Trevor Jones, even owes his life to one of the plants in it. Madagascar Periwinkle is a plant with five-petalled symmetrical flowers that are usually a vibrant white, pink or violet. However, this plant isn&apos;t just a pretty face, it&apos;s also highly poisonous to humans and animals alike. Not only that, but the medicines derived from it are cancer-killers. Trevor had leukaemia; the drug used to save his life came from this plant. Meaning that in a funny way, the Poison Garden has actually saved more human lives than it&apos;s ended.

There&apos;s also an important note to be made around education of these plants and how the general public can learn what certain plants do, why they may be controlled and why they&apos;re so dangerous. Claire Mitchell, Alnwick Garden&apos;s head of community and education, highlights the importance of the Duchess&apos; drug education programme to the local area. Northumberland is in the northeast of England and the North East has had the highest rate of drug poisoning deaths of any English region for over 10 years. As such, the garden&apos;s &quot;ABC of drugs&quot; serves to educate the populace about narcotics. The &quot;A&quot; in the ABC, is opium poppies, a class A drug. Whilst there are many pharmaceutical uses for opium in medicines and painkillers, these substances are extremely addictive and can eventually lead to heroin overdose while chasing the dragon. A cannabis plant serves as the class B drug. It has psychoactive effects and makes you hungry. The class C narcotic is *Catha edulis*, or Khat, a plant native to East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula that serves as a mild stimulant when the leaves are chewed on. Narcotics like marijuana and coca plants, which the garden gains special permission to grow, are locked up in metal cages, under 24-hour surveillance by CCTV cameras.

These narcotic plants in Alnwick Garden serve as an excellent way for people to learn about narcotics in a controlled environment, to hear directly from experts the dangers of their use and how to treat them with the respect they deserve.

So we&apos;ve learned about the plants themselves, their dangers and their medicinal qualities, but how dangerous is the garden itself? Do people simply visit, accidentally touch a plant they shouldn&apos;t have, keel over and die on the spot? Well actually, no. As we mentioned earlier there has miraculously never been a fatality at the Poison Garden. Safety briefings are provided before each tour and every tour has a maximum of 20 people in it at one time, ensuring guides are with visitors at all times. There are also people qualified in first aid on hand around the clock, whether they are the tour guides themselves or other members of staff.

Now it&apos;s important to mention that whilst nobody has died at the Poison Garden yet, you do not want to be the unfortunate winner of that Darwin award. The garden is still very dangerous, as there are a number of fainting episodes on average each year. In a 2013 TikTok by head tour guide John Knox, he revealed that year had seen 130 fainting incidents, 11 episodes of projectile vomiting and two ambulances had to be called. This place is called the Poison Garden for a reason. Knox was however keen to emphasise that this actually isn&apos;t as bad as it sounds. 61,000 people had visited the garden by that point in the year, which made the chance of any of these things happening to you around 0.02%. But when it does happen, the staff are prepared and know what to do. Another tour guide, Tom Pattison, stated in 2023 that when somebody does unfortunately faint, you get a little star put on your shoulder. Knox proudly mentions that a tour guide has yet to faint at the garden, at least as of 2013. Tour guide Tom Pattison actually showed that the garden had even gotten exponentially safer, with an article in October of 2023 only showing one singular fainting episode so far that year. Pattison calls back to the Duchess&apos;s dark sense of humour and fascination with death here to paradoxically point out that this may not actually be a good thing. He said that the Duchess actually wanted people to faint in the garden because it shocks people and makes them realise that you can&apos;t mess around with these plants.

## Odds and Ends – Poisonous Plants, Harry Potter and Nudity

There are several elements to the Poison Garden at Alnwick and its wider area that while having very little to do with the plants themselves are still interesting nonetheless. Alnwick Castle, upon whose grounds host the Poison Garden is famous in its own right. Alnwick Castle is actually a partial setting for everyone&apos;s favourite wizarding school, Hogwarts. The castle appears in the 1st and 2nd Harry Potter films. You know the scene where Harry and the gang learn to ride a broomstick? That was filmed on Alnwick Castle&apos;s grounds. Another area was where Harry played Quidditch. It is also the setting where Harry and Ron crash Mrs. Weasley&apos;s car into the whomping willow. It&apos;s equally ironic and interesting to see the castle be the setting for a dangerous fictional plant in the film whilst being the real life setting of actual dangerous plants. Things really do come full circle.

But what about if you&apos;re not into all that wizard and magic stuff? What if you&apos;re into experiencing the world more…naturally? Well, the Poison Garden even may have something for you too. Whilst most of the time, the plants within the Poison Garden are so dangerous that they cannot be touched without gloves and sometimes even require hazmat suits to do any maintenance, for a lucky few, they can cast off these limitations. The Duchess hosts a nudist day for British Naturist Members where guests of the garden strip bare and take a tour of the garden, given by the Duchess herself who yes, also partakes in the activity. Now, highly poisonous, venomous and otherwise dangerous plants and…let&apos;s just call them &quot;things that dangle&quot; do not go together in any way. Any man openly willing to expose himself even in the same postcode as a gympie-gympie plant is more of a man than most.

But that&apos;s it for the Poison Garden. It is truly a place that has something for everyone. If &quot;everyone&quot; means people who take delight in hanging around deadly plants. Alnwick Garden is truly in its own small way, a wonder of the world. Nowhere else right in the heart of the beautiful British countryside can you find death so readily available to visit. Most dangerous places that bring a brush with death happen quickly, in extreme scenarios with high stakes. At Alnwick you can pay death a visit, stay a while and have a cup of tea. And is there anything quite as British as that? Just be careful with the berries.

## Key Takeaways

- The Poison Garden at Alnwick Castle features plants so dangerous that special permission is required to grow them.
- The garden was created by the Duchess of Northumberland, who has a fascination with both nature and death.
- Many of the plants in the garden, such as the laburnum tree and European yew, are highly poisonous and can be fatal if ingested.
- The garden serves an educational purpose, teaching visitors about the dangers of poisonous plants and their potential medicinal uses.
- Despite its dangers, the Poison Garden has never had a fatality, with safety measures in place to protect visitors.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Alnwick Poison Garden?

The Alnwick Poison Garden is a collection of highly dangerous and poisonous plants located on the Alnwick Castle estate in England. It was created by the Duchess of Northumberland and features plants that require special permission from the British government to grow and house.

### How did the Alnwick Poison Garden come to be?

The garden was created by the Duchess of Northumberland, Jane Percy, after she became the Duchess in 1995. The land was previously a defunct forestry with rows of Christmas trees. The Duchess&apos;s husband, the Duke of Northumberland, suggested she do something with the area, leading to the creation of the Poison Garden.

### What inspired the Duchess to create the Poison Garden?

The Duchess was inspired by her love of nature and her fascination with the dark, deadly, and macabre. She visited various gardens and historical sites, including the villa Medici in Tuscany and Soutra Aisle in Scotland, which influenced her decision to create a garden that mixed her love of nature with her interest in deadly plants.

### What types of plants are in the Alnwick Poison Garden?

The garden features a wide range of poisonous plants, including the laburnum tree, European yew, rhododendrons, laurel, aconitum (Monkshood and Wolfsbane), gympie-gympie tree, castor oil plant (ricin), and tobacco. All 100% of the plants in this garden are poisonous.

### Is the Alnwick Poison Garden dangerous to visitors?

While the plants are dangerous, the garden has safety measures in place. Visitors are given safety briefings, tours are limited to 20 people, and there are qualified first aid personnel on hand. There have been fainting episodes and incidents of projectile vomiting, but no fatalities have been reported.

### What is the purpose of the Alnwick Poison Garden?

The garden serves multiple purposes, including education, medicinal research, and public safety. It educates visitors about dangerous plants, their medicinal qualities, and the importance of handling them with care. The garden also conducts botanical research and destroys the plants at the end of each season for security purposes.

### Are there any medicinal benefits to the plants in the Poison Garden?

Yes, many of the plants have medicinal qualities. For example, the yew tree produces paclitaxel, used in breast cancer treatments, and the Madagascar Periwinkle is used to treat leukemia. The garden also educates visitors about the medicinal uses of these plants.

### What safety measures are in place at the Alnwick Poison Garden?

The garden provides safety briefings before each tour, limits tours to 20 people, and has qualified first aid personnel on hand. The plants are strictly off-limits to touching, and some require hazmat suits and facemasks for maintenance. The garden also destroys the plants at the end of each season for security purposes.

### What is the most dangerous plant in the Alnwick Poison Garden?

The castor oil plant, which contains ricin, is considered one of the deadliest naturally occurring poisons in the world. Ricin can cause severe organ failure and death, and there is no antidote for ricin poisoning. The garden also features the gympie-gympie tree, known for its extremely painful stings.

### What is the connection between the Alnwick Poison Garden and Harry Potter?

Alnwick Castle, where the Poison Garden is located, was used as a filming location for the first two Harry Potter movies. Scenes such as Harry and his friends learning to ride broomsticks and playing Quidditch were filmed on the castle&apos;s grounds.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Alnwick Poison Garden: The Deadliest Plants in the World](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaDE_JaUfjk)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/Villa_Medici_a_Fiesole_1.jpg) by Donata Mazzini / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Boötes Void: The Biggest, Emptiest Thing in the Universe</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/bootes-void-biggest-emptiest-thing-universe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/bootes-void-biggest-emptiest-thing-universe</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Space. The final frontier. For millennia, humanity has looked up into the stars, wondering about the great things beyond our vision and reach. Could it be distant advanced alien civilisations? Other universes? Planets that rain pure 24-carat gold? And then we got there and we realised… space is pretty empty.

Can you imagine nothing? What if there was absolutely nothing around you right now. No computer or phone. No room, no house, no land, no sea, no sky, no sun. Just pure blackness. Absolutely nothing in every direction. An infinite landscape of absolutely nothing. That&apos;s what&apos;s up in space for the most part—nothing whatsoever. Whilst the introverts among you may think of hiding away in the dark recesses of space as the best thing ever, I can assure you it isn&apos;t. An infinite void of nothing, only darkness, isolation and a deafening silence.

What&apos;s more, there is a place in our universe defined by this very notion of nothing. Far off in the distant reaches of the cosmos lies an area so vast and so empty, it has prompted conspiracy theories about hyper-advanced civilisations, it has inspired stories of sci-fi fantasy and it has even taught us a little about the universe itself.

It is the universe&apos;s desert. A place so vast and empty, all the money on earth converted into pennies wouldn&apos;t even fill a fraction of 0.01% of it.

What happens when you stare into the abyss and the abyss stares back?

The Boötes Void.

## What Actually Is a Cosmic Void?

So, one of the first questions we have to ask ourselves in order to understand the Boötes Void is: what is a void? Scientifically speaking, a void in space is a vast region with a very low cosmic mean density. That&apos;s a fancy way of saying there&apos;s nothing in it, or rather, very little in it. You see, despite being called a void, the Boötes Void is far from totally empty. A void&apos;s definition comes from its low cosmic density relative to the rest of space.

The Boötes Void, one of the largest in the known universe, is 330 million light years across according to the BBC. It&apos;s absolutely enormous. But its size actually gives a good reference point for just how empty it is compared to the rest of space. In an average slice of space that&apos;s the same size as the Boötes Void, you would expect to find over 2,000 galaxies in it, meaning that on average there is a galaxy every 165,000 light years or so. In the Boötes Void, there are 60 galaxies. Which means on average, you would only expect to run into another galaxy once every 5.5 million light years.

There are great expanses of nothing here on earth—deserts and oceans where you can see absolutely nothing in every direction right to the horizon. Well, the number of earths it would take to fit into the Boötes Void is 1.47×1051. That is a quadrillion, quadrillion, quadrillion earths&apos; worth of space. BBC&apos;s *Sky at Night* magazine states that a region the volume of the Milky Way could fit into it billions of times over. All with just 60 galaxies in it.

These galaxies are sometimes known as &quot;field galaxies&quot; because they are isolated from the large clusters of galaxies that dominate other regions of the universe. There is something to be said about the idea of being in a galaxy in the middle of an enormous void and the major change in perspective to space that it would cause. If earth was in the middle of the Boötes Void, until we discovered how to map the universe, we would be led to believe that space is almost entirely empty, with our own galaxy being one of the only things in it. If we were in the middle, it&apos;s not like we would be able to get our satellites out of the void very easily. We may have discovered and come across a few other galaxies and planets, but certainly not the overwhelming abundance of them in the universe like we come to expect today.

As astronomer Greg Aldering put it: &quot;If the Milky Way had been in the centre of the Boötes void, we wouldn&apos;t have known there were other galaxies until the 1960s.&quot;

Voids themselves aren&apos;t a new thing, with the first one being discovered in the 19th century. However, nobody at that time could predict the sheer size and scale of universal structures. The Boötes Void is so massive that it takes up around 2% of the diameter of the observable universe.

It is referred to as the &quot;Great Void&quot; as well as &quot;The Great Nothing&quot;. The name Boötes Void comes from the fact that the void contains the constellation of Boötes, the herdsman who pushes the plough (Ursa Major) around Polaris (the North Star). Poor Boötes, doomed to circle forever in a vast sea of nothing, truly a fate worse than death.

The void is also surrounded by the Boötes superclusters, galaxy clusters that exist around the edges of the void, among other galaxies and stars. It&apos;s also really far away—a full 700 million light years away. So rest assured, humanity won&apos;t be visiting any time soon. With current technology, it would take around 13 trillion years to reach it. If you wanted to cross it, it would be another 6.

So sure, it&apos;s big and it&apos;s empty, but that poses a question. A void is just cosmic nothing; space is already mostly nothing. How did we find out the Boötes Void even existed in the first place? Well, for that, we need to go back to the 1970s and 1980s and to a man who would change science forever: an American scientist by the name of Robert Kirshner.

## The Discovery of the Boötes Void

In the 1970s, we were still just dipping our toe into the stars. We had been to the moon, orbited the earth, launched satellites and probes into deep space, but our understanding of space still lacked depth. That is until redshift surveys came along.

Redshift surveys are a type of astronomical survey that are used to measure the distribution of interstellar objects by calculating their &quot;redshifts&quot;. A redshift occurs when light or other electromagnetic radiation from an object is stretched to longer wavelengths (toward the red part of the light spectrum) as the object moves away from the observer. What is the universe doing at all times? Expanding. So objects are almost always moving further away, stretching that light. We can measure the distance from the earth to the redshifted light of interstellar objects to see how far away they are as well as how quickly they are moving away from us. In effect, this gives us a way to map the observable universe in full 3D.

So, in the mid-1970s, redshift surveys were starting to become common in our pledge to understand the stars. By the 1980s is when our hero, Robert Kirshner, came in. In 1981, Robert was working alongside his fellow astronomers at the University of Michigan, as well as at the Harvard-Smithsonian Institute for Astrophysics, in order to calculate the redshift of a large number of galaxies in the observable universe. He would go on to become a professor at the institute later in life.

Robert and his colleagues were doing the survey when one day they discovered a huge blank region, bigger than any void that had been seen up to that point, in a portion of the universe around 700 million light years away. In this part of the universe, Kirshner and co expected to see large swathes of redshifted light, and there was in a lot of other areas. But right where we now know the Boötes Void sits, there was simply nothing. Was it a problem with the software? No, the computer was working fine. The group had stumbled across a hitherto undiscovered void—a super void. There were other voids that had been found before this point, as we mentioned redshift surveys go back to the mid-70s, but definitely none this size. It was a real-life marvel, right in our own universe.

But also, as I mentioned, it wasn&apos;t the only one. Yes, the discovery of the Boötes Void led to major breakthroughs in our understanding of the universe, but it technically isn&apos;t the biggest, emptiest thing in the universe. It certainly was at the time it was discovered; however, since then more complete maps have been drawn of the observable universe and it turns out the Boötes Void was not the only super void on the block.

The biggest of them all is known as the KBC void—it is a staggering 2 billion light years across, as opposed to the Boötes Void&apos;s comparatively puny 330 million. Other voids over a billion light years across do exist, like the Eridanus super void and the Sloan Great Wall void, leaving the great Boötes Void as something of a historical and statistical afterthought by comparison.

Voids in space have captivated audiences across a wide range of sci-fi media, from *Star Trek* to Peter F. Hamilton&apos;s *Commonwealth Saga*. There is something of a call of the void, a deeply human macabre interest in these areas of space that house so little.

Where is the Boötes Void today? Where it&apos;s almost always been and will continue to be for a long time yet—near the Boötes constellation, 700 million light years away. Well, as far as we know anyway. The light that reaches our equipment on earth has been travelling for 700 million years. So any images we do have of the void will be primordial. But this can be useful. We can use the Boötes Void and others like it to understand some of the most pressing questions about our universe, and I&apos;ve got a pretty good one: why is it there?

## Where Do Voids Come From?

&quot;That&apos;s all well and good,&quot; you might say, &quot;but how can we answer the prevailing question of why such a large expanse of space is filled with seemingly nothing at all?&quot; We all know that space is mostly empty—it&apos;s why it&apos;s called space. However, this significantly sized chunk of it is distinctly emptier. A drop from several thousand galaxies to 60 is over a 95% decrease in matter in the area. That seems like an anomaly, doesn&apos;t it? But the sheer size of the thing and the fact we know there are larger ones defies that very notion. Why is this great void of nothing here?

Well, our understanding of these voids is like a negative photo. They are defined by what they lack. Scientists have created detailed maps of our universe and when putting the pieces together, it looks like a giant spider&apos;s web. The vast majority of galaxies in our universe are found on the threads of this web. They&apos;re known as &quot;filaments&quot;. Whilst the empty spaces in the middle are known as voids. Have you ever seen a population density map of Australia? That&apos;s what one of these individual voids with galaxies around the edge would look like. Except there are thousands in the observable universe, all linked together.

So voids are actually relatively common. There&apos;s even one near the Milky Way, creatively named the Local Void. They make up 80% of the observable universe and many are millions of light years across. Where galaxy filaments meet at areas of high concentration, it&apos;s known as a cluster. We&apos;re in one right now. The Milky Way is part of the Virgo cluster, which in turn is part of the Laniakea Supercluster. These filaments and voids are the largest structures in the known universe, and the Boötes Void is simply one of the largest pieces of the puzzle.

Ok great, but why does it exist?

The BBC&apos;s *Science Focus* asserts that in order to understand why we have these voids and filaments, we have to go back to where it all began: the Big Bang. When the universe was first formed, the matter contained within it (which encompasses all the mass in the known universe) was densely packed together because the universe was still small. Scientists&apos; theory is that in this densely packed state, quantum fluctuations within the densely packed matter caused some areas of matter to be slightly more densely packed than others. Denser areas began to gather matter quickly, owed to gravity, pulling in other matter from the less densely packed areas. As the universe continued to expand outwards, these denser areas continued to grow and clump together, eventually forming the galaxies we see today. However, as those less densely packed areas also began to expand, they continued to lose matter through gravity to the more densely packed areas. So over an excruciatingly long period of time, there was less and less matter in those areas, thus creating voids; similarly, there was more and more matter in the clusters, which then created the filaments. This led to the formation of the cosmic web as we know it today.

This makes logical sense from a scientific standpoint. Small fluctuations over billions of years would make quite the difference as the universe continued to expand in that time.

These individual voids are like bubbles in foam, where smaller bubbles can merge together into larger ones as they expand. Many believe this is how the Boötes Void, alongside the other larger voids in the universe, came to be. These filaments and voids, weaved together like a spider web, have allowed us to map large portions of the observable universe. The clusters of galaxies that make up the filaments give off more energy than the colder, mostly empty voids. This means we can map them when using thermal imaging, which is effectively how we discovered the concept in the first place.

Joseph Clampitt, a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Pennsylvania, explained the phenomenon in a novel way using height as a stand-in for density, quoting here: &quot;Voids are vast, shallow troughs in the dark matter [distribution], galaxies sit at the centre of narrow, towering peaks. A typical galaxy has the same height and footprint as the Empire State Building [and] a medium-size void would be a 3-foot-deep hole three times the size of Manhattan.&quot;

So the Boötes Void is just that—a void. A relic of a time long passed when the universe began, that expanded to become one of the largest things in the observable universe. A large hole in space filled to the brim with nothing at all. Of course, there are a few galaxies, but the Boötes Void is largely a barren wasteland. It conjures up thoughts of what it would be like to exist inside it for even a minute. To look around you and see an endless expanse of darkness in every direction. Not even planets, galaxies or stars. It has a funny allure to it. The void calls for us all.

However, there are some that don&apos;t believe that the Boötes Void is an afterthought of a tiny fluctuation in energy when the universe began. Instead, they have pioneered a set of theories, some wackier than others, in order to explain why there is a 330 million light year expanse of nothing in the middle of space. Let&apos;s explore those, shall we?

## Fringe Theories – The Good, the Bad and the Wacky

As our understanding of voids has only really grown since the 1980s—which is relatively recent in scientific terms; we went to the moon in the 60s after all—there are a lot of fringe theories with varying degrees of scientific merit to explain phenomena within the Boötes Void. They vary from the relatively scientifically sound all the way into conspiracy theory nonsense.

So, what do people think the Boötes Void is really? We&apos;ll start with the obvious one: a black hole. It would make some scientific sense for the Boötes Void to be a black hole. After all, there seems to be so little there relative to other more densely packed parts of the universe that even light can&apos;t seem to pass all the way through the void, indicating that the light could be being affected by some massive interstellar object. We know black holes have strong enough gravity to affect and even trap light. So in theory, it could be a reason some voids exist.

However, when we start to think about it as an explanation for the Boötes Void in more depth, it just doesn&apos;t add up. The largest black hole ever discovered is TON 618. NASA states it&apos;s 66 billion times bigger than the sun. Its event horizon is 0.02 light years across. The Boötes Void is 330 million light years across. This is a whole other level of scale. Simply put, if the Boötes Void was a black hole, we would have much, MUCH bigger problems. Not to mention we&apos;d be able to see massive light distortions around that area of space, and one would expect to see the 60 galaxies in the void affected somehow by a massive black hole. Also, the fact that stars collapse into black holes puts this theory to bed. In order for a star to collapse into a black hole, it needs an extremely large amount of mass. Moreover, given what we know about the cosmic web, where most of the universe&apos;s mass is concentrated along dense filaments, it&apos;s unlikely that anything with significant mass like a black hole could be present in the Boötes Void. Now I&apos;ll grant you, that doesn&apos;t make it impossible for there to be an enormous black hole in the Boötes Void that scientists somehow simply haven&apos;t found for some reason. After all, there are stars in it, and a large enough one could cause a black hole if it collapsed. However, what we know of the formation of these voids simply makes this hypothesis less likely.

In a similar capacity, some have theorised that the Boötes Void is a dark nebula, which are molecular clouds so dense that they obscure visible light, masking the light behind them. This too makes some sense, but again there is a size mismatch here. The biggest dark nebula we know of, the Coalsack Nebula, is only around 30 light years across versus the 330 million for the Boötes Void. We also run into the same issues with the 60 galaxies in the void—a dark nebula would obscure them from view. Finally, given that dark nebulae are often found in galaxy structures, and given the relative lack of galaxies in the void, it&apos;s highly unlikely one could grow large enough to explain the Boötes Void.

Alright, we&apos;ve done some proper ones, now let&apos;s do the silly stuff. Some have claimed that the Boötes Void actually doesn&apos;t exist. That&apos;s right—a 330 million light year void in space actually isn&apos;t real. What is there, you may ask? Dyson spheres.

A Dyson Sphere is an idea crafted by physicist and mathematician Freeman Dyson in 1960. The idea goes that it could be possible for advanced civilisations to build a superstructure around a star in order to harness as much of its energy as possible. These superstructures are known as Dyson Spheres. I&apos;m sure you can see where this is going. It&apos;s asserted that the Boötes Void is not a void at all. It is in fact a hyper-advanced civilisation thousands of years ahead of humans in its development. Not only has this civilisation pioneered interstellar travel and Dyson Sphere building, but mastered it. They mastered it to such an extent that there is now a 330 million light year dark patch in space, as most of the stars have been covered up.

Now we don&apos;t need to dive into a complex analysis on this one; we simply have to play a short game of Occam&apos;s Razor. What&apos;s more likely: a civilisation advanced enough to cover 330 million light years&apos; worth of stars in Dyson Spheres (amounting to billions of stars), or there&apos;s a bit of space that&apos;s emptier than the rest of space, which is already 99% empty? I rest my case, your honour.

One of the more minor theories about large voids in general is that they have some kind of special interactions with dark energy and antimatter. Another asserts that large voids contain remnants of &quot;bubble universes&quot;. However, rather than just for silly goofs or as wild speculation, there is one theory about large voids that may tell us a lot about the fate of the universe itself.

As we understand it, those voids were formed when all of the mass in the universe was packed tightly together before the Big Bang. When the universe expanded, the minor quantum fluctuations eventually became a web of mass that litters the cosmos, and the spaces between the filaments were the voids. Some scientists theorise that the universe could keep expanding indefinitely, while others think it will reach a certain size and then retreat back in. However, for those who think the universe will continue to expand, it gives us a potential window into the future of the universe itself. The large voids we see in the universe tell us that this is the result of a massive expansion over a very long period of time. If the universe is ever-expanding, however, and will continue to do so in perpetuity, then the distances between matter will continue to grow indefinitely too. After billions or maybe even trillions of years&apos; time, stars will burn out, galaxies will become isolated, and the universe may reach a state of near-total emptiness, not unlike what we see in the Boötes Void today. In that sense, Boötes could be a window into the long-term fate of the cosmos.

## What&apos;s So Special About the Boötes Void Anyway?

Ok, so we&apos;ve talked about the Boötes Void. We&apos;ve established it&apos;s likely a semi-common phenomenon that happens throughout the universe. We&apos;ve learned it&apos;s not even the biggest void that we know of in space. So why is it special? Why focus on this specific void if it&apos;s no different from the others except it&apos;s a little bigger than most of them?

Well, because in a funny way, the Boötes Void is a gift.

You&apos;re right—in the grand scale of the universe, the Boötes Void is like any other. In the cosmic expanse it may not matter, but to us, it&apos;s special. The Boötes Void was not just some void we discovered; it is one of the first voids that was ever discovered and certainly the largest at the time. So it&apos;s partially significant for that reason, but that&apos;s not all.

Kirshner&apos;s work has since been built upon. Not only can voids potentially indicate a direction of travel for our universe in the future, but they also give us an indication of our past. In studying these structures, astrophysicists today can gaze through a window into what the universe looked like in its earliest moments. BBC&apos;s *Science Focus* states that advancements in both telescope and imaging technology have made it possible to create more detailed versions of Kirshner&apos;s maps, such as the Dark Energy Survey which has mapped out a quarter of the southern sky and examined around 300 million galaxies. Meanwhile, supercomputers can now create detailed simulations of the universe&apos;s expansion. By comparing these maps with the simulations, astronomers can begin to understand how our universe came to look the way it does today.

In no short order, the Boötes Void altered the way we think about the universe. It has helped make up one small nugget of our understanding of our own universe, which by proxy helps you and I understand our place in it all. So I&apos;m grateful to that 330 million light year void, because without it, we may not understand just how incredibly fortunate we are to be here today. Simply put, the Boötes Void may be a huge expanse of nothing, but it&apos;s given us a piece of our everything.

## Key Takeaways

- The Boötes Void is a vast, nearly empty region of space, 330 million light-years across.
- It contains only 60 galaxies, far fewer than expected for its size.
- The void was discovered in the 1980s using redshift surveys, which map the universe in 3D.
- Cosmic voids like Boötes are formed from quantum fluctuations during the Big Bang.
- The Boötes Void has significantly advanced our understanding of the universe&apos;s structure and expansion.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Boötes Void?

The Boötes Void is a vast region in space with a very low cosmic mean density, making it one of the largest and emptiest known voids in the universe. It is approximately 330 million light years across and contains only about 60 galaxies.

### How was the Boötes Void discovered?

The Boötes Void was discovered in the 1980s by Robert Kirshner and his colleagues using redshift surveys. They noticed a large blank region in the universe where they expected to see redshifted light from galaxies.

### What are cosmic voids?

Cosmic voids are vast regions in space with a very low cosmic mean density. They are defined by their low density relative to the rest of space and are part of the cosmic web structure of the universe.

### How many galaxies are in the Boötes Void?

The Boötes Void contains approximately 60 galaxies, which is significantly fewer than the expected 2,000 galaxies in a similarly sized region of space.

### What is the significance of the Boötes Void?

The Boötes Void is significant because it was one of the first large voids discovered and has contributed to our understanding of the universe&apos;s structure and expansion. It provides insights into the early moments of the universe and the potential future of cosmic expansion.

### What are some fringe theories about the Boötes Void?

Some fringe theories suggest that the Boötes Void could be a black hole, a dark nebula, or even a region filled with Dyson spheres built by an advanced civilization. However, these theories are generally considered less likely based on current scientific understanding.

### How does the Boötes Void relate to the cosmic web?

The Boötes Void is part of the cosmic web structure, where most of the universe&apos;s mass is concentrated along dense filaments, and the empty spaces between these filaments are voids. The Boötes Void is one of the largest voids in this web.

### What is the distance to the Boötes Void?

The Boötes Void is located approximately 700 million light years away from Earth, making it one of the most distant and largest known voids in the observable universe.

### What are redshift surveys and how are they used to study the universe?

Redshift surveys are astronomical surveys that measure the distribution of interstellar objects by calculating their redshifts. This helps in mapping the observable universe in 3D by determining the distance and velocity of objects moving away from Earth.

### What is the potential future of the universe based on the study of voids?

The study of large voids like the Boötes Void suggests that the universe may continue to expand indefinitely, leading to a state of near-total emptiness over billions or trillions of years. This provides a window into the long-term fate of the cosmos.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Boötes Void: The Biggest, Emptiest Thing in the Universe](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z2xGOvUIX68)
- [Hero image source](https://images.rawpixel.com/editor_1024/czNmcy1wcml2YXRlL3Jhd3BpeGVsX2ltYWdlcy93ZWJzaXRlX2NvbnRlbnQvbHIvdXB3azYxNjkzODU2LXdpa2ltZWRpYS1pbWFnZS1rb3dsbDVsMS5qcGc.jpg) by openverse, cc0.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cactus Dome: The Nuclear Tomb in Paradise</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/cactus-dome-nuclear-tomb-paradise</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/cactus-dome-nuclear-tomb-paradise</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>*You were a whole island once. You were breadfruit trees heavy with green globes of fruit, whispering promises of massive canoes.*

*Then you became testing ground. Nine nuclear weapons consumed you, one by one, engulfed in an inferno of blazing heat. You became crater. You became tomb. You became concrete shell. You became solidified history.*

These are some lines from the poem &apos;Anointed&apos;, written by poet Kathy Jetñil-Kijiner, hailing from the Marshall Islands, an archipelago of heavenly atolls located roughly halfway between Australia and Hawaii.

In February 2017, Jetnil-Kijiner read aloud her poem, while standing on the &apos;concrete shell&apos;, the very &apos;tomb&apos; she described.

Unlike most tombs, this structure does not commemorate the dead. It is more of a barrier, holding back a curse: the curse of a poisonous history, which threatens to return to haunt this slice of paradise, as the sea waters rise and the slabs of concrete slowly, but surely, start to crack.

This is the curse of the Cactus Dome.

## The Tomb

The name &apos;Marshall Islands&apos; may not be immediately recognisable, unless you are a geography buff, but the toponym &apos;Bikini atoll&apos; should evoke images of unbridled testing of nuclear weapons at the start of the Cold War. These tests, and their fictionalised consequences, became the inspiration for the classic &apos;Godzilla&apos; franchise.

West of Bikini, lies a string of 40 islands, once contoured by white sandy beaches and covered in coconut trees: the Enewetak atoll. One of these tiny islands, Runit, is sadly home to today&apos;s destination: the Cactus Dome, also known as the &apos;Runit Dome&apos; or the &apos;Cactus Crater Containment Structure&apos;.

From the outside, the Dome looks like a circular, convex concrete cap, roughly 126 yards in diameter. It is composed of 357 trapezoidal slabs, converging towards a top section some 18 inches thick.

What lies beneath the Dome is far more impressive.

The concrete slabs were laid down to contain a total of 111,000 cubic yards of radioactively contaminated soil and debris, laced with potentially lethal amounts of plutonium, caesium and strontium isotopes.

This pile of nuclear waste was collected and dumped into a crater by the US military, in an effort to clean up the Enewetak atoll, contaminated by the dozens of nuclear weapons tested on the Marshall Islands.

This tomb, however, is far from sealed. The unforgiving passage of time, the onslaught of the elements, and overall neglect, have caused the slabs to crack and spall. Due to rising sea levels, the waters of the Pacific Ocean have seeped into the Dome. And contaminated water is flowing back out again, threatening the rich marine wildlife, as well as the health and livelihood of the local populations.

But to fully understand how the Runit Dome came into being, and its current implications, we have to trace the history of Enewetak and weapons testing in the Marshall Islands.

## Raining Hell

The Marshall Islands stretch over a vast expanse of ocean, measuring 750,000 square miles — that&apos;s almost five Californias! The islets and atolls are all that remains of ancient volcanoes that once rose from these waters.

The islands were first settled some 3,000 years ago by sea-faring populations, travelling from Asia and Polynesia. They lived largely undisturbed for centuries, until Imperial Germany first colonised the Marshalls in the 1880s.

Following WWI, Imperial Japan took control. And after some decades of peace, the Marshalls switched hands again. With the outset of WWII in the Pacific, American forces evicted the Japanese from the islands, seizing Enewetak on February 23, 1944. Due to the tranquil waters of its lagoon, this atoll became an important base for the US Pacific Fleet. And after the end of the war, the US control over the Marshalls was formalised with a Trusteeship, awarded by the United Nations in July 1947. Thus, the Marshall Islands and other Pacific archipelagos wrested from the Japanese became collectively known as the TTPI — or Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

The TTPI was administered by the military, who saw the Marshalls in particular as the perfect testing ground for nuclear bombs of increasingly destructive power. The Cold War was already on, and the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union had kicked off!

It is interesting to note, however, that the first two nuclear detonations on Bikini Atoll were conducted in the summer of 1946, prior to the TTPI being established!

All in all, between 1946 and 1958, the US military pounded the Marshall Islands with a total of 67 nuclear devices, 35 of which were detonated in 1958 only.

The Enewetak atoll bore the brunt of this radioactive slaughter. In late 1947, the newly constituted Atomic Energy Commission, or AEC, had designated Enewetak as a favoured test site. Thus, between 1948 and 1958, the AEC conducted six series of tests on the atoll, detonating 43 nuclear and thermonuclear bombs.

Notably, on October 31, 1952 the tiny island of Elugelab was obliterated by Ivy Mike, the very first thermonuclear device, boasting a 10.4 megaton yield. The explosion scattered tons of contaminated materials all over Enewetak and the surrounding waters, leaving behind a crater 1.24 miles wide and almost 500 feet deep.

The last series of tests, known as &apos;Hardtack&apos;, conducted in 1958, left the atoll almost entirely uninhabitable.

The &apos;Hardtack&apos; experiment involved the testing of nine devices. One of them, &apos;Cactus&apos;, exploded in May, leaving behind a crater which was later topped by the infamous Dome.

Other weapons were ironically nicknamed with more innocent sounding monikers such as Butternut, Holly, Magnolia and Quince. The latter, tested in August, failed to explode completely, spraying plutonium fuel across Runit island.

The Department of Defense and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory dispatched an infantry unit to clean up the surface of Runit. Well, &apos;clean up&apos; is probably an overstatement, as they simply shoved the contaminated soil into the Enewetak lagoon. They then excavated a trench, 30 feet wide and 8 feet deep, and filled it with 130 tons&apos; worth of radioactive dirt, transported all the way from a Nevada test site!

The following bomb, &apos;Fig&apos;, was dropped exactly over the poisonous trench, thus spreading yet more radioactive material over the area.

The local inhabitants had been relocated to other islands in the Marshalls prior to the tests, of course. But they were not immediately repatriated after the nuclear tests were stopped for good.

This happened in August of 1963, following the signature of the Partial Test Ban Treaty between the US, UK and the Soviet Union. The Test Ban Treaty, however, only applied to nuclear ordnance, which did not prevent the US Department of Defence from experimenting with other types of weapons.

In 1968, the new testing phase began, this time with a biological arsenal: bombs, missiles and spraying devices littered Enewetak, mostly Lojwa Island, with clouds of weaponised staphylococcal enterotoxin B, a biological agent which causes toxic shock and food poisoning.

According to declassified military files, a single one of those biological bombs could cover an area of 926 square miles — that&apos;s Los Angeles times two! — causing a 30% casualty rate.

## The Big Clean Up

By 1972, the US military decided to put an end to their testing in the region, and in April invited the former inhabitants of Enewetak to resettle in the atoll.

According to a Department of Energy report, the Enewetak leaders &quot;were deeply gratified to be able to visit their ancestral homeland, but they were mortified by what they saw.&quot;

Their once verdant and paradisiacal islands were now completely barren, a post-apocalyptic landscape where empty desolation was interrupted only by lonely, sickly palm trees and crumbling military facilities.

Clearly, the local people, the dri-Enewetak, could not resume their way of life, unless the islands were cleaned up.

In mid-1975, the Energy Research and Development Agency, or ERDA, estimated that a sum of $40 million would be needed to return the atoll to living conditions. The US Congress approved a budget of only $20 million, which was topped up by $12 million provided by the Department of the Interior, or DOI.

The ERDA had planned to hire specialised contractors for the clean up operations, but the budget cuts meant that US servicemen would be used instead, as virtually free labour.

In March of 1977, the Department of Energy, DOE, conducted a joint survey with the Defense Nuclear Agency, or DNA, which determined that only the top soil levels of the Enewetak islands were contaminated.

The only exception was Runit. This island had endured 17 nuclear detonations, and was too heavily poisoned by radiation.

A plan was soon put together: the US military would scrape up the top layers of soil from the affected islands in Enewetak, and then move it to Runit. Then, the dirt would be dumped into the crater left by the Cactus bomb.

The contaminated soil was to be mixed with concrete, to ensure that it was not spread by the winds. Finally, the radioactive slurry would be covered by a concrete structure: the Cactus, or Runit, Dome. Naturally, Runit island would remain off limits indefinitely.

The cleanup of Enewetak started in May 1977, and would be completed in April 1980. Eventually, the workforce employed included a small number of contractors and civil servants, but the bulk of the labour came from US servicemen, for a total of 4,000 people.

This force dumped into the Cactus crater 6,000 cubic yards of contaminated debris, as well as 105,000 cubic yards of radioactive soil. The crater was then capped with the 18-inch Dome, assembled from 357 slabs of concrete.

Before the Dome could be completed, though, the work crews discovered new piles of highly radioactive debris. This waste material was embedded into some of the slabs, which apparently did not cause concern for the officials involved. The Departments involved had conceived the Dome as a structure to contain the soil and debris, and not as a fully functional anti-radiation shield!

Once the Cactus Dome was indeed finally completed, crews found yet again more radioactive material, washed ashore by the tides. The servicemen involved had to construct two small antechambers to accommodate for the extra waste.

As the clean up progressed, a parallel program was put in place to make the atoll inhabitable by the returning dri-Enewetak.

A total of 37,000 coconut, breadfruit and other edible trees were planted across ten islands. The DOI also took care of building 116 new homes over the three largest islands. 39 out of 40 islands in the atoll were requalified for agriculture and food gathering.

The 40th island was Runit. It was deemed cleared of high levels of fissile materials, but the DOI took the wise decision not to resettle it.

Overall, the total cost of the cleanup and resettlement project has been estimated at $104 million.

## Like Mushrooms

The overall program may sound like an honest effort on behalf of the ERDA, the DOI, DOE and the military to return to the dri-Enewetak their slice of paradise, but the overall picture was, and is, far from idyllic.

As mentioned earlier, the Departments involved were fully aware that the Runit Dome would not be effective in keeping radiation at bay. Moreover, they failed to inform the dri-Enewetak, withholding from them also information about the biological weapons experiments.

The military personnel involved did not receive better treatment. They were neither properly trained nor adequately protected against radiation poisoning. Six servicemen died during the cleanup operation, hundreds more developed radiation-induced cancers.

It appears that some of them didn&apos;t even know they were working in a contaminated environment. Bob Reitmer, for example, served with the 84th Engineer Battalion, and worked at the Cactus Dome for a total of six months, in 1977 and 1978. He only found out about the dangers related to that operation in 2019!

As he declared to the Los Angeles Times: &quot;There were no masks, or respirators, or bug suits, for that matter. My uniform was a pair of combat boots, shorts and a hat. That was it. No shirt. No glasses.&quot;

Fittingly, he concluded that he and other fellow soldiers had been treated &quot;like mushrooms: They feed us crap and keep us in the dark.&quot;

In 1986, the US Government and the Government of the Marshall Islands signed an agreement, known as &apos;Compact of Free Association&apos;, to formalise their relationship, with specific clauses about the aftermath of the nuclear experiments.

As per the Compact, the two countries established a special international court in 1988. This was the Nuclear Claims Tribunal, designed to assess health and damage claims filed by the Marshallese. This court ruled that the US should have paid $2.3 billion in claims to the islanders. The US Congress, however, rejected this ruling.

A 2003 amendment to the Compact includes a clause granting $48,750,000 in reparations to the people of Enewetak.

However, according to a Los Angeles Times article published in 2019, the US Government has paid only $4 million to the residents of the atoll.

US Ambassador to the Marshall Islands, Karen Stewart, denied the need to pay further claims, as, according to her, the US had already invested more than $600 million in clean up and resettlement projects throughout the 1970s and 1980s — a figure which, according to Stewart, would equate to $1 billion adjusted for inflation.

However, official figures from the DoE place the clean up and resettlement bill at $104 million in 1980 value, which is about $386 million in 2023 money.

Nonetheless, between the signing of the Compact in 1986 and 2019, American institutions did invest time, effort and money in surveying the conditions of the Cactus Dome and the surrounding area, assessing the need for further decontamination interventions.

## Under Inspection

At the end of June 2008, the Office of Health and Safety of the DOE contracted National Security Technologies, NST, to perform an inspection of the outer surface of the Cactus Dome.

NST surveyed all 357 concrete panels, reporting no defects in 138 of them. But the remaining 219 did present signs of potentially concerning damage.

On many of these panels, it seems like vegetation was slowly conquering concrete, taking root in the joints between slabs and growing over the surface. Either as a consequence of plants taking root, or as a result of other atmospheric factors, many slabs appeared to be cracked, broken or chipped.

The most frequently reported concern, however, was spalling, prevalent across the entire dome, and especially significant along the joint edges.

The dri-Enewetak community naturally grew concerned about the structural integrity of the Cactus Dome. What would be the impact on the environment and their own health should the radioactive debris escape through the cracks?

In response to these concerns, in 2012 the US Congress passed the Insular Areas Act of 2011, which required the Secretary of Energy to conduct periodical inspections on Runit island. These inspections should have included both a survey of the concrete cover and a radiochemical analysis of the groundwater surrounding and inside the Dome.

The following year, a study of the Cactus Dome was conducted by Terry Hamilton, Scientific Director at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This inspection, similar to the one completed in 2008, reviewed the status of each individual concrete slab, reporting the usual issues of widespread cracking and spalling. However, Hamilton&apos;s study concluded that &quot;the cracks and spalling of concrete were not considered structural in nature or likely to present any additional hazard associated with the spread of radioactive contamination into the environment.&quot;

The 2012 survey of the Dome was followed by groundwater sampling in 2015. This was performed by Ken Buesseler, expert in marine radioactivity at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.

Buesseler found that &quot;there was an exchange between the lagoon water and material under the Dome.&quot; Which meant that the sea waters were filtering into the covered crater, and then seeped out again into the lagoon. Buesseler and his team, however, found that only low levels of radioactivity had been detected in the lagoon.

To clarify, Buesseler found that the solid sediments under the waters of the lagoon already contained plutonium — even before the clean up operations and the construction of the Dome.

This underwater plutonium is equivalent to only 0.1% of the plutonium released by the weapons tested in the 1940s and 1950s. And the plutonium buried under the Dome was estimated to be only 1% of this 0.1%!

All in all, the radiation levels detected by Buesseler&apos;s 2015 study fell below contamination level for international standards on the quality of water.

In 2016, a team of Columbia University researchers took care of measuring radiation levels on land, across the islands of Enewetak. This study found these levels to be lower than those measured in New York&apos;s Central Park! By the way, Central Park&apos;s background radioactivity is due to the presence of granite rocks.

In the same year, Terry Hamilton of the Lawrence Livermore Lab returned to the Dome for another series of tests on the concrete slabs, which included compressive strength testing, petrographic exams and chemical analysis. Despite the ever increasing number of cracks, this survey concluded that &quot;the exterior concrete remains well cemented, appears to be properly consolidated and cured, and has satisfactory strength and binding properties ... [It] is not significantly compromised and is still serving its intended purpose of providing an effective barrier to reduce natural erosion of underlying waste-pile materials.&quot;

In 2018 Hamilton made another trip to Runit, to oversee a visual inspection of the Dome, this time conducted via drone. His team identified 46 cracks and 36 spalls for immediate repair, which was carried out after the inspection. In his report on the event, Hamilton notes that these maintenance activities &quot;were performed largely to address widespread public perception that cracks in the concrete form sites for potentially harmful quantities of radioactivity becoming available for human exposure.&quot;

In other words, his opinion was that cracking on the Dome did not constitute an actual risk for additional contamination of Runit island. His reports however also note that two severely damaged concrete panels had left the underlying waste pile completely exposed. These panels &quot;were repaired during an earlier field mission to Enewetak Atoll.&quot;

The 2018 expedition was to be followed up by another trip in 2019, intended to carry out further repair work. This mission was cancelled due to outbreaks of measles and Dengue fever in the Marshall Islands, and further delayed in 2020 and 2021 due to the Covid pandemic.

During the inspection, Hamilton and team were also able to sample the groundwater aquifer underneath the Dome, test its radiological levels and assess the impact on the environment of the atoll. Their methodology focused in particular on testing levels of caesium and plutonium isotopes.

The presence of caesium did not worry Hamilton, who noted its &quot;negligible impact on radiological conditions in the wider marine environment on Enewetak Atoll.&quot;

On the other hand, the concentration of plutonium isotopes observed in the lagoon was significantly higher, compared to levels found in the open ocean.

Hamilton&apos;s report thus confirmed that fallout contamination had been leaking from the Cactus crater into the groundwater aquifer underneath. And the aquifer had become a source for &quot;potential migration of fallout radionuclides ... into the marine environment.&quot;

In other words: the waste and debris beneath the Dome had contaminated the layer of water under the crater, and the radiation had then spread into the lagoon.

## A Bomb with Two Fuses

Hamilton&apos;s conclusions were confirmed by the findings of a joint expedition, organised by the Los Angeles Times and Columbia University&apos;s Graduate School of Journalism.

The research team visited the Enewetak lagoon, finding radiation levels comparable to those found near Chernobyl and Fukushima. They also documented extensive environmental impact, such as coral bleaching, die-outs of fish and excessive proliferation of algae.

In May 2019, Terry Hamilton visited Majuro, the capital of the Marshall Islands, to address an audience of local dignitaries and officials. The researcher confirmed once more that the Cactus Dome was too exposed to the tides, with water leaking in and then seeping out again, contaminating the lagoon.

In conclusion, the structure was &quot;vulnerable to leakage and the sustained impacts of storm surge and sea level rise.&quot;

That is a key point. The Dome is a very low structure, its highest point standing at an elevation of just 25 feet above sea level. The Departments in charge of Runit&apos;s clean up had not considered the eventuality of progressive rise of sea levels — an undeniable fact which nullifies the Dome&apos;s purpose of containing the radioactive debris!

At the Majuro meeting, however, Hamilton reassured his audience that there was no cause for alarm. His point was that the lagoon was already so contaminated that any additional radiation would be almost undetectable.

The researcher added that, in his view, Runit was safe for habitation. Hamilton contends that the plutonium-laced soil is harmful only when it is airborne, or when enters the body via a superficial wound.

After the summit, Hamilton reiterated his views to the Los Angeles Times: &quot;Under existing living conditions, there is no radiological basis why I or anyone else should be concerned about living on Enewetak.&quot;

Hamilton&apos;s conclusions have left other scientists rather perplexed.

Holly M. Barker is an anthropologist at the University of Washington who has served on the Marshall Islands nuclear commission. In her view, Hamilton&apos;s conclusions make little sense, as they negated the very reason why the Dome, or &apos;Tomb&apos;, was built in the first place. &quot;The whole point of building the Tomb was to clean up contamination left behind by the U.S. testing programs.&quot;

Another critic is Paul Griego, a radiochemist who in 1978 worked as contractor during the construction of the Dome: &quot;I saw the water rising and falling as we filled that dome. I know that limestone is porous. And I know how sick people got. That dome is dangerous. And if it fails, it&apos;s a problem.&quot;

Understandably, the government of the Marshall Islands has grown concerned over the years about the worsening situation on Runit Islands. The situation can be described as a double time bomb, with two fuses ticking away towards catastrophe: on one hand, the Dome is slowly crumbling away; on the other, the waters are rising.

The President of the Marshall Islands, Hilda Heine, has repeatedly lobbied the White House for help, but Washington has declined, citing the fact that the Cactus Dome is on Marshallese land, and therefore it is not their responsibility.

In September 2019, President Heine vented her frustration: &quot;How can the Dome be ours? We don&apos;t want it. We didn&apos;t build it. The garbage inside is not ours. It&apos;s theirs.&quot;

Heine&apos;s views were supported by Prof Michael Gerrard, citing the fact that the US military was entirely responsible for the aftermath of the nuclear tests carried out in the Pacific.

Back in 2015, the already quoted marine radiochemist Ken Buesseler had not been concerned by radiation levels in the Enewetak lagoon. However, as of 2020, he agreed that the &apos;ticking time bomb&apos; in Runit was of great concern. To him, the most dangerous of the &apos;two fuses&apos; in the rise in sea levels.

&quot;A lot depends on future sea-level rise and how things like storms and seasonal high tides affect the flow of water in and out of the dome. It&apos;s a small source right now, but we need to monitor it more regularly to understand what&apos;s happening, and get the data directly to the affected communities in the region.&quot;

The risk posed by rising sea levels has been acknowledged also by a Department of Energy report, dated June 2020. One of its conclusions reads: &quot;The most notable and immediate impact of rising sea levels on the Cactus Crater containment structure is that associated with the physical effects of storm surge and wave-driven flooding.&quot;

As per the integrity of the Dome itself, the DoE concluded that it was not in &quot;immediate danger of collapse or failure,&quot; with the concrete slabs still fulfilling their job of protecting the contaminated soil from wind and water erosion.

The DoE further concludes that the radioactive material buried under the &apos;Tomb&apos; is not having any measurable adverse effect on the surrounding habitat. Moreover, it is not &quot;expected to have any adverse effect on the environment in 5, 10, or 20 years.&quot;

The report also reassures about the impact of exposure to fallout radionuclides on humans. Radiation dose rates measured on the dri-Enewetak are &quot;well below international standards for radiological protection of the public; i.e., 100 millirem per year.&quot;

The DoE, however, admitted the need of starting a program to analyse radiochemical activity in the groundwater beneath the Dome, to determine with certainty future impact on the environment.

## In Conclusion

To summarise the opinions of Hamilton, Buesseler and the DoE: yes, the Cactus Dome is potentially dangerous, but the radiation levels, due in particular to plutonium isotopes, are not a cause for concern at the moment.

In April 2022, Columbia University researchers Hart Rapaport and Ivana Nikolic Hughes disagreed with these views from the pages of Scientific American.

The authors of the article contend that the research conducted by the DoE and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory focused on caesium and plutonium, but did not report on the presence of strontium 90. This radioisotope is a cause of concern across the entire Marshall Islands, as it can cause leukaemia and bone cancer.

Their argument is that the US government is accountable for the damages left behind by nuclear testing, and that the Congress should provide funding to independent research and clean up efforts.

Speaking of funding, in June 2023 the US and the Marshall Islands renewed their Compact of Free Association. Section 107, Clause (b)(2) assigns a sum of $2.3 billion &quot;to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of any future amendments to the 2003 Amended Compact.&quot;

In other words, the US Government appears to have set aside a substantial fund which may be used to carry out further research at Runit island, to determine, for example, whether its environment is contaminated by dangerous levels of strontium isotopes.

The funds may be even used to repair those slowly eroding concrete slabs and thus keep at bay the spectre of a radioactive resurrection from beneath the Cactus Dome.

But will this be sufficient against the rise of the waters?

The Marshall Islands are particularly exposed to the danger of rising sea levels. Since 1993, they have increased by 0.3 inches year on year around the archipelago. By comparison, the global average is between 0.11 to 0.14 inches per year. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, levels could have increased as much as 5 feet by the end of the 21st Century, which could submerge most of the Marshalls.

We can only hope that a permanent solution is found on time, before the Cactus Dome ceases to be a radioactive tomb on a once heavenly island, to become instead a menacing time capsule lurking beneath the waves.

## Key Takeaways

- The Cactus Dome in the Marshall Islands contains radioactive waste from US nuclear tests.
- The dome&apos;s concrete slabs are cracking and spalling, allowing contaminated water to seep out.
- Rising sea levels and storm surges threaten the dome&apos;s integrity and the surrounding environment.
- The US and Marshall Islands have differing views on responsibility and funding for dome maintenance.
- Scientists debate the immediate danger of radiation levels, but agree on the need for monitoring.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Cactus Dome?

The Cactus Dome, also known as the &apos;Runit Dome&apos; or the &apos;Cactus Crater Containment Structure,&apos; is a circular, convex concrete cap located on Runit Island in the Enewetak atoll of the Marshall Islands. It was built to contain 111,000 cubic yards of radioactively contaminated soil and debris from nuclear weapons testing.

### Why was the Cactus Dome built?

The Cactus Dome was constructed to contain radioactive waste generated from nuclear weapons testing conducted by the US military in the Marshall Islands. The dome was intended to prevent the spread of radioactive materials into the environment.

### What is the current condition of the Cactus Dome?

The Cactus Dome is showing signs of deterioration, including cracks and spalling in the concrete slabs. Rising sea levels and storm surges are causing water to seep into the dome, potentially spreading radioactive contamination into the surrounding lagoon.

### What are the potential risks associated with the Cactus Dome?

The primary risks include the potential release of radioactive materials into the environment due to the dome&apos;s deteriorating condition and the rising sea levels. This could contaminate the marine ecosystem and pose health risks to local populations.

### What is the history of nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands?

Between 1946 and 1958, the US military conducted 67 nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands, with 43 of those tests taking place on the Enewetak atoll. The testing contaminated the islands, leading to the construction of the Cactus Dome to contain the radioactive waste.

### What is the Compact of Free Association?

The Compact of Free Association is an agreement signed in 1986 between the US Government and the Government of the Marshall Islands. It formalizes their relationship and includes clauses about the aftermath of nuclear testing, including reparations and cleanup efforts.

### What are the concerns of the Marshallese government regarding the Cactus Dome?

The Marshallese government is concerned about the deteriorating condition of the Cactus Dome and the potential for radioactive contamination due to rising sea levels. They have lobbied the US for help but have faced resistance, as the US argues that the dome is on Marshallese land.

### What is the current status of the Cactus Dome according to US reports?

According to reports from the US Department of Energy and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Cactus Dome is not in immediate danger of collapse. However, they acknowledge the need for ongoing monitoring and potential repair work due to the rising sea levels and structural issues.

### What is the significance of the 2023 renewal of the Compact of Free Association?

The 2023 renewal of the Compact of Free Association includes a substantial fund of $2.3 billion that could be used for further research and cleanup efforts at Runit Island, including addressing the issues with the Cactus Dome.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Cactus Dome: The Nuclear Tomb in Paradise](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qpcpR44swQk)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/10.30_%E7%B8%BD%E7%B5%B1%E6%8A%B5%E9%81%94%E9%A6%AC%E7%B4%B9%E7%88%BE%E7%BE%A4%E5%B3%B6%E5%85%B1%E5%92%8C%E5%9C%8B%EF%BC%8C%E7%94%B1%E6%B5%B7%E5%A6%AE%EF%BC%88Hilda_C._Heine%EF%BC%89%E7%B8%BD%E7%B5%B1%E9%99%AA%E5%90%8C%E6%B2%BF%E7%B4%85%E5%9C%B0%E6%AF%AF%E5%89%8D%E9%80%B2%EF%BC%8C%E6%8E%A5%E5%8F%97%E5%85%A9%E5%81%B4%E9%A6%AC%E5%9C%8B%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%B6%E8%AD%A6%E5%AF%9F%E5%84%80%E9%9A%8A%E8%87%B4%E6%95%AC_%2837980845986%29.jpg) by 總統府 / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Caribbean Capital City... That is a Ghost Town</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/caribbean-capital-city-ghost-town</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/caribbean-capital-city-ghost-town</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Welcome to Mariupol… or more rather… to the *memory* of it.

As recorded, it&apos;s a Ukrainian City on the Sea of Azov – the tenth largest in the nation in fact, and home to around 425,000 people, two *giant* steel mills, a busy port, and all the usual Soviet-era concrete you&apos;d expect from a City in that neck of the woods…

But in reality, *all* of that is now in the past, and it has been replaced by a *Russian* city; the natives mostly gone – either having been displaced or killed – the skyline demolished and created anew, and the language and landmarks steadily scrubbed to better fit &apos;New Mariupol&apos;, as Moscow calls it.

*How* did this happen? *Why* did this happen? *When* did this happen? And *what* will happen next?

They are all questions we will be answering today – *big* questions, with unsettling answers…

## The Background

If we want to understand what was *actually* erased, we need to understand what Mariupol was *before* it became a battlefield; because it isn&apos;t just &apos;copy and pasted Soviet-built city number 82&apos; – it&apos;s its own place, with its own story.

Geographically – to get us started – it&apos;s simple enough. Mariupol sits on the northern shore of the Sea of Azov, at the mouth of the Kalmius River, and that alone makes it strategically important; as whoever controls Mariupol controls not just a chunk of Ukraine&apos;s coastline, but a key outlet for Donbas coal, grain, and steel to the wider world.

Before the 2022 invasion too, it was also Ukraine&apos;s tenth-largest city, with around 425,000 people calling it home, most of whom lived within one of four urban districts: Kalmiuskyi, Livoberezhnyi (Left Bank), Prymorskyi (Seafront), and Tsentralnyi.

Historically though, the story starts with Greeks and Cossacks.

*Basically*, in the mid-18th century, the area around the Kalmius estuary was Cossack country – outposts, fishing villages… *and that&apos;s about it*. After Russia&apos;s victory over the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768 to 1774 however, Catherine the Great took it upon herself to &apos;tidy up&apos; the frontier – as she saw it.

Thus, in 1778, the town of &apos;Pavlovsk&apos; was founded; giving itself a smidge of an infrastructural headstart by building on top of an old Cossack encampment – and then, a year later, &apos;Pavlovsk&apos; became &apos;Mariupol&apos;.

But even that name – the name we know it as today – didn&apos;t stick though, as the Soviets renamed it &apos;Zhdanov&apos; between 1948 and 1989 in honour of one of Stalin&apos;s goons. After that, however, with the Soviet Empire then in the midst of absolutely imploding in on itself; &apos;Mariupol&apos; – the name was put back to normal.

As for the Greek connection, they come into Mariupol&apos;s story as its first major wave of settlers. Not that they had any choice in the matter, as Catherine the Great moved them there at bayonet point.

Long story short; she yanked tens of thousands of Greeks – and a few Armenians too – out of Crimea to: A), cripple the Crimean Khanate&apos;s tax base to soften it up for full annexation, B), seed the Azov steppe up with &apos;reliable&apos; Christian settlers, and C), to lock those very same settlers in *properly* as Russian subjects, subject *directly* to her laws and charters.

And right up to 2022, this &apos;Greek connection&apos; remained a *big* part of Mariupol&apos;s identity, as you had tens of thousands of &apos;Azov Greeks&apos; in the city and its surrounding villages, older folks still speaking the local Greek dialect – &apos;Rumeika&apos;, to use its proper name – dedicated Greek museums, Greek cultural centres and Sunday schools in town, and even a Modern Greek Studies department at Mariupol State University. It wasn&apos;t just some vague historical footnote, is what we&apos;re getting at, it was a *major* deal.

And what did they do for the first hundred years or so of their history in Mariupol? Not much actually… pretty much standard &apos;early modern period city stuff&apos; basically; plenty of agriculture, bit of industry here and there, plenty of Jesus-ing, and so and so forth.

**BUT THEN…** then came the railways, which connected the city up to the Donets Basin area in 1882. That one act alone lit the match on a process that would see Mariupol – the sleepy nowhere city as it then was – transform into a *major* industrial hub.

Coal came down that line you see… so they may as well expand the port so they can ship as much of it as possible… oh, and since the coal&apos;s coming that way anyway, why not expand complementary industries too… industries like, say, **STEEL**.

And so good of an idea did that compressed and simplified logic turn out to be, that it got a bit out of hand… with Mariupol becoming one of *the* biggest steel hubs in the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, with blast furnaces, coke plants, power stations and rolling mills all eventually sprawling out for *kilometres*.

We&apos;ll also give you two specific examples: the Ilyich Iron and Steel Works, founded in 1899, during the Imperial period, and the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works, founded in 1930, during the Soviet period. Why them in particular, you ask? Well, they both went out of business in 2022 didn&apos;t they… and as you can likely ascertain from that fact… they&apos;ll be coming up later in the episode…

Bringing it back to the matter at hand, however.

Mariupol, being an industrial port city in the Soviet Union had the *exact* pattern of growth you would imagine – *rapid* expansion, *rapid* urbanisation and absorption of surrounding villages, and *endless* Khrushchyovka apartment blocks popping up everywhere as far as the eye could see, all laid out in the familiar &apos;plenty of space between them and yet weirdly nowhere to park&apos; pattern that characterises *all* Soviet built cities.

Above all of that, however, Mariupol&apos;s Soviet-era growth also brought **POLLUTION**. We&apos;re talking *bad* pollution too, not London&apos;s &apos;remember those four days in 1952 when it got a bit smoggy&apos;, *no*, we&apos;re talking year-round steel-mill haze, brown snow, and metal dust on your balcony. Not quite Pripyat levels of bad admittedly, as that did raise the bar rather – *for very obvious reasons* – but still, very much &apos;top tier&apos; on any list of the Soviet Union&apos;s most polluted cities.

And while the situation certainly improved after the wall came down, Mariupol remained a city that&apos;d struggle to win the Greta Thunberg seal of approval all the same; still routinely coming in as one of Ukraine&apos;s most polluted cities, with long-running complaints and monitoring pointing to industrial emissions impacting residential areas downwind of Azovstal and Ilyich in particular.

Really though, all that is just a long-winded way of saying that Mariupol is not some postcard resort, but a *real* city: noisy in places, grimy in others, full of hardworking salt-of-the-earth blue-collar types who do their shifts at Azovstal and Ilyich, haul crates down at the docks, drive trams and trolleybuses, and go home to concrete blocks that rattle when a freight train comes past. A city where Greek grandmothers still swear in Rumeika, students did exams at the uni, and kids kick balls around between Khrushchyovkas…

…Or rather, should we say it *was* those things, because of course, on the 24th of February 2022, the Russian Military would pull the lid off the boiling pot of tensions that had been simmering since 2014, and initiate its full-scale invasion of Ukraine…

## The Siege

There were three things Russia wanted to achieve when it invaded: 1), to install a deferential government in Kyiv, 2), to drag Ukraine out of the Western orbit and back into Moscow&apos;s sphere of influence, and 3), to seize a swathe of territory in the East and South that would permanently secure its grip on Crimea, and provide a land corridor leading to it along the Azov Coast… and unfortunately… that last objective put Mariupol in the crosshairs… *literally*.

The city was to receive no reprieve, nor allowance for its civilians to flee before things got too bad either, as it started getting hit *immediately*.

At 04:20 on the 24th, for example, rockets were already slamming into Mariupol Airport, then housing a not insignificant radar and communications installation, which was then followed by BM-21 Grad rocket salvos hitting the Left Bank districts from 05:37, and the shelling of an apartment building in Skhidnyi District at 05:40 which left 10 civilians killed, and a further 35 wounded.

At the same time, Russian Ground Forces, as well as those from the Donetsk People&apos;s Republic – a self-declared separatist state established in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 – were pushing towards Mariupol from two main directions: East, from Novoazovsk, and North from the Volnovakha axis – probing Ukrainian lines and testing the routes that would later become the siege ring, basically.

A splinter force of the former also attempted an immediate and *direct* assault on the city come the afternoon – sometime around 16:00. Key word there though, **ATTEMPTED**, as their advance was stalled, and turned back before it could *properly* penetrate the built-up Eastern Districts – with it also losing *at least* three tanks outright destroyed in the process.

That was day one. From there, the intensity ratcheted up, slowly but surely.

On the 25th, for example, the Ukrainians were reporting fighting in *all* directions of the city, and by the 28th, Pavlo Kyrylenko – then serving as the Governor of the Donetsk Regional Military Administration – was reporting that the noose was being tightened, with the fighting now truly having reached the city limits as the attackers pushed ever-in, and outlying villages to the North and East having *totally* fallen under their control.

*Crucially* though, particularly for our purposes today with our focus on the erasure of the City, this initial phase of the Siege – vaguely the first week or so – the Russians started to hit infrastructure **HARD**,

DTEK, for example – that being Ukraine&apos;s largest energy company – reported that on the 25th, two vital lines feeding residential estates on the Left Bank went down together, and further, on 26th, the City Council reported that 188 electric substations had been damaged, cutting power to 41,229 customers – roughly a *quarter* of all households in the city – mostly in the Left Bank and Kalmiuskyi districts.

At the same time, thanks to strikes upstream on the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas canal system, canal water – from which many properties commercial and residential alike drew their water – effectively stopped flowing to the City on the 25th.

Most of the taps kept running for a time however, chiefly because damage was able to be offset by switching the still operable Starokrymski Filter Stations in the North of the City to draw water from the local reservoir instead. It was a workaround that&apos;d last for mere days though, as the Russians continued escalating their *unrelenting* targeting of infrastructure.

And indeed, the battle writ large escalated similarly too, with the Russians having **ONE** thing they wanted to achieve first and foremost: **encirclement**.

That is exactly what it sounds like too; *literally*, surrounding a city. And once that ring closes, reinforcements, ammo, food, fuel, medicine – **EVERYTHING** that the defenders could ever want to move in – stops getting in; and all the while, the attackers find themselves with carte blanche to rotate fresh units in, and generally keep piling the pressure on.

It wouldn&apos;t take the Russians long to pull it off either, with encirclement being achieved on the 2nd of March... more or less anyway – there was a thin Ukrainian-held strip running north out of Mariupol along the H20 Highway and an adjacent rail line… but this wasn&apos;t all that much use anyway given the direction it was pointing in, and it was choked off by the 8th regardless.

And with the City (effectively) encircled, the Russians&apos; tempo immediately shifted from **RACE** for Mariupol, to **SMASH** Mariupol; with artillery and airstrikes alike hitting *all* districts with a terrifying regularity from the 3rd to the 6th.

There were *attempts* to establish humanitarian corridors out of the city, but they came and went in a repeating cycle: a ceasefire window was announced, civilians were told to gather, cars and buses were fuelled… and then the shelling would start anew, forcing everyone back into their basements.

Want to know an unsettling reality, too? Their being trapped was **GOOD** for the Russians. A few would pick up arms against them, *sure*. But the reality was that most wouldn&apos;t, couldn&apos;t, and indeed, *didn&apos;t*. They were scared, desperate people who just wanted it to be over; for the terror of their newly reforged existence to come to an end. And what would you know, that was also exactly what the Russians wanted… just with the *very* specific asterisk attached that it happened with their flag being hoisted up over City Hall, and so the bombing and the artillery strikes continued unabated. All the people of Mariupol had to do was to convince their government to surrender… and it could all be over. So, the Russian&apos;s logic went, anyway.

But surrender, they did not – Mariupol was going to break *only* after it had made the attackers pay for every alley, every throughfare, and every damned paving slab with their blood.

Let&apos;s loop back to what we just said about the bombing and artillery strikes continuing though, because all that firepower had consequences: specifically the City losing **ALL** water and electricity on the day of the encirclement.

What followed was a phase of &apos;make do&apos;, as municipal workers and volunteers alike tried to improvise a water system out of whatever they had: eight large water tankers and two smaller vehicles, ferrying water from wells and reservoirs to hospitals, big shelters, and a handful of public gathering points. People queued for hours at makeshift water stations – including gyms, schools, and the forecourt of the Drama Theatre – *all* under shelling. Several of the trucks were eventually hit though, and so even that jury-rigged system would begin to fall apart with time.

Communications followed the same trajectory as well. Mobile coverage began breaking up in late February as masts and power supplies went down, and by the first week of March the last major cell tower was gone. The Internet specifically, it died in two stages: the loss of electricity taking landlines down with it, and the loss of the cell towers cutting off what mobile devices still had some charge in them.

And as for the **ACTUAL** fighting, it too only intensified following the encirclement, with Russian forces starting to prod into the City at its furthest edges.

To the East, Infantry and armour pushed up through Livoberezhnyi District, trying to cross the Kalmius River and get a foothold on the higher central ground, and to the North, columns edged down, testing every junction and crossroads on the H20 corridor. And in response, Ukrainian Marines, Azov Brigade detachments, National Guard, were effectively fighting a moving defence line – ambush a group of vehicles in one cluster of tower blocks, displace before the artillery found you, set up again two or three streets back, *repeat*.

The next few days too, specifically the 3rd to the 6th of March, were also when the Russian losses **REALLY** started stacking up.

In no small part, this was due to their tactics – a kind of combined arms packet that combined a handful of tanks, some BMPs, dismounts behind them, and a wall of artillery fire in front.

*But*, while such tactics had served them well in Syria, open and expansive as it is – it also didn&apos;t hurt how poor their Syrian opposition *actually* were as fighters – in Mariupol their tested tactics ran headlong into well prepared kill zones; RPG and NLAW teams high up in the apartment blocks, heavy machine gunners down in the courtyards, and pre-registered mortar fire dialled in and ready to go on their likely rally points.

We&apos;re spoilt for choice for examples to demonstrate this with as well, but one that stands out particularly was an attack on the 6th: the *entire* length of Russian column caught in a crossfire, *not* just its front face, and then; three tanks, four BMPs, and two Tigr armoured cars knocked out, and 30 soldiers, as the Ukrainians put it, &quot;remaining in their burning vehicles forever.&quot;

Such gallantry did little to dam the flowing tide, however – no, it simply stemmed it ever so. But nor did the defenders ever think that they *could* stop it. They were just tying up otherwise re-deployable forces by delaying their city&apos;s surrender – and, of course, just making the Russians **BLEED**.

Come the 8th and the 9th of March, the Russians were through the outskirts, and *properly* in the City.

Units from the 150th Motor Rifle Division, the Federal National Guard, and supporting elements from Donetsk People&apos;s Republic formations like &apos;Somalia&apos; and &apos;Vostok&apos; in particular were fighting their way along Mytropolytska Street and towards Myru Avenue, while other groups tried to push through industrial belts towards the port.

In response, the Ukrainian defenders – mainly Azov Brigade elements in that central Mytropolytska–Myru stretch, backed by elements of the 36th Marine Brigade, National Guard, and even police officers – hit back… **HARD**.

Over the 24 hours covering the 9th of March alone, to give you specifics, the Ukrainian Interior Ministry was boasting that they&apos;d dealt with **FOUR** main battle tanks, one infantry fighting vehicle, and a further **ELEVEN** armoured vehicles; all destroyed or knocked out *just* in Mariupol.

Come the 12th, Russian Command was finding itself increasingly frustrated with the slow rate of their progress in bringing Mariupol to heel – Pravda, **THE** Russian newspaper themselves, let slip in their coverage that it was turning into an absolute grind: literally, constant hard fighting, block by block.

And to do something about that fact, the following days saw the pressure noticeably ratchet up into a more deliberate push to break the city open: heavier and more continuous shelling, more aggressive probing assaults, and a clear attempt to cut Mariupol into chunks so the defenders couldn&apos;t shift forces between districts without being spotted and smashed; and that pace continued to build through the 13th to the 15th – culminating with a strike on the Mariupol Drama Theatre on the 16th.

It had long since started being used as a civilian shelter – as basically **EVERY** solidly built structure that the Russians *presumably* weren&apos;t prioritising for strikes had been – and, well… they say a picture speaks 1,000 words, so here it is before… and here it is after. As for how many were killed here: Moscow says 12, the Mariupol City Authorities said *300* at the time, and a mid-2022 Associated Press investigation that compiled survivor accounts and evidence put it at around 600.

Then, from the 17th through to the 19th, Russian forces continued to try and split Mariupol into pieces, carving corridors between districts and taking key junctions so Ukrainian units could no longer move laterally without being seen and hit. The port-side industrial belt became a particular focus.

The defence – starved of men and materiel as it was – held up *well* though, and so it wouldn&apos;t be until around the 24th that the Russians properly penetrated the edge of the industrial district. And from there, it was as before, just with the slow bloody progress through courtyards and Khrushchevkas being replaced with one through warehouses and workshops.

And as they were taken, and the Ukrainians found themselves with increasingly less land to fall back too, their defenced contracted towards the **ONLY** place for a last stand: the *vast* industrial complexes directly on the seafront.

This wasn&apos;t even the last chance saloon, as there had *never* been any chance of a Ukrainian victory here – the Russians were simply too comparatively vast in number, and their supply lines too short to allow any kind of &apos;Kyiv miracle&apos; where their &apos;range of a single tank of diesel&apos; logistical complexity would afford the defenders a deus ex machina. The Ukrainians, by comparison, were trying to hold a city at the end of a quickly severed lifeline – all while the **REAL** strategic priority was stopping the war being lost *outright* on the Kyiv Front…

No, *again*, they were just making the Russians bleed before the inevitable came.

Back to the matter at hand though: the Siege&apos;s final arc on the seafront.

There&apos;s no clear cut &apos;it started here&apos; moment to be found; but as a *vague* marker, we&apos;re talking the opening days of April for when Ukrainian units started properly digging in, and the Russians in turn started pushing.

Come the 10th, the port itself was under Russian control, and the Ilyich complex was under such pressure that the 36th Marine Brigade stationed there was down to a choice between staying put and being totally overrun, or trying to break through in a sharp, pointed attack, and (hopefully) escape.

And sure enough, *some* Ukrainian elements **DID** attempt a breakout on the night of the 11th through 12th. It didn&apos;t work though – the deck was just too tightly stacked against them at that point – and all involved were captured or killed.

As indeed, *all* of the Ilyich defenders would be within 24 hours, because following the failed push, all remaining broke. Surrenders then began to trickle in, and the trickle eventually cascaded into a flood, with the Russians taking 1,026 prisoners.

It would take a day still for the facility to be *properly* locked down, and then, what left of the Ukrainian defence was focused on one place: the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works.

The Russians made *many* attempts to storm the facility, but such efforts proved… costly, to say the least. As a result, Vladimir Putin himself personally called off any further direct action, and ordered the complex locked down and battered from afar instead – a siege within a siege.

And by May, it was all entering its final stage.

Between the 1st and 7th, UN and Red Cross–supervised convoys evacuated civilians from the plant in stages, until Kyiv announced that all women, children, and elderly people had been brought out. Fighting then continued till the 16th, and then, under orders from Kyiv, wounded Ukrainian servicemen started to come out of Azovstal and into Russian custody.

Ukraine framed it as the garrison having &quot;fulfilled its combat mission&quot;, and its commanders consequently being told to shift focus to saving lives. Moscow, by contrast, called it the start of a mass surrender.

Over the next few days, more defenders emerged in batches from the tunnels and bunkers – searched, disarmed, loaded onto buses – and by the 20th of May, Russia was claiming that around 2,400 troops from the Azovstal garrison had been taken prisoner.

And with Azovstal being the final holdout in Mariupol, that was it for the **WHOLE** siege.

It has lasted for 86 days – from the first rockets at 04:20 on the 24th of February, to the last defenders filing out of Azovstal. And in that time, Mariupol had gone from being Ukraine&apos;s tenth-largest city to a dead one; its garrison shattered, its people scattered or buried, its skyline ripped open and left to smoke.

As for how many never made it out at all, the figure is still somewhat up in the air, with different bodies giving very different numbers.

The UN Human Rights Office, for example, has only been able to *confirm* 1,348 civilian deaths in Mariupol, but stresses that the true toll is &quot;likely thousands higher.&quot; Mariupol&apos;s own officials have been far blunter, with the mayor and his advisers variously estimating over 20,000 civilians killed during the siege, and later Ukrainian figures putting it at at least 22 to 25 *thousand*.

A 2024 study by Human Rights Watch, for example, then estimated at least 8,000-plus excess deaths in the city between March 2022 and February 2023, while the Uppsala Conflict Data Program gives a total death range for Mariupol – mostly civilians – of roughly 27 to 88 **THOUSAND**.

However you slice those numbers up though – however cautious or expansive you want to be they all point to the same unpleasant truth: that Mariupol wasn&apos;t just conquered… it was **KILLED**.

## The Material Damage

Something we mentioned in passing during the last Chapter, but were unable to focus on overly for risk of being derailed, was Mariupol&apos;s *physical* destruction during the Siege.

It is just as much an aspect of erasure as much as the changing of the flag flying over city hall, and the death caused therefrom – because a city isn&apos;t *just* it&apos;s people, it&apos;s its shape: the landmarks that go on the postcards, the streets and districts people navigate by instinct, the schools and clinics that anchor neighbourhood life, and the hidden systems nobody thinks about until they&apos;re gone… and in Mariupol, a **LOT** of all that was gone come the end of the fighting.

If you want the bluntest possible proof of that, consider the City&apos;s housing stock, because by the 27th of March 2022 – so *well* before the Siege itself had even drawn to a close – the Authorities were already reporting that *2,340* high-rise apartment buildings had been damaged… and that&apos;s about 90% of the total amount in the City. Worse still, *1,040* of them were outright **DESTROYED** – now either just being a pile of rubble, or in such a ruinous state that tear-down was the only realistic path forward.

Similar levels of destruction were seen in private dwellings too, with *61,200* being damaged to one degree or another, and *27,200* of them being **DESTROYED**.

Independent and international bodies later converged on the same reality too – just using different wording. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, for example, assessed in June 2022 that up to 90% of residential buildings in Mariupol had been damaged or destroyed, with up to 60% of private dwellings being affected.

And then, layer public services onto that too, because Mariupol Authorities tallies that seven general hospitals had been *damaged*, with three being **DESTROYED** outright. Maternity hospitals took it too; three *damaged*, one **DESTROYED**. In fact, Human Rights Watch, working with Truth Hounds – a Ukrainian NGO that documents and investigates war crimes in the field – went over satellite imagery, and ended up concluding that there was not a single medical facility in the city that didn&apos;t at least receive *some* damage.

Education facilities followed the same pattern as well, with figures provided by the City in late-March 2022 – again, before the fighting had even stopped – listing 57 schools *damaged* and 23 **DESTROYED**; and that was alongside a further 70 kindergartens *damaged* as compared to 28 **DESTROYED**. Human Rights Watch&apos;s assessment put some numbers on the broad picture: 97% of educational facilities across the city showing damage.

Paint with a broader brush, however, and consider the United Nations Satellite Centre; because they undertook a *full* investigation of the City, and reported that 315 buildings had been **OUTRIGHT** destroyed, 2,132 were severely damaged, 3,002 were moderately damaged, and a further 194 were *possibly* damaged, but unverifiable from the satellite imagery.

And some areas of the city, of course, took it worse than others – with a particularly grim point of note being the immediate area around the Drama Theatre; a 14-kilometre square bit of land where 93% of high-rise apartment buildings were damaged or destroyed.

And then there&apos;s the economic spine of Mariupol – the stuff that made it more than *just* a 400,000+ strong housing estate.

The city authorities&apos; logged the port as damaged but useable in late March, and so immediately utilisable for bare minimum services once the shooting stopped… *but then there was the steel plants*.

Take Ilyich first. The Conflict and Environment Observatory – a British nonprofit that monitors and researches the environmental impacts of armed conflict and military activity – reported that 46% of its structures were damaged, with those hit not just being minor irrelevant sheds either, but **MAJOR** stuff: tailings heaps, fuel injector units, electrical substations, and wastewater treatment plants all appear in the remote-sensing and verified-footage picture. They also identified *major* fires during March and April, including one involving pulverised coal on the 1st of April, and another at a landfill heap beside the equipment repair shop that burned on the 6th through the 7th of April.

**BUT**, it wasn&apos;t outright destroyed. Production was still possible – a far *far* reduced output, and of a far, **FAR** worse quality too – but still.

Unfortunately, the same could **NOT** be said of Azovstal. In real terms, it was **GONE**, now little but scrap. If steel is *ever* made on that site again, it&apos;ll be in a ground up, totally rebuilt mill…

And speaking of things being rebuilt… that segways us nicely into discussing the occupation of the City…

## The Occupation

Like any stereotypical conqueror, the first on Russia&apos;s to-do list upon taking Mariupol was to set about *plundering* it – to pull the copper out the walls.

We mean that more literally than you might first imagine too, as on the 28th of May – so only **EIGHT** days after the final holdouts had surrendered at Azovstal – the RM-3, a general cargo ship, was in Mariupol&apos;s harbour; with TASS – a Russian state-owned news agency – proudly boasting that it had arrived to load 2,700 tonnes of metal for a run up to Rostov-on-Don.

And nor was it a one-off too, as on the 31st, the very same RM-3 was snapped being loaded with an estimated 2,500 tonnes of metal, again, bound for Rostov. Then, less than a week later, on the 4th of June, a second, unnamed ship arrived, with TASS reporting that it had been &quot;sent to load metal and ship it to Russia&quot;.

Around the same period, Russia&apos;s Defence Minister – Sergei Shoigu – was publicly boasting that the port had been demined and was &quot;functioning normally,&quot; which tells you all you need to know: these shipments were not going to be a one and done type affair, no, they were expecting Mariupol&apos;s port to become a regular conveyor belt of stolen steel and scrap feeding Russian mills up the coast – a permanent feature of the new order…

Then there&apos;s the matter of the dead.

Reuters, citing imagery gathered by Maxar Technologies – a *big* satellite-imagery company – reported that a cemetery at Manhush had expanded to include more than 200 new graves… and of course… that was **BEFORE** the City actually fell.

Give it a few months – till December specifically – and the Associated Press, again citing satellite data, would be reporting that *at least* 10,300 new graves had appeared in and around Mariupol, with the biggest concentration being at Staryi Krym.

&apos;But a matter of administration for Moscow, however – mere cleanup in the most morbid sense of the word. After all, if they *actually* cared about the sanctity of life, and human dignity, they wouldn&apos;t have invaded and levelled a city full of civilians in the first place, would they?

No, what Moscow was **REALLY** all about at this point was what they called &quot;reconstruction&quot;&apos;; Kremlin-ese for &apos;remove all physical reminders that we levelled the place, and make sure that what we put in its place *looks* Russian, *feels* Russian, and – on the surface at least – is *much* better than whatever was there before. It was a part of their attempt to claim legitimacy for the invasion basically: &apos;not only were we *morally* right to invade, but *materially* we&apos;ve improved where we took too – so what are you whinging about&apos;, type logic.

This &apos;reconstruction&apos; process is well documented too, with Human Rights Watch, working with SITU Research – a New York–based firm that uses satellite imagery and spatial forensics to map and analyse war damage – as well as Truth Hounds, documenting how it played out.

Basically, the occupation forces, supplemented by contracted workers, cleared **MILLIONS** of tonnes of rubble, trucking it to dump sites around the city, with that debris then being used in the rebuild where able.

Not that Moscow tried to hide that fact, as a Deputy Mayor for Urban Policy, Yurii Khadzhinov, told Meduza in February 2023 that there were about 2.5 million tonnes of rubble piled up over 37 hectares, and that buildings &quot;too badly damaged&quot; to restore were being crushed into concrete chips for road construction, with facilities supplied by Russia&apos;s Construction Ministry.

Around the same time, the Russian-installed Mayor of Mariupol – Oleg Morgun – was boasting that 287 of 409 buildings slated for demolition had already been knocked down and that all demolitions would be finished by the end of the year.

And as for what is going up in all of that&apos;s place, Moscow calls it &quot;New Mariupol&quot;, with planning documents published by Ukrainian media in October 2022 laying out a &quot;Rebuild-and-Redevelopment&quot; plan slated to last until 2035, targeting a total of 2.24 **MILLION** metres squared of housing to be built or renovated by the end of 2022, a further 2.76 million by 2025, and a final 1.25 million by the 2035 end date.

The quality, however – in stark contrast to what Moscow would have you believe – appears… *lacking*, to put it mildly, with analysis by Radio Free Europe, the Financial Times, and others, describing how showcase quarters like the so called &apos;Nevsky&apos; district, thrown up near the Azovstal site by Russian military builders – and much shown off during Putin&apos;s surprise night visit in March 2023 – are reportedly full of leaks, finished shoddily, and much smaller than what had *actually* been promised too.

And *crucially*, they&apos;re not building for returning Mariupol residents either, but for fresh arrivals from Russia to move in.

Russian real-estate marketing is **VERY** clear about this, with a Mariupol realtor&apos;s Telegram channel, for example – @rieltorspivak if you all wanted to look it up yourselves – boasting that, quote:

&gt; &quot;For those who are moving to Mariupol… central location, developed infrastructure and minimal renovation costs. You can immediately settle in on a new place.&quot;
&gt;
&gt; &quot;In my opinion, in the Primorsky district the park and the sea are on one side, and the whole city infrastructure is on the other – it&apos;s comfortable to live and relax here. I especially recommend this area to: students, couples who value peace and quiet, and people moving to Mariupol.&quot;
&gt;
&gt; &quot;An apartment for 22,177 roubles for those who are moving to Mariupol… an ideal option for a comfortable start in a new place… you can immediately settle in calmly in your new home.&quot;

Remember, that&apos;s a realtor **IN** Mariupol. He wants to make money. He&apos;ll be following the money. And the money, it appears, speaks Russian…

We don&apos;t just have to take Spivak&apos;s word for it either, as Russia&apos;s own media and developers spell out who &apos;New Mariupol&apos; is for. In an April 2025 real-estate piece, by way of an example, RIA Novosti – another Moscow-owned media group – quotes Mariupol realtor Luiza Naliwai as saying that new builds in the city &quot;are really growing like mushrooms after rain&quot; and that &quot;most buyers are from Moscow, St Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk and the northern regions of Russia.&quot;

And if that&apos;s not clear as day erasure, we don&apos;t know what is: they flattened a Ukrainian city, are bulldozing what&apos;s left, and are now quite openly selling the rebuilt bits as Russian Benidorm – cheap seaside real estate for Russians from &apos;Big Russia&apos; to move into instead.

The physical erasure doesn&apos;t just stop at mortar, migration, and mortgages though, as Moscow is also trying to fully Russify the city: Mira Avenue, for example, has become Lenin Avenue, and Freedom Square has become Lenin Square.

That isn&apos;t just a bit of nostalgic street renaming – it&apos;s the occupier scrubbing out Independence-era names, reinstating Soviet ones, and wrapping it all in Russian symbols so that, day by day, Mariupol feels a little less like a Ukrainian city that was taken, and a little more like a Russian one that has *always* been there.

There&apos;s a final angle to consider too: the bureaucratic one. Because in occupied Mariupol, housing wasn&apos;t *just* destroyed and replaced… it was also **STOLEN**.

Basically, now, thanks to &apos;Federal Law No. 518-FZ&apos;, passed in December 2025, so called &quot;ownerless&quot; mechanisms are being used to threaten eviction and reassign flats, with Russian-installed authorities openly publishing lists of apartments &quot;showing signs of ownerlessness&quot;, and ordering owners to appear in person with documents – specifically within 30 days…. and how the bloody hell are the 350,000 of Mariupol&apos;s pre-invasion population that the UN estimates fled the city meant to do that if their property gets flagged, given that **THEY FLED THE CITY**?

They aren&apos;t, is quite obviously the answer.

Really then, we should understand the occupation as an administrative continuation of the siege:

Artillery knocked holes in the walls – and now demolition orders finish them off.

Bombs drove people out – now &apos;ownerless&apos; procedures and 30-day deadlines quietly lock them out for good.

The old names come down, the old-old ones from the *last* Russian occupation go back up.

The new flats get advertised to buyers from Moscow and St Petersburg.

The port that once shipped Ukrainian steel to the world now loads whatever Russia can strip out.

And do you know what all of that means when viewed as a whole? It means that the place on the map marked &apos;Mariupol&apos; simply doesn&apos;t exist in any real sense anymore.

All the word &apos;Mariupol&apos; now signifies a skinsuit; its innards carved out and removed, and its leftover flesh grafted to a figure that clearly doesn&apos;t *quite* fit – and accordingly, just as how the slasher movie killer such imagery conjures up would insist that they *are* the person they are wearing, so too does &apos;New Mariupol&apos; claim to be &apos;Old Mariupol&apos;, despite possessing none of the substance beneath that borrowed skin: not the people, not the civic memory, not the history, not the identity that gave the name meaning in the first place, not even the same bloody buildings…

## The Future

*So*, what does the future hold for Mariupol, then? Is the new status-quo here to stay, or are the occupiers going to get kicked out – be it at muzzle point or with the flick of a pen – and some semblance of &apos;normalcy&apos; return to the city.

Well, *never say never*, and also *never* make absolute predictions – lest ye end up with egg on your face – but as we see it, the Russians are there to stay.

Chiefly, we make that prediction based upon one particularly unpleasant truth: the Russians – in real terms – have won the war. Is it a glorious and overwhelming victory? *Hell no*. Is it a bloodied pyrrhic victory? *Hell yes*. **BUT**, it is a victory all the same – and what do victors get? That&apos;s right – the spoils.

It&apos;s not something that&apos;s nice to hear – we&apos;d be the first to admit – but it&apos;s the reality of the matter: Russia currently controls somewhere in the region of 20% of Ukraine&apos;s territory as of the time of writing, including most of the Donbas, and the *entire* Northern Sea of Azov coastline. And while battered and bruised, it&apos;s war machine is still steaming along quite happily: they&apos;ve yet to run out of tanks, yet to run out of bodies, their economy is bountiful with strategic resources, and has been reinforced to the point of being all but sanction proof.

Ukraine, meanwhile, is *exhausted*: millions of its people have been driven abroad or internally displaced, its army is flagging after years of high-intensity fighting, able to tie the Russians up, but totally unable to push through and make any kind of bold or decisive action. Huge chunks of its power grid, industry, and housing stock have been wrecked, and it is now fundamentally dependent on a drip-feed of Western money, ammunition, and political will just to keep going… and worst of all from a strategic perspective… it&apos;s starting to run out of bodies to throw into the fight, with one recent analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimating around 400,000 Ukrainian military casualties – some 60–100,000 killed and the rest wounded – since 2022.

Such a situation simply isn&apos;t tenable, and that&apos;s **EXACTLY** why serious Peace Talks have been ongoing since early 2025, rolling through a year of shuttle summits in places like Riyadh and Washington, and now culminating in the first full Russia-Ukraine-US Trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, which are ongoing as of the time of writing.

And Russia, bruised and breathing heavily, but still just about upright as it is, has the upper hand in those negotiations. It can afford to continue fighting – just about – Ukraine cannot.

Further still, the return of the captured territories would also be nothing short of political **SUICIDE** for Vladimir Putin; no Russian leader could survive handing back a land corridor to Crimea and a &apos;hero city&apos; like Mariupol after burning through so much blood and treasure to seize them in the first place…

And with all of that basically killing any prospect of a White Peace deal – that being one where no side gains territory, money, or concessions, essentially returning to the status quo ante bellum – that means that to all intents and purposes, that Mariupol is not only a de-facto Russian city now, but will likely become a de-jure one soon enough too…

And that is where we will have to leave Mariupol today: not with some tidy and reassuring promise that it&apos;ll all be put back how it was, but with the far more uncomfortable truth that it in all likeliness won&apos;t be.

But whatever flag ends up flying over city hall, the simple fact will always remain that a Ukrainian city was bombed, starved, levelled, and then rebuilt as something else entirely. And if there&apos;s any justice left in the story now, it is only to be found in the fact that whenever the word &quot;Mariupol&quot; is spoken in the years to come, people will remember the place that was killed all so that Moscow could get its dry road to Crimea…

## Key Takeaways

- Mariupol was a major Ukrainian city with a rich history and significant industry.
- The Russian invasion in 2022 led to a brutal siege and extensive destruction.
- The siege resulted in massive civilian casualties and the near-total destruction of the city.
- Russia has since occupied Mariupol, renaming streets and rebuilding for Russian settlers.
- The future of Mariupol is uncertain, but it is likely to remain under Russian control.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What was the population of Mariupol before the 2022 invasion?

Mariupol had a population of around 425,000 people before the 2022 invasion.

### What are the four urban districts of Mariupol?

The four urban districts of Mariupol are Kalmiuskyi, Livoberezhnyi (Left Bank), Prymorskyi (Seafront), and Tsentralnyi.

### What is the strategic importance of Mariupol&apos;s location?

Mariupol&apos;s location on the northern shore of the Sea of Azov and at the mouth of the Kalmius River makes it strategically important for controlling a chunk of Ukraine&apos;s coastline and a key outlet for Donbas coal, grain, and steel.

### What was the original name of Mariupol and when was it founded?

Mariupol was originally founded as &apos;Pavlovsk&apos; in 1778 and was renamed &apos;Mariupol&apos; a year later.

### What is the &apos;Greek connection&apos; in Mariupol&apos;s history?

The &apos;Greek connection&apos; refers to the tens of thousands of Greeks and a few Armenians moved to Mariupol by Catherine the Great in the 18th century, which remained a significant part of the city&apos;s identity up to 2022.

### What were the two major steel mills in Mariupol?

The two major steel mills in Mariupol were the Ilyich Iron and Steel Works, founded in 1899, and the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works, founded in 1930.

### What was the impact of the Russian invasion on Mariupol&apos;s infrastructure?

The Russian invasion severely damaged Mariupol&apos;s infrastructure, including the destruction of residential buildings, hospitals, schools, and industrial facilities like the Azovstal steel plant.

### How did the Russian occupation affect Mariupol&apos;s population?

The Russian occupation led to the displacement or killing of most of Mariupol&apos;s native population, with the city being repopulated by Russians from other regions.

### What is the &apos;New Mariupol&apos; project?

The &apos;New Mariupol&apos; project involves the reconstruction and redevelopment of Mariupol to make it a Russian city, with new housing and infrastructure primarily for Russian settlers.

### What is the future outlook for Mariupol according to the article?

The article suggests that Mariupol is likely to remain under Russian control, with ongoing reconstruction efforts aimed at making it a permanent part of Russia.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Caribbean Capital City... That is a Ghost Town](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZpsKuOUdago)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9f/%D0%9C%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%8C%2C_%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82_%D0%9B%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%2C_%D1%86%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D1%80%2C_2025.jpg) by Vadim Tolbatov / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cartel Country: Where Drugs Rule All</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/cartel-country-where-drugs-rule-all</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/cartel-country-where-drugs-rule-all</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>For the better part of seventeen years, the nation of Mexico has been at war with itself. On one side of the conflict is the internationally recognized Mexican government, armed with modern guns, tanks, airplanes, and, at least generally, the support of the Mexican people. But the force that makes up the other side of the conflict is not a legion of freedom fighters, or a breakaway military warlord. In fact, it&apos;s not even one cohesive army—because the other side of Mexico&apos;s de-facto civil war isn&apos;t an army at all.

Mexico is at war with its drug cartels, an asymmetric, decentralized network of gangs and criminal syndicates that have been able to take their country to the brink. With no single leader, a whole lot of heavy weaponry, and the single objective of profit, the cartels have pushed an offensive that&apos;s more deliberately sadistic than nearly any modern nation would even dare attempt. And the cartels don&apos;t just control drugs, either; they control land, and the villages, towns, and even cities who live under their iron fist.

This article explores cartel country to the fullest: what it&apos;s like to live under one of the most brutal regimes in the world, how the situation ever got so bad, and what, if anything, Mexico can do to take back its own future.

## Lay of the Land

Before we can get into any specifics of what&apos;s going on in Mexico&apos;s internal conflict, we&apos;ve first got to establish what sort of conflict we&apos;re talking about. In many ways, the violence in Mexico bears resemblance to the violence that takes place in criminal underworlds across the globe: an intensely adversarial network of gangs, syndicates, and other organizations, all competing with each other for business, while trying to evade the state authorities who could end their business entirely. At the same time, there are parts of the Mexican conflict that appear nearly inseparable from a civil war. Mexico&apos;s cartels don&apos;t want to bring down the Mexican state; in fact, they rely on the Mexican state&apos;s perceived legitimacy on the world stage in order to keep other actors, and specifically the United States, out of their way. But despite their interest in preserving some semblance of a Mexican government, the cartels walk an incredibly fine line: diminish the government&apos;s power and control as much as they possibly can, without letting it fall apart entirely. We&apos;ll be referring to Mexico&apos;s situation as a war on drugs, a war between crime syndicates, and even a civil war; all are most of the way to being accurate, but none can tell the whole story by themselves.

No economy can exist without demand, and Mexico&apos;s vast drug economy is no different. Despite a relatively low appetite, and relatively low purchasing power, for illicit drugs inside Mexico&apos;s own borders, the country&apos;s northern neighbor is another matter entirely, and it&apos;s the United States of America&apos;s intense hunger for drugs that keeps Mexico&apos;s cartels in business. With some six percent of the country&apos;s three-hundred-million people believed to use illicit drugs, the USA has more than enough clientele to keep the cartels working overtime, and the nation&apos;s wealth is such that dealers can demand far more for a unit of a certain drug than they could elsewhere. Not only that, but the United States&apos; long, over-land border with Mexico presents a golden opportunity for drug smuggling, so lucrative and convenient that criminal syndicates all up and down Latin America are forced to work with Mexico&apos;s cartels in order to do business.

With Mexico acting as a convenient geopolitical bottleneck for most over-land or coastal drug shipments, cartels have an easy path to act as a middleman for the American drug market, controlling prices, shipping routes, and sprawling networks of growers, smugglers, and dealers. Not only that, but they&apos;ve got the connections on both sides of the border to facilitate safe transfer, avoid or pay off the US Border Patrol, and move product in massive amounts by road, rather than take the chance of traveling by boat, plane, or submarine. They maintain a major presence in every American port of entry along the border, and are adept at using the United States Postal Service to ship drugs in, with cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and much, much more, all streaming in through pathways and mechanisms that Mexico&apos;s cartels have locked down.

Now, it&apos;s tempting to take a map of Mexico and simply break it into lines of control, as if each individual cartel, as well as the Mexican government, each owned clearly demarcated sections of territory and went to war over each other&apos;s borders. But Mexico&apos;s informal civil war is a lot more complicated than that, with most areas of the country claimed by multiple cartels at once. The reason for this is that Mexico&apos;s entire narco-economy is built around controlling the flow of drugs toward, and then into, the United States. In this sort of environment, it&apos;s important to hold territory, whether it be an entire region of the country, or a city block, or even a few kilometers of road. But the reason that territory is important has nothing to do with the ordinary people who live there. Control the land, and that&apos;s more sprawling valleys that can grow drugs without interruption; more kilometers of road where a shipment can travel north unmolested; and more locations where those same drugs can be processed, stored, or even consumed, without another cartel or the Mexican government causing problems.

As such, many of Mexico&apos;s states are tightly contested between a range of cartels. With shipments coming into Mexico from all over the world, in ports mainly concentrated through the southwest states and the Yucatan peninsula, each cartel works hard to establish its own foothold and secure processing routes, while states along the US border, specifically the sparsely populated states of Sonora and Chihuahua, are some of the country&apos;s most tightly contested battlegrounds as cartels compete for dominance in a limited number of American points of entry. In the Mexican interior, it&apos;s all about which cartels can either protect their own smuggling routes, or lock down an area of the country and demand tribute from any smugglers who wish to pass through.

As of 2020, the American Drug Enforcement Administration, or DEA, counted six cartels as the most influential in all of Mexico. The **Sinaloa Cartel**, which boasted some hundred thousand members or more in 2009, has its historic routes in the states of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua, where massive amounts of Mexican opium and marijuana are produced. The **Jalisco New Generation Cartel**, or CJNG, has spent over a decade being considered one of Mexico&apos;s most sadistic cartels, but now has surpassed the Sinaloa as both a national security threat in Mexico, and the largest and most effective supplier of drugs in the US. The **Juarez Cartel** and the **Los Rojos Cartel** control some of Mexico&apos;s most important territory, with Juarez situated near the US border and Los Rojos controlling incoming supply from Latin America and the world. **La Familia Michoacana**, operating out of the state of Michoacan in Mexico&apos;s southwest, has largely splintered into a range of sub-factions, but these sub-factions still exert a tight grip on the region. And the **Gulf Cartel**, based in the Mexican city of Matamoros on the southern bank of the Rio Grande, and their long-time frenemies **Los Zetas** in the nearby city of Nuevo Laredo, are fixtures in any effort to bring drugs across the border into America.

Alongside these six major cartels are an absolute mess of breakaway factions, splinter groups, regional enclaves, and rogue interests, all competing with each other for the biggest possible piece of the pie in Mexico&apos;s drug trade. Their international links run not just through the United States, and not just down into Central and South America, but all over the world. And the Mexican government, currently led by President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, or AMLO, is just as important a player, with AMLO and his administration insisting that they maintain control across Mexico, despite the reality being very clearly different. Standing sometimes beside the Mexican government, and sometimes at odds, is the government of the United States, with its own vested interest in combating Mexico&apos;s cartels both on Mexican and American soil. It&apos;s in the tangled web of alliances, animosity, and violence that Mexico&apos;s civil war really exists, and it&apos;s ordinary Mexican civilians, caught in a constant crossfire, who have borne the brunt of this war for decades.

## Past and Present

Drug syndicates haven&apos;t always been major players in Mexico, but their rise to power began long before the official start of Mexico&apos;s drug war in 2006. For as long as the United States has had an appetite for drugs—which is to say, for a very long time—Mexico has been just as important a smuggling route as it is today. During America&apos;s Prohibition era, from 1920 to 1933, Mexican bootleggers were instrumental in keeping the United States&apos; criminal networks supplied with alcohol, and Mexico has had the requisite infrastructure to smuggle drugs at scale since the 1960s. But the story of the Mexican cartels actually begins with a Colombian one: the Medellin Cartel, run by one Pablo Escobar, who needs no introduction. The Medellin Cartel, along with the Cali Cartel, relied heavily on Mexican transshipment routes to do their business, and in 1980, Mexico grew a criminal syndicate to match.

It was known as the **Guadalajara Cartel**, formed under the control of a man named Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo. In many ways, the Guadalajara Cartel was in the right place at the right time, as the United States began to crack down on sea trafficking routes across the Gulf of Mexico at around the same time as Guadalajara began to accrue power. But at the same time, they also filled an emergent need to oversee distribution and protection of Colombia&apos;s product, something that the Medellin and Cali Cartels couldn&apos;t manage directly. With the Guadalajara Cartel came centralization, coordination, and unity between the opium and cannabis growers and the cocaine traffickers who had already been spread throughout Mexico. As their power grew, they evolved from a mere group of errand boys into a group with their own, real negotiating power, and became equal partners with the Colombians.

But this early rise came during the 1980s, where Mexico&apos;s dominant PRI Party, a deeply corrupt and autocratic government, were in the waning days of a 70-year-long, continuous rule. Between the PRI&apos;s willingness to look the other way in exchange for some coin, and their tendency to target crops rather than leadership structures when they did attempt to tamp down on the cartels&apos; power, they provided a fertile environment for the Guadalajara Cartel to amass power and build their criminal networks without interference. When Miguel Gallardo was arrested in 1989, and the cartel splintered into a range of competing factions between Sinaloa, the Gulf of Mexico, Tijuana, and elsewhere, they were largely free to establish spheres of influence and battle for dominance with each other.

That all changed in the year 2000, when the PRI&apos;s hold on power had finally loosened too far to hang on. In that year, Mexico&apos;s conservative PAN party gained the presidency, kicking off a wave of crackdowns against the cartels. Homicide rates in the country, generally high as a facet of the cartels&apos; battles with each other, fell over the six years that the PAN&apos;s first president, Vicente Fox, held power, and in 2006, his replacement, President Felipe Calderon, took things a step further. In an act that would later be considered the start of Mexico&apos;s drug war, Calderon would send 6,500 troops to his own home state of Michoacan, in a campaign meant to eliminate the influence of cartels in the area. Over the following years, Calderon&apos;s administration would scale up deployments massively, with as many as 45,000 soldiers assisting local and federal law enforcement.

Whether he intended it or not, Calderon&apos;s actions set off a powder keg in Mexico, especially in the states of Michoacan, Guerrero, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Nuevo Leon, and Baha California, where many of the most important smuggling operations had been taking place. Although the Mexican government was able to capture or kill dozens of drug lords, they also caused the cartels to retaliate not just against Mexican soldiers, but against each other. The introduction of the Mexican government into the midst of already-simmering tensions between the cartels sparked a violent opportunism across the criminal underworld, with each cartel looking to take advantage of the violence and consolidate their own power. Although figures are unclear, some sources estimate that well over 120,000 people were killed in the violence during Calderon&apos;s six years in power, from 2006 to 2012. But that bloodshed did anything but eliminate the cartels; instead, they militarized, and spread their networks of influence outward, while Calderon&apos;s military was largely ineffectual in carrying out everyday police and anti-trafficking operations.

The following administration, under President Enrique Peña Nieto, didn&apos;t fare much better. Despite his pledges to focus in on protecting civilians rather than capturing kingpins, Peña Nieto proved to have only a temporary impact on the cartels; after a few years of lowered homicide rates, the cartels adjusted to Peña Nieto&apos;s leadership style, and by the end of his term, the Mexican homicide rate was higher than ever before. This was partly due to some of the power and control changes among the cartels during these years, and partly due to the short-lived rise of the **Grupos de Autodefensa Comunitaria**, vigilante paramilitary movements that had made their best effort to take up arms against the cartels. Between the cartels&apos; ability to disrupt and stamp out the paramilitary groups, their ability to carry out brazen kidnappings and murders, and their 2015 jailbreak of kingpin Joaquin Guzman, better known as **El Chapo**, they were not significantly diminished by the Peña Nieto administration. In fact, they learned hard lessons that would carry them to even greater successes in the future.

And finally, there&apos;s AMLO, Mexico&apos;s current president and an unlikely candidate, to say the least, when it comes to being able to tamp down on Mexico&apos;s cartels. His administration&apos;s pursuit of anticorruption, decriminalization, and amnesty programs are a very different approach, on paper, than that of his predecessors. However, he&apos;s had no more luck than the rest of Mexico&apos;s beleaguered presidents, and the failure of his &quot;Hugs, Not Bullets&quot; approach to policy has pushed Mexico back into military operations to combat the cartels, even after AMLO declared an end to the Mexican drug war early in his presidency. Major black eyes for the administration, like a failed attempt to capture kingpin Ovidio Guzman Lopez that saw the newly established Mexican National Guard outfoxed by some 700 heavily armed cartel enforcers, certainly haven&apos;t helped matters. Mexico&apos;s defense spending has gone through the roof, more troops are deployed, but fewer confrontations with the cartels take place, and although individual cartels have risen and fallen with time, today&apos;s cartels are just as powerful as they&apos;ve ever been. Arrests or murders of high-ranking cartel members invariably result in extreme retaliation, while ambitious kingpins are essentially free to embark on expeditions into each other&apos;s territory, in a cycle of escalation that still hasn&apos;t seemed to peak.

And just as important as tracking the success of the cartels against the government is tracking the cartels against each other. When the Guadalajara Cartel was broken apart and its major transport routes were designated as territory for individual drug lords, five cartels were born from the ashes: the Tijuana cartel overseeing Tijuana, the Juarez Cartel overseeing the city of Ciudad Juarez, the Sonora Cartel in Mexico&apos;s Sonora state, the Gulf Cartel overseeing multiple cities near the US border, and finally, the Sinaloa Cartel along the Pacific coast. Those original five would go through a long list of changes: the Beltran-Leyva organization would splinter off from the Sinaloas before themselves dividing in 2010; the Sonora Cartel would be reformed into the Sinaloa Cartel. The Gulf Cartel bred several breakaway factions, most notably Los Zetas and the Knights Templar Cartel. And the Milenio Cartel, which became independent from the Sinaloas in the early 2000s, has since disbanded, with many of its kingpins and enforcers realigning into the most powerful cartel currently at work in Mexico: the Jalisco New Generation Cartel.

In the months and years between every individual rise, fall, and rebirth, have been a long succession of temporary alliances, civil wars, and attempts to unify a cartel here and a cartel there into a much more cohesive central body. Assassinations between the cartels, and even within one cartel, are commonplace; so too are the desecrations of bodies, the clear and visible marks of torture that one cartel will ensure to leave on the body of another cartel&apos;s deceased, now-former member. A long line of ambitious drug kingpins have led to a long line of rogue and breakaway factions, while the arrest or killing of a kingpin will often prompt a wave of internal violence as the cartels decide who will take their place.

## Paramilitaries, Propaganda, People

Mexico&apos;s major cartels may be, in essence, very big gangs, but just that label alone would badly undersell their actual ability to bring weapons, expertise, and manpower to bear. In essence, each cartel has the capacity to act as a paramilitary organization, often paying large sums of money in order to recruit former troops from the Mexican military. Elite units are in particularly high demand, and considering that the cartel can protect drug shipments worth eight figures, while keeping these troops very satisfied by paying four or five figures per job, they more than earn the steep fees they&apos;re worth. Beyond their simple ability to fight, they come with valuable insight into the tactics that the Mexican military intends to use in battles against the cartels. They bring discipline in the chaos of combat, they create kill zones and visualize battles in three dimensions, and the cartels are generally more than happy to set them up with an equally important partner. That would be cannon fodder, in the form of young, naïve gangsters who&apos;ve consumed enough amphetamines that they&apos;re willing to run directly into the line of fire.

And the cartels don&apos;t just fight with AK-47s, either. In terms of their small arms, many cartels are able to source reliable, well-made rifles and submachine guns like the Israeli-made Galil ACE, manufactured in Colombia and trafficked to Mexico quite easily. American M-16s are just as much a fixture in cartel country too. Those guns that aren&apos;t trafficked in are typically stolen or looted from the Mexican police and military, and when cartel weapons are seized, it&apos;s generally not too difficult to buy them back from corrupt government officials. In addition to rifles, cartel enforcers are increasingly equipped with body armor, combat harnesses, sniper rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades, or RPGs. And then there&apos;s so-called **narco-tanks**, massive improvised armored vehicles that are armed to the teeth with 50-caliber guns and ready to chew through any less-armored opposition they find. Car bombs and improvised explosive devices are commonplace, and ambushes and so-called **burning barriers**, using cars that are set on fire, are favored weapons for cartels who are essentially fighting on their territory.

And when the cartels do lock down a certain section of Mexico, their priorities quickly shift from beating back adversaries to ensuring that no one on their territory gets in the way of business. On the land they control, the tools the cartels use to keep order bear a strong resemblance to all manner of dictatorships, past and present. Torture and extrajudicial execution, often at random or on a whim, are very common in cartel-controlled areas, and at least eighty thousand civilians have been disappeared by the cartels since 2006. The discovery of mass graves, often with dismembered corpses found inside, is all but commonplace in today&apos;s Mexico. The targets of such violence can be anyone from local officials, to civil-rights advocates, to journalists, to foreign officials—but just as often, it&apos;s directed against ordinary Mexican citizens. Some, we can only presume, were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, while others may have lived under the cartels for years, or had only a few moments of contact with them.

What&apos;s done to those people is just as much about the rest of the population as it is about targeting them personally, and judging by the behavior of the cartels, there seems to be little point in simply disposing of a corpse that can be used to send a message. When bodies show up in cartel country, they&apos;re often beheaded, or bear shrapnel wounds and the marks of horrific, point-blank explosions. Others might be stuffed into tires or oil drums and set on fire, or bear horribly disfiguring acid wounds. When the bodies are dumped, it might well be on the side of a busy road, or hung from a lamppost—and that&apos;s when they&apos;re killed in private. In other cases, people are disappeared or even executed outright when they&apos;re in public, or even during social occasions where the cartels know they&apos;ll be surrounded by friends and family. Every killing is itself a threat to onlookers—and in a place where threats are so abundant, the cartels would risk a massive loss of face if their threats weren&apos;t acted on. Luckily for the cartels, they appear to have no such qualms about killing—and unlucky for ordinary Mexicans, such constant violence lends itself to an atmosphere of deep, mortal fear, where any act that might oppose the cartels simply isn&apos;t worth doing.

Brutality is a powerful tool on its own, spread by word-of-mouth and by the public display of the cartel&apos;s dead or dying enemies, but even more powerful is propaganda. Newer cartels, like the CJNG, emphasize Robin-Hood-like themes of altruistic banditry, or brazen shows of defiance against the Mexican government, almost as if to say, &quot;however bad we might be, we&apos;re still the angels of the Mexican people.&quot; These come amidst a barrage of torture videos, body dumps, and images of CJNG&apos;s mutilated enemies, all directed toward those who might stand against them in the future. The message, overall, is quite clear: CJNG doesn&apos;t want to hurt your average Mexican citizen, but they&apos;re absolutely not to be crossed.

It&apos;s not just CJNG that likes its propaganda, and the propaganda doesn&apos;t just come by videos, either. Mexico&apos;s cartels have popularized a genre of music called **narcocorridos**, where singers glamorize and extol the lifestyle of drug lords while backed up by trumpets and accordions. An excerpt from a song called &quot;La Familia Michoacana&quot;, focused on the cartel of the same name, reads: &quot;Continue working hard / No power to stop them / If you keep provoking them / You will pay the consequences / They have made clear that their places are respected.&quot; Of course, it flows better in Spanish. Hip-hop and rap music focused on the cartels are just as common, and along the streets and buildings in cartel-controlled areas, reminders of the syndicates are everywhere from graffiti to billboards. Cartel slang, cartel tombs, cartel television, and even cartel beer have become instruments of social control, and of course, it should go without saying that things like unrestricted freedom of the press simply do not exist on cartel land.

In terms of their membership, most cartels recruit heavily from disenfranchised, poor young men, similar to other criminal organizations and non-state groups around the world. On the priority list are police officers, border agents, and ex-military, partly because of their operational expertise, and partly because of all the information about police and border control that they bring with them. American recruits are just as important, not just because they can freely navigate the American side of the border, but because they can blend in far better than someone sent from Mexico. Poor, and often angry, young Mexicans are also prioritized, but for different reasons; lacking alternatives, social support, and sometimes even family connections, they&apos;re all but expendable, strongly incentivized to try working their way up but powerless to stop themselves from being used as pawns. And when compared to the poverty and lack of education that&apos;s widespread in many parts of Mexico, it&apos;s not hard to see why a young person might roll the dice and see if they can make it with the cartels. Play the cards right, and they can be swimming in cash within just a few years, acting as a highly respected shot-caller with full access to mansions, fast cars, women, and, most of all, power.

Now, if you&apos;ve been asking yourself where the Mexican government is to rein the cartels in, you&apos;re not the only one, but standing up to syndicates like these is far more dangerous in practice than in theory. Attempts to enforce judicial order on the government&apos;s behalf can often be a fool&apos;s errand; by example, when a federal judge approved the extradition of a high-ranking CJNG member to the United States, they quickly became the latest in a long line of judges killed in retribution for issuing such an order. Many more judges have since suffered the same fate, and they aren&apos;t the only ones either; in 2020, a recently-former governor of the state of Jalisco was assassinated in a restaurant bathroom, and in 2021, the police chief responsible for the state of Sinaloa was killed in a hail of over two hundred bullets while driving with his bodyguards. Party leaders, political candidates, local legislators, and city police chiefs have suffered the same fate, not just in ones and twos, but in the dozens and even the hundreds.

And at any moment, tensions deep in cartel country have the potential to break out into large-scale violence. By example, take the chaos that took place over just a few days in August 2022. On August 9, one cartel&apos;s enforcers set at least 25 convenience stores and 19 vehicles on fire in retribution for the arrest of one of their high-ranking members; two days later, at least ten people were killed at fast-food restaurants and convenience stores in response to gang battles that had taken place at a nearby prison earlier in the day. In the early hours of the following morning, in a completely different part of Mexico, numerous vehicles and convenience stores were set on fire and dragged into blockades, in further protest of the arrest we mentioned previously. This cycle, which took place just in the span of a few short days, is one that repeats anytime a cartel or the government upsets the fragile balance of power that exists in a given moment.

For citizens who might wish to take up arms and defend themselves, standing up to the cartels is no easy task, especially when they&apos;re facing heavy guns and narco-tanks. Some resistance groups do exist, drawing their own recruits from the family members of people who were killed and disappeared by the cartels, and at times, the leaders of these self-defense militias can operate in public without fear of retribution in the areas they&apos;ve secured. Sometimes, the groups are able to organize robust-enough highway patrols and security operations that they can send cartel members packing without a firefight, and they&apos;re provided weapons, on occasion, by local police. But in a war where one side is willing to maim and disfigure the bodies of its enemies, it&apos;s often difficult for the other side to defend itself without engaging in extreme violence themselves, and in Mexico, it&apos;s no different. In recent years, the Mexican government has become less and less willing to support militias, and has tried to set up a national guard as an alternative. But in practice, these decisions often reward the only civilians in Mexico willing to stand up to the cartels by simply leaving them out in the cold.

## Sinaloa

Because of how dominant the Sinaloa Cartel has been in Mexico, and for so long, there&apos;s plenty of information available about what it&apos;s like to live under their control. As expert Vanda Felbab-Brown explained, in a series of articles on how both the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel manage their territory, the two groups&apos; methods of social control are actually fairly different, and for our purposes today, it&apos;s the Sinaloa Cartel who we&apos;ll dive into first.

At this point in its decades-long history, the image the Sinaloa Cartel presents on its own territory is largely one of respect, moderation, and restraint, similar to the sort of old-world mafioso rule we might associate with much of the organized crime of the twentieth century. Now, that&apos;s not to say that life under the Sinaloa Cartel is straight out of *The Godfather*; anything but. Instead, the cartel aspires to a sort of sophisticated, orderly criminality on the territory they control, where violence certainly isn&apos;t unheard-of, but it&apos;s nonetheless used as a last resort. It&apos;s instrumental violence, done for a specific purpose, rather than the sort of gratuitous violence that characterizes the cartel&apos;s rivals.

On their land, big or even international businesses are forced to pay regular tribute to the Sinaloa Cartel, but it&apos;s a process that largely takes place without the chaos that comes from a range of petty gang bosses trying to impress their cartel superiors. As a businessman quoted by Vanda Felbab-Brown put it, &quot;Sinaloa, Caro Quintero&apos;s faction, now controls the top extortion in Acapulco. But it&apos;s much better than before. Straight-forward, easy. You don&apos;t have to pay weekly and to men brandishing their weapons in your face; just once every three months now, and it&apos;s calm, you don&apos;t see the weapons.&quot; Of course, it&apos;s not our intention here to draw too meaningful a distinction between &apos;good extortion&apos; and &apos;bad extortion&apos;, but it&apos;s important to note how this sort of relative restraint keeps the Sinaloa Cartel from having to worry about too much local discontent on the territory they control. It&apos;s the same principle we explained at the outset: the cartel is a moneymaking organization, and as long as their business remains uninterrupted, ordinary citizens should have little to fear.

But while the Sinaloa Cartel isn&apos;t over-the-top violent against ordinary people in the territory they control, the same can&apos;t be said for their front lines and their border regions, where the Sinaloa Cartel has been among the most successful expansionist cartels in Mexican history. From Ciudad Juarez to Tijuana and elsewhere, the Sinaloa Cartel have been more than willing to take territory by force, engaging in all the same torture and bloodshed in order to cow their rivals into submission. And while their extortion of businesses isn&apos;t quite so stereotypically cartel-ish as one might expect, it&apos;s no less complete; as Felbab-Brown explained in a separate report, the Sinaloa Cartel now runs every aspect of Mexico&apos;s fishing industry, from boats on open water to sale in restaurants, and they&apos;re more than happy to extend that level of control over the entire vertical chain of as many industries as they can. Yet again, the cartel is, above all else, a moneymaking organization.

For a cartel as large and powerful as the Sinaloas, it&apos;s difficult to keep any sort of consistent, top-down, centralized authority. After all, in such a hierarchical, sprawled-out system, the person in charge could be a kingpin if you&apos;re at his mansion—or it could be the low-level enforcer sitting in the passenger seat, as you and a few guys try to get a semi-truck to the US border. As such, the cartel&apos;s many smaller cells, gangs, and the support bases of each kingpin are given quite a bit of latitude to operate as they see fit, so the treatment that one community may receive under the Sinaloa Cartel could be very different from another. On a local level, street bosses pay a certain tribute for the Sinaloa Cartel&apos;s protection, they work inside the bounds of whatever strategy the cartel has passed down, and however that happens really isn&apos;t the cartel&apos;s concern. But by and large, the Sinaloa Cartel&apos;s operatives are relatively consistent in their willingness to keep daily life peaceful as long as the money flows in.

In many pockets of their territory, the Sinaloa Cartel even fills rather helpful roles in everyday life. Designated cartel officials serve as arbiters of minor disputes, distribute financial or social support to those in need, and act as informal policemen to keep order, with most of the cartel&apos;s business kept out of the way. They might keep close political relationships with priests, municipal officials, or any local police forces that still do exist, using them not just as extensions of the cartel&apos;s will, but critical mediators who can smooth relations between the cartel and the rest of the population. They give ordinary Mexicans tax breaks and immunity from regulation by keeping out tax collectors and inspectors, and in some areas, everyday inconveniences like speeding and parking tickets are unheard-of. On occasion, they&apos;ve even been known to investigate and solve kidnapping cases themselves, handing alleged kidnappers over to Mexican authorities rather than serving as their own judge, jury, and executioner.

In fact, the Sinaloa Cartel is unusually willing to work with the Mexican government in a variety of situations, mostly owing to the fact that they&apos;ve really got very little to fear from the government in its current state. In recent years, the Sinaloa Cartel has offered to enforce fishing regulation compliance on the government&apos;s behalf, and even check for government-issued fishing licenses while out on the water. Going the opposite direction, local police in cartel-controlled neighborhoods have taken to leaning on the Sinaloa Cartel to enforce laws against petty crimes, and the cartel is often the one building sports arenas, supporting local schools, and paying for block parties and neighborhood festivities, including in places where the cartel has very little business to conduct. The cartel was even able to work with and enforce compliance around COVID-19, offering cash support and social packages to people who couldn&apos;t work or risked illness in the community. For the Sinaloa Cartel in particular, it&apos;s less a vibe of &quot;you must fear us,&quot; and much more of an &quot;LMAO, it looks like we own this land now, we can&apos;t wait to work with you.&quot;

## Jalisco New Generation Cartel

Then there&apos;s the other side of the cartel coin: Mexico&apos;s Jalisco New Generation Cartel, which we&apos;ll refer to as CJNG. To put it mildly, their methods of leadership and social control are rather different than the ones the Sinaloa Cartel prefers—and specifically, they prefer to be a good bit more openly violent. Of course, we certainly wouldn&apos;t want to offend by suggesting that CJNG might be one of the most brutal cartels in Mexican history—but we&apos;d hazard a guess that they might take that moniker as a compliment.

It&apos;s important to note that this particular cartel is a relatively new arrival on the Mexican scene, one that exploded outward from the death of the Milenio Cartel, which was, at the time it dissolved, a loyal deputy organization under the Sinaloa Cartel. After the Milenio Cartel&apos;s fall, the CJNG coalesced under the leadership of a man named Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, or **El Mencho**, who today is the most-wanted man in Mexico. Since their initial appearance in 2009, the CJNG has captured a whole lot of territory and waged intense wars of expansion against everyone from the Sinaloa Cartel to the Knights Templar to Los Zetas. Today, they&apos;re the dominant force in almost a dozen Mexican states, and tightly contesting control of several others, while maintaining wide criminal networks in the most populated US states, nearly all of Latin America, and the UK, France, Italy, Spain, and the Balkans in Europe.

But in the areas they control, CJNG is a lot less concerned with top-to-bottom takeovers of entire industries, and much more focused on the kind of regularly extorted tribute payments that an average enforcer could carry out by themselves, without much trouble. In CJNG country, just about every industry is subject to demands for payment—not just illegal ventures like gambling or prostitution, but the legal sale of goods and services as well. These taxes tend to come down quite heavily—not quite so massive as to bankrupt a local business, but enough to make a business owner&apos;s margins very slim and ensure that they&apos;ll come to the cartel for support if they need it.

And in terms of how they actually get those payments, CJNG generally employs very little of the diplomacy or community relations of the Sinaloa Cartel, preferring instead to scare the living shit out of anyone who might be thinking about non-compliance. Both on the streets it controls and in terms of its territorial expansion, CJNG is more than happy to operate aggressively in pursuit of profit, proudly breaking kneecaps and flaunting big guns in order to gain compliance and deter any attempt at resistance. Under their rule, municipal police and other authorities are far less a partner than a threat, and the cartel&apos;s response is accordingly severe: CJNG makes a habit of assaulting police stations and killing officers in their homes, with the same response levied against judges, military leaders, and civil regulators if they try to stand in the cartel&apos;s way.

And CJNG&apos;s reign of terror doesn&apos;t stop with established municipal officials. Before the 2018 elections, CJNG was tied to the killings of over a hundred local and state-level politicians, and they&apos;re well-versed in using intimidation tactics to force municipal and state police units to do their bidding. In their local economies, the cartel&apos;s franchises run extortive rackets over everything from convenience stores and restaurants in the cities, to farmers and miners in the Mexican countryside. In a twenty-first-century twist, the cartel has even employed consumer-available drone technology to surveil its own territory, and those same drones have been used on multiple occasions to drop bombs on not just police, but civilian targets. The purpose of these bombings is to clear out the countryside entirely of anyone who&apos;s not a cartel affiliate, keeping the most valuable land and smuggling routes completely under their own control.

On a local level, CJNG operates on something akin to a franchise model. The cartel&apos;s foot soldiers aren&apos;t trained formally or brought under the authority of a central command; instead, they&apos;re trained in whichever city or town they&apos;re recruited, with the quality of that training being as good, or bad, as the cartel&apos;s presence in that city can provide. Their equipment is just as variable, and so is the propaganda they put out, leading to somewhat variable results in terms of how effectively they can keep control over their territory. To solve that, they&apos;re consistent in their willingness to hurt anyone who stands in their way, whether it&apos;s priests, teachers, doctors, or anybody else. After all, even the most clueless local enforcer has nothing to fear if there&apos;s nobody left to stand against him.

In terms of the image it portrays to ordinary Mexicans, CJNG stands out for its aggressive use of propaganda, both to curry favor with the people living in their territory and to ward off any outside challenges to their authority. When they&apos;ve tried to portray themselves as altruistic, it&apos;s been with stunts like the delivery of toys to children in areas that have seen fierce cartel battles, or providing goods or support during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. They&apos;ve also made public overtures to Mexican society as a whole, seeking to justify and explain their reasons for warring with other cartels. And notably, considering the extreme violence they show toward perceived threats to their authority, CJNG isn&apos;t interested in enforcing any particular message. Priests and teachers are free to preach and teach as they like, as long as absolutely nothing they say can be perceived as an attempt to organize people against the cartel.

Since they&apos;re a newer organization, still in the business of expanding outward and taking territory, the cartel has established a clear and rather totalitarian policy when it sweeps into a new town or village. Almost always, small-time local criminal leaders will be rounded up and killed, with their subordinates given the choice to either oppose the cartel by themselves—and probably die without success—or get in line. Obviously, that choice really is no choice at all. The same goes for community leaders and local officials, who may or may not be murdered outright, but will almost certainly be forced to make it clear whether they intend to fall in line or cause problems for the cartel later on. And even when the cartels do attempt to show generosity to those same communities, it&apos;s got the very strong connotations of help offered, sometimes literally, at gunpoint.

As a result, CJNG often ends up developing a bit of a Stockholm-syndrome relationship with the communities it controls. For residents powerless to oppose them, it&apos;s difficult not to eventually begin responding with a terrified sense of gratitude when they learn that every consecutive day isn&apos;t the day that the cartel decides to take their life. For CJNG, that works just as well; struggling with petty internal divisions at the local level and fighting a lot of wars at once, the group isn&apos;t equipped to do the kind of service delivery that the Sinaloa Cartel can. Having the local population too scared to move is in many ways a more practical option to get effective social control without spending too many resources in order to achieve it.

We&apos;ve also got to point out here that this sort of wanton violence by the cartel isn&apos;t simply playing on the inner demons of its enforcers. The brutality is often deliberately taught. When a person wants to join CJNG, they&apos;re likely to find themselves at one of the cartel&apos;s training camps, but even on its own, a stay at one of these particular camps can be a frightening experience. According to testimony by former training-camp attendees, even choosing to go at all is a harrowing experience; opt out before attending, and you might be allowed to stay home, but get cold feet once you&apos;re there, and you&apos;re likely never coming home again. One attendee described that as soon as he was brought to a camp, he was doused in water and shocked with a car battery, in order to burn out any GPS hidden inside his body. Shortly after, he was instructed on the use of handguns, rifles, and rocket launchers, until a recruit who became nervous while assembling a gun was immediately shot and killed. The rest of the recruits were made to dismember the man&apos;s body, decapitate him, crush his head with a stone, and *eat* parts of the dead man&apos;s flesh.

And these stories of cannibalism within CJNG don&apos;t just stop with one recruit. Other hit-men from the group have attested to cannibalism as relatively common practice, in order to desensitize themselves to violence. In February of 2022, a video surfaced of a CJNG member eating the heart of a dead soldier from a rival cartel, while another person mutilated a second corpse in the background. It&apos;s important to note here that cannibalism has shown up on occasion with other cartels, but CJNG, for lack of a better word, appears to have a taste for the stuff. In many ways, it&apos;s simply the next step in a cycle of cartel violence where each syndicate must one-up all the others, and eventually get one-upped themselves by whoever&apos;s willing to escalate the spectacle even further. But at least for CJNG, it&apos;s about more than that; it&apos;s done in private, routinely in the training camps, first with extremities and then with vital organs, with the expectation that any recruit can do it with a stone face and not even a hint of weakness. For CJNG, it&apos;s a bare standard that a person must be able to meet in order to earn the trust of one of the most ruthless gangs in the world. Other recruits tell of being forced to sleep next to cadavers in the training camps, and ending their training by hunting down an assigned target, killing them, and eating them too.

At present, CJNG is the most powerful cartel in all of Mexico, and they&apos;ve been designated the biggest national security threat to the state itself. Not only are they now more than capable of standing up to the Sinaloas and even getting the better of street battles against them, but they&apos;ve caught the ire of the entire world. The American DEA has placed a running, ten-million-dollar bounty on the head of its leader, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, and CJNG&apos;s control is only growing stronger. In addition to their trafficked drugs of choice, particularly fentanyl and methamphetamine, the group is becoming more and more involved with oil theft, large-scale extortion of farmers, and even the same top-to-bottom industry control that the Sinaloa Cartel has in fishing, although CJNG is a good way off from really locking down industrial monopolies of its own. Of all the cartels in Mexico, it&apos;s indisputably CJNG that&apos;s on the rise, and between their willingness to traffick in some of the most dangerous drugs on the planet and their clear intent to perpetrate some truly horrific acts on those who cross them, their ascension is not a good sign for the future of Mexico.

## Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas

Of course, there&apos;s more to the Mexican cartel-o-sphere than just the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation, and in a mess of other myriad competitors across Mexico, two others stand out: the Gulf Cartel, and a rival group that splintered from them in the early 2010s, Los Zetas.

First, the **Gulf Cartel**, who, unsurprisingly given their name, control most of the land that encircles the Gulf of Mexico. Although they&apos;ve been plagued by a long series of internal and external disputes, breakaway factions, and rogue kingpins, the group is lucky enough to sit on some extremely lucrative smuggling corridors, where they can serve Texas, Florida, and most of the American Deep South far more efficiently than their competitors. This has put them in particularly lethal crosshairs with the Mexican government, who&apos;ve got a long history of capturing Gulf Cartel kingpins more successfully than the kingpins of other cartels, but those sorts of inconveniences are more than made up for with the cartel&apos;s earning potential, and its self-protection and dominance in its own territory are just as ruthless as we might expect.

Somewhat contrary to how the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels operate, the Gulf Cartel are generally big believers in the value of payoffs, and do business with other cartels, private businesses, and the Mexican government by bribing people at the local and state levels, basically leaning on their massive profits in order to out-bid the better angels of anyone who could stand in their way. This basically allows the Gulf Cartel to operate without competition in the areas they control, while allowing them to pull the levers of civil authority in the places where they operate.

And once they&apos;ve got areas locked down, the Gulf Cartel are particularly ruthless about their protection rackets, where tribute payments are extorted from just about every business in the cities they control. While other cartels may have a bit more patience and a bit of a finer touch in order to secure payments in the long term, the Gulf Cartel is much less lenient; a business that declines to pay once is likely to find themselves attacked outright, and if they decline twice, some people are probably going to be murdered. With such harsh and immediate retribution, it&apos;s abundantly clear that the Gulf Cartel treats the businesses in its controlled territory as being just as much a revenue generator as drug trafficking. Not only that, but the payoff is far more immediate, and it&apos;s got the helpful knock-on effect of keeping the cartel&apos;s smuggling lanes especially peaceful.

In recent years, the Gulf Cartel has begun to intertwine itself increasingly closely with CJNG, integrating torture more and more into their regular practices of intimidation. At the same time, their leadership have become more and more accustomed to the idea that sitting at the head of the Gulf Cartel will typically bring a quick demise, incentivizing a much more hedonistic and lavish lifestyle while they&apos;re still alive. At the same time, this has the effect of diminishing the level of planning and attention that the Gulf Cartel, in particular, is willing to give to its future. In an environment that&apos;s already so violent, so zero-sum, this sort of short-term thinking leads to a great deal more carnage and enforcers who operate on a much shorter fuse than some of the others we&apos;ve discussed. Today, the Gulf Cartel is not what it used to be, assailed on all sides by those who would wish to get in on its profits, but like all dangerous organizations in decline, it&apos;s not unlikely that as the pressure on the Gulf Cartel increases, more people will pay the price with their lives.

Then there&apos;s **Los Zetas**, who trace their roots back to their former status as a private mercenary army that the Gulf Cartel hired in the late 1990s. After a few lucrative years as Gulf employees, then equal partners, the two groups went to war across the state of Tamaulipas, with many towns devastated in the crossfire. Although their war didn&apos;t result in the end of either organization, Los Zetas emerged looking particularly strong, propped up with elite recruits from the Guatemalan special forces. Using their skill and expertise, Los Zetas have locked down corridors across the Mexican east coast and established well-integrated affiliates in Guatemala.

At their core, Los Zetas is set apart by their former status as a true paramilitary organization, an ethos they&apos;ve kept alive through today. At one point, they were the largest cartel in Mexico, going strictly on the geography they controlled, and even today, they&apos;re formidable in battle. They have a particular penchant for massacres, especially in the early 2010s, and acts of sabotage, and while they&apos;ve since been reined in by intense pressure and attacks from other cartels and the Mexican government, they remain a force across many parts of Mexico.

In fact, the biggest thing that sets Los Zetas apart is how they go about bringing young recruits into the fold. Like in any other cartel, a young person joining Los Zetas has the opportunity to become rich and powerful, if they can escape the death and destruction that befalls most entry-level drug-runners. But uniquely, Los Zetas have historically featured an elaborate training camp similar to military boot camp, with far more of an operational focus than the equivalent programs run by CJNG. Zetas recruits, often just children, are first trained in surveillance, then assassination, with instruction ranging from the use of light armaments, to martial arts, to small-unit tactics for use in firefights. They&apos;re taught both how to torture others and how to withstand torture themselves, as well as tactical driving to evade pursuit. It&apos;s a shockingly robust program, one that puts most terrorist and insurgent training camps to shame, and given the continued survival of Los Zetas, it appears to have paid off.

Los Zetas&apos; utilitarian focus goes well beyond their training camps; uncommonly for a major Mexican cartel, Los Zetas integrate women into their organizational structure, especially as assassins, where they often seduce targets in order to kill them in private. Known as **&quot;Las Flacas&quot;**, or Skinny Girls, they form highly effective death squads, operating through infiltration where many men would be unable or unwilling to do the same. Often, the road from young Mexican woman to assassin is a difficult one, with prostitution or stays in prison used as the bridge from ordinary life into cartel service. But their role goes far beyond just &quot;Las Flacas&quot;; with the Zetas, women are present within the cartel as foot soldiers, street bosses, administrators, and more, giving Los Zetas a valuable leg up.

Finally, Los Zetas have diversified from drugs in a rather different way than most other cartels: they&apos;ve turned to oil, where in 2017, they were estimated to control some forty percent of the entire Mexican oil market. This, in addition to their work in people-smuggling across borders on the American supercontinent, and their willingness to deal in deadly but very lucrative fentanyl, have led Los Zetas to focus less on door-to-door extortion in the territories they control. Rather than the sort of brutally violent intimidation the Gulf Cartel or the Jalisco New Generation may use, Los Zetas have instead gone online; at least one report, by the *New York Times*, has tied them to the use of powerful tracking software co-opted from Mexican law enforcement. With that sort of ability to see into the lives of the people on their territory, such indiscriminate violence is unnecessary, making Los Zetas, for all their recent territorial losses, one of the most sophisticated cartel operations out there.

## The Mexican Government

With all the savagery that comes with life in cartel country, it would be tempting to harbor at least some hope that Mexico might be able to take back its own future, sooner than later. But unfortunately, that hope would appear to be misplaced, at least for now. As we mentioned at the outset, Mexico is currently governed by an administration led by President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, better known around the world as AMLO. But as recently as 2023, AMLO has proven unwilling to acknowledge even the mere fact of the drug cartels&apos; scale and power, and has instead made public claims that there is nowhere in Mexico that is not under the control of the Mexican authorities.

It&apos;s important to understand here that the Mexican government is under quite intense pressure, both at home and abroad. In Mexico, it&apos;s not hard to see how the long reach of the cartels permeates every facet of everyday life, and those citizens who aren&apos;t living in cartel country are making electoral decisions that the rest of Mexico either can&apos;t weigh in on, or can only comment on by casting their votes in the way the cartels would like. In the United States, the combination of an opioid epidemic and national security concerns have led legislators, particularly from America&apos;s Republican Party, to push for a military intervention on Mexican soil in order to root out the cartels. But AMLO&apos;s response has been far more focused on keeping up a positive public image of his version of Mexico and preventing any foreign troops from setting foot on Mexican soil than about actually dealing with the very real issues that his country is dealing with.

The steps that Mexico has taken under this administration look a whole lot like what previous administrations have done: create some new military apparatus, in this case a national guard, and hope that it&apos;ll be enough to fight back against the cartels. Between the cartels&apos; dominance and deeply entrenched defenses in the areas they control, and the endemic corruption that runs throughout the Mexican state, that military solution appears just as ineffectual as ever. Mexico&apos;s police and military have begun to more openly engage in their own torture, forced disappearances, and other human rights abuses, a move that can only escalate the conflict further. The alternative that AMLO has proposed, a loose pseudo-policy he refers to as &quot;hugs, not bullets,&quot; has been an abject failure, to the extent that it even exists as a true plan of action.

On the ground, many local police departments have simply given up. In a 2023 interview with the American NPR news organization, an unidentified police officer from Tijuana alleged that his own superiors had directed him to not file police reports involving cartel activity, to not investigate gunfire, and, when he was personally threatened by a cartel and told to deliver his own money to an enforcer, his supervisors refused to come to his aid. These sorts of stories are rare, as a facet of just how few officials are willing to speak out about what they&apos;ve experienced, but to hear ordinary Mexican citizens tell it, this sort of complete abandonment by their police is commonplace.

And as should be expected by now, the cartels have reacted to this visibly lax treatment by simply taking advantage. Once only a small part of cartel business, illegal migration to the United States has become fantastically lucrative for the cartels, who are willing to cut some truly worrying corners and keep migrants in awful conditions in order to move them across the border—more akin to cattle than people, in the eyes of their cartel handlers. So too have they bridged into forgery of documents, fencing goods to stores and businesses, and monopolizing more and more sectors of the Mexican economy. Young men and boys in Mexico, especially teenagers, are recruited at higher rates than ever, and they&apos;re being pushed into work as executioners and torturers long before they&apos;re even legal adults. One Associated Press report from 2021 spoke to three children: one who estimated that he killed nineteen people between age ten and age sixteen; one who testified to killing and dismembering his first victims for the cartel at age eleven; and one who was dissolving bodies in acid and performing public assassinations by the time he was in his mid-teens. Some thirty thousand other young children are estimated to have been recruited into cartels between 2019 and just 2021. All the while, battles in the streets continue, but these days, the survival of the cartels involved is no longer an open question. Those that have survived this long are most likely here to stay; the real question is how big a piece of the pie each cartel can hope to collect.

Of course, it&apos;s not for us to make assertions about just how pervasive corruption might be at even the highest levels in Mexico, or whether or not AMLO—a man with so many anti-democratic scandals that they&apos;d fill their own video—may have closer links with the cartels than can be proven. Those sorts of allegations will have to be made and investigated by the few journalists left who are willing to ask such dangerous questions in cartel country, with a full awareness of the dangers that come with any visible desire to expose the truth. But regardless of any intentionality or lack thereof, it&apos;s abundantly clear that the actions Mexico is taking to defend its own people just aren&apos;t enough. How the situation could eventually be brought to a halfway decent conclusion, we can&apos;t say, but with the cartels more dug-in, more influential, and perhaps even more powerful outright than the Mexican government, it&apos;ll take a massive shift in Latin American society to see them extricated.

So that&apos;s life in Mexico&apos;s cartel country, a bitter, incredibly violent part of the world where all life, for all people, exists in service to the cartels&apos; ability to move their product. Help them along, and a person may be rewarded with riches beyond their wildest dreams—until they too become expendable, and die like an estimated half a million or more people have before them. Stand in the cartels&apos; way, and a far more painful fate may await you, one that will make you into yet another instrument of the terror that these cartels use to keep control. How long this lasts, we really can&apos;t say, but until, and unless, something truly huge can change for Mexico, cartel country will forever remain the place where drugs, and profit, rule all.

## Key Takeaways

- Mexico&apos;s drug cartels have created a de-facto civil war, controlling vast territories and operating with heavy weaponry.
- The cartels&apos; primary goal is profit, using violence and intimidation to control drug routes and extort local businesses.
- The Mexican government&apos;s efforts to combat the cartels have been largely ineffective, with corruption and military operations failing to curb their influence.
- Cartels like Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation use different tactics, from diplomatic extortion to brutal violence, to maintain control.
- The cartels&apos; reach extends internationally, with significant operations in the U.S. and other countries, making them a global security threat.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the main conflict in Mexico?

Mexico is at war with its drug cartels, an asymmetric, decentralized network of gangs and criminal syndicates that have been able to take their country to the brink.

### How do the cartels control territory in Mexico?

The cartels control territory to secure drug production, smuggling routes, and processing locations, often leading to tightly contested areas between multiple cartels.

### What role does the United States play in Mexico&apos;s drug war?

The United States&apos; high demand for drugs and its long, over-land border with Mexico make it a key player in the drug trade, providing a lucrative market for the cartels.

### Who are the major cartels in Mexico as of 2020?

The major cartels include the Sinaloa Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), Juarez Cartel, Los Rojos Cartel, La Familia Michoacana, Gulf Cartel, and Los Zetas.

### How did the Mexican government&apos;s crackdowns in 2006 affect the cartels?

The crackdowns by President Felipe Calderon led to increased violence as cartels retaliated against each other and the government, resulting in a significant rise in homicides and the militarization of the cartels.

### What are some of the methods used by the cartels to maintain control?

The cartels use tactics such as torture, extrajudicial executions, mass graves, and propaganda to maintain control and instill fear in the population.

### How do the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel differ in their methods of control?

The Sinaloa Cartel prefers a more restrained and orderly approach, focusing on extortion and maintaining peaceful daily life, while CJNG is known for its brutal and aggressive tactics, including public displays of violence and intimidation.

### What is the current stance of the Mexican government under President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) on the drug war?

AMLO has denied the extent of the cartels&apos; control and has pursued a strategy of &apos;hugs, not bullets,&apos; which has been largely ineffective in combating the cartels.

### How do the cartels recruit and train their members?

The cartels recruit heavily from disenfranchised, poor young men, often prioritizing those with operational expertise. Training can include brutal methods such as cannibalism and torture to desensitize recruits to violence.

### What are some of the challenges faced by the Mexican government in combating the cartels?

The Mexican government faces challenges such as endemic corruption, the cartels&apos; deeply entrenched defenses, and the need to balance public image with effective action against the cartels.

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- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c4/%27El_Supl%C3%ADcio_de_Cuauht%C3%A9moc%27_%281893%29_by_Leandro_Izaguirre_-_Museo_Nacional_de_Artes_-_Mexico_2024.jpg) by José Luiz / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CECOT: The Alcatraz of Latin America</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/cecot-alcatraz-latin-america</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/cecot-alcatraz-latin-america</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>It is the summer of 2015, and a businessman is walking down the street in El Salvador when two young men appear in front of him. The man began to beg the two men for his life, pleading that he had young children. But they didn&apos;t listen. One drew a pistol and shot the man, first in the shoulder, then the stomach, then twice in the head. The man&apos;s crime? He refused to pay an extortion debt to a gang. The debt…was $21.

It is December of 2022, and a man sits in a dimly lit chapel perched on a wooden church pew. He clutches a picture of his daughter, a psychology student with the alias Marta, close to his chest as he chokes back tears. His daughter was not dead, she was in prison. Except she hadn&apos;t done anything wrong. She had been in prison for 6 months. It is unknown where Marta is today.

This just leaves us with one question. What on earth happened here? How did El Salvador go from one of the highest murder rates in the world to one of the lowest in such a short time? How did the government go from total anarchy on its streets to restoring order and peace for the first time in a generation?

Well El Salvador holds a dark secret. Deep in the middle of the country, in the middle of the desert, in the middle of nowhere, hides a hulking steel and concrete behemoth. It eats everything that wanders into its maw and is never full. A vault for El Salvador to lock away dangerous criminals and throw away the key. Today we&apos;re going to tell you a story about gang violence and one man&apos;s crusade against it. A story of how that man built a monument to his crusade in the form the most secure prison on earth, and how ordinary people have gotten caught in between.

The prison that nobody has ever been released from. A local police officer is reported as having said &quot;Not even El Chapo could escape from there.&quot; Where the worst of the worst go to rot in the highest security complex this side of the US border. The Alcatraz of South America.

CECOT.

## CECOT by the Numbers

CECOT is an acronym, meaning &quot;Centre of Confinement for Terrorism&quot;. To understand its significance, we need to appreciate what makes up this massive steel complex. It was built in the latter half of 2022 and started receiving its special guests in February of 2023. You&apos;ll need a while to get your head around just how mind-bendingly large it is. The complex covers 57 acres, but that is just the facility itself. The grounds around the facility patrolled by police and the army is a whopping 407 acres, around two and a half times the size of Disneyland and about 1000% less fun. It is one of the largest prison facilities in the Americas. It&apos;s also one of the most secure.

Working from the inside out, there are several rings of security that the prisoners here are held within. First are the cells. There are 32 cells in a cell block or &quot;module&quot;. There are eight modules, also locked and guarded, each held in a separate sector, bordered by several electrified chain-link fences, barbed wire and patrolling guards. Beyond that stand four-metre walls of 60cm thick sheer concrete, topped with barbed wire and multiple guard towers. After that is the main prison wall itself, which is an eye-watering 11 metres high (taller than the length of a London bus). It stretches for over 2 kilometres around the main compound&apos;s perimeter, with 19 guard towers at varying intervals housing armed guards. If you did somehow manage to get past all of that, you would find yourself in 400 acres worth of government land, with the army and police patrolling several perimeter layers and using external watchtowers. That makes around seven circles of security. Hell itself, has nine.

It was built in Tecoluca, 74 kilometres (or 46 miles) south-east of San Salvador, almost exactly in the centre of the country, in the middle of a desert, miles from any civilian settlements. El Salvador&apos;s previous experiences saw prisons in more urban areas have their issues bleed out into local communities. Here, isolation is a strategic design feature to protect those communities. The prison&apos;s infrastructure is entirely self-contained and independent from the national grid, with its own wells to provide water and a substation to generate electricity. If the rest of El Salvador was somehow destroyed tomorrow, CECOT could still function. And it really needs a plentiful electricity supply too, as the entire complex is lit up like a Christmas tree. Every square inch of the exterior is covered in spotlights. After all, an escapee can&apos;t hide in the dark if there is no dark.

There are still several unknowns when it comes to officially established information about the facility. We know it is energy independent, but for obvious security reasons it is unclear exactly what that infrastructure looks like. We don&apos;t know the total number of cameras or the number of staff. Maybe most importantly of all, we don&apos;t know what it cost to build, especially at the speed it was built. For the cameras, estimations are in the thousands. In comparison to prisons of a similar size and security globally, the number of cameras other facilities have is estimated to be in the hundreds, making CECOT a surveillance outlier. It is pushing the boundaries of what is feasible and even practical in modern jails. The staff is estimated to number a few thousand, which given prisons of a similar size, isn&apos;t actually that many. CECOT at capacity is reported to be able to hold 40,000 inmates. Riker&apos;s Island in New York can house 20,000 inmates and has around 10,000 staff. Those running the complex who showed the El Salvadoran President around the prison on his YouTube channel (modern politics is bizarre) stated that everything in CECOT was designed and built to global international standards. There is no doubt it has been influenced by some of the world&apos;s securest prisons like ADX Florence Supermax in Colorado. ADX Florence cost the US government around $60 million to build in 1994. However, that facility is designed to hold under 500 inmates at its absolute maximum, not 40,000. Given that CECOT&apos;s main compound is 20 acres larger than ADX Florence, is primed to house 80 times the inmates and was built state-of-the-art three decades later, it is reasonable to estimate that CECOT&apos;s cost would significantly dwarf that of Florence and indeed most prisons on earth.

The cells inside each module amount to little more than concrete boxes. They have thick reinforced bars on the front-facing walls and metal mesh ceilings for constant monitoring by armed guards in the gangways above. Every cell is fitted with two concrete toilets and two concrete basins, though the water is turned on and off from outside the cell. The main floorspace of the cells are filled with quadruple-decker metal frames forming the inmates&apos; beds. No mattresses, sheets or pillows are allowed, as even these can be fashioned into weapons. The whole complex holds 256 cells, with around 156 prisoners per cell. The Washington Post reports that at 98 people per acre, CECOT is designed to be one of the most densely populated prisons on earth. That&apos;s quite a tight squeeze. Especially when the temperature can reach 35 degrees Celsius with very little ventilation. The cells do not have any windows and as far as the El Salvadoran authorities are concerned; they do not need any. The design of the modules lets in a substantial amount of natural light during the day and fluorescent lighting is as ubiquitous inside as it is outside. These lights remain on 24/7, even while inmates attempt to sleep in order to maintain surveillance. The only exception is isolation. Solitary confinement cells are small, pitch-black-concrete boxes, with a concrete slab to sleep on and a concrete toilet.

All in all, the prison is as well equipped, if not better, than most on earth, even for the staff. A key element of the design of CECOT was the &quot;dignity&quot; that came with having a position there. Being a guard at CECOT provides you with a safe place to eat a hot meal, a comfortable place to rest, a recreational area and even a gym. The El Salvador government wanted to transform the previously sceptical perception towards its security services to one of respect. The prisoners naturally are not extended that courtesy and just in case the inmates get upset with that, CECOT has ample resources to handles these issues too. It has an armoury stacked to the hilt with rifles, riot gear and megaphones. Armed sharpshooters, especially in vantage areas, are a mainstay. But, if the prison officers do ever need help, they can call on the El Salvadoran police and army who are patrolling the outside. What&apos;s more, El Salvador&apos;s 6th infantry brigade are located only 20 kilometres away. The compound already has an army of vehicles, including a helicopter, and the open layout of the facility ensures multiple helicopters could land in the grounds if need be.

Now if you knew nothing about El Salvador, you may think that this is overdoing things a smidge. Who are the monsters that would be locked up in such an inescapable place and why would a country need to build such a large complex for them? Let&apos;s look into the recent history to find out.

## CECOT&apos;s Origins

To understand the current goings on in El Salvador that have led to the building of one of the most secure facilities on earth, we must first travel to 1980s Los Angeles, where El Salvador&apos;s gang problems originated. During the El Salvadoran civil war, between 1980 and 1992, many citizens fled to the US to escape the violence and persecution, forming a community of Salvadorans in Los Angeles. Some of these refugees literally ganged together in order to protect themselves against the native gangs of LA. One of the Salvadoran gangs was known as Barrio 18, or the 18th Street gang. The other was known as Mara Salvatrucha, or as it&apos;s more commonly known, MS-13, and both sects are bitter rivals. Both gangs today are known for their brutality, their indifference to the suffering of others and the wide range of criminal activities they specialise in. By the 1990s, this became such a prominent issue that the US Government began deporting dangerous Salvadoran gang members back to their homeland.

But the civil war had gutted the nation, infrastructure lay in ruins and no security left civilians vulnerable. This was the exact environment that these hardened gang members, now adept at setting up and running criminal organisations, were returned to. The New American Story Project reports as many as 4,000 gang members were repatriated to a nation that was wholly underequipped to do so. As a result, the gangs grew in the power vacuum up to tens of thousands. The result was that for over a generation, a cycle of extreme violence, extortion, trafficking and worse gripped the nation as both sides fought each other and the state for control. The government simply couldn&apos;t contain the violence and El Salvador&apos;s murder rate rose to a staggering 103 per 100,000 people in 2015. In other words, in 2015 one in every 972 people were murdered. All of this in a nation with a population smaller than New York City.

The prison system quickly became overwhelmed and the state was left with no option but to enter into unfavourable deals with the gangs in attempts to quell the violence. For example, Ciudad Barrios Penal Centre is a prison located in the capital, San Salvador that was previously exclusively for MS-13 gang members. The Guardian reports that the 2,600 inmates had such a hold on the place, that guards were too afraid to enter. I do not blame them. Inmates found ways to access just about anything they desired, including drugs, weapons, computers, phones, PlayStations and even prostitutes. Now whilst this sounds like a great time for them, it doesn&apos;t really scream &quot;punishment&quot; and one man in particular agreed with this. In fact, he agreed that the gangs had had it far too good for far too long and pledged to do something about it.

Enter El Salvador&apos;s newest &quot;El Presidente&quot;, Nayib Bukele. Bukele was previously the owner of a marketing company before deciding to get involved in politics, winning the 2019 Presidential Election with 53% of the vote. His anti-corruption, anti-establishment ideology, alongside the slogan &quot;There&apos;s enough money when no one steals,&quot; clearly resonated with the El Salvador electorate. Simply put, Bukele was a breath of fresh air from the main political parties responsible for the nation&apos;s mess. He was new and El Salvador needed new. In 2019 Bukele set about reclaiming the nation back from the gangs, known as his administration&apos;s &quot;territorial control plan&quot;. El Salvadoran regimes of the past had often preached security and control as part of the nation&apos;s ongoing &quot;iron fist&quot; policy towards gang violence that emerged in the 2000s. Bukele was about to show the gangs how much of a punch that fist would truly pack.

The government went about taking back control of the prisons first. They installed phone signal blockers and gave phone companies ultimatums to shut off the service completely in certain areas. They went into the prisons, seizing any contraband they could find. They even ended the prison segregation policy. Now it might seem counterintuitive to put violent groups of people who hate each other together in a concrete box. However, despite concerns that it would only ramp up the violence, the gangs decided to conduct somewhat of a truce. Being locked up together meant they had to find ways to live with each other. If it was &quot;kill on-sight&quot; all the time, the gangs would quickly tear each other apart in the prisons, which was no good for them. A non-violent truce made the move look like a masterstroke by the President. But whilst Bukele had the upper hand bureaucratically, the gangs still maintained significant control in other areas of the nation and continued to make their presence known. President Bukele&apos;s policies had brought down El Salvador&apos;s murder rate significantly, but violent outbursts were still common. On the 27th of March 2022, the BBC reported that 62 people were murdered within 24 hours in El Salvador. President Bukele had had enough; the gloves were about to come off, once and for all.

Bukele&apos;s government declared a &quot;state of exception&quot;, initially for 30 days, but this has been extended in perpetuity ever since and remains in force to this day. This emergency decree suspended various constitutional rights and granted law enforcement special powers to make arrests without evidence. It also allowed them to hold prisoners for longer than the ordinary limit of 72 hours without seeing a judge. Travel restrictions were implemented in known gang-heavy areas, some assembly was banned and the government granted itself access to citizens&apos; private communications. And of course, arrests were made…lots of them. By 2024, only two years into the operation, over 80,000 people have been arrested in El Salvador. However, according to Human Rights Watch, even the El Salvadoran police themselves state that around one in every six people arrested are innocent. The Bukele regime was arresting so many people every month that by the end of 2022 the previously overcrowded and overwhelmed Salvadoran prison system was faring even worse. The regime knew they needed a new prison to match their new policy, a shining monument to national security. If the gangs were bad, they were going to be worse. It was in that moment that CECOT was born.

## CECOT Prison Policy

So, we&apos;ve told you why it was built, we&apos;ve told you what you&apos;d expect to find if you visited, but what is life really like for the prisoners at CECOT? Who are they? What have they done to get here? And how does CECOT handle such dangerous inmates? Well, this can broadly be broken down into two main areas: prison policy and inmate policy.

Prison policy concerns the prison itself and its staff. CECOT is designed with several systems for the prison to run smoothly. Guards are paid fairly, well equipped and well trained. Guards and soldiers regularly conduct exercises to practice assaulting certain sections of the prison in case things should ever get out of hand. You can see a demonstration of this during President Bukele&apos;s tour of the facility, whereby riot gear-laden police stack up four-to-a-man against the cell doors, while a squad of marksmen sweeps the corridor. To ensure the prisoners are not colluding against them, counterintelligence teams operate in the prison and assess the mood on the ground at all times. One of the most important elements of prison security policy concerns contraband, to make certain these prisoners won&apos;t be procuring any PlayStations or partying with prostitutes. Anyone who enters the prison must pass through full-body, airport-style, X-ray scanners and manual frisks to make sure that they do not have contraband on them. What&apos;s more, any staff can select any specific inmate or even groups of inmates to be searched. They make sure there is nothing to hide and certainly nowhere to hide it. Even the more administrative prison policies are crucial to operations. Booking inmates into a digital system ensures that the state has a record of who these people are, why they&apos;re here and once you&apos;re in the system there&apos;s no way out of it.

As much as we would love to go more into detail about prison administration policy, we actually want you all to finish this video, so we&apos;ll move swiftly on to the inmate policy. What rules do the prisoners held here have to adhere to? Well for starters, prisoners are controlled at all times when outside of their cells. Unless in large groups, where they are made to sit body to body in large lines. Leg shackles are very common. Prisoners are put in irons when they are transported anywhere within the prison, which mostly means to isolation or sentencing. Every prisoner has a shaved head or a buzzcut and they are all given the same white boxer short, T-shirt combo. Prisoners spend the vast majority of their time in the 156-man cells previously discussed, with the metal shelving beds and the concrete toilet. Talking amongst the prisoners is frowned upon, although prison officers recognise the difficult to police such rules, hence the designated counterintelligence team.

When we said that prisoners stay in their cells most of the time, we weren&apos;t kidding. There are no family visits to the prison, most likely owed to the contraband risk that visits would entail. So, prisoners have an awful lot of downtime. When its lunch time, prisoners are given food in their cells, which they eat with their hands as utensils are forbidden. Would you trust an MS-13 gang leader with a plastic fork? I wouldn&apos;t either. It is reported that for recreation, prisoners are exercised in the corridor for 30 minutes every day. This, alongside the bright lights at night is enough to keep prisoners tired and unstimulated, with very little fitness growth. One of the exceptions for leaving the cell is for sentencing, but even then, prisoners do not leave CECOT. Instead, digital hearings are carried out, whereby they are placed in a room with a screen. A key element of eradicating gang activity is removing the threat of retaliation during legal proceedings. A remote digital hearing physically prevents the inmate from threatening the judge of witnesses.

The Presidential tour of CECOT did show where prisoners would be put to work, building and making items for society such as chairs and woven goods. However, the reports that inmates are only let out of their cells for 30 minutes per day for exercise in the corridor contradict this idea. So, it is unclear at this time whether this is an envisaged future strategy, or whether something was lost in translation on how prisoners would be put to work. With the kind of security CECOT has, allowing convicts to build anything makes little sense. This is a place that denies inmates access to cutlery; it may be unwise to hand over angle grinders and sewing machines.

Thus far, prison and inmate policy at CECOT, as well as its onion-like layers of security, have made it impossible for anyone to successfully escape, nor is anyone likely to escape soon. Nobody has been released and there are currently no plans for any inmate to be released. Those who go to CECOT, go for good. The BBC report that the El Salvadoran authorities do not expect CECOT&apos;s prisoners to ever be released, as the type of prisoners detained there are simply too dangerous to ever reintegrate into society. So, who are these people that El Salvador are so afraid of, that they will lock them in a vault forever and throw away the key?

Well, in brief, they are the worst of the worst. The identities of those who are currently at CECOT is not revealed to the public, but the facility is designed to house the very worst that El Salvadoran gangs have to offer. This includes personnel key to running the gangs, treasurers, communication heads and both national and regional gang leaders. On the list is also likely to be enforcers, extortionists, torturers and hit men. This is not a good place to wind up. And yet, it is believed that up to one in six of the thousands of people arrested by Bukele&apos;s government are completely innocent. Like in our example in the introduction, people are disappearing and family members do not know where they are. If the police suspected someone of doing a bad enough crime or being affiliated enough with the gangs, there&apos;s a very real chance that completely innocent people with extraordinarily bad luck could one day find themselves in CECOT forever.

## CECOT&apos;s Legacy – Safety, Control, Abuse

So, what comes of all this? What is the legacy of this super prison? Well, like so many other things in this world, its complicated. We&apos;ll run you through both sides of the argument and you can decide for yourself which is right. It is undoubted that there is a &quot;bad&quot; legacy that comes with CECOT: a legacy of missing people, a legacy of one form of extreme violence replacing another, a legacy of an increasingly undemocratic nation that solves its problems through human rights abuses and unreasonable force. Don&apos;t get me wrong, the vast majority of the prisoners in El Salvador&apos;s system, not just CECOT, are unequivocally violent gang members who had a hold on the country for far too long. But does this justify potentially throwing innocent people behind bars with no due process? Does it justify torture? Does it justify extra-judicial killing? What about someone like Marta? Is having her and others disappear into the system indefinitely seen by the governing regime as the price of freedom for the nation? The human rights organisation Humanitarian Legal Relief released a report in April of 2024 that stated 241 people are confirmed to have died in El Salvadoran prisons since the war on gangs began, though the actual figure is likely higher as this only accounted for confirmed cases. According to the NGO&apos;s report, of these deaths, 44% were due to &quot;violent&quot; or &quot;serious torture&quot; and 29% were due to a &quot;lack of medical attention&quot;. Now we&apos;re not trying to say, &quot;spare a thought for the poor MS-13 hitman&quot;, as these guys are the worst of the worst, but one could argue that the state has a responsibility to look after its citizens, even those who have committed the worst possible crimes. The state has to be better than those it convicts, it&apos;s not fair, but that&apos;s true law and order. With an innocent arrest rate according to the Salvadoran police of one in six, it is undoubtable that some of the people in the prison system and even some of those who have died or suffered abuse, may well have been completely innocent. Whether the Bukele regime like it or not, whether their cause is righteous enough or not, they have innocent blood on their hands for that, no matter how many criminals they lock away. Whether the ends justify the means, we&apos;ll leave that up to you.

Critiques of CECOT are far from limited to one NGO though. The BBC has reported that opponents of President Bukele have described CECOT as a &quot;black hole of human rights&quot;. Similarly, Miguel Sarre, a former member of the United Nations Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture, has described it as a &quot;concrete and steel pit [used] to dispose of people without formally applying the death penalty&quot;. Amnesty International states that El Salvador is experiencing a systematic policy of torture towards all those detained under the state of emergency on suspicion of being gang members. Families who maintain their loved one&apos;s innocence have reported family members being taken from their homes without even being shown an arrest warrant. From there, they were transported directly to detention centres or jails, before being subjected to group online hearings along with dozens of other detainees. In those hearings the judge would order a pre-trial detention, while the prosecutor&apos;s office investigated whether there was evidence for a formal charge - a process that the BBC states can last for months, or even years. Their cause is just until it&apos;s your door they&apos;re kicking down in the middle of the night. CECOT is a hammer, which makes every criminal a nail.

But we&apos;d be remiss if we didn&apos;t talk about how much better El Salvador is for the state stepping in. You can never condone the humanitarian abuses in El Salvador, no matter whether a person is innocent or guilty. However, the state of exception and the territorial control plan does appear to be working. The fact of the matter is, Bukele&apos;s administration has taken dangerous criminals off the streets and they have lowered the murder rate in El Salvador from one of the highest in human history to one of the lowest on earth in a decidedly short period of time. No matter which way you slice it, despotic, undemocratic, unhumanitarian, that&apos;s results. That&apos;s why the legacy of a place like CECOT is so complicated so early in its life. From a societal perspective it is rational for the state to have taken such decisive action. The average Salvadoran citizen previously had to pay protection money through extortion so they didn&apos;t get killed. Now the streets are safer again. One citizen told the BBC, &quot;Before, we lived in fear. Not anymore.&quot;

For all the humanitarian discussion, El Salvador is already benefitting from this change. The USDA Foreign Agricultural Service stated that in August of 2023, El Salvador received 25% more foreign visitors than in 2019. The rise of tourism, in turn strengthens the nation&apos;s economy, givng the nationa route back to prosperity. El Salvador prior to 2019 was somewhat of a basket case, a society gripped by existential violence, extortion and fear. Another person was reported by the BBC as saying, &quot;This place was not safe at all until the President did that&quot; referring to the state of exception. The state, even if spectacularly heavy-handed, has upheld a moral principle that El Salvadoran citizens should not suffer for the gang&apos;s violence. And what did it cost? An expensive prison, a few constitutional rights and a signature.

Ultimately, the people of El Salvador agree. A CID Gallup Poll of 1,200 Salvadoran citizens in January of 2024 showed a 92% favourability rate with President Bukele. The self-proclaimed &quot;coolest dictator ever&quot; has stood by his staunch approach, tweeting: &quot;Let all the &apos;human rights&apos; NGOs know that we are going to wipe out these bloody murderers and their collaborators, we will put them in prison and they will never get out.&quot; Salvadoran Justice and Public Security Minister, Gustavo Villatoro, stated &quot;we are eliminating this cancer from society.&quot; This is the way the Salvadoran government is choosing to justify its actions. They are cutting out a tumour and when you cut out a tumour, you have to get it all, even if that means you lose some healthy tissue too, to save the rest of the body. The situation for El Salvador was untenable for decades, the violence could not go on. No matter what they did, El Salvador was not going to legislate or negotiate its way out of it. After all, it had tried and failed. When every other tool in your toolbox was taken by gang members, sometimes the hammer is all you have left.

Where does that leave CECOT and El Salvador now? Well, the culture of the country is changing, the people are safer but the state is a force to be feared. There is a new status quo in El Salvador; one where the state sits at the head of the table, whilst the gang members are sent to bed with no supper. El Salvador will be pre-disposed to authoritarian rule even if the state of exception ever ends. But the Salvadoran people don&apos;t appear to mind this, as many feel they are safe for the first time in decades. The 2024 election in February saw Bukele re-elected in a landslide victory. As El Salvador forges a path on the world stage quite unlike any other, remember what was left behind. All the way in the middle of Tecoluca, in the middle of the desert, in the middle of nowhere, CECOT will still be there as an omnipotent monument to the state&apos;s security victory. The message is clear: best behave yourself, you don&apos;t want to end up here.

## Key Takeaways

- CECOT, a supermax prison in El Salvador, holds the worst gang members in extreme conditions.
- El Salvador&apos;s murder rate dropped significantly after President Bukele&apos;s crackdown on gangs.
- CECOT&apos;s extreme security measures include constant surveillance and isolation for inmates.
- Critics argue that Bukele&apos;s policies lead to human rights abuses and wrongful arrests.
- Despite controversies, Bukele&apos;s approach has increased public safety and tourism in El Salvador.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is CECOT?

CECOT stands for &apos;Centre of Confinement for Terrorism.&apos; It is a highly secure prison in El Salvador designed to hold the worst of the worst criminals, particularly gang members.

### Where is CECOT located?

CECOT is located in Tecoluca, 74 kilometres southeast of San Salvador, in the middle of a desert and far from any civilian settlements.

### How secure is CECOT?

CECOT is one of the most secure prisons in the Americas. It features multiple layers of security, including electrified fences, barbed wire, guard towers, and extensive surveillance.

### What is the capacity of CECOT?

CECOT is designed to hold up to 40,000 inmates, making it one of the largest prison facilities in the Americas.

### What kind of inmates are held in CECOT?

CECOT is designed to house the most dangerous criminals in El Salvador, including key gang members, treasurers, communication heads, and leaders of criminal organizations.

### What are the conditions like inside CECOT?

Inmates in CECOT are held in densely populated cells with minimal amenities. They spend most of their time in these cells, with limited opportunities for exercise or recreation.

### What is the impact of CECOT on El Salvador&apos;s crime rate?

Since the implementation of the state of exception and the construction of CECOT, El Salvador has seen a significant reduction in its murder rate, making the streets safer for citizens.

### What are some of the criticisms of CECOT?

Critics argue that CECOT represents a human rights violation, with reports of torture, lack of medical attention, and the imprisonment of innocent people. Human rights organizations have described it as a &apos;black hole of human rights.&apos;

### What is the public opinion of CECOT in El Salvador?

A significant majority of Salvadorans support the measures taken by President Bukele, including the construction of CECOT, as they feel safer and more secure with the reduction in gang violence.

### What is the legacy of CECOT?

CECOT&apos;s legacy is complex. While it has significantly reduced crime and improved public safety, it has also been criticized for human rights abuses and the potential imprisonment of innocent people.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: CECOT: The Alcatraz of Latin America](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YDr-sud_oV4)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cb/Nayib_Bukele_durante_una_visita_al_CECOT.jpg) by Casa Presidencial / openverse, cc0.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Central Asian Region Where People Can&apos;t Stop Fighting...</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/central-asian-region-people-cant-stop-fighting</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/central-asian-region-people-cant-stop-fighting</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Have you ever been to Central Asia?

If so, you may have visited the beautiful Uzbek cities of Samarkand and Bukhara, critical former constituents of the historical Silk Road. You may perhaps have seen the Tian Shen mountain range, which bedecks much of modern-day Kyrgyzstan. Or, you may have spent time in Kazakhstan&apos;s cosmopolitan city of Almaty, or other scenic sites within the vast Kazakh steppe.

The republics of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan have much else to offer other than this—as do other nearby countries of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. However, there are relatively fewer people who will have visited the latter two. Tajikistan has battled significant instability in recent years and Turkmenistan, well… it&apos;s just rather hard to get in.

But even in the more touristic countries of central Asia, there is a region which straddles several of these which you, also, may not have visited—in spite of its rich beauty.

This is the Fergana Valley, a glorious region of peaks and rivers, and one which has been the site of pitched battles between the multiple ethnicities who inhabit it.

Let&apos;s take a look.

## The Central Asian Melting Pot

So before we dive into the Fergana and its surrounding regions—as well the troubles long brewing there—it is important to expand a little on the context alluded to in the introduction.

The region of Central Asia is generally defined as the five neighbouring countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan—each of them former republics of the Soviet Union. All are nation-states named for the single largest ethnicity residing there, with the Kazakhs, Turkmen, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz respectively all belonging to the wider Turkic ethnic umbrella, with the Tajiks being Persian speakers with ethnic links to the Pashtuns and the Kurds. But the five countries&apos; populations are very far from uniform—each one having significant minorities of one or another ethnicity residing within their borders.

Of all these, it is Turkmenistan which is the most homogenous. It has about seven and a half million people, of whom 85% are ethnic Turkmen, with the proportion rising over time due to the sealed nature of the state. Turkmenistan is a dictatorship, and one of the world&apos;s most closed-off societies—welcoming only around 14,000 tourists in 2019. Meanwhile, Tajikistan is thought to be the second-most homogenous, with ethnic Tajiks constituting about 86% of its 10 million-strong population, according to the most recent census. It is also thought that almost as many Tajiks may be living in Uzbekistan—although this has been, controversially, been long-contested by the Uzbek government—which claims less than 2 million ethnic Tajik citizens. Curiously, the absolute highest number of Tajiks actually lives in neither country but in nearby Afghanistan, where they may constitute more than a quarter of its vast population of 42 million.

Anyway, while Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are relatively homogeneous, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are not. All three have large so-called European populations (mostly Russians and Ukrainians), who arrived during the Soviet Era and remained after independence. In all three countries, this amounts to hundreds of thousands of people—with the single-highest proportion in Kazakhstan, where its European population is as high as 25% of the population of 20 million, and a majority in its northernmost regions. Kazakhstan also has around 600,000 Uzbeks, as well as smaller populations of Uyghurs, Tatars, Azerbaijanis and others. Kyrgyzstan, the smallest country at 5.5 million inhabitants, is no less diverse than its neighbours. Its single-largest minority is the Uzbeks—at around 1 million people—who make up around 15% of the entire population. But it is Uzbekistan—the largest country of all at 30 million inhabitants—where the ethnic mix reaches an incomparable scale. In addition to millions upon millions of Tajiks, it has about 800,000 Kazakhs, around 750,000 Russians, some 750,000 Karakalpaks (in the autonomous region of Karakalpakstan) and communities of Turkmens, Kyrgyz, Tatars, and Koreans each several hundred thousand strong.

Now, you may be inclined to think—given the great diversity and historic ties between all three—that these communities would have largely good relations with one another.

….No.

Though it varies from place to place, interethnic relations in some parts of Central Asia have been fraught with tension. In some parts, this has spilled into brutal ethnic conflict.

And perhaps nowhere more so than in the lowlands of the lush Fergana Valley.

## The Fergana Valley

Now, to understand exactly why the Fergana Valley would be the epicentre of inharmonious ethnic relations, it is important to—at first—understand the aforementioned ethnic circumstances.

…but you could also just look at a map, which would give you a pretty clear picture on its own.

In looking at a relief map, you&apos;d see the endless folds of the Central Asian mountains punctuated by one fairly uninterrupted piece of low terrain right in the middle. Unlike the surrounding parched mountains, the valley is fertile and hospitable to farming: something which also contrasts it with the arid expanses of the steppe, subject to dry weather and a powerful desertifying wind known as the Sukhovey. The valley owes its fertility to the presence of two rivers, the Naryn and the Kara Darya, which run from the east and reach a confluence near the Uzbek city of Namangan, forming the Syr Darya which in turn runs north into Kazakhstan and the Aral Sea. The region&apos;s fertility allows for cotton cultivation—which is the biggest industry in Uzbekistan and a significant industry also in other countries. The valley also contains some known oil reserves, produces a diverse yield of grains, fruits, and vegetables, and offers a viable region for stock breeding and mineral mining. Without doubt, it represents one of the most important economic areas in all of Central Asia.

Secondly, and perhaps just as importantly, if you were to look at a territorial map of Central Asia, you&apos;d see generally clearly-defined borders everywhere except around the Fergana, where border lines seem to make little-or-no sense.

The valley lies mostly within the borders of Uzbekistan, incorporating parts of three different administrative regions with a collective population of 10 million people. But the Fergana also includes the Tajik region of Sughd—a province with (on its own) about 2.5 million residents. And there are no less than four Kyrgyz provinces which lie at least partially in the valley—including the major cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, the second- and third-biggest cities in Kyrgyzstan respectively. If all that weren&apos;t enough, one of the Kyrgyz regions in the Fergana is its southern salient of Batken, which is a multiethnic area containing one of the most complicated territorial patchworks of anywhere in the world. The Batken region contains no less than six enclaves, or portions of territory located entirely in Kyrgyzstan but belonging to a different country. Four of those six belong to Uzbekistan, and two to Tajikistan. And just for good measure, there is yet another enclave belonging to Tajikistan in the valley, but this one—Sarvan—is located further north, and within the borders of Uzbekistan.

So amidst all this boundary confusion in the Fergana, who actually lives there? Well in short, just about everyone.

Although the estimated 13 million-strong population of Fergana is principally home to Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks, it also contains significant populations of Uyghurs, Tatars, Turks, Russians, and many others.

And relations between ethnicities aren&apos;t very relaxed.

## Yet Another Soviet Mess

As you might have expected, a lot of this geographical messiness—just like in many other parts of Asia and Europe—can be traced back to Soviet-era population transfers.

As if the demographic configuration of the Fergana Valley and Central Asia wasn&apos;t already complicated enough before the 20th century, the USSR under Stalin made things even more so by uprooting large populations from elsewhere and dumping them into Central Asia as either a punishment, containment mechanism, or a sort of indentured workforce. As a result, large numbers of Chechens, Ingush, Germans, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Greeks, and Turks wound up in various parts of the wider region. While many of these found themselves in the underpopulated expanses of the Kazakh steppe, some also ended up in the Fergana Valley. And this—like many other population transfers—would lead to problems.

In fact, even before the transfers, Stalin had introduced a series of measures which equally led to chaos down the line. As the Soviet People&apos;s Commissar for Nationalities between 1917 and 1923, he was charged with delineating the boundaries of various constituent republics of the USSR. This he did with characteristic scant regard for circumstances on the ground, prioritising—above all—the interests of the state above the delicate social balance in parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Fergana Valley, being the most central, most diverse, and most populous part of the Central Asian region, represented a major worry for Stalin—who feared that disloyalty to the state might fester there if not strictly controlled. And so the capitals of the newly-established Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics would be specifically designated as locations located safely away from the confines of the valley.

Uzbekistan&apos;s capital—previously the Silk Road city of Samarkand, located west of the Fergana—was switched to the northern city of Tashkent in 1930. It remained as such throughout the entire Soviet Era and afterwards, even though Tashkent was blitzed to smithereens by a powerful earthquake in 1966. Elsewhere, the capital of the Kazakh SSR was set as the city of Alma-Ata (now simply Almaty) in 1929, located several hundred kilometres from the Fergana at the foot of the Alatau mountains. And when the Kirghiz SSR was established in 1936, its capital became the city of Frunze (since renamed as Bishkek)—similarly located on the other side of rugged mountain ranges and a cosy 200 kilometres from the other major Soviet power base in nearby Almaty.

Another tactic of the Soviet leadership was to redraw territorial boundaries all across the USSR—something which notably led to war with Finland in the late 1930s, and havoc in parts of the southern Caucasus at both ends of the 20th century. Well, Central Asia was not much different. In the 1920s, the Tajik SSR emerged from Uzbekistan, with its newly-established region of Sughd cutting straight through the Fergana, and isolating it from cities such as Samarkhand, Bukhara, and Jizzakh. At the time, Moscow was labouring to suppress anti-Soviet uprisings which were largely centred there—especially the notorious Basmachi Rebellion, which lasted throughout the entire 1920s. The addition of the Sughd region also meant that the Fergana was inaccessible even from the Uzbek capital Tashkent without transgressing through Tajik territory, unless done via the narrow and mountainous region of Namangan, which contained precious few roads, with multiple bottlenecks that could easily be blockaded or blown up if required.

Somehow, Soviet meddling didn&apos;t end there. In the early part of the 20th century, the Fergana Valley was home to yet another group of people, an obscure ethnicity collectively referred to by Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomads as the Sarts. These spoke a tongue somewhat similar to the Uyghur language, and which was by-and-large incomprehensible to the nearby Uzbeks in spite of several common features of both cultures. But in the 1920s, the Soviets decided not to waste any more time in figuring out who exactly this ethnicity were, and simply labelled them Uzbeks. The community assimilated in the following years, and the term Sart took on a pejorative, insulting personality—especially when used by the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs against external ethnicities.

With time, and especially during the Second World War, the USSR continued to send undesirable populations to live in the Fergana—as well as rather more desirable populations such as Russians and Ukrainians: who were seen as loyal to the Soviet ascendancy and unlikely to partake in any new rabble-rousing against the centralised system. Some of the smaller ethnicities of the region, however, became the subject of festering resentment due to their perceived economic prosperity and higher social status.

This included newly-arrived Turks and long-established communities of Jews, who would become the subject of xenophobic targeting as the years of the Soviet Era drew to a close.

## The Violence Erupts

In 1989, the USSR was on the brink of unravelling. As it faltered, long-suppressed ethnic tensions across the union began to explode. And in the Fergana Valley, populations long harbouring antipathy for one another wasted no time in getting stuck right into communal violence.

Over the course of only nine days in June 1989, the region saw its first episode of wanton brutality, with what became known as the Fergana Massacre. Uzbek youths went on a rampage which resulted in the destruction of around 1,000 properties, and the deaths of 107 people. The targets of the unrest were Meskhetian Turks, a subgroup of Turkish people who&apos;d previously inhabited the region of Meskheti in Stalin&apos;s home country of Georgia. These were shipped to Central Asia—like many others—on the Soviet leader&apos;s orders in 1944. But also targeted were the Bukharian Jews—a small, Persian-speaking group who&apos;d inhabited the Fergana Valley for many centuries. In the wake of the massacre, and as the Soviet Union began to come apart at the seams, emigration by the Jews to Israel took off at pace. Sensing instability and local resentment, ethnic Russians also began to migrate back to Russia. The Turks, for their part, left the Fergana for safer pastures in Turkey, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere in Central Asia. After Georgia became independent in 1991, calls were made to repatriate the community back to Meskheti. Georgia said no.

Back in Fergana, the violence was not over. In fact, it was only getting started. And this time, it was the Uzbeks who&apos;d be the targets—only a handful of kilometres away, but across a state border in the Kyrgyz province of Osh.

The Osh region, composed largely of a Kyrgyz majority and large Uzbek minority, had also seen simmering nationalism rise as the USSR waned. In June 1990, disputes between the principal ethnic groups erupted into two days of runaway, bloody mayhem. Pitched battles between civilians spread rapidly across the region, as state security forces effectively collapsed and their members simply joined the violence alongside their respective kin. The border was shut to prevent Uzbeks from crossing and joining the melée alongside their brethren, and pillaging and sacking of settlements began to take place. In some parts of the countryside, Kyrgyz herders stormed across territory on horseback to ransack nearby Uzbek villages. The riots led to a state of emergency which lasted several months—and by the end, officials estimated that around 300 people had been killed, mostly ethnic Uzbeks. This was, however, almost certainly an extreme undercount. Unofficial estimates suggested a figure of several thousand—and possibly as high as 10,000—dead due to the brutal violence.

The events impacted gravely on interethnic relations in the region. The 1990 Osh Riots would live long in the memory of the local Uzbeks—whose lingering outrage at the violence and the response of Kyrgyz authorities would play a role in what would follow years later.

## Peace? No.

In the years after both the Fergana Massacre and the Osh Riots, a tense peace largely seemed to reign.

But all was not well. The suppressing influence of the communist system had allowed ethnic tension to fester but not be released. With this system now abandoned, nationalism rose, and drifted across the hamfisted state boundaries to infect mixed regions of the Fergana. Many ethnicities, sensing the danger, began to abandon their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. Others sought a replacement unifying ideology—which some found in Islamic Fundamentalism.

With time, Islamist groups in the post-Soviet Central Asian space emerged, and this would lead to another major episode of violence in 1999. That year, hundreds of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan militants seized villages in Kyrgyzstan in order to launch attacks into Uzbekistan proper, before being counterattacked by Kyrgyz authorities, leading to scores of deaths and massive displacement.

Tajikistan, for its part, seemed to remain untouched by the ethnic violence—but only because a full-blown Civil War had erupted between the government and an Islamist-dominated opposition in 1992. The Civil War lasted seven years, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths, and the mass migration of many of Tajikistan&apos;s minorities—including the Russians, who dwindled from a height of 388,000 in 1989 to less than 70,000 in 2000.

Back in the Fergana Valley, in 2005, protests erupted in the Uzbek city of Andijan in response to claims of state corruption, economic instability, authoritarianism and police brutality. But security forces, in an act which did little to prove the protests misguided, opened fire on the crowds—who they claimed were supported by members of the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan and the fundamentalist organisation Hizb Ut-Tahrir. Several hundred died, in what became known as the Andijan Massacre.

Amidst all this, ethnic tensions spiralled further. Back in Osh, Uzbek outrage at their community&apos;s fate in 1990 had not diminished—and was likely only contained by the threat of a new Kyrgyz state crackdown. But when President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted in April 2010, the region dived headfirst into another episode of ferocious interethnic strife. On this occasion, Uzbekistan acted quickly to carry out a limited troop incursion in Kyrgyzstan, but soon withdrew to allow Uzbek refugees to flee inwards. The 2010 riots killed nearly 420 people, again mostly Uzbeks—but also local populations of Uyghurs, Russians, Turks, and Dungans (a Chinese-speaking Muslim minority). Thousands of houses were torched, and some 80,000 people were displaced—amidst a string of abductions, forced disappearances, and torture allegations. Human Rights Watch detailed disproportionate arrests of Uzbeks in the wake of the events, as well as the ill-treatment and deaths in custody of several young detainees. And once again, although only 420 people were reported dead, unofficial estimates put the figure much higher—at around 2,000 total fatalities.

## The Tensions Live On

In the period since, interethnic tension along the margins of the Fergana Valley have not much improved—if anything, communal violence has been the only consistent theme, amidst a string of state captures and internal instability.

By the late 2020s, cross-border conflicts erupted once more, on this occasion between the Kyrgyz and Tajik populations in contested border areas of the south Fergana. The checkerboard region of Batken became the epicentre of the strife, as both countries accused one another of border trespasses and provocative military exercises in, or close to, the territory of the other. The year 2021 saw border clashes erupt which claimed the lives of several dozen Kyrgyz and Tajik civilians. The following year saw yet another episode of similar violence, with 100 more deaths and yet more displacement of populations. Other than territorial concerns, much of the violence came to centre on the region&apos;s much-desired central resource—water—hotly contested by several countries due to its much-needed supply in the parched environs of the region&apos;s perimeter. And the resulting antipathy began to spread to other parts of each country as well.

Most recently, in 2024, anti-foreigner riots broke all the way north in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, sparked by a dispute between locals and a group of Egyptian students. The violence increased, causing several countries to pull their citizens out of Kyrgyzstan, and leading to condemnation by the foreign governments including Egypt and Pakistan.

Today, the tensions remain—as do lingering cross-border raids and civilian clashes, which constantly risk erupted once more into wider violence across the divided portions of both the Fergana Valley and the Wider Central Asian region.

And what was set in motion by the haphazard restructuring of the region, punctuated by centuries-old rivalries, resentment, and hostility, may be unlikely to abate anytime soon.

## Key Takeaways

- The Fergana Valley is a fertile region in Central Asia, crucial for agriculture and resources, but plagued by ethnic tensions.
- Ethnic diversity in Central Asia is high, with significant minorities in each country, leading to complex interethnic relations.
- Soviet-era policies, including forced population transfers and arbitrary border drawing, exacerbated ethnic tensions in the Fergana Valley.
- The Fergana Valley has experienced multiple episodes of violent ethnic conflict since the late 1980s, driven by historical grievances and resource disputes.
- Despite attempts at peace, ethnic tensions in the Fergana Valley persist, with ongoing border conflicts and communal violence.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What countries make up the Central Asia region?

The Central Asia region is generally defined as the five neighboring countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.

### Which Central Asian country is the most homogeneous?

Turkmenistan is the most homogeneous, with about 85% of its population being ethnic Turkmen.

### What is the Fergana Valley known for?

The Fergana Valley is known for its rich beauty, fertile land, and significant economic importance due to its agricultural and mineral resources. However, it is also known for being a site of pitched battles between multiple ethnicities.

### What are some of the major ethnic groups in the Fergana Valley?

The Fergana Valley is principally home to Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks, but it also contains significant populations of Uyghurs, Tatars, Turks, Russians, and many others.

### What historical events contributed to the ethnic tensions in the Fergana Valley?

Soviet-era population transfers and boundary redrawing, as well as long-standing ethnic rivalries and resentments, have contributed to the ethnic tensions in the Fergana Valley.

### What was the Fergana Massacre?

The Fergana Massacre occurred in June 1989, where Uzbek youths rampaged, resulting in the destruction of around 1,000 properties and the deaths of 107 people, primarily targeting Meskhetian Turks and Bukharian Jews.

### What happened during the Osh Riots in 1990?

The Osh Riots in 1990 involved two days of violent clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups in the Kyrgyz province of Osh, resulting in an estimated 300 to 10,000 deaths, mostly ethnic Uzbeks.

### What was the Andijan Massacre?

The Andijan Massacre occurred in 2005 when security forces opened fire on protesters in the Uzbek city of Andijan, resulting in several hundred deaths. The protests were in response to claims of state corruption, economic instability, authoritarianism, and police brutality.

### What recent conflicts have occurred in the Fergana Valley?

In the late 2020s, cross-border conflicts erupted between Kyrgyz and Tajik populations in contested border areas of the south Fergana, with clashes in 2021 and 2022 resulting in dozens of deaths and displacement of populations.

### What is the current state of ethnic tensions in the Fergana Valley?

The tensions remain, with lingering cross-border raids and civilian clashes that constantly risk erupting into wider violence across the divided portions of both the Fergana Valley and the wider Central Asian region.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Central Asian Region Where People Can&apos;t Stop Fighting...](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dL88Vb9W3ek)
- [https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/turkmenistan](https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/turkmenistan)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batken_Region#/media/File:Enclaves_in_Kyrgyzstan_EN.png](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batken_Region#/media/File:Enclaves_in_Kyrgyzstan_EN.png)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarvan,_Tajikistan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarvan,_Tajikistan)
- [https://cooper-thomas.com/a-tale-of-two-cities/](https://cooper-thomas.com/a-tale-of-two-cities/)
- [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/02/central-asian-violence-spurs-russian-exodus/5d6c8615-6091-4767-99c3-6a541ead6697/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/02/central-asian-violence-spurs-russian-exodus/5d6c8615-6091-4767-99c3-6a541ead6697/)
- [https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/08/16/where-justice/interethnic-violence-southern-kyrgyzstan-and-its-aftermath](https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/08/16/where-justice/interethnic-violence-southern-kyrgyzstan-and-its-aftermath)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Namangan_Region](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Namangan_Region)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sughd_Region](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sughd_Region)
- [https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/hrw/1999/en/23014](https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/hrw/1999/en/23014)
- [https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/08/16/where-justice/interethnic-violence-southern-kyrgyzstan-and-its-aftermath](https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/08/16/where-justice/interethnic-violence-southern-kyrgyzstan-and-its-aftermath)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Kyrgyzstan%E2%80%93Tajikistan_clashes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Kyrgyzstan%E2%80%93Tajikistan_clashes)
- [https://www.rferl.org/a/Why_Is_The_Ferghana_Valley_A_Tinderbox_For_Violence/2074849.html](https://www.rferl.org/a/Why_Is_The_Ferghana_Valley_A_Tinderbox_For_Violence/2074849.html)
- [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62950787](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62950787)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tourism_in_Turkmenistan#:~:text=Tourism%20is%20a%20small%20industry,over%2014%2C000%20visitors%20in%202019](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tourism_in_Turkmenistan#:~:text=Tourism%20is%20a%20small%20industry,over%2014%2C000%20visitors%20in%202019)
- [https://minorityrights.org/communities/tajiks-2/](https://minorityrights.org/communities/tajiks-2/)
- [https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/sarts](https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/sarts)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/52/Osh_bazaar%2C_Bishkek%2C_Central_Asia_%282025%29.jpg) by Petar Milošević / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>China&apos;s Rotting Mansion Cities.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/chinas-rotting-mansion-cities</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/chinas-rotting-mansion-cities</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Million-dollar mansions decorated with marble floors, crystal chandeliers, and grand spiral staircases. Near Shanghai, an entire English market town complete with Tudor houses, Gothic churches, even those iconic red telephone booths. A couple hours away, there&apos;s a 263-acre theme park designed to rival Disneyland Shanghai.

These are some of China&apos;s most ambitious construction developments. They&apos;re also completely empty.

Cattle now graze between the luxury mansions in Thames Town. Wedding photographers outnumber residents in the fake English village. Beijing has 20% of its housing stock sitting empty while tiny apartments cost a fortune. China has built 65 to 80 million vacant homes—enough to shelter the entire population of Germany—while millions struggle to find affordable housing.

But the numbers only tell part of the story. Behind these ghost cities are real people trapped in a broken system. Elvis Fan, a programmer in Guangzhou, risks losing his prospective marriage as he can&apos;t afford a downpayment on an apartment. Chen from Zhengzhou has been paying a mortgage for a decade on a building that was never completed. Ms. Xu lives in an unfinished apartment with no running water, carrying bottles up flights of stairs daily because she sunk everything into this apartment.

This is what happens when real estate stops being about homes and becomes pure financial speculation. When government officials get promoted for hitting GDP targets regardless of whether anyone actually needs what they&apos;re building. When an entire country mistakes construction for prosperity.

## Journey Through the Phantom Cities

Our first stop on our tour through China&apos;s most expensive mistakes is in the outskirts of Shenyang, where we have 260 European-style mansions—each one cost over $850,000 to build. Marble floors, crystal chandeliers, grand spiral staircases… the stuff of the rich and famous you see in movies.

But something&apos;s not quite right here. Are those… cattle grazing between the mansions?

The deeper we go, the more surreal it becomes. Roads designed for Bentleys and Ferraris have been turned into vegetable patches by local farmers. The houses sit completely empty, many never even finished. Those that were have sheets of dust covering expensive leather furniture, imported from Italy, that no one has ever used.

Welcome to the State Guest Mansions—a $238 million luxury retreat built for China&apos;s elite to escape from the congestion and hecticness that is so many of China&apos;s largest cities. Construction began in 2010 but came to a halt less than two years later, leaving a quarter-billion dollar ghost town where cattle wander through what were supposed to be ornate gardens.

If this seems bizarre, we don&apos;t blame you. But here in China, this is just the start of what truly has become the largest misallocation of capital in history.

Drive southeast, and you&apos;ll arrive at Thames Town—a perfect replica of an English market town, complete with Tudor styled homes, cobblestone streets, Gothic churches, and even those iconic red telephone boxes. Statues of Winston Churchill and William Shakespeare stand guard over empty streets. The local fish and chips shop was modeled after the original in Lyme Regis. There&apos;s even a replica of Bristol&apos;s Christ Church. Developers spent over $700 million creating this fantasy with details so perfect you&apos;d forget you were in China.

Originally built for 10,000 residents, Thames Town is less than 25% occupied today. Its primary occupants? Wedding photographers, who have built quite a business for themselves: the town has become a hot spot destination for soon-to-be-married couples who want exotic photos without leaving the country.

Drive northeast to Tianjin, and you&apos;ll see something even more audacious: the Yujiapu Financial District, a $30 billion attempt to make something of a Chinese Manhattan. Complete with skyscrapers that mimic New York&apos;s most famous buildings and a high-speed rail station connecting the city to Beijing in under an hour, Yujiapu was ambitious to say the least.

The problem here is that the designers got ahead of themselves with the scale of the district—and just a little. Three quarters of office space sits empty. Construction has stopped on many buildings entirely, and many destination sites—such as their would-be enormous mall and IMAX theater—are closed, permanently.

But perhaps nothing captures the scale of this ambition and failure quite like Evergrande&apos;s Cultural Tourism City. Sprawling across 263 acres in Jiangsu province, this wasn&apos;t just a theme park—it was a vision of the future. The project was staggering in its scope: Evergrande wanted to rival Disneyland Shanghai, complete with elaborate rides, themed attractions, and fairy-tale castles that would draw millions of visitors annually. Or so they hoped.

This was just one of fifteen planned &quot;Evergrande Fairyland&quot; projects across the country, part of the company&apos;s $67 billion tourism industry. Each was designed to serve a different region, creating a tourist attraction throughout lesser-visited parts of the country.

Except, like so much else throughout the country, this never materialized. Evergrande defaulted on over $300 billion in debt in 2021, construction stopped on all of their Fairyland projects throughout the country. Today, aerial footage shows the Cultural Tourism City being reclaimed by vegetation, completely abandoned.

These aren&apos;t isolated failures. Across China, you can drive for hours through entire cities with little to no signs of life. We&apos;re talking 65 to 80 million empty homes—this is enough to fit the entire population of many countries.

These phantom cities represent the most expensive mistakes in human history. Complete with water systems, power grids, and internet cables, all built to serve populations that never came. Fifty major developments sit in various stages of abandonment and ruin, monuments to ambition that simply outpaced reality.

## How China Broke Housing

So. How does a country end up here? You don&apos;t just wake up one day to find entire cities virtually empty with enough empty housing units to fit the entire population of Germany. This was a crisis decades in the making—the result of a system that broke itself through bad incentives, a relentless focus on growth at all costs, cultural factors that added fuel to the fire, and a government too hesitant to step in before it all went south.

The roots of China&apos;s housing crisis stretch back to 1994, when Beijing implemented &quot;tax sharing reform,&quot; centralizing revenue collection in the capital at the expense of local governments. While much of this is redistributed according to where the central government believes it is best spent, this starved many local governments of much-needed revenue used for day to day operations such as schools, hospitals, and other basic services.

They needed new revenue sources, and fast. One alternative solution presented itself in the form of leasing land: all land in China is officially owned by the state, but it can be leased out to private developers for periods of time. What&apos;s more, the local governments are the ones who do the leasing and keep 100% of the proceeds. This created a simple equation: the more land they sold, and the higher the price, the more money they made.

By the early 2000s, leasing land had become the backbone of local government revenue, accounting for an estimated 60 to 80 percent of their income. In order to maximize this cash flow, officials had strong incentives to drive up the value of the land that they were leasing out—often through large-scale infrastructure projects, regardless of their actual need. A plot of land with a mall and a school was inherently more valuable than an empty plot, even if nobody used it.

This is where the system really went off the rails. Chinese officials were evaluated primarily on economic growth they achieved in their jurisdictions, measured by Gross Domestic Product, almost to the exclusion of everything else including common sense. Miss your GDP targets, and you can kiss that promotion goodbye. Consistently underperform your peers, and you can pack your bags.

Construction became the solution for ambitious officials. Every road paved, every apartment building erected, every shopping mall built directly boosted GDP figures. Whether anyone would actually use these buildings was entirely beside the point—build it and they will come, they said.

In addition to the government&apos;s direct infrastructure investments, Chinese economic policy further incentivized individuals and families to prioritize property above all else. While home ownership had long been a major source of importance in traditional society, the government&apos;s strict capital controls and extremely low interest rate policies made alternative forms of investment difficult at best and unprofitable at worst. The domestic stock market, which is dominated by state-owned enterprises which prioritize political goals rather than returns for the shareholders, has barely kept pace with inflation. In an age of super-easy lending requirements and ultra-low interest rates, savings accounts returned almost nothing.

So, what was left? Property. It became the only viable option for Chinese citizens who wanted any real return on their money. By 2020, Chinese households had 70 percent of their wealth tied up in real estate. Families didn&apos;t just buy these to live in, either: they frequently were buying second and third properties, and held them long-term like stocks. There is a sharp drop off in value for houses and apartments that have already been lived in, which only exacerbated the issue: many of the units that served as investment vehicles weren&apos;t rented out at all, as it was more lucrative for families long-term to let them sit empty.

This led to staggering vacancy rates. In Beijing, China&apos;s most expensive city, almost 20% of the housing stock sits empty.

In fairness to the government—which nevertheless still retains the lion share of the burden for this crisis by allowing it to escalate to this level—there were other, more deeply-rooted factors at play, too. In Chinese culture, property ownership is seen as nothing short of a prerequisite for marriage. Men frequently need to &quot;win permission&quot; from their would-be-bride&apos;s parents for permission to go through with the marriage, which often centers around the expectation of homeownership.

Making this factor even more crucial—and further extending the property-driven madness—is the demographic crisis that&apos;s been the result of China&apos;s one-child policy. Given the relatively widespread traditional preference for a family to have a son to carry on their lineage—especially if they can have only one child—many used ultrasounds to determine their unborn child&apos;s sex, with abortion being widespread if it was a girl.

The scale of this gender selection was massive: demographers estimate that between 1980 and 2010, approximately 23 million girls were &quot;missing&quot; from China&apos;s population due to sex-selective abortions—as well as female infanticide. China now has roughly 30 to 40 million more men than women. For millions of Chinese men, particularly in rural areas, the math simply means they will never find a wife. For those who throw their hat in the ring of this skewed marriage market, it further ramps up the expectations for getting married. Families have begun regularly going into debt to help their sons buy an apartment, knowing that without property ownership, finding a spouse would be next to impossible.

Elvis Fan, a 27 year old programmer in Guangzhou, learned this firsthand. He and his long-time girlfriend wanted to get married, but her parents made it clear that he would have to have property of his own to win their blessing. Unfortunately, his salary was not enough to afford a downpayment, even in the relatively cheaper areas around him.

Faced with this daunting math, he turned to his parents. They would have to sell their own apartment to support their son&apos;s prospects. &quot;I once thought about giving up my relationship with my girlfriend,&quot; he admitted. &quot;But I feel that if I give up, I would feel as if I had given up on my goal.&quot;

The situation is much worse in rural areas. Yiguo Jin lives in a rural village of less than 300 people, where 68 of them are bachelors. Unlike Elvis, he can&apos;t turn to his parents for financial support, and his lack of higher education offers little prospect of leaving his farming village. At 33, he has resigned himself to never marrying.

In a society where marriage and homeownership are so deeply intertwined, this gender imbalance has intensified the already extreme pressure on families to purchase property. The result? China&apos;s property market isn&apos;t just driven by investment speculation—it&apos;s fueled by demographic desperation.

By 2010, the government had created a monster it couldn&apos;t control. Real estate and related industries contributed to 25 to 30 percent of China&apos;s GDP. Construction employed tens of millions of workers. Steel, cement, and other building materials became China&apos;s largest industrial sectors. Between 2011 and 2013, China consumed more concrete than the United States did during the entire 20th century.

## Trapped in a Broken System

Looking at economic figures and eerie ghost cities, it&apos;s easy to forget that this isn&apos;t some academic exercise. Behind every failed development is a real person or family. We&apos;re not being hyperbolic when we say this has literally destroyed lives.

Take Chen, a man in his mid-30s from Zhengzhou. In 2015, he did what millions of young Chinese do: he scraped together enough money for a down payment on an apartment. His entire life savings, combined with money from his parents, all went toward his future home.

A decade on, Chen is still waiting. His apartment exists only on paper—the developer took his money through China&apos;s widespread presale system, began construction, only to run out of cash and walked away. Chen has been trapped in something few can imagine: paying a mortgage, with interest, on a building that doesn&apos;t exist.

&quot;I&apos;m already dead in a social sense,&quot; he told reporters a few years ago. &quot;My life is destroyed.&quot; Without property ownership, Chen puts his chances of getting married and starting a family at almost zero. At 35, he has watched his friends and colleagues move on with their lives while he remains frozen, legally bound to a phantom apartment.

Chen isn&apos;t alone—far from it. An estimated 20 million people across China are paying mortgages on unfinished homes. In Shijiazhuang, a 38 year old woman lost $350,000—her family&apos;s entire financial future—on two presold Evergrande apartments that were never completed.

And then there&apos;s cases like Ms. Xu, who has moved into her unfinished apartment because she lacked any alternative. At 55, she&apos;s hardly living how many would aspire their early retirement years to look like: holes where electric sockets should be, no gas or running water. Every day, she has to bring large bottles down multiple flights of stairs to fetch water for her house from a hose outside the building, only to lug them back up the same stairs.

&quot;All the family&apos;s savings were invested in this house,&quot; she told the media. She lives in the building with about 20 others, who collectively share a makeshift toilet outdoors. She had originally purchased the apartment for her son, with the hope that it would allow him to start a family.

When Evergrande, the now infamous property developer that was the first of its size to go belly-up in 2021, it revealed the true scale of China&apos;s housing fraud. The company had liabilities exceeding $300 billion—larger than the GDP of many countries. But the numbers tell only part of the story.

Evergrande alone left over 800,000 pre sold homes unfinished. Eight hundred thousand families had paid deposits they had worked their entire lives to save up and, in many cases, borrowed from family to put together. These were not whimsical purchases, but likely the biggest purchase they would make in their life.

With this pre sold house system, the company operated essentially as a Ponzi scheme disguised as real estate: sell apartments before building them, use those deposits to fund other projects, then sell more apartments to make up the difference. This system worked perfectly fine—so long as property prices kept rising, so long as new buyers kept lining up, and so long as interest rates remained low.

When all these stopped, the scheme collapsed in a way that makes the 2008 U.S. housing crisis look tame by comparison. Some families, out of options, have moved into unfinished buildings. After years of exposure to the elements, many interiors have begun to rot. Others continue paying their mortgages for homes that may never be completed.

Perhaps the most unusual aspect of all this, as well the cruelest twist for those caught up in it, is that China has built millions of surplus homes they cannot fill, while many are locked out of a home altogether. They suffer the most unique combination of simultaneous over-saturation and underproduction that we at Places have ever seen.

This paradox exists because of China&apos;s unique circumstances. When someone owns an empty apartment in Beijing, which they hold as an investment vehicle that they refuse to rent out, they have no incentive to sell—prices have taken a nosedive in recent years. Selling would lock in those losses, prevent any future recovery, and leave them with cash—something very difficult to get a return on.

Meanwhile, there are entire cities only 10-20% occupied where apartments would be cheaper for young professionals. But what good is a cheaper apartment halfway across the country, when your job is in Beijing or Shanghai?

This is a geographic mismatch of epic proportions that traps everyone. Young professionals spend upwards of 60 percent, sometimes even 80 percent of their income renting tiny apartments in major cities, often sharing single rooms. It hasn&apos;t quite reached the level of &quot;coffin apartments&quot; that has plagued Hong Kong—spaces barely larger than a bed—but the trend is moving in that direction. Meanwhile, luxury towers stand kilometers away, their units empty, mocking those looking on.

Even the developers who built these phantom cities find themselves with few options. They can&apos;t slash prices too dramatically without triggering bankruptcy. Land costs, construction loans, and overhead expenses that racked up over the years are simply too high.

For those watching wondering why anyone should shed tears for these companies—well, you&apos;re right. We shouldn&apos;t. But we also have to be clear-eyed about the ramifications of the fallout from more developer bankruptcies. Remember our friend Chen, who had put his life savings into an apartment and is still waiting ten years on? That&apos;s the fallout from that—it&apos;s not good for anyone.

This whole scandal has broken a core pillar of the Chinese social contract. Families who thought they were securing their children&apos;s future by helping them buy their first home put it all on the table and walked away with nothing. Social mobility—which had become a core promise of China&apos;s economic miracle—has become an illusion for millions trapped in this broken system.

## Fighting a Losing Battle

Faced with the largest housing crisis in modern history, the Chinese government could ignore the problem no longer by 2021. Gone are the days of unrestricted GDP growth at all costs, where construction was the only thing that mattered. Over the last several years, Beijing has steadily been upping its game on this issue. But, many fear that this is simply too little, too late. And on some level, their strategy still centers on the idea that they can build their way out of this mess.

When China&apos;s housing market began its spectacular collapse back in 2021, Beijing severely underestimated the scale of the problems at hand and believed it could be addressed through containment of the worst-performing companies. They rolled out limited, targeted support for completing pre sold homes, a few interest rates cuts, and quiet efforts to keep panic from spreading.

This wasn&apos;t enough. After Evergrande, Country Garden—China&apos;s largest developer—started showing signs of distress within eighteen months. Other major players weren&apos;t immune, either—with many having their credit ratings downgraded, making future borrowing even more expensive. Things spiraled when mortgage boycotts spread as families refused to pay for apartments that might never be completed. Local government revenues plummeted as land sales dried up, and construction employment took a downturn.

By May 2024, Beijing realized a gradualist approach wasn&apos;t going to cut it. This had transformed from a localized failure to economic DEFCON-1. They unveiled what state media called a &quot;historic&quot; rescue measure: $42 billion in central bank funding for a broad range of state-owned enterprises to buy unsold homes and convert them into affordable housing, slashed mortgage requirements—because how could that come back to bite anyone? —and authorized local governments to purchase properties.

To their credit, there is a certain logic to this approach: they will help clear the inventory backlog, restart the property market, remove barriers to homebuying to incentivize buying, and use resources to prevent a collapse of the enormous construction industry throughout the country.

But their numbers aren&apos;t in their favor, and it seems all but certain that they are continuing to underestimate the scale of the crisis. Goldman Sachs estimates that returning China&apos;s housing inventory to just 2018 levels would require 7.7 trillion yuan—assuming a fifty percent discount on current market prices. That&apos;s roughly 25 times the size of Beijing&apos;s current plan. Even just completing homes that developers have already pre sold would require $553 billion—more than ten times the current funding they&apos;ve allocated to the problem.

Chinese officials face genuine constraints here. Local governments remain heavily dependent on land sales for 60-80% of their revenue. They&apos;re less than eager to go in with large-scale bailouts of private developers, wanting to avoid a moral hazard of rewarding them for taking on more than they can handle. At the same time, they&apos;re worried about allowing the sector to collapse, given the social upheaval that would cause.

There have been a few bright spots. Zhengdong New Area, which had once been labeled a ghost city, has grown to over a million people after iPhone manufacturing factories moved into the area. The economic activity brought life to a city that for years had consisted of empty buildings and vacant streets.

Most cities won&apos;t be so lucky. Drive through the city of Kangbashi today, and you&apos;ll see it slowly coming to life—but only because the government forcibly relocated top-tier schools there, forcing students, staff, and professors to move. The population has grown from 30,000 to 126,000, but this is still far short of the one million originally planned.

This forced relocation strategy represents Beijing&apos;s most direct intervention in the host city problem. By moving essential services—schools, hospitals, and government offices—authorities can literally force people to populate the empty developments. It&apos;s urban planning on steroids. &quot;Build it and they will come&quot; has begun to transform into &quot;build it and make them come.&quot;

The ornate examples from earlier in our tour have not had any of these successes—they are too small to relocate a school; too expensive to buy for everyday citizens as affordable housing. Thames Town near Shanghai remains a wedding photo destination where couples visit for shoots—and then leave. Almost nobody actually lives there. The State Guest Mansions in Shenyang tell a similar story.

China&apos;s demographic reality paints a bleak future. With population and birth rates declining due to the long-enforced one-child policy, it&apos;s difficult to imagine ghost cities transforming into anything meaningful. They&apos;ll stand there, slowly crumbling, a testament to an era when China believed it could build its way out of just about anything.

Something less discussed is the maintenance of these buildings, towns, and cities. Maintenance on inhabited buildings is bad enough as is, but empty ones? Astronomical. If the heat breaks in the winter of an inhabited building, people know about it immediately. But in these abandoned towers? It might go for weeks or even months, until a pipe freezes and breaks, flooding the whole thing.

The lack of attention paid to these issues by the ghost inhabitants cause homes and buildings to decay much faster than if someone was actually living or working there. The construction quality makes the problem even worse, with cheap materials widely used and the average building designed to last only 30 to 35 years.

It should come as little surprise that ghost cities are slowly decaying into modern ruins. So-called rotten-tail buildings, as they&apos;re known in Chinese, can be found all throughout the ghost cities. China built the most expensive mistake in human history. Now, it&apos;s watching that mistake slowly crumble, one empty building at a time, while millions of families who desperately need housing remain trapped.

## Conclusion

We&apos;ve taken a journey through China&apos;s most expensive mistakes. We&apos;ve walked the cobblestone streets of Thames Town, seen the cattle grazing between quarter-billion dollar villas in the State Guest Mansions. We&apos;ve met families paying mortgages on buildings that don&apos;t exist and others living in unfinished apartments without running water.

These ghost cities reveal something crucial about the nature of housing: when homes become purely financial instruments, disconnected from the basic human need for shelter, the results are tragic.

They also expose what happens when governments create harmful incentive structures, both for the private sector and the public. Local officials here weren&apos;t rogue actors going against the system—they were doing exactly what the system had trained them and rewarded them to do. Beijing rewarded GDP growth above all else, so officials became excellent at delivering precisely that. They responded rationally to irrational incentives, and the result was a landscape of perfectly built, completely empty cities.

The human cost is staggering. In addition to the few stories we were able to touch upon, there are millions more whose struggles we can only imagine. In Beijing tonight, young Chinese citizens trying to get their life going spend 80 percent of their income on tiny rooms, while luxury towers sit empty nearby. Across the country, there are hundreds of thousands more cases like Chen, who sunk everything he had into a house that might never be built. In many rural villages, countless men have given up trying to find a partner given that mathematically it just isn&apos;t possible for many men.

China created an incredible system where families are simultaneously suffering from housing shortages and surpluses, where ghost cities crumble while millions can&apos;t afford homes, where the country that used more concrete in three years than America used all of last century managed to build everything except what people actually needed.

The most expensive lesson in modern economic history may be the simplest: homes must first and foremost be for living, not speculation. Those who ignore this basic truth do so at great peril.

China&apos;s crisis also serves as a stark warning for the rest of the world, particularly in the West. Despite vastly different systems, countries from the United States to Canada to New Zealand face their own housing crises that makes home ownership less and less likely for younger generations.

What does it say when despite all this spending, all this construction, young people globally struggle to afford basic housing? China&apos;s ghost cities may be an extreme example, but they&apos;re a warning of what happens when we lose sight of housing&apos;s fundamental purpose: providing people with places to live.

## Key Takeaways

- China has constructed 65 to 80 million vacant homes, enough to house Germany&apos;s entire population.
- Local governments in China rely heavily on land sales for revenue, leading to excessive construction.
- The Chinese government&apos;s focus on GDP growth incentivized officials to build regardless of demand.
- Many Chinese families are trapped in a broken system, paying mortgages on unfinished homes.
- The housing crisis in China highlights the dangers of prioritizing real estate speculation over actual housing needs.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What are some examples of China&apos;s empty luxury developments?

Examples include the State Guest Mansions in Shenyang, Thames Town near Shanghai, the Yujiapu Financial District in Tianjin, and Evergrande’s Cultural Tourism City in Jiangsu province.

### How many vacant homes are there in China?

China has built 65 to 80 million vacant homes, enough to shelter the entire population of Germany.

### What is the primary reason for the high number of vacant homes in China?

The high number of vacant homes is due to real estate being used for financial speculation rather than providing homes, government officials being promoted based on GDP targets, and a cultural emphasis on property ownership.

### What is the significance of property ownership in Chinese culture?

Property ownership is seen as a prerequisite for marriage in Chinese culture, with men often needing to own property to gain approval from their future in-laws.

### What is the demographic crisis in China related to property ownership?

China&apos;s one-child policy and preference for male children have led to a gender imbalance, making property ownership even more crucial for men seeking marriage.

### What are some of the consequences for individuals who have invested in unfinished properties?

Individuals like Chen from Zhengzhou have been paying mortgages for decades on properties that were never completed, leading to financial ruin and social isolation.

### What role did the government&apos;s tax sharing reform play in the housing crisis?

The 1994 tax sharing reform centralized revenue collection, starving local governments of funds and pushing them to rely on land leasing for revenue, which led to excessive construction.

### What is the current government strategy to address the housing crisis?

The government has allocated $42 billion in central bank funding for state-owned enterprises to buy unsold homes, slashed mortgage requirements, and authorized local governments to purchase properties.

### What are &apos;rotten-tail buildings&apos;?

Rotten-tail buildings are empty structures in ghost cities that decay rapidly due to lack of maintenance and poor construction quality.

### How has the housing crisis affected social mobility in China?

The housing crisis has broken a core pillar of the Chinese social contract, making it difficult for families to secure their children&apos;s future through homeownership and leading to a decline in social mobility.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: China&apos;s Rotting Mansion Cities.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K9AF6OtHtYs)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/Thame_Town_Hall.jpg) by Tom Bastin uploaded and derivative work: MrPanyGoff / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Chukotka: Russia&apos;s Most Inhospitable Region.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/chukotka-russia-most-inhospitable-region</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/chukotka-russia-most-inhospitable-region</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Today we&apos;re going to talk about a place so intolerable that you may find yourself wondering why on earth would anybody deign to live there. Let&apos;s see if it can take the crown away from a place like North Sentinel Island, which (for now) remains as the most inhospitable place you could decide to go to — they will kill you.

Now let&apos;s see how you&apos;d fare in **Chukotka: Russia&apos;s Most Inhospitable Region**.

## Introduction

Dos Vidanya comrades! Ah Russia, with your bear wrestling, your topless politicians, and your absolutely unhinged music, it&apos;s a country that feels less like a nation, and more like thousands of stereotypes wearing a trenchcoat.

But strip away the spectacle, the pageantry, the clichés and go east. Past the cities, past the roads, past everything, and you will eventually find the region of Chukotka — isolated, utterly neglected, and dying.

So how did a once-thriving bastion of Soviet industry end up with closed mines and shattered dreams?

How did a region with 10% of Russia&apos;s gold reserves end up so poor?

And why does nothing anyone does seem to make it any better?

As it turns out, the motherland isn&apos;t all that motherly.

Because for Russia&apos;s most isolated region, this is where hope goes to die.

## Chukotka the Land

Ok, so what is there to know about Chukotka? Well where do you start? Its full title is the **Chukotka Autonomous Okrug** (okrug is just a fancy Russian word meaning district) and it&apos;s one of four in all of the Russian Federation, although to the Putin regime the word &quot;autonomous&quot; doesn&apos;t always mean what we think it means — but we&apos;ll get to that later.

Russia is often seen as one continuous, homogenous country, but that couldn&apos;t be further from the truth; it&apos;s full of differing regions, oblasts, ethnic groups, languages, cultures and interesting little carve-outs. For example, despite being one of four okrugs in Russia, it&apos;s the only one not subordinate to a larger oblast (think of these like a state or a county), meaning that it effectively acts as an oblast whilst not being one.

It&apos;s also the most remote region in all of Russia, located right at the northeast tip of Siberia, about as far east as you can possibly go on Russia&apos;s mainland at least. In fact it even touches the Bering strait, meaning it&apos;s the only part of Asia that technically extends into the Western hemisphere. If you were a Russian or Soviet dissident sent to a Siberian gulag, Chukotka is the sort of place you&apos;d end up. It&apos;s cold, it&apos;s remote, and it&apos;s empty.

And you know what else? It&apos;s *big.* The region is around 737,700 kilometres squared or around 285,000 square miles, which makes it a bit bigger than *Texas.* And *everything* is bigger in Texas. If it were to become its own country tomorrow, it would be the 40th largest by land area in the entire world. That&apos;s bigger than Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Somalia just to name a few. It makes up around 3.2% of Russia&apos;s total territory, and it makes up around just under 0.5% of all land on earth.

And you&apos;d never even heard of it. But that&apos;s why we&apos;re here! You lucky people.

Chukotka has two main cities (yes in an area that size.) The capital is a port city called **Anadyr**, there&apos;s an inland city called **Bilibino** which used to have a nuclear power plant, and there&apos;s also **Pevek**, the northernmost city in all of Asia. And that&apos;s it pretty much. There are also 15 townships and 45 villages amongst its six administrative districts, but as far as major settlements you *could* call cities, it&apos;s just three. Most places this size end up with more cities than that *by accident* but not Chukotka.

And that&apos;s partly because its so remote, and partly because of its intense climate. We&apos;re talking further North than your average white walker&apos;s house. Permafrost, arctic mountainous tundra, long harsh winters, short summers, tonnes of storms, and a wind chill that could freeze a campfire in minutes are just some of the lovely holiday destination-like conditions you can expect. Winter tends to last from October to May — no that&apos;s not a joke — and snow covers large portions of the region all year round. Anything that isn&apos;t white is green, whether its tundra vegetation or some stunted forests when you travel further south. The average winter temperature (which I&apos;ll remind you is *eight months* of the year) is a frigid minus 19 degrees Celsius (that&apos;s negative two degrees Fahrenheit) – in summer the average is a scorching… eight degrees Celsius (or about 47 degrees Fahrenheit). But those storms don&apos;t arrive for no reason, Chukotka has some of the largest temperature variances between seasons in the world. The highest of highs can reach a particularly tropical 30 degrees Celsius (86 degrees Fahrenheit) but it can drop as low as negative 49 degrees Celsius (that&apos;s minus 56 degrees Fahrenheit) which is sure to give all the residents temperature-based whiplash every year.

But because its so remote its also a biodiversity hotspot. Even the name &quot;Chukotka&quot; is derived from an indigenous word meaning &quot;rich in reindeer.&quot; It&apos;s home to narwhals, grey whales, wolves, Arctic fox, Pacific walrus, brown bears, polar bears, and wolverines. But it&apos;s not the X-men you should be worried about here; it&apos;s those polar bears. According to Sergey Uvarov, a project coordinator for the WWF (that&apos;s the wildlife people, not the wrestling people) he said:

&gt; &quot;You can run into a bear when taking out the trash or taking the children to school. You might not even be able to leave home because there&apos;s a huge beast waiting by the entrance.&quot;

Polar bears have even moved into an old abandoned weather station in Chukotka, and their pictures show them looking particularly smug. Wouldn&apos;t you be? It&apos;s hard to get on the property ladder these days.

Chukotka isn&apos;t just rich in wildlife, but also natural resources. It&apos;s the leading area for gold in all of Siberia, containing 10% of all gold deposits in Russia. It also has an abundance of tin, copper, tungsten, platinum, silver, coal, oil and gas, which are central to its economy.

Time zones? Got you covered. Chukotka observes Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky Time (PETT) all year round which is 12 hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time. It&apos;s just the nine hours ahead of Moscow. It has no daylight savings, but let&apos;s be honest for a good portion of the year there&apos;s no daylight to save. The winter months see minimum sunlight, with Chukotka only experiencing 12 hours of daylight in the *entire month of December.*

Here&apos;s a fun one, Alaska&apos;s time zone is minus nine hours out from GMT, meaning that it is about 21 hours behind Chukotka, even though you could get to Alaska from there in a fraction of the time it would take to get to Moscow. In fact that&apos;s where the whole Sarah Palin quote about being able to see Russia from Alaska comes from, she&apos;s talking about Chukotka.

And she might have been exaggerating a little, but also maybe not. On the mainland the closest points of Chukotka and Alaska are about 55 miles apart. But, there are two islands in the Bering Strait known as **Big Diomede** on the Russian side, and **Little Diomede** on the American side separated by the international date line – and no that&apos;s not the number you call for your mail order Russian bride. Big and Little Diomede, also known as &quot;Tomorrow Island&quot; and &quot;Yesterday Isle&quot; are just 2.4 miles or 3.8 kilometres apart, despite being 21 hours out of sync with one another. During the winter months, sea ice actually creates a natural bridge between both islands and although travel between the two isn&apos;t allowed for geopolitical reasons, you could theoretically walk between them very easily. So thanks Chukotka for one of the strangest geographical oddities on earth.

But that&apos;s enough about the land, what about the people who make up this place? Who lives in this hostile an environment?

## Chukotka the People

Well to be honest? Almost nobody for the size of it. According to a 2021 census (we don&apos;t have more accurate data because of that war about 10 hours west of here) Chukotka has a population of around 47,490 people. For reference, that is fewer people than live in American Samoa. The tiny African island nation of Cape Verde has *ten times* that many people despite having a landmass roughly *1800 times smaller*.

Of the okrug&apos;s population, ethnic Russians make up around 54%, the indigenous Chukchi people make up about 28%, Ukrainians 3.2%, Yupiks 3.1%, the Even people make up 2.7%, the Chuvan 1.6% and everyone else is below a single percentage point. So quite a diverse region with a large indigenous population for Russia. As we said the main minority are the Chukchi people.

The Chukchi are traditionally divided into two ethnographic groups: the **Reindeer Chukchi** and the **Maritime Chukchi**. The name &quot;Chukchi&quot; are where the name Chukotka comes from, and in their language that translates to &quot;a man who is rich in reindeer,&quot; although there are also &quot;maritime&quot; Chukchi who focus more on fish. We&apos;re simplifying here because there&apos;s a lot of diverse cultural history to this region, everyone has their own names for themselves and each other, their own languages, cultures, traditions, and more. Most of the non-indigenous populations arrived during the Soviet era, but Chukotka has been experiencing something of a population drought in the last 30 years. The population has decreased by over two thirds in the last three decades due to a number of factors that we&apos;ll explain shortly. For now we just want to get across *just how remote* Chukotka really is.

Chukotka&apos;s population density is 0.06 people per square kilometre, or around 0.17 people per square mile. Let&apos;s put it this way. You all know Manhattan, right? Downtown New York, a famously busy place. It has a population of around 1.6 million people. If Manhattan had the population density of Chukotka, do you know how many people would live there? Four. Yes you heard that right, *four.*

Or look at somewhere like Mongolia, which is famously sparse of people, a place where you can not see anybody for days on end. It&apos;s even a similar region geographically, and it has *30 times* the population density of Chukotka. Or what about the Sahara Desert? one of the most notoriously inhospitable regions on the entire planet, absolute nobody lives out there its so empty. Even it has a population density that is *six times* greater than Chukotka. If you scattered every person across Chukotka evenly, they would have 15 square kilometres, or just under six square miles to themselves, equivalent to four and a half Central Parks worth of land each, with nobody else in sight.

So yeah, it&apos;s pretty empty today.

But it wasn&apos;t always as empty as it is now, Chukotka has been through a lot even in the last century, so why don&apos;t we tell you about it?

## Chukotka the Past

So people have likely lived in or traversed the region now known as Chukotka for thousands of years. In fact given how close the region is to Alaska, some of the indigenous people of Chukotka may have migrated over the now submerged Bering land bridge, which would showcase why some of the native peoples are similar to native Inuit populations in Alaska and Canada today despite being a continent apart.

But we&apos;re not going to go back quite that far, instead we&apos;ll start in the 1920s and the rise of the Soviet Union. During the decade, Vladimir Lenin promoted the policy of indigenisation, which sought to encourage the growth of indigenous languages and cultures in Russia, which included training local elites in how to govern, the official okrug of Chukotka was first created in 1930 which brought formal governance to the area for the first time.

But that all changed when Stalin came to power. Indigenisation was repressed, leaders were purged, reindeer herding was collectivised, communities were forced into state farms. The nomadic natives who roamed the region with their reindeer were forced to stay in one place. Those local had barely just been recognised as part of the Soviet Union, and they were crushed under its heel just as quickly.

Chukotka would prove vital to the USSR&apos;s military efforts during World War Two, the region was able to provide resources like tin, gold, furs, and food. It also was a strategic location for allied supplies to be flown through via Alaska. But it wasn&apos;t all sunshine (especially in a place that barely has any,) numerous mining and construction projects here were built using forced labour. What we said about gulags and Siberian exile wasn&apos;t a joke. Military bases, radar stations, and airfields would all become part of the military infrastructure here as a result.

By 1958, gold would start to be extracted on an industrial scale for the first time, which fittingly marked the start of Chukotka&apos;s golden age. And by the 1960s construction and development was happening everywhere. New mines, ore processing plants, industrials enterprises, power stations, roads, settlements, resorts, and schools were popping up all over the place. Chukotka would become a net exporter of electric power. Fuelled by its resources, the region went from strength to strength. People were encouraged to move to Chukotka and work there from what was known as the &quot;Northern Bonus&quot; – which meant salaries in Chukotka were considerably higher than the national average, and they were even higher than in other Arctic regions. Chukotka was soon awash with qualified, competent professionals who would swell the regions numbers considerably, to the extent that by the 1970s the population became majority non-indigenous.

But the good times couldn&apos;t last. Stagnation in the 80s followed, and people started to leave. In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed, and with it all of Chukotka&apos;s progress did too. As market doors were thrown open to the new Russian Federation, Chukotka suffered severe economic depression and depopulation. The incentives to move and work there were gone. Construction had come to a standstill, the mining industry that propped up the region economically completely imploded as gold mining was no longer profitable. Unemployment skyrocketed, food and fuel became scarce. Reindeer breeding was drastically reduced as the once-flourishing hunting and fur trade declined rapidly. Many settlements became totally abandoned or deserted. Healthcare and education floundered. Hospitals didn&apos;t have enough equipment, schools didn&apos;t have enough textbooks, and nobody had enough money. The population fell quickly into a depression, many turned to the bottle which made things even worse. From the highest of highs for such a remote region, Chukotka was on the edge of ruin.

And then, a reprieve from an unlikely source. **Roman Abramovich**, one of the new class of oligarchs who benefitted from state enterprises being sold off for pennies on the dollar in private auctions, became the governor of the region in late 2000. When he arrived, Chukotka was destitute, bankrupt with enormous debts equivalent to four times&apos; its annual budgets. State employees hadn&apos;t been paid in half a year.

Abramovich was a rockstar who bought football clubs and superyachts, not normally the sort of person you&apos;d expect to bail out an Arctic backwater. And yet when he arrived, he brought with him a genuine willingness to turn the region around. In 2001 he organised humanitarian help, ensuring each resident received 20 kilograms of sugar, five kilograms of salt, a sack of flour, a sack of potatoes, five kilograms of butter, and five kilograms of dried fruits. In such a poor region where supplies were scarce such charity was invaluable to the people living there. Next he organised bringing business back to the region, registering three branches of the Sibneft oil company that Abramovich owned in Chukotka. Large scale construction would also be renewed. During Abramovich&apos;s tenure between 2001 and 2008, 100,000 square metres of housing was built, 18 new schools went up, and 28 medical facilities like hospitals began operations. In new houses hot water, flush toilets, and double glazing were all mandatory which genuinely improved people&apos;s quality of life.

Schools were given brand new computers, access to the internet, televisions, textbooks, free food, and free health services. The Chukchi language and culture – at this point teetering on the edge of extinction – were reintroduced into the school curriculum, breathing life back into a region that had little hope for the future. And on top of that, each year every single child (about 6,000 of them in total) would be sent on a free summer vacation by the Black Sea. Even just by moving to the region, Abramovich added some tens of millions of dollars in tax revenues to Chukotka&apos;s meagre budget. There was a phrase in Chukotka at the time, &quot;God sent Abramovich&quot; – but academic Alexey Dudarev would go one further, quoting:

&gt; The Chukchi revered Abramovich as the source of many good things; some even considered him a deity to be prayed to.

Now, despite his good deeds its important to note that Abramovich was no saint. He has close ties to the Kremlin (how do you think he became a governor in the first place). His wealth has been tied to Israeli west-bank settlement groups and industries that benefitted from war with Ukraine. Abramovich himself is a complicated figure who also tried to help negotiate an end to the Ukraine war early on in 2022. But at least for Chukotka, his philanthropy was very real, and even though it couldn&apos;t fix everything, it made a real difference to people living there.

But what couldn&apos;t be fixed, no matter how much money you throw at it?

## Chukotka the Dying

Today, Chukotka is still awash with a great menagerie of complicated problems that make it a very difficult place to live. The first one, above all being just how isolated the place still remains. A part of the population lives in tiny remote villages that are hard to access. They&apos;re dependant on transportation but the climate makes that seriously unreliable and unpredictable. Due to the permafrost there&apos;s a distinct lack of railways and roads in the region. Chukotka currently has *zero* road or rail connections to any other Russian region whatsoever. 90% of all freight is moved by sea and air there, which leaves the people highly susceptible to supply lines faltering in bad weather, which Chukotka gets an awful lot of. There&apos;s only one year-round link to Moscow via an eight hour long-haul flight from the capital of Anadyr. That&apos;s it. This isn&apos;t your average secluded area; this is like putting a village at the end of the world. It&apos;s like putting a settlement at the edge of a map in the 1500s with people afraid to visit it for fear of falling off the edge.

Without sustainable transport links that can connect Chukotka to the rest of the country, it will continue to struggle.

Next in the long line of issues is depopulation. After the USSR&apos;s collapse, Chukotka experienced one of the sharpest population declines of any region in the entire Russian Federation – and if you know anything about Russian population decline, that is a difficult scoreboard to be near the top of. In 1989, just before everything fell apart for Chukotka, its population peaked at around 162,000 people. It&apos;s now at 47,000 or so based on that 2021 census, and because of the war in Ukraine&apos;s desperate need for soldiers it now could be even lower. Disregarding the war for a moment, even if nobody had been called up whatsoever to fight, the population of Chukotka would have declined by around 70% in just the three decades and change since its peak. That&apos;s less so an emigration crisis and more of a total population collapse.

Because of the end of Soviet subsidies and Northern benefits, a large number of the non-indigenous population saw little reason to remain in such a harsh and remote environment without adequate compensation. Chukotka&apos;s settlement network had been built almost entirely around Soviet-era resource extraction and military installations. So when the money and work dried up people just left. The result of this was that much of Chukotka&apos;s previous settlements, military installations, and other infrastructure is now totally abandoned, with ghost towns littering the landscape slowly being reclaimed by the snow. Take little settlements like **Leningradsky** for example, this former gold-mining settlement was closed and evacuated in the early 2000s when the mine became unprofitable, now its houses have collapsed under the weather with no upkeep, its machinery rusts out in the open, and any remnants of the life that was once sustained by this place is now gone. As much as Abramovich was able to help stem the tide by bringing back basic services, paying the workers who had been waiting months for their money, and by providing some much needed upgrades, places like Leningradsky still litter Chukotka today. There&apos;s only so much wealth can do alone. You can&apos;t stop the rot without people, and Chukotka just doesn&apos;t have enough of them. It&apos;s a vicious cycle – industry can no longer sustain its people, and then the people can no longer sustain their industry. No wonder the polar bears moved in.

And so despite Abramovich&apos;s reforms and his money he was able to bring, the socio-economic conditions for most in Chukotka are pretty bleak. Most settlements can&apos;t get the supplies they need like fuel, foodstuffs, and electricity. The people are fiercely self-reliant. They&apos;re able to go out and hunt or fish for food, but there&apos;s little opportunity to do more than either survive or leave. Many settlements out in the wilderness struggle with a poor water supply, sanitation, and housing. With a landscape so harsh and hard to build on, and with so little money, Chukotka&apos;s residents aren&apos;t able to supply themselves with anything other than basic infrastructure that they can build themselves. For all intents and purposes its like they&apos;ve been abandoned, because there appears to be no political will to improve things. Because their settlements are so reliant on heavy industries like metal ore mining, the regions&apos; financial future is completely at the whims of corporate decisions, price swings, political decisions, and even things like international sanctions – which if you know anything about Russia are pretty common. And that&apos;s before you get to the corruption which no doubt helps a select few skim off the top.

Just look at **Zemtek mining company** for instance, which in May of 2025 failed to pay over 1,000 temporary workers in remote Chukotka town of Bilibino. These are workers who were brought from elsewhere in the motherland to do the necessary hard labour. Zemtek pledged to pay the workers but there was no indication that this happened. Our most recent information suggest that there at least 700 still stuck there, with the workers making appeals to President Putin to help arrange their return home, some have alleged that those who refused to continue working without pay were denied food for at least 36 hours. We&apos;ll never know if the company genuinely couldn&apos;t pay their workers as a result of economic circumstances or because someone stole the money – we&apos;re willing to bet it was likely both. And it just shows what Chukotka has become.

But you might be tempted to say that yes there are some abandoned settlements, but isn&apos;t having Chukotka remain as a mostly untouched paradise a good thing? Well it would be, if that were true. Industry has taken its toll on the natural world of Chukotka. Outside the capital the land still needs a serious cleanup from what Soviet-era industry has left behind. Scrap metal, junk, and hundreds of thousands of rusted-out oil barrels pollute this beautiful region, especially in the coastal regions. Nothing says &quot;natural paradise on earth&quot; like a pristine Arctic landscape carpeted with Soviet scrap.

The final massive issue that continues to plague the region, is mostly related to poor public health, alongside poor livestock health to boot. Zoonotic diseases (diseases that pass from animals to humans) remain problematic. A good example of this is **Brucellosis**, a bacterial infection that affects a lot of the wildlife and livestock in Chukotka. At its peak it was reported to be endemic in about 50% of reindeer farms, which for a place literally *named* after being rich in reindeer, is really not good. The disease which can cause severe health complications in animals puts the reindeer, their herders, and their breeders at risk. In people, it causes flu-like symptoms that can be mild to severe. Veterinary help is often hampered by the harsh conditions, and as a result it continues to be an issue to this day.

Among the indigenous population, there&apos;s a high rate of sexually transmitted illnesses, with gonorrhoea rates among Indigenous people being between three and six times higher than the Russian national average. That&apos;s a lot of warts, and its sure to make people&apos;s lives even more miserable. In 1998, three cases of AIDS were recorded for the first time here, which for a region this remote and with so few people that&apos;s a major threat with the possibility of it spreading quickly amongst small close-knit communities. The conditions, the hopelessness, the infection, the poverty – it all compounds into this region in Russia having the highest levels of alcohol consumption in all of Russia. If you know anything about Russia, that is simply *staggering.* But it&apos;s not just drinking, it&apos;s everything that comes with too much of it. In 2024, the Russian state-owned news publication RIA Novosti reported Chukotka had the highest incidence of alcoholism and alcoholic psychosis in Russia as well. In Moscow, this happens at a rate of around 15.9 per 100,000 people, in Chukotka the rate is 247.8 per 100,000 people, which is almost 16 times higher. Remember this is Russia, the place where alcoholism is a character trait and people drink like fish.

Even health issues of the past have been dealt with poorly. Because this region isn&apos;t hostile enough to the average human being, it also has an **anthrax** problem. Between 1985 and 2008, 72 cases of anthrax occurred among humans living in Siberia, including Chukotka. Cattle that are infected can spread the disease to other animals and humans. Past outbreaks have been linked to the deaths of 1.5 million deer that were buried in some 13,000 burial sites that do not reportedly meet federal sanitary and safety standards. *Bacillus anthracis*, the bacteria that causes anthrax infections, are known to survive between 60 and 70 years, but because of the permafrost it&apos;s likely to be longer or even indefinitely. Melting of the permafrost sped up by climate change will then release this dormant anthrax back into the populations of animals and people. It&apos;s like there&apos;s an enormous anthrax grenade under the ice, and the pin was pulled years ago.

And unfortunately for Chukotka, as time wears on, it seems things are only going to get worse.

## Chukotka the End?

So where does that leave Chukotka today and for the future? Well we can&apos;t sugarcoat it, it&apos;s not good.

In the present, the population are suffering from everything we&apos;ve talked about today, and it&apos;s not been helped by the fighting going on in Ukraine. Whilst you might expect the effects of the war to not be felt very much so far from the frontline, war doesn&apos;t really work that way. The international sanctions continues to make the region poorer, and the war needs men. The further east you go in Russia, you find ethnic minorities and their settlements disproportionately targeted with mobilisation campaigns. Russia&apos;s manpower problem in Ukraine is very well-known, necessitating some limited conscription – but to ease the unpopularity of such a policy, the regime have instead begun to offer increasingly large salaries and signing on bonuses which amount to lifechanging money for most of the Russian population. And how do you think such offers go down in Chukotka, where people are poorer than most, and with fewer opportunities than most to make anything close to decent money? The benefits are very good…if you survive. And if you don&apos;t your family gets a lot of money in compensation. So in every settlement in Chukotka a number of men have seen the government&apos;s offer as too good to refuse. And those who don&apos;t come back only further push the region into further decline as the population shrinks even faster.

The war this far east is generally popular thanks to intense state propaganda, and those who have been killed who were from Chukotka are considered heroes, but recruitment drives have rattled some of the population. Some do have mixed feelings but this is Russia, and dissenting opinions aren&apos;t welcome here. Those who live here might be considered the closest thing to those who live under a rock, but they&apos;re not stupid.

In truth there&apos;s no way to know exactly how many people from Chukotka have chosen to go to war for one reason or another, but estimates based on numbers in other regions and generally extrapolating for underreported deaths mean it could be anywhere from a few hundred to a little over a thousand people. And Chukotka just can&apos;t afford to lose that many. Many of the men who go are adept hunters who helped provide for their communities. When they don&apos;t come back the settlements lose valuable members of their communities with the skills needed to help everyone survive.

And for the future, it seems like Chukotka is expected to continue its spiral of decay and decline. Sure, it might be a little less isolated in the future with companies like **Severaero** launching helicopter passenger and cargo services between Chukotka&apos;s remote districts in 2027, but it&apos;s a day late and a dollar short now, it&apos;s not going to reverse the damage that&apos;s been done.

Unfortunately it&apos;s a simple story for Russia&apos;s most isolated region. One of hardship, industrial boom and bust policies, and of extreme post-Soviet decline. Without the political will, hard decisions, hard work, the money, or the time to make things better, those settlements in Chukotka might soon cease to exist completely.

And the great Russian bear will have swallowed another victim.

## Key Takeaways

- Chukotka, Russia&apos;s most inhospitable region, is isolated and neglected with a harsh climate.
- The region has a rich history of Soviet industry but faces severe economic decline.
- Chukotka&apos;s population has drastically decreased, with many settlements abandoned.
- Despite natural resources, Chukotka struggles with poor infrastructure and health issues.
- The region&apos;s future looks bleak due to ongoing challenges and lack of political will.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the full title of Chukotka?

The full title of Chukotka is the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.

### How large is Chukotka in square kilometers?

Chukotka is around 737,700 square kilometers.

### What are the main cities in Chukotka?

The main cities in Chukotka are Anadyr, Bilibino, and Pevek.

### What is the average winter temperature in Chukotka?

The average winter temperature in Chukotka is minus 19 degrees Celsius.

### What is the population of Chukotka according to the 2021 census?

The population of Chukotka according to the 2021 census is around 47,490 people.

### What is the population density of Chukotka?

The population density of Chukotka is 0.06 people per square kilometer.

### What is the primary economic activity in Chukotka?

Chukotka&apos;s economy is primarily based on natural resources, including gold, tin, copper, tungsten, platinum, silver, coal, oil, and gas.

### What time zone does Chukotka observe?

Chukotka observes Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky Time (PETT), which is 12 hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time.

### What are some of the major issues facing Chukotka today?

Chukotka faces issues such as isolation, depopulation, poor infrastructure, economic decline, and health problems including high rates of alcoholism and zoonotic diseases.

### What is the significance of the Diomede Islands in relation to Chukotka?

The Diomede Islands, known as Big Diomede (Russian) and Little Diomede (American), are separated by the international date line and are only 2.4 miles apart, despite being 21 hours out of sync with each other.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Chukotka: Russia&apos;s Most Inhospitable Region.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2xsxaR5Gn24)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/57/Aerial_landscape_view_%282017%29.jpg) by Saga1111 / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Darvaza: Turkmenistan&apos;s Eternally-Burning Crater</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/darvaza-turkmenistan-eternally-burning-crater</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/darvaza-turkmenistan-eternally-burning-crater</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Totalitarian regimes have a habit of portraying themselves as monolithic, yet well-oiled machines, churning out astounding achievements in the fields of science, engineering, military technology.

To that respect, the Soviet Union during the Cold War era was no different, seeking to impress the capitalist world with its wondrous industrial development, its aerospace conquests, and its armaments program.

But totalitarian regimes also have a habit of pulling the most embarrassing FUBARs, SNAFUs, oopsies, whatever you like to call them.

To that respect, the Soviet Union during the Cold War era was no different! Nuclear meltdowns, ill-conceived military vehicles, badly timed purges of key military or medical personnel …

Most of these incidents were tragedies which left a trail of death, illness and despair in their wake. As such, they are no laughing matter. But today we can allow ourselves a quantum of levity, as we are going to discuss possibly the only Soviet cock-up which ended up creating a tourist attraction, one of the most wondrous and downright bizarre on the planet!

This is the story of the Darvaza gas crater, Turkmenistan, also known as the Gates of Hell.

## Gates of Hell or Giant Stove?

This peculiar location is also known as &apos;the Door to Hell&apos;, or any other variation on that theme. So, you get the idea: it is a large crater, perpetually burning with insanely hot flames, which may rise as high as 15 metres in the air.

This fiery gate is roughly 70 meters in diameter, and 30 meters deep, meaning it could easily contain three times the US Capitol Rotunda, or be filled with the contents of 45 Olympic Swimming Pools — but even that amount of water would not be able to put out the flames, as we shall discover later.

The crater is located in the middle of the vast and inhospitable Karakum Desert. So vast, in fact, that it takes some 70% of Turkmenistan&apos;s entire surface area. And so inhospitable that temperatures can soar to more than 50 degrees celsius in summer, and plummet below freezing during winter nights.

As you may imagine, the door to hell is in a pretty isolated location, with the closest village, Derweze, counting just about 2,000 inhabitants. If you are looking for a more lively urban centre with a few more people knocking around, then you&apos;ll have to travel to Turkmenistan&apos;s capital, Ashgabat, some 270 kilometers of bumpy desert road to the south.

Now, the Karakum Desert might make for a hot and hostile environment, sure, but it&apos;s just a puny amateur when compared to what goes on within the crater itself. Temperatures inside this pit of raging flames can reach up to 1,000 degrees Celsius, which is more than 500 degrees hotter than the average temperature on Venus!

Even standing close to the edge of the circular inferno is an uncomfortable experience, similar to being exposed to overwhelming blasts of incinerating heat. Those who have visited the Darvaza phenomenon have described it as an eerie, unsettling spectacle, especially at night, when the flames permeate the surrounding darkness with a deep orange-red glow, accompanied by the roar of a fire that refuses to die.

Many visitors have described the vision of the crater at night as a portal to another dimension, or a gateway to some planet devastated by an apocalyptic event. More often than not, visitors draw comparisons with infernal imagery, and liken the crater to the entrance to the first circles of hell. Or to some sort of demonic cauldron in which Satan&apos;s minions stir the souls of the damned.

Alternatively, the pit can evoke the image of a gigantic dragon&apos;s mouth, smouldering with searing flames.

But if you are not inclined to such dramatic descriptions, you may as well compare the Darvaza crater to some sort of gargantuan hob or stove, which somebody forgot to turn down. The fire is still on, and is now desperately begging for someone to cook a giant cauldron of Chekdirme, a mouthwatering local dish of rice, meat, tomato and sautéed onions. That would be quite the feast!

However anticlimactic, the stove comparison would be rather appropriate, as these supposedly hellish flames are being fed by a constant flow of very mundane methane gas. Turkmenistan, in fact, has access to the world&apos;s sixth largest reserves of natural gas, with much of it sitting underneath the Karakum desert. And the area in which the Darvaza crater is found, is right in the middle of the Zeaghly-Derveze group of gas fields.

It was this abundance of natural resources, and a desire to exploit them, which eventually gave origin to the endless flames of Darvaza …

## Origin Story

We are sure that there is a parallel universe in which the Soviet and Western blocs did not engage in a nuclear arms race, but rather invested their efforts in wizardry and necromancy.

And we like to think that, in that universe, a coven of Russian and Turkmen warlocks opened a gateway to hell, to summon legions of demons for a final showdown with the forces of Capitalism.

But the origin story of the burning pit of Karakum is far more prosaic, being the result of a Soviet engineering mishap, as hinted at earlier.

We have to rewind the calendar back to 1971, or perhaps even back to 1963, according to different accounts.

Turkmenistan was still part of the USSR, and a team of Soviet geologists was sent by the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry to prospect the Zeagle-Derweze gas fields. The squad set-up a large drilling rig in the area, with the intention of boring into the desert floor and revealing some valuable pockets of natural gas.

Unfortunately, they set up their heavy rig above a cavernous void, which interrupted the otherwise solid limestone foundations of the deserts. The ground thus trembled and cracked, before swallowing the rig and revealing a deep chasm underneath. The geologists had pulled a relatively costly oopsie — they had lost some precious drilling equipment after all. But they soon realised that their mistake could have much costlier consequences.

The crater they had just revealed happened to be connected with an enormous reservoir of methane gas, which was now free to pollute the surrounding air, creating an environmental hazard. According to energy consultancy Capterio:

&gt; &apos;Methane is up to 83 times more potent than CO2 as a greenhouse gas&apos;

Which motivated the geologists to enact a:

&gt; &apos;Shrewd and environmentally advantageous move&apos;

The prospectors thus set the methane leak on fire, hoping that the ignited gas would burn for a few weeks. Once the flames inside the crater would run out of fuel, the team had all the best intentions to further explore the methane reservoir, and exploit it to the benefit of the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry.

This origin story was partially contradicted by Greek-Canadian explorer, broadcaster and &apos;storm chaser&apos; George Kourounis, who visited the site in 2013 and spoke to local Turkmen geologists. According to them, the Soviet geologists did cause the collapse and opening of the chasm in 1963. But the spewing methane was lit on fire only some time in the 1980s.

Ultimately, there are no official records on the overall incident, which means there is no definitive version. But all accounts agree on the fact that geology experts — either local or sent from Moscow — had wildly underestimated the volume of gas trapped below the desert.

The flames did not go extinguished in a matter of weeks, but rather would keep on burning for months, eventually years.

The Cold War occasionally flared up in localised conflicts or tense stand-offs, while the Gates of Hell in the Karakum still burned consistently, hotter and hotter. Soviet authorities in Moscow were otherwise preoccupied in their continuous efforts to uphold Communist ideology against a Capitalist west. Understandably, they had bigger fish to fry than solving the issue of putting out the Darvaza Gas Crater.

This spectacular memento of a prospecting expedition gone wrong gradually fell into oblivion, known only to the inhabitants of the local villages. They knew the giant campfire was borne out of some sort of industrial project, but the details had been lost to time and the maze-like bureaucracy of a secretive State.

Eventually, the Soviet giant disgregated, as its components sought to detach themselves from Moscow. Turkmenistan was no exception, and declared independence on October 27, 1991.

The fires in the desert kept on scorching the air — while the outside world had absolutely no idea that such a phenomenon even existed!

## Fanning the Flames

Since declaring independence, Turkmenistan has been ruled by only three Presidents: Saparmurat Niyazov, from 1991 to 2006. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, from 2006 until March 2022.

And more recently his son, Serdar.

The country has been described as a secretive and totalitarian dictatorship, shaped by the cult of personality and by the frankly puzzling decrees enacted by its first ruler, Niyazov. The self-appointed &apos;Turkmenbasy&apos;, or &apos;Leader of the Turkmen&apos; placed a strict veto on ballet and opera, forbade beards and long hair, and imposed his autobiography, the Ruhnama or &apos;Book of the Soul&apos; as mandatory reading to obtain a driving licence.

During the Turkmenbasy era, very little was known about Turkmenistan, and the country was far from being a tourist hotspot. But President Berdimuhamedow gradually opened up the country, and government officials realised that the Darvaza Crater, once considered just the puzzling relic of Soviet industrial clumsiness, could actually become an attraction for adventurous travellers. Local travel agencies started marketing the Gates of Hell experience to foreign visitors, including it as an extra on guided tours of the capital city.

By extending a trip to Ashgabat by some 24 hours, it became possible to drive across the desert, set up camp by the fiery pit at sunset, and enjoy the otherworldly sight of the ring of fire, glowing red in the vast darkness of the Karakum. Tour guides would also offer to cook a typical Turkmen barbecue — not over the Door to Hell itself, mind you, but at a safe distance!

In fact, all travel brochures specify that visitors should only spend a few minutes by the crater, as there is a danger of inhaling noxious fumes.

The crater&apos;s popularity slowly but gradually increased, attracting the attention of travel bloggers and trending on social media. But it would take much more for the Door to Hell to become a proper, global phenomenon.

The flames of popularity were first fanned in 2010, when the then President of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, paid an official visit to the crater. The leader did not care much for the Darvaza pit, and in fact openly described it as an inconvenient nuisance, an environmental hazard and an economic liability. Furthermore, Mr Berdimuhamedow voiced his desire for the flames to be put out for good!

The President&apos;s tirade and his plans to seal shut the entrance to hell had the unintended consequence of further raising the crater&apos;s profile, until it came into the crosshairs of the already mentioned explorer George Kourounis and microbiologist Dr Stefan Green.

In 2011, with funding from National Geographic and travel company Kensington Tours, the duo started organising an expedition to the crater. More precisely, and more insanely, to the very bottom of the pit, perhaps the hottest and most inhospitable location on Earth — barring active volcanoes, of course.

Their mission would be to collect samples of the soil at the crater&apos;s bottom, and look for evidence of &apos;extremophile bacteria&apos;. In other words: unicellular organisms which are able to thrive in the most extreme environments. And if such tiny monsters can survive on hell-on-Earth itself, similar critters could be found on extrasolar planets. In Kourounis&apos; words:

&gt; &apos;There are planets that have been discovered outside of our solar system that have a very hot, methane-rich environment kind of similar to what is in the crater. So, in essence, we were looking for alien life right here on Earth.&apos;

After grappling with Turkmen bureaucracy for two years, the expedition finally reached the Door to Hell in November 2013.

Before descending into the 1000-degree inferno, Kourounis donned his otherworldly protective gear, including a heat-resistant suit in aluminized fabric, a breathing apparatus, and a climbing harness made of kevlar. Even so, the explorer admitted to suffering extreme heat:

&gt; &apos;I did feel a bit like a baked potato in there!&apos;

Nonetheless, the indomitable Kourounis rappelled down into the fiery mouth of the pit, providing the only account of experiencing the crater from within:

&gt; &apos;I described it as a coliseum of fire—just everywhere you look it&apos;s thousands of these small fires. The sound was like that of a jet engine, this roaring, high-pressure, gas-burning sound. And there was no smoke. It burns very cleanly, so there&apos;s nothing to obscure your view.&apos;

The explorer completed the mission, collecting samples which were later analysed by Dr Green. Astonishingly, the microbiologist found some extremophile bacteria present in the soil, which he described as being &apos;enriched&apos; by the crater&apos;s high temperatures and low nutrient levels.

And that fact alone is way more terrifying than a perpetually burning &apos;coliseum of fire&apos;! But Kourounis&apos; expedition did not scare off visitors, on the contrary: his adventure raised awareness of the pit of Karakum around the world, as his photos amidst the flames went viral.

The Door to Hell had finally made it to the &apos;big league&apos; of extreme and bizarre tourist destinations, and the first Tripadvisor reviews would soon follow …

Commenters on the popular review website generally agree that the Darvaza Gas Crater is well worth visiting, despite the lack of hospitality infrastructure, and the hassle to traverse the desert from Ashgabat. Amongst the many positive reviews, we singled out the account posted in June 2019 by American recording artist Van Pimpenstein.

&gt; &apos;Darvaza is like no other tourist attraction. We were in Ashgabat prepping to play a Van Pimpenstein concert for a US Embassy function when my band mates and I heard about the infamous gas crater. We decided it was a must see … The crater itself is enormous and makes for some incredible photo opportunities. Me and our bass player Richard Texas put on an impromptu performance for another tourist group that was visiting the site.&apos;

Van Pimpenstein&apos;s improvised concert by the rim of the crater must have been quite the sight, but it surely paled in comparison to the second official visit of President Berdymukhamedov, on August 7, 2019.

The absolute leader had disappeared from public view since July 15, the date of his last TV appearance. On that occasion, the President and his grandson had given Van Pimpenstein a run for his money, as they performed together a rap song dedicated to Turkmenistan&apos;s natural beauty. The clip is worth watching, as the 62-year-old autocrat showcases some serious drum-machine and keyboard skills.

But following that performance, the President was nowhere to be seen, fuelling speculations that he had actually died. Perhaps to put those rumours to rest, Berdymukhamedov resurfaced in what must have been the raddest stunt pulled by a head of State in the 21st Century: in another clip, released by Turkmenistan&apos;s state TV, the President could be seen aggressively driving a rally car around the Door to Hell, performing &apos;donuts&apos; on the brink of the fiery pit, and &apos;drifting&apos; on the Karakum sands like a proud member of the Toretto family.

*[Editor&apos;s note: The &apos;Toretto family&apos; mention is a reference to the Fast and Furious franchise, where Vin Diesel stars alongside other vehicles. Clips for both of the President&apos;s PR stunts, the rap song and the car race, can be found via [ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-07/turkmenistan-president-rally-car-hells-gate-dispel-death-rumours/11392246).]*

## The Slow Death of a Dragon?

The race-car driving President must have had something of a love-hate relationship with the Darvaza gas crater. Surely it had great pulling power on international tourists! And surely it made for a great backdrop to announce he wasn&apos;t dead yet!

But at the same time, the leader realised that the crater still posed an environmental hazard, besides burning millions of cubic metres of valuable methane gas. In January 2022, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov voiced again his intention to snuff out the Gates of Hell for good, announcing on TV that:

&gt; &apos;We are losing valuable natural resources for which we could get significant profits and use them for improving the well-being of our people&apos;

His cabinet put forward three potential solutions to finally shut down the massive desert hob:

First, one could fill the crater with sand or clay. That would make for a simple and relatively cheap solution, but it carries the risk of triggering a massive explosion.

Or how about placing a sealed, heat-resistant shell over the mouth of the crater? That should work, but it would be outrageously expensive.

Another option was to trigger a series of controlled explosions to cause a collapse of the crater&apos;s walls. But this solution could open yet more craters.

The most viable option, proposed by state-run agency Turkemngaz was to drill new wells around the crater, so as to starve out the flames by redirecting the gas elsewhere.

Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow sat on those options for a couple of months, before stepping down from power and being replaced by his son Serdar, in March 2022.

Which may give the impression that the anguish over what to do with that blessed crater finally pushed him over the edge, and into retirement!

But obviously Turkmen politics are a much more complicated affair, and the country has been defined as an:

&gt; &apos;All-pervasive kleptocracy&apos;

*[Editor&apos;s note: Source — Chatham House]*

Ruled by a:

&gt; &apos;Tyranny [mutating] into dynasty&apos;

*[Editor&apos;s note: Source — Civicus Lens]*

The previous President had been grooming his son for succession for years, having him appointed deputy prime minister. Probably due to health issues, Gurbanguly decided it was time to engineer the handover to Serdar, who took power after securing an absolutely not suspicious 72.97% of the votes.

Since taking the top job, it appears that Serdar has tackled once again the, well, burning issue of the Door to Hell. According to the 2024 report by energy consultancy Capterio, agency Turkmengaz did manage to drill a &apos;bypass&apos; well next to the crater, without causing accidental collapses. The effects of the bypass have been captured by satellite imagery, as reported by Capterio:

&gt; &apos;Independent satellite data now confirm a significant drop in emissions, highlighting the success of Turkmenistan&apos;s efforts to reduce gas flaring, venting, and leaking.&apos;

Depending on what origin story you choose to believe, the flames of the Door to Hell were ignited by a volatile combination of Soviet incompetence and a sincere, yet clumsy attempt to mitigate an environmental disaster. Since then, they have been burning incessantly for anything up to 62 years, first ignored by the world, and later admired as a wondrous anomaly.

Much like a mythical dragon, the Darvaza Gas Crater, was sitting atop a giant hoard of riches. Not gold and jewels, of course, but a massive reservoir of natural gas, which unfortunately is very likely to enrich only Turkmenistan&apos;s kleptocratic elite.

And much like a mythical dragon at the end of a legendary tale, it appears that the crater may soon exhale its last, fiery breath.

## Key Takeaways

- The Darvaza gas crater, known as the Gates of Hell, is a 70-meter wide, 30-meter deep crater burning methane gas in Turkmenistan&apos;s Karakum Desert.
- The crater was accidentally created by Soviet geologists in the 1960s or 1970s while prospecting for natural gas.
- Initially intended to burn for a few weeks, the crater has been burning continuously for up to 62 years.
- The crater became a tourist attraction, drawing visitors for its eerie, otherworldly spectacle, despite its remote and harsh location.
- Efforts to extinguish the crater&apos;s flames have been considered due to environmental concerns and the loss of valuable natural gas.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Darvaza Gas Crater?

The Darvaza Gas Crater, also known as the Gates of Hell, is a large crater in Turkmenistan that has been burning continuously since the 1970s. It is approximately 70 meters in diameter and 30 meters deep, fueled by a constant flow of methane gas.

### How did the Darvaza Gas Crater originate?

The crater originated from a Soviet engineering mishap in the 1970s. Geologists drilling for natural gas accidentally uncovered a cavern, releasing methane gas. To prevent environmental hazards, they set the gas on fire, intending it to burn for a few weeks, but it has been burning ever since.

### What are the temperatures like inside the Darvaza Gas Crater?

Temperatures inside the crater can reach up to 1,000 degrees Celsius, making it one of the hottest places on Earth.

### Where is the Darvaza Gas Crater located?

The crater is located in the Karakum Desert in Turkmenistan, about 270 kilometers north of the capital city, Ashgabat.

### What is the environmental impact of the Darvaza Gas Crater?

The crater burns millions of cubic meters of valuable methane gas, contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and posing an environmental hazard.

### What are some tourist activities related to the Darvaza Gas Crater?

Tourists can visit the crater, often as part of a guided tour from Ashgabat. They can camp nearby, enjoy the fiery spectacle, and some have even performed impromptu concerts by the crater&apos;s rim.

### What are the plans to extinguish the Darvaza Gas Crater?

Turkmenistan has considered several methods to extinguish the crater, including filling it with sand or clay, placing a sealed shell over it, triggering controlled explosions, or drilling new wells to redirect the gas. As of recent reports, efforts to reduce gas emissions have been successful.

### What is the significance of the Darvaza Gas Crater in Turkmenistan&apos;s tourism?

The crater has become a major tourist attraction, drawing adventurous travelers from around the world. It has been featured in various media outlets and has gained popularity through social media and travel blogs.

### What is the political context surrounding the Darvaza Gas Crater?

The crater&apos;s management has been influenced by Turkmenistan&apos;s political leadership. Previous presidents have expressed interest in extinguishing the flames, and the current president, Serdar Berdimuhamedow, has continued efforts to address the environmental and economic issues it presents.

### What scientific research has been conducted at the Darvaza Gas Crater?

In 2013, explorer George Kourounis and microbiologist Dr. Stefan Green conducted an expedition to collect soil samples from the crater&apos;s bottom. They discovered extremophile bacteria that thrive in the extreme conditions, providing insights into potential life on other planets.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Darvaza: Turkmenistan&apos;s Eternally-Burning Crater](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J0YGRjZlgWg)
- [https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/entering-door-hell/](https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/entering-door-hell/)
- [https://www.cnn.com/travel/turkmenistan-flaming-gates-of-hell-darvaza/index.html](https://www.cnn.com/travel/turkmenistan-flaming-gates-of-hell-darvaza/index.html)
- [https://www.livescience.com/planet-earth/geology/gates-of-hell-turkmenistans-methane-fueled-fire-pit-that-has-been-burning-since-1971](https://www.livescience.com/planet-earth/geology/gates-of-hell-turkmenistans-methane-fueled-fire-pit-that-has-been-burning-since-1971)
- [https://geology.com/oil-and-gas/darvaza-gas-crater/](https://geology.com/oil-and-gas/darvaza-gas-crater/)
- [https://www.nationalgeographic.com/premium/article/gate-hell-darvaza-gas-crater-turkmenistan-extinguish](https://www.nationalgeographic.com/premium/article/gate-hell-darvaza-gas-crater-turkmenistan-extinguish)
- [https://rees.sas.upenn.edu/about/spotlight/door-hell-turkmenistan](https://rees.sas.upenn.edu/about/spotlight/door-hell-turkmenistan)
- [https://flareintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/20240423-Capterio-New-Perspectives-on-Old-Flames-at-Darvaza-Turkmenistan-1.pdf](https://flareintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/20240423-Capterio-New-Perspectives-on-Old-Flames-at-Darvaza-Turkmenistan-1.pdf)
- [https://old.absolutenomads.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Ashgabat-Darvaza-Beyond-1.pdf](https://old.absolutenomads.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Ashgabat-Darvaza-Beyond-1.pdf)
- [https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/extreme-sleepover-10-an-encounter-with-hells-gate](https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/extreme-sleepover-10-an-encounter-with-hells-gate)
- [https://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Attraction_Review-g2049541-d3618466-Reviews-Darvaza_Gas_Crater-Darvaza_Ahal_Province.html](https://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Attraction_Review-g2049541-d3618466-Reviews-Darvaza_Gas_Crater-Darvaza_Ahal_Province.html)
- [https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2024/04/30/door-to-hell-burning-crater-is-gradually-running-out-of-fuel](https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2024/04/30/door-to-hell-burning-crater-is-gradually-running-out-of-fuel)
- [https://www.turkmenportal.com/en/blog/86640/rossiiskii-ekspert-nazval-tri-vozmozhnyh-sposoba-tusheniya-turkmenskogo-kratera-darvaza-goryashchego-bolee-50-let](https://www.turkmenportal.com/en/blog/86640/rossiiskii-ekspert-nazval-tri-vozmozhnyh-sposoba-tusheniya-turkmenskogo-kratera-darvaza-goryashchego-bolee-50-let)
- [https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/the-quest-to-extinguish-the-flames-of-turkmenistans-terrifying-gates-of-hell-firepit-180979458/](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/the-quest-to-extinguish-the-flames-of-turkmenistans-terrifying-gates-of-hell-firepit-180979458/)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/08/turkmenistan-plans-to-extinguish-vast-gas-crater-fire-dubbed-gateway-to-hell](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/08/turkmenistan-plans-to-extinguish-vast-gas-crater-fire-dubbed-gateway-to-hell)
- [https://phys.org/pdf560878089.pdf](https://phys.org/pdf560878089.pdf)
- [https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-59920221](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-59920221)
- [https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/man-descended-into-1-000-degrees-celsius-door-to-hell-read-the-viral-story-4673647](https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/man-descended-into-1-000-degrees-celsius-door-to-hell-read-the-viral-story-4673647)
- [https://www.msn.com/en-ph/news/world/turkmenistan-s-gateway-to-hell-faces-closure/ar-AA1sYNTk?ocid=UCPNC2](https://www.msn.com/en-ph/news/world/turkmenistan-s-gateway-to-hell-faces-closure/ar-AA1sYNTk?ocid=UCPNC2)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/57/Aerial_landscape_view_%282017%29.jpg) by Saga1111 / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>This is the DEADLIEST Mountain Peak in the World...</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/deadliest-mountain-peak-in-the-world</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/deadliest-mountain-peak-in-the-world</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>In May 1996, a terrible disaster occurred on the slopes of Mount Everest.

The combination of adverse weather conditions, overcrowding, miscommunication and circumstantial mishaps resulted in no less than eight people dying on the mountain in a single day. Practically all the victims were experienced climbers, several of them having already made it to the summit of the famous mountain at least once before. What has since been referred to as the Everest Disaster was immortalised by author Jon Krakauer - who was part of the fateful expedition - in the bestselling book Into the Air. The events were also later depicted in the harrowing 2015 Hollywood movie Everest.

It might surprise you, then, that the deadliest mountain in the world - and the subject of today&apos;s video - is not Mount Everest.

One of the individuals who lived through the tragedy that day was famous mountaineer Anatoli Boukreev. Boukreev had been a leader on the Mountain Madness team, and his experience and strength allowed him to not only to survive the tragedy, but to rescue three climbers by dragging them off the slopes to safety. But in spite of his experience and skill, Boukreev met his end only one year later, on another peak further west in the Himalaya range. This was Annapurna, the true single most deadly mountain in existence. The avalanche that killed Boukreev on Christmas Day 1997 also took the life of his climbing partner Dimitri Sobolev, and only six years before, a similar event took the lives of two South Korean climbers and four Nepalese guides. One year after Boukreev&apos;s death, yet another avalanche killed one more South Korean climber and two more Nepalese guides. In the space of only a couple of years, dozens of lives were lost to the unforgiving elements of the mountain.

And even these disasters don&apos;t come close to the single most costly loss of life occurring on the mountain which - in terms of casualties - stands as the single worst mountain disaster in Nepal, and one of the very worst in history.

## The Call of the Annapurna Massif

Now, even just this introduction might beg the question: why would climbers put themselves through summiting a peak as perilous as Annapurna?

Part of the answer - as with many mountains - lies in its unquestionable beauty. The Annapurna range is a breathtaking location, a 55-kilometre long massif - or group of peaks - renowned for its mystique and glorious landscapes. Annapurna&apos;s name is derived from the Sanskrit &quot;Anna&quot; (meaning food) and &quot;Purna&quot; (meaning filled), and can be understood to mean &apos;everlasting bounty&apos;. The surrounding 7,600 square-kilometre Annapurna Conservation Area attracts not only climbers, but trekkers, conservationists, and nature enthusiasts alike, through its unique blend of grandeur and scenic sights.

Moreover, Annapurna - in theory - is more achievable for ambitious mountaineers than some of the other summits of the Himalayan &apos;eight-thousanders&apos;. Its highest point is Annapurna I Main, standing at 8,091 meters (or 26,545 feet) - making it the 10th tallest mountain in the world, and one of the shortest from the prestigious &quot;eight-thousander&quot; family. It was actually the first of the fourteen mountains 8,000 metre-plus peaks to be successfully summited, a feat accomplished by a French mountaineer Maurice Herzog and his team in 1950.

The Annapurna massif itself includes a number of other prominent peaks such as Annapurna II (which, at 7,937 meters, is the tallest mountain outside the eight-thousanders), as well as Annapurna III (7,555 meters), and Annapurna South (7,219 meters). The range therefore offers a variety of milestones for seasoned and novice climbers alike. Another famous site is Machapuchare, or Fishtail Mountain, which stands at a little under 7,000 meters. But this peak is considered sacred by locals and is therefore prohibited for climbing.

And there&apos;s another reason still for venturing to Annapurna: it is cheap. To attempt to climb Everest warrants a permit worth at least 15,000 dollars alone, in addition to travel fees, accommodation, food supplies, guide fees and equipment, which can collectively accumulate to around 50,000 dollars. But a trek on Annapurna can be done for as little as one thousand dollars per person for a twelve-day route, with minimal climbing gear or even guided accompaniment necessary. The advance of &quot;cheap tourism&quot; however, has led to criticism and disaster, as we shall see a little later.

Annapurna&apos;s surrounding region is a jewel of topography, with subalpine woodlands and lowland meadows, as well as snowfields and glaciers at higher altitudes. It is the largest protected area in Nepal and features a wide array of wildlife, including snow leopards, Tibetan wolves and Himalayan tahrs - a type of wild goat. The area is so beautiful that an entire aviation industry has developed which offers fly-bys over the picturesque mountains.

But the enduring beauty of Annapurna has a lethal dark side.

The region experiences a volatile variety of climatic conditions caused by its location and altitude. Its weather is influenced by the monsoon rains, which occur between June and September each year. The heavy rainfall helps nurture Annapurna&apos;s lush vegetation but also makes outdoor activity challenging, in what would be prime trekking and mountaineering season for most Northern Hemisphere peaks. The Winter, meanwhile - like on other mountains - brings with it heavy snowfall and below-freezing temperatures.

As such, the ideal conditions for trekking are the Spring (from March to May), and a brief window in the Autumn - usually October to November. The rest of the year can be perilous, without even touching upon the obvious challenge of scaling the peak itself. Moreover, at higher altitudes, the weather on Annapurna is notoriously unpredictable all year-round, irrespective of season. Sudden snowstorms, avalanches, and high winds are common, and Annapurna I Main just so happens to be the most prone to unpredictability of them all.

It is by no accident, therefore, that the mountain happens to have the highest fatality rate of any in the world.

## A Dance with the Devil

Now, even assuming perfect weather conditions, to attempt to summit Annapurna Main is not for the faint-hearted.

The mountain features a steep south face, which rises 3,000 meters from base camp to summit and which is considered one of the most dangerous climbs in the world. Climbers are forced to navigate the terrain while keeping an eye out for sudden rockfalls and avalanches, all while carrying heavy packs and supplementary oxygen to deal with sudden weather changes and the threat of altitude sickness.

Scaling the mountain also requires a high level of technical and physical skill. Climbers must be proficient in ice and rock climbing, and must also have the fitness to endure both the long push to the summit and a successful descent.

As if that weren&apos;t enough, rescue endeavours on Annapurna are hampered by its isolation and inaccessibility. To reach base camp alone can take as much as a week. Helicopter evacuations are difficult and are rarely effectuated, and unlike Everest with its large population of local sherpas, the locals around Annapurna are not dedicated mountaineers, able to assist adventurers in moments of jeopardy.

The combination of these factors has contributed to a string of tragic deaths on Annapurna.

Aside from Anatoli Boukreev, other notable mountaineers who have succumbed to their attempt to climb Annapurna include Finnish climber Samuli Mansikka and Italian Christian Kuntner - both of whom successfully summited all thirteen other eight-thousanders but died while striving to conquer Annapurna Main. Another famous case is Kang Ki-Seok, a South Korean who had helped forge a new route to the summit of Everest - known as the Korean Route - but who was killed in a suspected rockfall in his attempt to do the same thing on Annapurna. Kang died alongside his climbing partner Park Yeong-Seok, a veteran mountaineer who had once successfully summited Annapurna (and every other eight-thousander), but was killed along with Kang on his second summit in 2011.

Yet it is not only mountaineers who have fallen victim to the mountain, as would come to pass three years after the deaths of Kang and Park.

## The 2014 Annapurna Disaster

Maya was twenty-one years old when she set out to trek Annapurna with her friends in October 2014.

They were not alone, and the number of trekkers around Annapurna Main and the nearby Dhaulagiri mountain that season was in the hundreds. Trekking and mountaineering are two quite distinct activities carried out in the Himalayas - the former tracing mountain paths around the peaks, the latter scaling upwards to their summits. In Nepal, both occur at high altitude and neither are free of hazard, being exposed to unforgiving weather and unpredictable avalanches. Still, although trekking on Everest is impossible, trekking on Annapurna is common, and the brief Autumn window - considered high season - can attract thousands of adventurers keen to experience the region&apos;s irresistible sights.

Maya and her group were undeterred by a tragic disaster that had occurred several months earlier on Everest, and set out on a three-hour route toward the Thorong La, the highest point on the Annapurna trekking circuit, at around 5,400 metres altitude.

The group was largely inexperienced, but as revealed in a later article by physician and adventurer Stephen Fabes, even seasoned trekkers and mountain guides were hamstrung by the ferocious elements on the mountainside that day. As it happened, the entire region was racked by the devastating storm effects of Cyclone Hudhud, a tropical cyclone which had formed off the coast of Thailand on October 6th and travelled north soon after. By October 12th, it hit landfall and laid waste to the northern India state of Uttar Pradesh, causing massive infrastructural damage and killing 18 people. Cyclone Hudhud crossed into Nepal the following day and reached the Himalayas on the 14th of October, by which time the storm was so powerful that it caused 1.5 metres of snow to fall within 12 hours. Maya and her group had set out for Thorong La the same morning.

Fabes, who was further down the mountain, described what happened next. While safely camped in the village of Manang and waiting to begin his own two-day trek toward Thorong La, he woke up to more than 60 centimetres of snow which had fallen in the night between the 13th and 14th of October. Fabes wrote:

&quot;October in Manang means brochure-blue skies, not blizzards. We&apos;d heard no weather warnings at any of the trekking permit checkpoints en route. My mind jumped to our impending climb: if there are 2 feet of snowfall here, then Thorong La must be impassable.&quot;

He was right. High up on the mountain, catastrophe had struck.

More than 200 hikers had made the journey to Thorong La, many of them anticipating mild weather and very few dressed appropriately for the powerstorm that was to come. As the storm struck, heavy snow fell, temperatures plummeted, and chaos erupted. Many trekkers were without guides, and were forced to cling together under what little cover they had, as Cyclone Hudhud raged. Some tried to turn back to avoid hypothermia; not all were successful. Maya, who&apos;d by now reached the pass with her friends, reported:

&quot;We didn&apos;t have much equipment, and we just dropped our bags and kept going through the storm … Everybody was saying if you stay, you are going to die… We couldn&apos;t see the way. There&apos;s no path. There&apos;s 150 centimetres of snow. We were walking between the bodies and bags, and we could see our dead friends and the bodies of the guides. It was horrible, a horror.&quot;

Owing to the storm, electrical power, cell phone service, and internet connectivity failed in the Manang District, hampering relief efforts. Maya and her group were forced to huddle in a crowded cabin on the Thorong La pass for twenty hours, as the blizzard swirled furiously around them.

By October 15th, the day Fabes&apos; group had intended to begin their trek, the storm largely passed, and rescue teams were in a better position to try to assist the stranded trekkers. What they encountered high up on the pass was devastation.

32 people were immediately found to have died, including 17 alone on Thorong La. A huge rescue operation was launched by the Nepalese authorities, incorporating units of the army and military and civilian helicopters. More than 70 sorties and a sweep of the entire area were conducted, but it took days to be able to rescue some of the stranded trekkers. One British man survived having been stranded on the pass for 72 hours. Many others weren&apos;t so lucky. The dead were placed in body bags and flown to Manang, many of them dressed in little other than the jeans and trainers they&apos;d set out on their trek wearing.

At least 43 people ultimately died on Annapurna that day, and a further 175 were treated for injuries such as severe frostbite, with some having limbs later amputated. In the wake of the disaster, the Nepalese authorities were criticised for insufficient advance meteorological warnings and for allowing the saturation of trekkers who&apos;d journeyed to the Conservation Area in the years leading up to the tragedy. The government, on the other hand, clapped back: lambasting the emergence of &quot;cheap tourism&quot; and adventurers willing to risk the trek without paying for guides and sufficient equipment, thereby leaving themselves vulnerable to the inherent dangers of the mountain.

## The Terrifying Tale of the Mountain

But while the 2014 tragedy was caused by an exceptionally-strong storm, and likely exacerbated by the inexperience of some trekkers, this doesn&apos;t mean that weathered and well-prepared thrill-seekers are much safer on the unforgiving mountain.

A total of 73 climbers have succumbed to the treacherous elements on Annapurna Main. While this figure pales with the 332 people who have died on Everest, the tallest mountain on earth, in turn, withers if compared with Annapurna&apos;s sheer relative mortality.

Only 395 people are known to have summited Annapurna Main I, which - when held against the 73 deaths - leads to a fatality rate of roughly one for every five successful ascents. You will recall - from the introduction - that Annapurna was the first eight-thousander to be summited, a full three years before Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay conquered Everest in 1953. That means that in the 75 years since Maurice Herzog and his teammates scaled Annapurna Main, a little over 5 people per year - on average - have managed to repeat the feat. Herzog wrote his name into history with his successful ascent, but suffered severe frostbite on the way back and returned to France having lost all his toes and most of his fingers.

Everest - in stark contrast with Annapurna - has been successfully summited over 12,000 times by more than 7,000 individuals. In effect, a fatality rate of little over one death for every thirty-six ascents. Even the second-highest eight-thousander, K2, which is seen as technically the most challenging peak in the world and even by some as the riskiest, has been ascended by more than 800 people since 1954. 96 people have died, leading to a mortality of a little over one in eight. A terrifying figure, no doubt - but still significantly less than Annapurna&apos;s astonishing one in five. Moreover, the death rate on Annapurna has been dilated by a number of successful summits in 2022 and 2023 with only one fatality - and the fatality rate may have been as high as one in three by 2012.

To put the scale further into perspective, the very worst incident on Everest to date - albeit, perhaps, not the most well-known - occurred in April 2014, when a freak ice avalanche killed sixteen Nepalese sherpas in one swoop. But as awful as that event was, it paled in comparison to the disaster on Annapurna and Dhaulagiri later the same year, with the 43 dead and 175 wounded constituting the single worst mountain tragedy in Nepal, and one of the very worst in history.

## Key Takeaways

- Annapurna is the deadliest mountain in the world, with a fatality rate of one death for every five successful ascents.
- The 2014 Annapurna disaster, caused by Cyclone Hudhud, resulted in 43 deaths and 175 injuries, making it Nepal&apos;s worst mountain tragedy.
- Annapurna&apos;s unpredictable weather and technical challenges make it a perilous climb, even for experienced mountaineers.
- The mountain&apos;s isolation and inaccessibility hinder rescue efforts, adding to the danger for climbers.
- Despite its risks, Annapurna attracts climbers due to its beauty, relative accessibility, and lower cost compared to Everest.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What was the deadliest day on Mount Everest?

In May 1996, eight people died on Mount Everest in a single day due to adverse weather conditions, overcrowding, miscommunication, and circumstantial mishaps.

### Who is Anatoli Boukreev?

Anatoli Boukreev was a famous mountaineer who survived the 1996 Everest disaster and rescued three climbers. He died in an avalanche on Annapurna in 1997.

### What is the fatality rate of Annapurna Main?

The fatality rate of Annapurna Main is approximately one death for every five successful ascents.

### What is the highest point of the Annapurna massif?

The highest point of the Annapurna massif is Annapurna I Main, standing at 8,091 meters (26,545 feet).

### What is the best time to trek in the Annapurna region?

The ideal conditions for trekking in the Annapurna region are during the Spring (from March to May) and a brief window in the Autumn (usually October to November).

### What was the 2014 Annapurna disaster?

The 2014 Annapurna disaster was caused by Cyclone Hudhud, which resulted in heavy snowfall and extreme weather conditions. At least 43 people died, and 175 were injured.

### What is the Annapurna Conservation Area known for?

The Annapurna Conservation Area is known for its unique blend of grandeur and scenic sights, attracting climbers, trekkers, conservationists, and nature enthusiasts.

### Why is Annapurna considered more dangerous than Everest?

Annapurna is considered more dangerous due to its high fatality rate of approximately one death for every five successful ascents, compared to Everest&apos;s fatality rate of one death for every thirty-six ascents.

### What are some of the other prominent peaks in the Annapurna massif?

Other prominent peaks in the Annapurna massif include Annapurna II (7,937 meters), Annapurna III (7,555 meters), and Annapurna South (7,219 meters).

### What is the significance of Machapuchare in the Annapurna region?

Machapuchare, or Fishtail Mountain, is considered sacred by locals and is therefore prohibited for climbing.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: This is the DEADLIEST Mountain Peak in the World...](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFFl_zv6mOM)
- [https://www.londondaily.news/annapurna-base-camp-trek-everything-to-know-before-you-go/](https://www.londondaily.news/annapurna-base-camp-trek-everything-to-know-before-you-go/)
- [https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=18596](https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=18596)
- [https://www.backpacker.com/survival/inside-nepals-deadly-blizzard/](https://www.backpacker.com/survival/inside-nepals-deadly-blizzard/)
- [https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4581195,00.html](https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4581195,00.html)
- [https://cdn-s-www.estrepublicain.fr/images/A86FEF8C-462E-4F7A-AAA7-235CE3A4E437/NW_raw/maurice-herzog-1355489070.jpg](https://cdn-s-www.estrepublicain.fr/images/A86FEF8C-462E-4F7A-AAA7-235CE3A4E437/NW_raw/maurice-herzog-1355489070.jpg)
- [https://www.greenvalleynepaltreks.com/annapurna-circuit-trek](https://www.greenvalleynepaltreks.com/annapurna-circuit-trek)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/17/nepal-cheap-tourists-snow-disaster](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/17/nepal-cheap-tourists-snow-disaster)
- [https://www.greenmatters.com/living/annapurna-death-rate](https://www.greenmatters.com/living/annapurna-death-rate)
- [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29679773](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29679773)
- [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nepal-hikers/death-toll-in-nepals-worst-trekking-disaster-reaches-43-idUSKCN0IA1XU20141021/](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nepal-hikers/death-toll-in-nepals-worst-trekking-disaster-reaches-43-idUSKCN0IA1XU20141021/)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/76/Chaukhambha_%283641812744%29.jpg) by dr ashok kolluru / openverse, cc0.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Diego Garcia: The Most Controversial Island in the World</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/diego-garcia-most-controversial-island-world</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/diego-garcia-most-controversial-island-world</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>## Introduction

Deep in the heart of the Indian Ocean, nearly two thousand kilometers from the nearest continental landmass, lies the humble island of Diego Garcia. A modest, ring-shaped atoll of just over thirty kilometers squared in total land area, Diego Garcia snakes through the water like any one of the hundreds of similar islands scattered around the world. View it from thirty thousand feet, and it might seem so tiny, so utterly inconsequential that it only exists at all because no wave has yet come by and swept it away.

But the story of Diego Garcia is not just the story of any old island. From its early settlement by France, and then by the British East India Company, to the expulsion of a community who had made the atoll their home for generations, to the immense geopolitical relevance of Diego Garcia in the modern world, the island has been a lightning rod for controversy for the better part of three centuries. This story winds through indentured servitude, forced exile, military occupation, WikiLeaks, environmental conservation, and even an alleged CIA black site, all in service to the island of Diego Garcia.

## Where in the World is Diego Garcia?

The voyage to Diego Garcia is an arduous one, no matter which way you slice it. Embark on a journey to the island from the Tanzanian coastline, and you&apos;ll have to sail a ship over 3,500 kilometers of nearly entirely open ocean. Set sail from Australia, and the journey&apos;s even longer, just short of five thousand kilometers. Your best bet is to leave from the city of Kanniyakumari, India, but even then, you&apos;ll sail a line nearly directly south for eighteen hundred kilometers before you can finally set foot on dry land.

Diego Garcia is a coral atoll, situated on the southernmost tip of a massive underwater mountain range. Along that range, you&apos;ll find the Maldives, the Indian island chain of Lakshadweep, and the Chagos Archipelago, of which Diego Garcia is the largest among some sixty individual islands. On the scale of global atolls—a type of ring-shaped, coral-rimmed island encircling a lagoon—Diego Garcia is the largest in the world. However, that certainly doesn&apos;t mean that it&apos;s big; although it occupies about 174 square kilometers in total, just a small portion of that, 27 square kilometers or ten square miles, are actually dry land. Circling around a large central lagoon in a shape that, if you squint a bit, looks almost like a bent version of Greenland, Diego Garcia is no more than a couple of hundred meters wide in some parts. The atoll, plus a few scattered islands in the immediate vicinity, sit barely above the surface of the sea, enduring frequent earthquakes that, at times, can measure at a 4 or higher on the Richter scale.

Perhaps the most pleasant way to imagine Diego Garcia is to see it almost as a vacation spot. Its equatorial climate is warm all day and night, hitting around thirty degrees Celsius, eighty-six Fahrenheit, on the warmest days of the year, and despite its humidity, the island is washed in a constant westerly breeze that rarely ventures above ten knots. It&apos;s got a clear wet season and dry season; thunderstorms typically sweep through the area on summer evenings, and as far as extreme weather goes, it&apos;s at almost no risk of cyclones compared to most of the Indian Ocean. There are no mountains or cliff faces to navigate, either; the highest point on the atoll is all of 22 feet, seven meters, above sea level. Rainwater can be easily collected in cisterns or taken from a few natural depressions, and what little inland area exists on Diego Garcia is largely overtaken by tropical wetlands, with the occasional marsh or scrubland. The outer-facing and lagoon-facing edges, of course, feature enough sandy beaches to make a sunbather weep with joy.

The story of Diego Garcia is the story of an island that has been fundamentally altered by the presence of humans, but in order to really understand that story in full, we&apos;ve got to first take a look at what the island would have been like before people showed up. Diego Garcia was completely uninhabited before its discovery by Portuguese explorer Pedro Mascarenhas, although it may have been host to the occasional stranded prehistoric fisherman or have been visited by Austronesian or Arab voyagers. As we&apos;ve just described, the atoll is teeming with plant life, but like many of the islands of this area, there are no mammal, land reptile, or amphibian species native to Diego Garcia. Instead, it&apos;s a critical breeding ground for seabirds and both hawksbill and green turtles, while its beaches are ruled by the surprisingly hefty coconut crab and the warrior crab. It&apos;s one small part of a sprawling oceanic ecosystem, one that likely existed without much change for millennia before humans arrived.

## Life Before 1967

After Pedro Mascarenhas and his ship arrived at the atoll in 1512, the first order of business was to give the place a name. It wouldn&apos;t have been a bad guess when you first started in on this story to assume that the island of Diego Garcia was named after some guy named Diego Garcia—but no such luck. The atoll was first dubbed Dom Garcia in honor of the Portuguese nobleman Garcia de Noronha, the benefactor who had funded Pedro Mascarenhas&apos; voyage. Although the atoll was largely forgotten after Mascarenhas&apos; departure, the &quot;Garcia&quot; name came back in 1544, when another explorer rediscovered it. This guy&apos;s name *was* Diego Garcia, specifically Diego Garcia de Moguer, and he named the island after himself, leading to a lot of confusion on the maps of the time. Making matters worse, a prominent map that did depict the atoll featured a misspelled note in the area of the island, which was meant to say &quot;deo gracias,&quot; or &quot;thank God,&quot; and even though the first English-language map that depicted the island called it Diego Garcia, this was likely a misreading of either &quot;D. Gratia&quot; or &quot;Dio Gratia&quot; on a Portuguese-language map. But by this time, the atoll had already stumbled its way into the name &quot;Diego Garcia,&quot; and when that name was picked up by subsequent mapmakers, it became as good as official. All this, to disabuse you of the thought that prior generations of explorers had their shit together.

Regardless of the name it carried, Diego Garcia went uninhabited until the late 1770s. By then, the atoll and the rest of the Chagos Archipelago were under the administration of the French, and a short-lived settlement cropped up there courtesy of one Monsieur Dupuit de la Faye. As best as historians can tell, not much went on in this settlement except for a bit of fishing and coconut-collecting, which, now that we think of it, is not a euphemism but really should be. French surveyors had found the atoll somewhat useless in terms of an expanded settlement; in the words of one Lieutenant La Fontaine, who appraised the island in 1770, &quot;A great number of vessels might anchor there&quot;—meaning in Diego Garcia&apos;s lagoon—&quot;but the principle object is wanting: for though it is covered with woods, it is not provided with fresh water.&quot; By 1786, Diego Garcia&apos;s early settlers were already gone, and so the atoll was abandoned again when, in that year, the British East India Company came calling. Despite their attempt to settle the island, with an initial community of some 275 people, a nearby shipwreck of another East India Company ship all but doomed the settlement when another 250 survivors clambered ashore, desperately in need of food and water. By now, travelers to the area had already learned that shipwrecks were common on the great underwater reefs that surrounded the atoll at this time. The castaways&apos; drain on supplies ended up making the settlement untenable, and the East India Company, too, picked up and left. France had actually sent a naval frigate to try and boot the British off the island, but by the time it arrived, they were already gone. Next, Diego Garcia was a destination used by the French colony of Mauritius, who decided to maroon some lepers there, and a few years later, France moved back in, this time bringing slave labor to the atoll in an effort to start a coconut plantation. Two ships, each carrying some twenty-five men as well as slaves, were able to establish themselves on the island and form a profitable settlement, this one producing sun-dried coconut flesh, or copra, and coconut oil. With their success, more oil manufacturers arrived, and after Mauritius continued to send lepers to the island, it developed several smaller communities, including a leper colony.

By 1814, Diego Garcia passed from French control into British hands for good, courtesy of the Treaty of Paris, which ceded a number of French territories over to the Crown after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. By then, the atoll had already proven its worth as a small plantation colony, and it was split into several plantations across the island: East Point, Minni Minni, and Pointe Marianne, with small pockets of workers scattered in villages across the rest of the island. Unfortunately for the Diego Garcia ecosystem, but predictably, the advent of large-scale plantation farming led much of the island&apos;s wetland forests to be razed to the ground, and a number of new plant and animal species were introduced to the island. Although we don&apos;t know exactly when each new species was introduced, we know that there are today about 280 terrestrial plant species on the island, compared to 36 that would have been there prior to the introduction of humans, and rats, Sicilian donkeys, horses, dogs, housecats, cane toads, and chickens formed their own version of the Diego Garcia ecosystem, grafted on top of the one that had existed there before.

With the arrival of the British came the British policy of abolition of the slave trade, but with so many former slaves now out of work and without other means to support themselves or leave, they were kept on as indentured servants working the same plantations as before. The island was surveyed and developed further, and with its high potential to generate coconut oil, compared to the relatively few resources it demanded, Diego Garcia became more and more profitable. Judging by the available data on just how much coconut oil was being produced at this time, it&apos;s likely that nearly the entire island was overtaken by growing operations, and it was able to ship out several times more of its product than comparably sized islands in the area. By 1883, the three plantations on the island had been united under the command of a single manager, a man named James Spurs, who instituted strict policies on liquor consumption, sent quota expectations through the roof, and was apparently able to keep the island in check anyhow, mostly owing to what period sources describe as his competency and benevolence toward the island&apos;s workers.

Around this same time, portions of the island were set aside as coal depots for ships making the long journey across the Indian Ocean, with some 180 ships a year being fueled within a couple years of the operation&apos;s start. So as not to infringe on the work of the plantations there, visiting ships were prohibited from allowing their crews and passengers to set foot on the island other than to refuel, but these guidelines were quickly and frequently violated by large ships filled with migrants, whose crews had trouble keeping everyone hemmed in when land was in sight. The rise in unlawful entries led to the establishment of a police force, which in turn exacerbated the labor disputes already ongoing between the plantations and their workers. In the words of one G. C. Bourne, who visited the island in 1886, speaking about a friend who had visited previously: &quot;Mr. Leconte told me that on his arrival on the island three years ago, he found the Negroes in a most insubordinate condition, and that within a month of his landing, his verandah was besieged by a body of thirty men, armed with knives and bludgeons, who declared that they would not leave the place until they had taken his life. Luckily for him they were as cowardly as they were insolent, and he was able to keep them at bay presenting a revolver, until he had succeeded in reducing them to a more reasonable state of mind.&quot; We can only imagine, in retrospect, what the context behind such an act may have been, and what the actual objective of thirty armed, organized plantation workers may have been.

It wasn&apos;t long after this point that coaling operations on Diego Garcia were shut down. Not only had they led to turmoil on the island, but the whole endeavor had been unprofitable too, and before long, the atoll was strictly dedicated to providing coconut products again. A chapel was built on Diego Garcia, then a church, then a jetty and light railway, and then a center of commerce at East Point, in a sign of the growing economic stability—or even economic power—of this little island. New technologies made the Diego Garcia plantations favor production of copra instead of coconut oil, and by this time, it&apos;s believed that production was reaching its eventual maximum, some 5.3 million coconuts yielded per year—just about half the coconut production of the entire British Indian Ocean Territory.

But coconuts weren&apos;t the only reason that Diego Garcia mattered at the turn of the twentieth century; with global war on the horizon, its spacious lagoon, located way out in the middle of nowhere, was a perfect oceanic anchorage for any one of the world&apos;s major powers to, say, park a battleship or two in advance of major hostilities. In 1899, the atoll hosted the German warships *Bismarck* and *Marie*, and the British warship *Hampshire*, and after war broke out in 1914, a German ship, the *Emden*, stopped over at Diego Garcia to refuel and clean while it was being chased by English warships. Although Diego Garcia was very much a British protectorate at that time, and thus on the other side of the war, word hadn&apos;t yet reached the island that there was a war at all, so the *Emden*&apos;s damage was explained away as having come from storms, and its officers were wined and dined before departing just in advance of their British pursuers. By and large, World War I avoided the Indian Ocean, and Diego Garcia was not otherwise involved in the conflict, but in World War II, it was used to support naval craft, refuel flying boats like the Catalina, and otherwise keep British operations going in the area.

## Forcible Expulsion and Militarization

Up until this point, Diego Garcia had been a quiet, stable settlement that was, if not frozen in time, then at the very least resistant to change. Increased productivity had raised the overall quality of life on the atoll, the occasional visitors by sea had added to island life in both positive and negative ways, but all told, the status quo on Diego Garcia hadn&apos;t substantively changed in well over a hundred years. Through modernization, through abolition, through the Great Depression and two World Wars, Diego Garcia carried on as it always had.

But it was the arrival of the Cold War that would change everything on Diego Garcia, not in those first few desperate years of factional alignment and nuclear development, but in the years that immediately followed the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1965, the British government detached Diego Garcia and the rest of the Chagos Archipelago from the oversight of Mauritius, and instead incorporated it into the British Indian Ocean Territory, just in time for it to be subject to an agreement made with the United States. According to this pact, both nations would share free, unrestricted use of the British Indian Ocean Territory for military purposes, for a period of at least fifty years.

As we&apos;d mentioned before, Diego Garcia has had the potential to be militarily significant since it was first charted. If, say, fuel could be stored there, or supplies, it could be a valuable depot way out in the ocean, and its large lagoon ensured that numerous ships could potentially stay over, but in an era of ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and ships with ranges of up to thousands of kilometers before refueling, plus the arrival of the first nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, an island like this was a massive strategic asset for whomever controlled it. Similar to how Soviet ties to the island of Cuba made it a regional player in the affairs of Central and South America, a US/UK-controlled naval base at Diego Garcia could allow both nations to extend their influence all up and down East Africa, South Asia, the Philippines, and Australia. Not only that, but it could serve as a valuable home base in American efforts to interdict Russian oil moving out of the Persian Gulf. With the Vietnam War still very much an active conflict, plus a whole range of other unfriendly nations in the area, the value of a militarized Diego Garcia was apparently too great to ignore.

But after they signed their compact with the Americans, the British military didn&apos;t stay for long. By 1968, Britain had made public its intent to withdraw from all military holdings east of the Suez Canal, including not just Malaysia and Singapore, but Diego Garcia as well. Although this decision was ultimately an unavoidable one for the waning British Empire, beset as they were by a stark economic decline and forced to recalibrate toward Europe, it had the collateral effect of raising questions about what an Indian Ocean without Britain&apos;s influence would look like. This so-called &quot;Vacuum in the Indian Ocean&quot; didn&apos;t last for long, of course; after all, the United States and the Soviet Union both had something of a reflexive reaction to send military assets to any corner of the world that didn&apos;t seem sufficiently involved in their global standoff. Predictably, this turned into yet another small arms race in a war of many arms races, and by the time Britain left the area, the Americans and the Soviets had more than filled in the gaps.

Diego Garcia was a particularly thorny issue during this time, on both sides of the divide. American logic at the time held that the Soviets would try anything to keep America from establishing a large-scale naval presence, for which Diego Garcia was something of an ideal center if it could be consistently resupplied, while the Soviets were particularly concerned about the US turning the atoll into a communications base. If that were to happen, the Soviets believed, then it would be because Diego Garcia had become a command-and-control center to coordinate the operations of ballistic-missile submarines in the Indian Ocean, submarines whose missiles would, of course, be pointed at the Soviet Union. America never acknowledged whether or not these submarines were present, Russia began dispatching its own warships to the Indian Ocean much more frequently, and the &quot;Vacuum in the Indian Ocean&quot; quickly became the least of anyone&apos;s concerns.

Now, even with all this upheaval in the region, Diego Garcia&apos;s plantations had been able to survive, harvesting coconuts and churning out copra oil at an average of four million nuts a year. But all that changed on January 23, 1971, when a nine-man team from the US Navy arrived to survey potential locations for a beach landing. Within two months, those nine men would swell to over two hundred, clearing beaches, installing navigational aids for incoming ships, and mapping the underwater areas under both the lagoon and the seas surrounding Diego Garcia. By March 24, 1971, the Navy broke ground on its so-called US Naval Communication Facility Diego Garcia, along with a nearby runway—first an interim version, and later, a fully functional, permanent military airstrip.

Then, full construction began, and any Diego Garcia inhabitants who might have thought this would only be a minor change to their way of life were quickly disabused of their optimism. Transmitter buildings, receiver buildings, a full military encampment, and the atoll&apos;s permanent runway were all under construction by the end of the year, and on Christmas Day, 1971, the Bob Hope Christmas Troupe arrived aboard a C-141J cargo transport, breaking in the runway for a good bit of caroling.

But as the US Navy&apos;s Seabees were enjoying their hot cocoa, the people of Diego Garcia and the Chagos Archipelago were suffering a very different fate. By the time Bob Hope&apos;s singers landed, most Chagossian inhabitants of Diego Garcia were already gone, with their entire population of about 1,500 islanders picked up and taken elsewhere. And we absolutely must be clear that this was not a willful or even a compensated departure for the islanders, but a forced expulsion.

Starting in 1965, the Diego Garcia islanders had been systematically rounded up, processed, and directed to leave the island. First, Britain and the US declared that all Chagossians who were not on Diego Garcia at the time of their arrival would not be able to return regardless of the reason they had left. Not only that, but those remaining on the island were informed that they could not seek employment with the incoming naval base in order to stay. Then, a regime of import restrictions was used to create scarcity all up and down the atoll, taking away not just frivolous goods but fundamental ones. Then, the threats began; the islanders&apos; beloved pet dogs were rounded up and killed, with a mix of poison, gas, burning, and bullets, and their homes were demolished, as ordered by the British commissioner of the Indian Ocean Territory, and carried out with the direct assistance of the US Navy. Finally, 1971&apos;s Immigration Ordinance No. 1 was passed, prohibiting all Chagossians from entering or remaining on the islands.

When the time for evictions finally came, the Chagossians were mostly transported in the cargo holds of rusted-out ships, with some accounts of the islanders being forced to sleep on bird fertilizer. It should go without saying that this alone, done by British administrators to a mostly-black population whose ancestors had come to Diego Garcia as slaves, was already reminiscent of a long history of slavery and forced expulsion. Taken to the Seychelles, they were detained for a time until the British government decided what was to be done with them, and once a decision was made, they were loaded up again and shipped to Mauritius. There, instead of the homes and jobs they were promised, they found broken-down, dilapidated housing, formerly used by dock workers, with no access to clean water or electricity. Interviews with those who have survived, done by journalist John Pilger for Al Jazeera, describe the death of no fewer than twenty-six of Diego Garcia&apos;s families in those conditions, at least nine suicides, and several instances of girls being forced into prostitution on Mauritius in order to feed their families.

Their predicament wouldn&apos;t even be minimally addressed until 1982, a full decade or more after most had left Diego Garcia, and in the same year that Britain went to great lengths to protect and transport a roughly equivalent number of white islanders from the Falkland Islands, off the coast of Argentina. In that year, demonstrations by the Diego Garcia islanders in 1982 earned them compensation of less than 3,000 British pounds each. In exchange for those payments, Chagossians from not just Diego Garcia, but the entire archipelago, were expected to sign or thumbprint documents that gave up their right to return to the archipelago. Those documents, written in English and using legal terms that were never explained to the Chagossians, were apparently more than enough for the British government to feel as if they&apos;d washed their hands of the matter. And even this, for the Chagossians of Mauritius, was better than what waited for those who sought refuge in the Seychelles. They, a population of 232 souls, received nothing.

Returning to the island of Diego Garcia itself, the removal of the Chagossians set off a full militarization of the atoll. Within a couple of years of their departure, the naval base there featured an 8,000-foot runway, plus supply depots, personnel accommodations, and logistical support infrastructure. The lagoon was cleared out of obstructions, including coral reefs, in order to form a ship channel and a turning basin, and the airport was dramatically expanded to store aircraft for the long term. A few years later, the island was designated a Naval Support Facility, and its runway was expanded to 12,000 feet in order to accommodate the largest aircraft of America&apos;s military arsenal. Its lagoon, now partially built into a harbor, was expanded and used to dock a permanent fleet of some seventeen ships, all loaded up with enough equipment, ammunition, and other supplies to support a Marine Amphibious Brigade on a moment&apos;s notice for crisis response.

In many ways, the size and scale of operations on Diego Garcia were a reflection of the many setbacks the US faced around that time, a long list of which happened within relative proximity to the island. The fall of Saigon, the victory of the Khmer Rouge, Soviet buildup in the region, and more, all clarified to the United States and the United Kingdom that anything less than an island version of a citadel risked a sort of unpreparedness in the region that the US was unwilling to stomach. After the Iranian Revolution and the Iran Hostage Crisis, the US relied on Diego Garcia to host heavy bombers and dozens of ships, including some of the largest naval vessels in the world, plus storage for well over a million barrels of fuel, and when US bases in the Philippines closed in the early 1990s, the base only got bigger.

During the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Diego Garcia was placed optimally to support the global coalition&apos;s response, and achieved a level of operational readiness throughout the conflict that went well above and beyond what the military, or the rest of the world, had expected. Diego Garcia was the only naval base to launch offensive operations during Operation Desert Storm, and its personnel were able to handle up to a 2000% increase in their workload during the crisis, without missing a beat. So, too, was it a launchpad for air operations in Afghanistan, with heavy bombers and tankers completing an eight-thousand-mile round trip in order to get it done. Far from being a deterrent, that eight-thousand-mile trip was the one most favored by the US military, and Diego Garcia&apos;s coalition aircraft dropped more ordnance on al-Qaeda and the Taliban than any other US military unit during the entire War on Terror. The island even hosted high-tech B-2 Spirit bombers in specialized, climate-controlled shelters, and at times had some of the highest concentration of B-2s in the world.

## Enter the 21st Century

Today, Diego Garcia remains under the control of the US military, and under the ownership of the United Kingdom. Amidst rising tensions with China, escalation between India and Pakistan, and innumerable crises in Africa and Asia, the base on Diego Garcia is an increasingly important asset for the United States and its Western partners, one of only a few major bases in that part of the world. Personnel stationed there live without their families present, reliant on back-and-forth flights to Singapore for transit in and out, and expected to hop onto one of those flights to receive things like dental care. The island does have a nine-hole golf course, though, so… there&apos;s something, we suppose.

However, the question of &quot;what&apos;s being kept on Diego Garcia&quot; has a lot less to do with a golf course, and a lot more to do with nuclear weapons. The United States has a longstanding policy of not confirming or denying whether nuclear weapons are present aboard its aircraft, naval vessels, and ballistic-missile submarines, but with so many nuclear-capable assets stationed there, it seems rather unlikely that not a single warhead would have ever passed across Diego Garcia&apos;s sandy shores. The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty claims to cover Diego Garcia, but neither the US nor the UK agree with that interpretation, and neither government has ever clarified whether nuclear weapons have ever been stored there.

And nukes aren&apos;t the only unwelcome visitors on Diego Garcia, either—or at least, not allegedly. In 2015, a former colonel of the US Army, Lawrence Wilkerson, claimed that Diego Garcia had been used by the American Central Intelligence Agency for what he called &quot;nefarious activities.&quot; Wilkerson, who had, until recently, served as Chief of Staff to US Secretary of State Colin Powell, gave this cryptic quote to Vice News: &quot;What I heard was more along the lines of using it as a transit location when perhaps other places were full or other places were deemed too dangerous or insecure, or unavailable at the moment […] So you might have a case where you simply go in and use a facility at Diego Garcia for a month or two weeks or whatever and you do your nefarious activities there.&quot;

What Wilkerson was referring to was the kidnap-and-torture program used by the Central Intelligence Agency in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks. Essentially, Wilkerson alleged that Diego Garcia is, or was, home to a CIA black site, a location where undisclosed or hidden projects or programs are conducted away from the public eye. According to the United Nations, the CIA is believed to have formed at least twenty black sites around the world since 9/11, and potentially more. At these sites, global observers allege, detainees are tortured brutally in ways that we won&apos;t be going into here.

By the time Wilkerson made his statements, enough people around the world had heard of a CIA black site on Diego Garcia that a number of international sources were compelled to speak out. A UN official, Manfred Nowak, added that sometimes, CIA detainees are held and tortured on US ships in the Indian Ocean. One terrorist known as Hambali, who was believed to have been involved in a 2002 bombing in Bali that killed 202 people, is believed to have spent two months on Diego Garcia. Human rights organizations had also dug around on their own and found that at least two aircraft known to be involved with the CIA&apos;s rendition program flew in and out of the Diego Garcia airstrip. Most damning of all, US sources testified that a CIA report on its own use of torture, presented to the US Senate Intelligence Committee, referenced its use of Diego Garcia multiple times. As more information came out about the rumored black site, the world learned that Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, the so-called &quot;principal architect&quot; of the 9/11 attacks, spent time there while in CIA custody. Whether that site still exists today, we don&apos;t know, but when a US Senate intelligence report was released in 2014, detailing the CIA&apos;s torture programs, Diego Garcia was never mentioned. We&apos;ll leave it to you to assume whether that means the site never existed at all, or whether it was deemed important enough to keep hidden for later use.

Then, there&apos;s the continued efforts of the Chagossian population and their backers to return to Diego Garcia and the surrounding islands, efforts that have been consistently rebuffed by the US and the UK. Although Britain&apos;s High Court in London ruled their expulsion illegal in 2000, Tony Blair&apos;s government avoided repercussions by bypassing the courts with an archaic trick of the monarchy, and when the High Court ruled that Chagossians should be allowed to return to their home, the British Foreign Office successfully appealed the decision. In the words of journalist John Pilger, who we mentioned earlier: &quot;I was in the House of Lords—where the court then sat on the day of the judgment. I have never seen such shame-faced judges in what was clearly a political decision.&quot;

As if that weren&apos;t enough, the British government then went on to add insult to injury, attempting to insulate themselves further against a Chagossian return by attempting to designate the waters around the archipelago as a nature reserve. This action, along with many others of the time, was revealed via a WikiLeaks dump that published a 2009 cable from a US embassy about the issue. In that cable, the embassy directly stated that the establishment of a marine reserve would be &quot;the most effective long-term way to prevent any of the Chagos Islands&apos; former inhabitants or descendants from resettling.&quot; These revelations were confirmed with the exposure of another cable, in which the British government wrote, &quot;[…] the establishment of a marine park—the world&apos;s largest—would in no way impinge on USG use of the BIOT&quot;—that&apos;s the British Indian Ocean Territory—&quot;including Diego Garcia, for military purposes.&quot; And later, in the same document: &quot;[…] the BIOT&apos;s former inhabitants would find it difficult, if not impossible, to pursue their claim for resettlement on the islands if the entire Chagos Archipelago were a marine reserve.&quot; This reserve, the Chagos Marine Protected Area, was declared in 2010, although it would be ruled illegal by the Hague in 2015 and dissolved.

In the following years, Mauritius would go to war with Britain over ownership of the Chagos Archipelago, supported by their close ally India in claims that the islands should have already been reverted to Mauritian control. But in terms of its potential impact on the Chagossian islanders-in-exile, Mauritius isn&apos;t much better of an alternative. The Mauritian envoy to the United Nations has claimed that if Mauritius did regain sovereignty over the archipelago, Chagossians will be allowed back to some of the islands, but not Diego Garcia itself. Instead, they&apos;d be placed on three islands over a hundred miles away. The archipelago features prominently in Mauritius&apos; own internal squabbles, specifically between two political dynasties who have passed power back and forth in the last few decades. Whoever gets back sovereignty over the islands can lease Diego Garcia back to the Americans and make a whole lot of money, while also opening up fishing routes that are currently closed off.

And even after all this, there&apos;s yet more controversy to discuss around Diego Garcia—specifically, a conspiracy theory naming the atoll as the final resting place of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, which disappeared on the eighth of March, 2014 while en route from Malaysia to China. The incident, still unexplained to this day, sparked mass speculation on what might have happened to the flight, and Diego Garcia has played a rather prominent role. In an exploration of the MH370 pilot&apos;s personal belongings, investigators discovered that he had programmed the location of Diego Garcia, and its landing strip, into his home flight simulator. The reason why he may have done so is unknown. Other theories range from the digitally vulnerable Boeing 777 having been taken over by hackers, to the flight being shot down by the United States when the pilot, hypothetically, brought it close to the island for his own purposes.

The island has also hosted a group of migrants for nearly two years, after a fishing boat was intercepted near the island in October 2021. Struggling to move under its own power, the boat was stuffed with eighty-nine Sri Lankan Tamils, who claimed they were fleeing persecution at home. According to maps, diary entries, and GPS coordinates found aboard the boat, its passengers had believed that they would be able to make it to Canada and seek asylum, but ran into rough weather and were forced to sail toward the nearest source of light. But after arriving to the island, and being placed into temporary accommodation, these eighty-nine people have basically been swallowed up by the base there. Unsuccessful in lobbying the commander of British forces on Diego Garcia for safe passage elsewhere, they have since lived in makeshift tent encampments, with reports of suicide attempts, sexual assaults, and rampant mental and physical health concerns among the migrants. They&apos;ve also started to get company, with other boats in similar situations either intentionally or unintentionally ending up seeking help from Diego Garcia in the intervening months. With many of the migrants there claiming fears for their own safety if they were to go back to Sri Lanka, in part due to some of their past affiliations to the Tamil Tigers organization, their situation is in limbo, and hunger strikes, even ones involving the children at their encampment, have not led to any change for the sixty-or-so people who haven&apos;t yet been sent elsewhere. Said one migrant, when quoted by the BBC: &quot;We are the parrots; We are in a cage.&quot;

As for where things on Diego Garcia stand now, it&apos;s worth returning once more to the plight of the Diego Garcia islanders and the other Chagossians who were expelled from their homes, now over fifty years ago. Earlier this year, Human Rights Watch released a comprehensive report detailing their forced removal from their island homes, and the degree to which the Chagossians had been deeply established on the islands prior to removal, with their own language, culture, and music. All this, contrasted with Britain&apos;s claims at the time of removal, that no people lived permanently on the Chagos Archipelago. The report brought Chagossian survivors and their families back into public consciousness, and calls for full reparations drew a response from both the US and the UK governments, although neither nation expressed any interest in a more comprehensive redress than what has already been done. This, according to the UK government, includes limited payments, education, community support, and sponsored trips back to the Chagossian Archipelago to visit—not nothing, but not even *slightly* the same thing as an actual plan to address the repercussions of Britain&apos;s actions.

With such a painful history, such a complex and shrouded situation in the present day, and so seemingly few points of compromise between the United States, the United Kingdom, Mauritius, India, and the Chagossians themselves, it looks as if the deeply uncomfortable set of compromises and realities around Diego Garcia will remain unchanged in the years to come. With American and British standing in the nations around the Indian Ocean only growing more contentious, it&apos;s unlikely that either nation would willfully relinquish their hold on the island, and so long as they keep it, the ancestral home of the Chagossian people will remain permanently out of their reach. It&apos;ll take a miracle to change that balance now, and of all the countless things that seem to weigh Diego Garcia down… miracles certainly aren&apos;t among them.

## Key Takeaways

- Diego Garcia, a small atoll in the Indian Ocean, has a complex history marked by colonial settlement, forced expulsion, and military use.
- The island was settled by the French and British, with coconut plantations established and later managed by indentured servants.
- In the 1960s, the UK and US agreed to use Diego Garcia for military purposes, leading to the forced expulsion of the Chagossian inhabitants.
- The island has been a strategic military base, particularly during the Cold War, Gulf War, and War on Terror, hosting nuclear-capable assets.
- Despite legal battles and international pressure, the Chagossians have not been allowed to return to Diego Garcia.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### Where is Diego Garcia located?

Diego Garcia is located in the Indian Ocean, nearly two thousand kilometers from the nearest continental landmass. It is situated on the southernmost tip of a massive underwater mountain range and is part of the Chagos Archipelago.

### What is the size of Diego Garcia?

Diego Garcia is a coral atoll with a total land area of just over thirty square kilometers. Only about 27 square kilometers of this area is dry land.

### What is the climate like on Diego Garcia?

Diego Garcia has an equatorial climate with warm temperatures year-round, hitting around thirty degrees Celsius on the warmest days. It has a clear wet season and dry season, with thunderstorms typically occurring on summer evenings. The island is also at almost no risk of cyclones compared to most of the Indian Ocean.

### What is the history of settlement on Diego Garcia?

Diego Garcia was first settled by France in the late 1770s, followed by the British East India Company in 1786. The island has seen various settlements and expulsions, including the forced removal of the Chagossian population in the 1960s and 1970s to make way for a military base.

### What is the significance of Diego Garcia in modern geopolitics?

Diego Garcia is a strategically important military base shared by the United States and the United Kingdom. It has been used for various military operations, including those in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The base is also suspected of housing nuclear weapons and alleged CIA black sites.

### What happened to the original inhabitants of Diego Garcia?

The original inhabitants of Diego Garcia, known as the Chagossians, were forcibly expelled from the island between 1965 and 1973. They were relocated to Mauritius and the Seychelles, where they faced poor living conditions and limited compensation.

### What is the current status of the Chagossians&apos; efforts to return to Diego Garcia?

The Chagossians have been fighting for the right to return to Diego Garcia for decades. Despite some legal victories, their efforts have been consistently rebuffed by the US and UK governments, which have cited military and environmental reasons for preventing their return.

### What is the Chagos Marine Protected Area?

The Chagos Marine Protected Area was established in 2010 as a nature reserve around the Chagos Archipelago. It was later ruled illegal by the Hague in 2015 and dissolved. The reserve was seen as a way to prevent the Chagossians from resettling on the islands.

### What is the controversy surrounding Diego Garcia and Malaysia Airlines Flight 370?

There is a conspiracy theory suggesting that Diego Garcia might be the final resting place of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, which disappeared in 2014. This theory is based on the discovery that the pilot had programmed the location of Diego Garcia into his home flight simulator.

### What is the current use of Diego Garcia by the US military?

Diego Garcia is currently used as a strategic military base by the US and UK. It hosts a variety of military assets, including aircraft, naval vessels, and storage facilities. The base has been involved in numerous military operations and is considered a key asset in the region.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Diego Garcia: The Most Controversial Island in the World](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XsLmrnuwYM4)
- [https://repository.si.edu/bitstream/handle/10088/34127/ARB_settlement.pdf?sequence=1&amp;amp;isAllowed=y](https://repository.si.edu/bitstream/handle/10088/34127/ARB_settlement.pdf?sequence=1&amp;amp;isAllowed=y)
- [https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2023/02/15/human-rights-watch-report-reparation-chagos-diego-garcia/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2023/02/15/human-rights-watch-report-reparation-chagos-diego-garcia/)
- [https://theconversation.com/how-the-us-and-uk-worked-together-to-recolonise-the-chagos-islands-and-evict-chagossians-177636](https://theconversation.com/how-the-us-and-uk-worked-together-to-recolonise-the-chagos-islands-and-evict-chagossians-177636)
- [https://theconversation.com/how-the-us-and-uk-worked-together-to-recolonise-the-chagos-islands-and-evict-chagossians-177636](https://theconversation.com/how-the-us-and-uk-worked-together-to-recolonise-the-chagos-islands-and-evict-chagossians-177636)
- [https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/psp.1754](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/psp.1754)
- [https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/2/25/how-britain-forcefully-depopulated-a-whole-archipelago](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/2/25/how-britain-forcefully-depopulated-a-whole-archipelago)
- [https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2010/12/british-government-mauritius](https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2010/12/british-government-mauritius)
- [https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/seabee/explore/online-reading-room/historic-topics0/diego-garcia.html](https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/seabee/explore/online-reading-room/historic-topics0/diego-garcia.html)
- [https://archive.eol.ucar.edu/projects/dynamo/documents/history.html](https://archive.eol.ucar.edu/projects/dynamo/documents/history.html)
- [https://cnrj.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSF-Diego-Garcia/About/History/#:~:text=Diego%20Garcia%20was%20discovered%20by,ship&apos;s%20captain%20or%20the%20navigator](https://cnrj.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSF-Diego-Garcia/About/History/#:~:text=Diego%20Garcia%20was%20discovered%20by,ship&apos;s%20captain%20or%20the%20navigator)
- [https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/british-indian-ocean-territory/](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/british-indian-ocean-territory/)
- [https://warontherocks.com/2021/07/overcoming-the-diego-garcia-stalemate/](https://warontherocks.com/2021/07/overcoming-the-diego-garcia-stalemate/)
- [https://www.amnestyusa.org/updates/mapping-cia-black-sites/](https://www.amnestyusa.org/updates/mapping-cia-black-sites/)
- [http://blog.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/secretdetentionmap.jpg](http://blog.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/secretdetentionmap.jpg)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/30/cia-interrogation-diego-garcia-lawrence-wilkerson](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/30/cia-interrogation-diego-garcia-lawrence-wilkerson)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/13/diego-garcia-cia-us-torture-rendition](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/13/diego-garcia-cia-us-torture-rendition)
- [https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/09/asia/chagos-islands-feature-intl/index.html](https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/09/asia/chagos-islands-feature-intl/index.html)
- [https://www.businessinsider.com/photos-diego-garcia-air-base-indian-ocean-2019-8#from-1967-to-1973-the-british-evicted-the-entire-population-of-the-chagos-islands-known-as-the-ilois-to-make-way-for-the-us-air-base-10](https://www.businessinsider.com/photos-diego-garcia-air-base-indian-ocean-2019-8#from-1967-to-1973-the-british-evicted-the-entire-population-of-the-chagos-islands-known-as-the-ilois-to-make-way-for-the-us-air-base-10)
- [https://veteranlife.com/military-history/diego-garcia](https://veteranlife.com/military-history/diego-garcia)
- [https://www.britannica.com/place/Diego-Garcia-island-Indian-Ocean](https://www.britannica.com/place/Diego-Garcia-island-Indian-Ocean)
- [https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-65777863](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-65777863)
- [https://cnrj.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSF-Diego-Garcia/](https://cnrj.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSF-Diego-Garcia/)
- [https://installations.militaryonesource.mil/in-depth-overview/navy-support-facility-diego-garcia](https://installations.militaryonesource.mil/in-depth-overview/navy-support-facility-diego-garcia)
- [https://inkstickmedia.com/the-us-base-at-diego-garcia-holds-a-dirty-secret/](https://inkstickmedia.com/the-us-base-at-diego-garcia-holds-a-dirty-secret/)
- [https://amti.csis.org/decolonizing-diego-garcia-a-boon-for-india/](https://amti.csis.org/decolonizing-diego-garcia-a-boon-for-india/)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c2/Diego_Garcia_Abandoned_Plantation.jpg) by Steve Swayne from Maleny, Australia / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Dzerzhinsk: Russia&apos;s Insane Chemical Weapon Wasteland</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/dzerzhinsk-russia-insane-chemical-weapon-wasteland</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/dzerzhinsk-russia-insane-chemical-weapon-wasteland</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Chemicals. Everything is made of them. We all need them and some are certainly better than others. The science of chemistry has led to the creations of many great man-made miracles, such as medicines, soaps, detergents, automotive products, computer components and even some foods. Yes, chemistry is a dream.

But it can also be a nightmare. You see chemistry can make some wonderful, innovative and truly destructive things. But it&apos;s the things that it can leave behind on an industrial scale that reveal true horror. We&apos;re going to take you to the place where Mother Nature was brutally murdered; a place where the life expectancy is almost 20 years lower than everywhere else in Russia. What happened here? Who caused this widespread destruction? And who are the people living in this city&apos;s rotting corpse today?

The area that Greenpeace called the most polluted place on earth. A chemical wasteland more toxic than any other.

No, not your ex&apos;s house.

Dzerzhinsk.

## A Secret Soviet City

Dzerzhinsk is a small city in western Russia located in the Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and lies around 230 miles east of the Russian capital of Moscow. It sits on the Oka River, which is one of two main tributaries of the Volga, Europe&apos;s longest and Russia&apos;s most important river. Today, its population is around 218,000 people. It was previously known as Rastyapino, but in 1929 it was renamed in honour of Feliks E. Dzerzhinsky, the first head of the Ceska or Soviet secret police organisation. How unfortunate that the same secrecy would lead to the widespread pollution of the landscape.

You see Dzerzhinsk for a long time was a secret Soviet city, as they were manufacturing things there that had to be kept secret. Chemical weapons. That secrecy persisted for a very long period of time. So much so, outsiders were still barred from entering the region even decades after chemical weapons were no longer manufactured there. Even now, for a foreigner to visit the city, you technically need a VISA and an invitation from someone within the municipal government that oversees the region. Dzerzhinsk&apos;s own website does mention tours of the city, but it is unclear whether this is meant for visiting Russians from other parts of the nation or whether this would extend to foreigners. The industrial use of chemicals was also common here. By 1939, the Soviet&apos;s first Five-Year Plan under Joseph Stalin came into effect. It massively boosted the city industrially, technologically and economically. In a little over a decade, Dzerzhinsk evolved from a settlement with fewer than 10,000 residents in 1926, to a city with over 100,000 residents by 1939. This transformed it from small Russian backwater in the Nizhniy Novgorod oblast to a chemical industrial hub feeding the wider USSR.

But that feeding took a dangerous toll on the landscape and the people. The regulations were lax and within just a few short decades the city of Dzerzhinsk went from one of Soviet pride to national shame. But why exactly is this small slice of Russia so polluted? And what are the consequences for the people that live here?

## The Toxic Wasteland – Why is Dzerzhinsk so Polluted?

Manufacturing of chemical weapons started in 1941 and officially ended in Dzerzhinsk in 1965, with large amounts of waste material including arsenic and countless other toxic pollutants being buried in dumps directly on the sites of factories. Full dismantling of a facility that manufactured the chemical agent known as yperite, or mustard gas, commenced in 1994. However, as of 1998, the production unit of the poisonous gas lewisite had still not been completely disassembled. As you can see this isn&apos;t relegated to just one area or factory, it&apos;s an ongoing theme across the city of Dzerzhinsk. Toxic dumps are everywhere.

Dzerzhinsk&apos;s largest factory is the Sverdlov plant. It is a Russian federal state enterprise and is on the presidential list of the country&apos;s strategic enterprises. It creates munitions, battle and industrial explosives as well as chemicals for industrial uses. Another factory named Korund JSC used to produce cyanide before producing corundum for lasers but it was eventually shuttered in 2004 owed to bankruptcy. Various other factories litter the landscape all with their own toxic chemical processes, which combined with shoddy Russian regulations and poor sanitation enabled by the state, has led to it becoming a toxic wasteland over time. Dangerous chemicals have been slowly seeping their way into the groundwater beneath the city that many use as drinking water with disastrous results. In an excellent documentary from a little YouTube channel known as &quot;Vrpo World Stories&quot;, Jelle Brandt and his team travelled to the city in 2018 to see what life is like there. His footage documents the tap water in hotels coming out in a disgusting grey colour.

The Blacksmith Institute, an international ecological NGO, released a report on Dzerzhinsk in 2007, labelling it as one of the most polluted cities in the world. The Guiness Book of World Records went one step further, tagging it the most polluted city in the world in the same year. Blacksmith&apos;s report states that the life expectancy in Dzerzhinsk is shockingly low (at least as of 2007) with women living to an average age of 47 years old. Meanwhile men only live to an average of 42. The Life expectancy in the rest of Russia was around 64 years old at that time, a full 20 years ahead of Dzerzhinsk. In 2003, the city&apos;s death rate exceeded the birth rate by 260%. Meaning that for every person born in Dzerzhinsk that year, 2.6 people lost their lives. The death rate was reported as being 17 per 1,000 people, as opposed to the rest of the nation which sits at 14 per 1,000 people, equating to hundreds more deaths every year than elsewhere in Russia. Once sworn to secrecy, Dr Muradian, of the city&apos;s maternity hospital told the BBC in 2003: &quot;This year the death rate exceeds the birth rate by 2.6 times. If, on average, six to eight babies are born each 24 hours, 15 to 18 people die. The situation is simply catastrophic.&quot; The Blacksmith Institute also names sarin, lewisite, sulfur mustard, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, lead, and other organic chemicals among the worst pollutants. Some reports place up to 150 different highly dangerous foreign chemicals in Dzerzhinsk&apos;s water supply. The Director of the Regional Ecological Monitoring Centre at Dzerzhinsk, Sergei Ditatiev, admitted some horrifying figures to the BBC when discussing the sheer scale of the situation: &quot;Over 1,150 sources of pollution have been discovered. Of these more than 150 are of the most dangerous type. Among them, 24 main pollutants were specified as deadly dangerous for our health.&quot; It&apos;s a miracle anyone makes it to 50.

But wait, Blacksmith&apos;s report gets worse. Parts of Dzerzhinsk&apos;s water are contaminated with dioxins and phenol – two highly dangerous substances that are at levels seventeen million times the safe limit for humans. Dzerzhinsk&apos;s environmental agency according to Blacksmith estimates that almost 300,000 tons of chemical waste were dumped in the city between 1930 and 1998. And you thought your best friend&apos;s relationship was toxic. The Committee on Ecology of the Russian State Duma also considered Dzerzhinsk among the top ten cities with disastrous ecological conditions in a report that came out in 2004. In that same report, it was recommended that ten affected cities (of which Dzerzhinsk was one) would need 7 billion Rubles, or 238 million US dollars, every year for 10 years in order to clean them up. Suffice to say that they did not get that funding. Alexander Kosarikov, deputy chairperson of the Committee on Ecology stated in 2007 that Dzerzhinsk is &quot;among the ten most ecologically unfavourable territories of the Russian Federation.&quot; He also added that poor ecology can shorten the lives of Russians by up to four years, and in regions where &quot;the environmental issue is critical&quot; the figure is twice as high, lending some credence to the life expectancy numbers. This shows even the Russian state themselves were a little concerned about the situation in Dzerzhinsk at the time. Or at the very least, one state bureaucrat was. The Russian state has done little to amend the situation since. Clearly concern does not always equal action.

## The White Sea and the Black Hole

When you get into the specific landmarks and details of Dzerzhinsk, things do not improve. &quot;The White Sea&quot; is a local 100-acre lake full of toxic sludge caused by the dumping of vast amounts of chemical waste. It&apos;s called the White Sea because of the appearance of the waste; the toxic chemical soup has gained a white colour that sits on top of the lake and the name stuck. It is so polluted that it makes Victorian London look like a 21st operating theatre. If you went swimming in it, we can only imagine you would catch every disease known to man like that one episode of Doctor Who with the cat nurses. Of course, that would be before your body completely dissolved into the chemical soup like in that one episode of Breaking Bad, before what was left of you evolved backwards into a primordial ooze. What&apos;s worse is it&apos;s not the only site in Dzerzhinsk so polluted it earned a nickname.

That honour would go to the &quot;Black hole&quot; waste heap, which is reported as being 30 feet deep and despite being smaller than the White Sea, is host to thousands of tonnes of hazardous industrial waste. It comes in third place to Reactor three at Chernobyl and the White Sea on my list of places I do not ever wish to visit. Both the black hole and the White Sea cause even more chemicals to seep into the groundwater around Dzerzhinsk, contaminating it so it can no longer be used by the city&apos;s people. But what is the solution for a place this toxic? It is hard to go and clean up 300,000 tonnes of chemical waste, some of which was dumped almost a century ago. The fact that the city&apos;s industry is gradually fading further is, perhaps paradoxically, adding to the problem. Because a number of industries are no longer in operation in Dzerzhinsk, local groundwater levels have risen, bringing the chemically contaminated water closer to the surface where it feeds Dzerzhinsk&apos;s waterways like the Oka. This poses a substantial hazard to the Volga River basin, which is fed by the Oka releasing massive amounts of arsenic, mercury, lead and dioxins into the water supply. The Volga is Europe&apos;s longest river, but more locally is the primary source of drinking water for the nearby major city of Nizhny Novgorod, which currently houses over a million people. In short, the damage is already done and inaction only exacerbates the problems downstream. According to a BBC short feature including a woman who once lived there, residents in Nizhny Novgorod often joke about the two-headed purple skinned people who live in Dzerzhinsk. Whether it&apos;s just a bit of banter between regional urban centres, or a genuine misunderstanding of the geography, the irony cannot be lost on the residents of Nizhny Novgorod that the polluted rivers are flowing directly into their city also.

## Life in the Wasteland

Most affected by all of this of course are the people who live in and around Dzerzhinsk and the Oka River basin. Blacksmith&apos;s report estimates that a quarter of the city&apos;s population work in the factories that produce the chemicals poisoning the landscape. This means that when most of these people go home, they don&apos;t escape the toxicity; they live it 24/7 and their bodies have no time to detox. The chemicals then build up over time and manifest as health problems. WorstPolluted.Org, an NGO and subsidiary of Blacksmith, reported that residents of Dzershinsk suffered from increased levels of diseases and cancers of the eyes, lungs, and kidneys, all of which contributed to the shockingly low life expectancy. It also reported that a 2013 study found that 35% of those residents living adjacent to an industrial or mining area had experienced a chronic cough with sputum, compared to just 18% of those residents who did not.

This is a difficult quagmire that the people in Dzerzhinsk are unable to escape from without physically leaving the city, which also contributes to the declining population. And unfortunately, it doesn&apos;t appear just having more children is the solution to this waning industrial city. On top of the pollution likely affecting pregnant women and their unborn children disproportionately, many do not live long enough to form stable families of their own. For those who are still alive and want to start a family, that too can be difficult. The BBC&apos;s feature on Dzerzhinsk led them to speaking with several residents of the city, one of which was Olga who had something to say about the sex lives of people in Dzerzhinsk, quoting here: &quot;Our men are poor sex performers. This is a real tragedy for our women. It&apos;s a chore for them to drag their husbands to bed.&quot; But as humorous as that might be to hear on the surface, this is no laughing matter. Jelle Brandt spoke to a doctor at the city&apos;s maternity clinic, who stated that the death rate for men was three times the birth rate, that there was an increase in male infertility, and increased prevalence of growth defects among infants, including ectopia cordis, whereby a baby is born with their heart on the outside of their body. However, the doctor comments that this was much more common during the Soviet era than today. The contaminated drinking water alongside other factors are facilitating a self-fulfilling cycle of decline in Dzerzhinsk.

Another person the BBC spoke to was Serafim, who having notched up 53 years working in the city is practically a fossil for Dzerzhinsk. Serafim has taken a stand against the environmental issues since retiring. He described how one neighbour lost their cow, again quoting here: &quot;She bought a young, strong cow, for breeding. Because she was busy getting ready for work, she didn&apos;t have time to give it water, so she hung a bucket on the cow&apos;s neck. The cow drank from it twice and dropped dead.&quot; Serafim&apos;s entire family has worked at the local factory.

Independent journalist Stanley Greene wrote a feature for the International Festival of Journalism on Dzerzhinsk which further paints the pictures of everyday horror that the people here are forced to live with. Children fish and swim in the Volga River, which is directly downstream from the aforementioned, toxic sludge lake, known as the White Sea. Many of these children unsurprisingly develop skin ulcers from the water. Dioxin infects mothers&apos; breast milk, rendering it toxic to newborns who are yet to fully establish a functioning immune system. Although, an immune system here is like putting on safety goggles before a piano comedically falls on you. You&apos;re going to be glad to have it but it&apos;s not going to do much. The same cattle that drop dead from the water consumption also graze in fields that toxic waste is buried underneath. Every facet of life and society is adversely affected by the staggering pollution here.

Another resident Jelle Brandy spoke to, commented that things were at their worst in the early 2000s. &quot;If you left the water to settle it turned brown instantly,&quot; the man said. Though interestingly enough, the same man later comments that the water is &quot;better now&quot;, despite standing next to a pale of decidedly brown water he had been pumping by hand to take home. Another said, &quot;of course I worry, for my kids too, you would too,&quot; when commenting on the extent of the pollution.

But what are the Kremlin and local government officials going to do about it? Well, given their frankly extensive portfolio of…nothing so far, it doesn&apos;t appear like the residents of Dzerzhinsk are going to receive much support from their local and national governments. One resident was quoted as saying: &quot;We have no hope in the government at all. When we made a request to Moscow for money to buy a water filtering system, we were told our town no longer existed and had been demolished in 1965.&quot; This nicely lines up with when chemical weapon production ended. I&apos;m sure many inhabitants of Dzerzhinsk would be shocked to learn of when their town was destroyed, given the 200,000 plus people still living there today.

## Controversy, Cleanup and Dzerzhinsk Today

However, not everybody is keen to accept the idea that Dzerzhinsk is the world&apos;s pollution capital. City officials from the municipal government disagree with Blacksmith&apos;s 2007 report on the city. They cite the reason for discrediting the report is that sarin has never been produced there, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the rest of the report. They also disagree with the shocking life expectancy statistics. Dzerzhinsk officials claim that the average life expectancy in their city was 64 in 2006, which would align it with national figures across the country at the time, if true. Furthermore, the public Russian ecological organisation known as DRONT, Russian for &quot;dodo&quot;, is also reported as being a source for Blacksmith&apos;s work. However, the leader of this organisation, Askhat Kayumakov, claims that they had never provided Blacksmith with any data for their report. Although it is clear that the organisations have had some collaborative work together, as they are frequently mentioned in the same circles and Blacksmith&apos;s report even suggests as such. A highlight from it reads as follows: &quot;Blacksmith has also funded the establishment of a steering committee led by a local NGO (DRONT), in cooperation with the Nizhniy Novgorod municipal government, to begin the design of a large-scale remediation and pollution mitigation plan for the entire affected area.&quot; Similarly, Kayumakov doesn&apos;t deny working with Blacksmith, but specifically not giving them any data. It&apos;s a strange line to pedal. One could be led to assume that the municipal government and DRONT were involved in some way to try and sanitise the image of the city. But what benefit would an ecological NGO have in covering for the government in this way? There&apos;s no way to know what happened here for sure, but somebody isn&apos;t telling the truth.

Let us assume for a minute though that these criticisms of the Blacksmith report are in fact valid. What causes Dzerzhink&apos;s population decline? Well, lots of things can contribute to a major population decrease in an area over time, especially in the post-Soviet world. Economic downturns, closure of factories and the slowing down of industry from its heyday will certainly be a factor in the city&apos;s decline. Those who need jobs will go elsewhere to get them if there aren&apos;t enough in the city, leading to a small brain drain. Another reason could even be the reputation of the city itself. Who wants to move to and work in a city that has been dubbed the most polluted in the whole world, where apparently men and women alike regularly don&apos;t reach their 50s. It&apos;s no place to settle down and raise a family. Would you move there? I wouldn&apos;t either.

To test this then, we need to look at a similar city in terms of size, scope, population and industrial history in order to compare them and see if there is a similar population decline there also. That brings us to the Russian city of Cherepovets. It is a good comparison site to test this hypothesis. It&apos;s also a middling-sized former industrial hub with some strategic importance to Moscow. It is a similar distance away from Moscow, sitting 230 miles due North of the capital. It has experienced a similar Soviet-era industrialisation which has since somewhat fallen away (although Cherepovets does have a more stable economic base than Dzerzhinsk today). In a similar vein to Dzerzhinsk, it is also the site of serious pollution, appearing on the same 2004 report published by the state Duma&apos;s Committee on Ecology about polluted areas of Russia. Last but not least, in 1989, it even had a similar population to Dzerzhinsk, sitting just over 300,000 people whilst Dzerzhinsk was just under. For all intents and purposes, this almost identical city is the ideal location to assess the population decline between two urban centres and determine whether the specific chemical pollution in Dzerzhinsk is having an influence on it. And the results are pretty conclusive.

Despite the same set of circumstances and even intense pollution in the area itself, Cherepovets in 2021 had over 100,000 more people living in it than Dzerzhinsk does. The population there plateaued after the Soviet collapse, whilst in Dzerzhinsk, every census since 1989 has showed a steep and regular decline in population. In just 32 years, Dzerzhinsk has lost 67,000 people, roughly equivalent to a loss of between a quarter and a fifth of the peak population. It&apos;s important to note that this will not account for the differences in the areas that we can&apos;t quantify with data which might also be contributing to the fall in population. For example, Dzerzhinsk&apos;s location to the east of Moscow versus Cherepovets&apos; in the north, or the Kremlin favouring one city over the other for whatever reason and therefore ensuring it received more resources. Even the local state apparatus and its relative efficiency could go some of the way to explaining the difference in population today, if one city was run exceptionally well and the other exceptionally poorly. However, the sheer stark contrast in numbers between both places makes it very hard to simply overlook the specific level of chemical pollution in Dzerzhinsk as a contributing factor to the city&apos;s population decline, alongside its economic slide. Sorry municipal government, it&apos;s not looking good for your excuses. It may ultimately be that municipal government officials intend to change the narrative around Dzerzhinsk, as accepting the situation for what it really is would only make the city poorer and less equipped to manage more people leaving. Some of their points may be valid, like Blacksmith&apos;s sarin question, but the overwhelming evidence from everybody else who comes here tells us that the place is a toxic wasteland.

## Cleanup Efforts and Modern Dangers

Even the Russian government appears to agree with this through the small actions they&apos;ve taken. If the pollution there was otherwise not an issue, the Russian government would not have given companies an invitation to bid to clean up the &quot;black hole&quot; garbage dump in 2016. It was won by a company called GazEnergoStroy. Which brings us nicely into our next topic; how are cleanup efforts in Dzerzhinsk actually going?

Well, it&apos;s hard to tell how much cleaning up has really happened. Blacksmith laid out plans to provide residents of the city with safe drinking water in 2004, as the contamination in the groundwater has made the natural water toxic. Given the purported Russian state official&apos;s dismissal of the city, it&apos;s hard to know if this was ever implemented. There are reports of a few small water treatment systems being built around that time for a few villages in particularly affected areas, but the scale of the problem in Dzerzhinsk means that it was like putting a band-aid on the San Andreas fault.

GazEnergoStroy started cleaning the &quot;black hole&quot; waste heap in 2016 when they won the bid, but progress has been slow. The original deadline was 2019 to clear up the waste, but reports state that, whilst waste was supposed to be neutralised around the clock, equipment downtime accounted for 49% of the time spent on site. Furthermore, more waste than expected was discovered there, which then required an extra 238 million Rubles to clear up…A 238 million Rubles that was not granted by the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources. The deadline for cleanup was pushed back to mid-2021 but, given the speed of cleanup so far, it was always unlikely it would be finished by this time. By early 2022, the Russian government had become very busy over the war in Ukraine, which has delayed any cleanup for the rest of the city, let alone just one bad spot. There have been no reports of other cleanup efforts since. Rest assured that the Sverdlov plant will have been churning out munitions for the Ukraine conflict though. So much in fact that the factory itself is one of the many entities sanctioned by the US. The US Department of State considers Sverdlov to be classified as a &quot;Defense Industrial Base&quot;.

However, Russia&apos;s &quot;special military operation&quot; has presented the city with a new kind of danger. Owing to its strategic purpose as a hub for conventional munitions manufacturing, it has increasingly become the target for Ukrainian attacks. Unconfirmed reports on Russian Telegram channels have marked explosions in the city in recent years. So now the water in the city isn&apos;t the only thing that will kill you prematurely. Given how Russia treats its ammunition depots, leaving them open and vulnerable to long range attacks, the people of the city simply have another thing to fear. There were videos published in 2022 during Russia&apos;s mass mobilisation that took many men from Dzerzhinsk to fight in Ukraine. For what its worth that might have actually increased their life expectancy. At least the recruits from there will already be well-versed in chemical warfare.

This is not the first time explosions have rocked Dzerzhinsk. In 2019, a large explosion caused one of the JSC Kristall Research institute&apos;s plants to be wiped off the map. Fortunately, no people were reported to have been killed in the blast, which is believed to have been caused by stored ammunition in the facility detonating. However, 78 people were injured and 180 nearby homes were damaged.

## The Future of Dzerzhinsk

Dzerzhinsk today is trying to rebuild itself. It now has a sushi bar and a McDonalds since opening up its doors to foreigners. Many there believe that the issues they face today are not as bad as during the Soviet era when biohazards were simply a byproduct of the state&apos;s chemical weapons production. Indeed, things in Dzerzhinsk may finally just be starting to return to some semblance of normal. But the reality is without extensive help the landscape and water is going to be poisoned for a very long time.

That&apos;s it for Dzerzhinsk. It will remain for now as having a legacy as the most polluted city in the world, whether or not it actually deserves that title today. Cleanup efforts continue to be slowed by the war, but also a general apathy towards this city that at one time was at the forefront of Soviet industrialisation and innovation. The population, now lower than it was in 1970, is a clear indicator that this toxic wasteland&apos;s best days are behind it, but the people are still there, scratching out a living with what they have. They&apos;ve been left to deal with a mess they didn&apos;t make and there just isn&apos;t the political will to change that right now and certainly not with the war ongoing. Simply put, Dzerzhinsk is going to stay this way until somebody does something serious about it. Let&apos;s hope that comes soon for the sake of the people living there.

## Key Takeaways

- Dzerzhinsk, Russia, is infamous for its severe pollution, with life expectancy significantly lower than the national average.
- The city&apos;s pollution stems from decades of chemical weapon production and industrial activities, leading to toxic waste dumps and contaminated water.
- Residents of Dzerzhinsk face high rates of diseases and cancers due to prolonged exposure to hazardous chemicals.
- Efforts to clean up the city have been slow and insufficient, with cleanup projects delayed by the war in Ukraine.
- The population of Dzerzhinsk has been declining, partly due to the city&apos;s toxic environment and economic struggles.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is Dzerzhinsk known for?

Dzerzhinsk is known for being one of the most polluted cities in the world due to its history of chemical weapon manufacturing and industrial pollution.

### What was the life expectancy in Dzerzhinsk in 2007?

In 2007, the life expectancy in Dzerzhinsk was shockingly low, with women living to an average age of 47 years old and men to an average of 42 years old.

### What are some of the major pollutants found in Dzerzhinsk?

Some of the major pollutants found in Dzerzhinsk include sarin, lewisite, sulfur mustard, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, lead, dioxins, phenol, and other organic chemicals.

### What is the &apos;White Sea&apos; in Dzerzhinsk?

The &apos;White Sea&apos; is a 100-acre lake in Dzerzhinsk filled with toxic sludge caused by the dumping of vast amounts of chemical waste. It is called the &apos;White Sea&apos; due to the white color of the toxic chemical soup.

### What is the &apos;Black Hole&apos; waste heap in Dzerzhinsk?

The &apos;Black Hole&apos; waste heap is a 30-foot-deep site in Dzerzhinsk that contains thousands of tonnes of hazardous industrial waste. It is one of the most polluted sites in the city.

### What are some of the health issues faced by residents of Dzerzhinsk?

Residents of Dzerzhinsk suffer from increased levels of diseases and cancers of the eyes, lungs, and kidneys. They also experience chronic coughs, male infertility, and growth defects among infants.

### What is the current population of Dzerzhinsk?

As of the information provided, the population of Dzerzhinsk is around 218,000 people.

### What is the Sverdlov plant in Dzerzhinsk?

The Sverdlov plant is a Russian federal state enterprise in Dzerzhinsk that creates munitions, battle and industrial explosives, and chemicals for industrial uses. It is considered a strategic enterprise by the Russian government.

### What is the current status of cleanup efforts in Dzerzhinsk?

Cleanup efforts in Dzerzhinsk have been slow. The Russian government invited companies to bid on cleaning up the &apos;Black Hole&apos; waste heap in 2016, but progress has been delayed due to various factors, including the war in Ukraine.

### What is the impact of the war in Ukraine on Dzerzhinsk?

The war in Ukraine has delayed cleanup efforts in Dzerzhinsk and made the city a target for Ukrainian attacks due to its strategic importance as a munitions manufacturing hub.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Dzerzhinsk: Russia&apos;s Insane Chemical Weapon Wasteland](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fplNqo8JYsw)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d8/Vachsky_District%2C_Nizhny_Novgorod_Oblast%2C_Russia_-_panoramio.jpg) by Senin Roman / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>El Camino De La Muerte: Bolivia&apos;s Road of Death</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/el-camino-de-la-muerte-bolivias-road-of-death</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/el-camino-de-la-muerte-bolivias-road-of-death</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Roads. The seemingly banal paths for vehicles that we interact with every day. Whether it&apos;s a dirt track or a six-lane concrete all-American highway, we all know a road when we see one. There&apos;s never much more to it: some concrete, some lines, maybe a few lights. Except on one road there is a whole lot more…and paradoxically, also a whole lot less.

Stranded almost four kilometres up in the mountains, one road stands alone for the unique fear it instils in drivers. The rate of white knuckling it here is 100 percent. In a remote part of Bolivia, near the Amazon rainforest and the capital city of La Paz, lies one of South America&apos;s most deadly killers. An unforgiving stretch of road that has claimed countless lives during the decades it&apos;s been in operation.

Today we&apos;re going to learn about a highway with a body count in the thousands. We&apos;re going to talk about its legacy, its history and most importantly, its fatalities. It exists purely as an outsider, a pariah to all road-kind. We&apos;re going to lay out for you why that status is fully deserved and why that, despite things being slightly different today, people still risk life and limb every year to travel on it. This is a place where death is literally around every corner. This is a place where mother nature rejected humanity&apos;s advances. It&apos;s a place that shouldn&apos;t exist, but it does anyway.

Better buckle your seatbelts tightly for this one as we peer into the void below. Traction control? Off. Engine? Revved. Will? Signed.

This is La Carretera de los Yungas, AKA El Camino de Muerte. The most dangerous road in the world.

## What Makes This Road So Dangerous?

So, you can probably see from the pictures, sure it&apos;s pretty perilous. But what led the Inter American Development Bank to christen it &quot;the most dangerous road in the world&quot; in 1995? Well, I think its right to start with a few numbers, and a bit of history. The North Yungas Road was first built by Paraguayan prisoners of war during the Chaco War in the early 1930s and has continued to be ever since. In what would become a sign of things to come, the BBC reported that many of the Paraguayan prisoners perished even just whilst building the road. It was built as a strategic military route, used to transport troops and supplies between the Yungas region in the Amazon to the capital city of La Paz, a route critical to Bolivian military strategists. High in the mountains and overwatching the capital, it provided a strong vantage point within the area that any military force would find beneficial.

This thin stretch of pure anxiety stretches from La Paz, the worlds highest capital at 3,660 metres in altitude, towards the town of Coroico in the Nor Yungas Province. The road doesn&apos;t mess around in getting there either. At its highest point, the road climbs to 4,650 metres above sea level at La Cumbre Pass, before making an eye-wateringly steep descent around 3,500 metres to Coroico, sitting at an altitude of only 1,200 metres. There are conflicting reports, depending on where you measure from and to about exactly how long the road is, but the commonly accepted number is 56 kilometres. This makes El Camino de Muerte one of longest stretches of continuous downhill roadway in the world. It is therefore simultaneously somewhat understandable and horrific when we learn that between 200 and 300 people died on this road every year for decades. The BBC reported that in one year alone, although they didn&apos;t specify which one, 25 vehicles careened off the steep banks of the road into the ravine below. That is one almost certainly fatal accident every two weeks, for an entire year. The same article asserts that the North Yungas Road contains drops over sheer cliffs of more than a kilometre, whilst the road itself is mostly only 3.5 metres wide, narrowing to only 3.2 metres some areas. What&apos;s wrong with that you ask? The average car is a little under two metres wide, any car would comfortably fit on it, and you&apos;re right. However, this road has two-way traffic. Bit more a tight squeeze now, isn&apos;t it? What&apos;s more, there are very few crash barriers on the road&apos;s edge to stop you tumbling to your demise. Larger vehicles that are even wider have used the road extensively in the past and still do in part today. The thought of meeting a large vehicle at a particularly narrow point and taking the outside lane with a kilometre fall to the death mere inches away is enough to make anyone&apos;s hair stand on end.

Those numbers are enough to make anybody dizzy from altitude sickness. Although the sheer height is impressive and the number of fatalities truly shocking, it is the multitude of other factors and events that can occur on this road that is the reason so many have deemed it the most dangerous road in the world. For starters, the weather and general road conditions certainly contribute to the sheer number of accidents and deaths. It&apos;s as if the land itself rejects the concept of having a road in such a perilous place. It is dry for a fair portion of the year, though the further the road extends away from La Paz and towards the Amazon rainforest, the more it resembles a dirt track. However, even in the dry weather, the dust from the road is kicked up by vehicles, lowering visibility for anyone unfortunate enough to be caught in it. Heavier vehicles only make this problem worse. What&apos;s more is that the dust and gravelly road, particularly around Chuspipata, provide an ever-present danger. If you hit a patch of gravel on the edge or your breaks aren&apos;t 100 percent functional, you&apos;ll start to skid. What would be a minor incident on any other road has life and death stakes here. Skidding doesn&apos;t just mean loss of control of the car; it means a potential fall for hundreds of metres and certain death. And that&apos;s in the dry.

The rainy season, which comes between December and February in this part of the world, makes the road even more dangerous. The dusty dirt track develops a thin layer of slick slime on the surface of the road – essentially mud saturated with water. As you can imagine, this makes the previous things we&apos;ve said about skidding and sliding on the dry gravel is made 100 times worse. So much so that some tour guides only recommend travelling on the road during the rainy season if you have a lot of experience. But here, the road does not respect its travellers and the weather has even more in store for the average driver. Depending on the altitude, you can expect to see mist and fog, which dramatically reduces visibility and given the road is extra windy with many perilous hairpin bends, there are many things that could lead to loss of control and death. That is, if being so high up, a cloud does not block your view first. The road even passes through a region of the Andes known as the Andean Cloud Forest. A unique ecosystem found in the high-altitude regions characterised by near constant fog. Winds can be harsh up here, with powerful gusts ready to send an unsuspecting cyclist plummeting to their doom. There can even be snow on the peaks. All these weather events have an effect on the road and the land that it&apos;s built into. When it is wet, rockfalls and mudslides are highly common, often completely blocking the road. Without maintenance workers on the scene quickly, it could well lead to disaster. There are stories told here of truckers who stopped for the night, too tired or simply too frightened to continue, but as they slept in their cabs the landscape was washed away around them by the rain.

As you can tell, the level of death and danger on the North Yungas Road makes it a very suspicious place. Even the most ardent atheist may find themselves paying for a blessing to the goddess Pachamama, or pouring beer into the earth as an offering to her to ensure safe passage. At night, the unlit road is even more perilous and, in a land where vehicles are not all that well maintained but are kept for many years (the average vehicle in Bolivia is 19-years-old), something as simple as working headlights could be the difference between life and death. But what is one to do if their headlights fail mid-journey here? You can&apos;t stop. You&apos;d be a goner for sure, so you must keep venturing forth into the void, regardless of the imminent danger.

Even worse still, it&apos;s the only road in all of South America where traditional road customs don&apos;t apply. In South America, everyone drives on the right, except the North Yungas Road. Here, vehicles drive on the left. Vehicles climbing up from Coroico hug the mountain and have right of way, whilst vehicles descending from La Paz take the outside path. This is in order to stop drivers coming down the road at high speeds, as it presents a real danger of death. With the threat of death looming so close, with one wrong move ready to end your life, would you fly down in a vehicle at speed? I wouldn&apos;t either. Is that all? No, it is not. Regardless of weather, conditions, the road itself, the landscape and the different driving custom, there are waterfalls on the road that fall all year round from on high. And where does that water, sometimes dropping 100 metres or more land? That&apos;s right, squarely on the road. Not only does this create that slick slime for these portions of the road all year round, but the water falling onto a vehicle or a person on a bicycle, is a particularly unwanted distraction at best and could cause you physical harm at worst.

Overall, it is easy to understand why all these factors combined make this a really dangerous place to travel. Don&apos;t just take it from me though, even a cursory look at pictures and videos of the &quot;El Camino de la Muerte&quot; confirms it is absolutely covered in memorials for those who have lost their lives on this perilous stretch of dirt. On the 24th of July 1983, a bus veered off the North Yungas Road in an area known as &quot;Devil&apos;s Curse&quot; and into the canyon below. 100 passengers on board the overcrowded vehicle lost their lives, making it the deadliest documented accident to date. It is said to be Bolivia&apos;s worst ever road accident, according to DangerousRoads.org, a semi-open-source encyclopaedia for the most dangerous roads in the world. The death does not stop there…how could it on such a perilous road? In December of 1999, eight Israeli tourists were killed in a jeep accident on the road. Whilst in 2019, a bus with 25 passengers careened off the cliff side, killing almost everyone on board. Incredibly the driver, who was found to be carelessly ignoring the signs, was only injured in the crash.

No matter the era or the technology, the sheer cliffs are the great equaliser here. There are countless other examples of people losing their lives on this road, as we mentioned, for a long time between 200-300 people lost their lives here every single year. This number equates to anywhere between a quarter and a half of the number of total homicides in all of the rest of Bolivia every year. This makes this one 56-kilometre stretch of road Bolivia&apos;s most successful serial killer. This level of sheer danger is what led to the road ultimately being labelled &quot;the most dangerous road in the world&quot; by the Inter-America Development Bank in 1995.

The locals agree with how dangerous it is too. Nik Berg, a travel journalist for the BBC, travelled along the road in the early 2000s and spoke to Captain Henard Romero of Police Rescue. In eight years of service, he personally attended 30 rescues involving approximately 250 people, yet was only able to rescue around 100. His reasoning at the time for the road being so deadly was clear, quoting here: &quot;The reason that the death toll is so high, is that the trucks and buses that travel the road are overloaded with people. In 2002 we had four buses that went over the edge.&quot; When asked what he thought of the road&apos;s moniker, he said, &quot;I do not like that term. It is just a road.&quot; Nik Berg also spoke to Timoteo, a 52-year-old man who has acted as a human traffic light on the road in particularly dangerous areas for at least a decade, warning drivers of other vehicles around perilous bends. At this time, he scratched out a living from tips given by grateful drivers and lived right there on the roadside. When asked why he undertook this task of trying to keep people safe, he stated that in 1978 he had lost his family over the edge of the cliff face and wanted to prevent other families from experiencing the pain he felt. A truly human story juxtaposed by the sheer level of death that has become ubiquitous to the road.

Over the years there have been several high-profile media pieces about the road. There was a documentary on the road on Channel 4 in the UK. Top Gear, a UK-based car programme, famously went there in 2009 during one of Clarkson, Hammond and May&apos;s many adventures together. There is a famous scene from The Bolivia Special on &quot;Death Road&quot; itself, as Clarkson creeps forward in a four-by-four on the outside of a big SUV, he hangs his arm out the window, looking down at his wheels to ensure they stay on the edge of the road and not an inch further over. It is hair-raising viewing even if you&apos;ve watched it multiple times. You can also digitally visit part of the North Yungas Road itself. You can take the intrepid, winding roads up some of the way to La Paz on Google Earth. It must be said, I feel particularly bad for the Google employee whose task that was. Thank you, mystery Google employee for risking your life so we can all enjoy a part of El Camino de Muerte from the comfort and safety of our homes.

## Is it Still the Most Dangerous Road in the World Today?

So, given its extraordinarily dangerous legacy, you would assume that it&apos;s still the most dangerous road in the world today. Right? Well, yes and no. Like so many things in this world, it&apos;s complicated. Now, nobody is suggesting this road isn&apos;t dangerous. The circumstances, statistics and countless memorials ensure the North Yungas Road will retain its legacy as the El Camino de Muerte for many years to come. However, whilst the hazards of the North Yungas Road prevail, the extent to which they still pose a risk to its users has been somewhat reduced. The road has seen several changes over the years. Some guardrails have been installed that have no doubt saved countless lives from plummeting to their dooms. What&apos;s more, is that particularly dangerous parts of the road were altered during a construction project that ended in 2006. Certain parts of the road were made wider by digging a little further into the cliffside to allow a little more room on those narrow passes.

Now the Top Gear guys went on the road in 2009 and it still looked pretty hairy there, so whilst these changes likely have helped the road actually become a little less dangerous over time, it wasn&apos;t by much. The most notable safety feature that was ever implemented for the North Yungas Road actually had nothing to do with the road itself. In 2006, following a 20-year construction period, a totally separate highway, Ruta Nacional 3, was opened to the public and acts as a bypass between Coroico and La Paz to this day. With bridges, guardrails, drainage, a paved surface, multiple lanes, road markings and a pavement for pedestrians, why would anyone else ever use the North Yungas Road again? Why risk your life when there is a perfectly safe, modern alternative where you are far less likely to fall hundreds of metres to your death? A lot of the locals agree, most use the newer road. But whilst most settlements are accessible using the new Ruta Nacional 3, a few areas continue to only be accessible via the North Yungas Road. There is a lot less traffic on the road today than there was in the past. Less traffic means fewer collisions, fewer hair-raising narrow passes and less chance of large vehicles careening off the side housing many passengers. However, even still, every year people die on this road. Inexplicably, people still use it and as a result there are still highly fatal accidents, like the bus example from 2019. The bypass had been in service for 13 years at that point and yet still people chanced it. There&apos;s also something to be said about the effect of the road&apos;s reputation on people who want to travel on it. Less traffic is safer, but there is a danger of people thinking that it was all hype and not taking this incredibly dangerous road seriously. Even for an experienced extreme cyclist or motorist, one slip, one false move or one mistake could easily see you falling to your death.

The road is still used today. However, it has quite a different clientele. Starting in the 1990s; hobbyists, enthusiasts, adrenaline junkies and nutcases alike all fly from across the world to risk their lives cycling on the road. Yes, it has now become something of an extreme sports tourist attraction and has drawn some 25,000 thrill-seekers over the years. It has developed into a cottage industry where people will pay their hard-earned money to try and not die here, but people still do. Is running tours on parts of the road dangerous? Certainly, in the 1990s it would have been extremely so. I for one would love to meet one of the smooth-brained organisms that decided that this road was a good idea to travel down in the decade that it received its infamous label.

Undoubtedly the danger is what draws people in, but there are a few things that make the road safer for tourism today, at least safer than it used to be. Large portions of the road were officially closed to regular traffic when the bypass was built but some more remote rural areas still need the road to reach places that the bypass cannot. This leads to the limited use of the roads by some motorists. It&apos;s a heartening thought nevertheless to imagine that Timoteo, who acted as a human traffic light for so long out of passion and grief, was able to honour the memory of his family by being a small part of the North Yungas Road becoming safer. This means that for the most part, it is safe to cycle the death road if you are experienced, have good equipment, the weather isn&apos;t too bad and you have a solid guide alongside mechanics, with medical and rescue staff on standby. In the peak season 250 bikes head down from La Paz every day. You too can take a trip on a bike or in a four-by-four on the death road, risking life and limb for as little as $80. You can rent guides, transport, equipment, everything you would need. But you are relying on equipment maintained by the same country that didn&apos;t put guardrails on the whole road in the first place. In tour advertisements, some warn that certain companies (who helpfully remain unnamed on the pages) do not keep their bikes and vehicles well maintained. So, if you get the wrong bike, in the wrong weather on the wrong day, what began as a safe tour through one of the world&apos;s most perilous roadways can quickly become fatal. Although it&apos;s worth noting that according to DangerousRoads.org, at least 20 cyclists have been killed on the road since 1998. So, whilst clearly still very dangerous, the road does not incur the number of casualties every year it once did.

The Municipality of Coroico, which oversees the upkeep of the North Yungas Road, introduced a fee of 50 Bolivianos, or about $7.23 for cyclists that goes towards the continued upkeep of the road&apos;s infrastructure. The money from the fees is used for everything from cleaning the public toilets en route, which is useful if you hadn&apos;t defecated yourself already by merely existing there. But it also helps pay for more crucial services like maintenance, security, emergency and rescue. The way in which you pay this fee however must be some kind of macabre joke by the Coroico Municipality that is perfectly on brand for the road itself. You pay 25 Bolivianos at the start of the road and 25 at the end. Meaning, if you didn&apos;t make it, at least you got a discount! Every cloud and all that.

So, what then? Is this really the most dangerous road in the world today? Well, kinda. Does it have the same number of accidents and fatalities that gave it that label in the 90s? No, nobody is disputing that, on every metric the road is safer today statistically than it used to be. But you also have to remember it was effectively closing most of the road that, alongside the building of Ruta Nacional 3, has made it that way. Put another way, this was a road so dangerous they had to close it and open an entirely new one. And people still die on it every single year. That is a legacy, a dark and macabre one sure, but definitely a legacy.

It&apos;s important to note there are likely other roads on earth as dangerous and potentially even more dangerous than this one, in nations like India, Pakistan, Ukraine, Turkey and Afghanistan. The label of the &quot;most dangerous road in the world&quot; given to the North Yungas Road by the Inter-America Development Bank is a useful shorthand to describe to other people just how dangerous the road is, but it&apos;s hard to actually factually ascertain which road on earth is the most dangerous. What yardstick do you use for such an experiment? Is it deaths? Deaths per mile? Is it the layout of the road itself? What about the quality of the road? Then you&apos;ve got to ask how busy is it? Do local traffic laws apply? Have things changed over time? There are a lot of factors that could affect how dangerous a road is deemed to be. These things will be weighted differently by the context of the areas they exist in. A good example is a few of the ones above. A particularly dangerous road in one country could be considered even more dangerous in Afghanistan, where Taliban militants run the country, or in Ukraine actively under siege. That&apos;s certainly one thing other roads may have over the North Yungas Road, there is no conflict there today. However, that also makes it remarkable. This is a road that was deemed the most dangerous in the entire world and it isn&apos;t in an active warzone. It says a lot about the danger of the road itself, rather than the circumstances around it. For all the point-scoring, as roads go, it would be a real task to get much more dangerous than the North Yungas Road. It&apos;s as simple as that…

Except if you travel due South a little, where you can find the South Yungas Road, whilst not quite as dangerous than its Northern counterpart, the road (also known as Chulumani Road) also reaches over 3.5 kilometres at its highest. It also has tight roads with narrow crossings and hairpin turns, with similar dastardly deep drops. In actuality, it may be that the most dangerous road in the world isn&apos;t that special after all. There&apos;s an identical one exactly like it just due South of it to very little fanfare. The dangerous thing here isn&apos;t the roads, it&apos;s the landscape. It&apos;s the harsh terrain. It&apos;s the hubris of people to have built and travelled on this road in the first place. It&apos;s like an afront to mother nature, and mother nature wanted her revenge. However, despite whether it is actually the most dangerous road in the world or not (and statistically it would take some beating) something about the North Yungas Road has always drawn people to it. Whether out of military necessity, a commute to work, or someone just searching for adrenaline, the famed &quot;most dangerous road in the world&quot; has captivated audiences for decades now. It serves today as a reminder that just because you can do something, doesn&apos;t mean you should. It remains as a memorial for the countless lives that have been lost over its steep edges. It remains as a road that gave itself a legacy, regardless of human efforts to make it safer and without a shot being fired. That&apos;s pretty rare, it&apos;s reserved for the likes of much beloved roads like the German Autobahn or much maligned ones like the British M25. This a dirt track, almost four kilometres in the sky. Maybe we&apos;re reading too poetically into it. Maybe at the end of the day, it is just a road. However, that doesn&apos;t mean people shouldn&apos;t treat it with the respect and reverence that it deserves. After all, if you found yourself on the most dangerous road in the world and you didn&apos;t, that would be a surefire way of ending up careening over the edge at high speed.

I wouldn&apos;t worry though, it isn&apos;t the fall that kills you, it&apos;s the sudden stop at the end.

## Key Takeaways

- La Carretera de los Yungas, known as El Camino de Muerte, is infamous for its high fatality rate.
- The road&apos;s extreme danger is due to its narrow width, steep drops, and challenging weather conditions.
- Historically, 200-300 people died annually on the road, earning it the title of the world&apos;s most dangerous.
- Safety improvements and a bypass have reduced fatalities, but the road remains perilous.
- Despite risks, the road attracts thrill-seekers and tourists, contributing to its enduring notoriety.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the El Camino de la Muerte?

El Camino de la Muerte, also known as La Carretera de los Yungas, is a road in Bolivia near the Amazon rainforest and the capital city of La Paz. It is infamous for being one of the most dangerous roads in the world due to its high fatality rate and treacherous conditions.

### Why is the El Camino de la Muerte considered the most dangerous road in the world?

The road is considered the most dangerous due to its narrow width, steep drops, lack of guardrails, and challenging weather conditions. It has claimed thousands of lives over the decades, with reports of 200 to 300 fatalities per year in the past.

### What are the key features of the El Camino de la Muerte?

The road stretches from La Paz to Coroico, with a length of about 56 kilometers. It climbs to 4,650 meters at La Cumbre Pass and descends to 1,200 meters at Coroico. It is known for its narrow width, steep drops, and challenging weather conditions, including fog, mist, and mudslides.

### What historical events contributed to the road&apos;s dangerous reputation?

The road was built by Paraguayan prisoners of war during the Chaco War in the 1930s. Many prisoners died during its construction. The road has seen numerous fatal accidents, including a bus crash in 1983 that killed 100 people, making it Bolivia&apos;s worst road accident.

### How has the road&apos;s safety improved over the years?

Some guardrails have been installed, and certain parts of the road were widened during a construction project that ended in 2006. Additionally, a new highway, Ruta Nacional 3, was opened in 2006, providing a safer alternative for most travelers.

### Who uses the El Camino de la Muerte today?

Today, the road is primarily used by extreme sports tourists, including cyclists and motorists seeking an adrenaline rush. It has become a popular destination for thrill-seekers from around the world, with tours available for as little as $80.

### What are the current safety measures in place for tourists?

Large portions of the road are closed to regular traffic, and tours are conducted with experienced guides, mechanics, and medical and rescue staff on standby. The Municipality of Coroico charges a fee for cyclists to fund the upkeep of the road&apos;s infrastructure and safety services.

### Are there any other roads as dangerous as the El Camino de la Muerte?

There are likely other roads as dangerous or even more dangerous in countries like India, Pakistan, Ukraine, Turkey, and Afghanistan. The South Yungas Road, also known as Chulumani Road, is similarly dangerous and located just south of the North Yungas Road.

### What is the legacy of the El Camino de la Muerte?

The road serves as a reminder of the dangers of human hubris in challenging natural landscapes. It remains a memorial for the countless lives lost and a testament to the enduring fascination with extreme experiences.

### What is the driving custom on the El Camino de la Muerte?

Unlike the rest of South America, vehicles on the El Camino de la Muerte drive on the left. Vehicles climbing from Coroico have the right of way and hug the mountain, while vehicles descending from La Paz take the outside path.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: El Camino De La Muerte: Bolivia&apos;s Road of Death](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nf0Pl62QIqk)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/Oblique_aerial_landscape_view_%28AM_82169-1%29.jpg) by Collins, Tudor Washington, 1898-1970, photographer / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Extreme Problems of the World&apos;s Most Densely Populated City.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/extreme-problems-worlds-most-densely-populated-city</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/extreme-problems-worlds-most-densely-populated-city</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>On August 2nd, 1968, a powerful tremor shook the largest island in the Philippines, Luzon.

What became known as the Casiguran earthquake had a powerful magnitude of 7.3, and a rating of nine (or &quot;violent&quot;) on the Mercalli intensity scale. Its epicentre was in a city of the same name, located in the northeast of Luzon, about 200 kilometres from the Philippines&apos; then-capital, Quezon City.

But the most disastrous consequences took place in Manila city proper—located about 10 kilometres southwest of Quezon and no less than 212 kilometres from the quake&apos;s epicentre in Casiguran. The seismic force caused a high-rise building known as the Ruby Tower to collapse, burying hundreds of its occupants and resulting in the deaths of 268 people. These would constitute the overwhelming majority of the total death toll of the disaster—estimated to be around 271 people.

The reason for the building&apos;s collapse was attributed to the design and quality of its construction. The Ruby Tower had been built at a cut-price cost of around 250,000 dollars, or around 2.5 million dollars today. It was built to house 600 to 1,000 people as well as various commercial enterprises. But the Ruby Tower had been built using shoddy materials, on unsound foundations close to Manila&apos;s Pasig River mouth.

The quake became referred to by many as the Ruby Tower Earthquake, and laid bare the extreme vulnerability of structures located in Manila which had led—despite the best efforts of rescuers—to the unnecessary deaths of hundreds of people.

Unfortunately, this is a risk which likely persists in the city.

Manila has since gone on to become—by some margin—the most densely populated city on earth. And the presence of such unsound structures? Well, they&apos;ve not gone away.

## The Many Manilas

Now, perhaps surprisingly, in spite of being the most densely populated city in the world, Manila isn&apos;t really exceptional in terms of its actual population size.

At around 1.8 million inhabitants, the capital of the Philippines is about the same size as Warsaw, capital of Poland, or only marginally bigger than the US city of Phoenix. In fact, Manila isn&apos;t even the most populous city found in the Philippines. That title remains with Quezon, located directly adjacent to Manila, and which has a little under 3 million inhabitants. Both cities are located in the capital city&apos;s metropolitan area on Luzon, an area simply known as &quot;Metro Manila&quot;.

Metro Manila is a gargantuan patchwork of sixteen separate cities, all of them within a few kilometres of each other. Most of these have a population of around half a million people, and the collective population of the region is estimated to be around 15 million people.

And the large number of cities in Metro Manila, but which are not actually Manila, can lead to some confusion. For example, in 1975, Muhammad Ali fought Joe Frazier in the Philippines, in what remains regarded as one of the most famous boxing matches in history. But what was known as the &quot;Thrilla in Manila&quot; didn&apos;t actually take place in Manila city—it was in Quezon City, at that time still the capital of the Philippines. Capital city status was passed back to Manila just one year later, in 1976.

But it is not the population count that is the chief cause for Manila being so densely packed.

It is its physical size.

## The Many Manileños

Now, while Metro Manila is relatively spacious at about 619 square kilometres or 239 square miles, Manila city is simply tiny.

Its city boundaries occupy a space of about 42.5 square kilometres total—about one-quarter the land area of the Principality of Liechtenstein, which has a total population of about 40,000 people.

If you were to cross the entire city of Manila from north to south, you could do so in a little over two hours on foot. This contrasts Manila starkly with the city of Warsaw—with which, you will recall, it is roughly comparable in its number of residents. To cross Warsaw by foot would take no less than six hours walking. Meanwhile, to cross Phoenix—also comparable to Manila in population—would take as much as fifteen. To put it in another way, Manila&apos;s entire population of almost 2 million people is crammed into a parcel of land about two-thirds the size of Scranton, Pennsylvania.

What this leads to is population density in Manila of an eye-watering 45,000 people for every square kilometre, or 118,000 for every square mile. Manila has twice the population density of New York, and an average of about 200 people residing on every American football pitch-sized parcel of land. To account for this, the city is dotted with high-rise buildings, with no less than 215 structures in Manila having a height of 150 metres or more. With that said, Manila&apos;s skyscrapers pale in size with the megastructures of Chinese and American cities. The Metrobank Centre—the tallest building in Manila and the Philippines—does not even rank within the tallest hundred buildings on earth. Even so, the large number of high-rises does help to account for the steep population density… to some extent. Manila&apos;s area may be less than 43 square kilometres, but its urban area (the area of the city if counting the floorspace of built infrastructure) is somewhere in the region of 1,873 square kilometres—about three times that of Warsaw. If counting this area, Manila city&apos;s density falls to a lower—but still extremely high—figure, of around 22,000 per square kilometre.

However, as one might predict, that urban area is by no means shared equally by its residents—known in the Philippines as Manileños. The vast majority of Manila&apos;s impoverished populations are squashed into shantytowns on the city&apos;s periphery. While the central, middle-class district of San Miguel—home to the Presidential palace—has a population density of 20,000 people per square kilometre, the northwestern district of Tondo has a density of around 75,000 people, or a total of 650,000 residents crammed into just 8.5 square kilometres of space.

The overcrowded districts are vulnerable to disease, pollution and related problems, and are also highly exposed to a wide array of natural disasters like the Ruby Tower quake—as we shall see a little later.

## &quot;City Beautiful&quot; with Daniel Burnham

So how did this all come to be?

Modern-day Manila was founded in the 1500s by Spanish settlers as a city named &apos;Intramuros&apos;. People had—in fact—already lived at the mouth of the Pasig River for centuries before this, and a city of mostly Bruneian Muslim colonists named &quot;Maynila&quot; was founded there in the 13th century. The Bruneians were conquered and kicked out by the Spanish in 1571, although the walls of the old settlement were preserved as the margins of the new one, with the name of the Spanish city translating into English as &apos;Between the Walls&apos;. The city reverted to the name &apos;Manila&apos; three years later, and became capital of the Spanish East Indies in 1595. The old district of Intramuros remains one of Manila&apos;s most prominent neighbourhoods to this day, as well as its university belt and home to multiple colonial style buildings.

Manila preserved its Capital Status beyond the Philippines&apos; independence in 1898, and through the turbulence of the Philippine-American War which began the following year. It lost this status in 1941 after Quezon City was established, but got it back in 1976, the year after Ali and Frazier did battle in Quezon&apos;s Araneta Coliseum. Unusually, from 1903 the Philippines also had a Summer Capital—the city of Baguio, further north on Luzon Island. But this status, in practice, also put to an end in 1976.

In the wake of American colonisation after the Philippine-American War, and as Manila grew in both status and population, US architect Daniel Burnham (proponent of the so-called City Beautiful architectural movement) arrived to revolutionise the cityscape.

Burnham&apos;s 1904 plans largely copied the physical features and layout of several European cities, and resulted in the creation of some eye-catching pieces of architecture and city designs in Manila. But much of his plans were laid to waste in 1945, when the United States and the Philippines—this time fighting together—won a ruinous battle to dislodge the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The Battle of Manila devastated the city, and upended not only the Burnham Plan but practically the entirety of Intramuros and many of Manila&apos;s historic buildings. More tragically, the fighting flattened the homes of hundreds of thousands of Manila residents, and around 100,000 people were killed as retreating Japanese forces carried out a frenzied slaughter of the local population. In the time since, civil administrators have periodically attempted to restart the century-old plans for the city. But the steep rise of the population and the vanishing of available space has made this impractical.

Moreover, Burnham had crafted a plan for a city intended to be a maximum of 800,000 people, and his blueprints to accomplish even that were not fully realised in his lifetime. And at the time he began the project, Manila only had a population of some 200,000 people. That population has since climbed to almost 2 million, many of them arriving in the years and decades post-1945, and to a city long struggling to roll back the devastating effects of the war.

The need to build large structures capable of accommodating the growing population resulted in the hasty creation of buildings like the Ruby Tower, but also in the rapid rise in residents of districts like Tondo—which grew to over half a million people by 1990. With time, practically every last inch of ground came to be occupied. Even the former shipyard in Manila&apos;s Port Area became a dense residential neighbourhood, after President Ferdinand Marcos resettled urban poor into the area in the late 1970s. Today, what is known as the Baseco Compound has a population of almost 70,000 people, residing on a patch of land roughly the same size as the Vatican City.

As Manila&apos;s rapid growth continued unabated, the city, quite simply, ran out of space.

## No Rest for the Dead

In 2010, *The Guardian* writer Jenny Kleeman stood dumbfounded as a Manila local prised open the coffin of a dead resident, and cleared away the man&apos;s remains by hand in order to make room for someone else.

This morbid practice is born of necessity. So little is the available space in Manila that even gravesites in some of the city&apos;s poorer districts can only be rented, not owned. Locals have been known to swap out the graves of the deceased in the event of the non-payment of rent by the dead person&apos;s descendants.

The same *Guardian* article estimated that up to one-third of Manila&apos;s population—which, in 2010, stood at a little over 1.6 million people—were now living in makeshift settlements on any precious piece of spare land available. The problem is unlikely to have gotten any better over time. The population is soaring, driven in part by high birth rates in a religious society, and by the large streams of migrants arriving from poor parts of the Philippine archipelago in search of work. Paradoxically, in this regard, Manila is a victim of its own success. The Philippines stands as one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia, racing forwards in the fields of tech, sustainable energy and—ironically—real estate. Metro Manila is considered an economic powerhouse in Asia, and Manila is a key part of this economic charge. The massive hike in residents of the region has led to an urban sprawl visible on satellite images, as the outlying settlements close to the capital have expanded outwards towards Quezon and the Luzon island hinterlands.

But in the tight Manila city confines, the problem has reached a tipping point. Given the extreme shortage of space, many of the new arrivals wind up residing in unregistered housing wherein disease and squalor are rife. Pneumonia, tuberculosis, and dengue fever are common ailments which claim thousands of lives a year in the city slums. And if health problems weren&apos;t enough, Manila just so happens to be prone to some of the most serious ravages posed by nature to any major city in the world. The entire region of Metro Manila lies close to the epicentres of what are ominously known as the Ring of Fire and the Pacific Typhoon Belt—sites of regular volcanic activity and tropical cyclones, respectively. Its hazardous geographical location makes the region prone to flooding, storms, landslides, mudslides, volcano eruptions, and drought. In fact, natural disasters are so common to Metro Manila that they&apos;re enumerated on their own dedicated Wikipedia page. And while earthquakes are rare, the Casiguran disaster showed not only that they can occur—but just what their consequences might be. Worse, Manila lies directly on a major seismic line known as the West Valley Fault which—like Cascadia and San Andreas—is statistically due for a major event. If a Big One does strike, it is estimated that this would result in at least tens of thousands of deaths.

But while a major earthquake of such a scale has not shaken the region for several hundred years, what certainly have done are cyclones and typhoons, some of which have devastated parts of the city in the recent past. When Tropical Storm Ondoy struck in 2009, it unleashed a terrible fury that left at least 241 dead in Metro Manila and brought wanton devastation upon the shantytowns home to much of the population. Residents were forced to take cover wherever possible, and remarkably even the Malacañang Palace (residence of the President of the Philippines) was used to shelter locals.

But those most at risk by the storm&apos;s blitz proved to be those residing in the precarious temporary homes dotting the landscape. And the presence of the shantytowns—as we shall see in the following section—even reduced the robustness of more reinforced parts of Manila against the storm.

## The Weight of the &quot;Pearl of the Orient&quot;

Aside from rampant disease combined with risks of natural disaster in Manila&apos;s overcrowded settlements, the severe demographic saturation has led to other problems affecting the population of Manila more widely.

One of those is congestion. Manila ranks as one of the worst cities in the world for hours lost to traffic, recording an average travel time of 27 minutes and 20 seconds, and an average of 105 hours lost to traffic per resident annually. Road transportation is compounded by the sheer volume of different types of vehicles used by commuters, ranging from cars, buses, and taxis to three-wheelers, motorcycles and various types of jeepneys and rickshaws—as well as unique horse-drawn carriages used in parts of the old town, known as *kalesas*. The cumulative effect of vehicles vying for space on the roads contributes to the steep transit time, as well as to pollution and highway deterioration. Rail transport exists, but largely connects Manila with the outlying cities of the metropolitan region. And most internal rail transit declined massively after World War II—including the famous Tranvía streetcar system, which was obliterated beyond salvage during the Japanese rampage in 1945.

Now admittedly, being the most densely populated city in the world would almost by default lead to steep congestion. Given the sheer amount of residents, it is a wonder that Manila does not occupy first place for traffic, let alone barely scraping the top 10 (according to traffic index aggregator TomTom). But Manila&apos;s problems do not stop there.

Manila has an acute drainage problem. The absence of drainage has exacerbated periodic floods, leading to extended chaos during typhoons and other cyclical periods of severe weather. The failure to implement key parts of the Burnham plan has exacerbated the city&apos;s drainage woes. But another issue is that the sprawling shantytowns have extended even into existing floodways built to contain the threat of floodwaters. In the wake of Tropical Storm Ondoy, a report by disaster prevention researchers noted that buildings erected in the channels of the Manggahan Floodway—close to Manila city—had reduced their effectiveness during severe flooding. Moreover, while Manila sits at an average elevation of 9m, and up to 108m at its highest, the same report noted that illegal dwellings had sprung up in parts of the city lying effectively level with the Pasig River and Manila Bay, rendering them even more prone to the effects of sudden water level rises.

Schools are overburdened, and it is not unheard of for children in poor districts to attend classes in shifts. At Manila&apos;s maternity hospitals, several mothers at a time regularly share available beds. And Manila City Jail is one of the most overcrowded in the world, in 2019 housing 6,300 inmates in a facility built for around 1,000. Much of the overpopulation was a result of President Rodrigo Duterte&apos;s infamous drug crackdown, and the severe overcrowding meant that COVID-19 ravaged the facility when the pandemic began one year later.

## &apos;Build! Build! Build!&apos;

Manila continues to struggle beneath the weight of its population density, but that is not to say the state hasn&apos;t made several stringent efforts to curb the problem.

In 2017, then-President Duterte began a massive infrastructure project intended to provide much-needed buildings to Metro Manila, as well as to encourage economic growth and reduce congestion and poverty. The creatively-named &apos;Build! Build! Build!&apos; programme saw the construction of new expressways, bridges, and rail systems aimed at improving connectivity between the cities of the region, and easing transit chaos within them. The programme also established the Clark Freeport Zone, a business hub intended to draw industries and residents away from the capital, and to a new location in Pampanga, 57 kilometres north of Manila.

After Duterte left office in 2022, the programme was overtaken by the &apos;Build Better More&apos; plan, introduced by new President Bongbong Marcos. The plan inherited 77 ongoing projects and greenlit a further 123—aimed at improving public transport, health, water resources, and agricultural projects (among others).

The government also intensified efforts to provide socialised housing and to relocate informal settlers away from temporary housing neighbourhoods, such as by way of the &quot;4PH&quot; programme, which aims to construct one million housing units per year across Metro Manila.

To facilitate such relocations, plans were unveiled—during the Duterte era—for the so-called &quot;Project of the Century&quot;: the construction of a 21km Metro Manila Subway line connecting the cities of Quezon, Valenzuela, Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque and Pasay. The subway is expected to be operational by 2029, and is partly funded—ironically—by loans from the Japanese government, and overseen by a Japanese consultant consortium.

Some of the government efforts are remarkable, given that many of the problems experienced by Manila were not necessarily the handiwork of the Philippines itself. Some are the product of a city designed during a bygone era by a colonial entity for a far smaller population. Others are the consequence of the cataclysmic devastation wrought by the Battle of Manila in 1945. And others still are the work of the cyclical natural disasters which periodically affect the region.

But the plans may not be enough.

## The &quot;Dead City&quot; of the Future?

Despite all these regenerative efforts, the future of Manila is uncertain.

Around the time Duterte announced his &quot;Build Build Build&quot; programme, he also stated that the traffic and poverty of Manila may be impossible to overhaul, and infamously declared that the capital would become a (quote) &quot;Dead City&quot; within twenty-five years. Duterte added that the government should focus on state infrastructure and development projects elsewhere, and proceeded with the establishment of the Clark business hub and expansion of Clark International Airport, both of them in the city of Pampanga. Such a shift would hardly be unprecedented, as many of Manila&apos;s elites left the city en masse following the devastation of 1945, and the entire government relocated to Quezon, which rapidly became the most populous city in the Philippines—only a matter of decades after its foundation.

But in spite of the ambitious building projects carried out by the Philippines to draw citizens away from the overwhelmed capital, there may be another problem: people simply do not want to leave. Given the sheer numbers of people living in Manila and in Metro Manila alike, combined with the accelerated rate of growth of the population, it is likely that even the best-case scenario of all projects being completed successfully would not provide the requisite conditions for residents to abandon normality for life elsewhere. Such a reality could be to leave destitution in one area, in return for poverty and unfamiliarity in another.

In Manila, plans continue to build whatever infrastructure are possible to offset the extreme problems of the world&apos;s most densely-populated city. But these remain hampered by the lack of available space on which to build, and some are even opposed by urban conservationists due to the risk of tarnishing the historic legacy of Manila&apos;s picturesque old buildings. One of the key additions to Manila city under the Build Build Build programme was the Binondo-Intramuros bridge, completed in 2022 as an important thoroughfare linking Intramuros with the north districts of Binondo and San Nicolas across the Pasig River. But the bridge was opposed by some heritage groups due to its stark contrast with Intramuros&apos;s remaining Spanish colonial architecture, including the famous San Agustin church—one of very few to survive the devastation of the Battle of Manila in 1945.

As Manila&apos;s problems grow, the Pearl of the Orient continues to grapple to contain them. Here&apos;s hoping it will succeed in doing so.

## Key Takeaways

- The 1968 Casiguran earthquake caused the Ruby Tower to collapse in Manila, killing 268 people due to poor construction quality.
- Manila is the most densely populated city in the world, with 45,000 people per square kilometer.
- The city&apos;s rapid growth and limited space have led to severe overcrowding, disease, and vulnerability to natural disasters.
- Historical events, such as the Battle of Manila in 1945, and colonial-era planning have contributed to the city&apos;s current challenges.
- Government initiatives like &apos;Build! Build! Build!&apos; aim to alleviate congestion and housing issues, but face significant obstacles.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What was the magnitude and intensity of the Casiguran earthquake?

The Casiguran earthquake had a magnitude of 7.3 and a rating of nine (or “violent”) on the Mercalli intensity scale.

### What was the primary cause of the Ruby Tower collapse during the Casiguran earthquake?

The collapse of the Ruby Tower was attributed to the design and quality of its construction, including shoddy materials and unsound foundations close to Manila’s Pasig River mouth.

### How many people died in the Ruby Tower collapse?

The collapse of the Ruby Tower resulted in the deaths of 268 people, which constituted the overwhelming majority of the total death toll of the disaster, estimated to be around 271 people.

### What is the population density of Manila?

Manila has a population density of approximately 45,000 people per square kilometre, or 118,000 people per square mile.

### How many high-rise buildings are there in Manila?

There are no less than 215 structures in Manila with a height of 150 metres or more.

### What is the urban area of Manila?

The urban area of Manila, counting the floorspace of built infrastructure, is approximately 1,873 square kilometres.

### What is the population of the Tondo district in Manila?

The northwestern district of Tondo in Manila has a population of around 650,000 residents crammed into just 8.5 square kilometres of space.

### What is the &apos;Build! Build! Build!&apos; program?

The &apos;Build! Build! Build!&apos; program was a massive infrastructure project initiated by then-President Duterte in 2017 to provide much-needed buildings to Metro Manila, improve connectivity, and reduce congestion and poverty.

### What is the &apos;Project of the Century&apos; in Manila?

The &apos;Project of the Century&apos; refers to the construction of a 21km Metro Manila Subway line connecting several cities in the region, expected to be operational by 2029.

### What is the population of Metro Manila?

The collective population of Metro Manila is estimated to be around 15 million people.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Extreme Problems of the World&apos;s Most Densely Populated City.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TwQ31iXk4PI)
- [https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/04/sport/thrilla-in-manila-remembered/index.html](https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/04/sport/thrilla-in-manila-remembered/index.html)
- [https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/travel/destinations/traffic-nightmares-10-cities-with-the-worst-traffic-in-world/photostory/111166035.cms](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/travel/destinations/traffic-nightmares-10-cities-with-the-worst-traffic-in-world/photostory/111166035.cms)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/15/philippines-overpopulation-crisis](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/15/philippines-overpopulation-crisis)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_disasters_in_Metro_Manila_by_death_tol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_disasters_in_Metro_Manila_by_death_tol)
- [https://tvradioschedules.fandom.com/wiki/List_of_tallest_buildings_in_Metro_Manila#:~:text=This%20list%20of%20tallest%20buildings,(492%20feet)%20or%20higher](https://tvradioschedules.fandom.com/wiki/List_of_tallest_buildings_in_Metro_Manila#:~:text=This%20list%20of%20tallest%20buildings,(492%20feet)%20or%20higher)
- [https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/86780/the-growth-of-manila](https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/86780/the-growth-of-manila)
- [https://forbesasiacustom.com/the-philippines-a-nation-rising/](https://forbesasiacustom.com/the-philippines-a-nation-rising/)
- [https://www.distance.to/Quezon-City,Metro-Manila,National-Capital-Region,PHL/Manila,Metro-Manila,National-Capital-Region,PHL](https://www.distance.to/Quezon-City,Metro-Manila,National-Capital-Region,PHL/Manila,Metro-Manila,National-Capital-Region,PHL)
- [https://mb.com.ph/2018/08/02/looking-back-ruby-tower-disaster-casiguran-quake/](https://mb.com.ph/2018/08/02/looking-back-ruby-tower-disaster-casiguran-quake/)
- [https://www.citypopulation.de/en/philippines/manilacity/admin/133901__tondo/](https://www.citypopulation.de/en/philippines/manilacity/admin/133901__tondo/)
- [https://www.researchgate.net/figure/The-BaSECo-compound-in-the-frame-of-Metro-Manila_fig1_334104497](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/The-BaSECo-compound-in-the-frame-of-Metro-Manila_fig1_334104497)
- [https://dil-opac.bosai.go.jp/publication/nied_natural_disaster/pdf/45/45-04E.pdf](https://dil-opac.bosai.go.jp/publication/nied_natural_disaster/pdf/45/45-04E.pdf)
- [https://www.distance.to/City-of-Manila,Capital-District,National-Capital-Region,PHL/Pampanga,Central-Luzon,PHL](https://www.distance.to/City-of-Manila,Capital-District,National-Capital-Region,PHL/Pampanga,Central-Luzon,PHL)
- [https://businessmirror.com.ph/2018/11/22/government-awards-p11-billion-subway-contract-to-japanese-group/](https://businessmirror.com.ph/2018/11/22/government-awards-p11-billion-subway-contract-to-japanese-group/)
- [https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/28/philippines-prison-deaths-unreported-amid-pandemic](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/28/philippines-prison-deaths-unreported-amid-pandemic)
- [https://business.inquirer.net/281164/p393-b-metro-manila-subway-is-project-of-the-century-for-ph](https://business.inquirer.net/281164/p393-b-metro-manila-subway-is-project-of-the-century-for-ph)
- [https://youtu.be/Go71zF_KxKU?si=Mh7xAqI2SZk64u2D&amp;amp;t=10](https://youtu.be/Go71zF_KxKU?si=Mh7xAqI2SZk64u2D&amp;amp;t=10)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/24/International_Human_Rights_Day%2C_Manila_Philippines%2C_2025_2.jpg) by Kej Andrés (Ryomaandres) / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Forgotten Worlds of Western Europe.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/forgotten-worlds-of-western-europe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/forgotten-worlds-of-western-europe</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>So, you may recall that we recently published a video on this channel, identifying and discussing the Forgotten Worlds dotted all across what is — culturally, at least — seen as Eastern Europe.

From Tskaltubo in Georgia all the way to Pyramiden in the Arctic Circle, our list featured sites which generally served some specific purpose or other in the 20th century. But when those purposes vanished with the collapse of communism, they mostly became little more than relics, decaying and exposed to the ravages of time and nature.

Now, western Europe obviously did not have quite the same experience in the 20th century. As such, the likes of closed towns such as Skrunda-1 or Akarmara didn&apos;t really exist west of the Iron Curtain in quite the same way as east of it.

But does that mean that once-great places — now forlorn or forgotten — aren&apos;t to be found in western Europe too? Absolutely not. Whether by disaster, misadventure, or simply the passage of time, there are several places in western Europe which now sit similarly bereft of inhabitants.

So let&apos;s check out a few of those.

## Craco

No; not Krakow, Poland — although there is something these places do have in common (other than the name).

Both are places renowned for their beauty, punctuated by a majestic castle on a hill rising above their cityscapes. But that is where the similarities end. Because Krakow, Poland, is a thriving modern city and Craco, Italy…is not. It has been abandoned for almost half a century, and its homes and streets, bell towers and churches are now empty — dishevelled and worn out beneath the southern Italian sun.

With that said, it is not that the now-ghost town doesn&apos;t see any human life.

In fact, Craco remains very much a draw to this day, being regularly visited by tours from the nearby city of Matera, a distance of less than one hour by car. Both towns lie in the southern region of Basilicata, with the closest major transit hub being the international airport at Bari, itself less than two hours&apos; drive to Craco directly.

Now, despite being currently uninhabited, you may be inclined to think — given its lush views, the surrounding valleys, its relative accessibility and the survival of towns nearby, that living in Craco must — at least at some point — have been really quite amenable.

Not really.

You see, despite a long history, Craco was plagued by vulnerability to natural disasters: so much so that its residents finally had enough and shipped out in 1980.

The area was inhabited as early as 540 BC by Greek settlers, and by the early Middle Ages it had become a thriving provincial centre. Craco even, at one time, had its own university — and its population remained rather consistent (at between 1 and 3,000 people) over most of the following centuries. But by the early 20th century, life in the town had become rather miserable.

Craco was — and remains — situated on a sheer cliff face over 400 metres tall — which had once served a strategic purpose: allowing the population to identify military threats from afar. But the same elevation caused land drainage to be highly unsustainable, in what was already an arid region subject to cyclical parching. Aside from making successful irrigation of crops difficult, poor drainage also led to more than a few catastrophic landslides, which ravaged the town in the years 1600, 1805, 1857, and 1933. Poor agricultural conditions between 1892 and 1922 caused severe food shortages, which in turn led a large portion of Craco&apos;s population to migrate en masse to North America. In the 1950s, as soil quality deteriorated even further, pipe irrigation systems were installed to attempt to remedy the situation. But these failed, and yet another disastrous landslide in 1963 caused the population to fall even more, as many locals relocated to the nearby phoenix town of Craco Peschiera.

In 1972, a flash flood killed off what few prospects of permanent residency remained, creating yet more landslides and making Craco&apos;s buildings ever more hazardous to live in. By this point, locals must have started to believe some higher power simply had no intention of allowing them to live in their ancestral home. The question seemed to be conclusively answered when an earthquake struck in 1980. Craco — by now known as Craco Vecchia or Old Craco — has remained a ghost town ever since.

Still, given its unique sights and history, the town has drawn a thriving tourism industry. Its key features include the abandoned monastery of San Pietro and the remains of the Norman Tower, offering a rich view of the surrounding fields and landscape.

Craco Vecchia has become one of southern Italy&apos;s most renowned features, and even a prominent movie set, with parts of the James Bond film *Quantum of Solace* and Mel Gibson&apos;s *The Passion of the Christ* having been filmed there.

Even so, it remains decidedly abandoned — and the haunting views of its streets seem to suggest a solitude far predating the 45 years since its evacuation.

## Svalbard&apos;s Forgotten Settlements

Now, we discussed the former settlement of Pyramiden in our previous video, one of three former Soviet settlements which existed on the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard, and which closed its doors permanently in 1998. The other two didn&apos;t fare a whole lot better. The mining village of Grumant ceased operations in 1965, with only a few shell-like structures remaining where the settlement once stood. Even the principal Soviet settlement of Barentsburg hasn&apos;t exactly thrived in recent years. It lingers on as an inhabited town today — although at about 400 residents, it is just about clinging on for dear life.

But what&apos;s interesting about Svalbard is the peculiar geostrategic balance which has existed there for more than a century.

Naturally, it doesn&apos;t make such sense — geographically, at least — for two communities inhabiting the same archipelago in the Arctic to be called Western or Eastern European. This is especially true given that all three Soviet settlements of Pyramiden, Grumant, and Barentsburg were located closer to the largest Norwegian town (Longyearbyen) than it was to any of the remaining Norwegian settlements. In fact, Grumant — which once had a population of around 1,000 residents — was located only 10 kilometers from Longyearbyen: so on a clear day, more or less a walkable distance (save for the threat of Svalbard&apos;s 3,000 polar bears). Politically, however, the Norwegian settlements on Svalbard were — without doubt — western European, whereas the Soviet mining towns obviously weren&apos;t. The distinction is important, as it also helps to explain their respective decays.

Over time, Norway established settlements of various kinds to make use of Svalbard&apos;s unique climate and natural resources. It wasn&apos;t the only nation to do so — and throughout the centuries, similar sites were built by Denmark, Britain and the Dutch for coal mining, fishing and whaling. This was possible because the area was long considered *terra nullius*, or nobody&apos;s land. But that changed with the signing of the Svalbard Treaty in 1920, which gave stewardship over the archipelago to Norway while allowing free commercial activity on the territory to any of the treaty&apos;s signatories who wished to make use of it.

Most who did generally established only meteorological or seasonal research facilities — including Poland, which maintains a station of 12 scientists on the southern tip of Svalbard to this day. Norway itself operates two other desolate settlements: one is the former mining village of Nybyen, which features a series of colorful little structures including an art gallery, a restaurant, a club, a cinema, and even a small residence for students from Svalbard&apos;s University Centre in Longyearbyen. The other Norwegian settlement is the hamlet of Ny-Alesund, located all the way on the northwestern fringe of the archipelago, with a population of between 35 in the winter and around 117 in the summer. Ny-Alesund is a company town run by the Norwegian state-owned Kings Bay enterprise, which provides facilities for 19 research institutions located there. Ny-Alesund is also the northernmost functional civilian settlement in the world — and due to its extreme isolation, is accessible only by flight or boat journey from Longyearbyen, or from the Norwegian mainland itself.

But aside from this, remnants of former whaling or coal mining stations can be found dotted at various spots all across the archipelago. One example is Ny-London (or New London), a British marble-mining settlement established close to Ny-Alesund by the Northern Exploration Company in 1911. New London was abandoned in 1920, but its lonely wooden structures continue to stand in place until this day. And another example is Smeerenburg — once a Dutch whaling station on the furthest northern fringe of Svalbard — which was in operation in the 17th century, and of which only a few stone structures now remain. Two previous Norwegian settlements on Svalbard have also been discarded: Hiorthhamn, which existed for four years before ceasing mining operations in the early 1900s, and Sveagruva, which was Svalbard&apos;s most productive coal mine for much of its 100-year existence before it, too, closed its doors in 2020. Sveagruva, unlike most other such sites on the territory, was meticulously disassembled following its closure — and practically no traces of its existence remain today.

And this is where the distinction comes in.

You see, unlike in Pyramiden, the Norwegians inhabiting and working the mining settlements of Svalbard were likely incentivised by the lucrative yield of the commercial enterprises carried out in them. As such, it was in the workers&apos; interest to put up with the harsh realities of the Arctic climate — and they were otherwise free to leave whenever. This was almost certainly not the case in the neighbouring Soviet settlements. In Pyramiden, for example, life was made somewhat agreeable by the range of amenities provided to residents. But even so, the miners and labourers who moved there were probably not in a position to abandon ship if they found the environment too disfavourable. To actively choose to leave would either have been really rather impossible…or really rather unwise.

Perhaps small wonder, then, that Pyramiden folded only a few years after the Soviet Union collapsed, and Barentsburg has seen its number of residents halved in the years since 1991. Longyearbyen — by comparison — has seen its population more than double in the same period, becoming today a thriving town of almost 3,000 residents, representing a total of around 53 nationalities.

## Grindavik, Iceland

So here&apos;s a fun fact.

You might be inclined to think that the country of Iceland would be relatively close by — or at least, at a similar degree of latitude or northwardliness — to Svalbard, with both of them being located at opposite ends of the Norwegian Sea. But no: in fact, Iceland&apos;s capital Reykjavik is far south of Svalbard, having a latitude roughly similar to the central Norwegian city of Trondheim. It is also separated from the Svalbard archipelago by more than 1,500 kilometres of open sea. To put it another way, in straight line distances, Reykjavik is roughly as close to Amsterdam as it is to Svalbard&apos;s capital Longyearbyen.

Anyway, about 55 kilometres southwest of Reykjavik sits the fishing town of Grindavík, on the southern coast of Iceland along the Reykjanes Peninsula. The town, until recently, was home to about 3,600 people — and despite its unassuming profile, it was a place of some renown, due to its proximity to some of Iceland&apos;s best-known features. One of these is the Blue Lagoon — a geothermal spa located only 3 kilometres north of Grindavik. Also nearby sit some of Iceland&apos;s best-known volcanoes, which are equally a draw for tourists, but which put paid to the entire town in November 2023.

That month, what became known as the Sundhnúkur eruptions began. Volcanic activity had become a concern in the peninsula three years previously, when the Eldvörp–Svartsengi volcanic system suddenly became active after years of lying dormant. Over time, this led to thousands of mini-earthquakes, which in turn caused worrying underground movement of magma (or subterranean lava). Huge magma intrusions began to form near Grindavik, leading to tremors which caused the streets and roads to start splitting open. Within days, the Icelandic Meteorological Office had detected an intrusion stretching ominously towards the town, and a state of emergency was declared. When on November 10th, another strong series of earthquakes struck, the Icelandic authorities issued an immediate evacuation order to the majority of Grindavík&apos;s residents.

Residents were given little time to leave, and while the initial departure was considered temporary, subsequent eruptions afforded little chance of reprieve. In the following weeks and months, a nearby chain of volcanic craters erupted no less than eight times, resulting in lava spills which reached the outskirts of the town, damaging infrastructure and homes. The eruptions have continued in the time ever since — and in April 2025, all remaining residents of Grindavik were evacuated. The eruptions also led to wildfires and disruption to electricity and water sources on the peninsula. The Blue Lagoon itself was also subject to several temporary closures, as was the nearby Svartsengi geothermal power station — the primary source of water heating system for the entire Reykjanes Peninsula, or more than 21,000 Icelandic households.

Now, it is perhaps unfair to call Grindavik forgotten — as there remains a chance that its residents may yet return to the town one day. During lulls between the eruptions, the Icelandic authorities began allowing the town&apos;s locals to return to recover their possessions, boat owners to sail their vessels out of the harbour, and even some limited return to commercial activity in the town during set hours of the day.

But in practice, a permanent return to Grindavik seems unlikely. In the weeks and months after the evacuation, housing was sought for the displaced residents elsewhere on the Reykjanes Peninsula or in Reykjavik itself, and Iceland&apos;s major banks agreed to waive interest housing loans for properties in the stricken town. Grindavik has more-or-less been turned into Silent Hill by the fissures, and some of its buildings now feature gaping holes caused by the force of the tremors.

Seismologists have predicted that the Grindavik fissure eruptions could continue for decades — if not centuries — something which severely calls into question the safety of the entire peninsula, if not the entire country of Iceland itself.

## Skellig Michael

Further south in the Atlantic Ocean lies the island nation of Ireland. And sitting in silent view of Ireland is the former monastic settlement of the island of Skellig Michael, complete with a sequence of thousand-year-old stone huts and a thriving community of puffins, seagulls, and gray seals.

Skellig Michael — or Great Skellig — is one of two islands which together form the Skelligs, located 12 kilometres off Ireland&apos;s southwestern coast. In practice, the Skelligs are little more than a pair of rocky crags — but that didn&apos;t stop a community of monks being established there in roughly the 7th century AD. You see, early Christian communities built their monasteries in isolated locations to escape the distractions of life in more populated environments, and to devote themselves entirely to spiritual practices. Skellig Michael — being one of the most inhospitable locations and lonesome places imaginable — was just perfect for such an objective.

Although the island is every bit as hostile to humans as practically any other rock in the Atlantic would be, it did have a flat terrace roughly 180 meters above the sea, on which structures could stand. Not only that, but its vast quantities of rock allowed for the building of huts using dry-stone techniques; in other words, piling stones and pebbles on top of one another to create rudimentary structures. And so the monks who inhabited the crag built their beehive huts — known as *clocháns* — from pieces of rock, and continued their abstinent existence for several centuries. The community was never very large — at its peak, probably no more than 12 monks and an abbot — but in addition to the six huts, the site featured two oratories, a hermitage, a church, and even a small cemetery.

Of course, Skellig Michael was every bit as hospitable as you might think, being subject to harsh rains and the high winds of the Atlantic. It also contained no native flora, vegetation or agriculture of its own. Yet the monks showed remarkable creativity and resilience which allowed them to continue their seclusion for as long as they did. They grew vegetables on a small arable depression between the island&apos;s peaks — known as the Wailing Woman gap — and otherwise subsisted on fish and the meat and eggs of local birds.

Unfortunately, the small size of the community — combined with its prominent and indefensible location — made Skellig Michael vulnerable to another great hazard of the time: Viking raids. According to surviving texts from medieval Irish history, the monastery was subject to its first raid in 823, when Viking raiders made off with precious relics and the abbot. Several more raids took place over the coming centuries, and by the 13th century, the monastery had been abandoned and the community relocated to Ballinskelligs, on the Irish mainland.

In the following centuries, the site remained in the possession of the Catholic church and became a pilgrimage site — until it was stripped and handed to an Anglican land-owning family under Elizabethan anti-Catholic land reforms in the 16th century. Ultimately, the Skelligs came into the possession of the Irish state, and the former settlement was made a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1996.

Skellig Michael is still visitable today — and like Craco — has been used as a Hollywood film set: having been featured in no less than three movies from the *Star Wars* franchise. But visiting the site is no less hazardous today than it would have been 1,000 years ago. The terrace can only be accessed by a sheer 600-step stone path, rising sharply from the landing coves and with no handrails to provide grip against the winds and rain. In 2009, two visitors died in separate instances following falls from the same ledge on route to the monastery.

As a precaution therefore, access to the storied island is strictly limited — and prohibited entirely outside of the relatively mild summer seasons of May until October each year.

## St Kilda

Further north, also on the eastern fringe of the Atlantic and around 170 kilometres off the coast of Scotland, lies a lonely archipelago known as St Kilda.

One thing that St Kilda and Skellig Michael have in common is that they are remnants of the Gaelic culture which flourished in Scotland and Ireland for over a thousand years. Human habitation on St Kilda carried on until much more recently than on Great Skellig — but unfortunately, both have met a similar fate, being today totally devoid of a permanent population.

But curiously, what is known about St Kilda is that its habitation extends even further back than that of the Skelligs or even many other places on the British isles — possibly going as far back as the Bronze Age, more than 2,000 years ago. A visiting Scottish clergyman in the 1500s described the islanders as a group of pagans, subsisting on livestock and primitive forms of agriculture. The community was very small — around 180 people at its documented height in the 1600s — all of whom lived on the main island of Hirta, in a tiny settlement known simply as *Am Baile* (Scottish Gaelic for &quot;The Village&quot;).

The origins of the island culture are unknown — but suspected to be a blend of Gaelic and Viking influences. This was seemingly reflected in the peculiar language used by the islanders, which was described in the early 1700s as

&gt; &quot;A very corrupt dialect of the Galic adulterated with a little mixture of the Norwegian tongue.&quot;

The culture and traditions of the community contrasted highly with the British mainland, so isolated were they from the rest of the world. As on the Skelligs, the islanders were highly vulnerable to raids — but were known to flee to Hirta&apos;s narrow and poorly-accessible caves when in fear of an expected attack. Their only line of contact with the outside world was by bonfires which — on a clear day — could just about be seen by locals on the Outer Hebrides, the northwesternmost Scottish islands. And when an expedition of British soldiers arrived at St Kilda in 1746, they found that the locals — once persuaded to come down from their caves — knew nothing of the then-ongoing Jacobite uprising in Scotland and had never heard of King George II of England either.

Yet despite their isolation, the St Kildans lived a self-sufficient, almost bountiful existence. They were able to grow barley and potatoes, and kept sheep and cattle as livestock — being able to even make a type of crude cheese out of sheep&apos;s milk. Perhaps unusually, the community rarely fished — due to a combination of superstition and the hazards posed by the stormy, unpredictable surrounding sea. Instead, they consumed large quantities of birds such as funnet, and further supplemented their diets with bird eggs. The St Kildans also caught puffins using a unique fowling technique, which involved draping a snare over the bird&apos;s head and killing it without causing the entire flock to scatter. A record from 1764 noted the community of 90 people would devour as many as 3,240 eggs and 1,620 birds collectively on a daily basis, while also using rendered fat from the local species of fulmar birds as lamp oil, as well as seabird down to stuff their bedding.

With time, the archipelago began to be visited by missionaries — which resulted in the islanders converting to Christianity and which brought some improvements in living conditions, such as the establishment of Hirta&apos;s first non-rudimentary structures. But the visitation also brought diseases which nearly killed off the entire population, with cholera and smallpox reducing the population to around 60 by the middle of the 18th century. Other than the illnesses brought from afar, however, the health of St Kildans was remarked as standing favourably in comparison with the inhabitants of places like the Outer Hebrides. The community also had a unique social structure, wherein the daily routine would begin with prayers followed by a quasi-parliamentary sitting attended by all men, to discuss the day&apos;s activities and in which all present had the right to speak. Minor infractions were punished by penalties, but no serious crime was ever recorded as having taken place amongst the islanders. The men caught birds and the women plucked their feathers by hand, but otherwise the daily work was shared evenly. The St Kildan men were known to be skilled weavers — a skill not many would have shared in the industrialising Scotland of the 1800s.

However, with time, diseases began to wreak a greater and greater toll on the islanders, exacerbated by the arrival of tourists in the 19th century. Visits to the community were organised for curiosity travellers from Glasgow, and this helped to effectively kill off what remained of St Kilda&apos;s centuries-old way of life. The tourists brought with them diseases such as smallpox, tuberculosis, whooping cough and neonatal tetanus, which collectively began to wrack the population as the century progressed. Furthermore, the islanders began to become accustomed to receiving food provisions by boat, causing them to largely abandon their traditional hunter-gatherer way of life, which in turn made them vulnerable to disruptions in delivery caused by poor weather, or to poor crop yields on the island. This — combined with emigration to the mainland and to Australia in the late 19th and early 20th century, began to cause the community to decline dramatically. By 1928, the population stood at only 37 people, and two years later, the islanders gave up on their homeland entirely. They petitioned the British government to relocate them to the mainland, and the last native St Kildans departed on the 29th of August 1930, bringing to an end thousands of years of continued existence on the archipelago. Among the departing group was an eight-year-old Rachel Johnson, who died as the last native St Kildan at the age of 93 in 2016.

Today, St Kilda is inhabited by nobody except for a large population of soay sheep and seals, as well as a diverse population of seabirds, including puffin, gannet, fulmar, razorbills, and Kittiwake.

## Belchite

It was late in the summer of 1937, when artillery strikes began to rain down upon the small town of Belchite, located around 30 kilometres south of Zaragoza in northeastern Spain.

The Spanish Civil War was ongoing, and the town was in the hands of the nationalist forces of General Francisco Franco, later El Caudillo Franco, dictator and namesake of Francoist Spain. Early in the war, his forces had made blistering advances in the country&apos;s north and south, driving their Republican adversaries east, although for now they still held Spain&apos;s capital Madrid and the next largest cities of Barcelona and Valencia. The importance of securing major cities had become visible in the course of the war, and the Republican objective would be to retake Zaragoza, at that time located only a handful of kilometres between a thin Aragon front. And so a massive assault was planned, stretching from Zuera, north of Zaragoza, to Belchite in the south. Taking the town would — it was thought — represent a huge strategic victory for the Republicans, and concurrently facilitate the retaking of Zaragoza itself.

And so the Republican offensive began, with 80,000 men including the 11th and 15th International Brigades, as well as six aviation squadrons armed with Soviet aircraft. The attack was preceded by a relentless bombing campaign, carried out mostly by Russian-made Polikarpov and Tupolev bombers. This was followed by a fierce pitched battle between the Republican attackers and Nationalist defenders, that reduced what remained of the town to ruin, and caused around 5,000 deaths in only a few days of fighting. What resulted was a pyrrhic victory for the Republicans. They took Belchite, but failed in the wider Zaragoza offensive, suffering heavy losses of armaments and tanks. The town held little strategic value on its own — and what the Republicans had gained was a shattered husk and a few kilometres of territory, at the cost of around 2,800 dead and 6,000 wounded, against the Nationalists&apos; total casualty count of around 2,600. Franco&apos;s forces later regrouped, and reclaimed the shattered town six months later. The Nationalists preceded their counterattack with a bombing campaign of their own, blitzing Belchite once more with German Condors, and further devastating what was by now little more than a depleted shell.

A stark contrast with what it had once been.

Belchite&apos;s origins are believed to stretch throughout multiple key periods in Spain&apos;s history. It was probably settled during the Roman Era, and in the 12th century, it became the headquarters of an order of knights under Alfonso, King of Aragon and Navarre, to defend the advance of the Moors into northern Spain. At one time, Belchite had a population of Muslims, Christians and Jews — and its architecture was seen as a blend of Renaissance, Baroque, and Mudéjar (or Iberian-Muslim) styles. Its pre-war population was around 4,000 people, and the town&apos;s most renowned features included the 16th century church of San Martin de Tours, and the former convent of San Agustín — which, by the end of the civil war in 1939, were both gutted and riddled with bullet holes.

And riddled with bullet holes they remain. Because Franco decided not to rebuild the town after his victory over the Republicans. Instead, he left it as a memorial to the bombing — and had Republican prisoners build a new Belchite next to the destroyed town. Aside from its ruined streets, the old town — today known as Antiguo Belchite — features a prominent cross ostensibly dedicated to the victims of the war, similar in style to Franco&apos;s controversial Valley of Cuelgamuros monument near Madrid, which was also built by Republican prisoners in the years after the war.

The town has since been left as it stands, its ruins offering both a historical lesson and point of curiosity to visitors. Once again, in what could be seen as Western European cultural pattern shared with Craco and Skellig Michael, Belchite has been also used as a movie set in prominent 21st century filmmaking. The most notable of these is Guillermo Del Toro&apos;s 2006 gothic fantasy film *Pan&apos;s Labyrinth*, set in 1944 against the aftermath of the civil war.

New Belchite remains a thriving town to this day — although, at 1,500 inhabitants, it has never quite accomplished the demographic heights of the pre-Civil War era.

## Key Takeaways

- Western Europe has several abandoned places, each with unique histories of decline.
- Natural disasters and conflicts led to the abandonment of towns like Craco and Belchite.
- Svalbard&apos;s settlements highlight the geopolitical and economic factors influencing their decay.
- Skellig Michael and St Kilda were isolated monastic and Gaelic communities, respectively.
- Grindavik&apos;s evacuation due to volcanic activity underscores the ongoing threat of natural disasters.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is Craco known for?

Craco is known for its beauty and majestic castle on a hill, but it has been abandoned for almost half a century due to natural disasters. It is now a popular tourist destination and has been used as a movie set for films like &apos;Quantum of Solace&apos; and &apos;The Passion of the Christ&apos;.

### Why was Craco abandoned?

Craco was abandoned due to its vulnerability to natural disasters, including landslides and floods. The final blow came in 1980 with an earthquake, after which the town was evacuated and has remained a ghost town ever since.

### What are some of the notable features of Craco?

Some of the notable features of Craco include the abandoned monastery of San Pietro and the remains of the Norman Tower, which offer a rich view of the surrounding fields and landscape.

### What happened to the town of Grindavik?

Grindavik was evacuated in November 2023 due to volcanic eruptions. The eruptions caused significant damage to the town, and while some residents have been allowed to return temporarily, a permanent return seems unlikely.

### What is the significance of Skellig Michael?

Skellig Michael is a former monastic settlement established in the 7th century AD. It is known for its thousand-year-old stone huts and is a UNESCO World Heritage Site. It has also been used as a film set for the Star Wars franchise.

### Why was St Kilda abandoned?

St Kilda was abandoned in 1930 due to a combination of factors, including disease brought by tourists, reliance on food provisions, and emigration. The last native St Kildans departed on August 29, 1930.

### What is the history of Belchite?

Belchite was a town in northeastern Spain that was heavily damaged during the Spanish Civil War. It was left in ruins as a memorial to the war, and a new town was built nearby. The old town, known as Antiguo Belchite, is now a historical site and has been used as a movie set.

### What is the current status of the old town of Belchite?

The old town of Belchite, known as Antiguo Belchite, remains in ruins and is a popular tourist destination. It has been used as a movie set for films like &apos;Pan’s Labyrinth&apos;.

### What are some of the forgotten settlements in Svalbard?

Some of the forgotten settlements in Svalbard include Grumant, which ceased operations in 1965, and Pyramiden, which closed in 1998. The principal Soviet settlement of Barentsburg has also seen a significant decline in population.

### What is the current population of Longyearbyen?

Longyearbyen, the largest Norwegian town in Svalbard, has a population of almost 3,000 residents, representing a total of around 53 nationalities.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Forgotten Worlds of Western Europe.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4UGqtbYwC5s)
- [https://youtu.be/GD6RwrZJI7M?si=NVU1KbD11VfGU0_N](https://youtu.be/GD6RwrZJI7M?si=NVU1KbD11VfGU0_N)
- [https://youtu.be/ZSfTnxN9Ytc?si=4biSbQq5YFKevBv5&amp;amp;t=98](https://youtu.be/ZSfTnxN9Ytc?si=4biSbQq5YFKevBv5&amp;amp;t=98)
- [https://worldpopulationreview.com/cities/norway/longyearbyen](https://worldpopulationreview.com/cities/norway/longyearbyen)
- [https://svalbardadventures.com/en/about-svalbard/longyearbyen-city/](https://svalbardadventures.com/en/about-svalbard/longyearbyen-city/)
- [https://www.highland.gov.uk/site/gaelic-toolkit/toolkit/gaelic_history/index.html](https://www.highland.gov.uk/site/gaelic-toolkit/toolkit/gaelic_history/index.html)
- [https://amarist.com/portfolio/san-agustin-church/](https://amarist.com/portfolio/san-agustin-church/)
- [https://www.wmf.org/monuments/old-belchite](https://www.wmf.org/monuments/old-belchite)
- [https://www.tripadvisor.com/Attractions-g1566379-Activities-Craco_Province_of_Matera_Basilicata.html](https://www.tripadvisor.com/Attractions-g1566379-Activities-Craco_Province_of_Matera_Basilicata.html)
- [https://www.independent.ie/regionals/kerry/news/tourist-falls-to-her-death-on-skelligs/27387373.html](https://www.independent.ie/regionals/kerry/news/tourist-falls-to-her-death-on-skelligs/27387373.html)
- [Hero image source](https://images.rawpixel.com/editor_1024/czNmcy1wcml2YXRlL3Jhd3BpeGVsX2ltYWdlcy93ZWJzaXRlX2NvbnRlbnQvbHIvdXB3azYxNjkzODU2LXdpa2ltZWRpYS1pbWFnZS1rb3dsbDVsMS5qcGc.jpg) by openverse, cc0.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Golden Triangle&apos;s &quot;Special Economic Zone&quot; (For Crime)</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/golden-triangle-special-economic-zone-crime</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/golden-triangle-special-economic-zone-crime</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>There is a place on earth you can go to right now where you can gamble your life savings, take your winnings and buy a bottle of wine made from tiger bones. It&apos;s a place that smuggles heroin and meth to global sea lanes, and where you can launder your ill-gotten gains totally unabated. It&apos;s a lawless wasteland built on foundations of suffering and greed. It exists in a legislative gap; accountable to nobody, ruled by somebody and dangerous for everybody.

The 21st century&apos;s answer to Dodge City. Laos&apos; dark secret. The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone.

## The Triangle, the Businessman and the Casino

Stranded on the precipice of the Mekong River, where the three nations of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand meet, is what&apos;s known as the Golden Triangle. So named for its infamous reputation as one of the distribution centres of the global opium trade. The Mekong feeds rivers to many countries throughout Southeast Asia and offers a useful way to take goods out to global sea lanes. Of course this is not just limited to legal goods however, as the Mekong offers a route to the global market for illicit ones too and the Golden Triangle has been used in this way for decades. It is a perfect place for smugglers, far away from the prying eyes of government bureaucrats. On the southwestern bank of the Mekong lies Thailand, an economic powerhouse in the region backed by Western powers. In the northwest lies Myanmar, a nation struggling with a brutal civil war, pushing some farmers to opium production to make ends meet. In the northeast lies Laos, a country economically and politically allied with China. And right in the middle of it all, in Laotian territory where all three meet is the subject of today&apos;s story. The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, or GTSEZ.

This land, despite being in Laos, is not currently owned by Laos. What&apos;s more, it is a haven of debauchery and criminality where millions of dollars are made every year through illegal means. Everything from money laundering to drug smuggling to human trafficking happens in this zone. News outlets describe the GTSEZ as a kind of wild west, a lawless wasteland where there is little accountability or oversight from governments to stop criminal misdeeds. But how did 3,000 hectares of land end up out of the Laotian government&apos;s hands? Why are illicit activities there allowed almost unabated? And why are all the signs in Chinese?

To answer those questions, we need to tell the story of the founder of the GTSEZ. A Chinese businessman by the name of Zhao Wei. Not an awful lot is known about his earlier life that is in English. We know that he left school by 12 to pursue work, eventually becoming a timber trader. In the 1990s, he relocated to Macau where he entered the casino business. Macau was the gambling capital of Asia at the time and was proving highly lucrative, which likely influenced Zhao&apos;s career choice. It is thought that he is a veteran of the Chinese gambling industry and that he likely made his fortune running casinos in the Myanmar side of the Chinese border in a town called Mongla. This catered to Chinese tourists who were trying to get around the total ban on domestic gambling in China. In 2005, one of these casinos held several Chinese citizens for ransom owing to them not paying their gambling debts. Amid other claims that Chinese officials had been gambling with state funds, China closed the crossing into Mongla and cut off the town&apos;s electricity supply, killing the casino overnight. This may well have prompted Zhao&apos;s move to Laos.

He was seemingly able to make some friends in high places there, especially in Vientiane, the nation&apos;s capital. Good enough friends that in 2007 the Laotian government, hungry for investment, agreed to create the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone. They granted Zhao a 99-year lease on a swathe of little-developed land and effectively said &quot;have at it&quot;. The land wasn&apos;t being used for much at the time and if this successful Chinese businessman could help develop the land for nothing other than a little autonomy for a century, what was the harm? Zhao, now effectively sovereign ruler of this 3,000-hectare patch of Laos, got to work. All sorts of infrastructure were built in the zone including a six-lane-highway lined with palm trees, hotels, houses and most importantly of all, a casino. Zhao and his company, the Kings Romans Group, also known as Dok Ngiew Kham Group, poured in hundreds of millions of dollars&apos; worth of investment into the region, according to the Berkley Political Review. Their lease runs until the year 2106, at which point the land, now developed and full of tourists, in theory will be returned to Laos.

A byproduct of this agreement though, was the total lack of governance in the region. Zhao effectively was the leader of this little slice of the world. Laws would be written by Zhao and his associates, and a private security force would be brought in to maintain order. It was his own little state within a state where he made all the rules. The region was granted the autonomy to police itself, with Laotian police and other forces only able to enter the GTSEZ with permission from Zhao. However, this also meant that there was very little government oversight from any of the powers in the Golden Triangle. As such, the GTSEZ started to gain a reputation as a gamblers&apos; paradise. The Kings Roman casino proved popular with Chinese tourists who visited the zone and quickly started to make money for Zhao and his associates. However, we are in the Golden Triangle after all. The lack of government oversight in the GTSEZ didn&apos;t just make it good for Chinese gambling tourism, but for more illicit activities that criminal organisations wanted to keep away from government surveillance. Soon after the land started to be developed, the drug traffickers came, using this lawless slice of no man&apos;s land to move materials onto the Mekong. Bloomberg reports that Zhao, as the landlord and facilitator of their illegal activities, likely gets a cut of the profits.

There was a little more oversight in the region though when China was snooping around the GTSEZ, however. Beijing was furious when an incident in 2011 saw 13 Chinese merchants, or smugglers depending on who you believe, shot and killed on the Mekong by well-known gangster Naw Kham. China decided to start sending its own gunboats down the Mekong after that to dissuade smuggling. But there were still other ways to get things through the zone, usually in the form of bribery and corruption. Naw Kham was later captured, extradited to China and executed for his role in the crime. However, Bloomberg tells us that regional security experts have suspected since that Kham wasn&apos;t the true culprit. This implies that Beijing used the murdered sailors as a pretext to eliminate a troublesome criminal. Either way, Kham&apos;s death left Zhao as the dominant player in the Golden Triangle, which he, alongside his company, have ruled to this day almost entirely uncontested.

Since then, the one major development in the GTSEZ was that the US Treasury sanctioned the Kings Romans Group and its international subsidiaries in January 2018, labelling it as a &quot;Transnational Criminal Organisation&quot;. Although, these sanctions have not seemed to have much effect in practice. The zone has emboldened smugglers and paramilitary groups in Myanmar which since the coup in 2021, have had control over the border regions of the country. Stretched thin, the Burmese military has become more reliant on Border Guard Forces and other militias to contain the armed resistance, reducing its willingness and ability to constrain its allies&apos; illegal activities. This leaves the perfect opportunity for Zhao to step in as the middleman.

## Crimes of the GTSEZ

As we&apos;ve covered, drugs aren&apos;t exactly a novel concept in the Golden Triangle. Corruption keeps the drug trade flowing out of the Golden Triangle and into global markets via various means. Speaking with Al-Jazeera, Jeremy Douglas, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) regional representative for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, said that corruption is inbuilt in the drug trade, noting &quot;In essence, what I&apos;m describing is the chain: from source right through to export and end market involves corruption.&quot; Opium was a convenient cash crop for farmers in conflict-affected areas, and the opium trade helped fund the various armed groups operating in the Golden Triangle. By the 1970s, the Golden Triangle was the largest source of illicit opium in the world, before declining significantly in the 1990s as a result of opium cultivation bans and a drug market shift to methamphetamines. A large amount of opium is still grown in the triangle today. However, UNODC rep Douglas states that this is through no great love of opium from the farmers themselves, quoting here: &quot;I would say our understanding from the farmers – and we&apos;ve talked to them for years and years – is that they&apos;re ready to give up opium. They turn to opium when they don&apos;t have other options.&quot; What&apos;s more is that armed militias that oversee drug production will &quot;encourage&quot; the farmers to keep farming opium. Who are they to say no to these powerful people?

UNODC rep Douglas stated that efforts to combat the drug trade in the Golden Triangle and the GTSEZ simply wasn&apos;t working. Synthetic drug production has increased since the mid-2010s, according to Al-Jazeera, with new markets for meth and other narcotics. The profitability of the drug trade in the Golden Triangle has allowed for other criminal enterprises in the zone to rapidly expand. What&apos;s more is that it was deliberately set up this way. According to Bloomberg, an international law enforcement official who asked not to be identified, likened the GTSEZ to a tollbooth. If traffickers moving shipments through Zhao&apos;s area of operations fail to employ its services or pay a fee, they might find their cargoes seized by authorities who&apos;ve received a conveniently timed tip. Now opium is coming back into fashion in the area. The Taliban cut production of opium after coming back to power in Afghanistan. Since this is where most global opium came from, it caused heroin prices to skyrocket, enriching the Taliban in the process. However, this has opened up the opportunity for others to undercut the Taliban with their own cheaper supply, and one such place is the Golden Triangle.

The prevalence of the drug trade has given rise to another major crime in the GTSEZ, and combined with another major vice, it creates a dangerously illegal combination. Southeast Asia has always been a gamblers&apos; paradise, where people from across Asia travel far and wide in order to part with their hard-earned cash. As we mentioned, gambling is illegal in China, so many of their citizens travel abroad in order to gamble. This is how Zhao made his fortune and also why the GTSEZ gets so many Chinese visitors. The only casino in the small region is Zhao and co.&apos;s Kings Roman Casino. Furthermore, with Zhao&apos;s background in the Chinese gambling sector, it will not surprise you to learn that the casino was more or less the first thing built in the GTSEZ when development rights were granted in 2007.

It is undoubtable that many people, mainly Chinese tourists, travel to the zone every year in order to gamble, making the casinos staggering amounts of money hand over fist. After all, if casinos weren&apos;t profitable, they wouldn&apos;t be built. However, in the background, just like much in the GTSEZ there is something more sinister going on. The relatively unregulated gambling sector of the GTSEZ allows for criminals (nominally in the drug trade) to launder their illicitly-gained cash. In converting criminal proceeds into poker chips and back again, criminal organisations are able to wash their cash, making it look more legitimate. UNODC representative Douglas linked the casinos to drug profits stating, &quot;Increasingly large drug profits have had to move somewhere and casinos have played a special role in recent years.&quot; The casino likely allows this because in order to avoid suspicion and to blend in, a small portion of the proceeds are gambled away in the casino. There is no authority to hold Kings Roman Casino accountable unless the Laos and Chinese governments both got involved. Even that is just one way in which money is laundered in the GTSEZ. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and other agencies have identified the GTSEZ as a nexus of money laundering, connecting criminal groups from Taiwan to Myanmar that use crypto, underground casinos and shadow banking to move ill-gotten gains.

An even more sinister beast looms out of sight behind the GTSEZ, though that would require money laundering to keep off the official books, one of human trafficking. According to the Berkley Political Review, reports from independent journalists and NGOs have found scam centres staffed by human trafficking victims. Individuals from Thailand or from further afield like Nigeria or Brazil are trafficked in various ways and brought to the GTSEZ to engage in forced elaborate scams. There are a variety of scam options, a popular one is the honey trap, where women lure wealthy businessmen into parting with their cash; another is simple scam calls for fake cryptocurrency schemes. People from across the world are promised jobs in return for traveling to the GTSEZ, at which point their passports are taken and management demands payment for the travel expenses. Often people&apos;s only choice is to try and make the money back through the scam centres. Many more do this kind of work in the region as paid employees, but a select number are effectively slaves.

Crisis group identified four guarded high-rise buildings in the zone, with barred windows and high fences wrapped in razor wire. Locals told the organisation that people were locked inside. Meanwhile Bloomberg reports that one building had an air-conditioning compressor next to nearly every barred window on the upper floors, suggesting they&apos;d been divided into many small units, or to use another word, cells. It is reported by victims of the centres that workers who failed to make enough money for the scam artists were punished. One Thai victim stated that she saw a man being beaten with a leather whip so severely that his blood covered the floor whilst others were locked in rooms without food. She was one of the lucky ones and was later able to escape back to Thailand. That is not all however, as Crisis Group tells us that there is widespread human trafficking, not only of scam centre workers, but also of young women for sexual exploitation in the zone. It&apos;s impossible to know how many people are being held against their will for certain, but the United States Institute for Peace, the Congress-funded research group, estimates there could be as many as 85,000 in Laos alone, with the majority likely in the GTSEZ. The UK government&apos;s travel advice to the region is stark. It reads; &quot;Be extremely cautious in Bokeo Province, particularly near the borders with Myanmar and Thailand, and around the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone. Armed groups carry out employment scams and drug trafficking in this area.&quot;

Scam centres have become so prevalent in the area that Interpol issued a global warning for scam centres in the Mekong sub-region, noting that their rapid spread represents a &quot;serious and imminent threat&quot; to global public safety. And it seems this is the straw that broke the camel&apos;s back, with the Chinese and Laotian governments collaborating to do something about the scam centre problem. Beijing has moved to crack down on online scamming centres in the region, impelled in part by growing domestic concern about the number of Chinese citizens lured into these operations. It is not a good look if an area owned by a Chinese businessman has human traffickers in it that target Chinese nationals. The Laotian government (likely backed by Beijing&apos;s insistence) issued an ultimatum to the scam centres, giving them until the 25th of August 2024 to leave the GTSEZ. That deadline has now passed and many are beginning to be arrested and deported from Laos. Laos and China appear ok with the other illegal activities that happen in the zone, so why does this matter more? Simply put, outside of the morality question, human trafficking is simply bad for business. Even Zhao knew not to stand in the two nations&apos; way. It&apos;s notable that lots of Chinese citizens have been deported from the zone. It may be that Beijing doesn&apos;t take kindly to the potential of these centres targeting Chinese civilians and wants them to face punishment in their homeland. Although it&apos;s not out of the question that at least some if not many of the Chinese citizens deported may have been trafficking victims.

Chinese security officials have been involved in the raids, showing the seriousness of intent to root out these scam centres. But it remains to be seen if the crackdown will solve the problem. Tightening of security in other areas like drug law enforcement has not led to widespread change. The proof will be in the pudding of whether this truly reduces human trafficking in the area. Many of the scam centres, as well as online gambling operations, are relocating to Myanmar to avoid the crackdown. This is the nature of this kind of cross-border issue and Myanmar&apos;s current state of conflict allows for criminals to retreat into the wilderness, out of the range of government oversight. Like all its issues, human trafficking in the zone is only going to be solved with a collaborative approach from all parties.

People are not the only living beings trafficked through the GTSEZ though. Rare and endangered animal trafficking is also highly common in the zone, even hosting illegal wildlife markets for people to buy these rare creatures at a premium. Laos banned tiger farms in 2016, although this appears to not have had much effect on the GTSEZ. Crisis Group reports that a facility named as a &quot;zoo&quot; in the zone is how this rule is circumvented. This particular &quot;zoo&quot; was not open to the public, with an employee telling Crisis Group that the facility was used for breeding tigers and bears. It was also an abattoir, where these rare animals would be slaughtered for materials and pelts. The organisation found that in the markets of the GTSEZ, &quot;tiger wine&quot; an alcoholic beverage made from the bones of tigers, was regarded as being &quot;locally produced&quot;. This is just the tip of the iceberg as many animals are trafficked through the GTSEZ for sale or processing into products. It is a stark reminder of the lawlessness of this land.

## Questions Galore – Implications of the Zone

There are a few prevailing questions when you see what the GTSEZ has become over time and the vast array of crimes that happen there. The most important one is why. Why was a Chinese businessman allowed to take over a tiny strip of Laos and do as he please within it? Why can&apos;t the Laos government act to stop the criminality? And what do Beijing think of it all? It would appear that whilst kept at arms&apos; length, Zhao has carved himself out as a useful resource. The tourism, especially the Chinese gambling tourism, is likely to bring in a very large amount of money for Zhao and the Laos government. Since the special economic zone was launched, Crisis Group reports that Bokeo has gone from one of the country&apos;s poorest provinces in Laos to one of its best-off, registering the steepest reduction in poverty of any of Laos&apos; provinces since 2013. Like it or not, that is results. Although it&apos;s clear that the locals are quickly getting tired of seeing a small section of Laos&apos; sovereignty being stripped away.

NPR reported a souvenir vendor on the ground in the GTSEZ as saying &quot;In (the) casino, (they are) all Chinese. That area is Chinese, this area is Lao&quot;. Laotians are right to worry about the sovereignty of the area. Lao farmers were relocated when the GTSEZ was established as land needed to be cleared. The ownership of the GTSEZ by a Chinese businessman, as well as the large number of Chinese people who visit and work there, could constitute something of a soft power takeover. The more Chinese influence the area has, the less likely Beijing will want to let it go when the lease is up. The CCP&apos;s policy on what is China is pretty expansive, so a Chinese dominated, Chinese administered area fairly close to its border would not be a massive stretch for Beijing.

If nothing else, the Chinese influence is palpable in the area. The zone&apos;s law enforcement is handled by a &quot;public security bureau&quot;. A private police force modelled on China&apos;s law enforcement units of the same name. The signs and billboards are written in Chinese and Mandarin is the spoken language of the area not Lao, whilst clocks are set to Beijing time. All in a region around 200 kilometres from mainland China itself. Bloomberg reports that a brochure on the city envisions over 300,000 people living there by 2026. That would make the GTSEZ easily the second-largest urban centre in Laos after the capital, Vientiane, a city that is heavily influenced by Beijing. According to Bloomberg, Zhao has no formal relationship with the Chinese state, but he does present his activities as aligned with Chinese policy. Whether it is to enrich China through the laws of the GTSEZ, or simply to curry favour in Beijing as the largest player in the region, we do not know. We know that Beijing knows him and may at any time, use him as a puppet of the state. For now, he is mainly used on state media as a rags to riches story of a successful businessman who is economically developing another nation. There is often little mention of the zone&apos;s misdeeds and his place in them. He has to be careful here though. Zhao is a very new, very small fish that has just stepped into an enormous pond. There are sharks here, and one of them may need Zhao for something soon enough. Better to be useful than eaten.

As for the Laotian government, it&apos;s not like Vientiane aren&apos;t aware of the activities that go on in the triangle, in fact, they are complicit in it. After all, we have seen that the Laotian government can move on the zone when it is convenient, like with the scam call centres. However, they do not have much of an incentive to curb activities in the zone. The Laotian government received a 20% equity stake in the GTSEZ in 2007. Meaning that not only are they party to Zhao&apos;s &quot;toll booth&quot; agreement, a fraction of the profits that Kings Romans Group makes ends up in the Lao government&apos;s coffers. What you end up with then is a Chinese businessman who is effectively the sovereign dictator of a small patch of Laos. The Laotian government (which is aligned ideologically with Beijing) has no incentive to curb the actions of Zhao Wei himself. One, because he&apos;s economically developing the area, two he&apos;s making them money and three, because he&apos;s Chinese. Laos wants a good relationship with China, and arresting someone who has effectively built a Chinese enclave would be a good way to anger Beijing. Legally speaking as well, the Lao government&apos;s hands are tied. They leased the land until 2106 and they need special permission from Zhao to enter the zone. They agreed to the level of autonomy that the zone operates under. The nation needed the investment and this is what came. You end up with a situation where not only are the Lao government powerless to act without an ok from Beijing or Zhao himself, but they are actively disincentivised from fixing the issues there. According to the Berkley Political Review, investments in the GTSEZ by the Kings Romans Group account for more than ten percent of Laos&apos; GDP. Sure, there is smuggling and scamming and people trafficking and drugs and all other nature of sins. But why would the Lao government kill their golden goose?

## Future of the GTSEZ

So where does the GTSEZ go from here? Well as we mentioned its lease is up in 2106, so the zone has a long time before the inevitable political crisis of having ostensibly a Chinese exclave in Lao territory comes to pass. For now, the zone continues to expand both within and outside of its borders. 70% of the land remains as forested hills and nature reserves meaning there is plenty of land to expand into. Early developments of villas along the Mekong will encourage wealthy businessmen to buy them, especially in a land with very little government oversight. The further development of hotels and a nearby airport that made its first flight in 2021 will only encourage more tourism to the area, especially as the new airport can be flown to directly from mainland China. To draw in more tourists, Chinese entrepreneurs are constructing a fake Venice, which sits on a &quot;water street&quot; below the casino. All the while crime and inequality continue to grow.

It&apos;s not just tourists that are being incentivised to spend their money here though, as over 2,000 hectares of nearby land is being developed into an enormous port facility to accompany the city. In 2020, a Kings Romans Group subsidiary reportedly paid the Lao government $50 million for a majority stake in a port development project at Ban Mom, a few kilometres upriver from the SEZ. It will be two thirds the size of the entire zone itself and include offices, hotels and warehouses. It will also handle all cargo entering the zone via the Mekong. Given the notoriety of the area for smuggling, this is apt, as the port and its accompanying infrastructure will only make it easier for things and people to be smuggled in and out of the zone. Among a mass of shipping containers, whose to know which ones are filled with illicit goods? Crisis Group asserts the port will facilitate the bypassing of other nations&apos; jurisdictions and help avoid crackdowns. It will effectively be a smugglers safe haven and if you fail to pay the toll to Father Zhao, one of the Chinese gunboats that patrols the Mekong might just get a phone call.

There remains a fundamental disconnect that allows these kinds of crime havens to function in these kinds of environments. With the US-backed Thailand on one side and the Burmese and Thai governments backed by China on the other, there is little will to collaborate to help solve the issues at hand on a truly cooperative international basis. With Myanmar currently at war with itself, it only strengthens non-state actors and militias on the border who facilitate the zone&apos;s illegal activities. As we&apos;ve seen, Laos itself, when backed by China, can exert influence on the zone, but it is clear that crackdowns will simply drive some of the issues to elsewhere in the region, likely Myanmar. It will take a coordinated approach from all three nations and their international backers to flush out the criminals for good. However, with Myanmar in a state of collapse and with the Laos government being in on the SEZ&apos;s deal, that&apos;s easier said than done.

After the sanctions, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering reported in 2023 that Laos &quot;took no action&quot; to respond. The Laotian government are in on the deal, so they have very little will to step in. Zhao has carte blanche to do as he pleases with the territory, as long as he isn&apos;t acting too contrary to Chinese interests. All of that is to say that the zone, Zhao and its illicit activities may well be here to stay for a while longer yet. Crackdowns have come and gone before, but the result has been the same, the failure to eliminate illicit activity from the region. This is an issue that predates the GTSEZ but is exacerbated by it, with the state-like bureaucracy and cronyism only further entrenching these issues. What will happen in the GTSEZ next, we cannot know for sure. More crackdowns may come if enough Chinese citizens are found in the firing line. Perhaps one day the zone will be able to clean up its act, but that is unlikely given the Kings Roman Group&apos;s activities and Zhao&apos;s role cosplaying as a dictator. Until that day, it stands to remain a beacon of sin and lawlessness in Southeast Asia, where smugglers, money launderers and gangsters run wild, all administered by a company run by a man ultimately accountable to almost nobody.

## Key Takeaways

- The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ) in Laos is a lawless area where gambling, drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking thrive.
- Chinese businessman Zhao Wei controls the GTSEZ, which operates with minimal government oversight and significant autonomy.
- The GTSEZ&apos;s lack of regulation attracts criminal activities, including the smuggling of drugs and endangered animals, and the operation of scam centers.
- Laos and China benefit economically from the GTSEZ, despite its illicit activities, leading to limited efforts to curb the criminality.
- The future of the GTSEZ remains uncertain, with ongoing expansions and potential crackdowns on specific crimes like human trafficking.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ)?

The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ) is a 3,000-hectare area located on the Mekong River where Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand meet. It is known for its lawlessness and is a hub for various illegal activities, including drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking.

### Who is Zhao Wei and what is his role in the GTSEZ?

Zhao Wei is a Chinese businessman who founded the GTSEZ. He was granted a 99-year lease on the land by the Laotian government in 2007 and has since developed the area into a hub for illegal activities. He effectively rules the zone with little government oversight.

### What kinds of illegal activities occur in the GTSEZ?

The GTSEZ is a hub for various illegal activities, including drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, and wildlife trafficking. The zone&apos;s lack of government oversight makes it an ideal location for these activities.

### Why is the GTSEZ considered a &apos;lawless wasteland&apos;?

The GTSEZ is considered a &apos;lawless wasteland&apos; because it operates with little to no government oversight. Zhao Wei, the founder, has the authority to write laws and maintain order through a private security force, allowing illegal activities to thrive.

### What is the significance of the Mekong River in the GTSEZ?

The Mekong River is significant because it provides a route for smugglers to move illicit goods to global sea lanes. The river&apos;s proximity to the GTSEZ makes it an ideal location for drug trafficking and other illegal activities.

### How does the GTSEZ impact the local economy?

The GTSEZ has significantly improved the economy of Bokeo Province in Laos, turning it from one of the poorest provinces to one of the best-off. However, this economic development comes at the cost of increased illegal activities and a loss of sovereignty.

### What is the role of the Laotian government in the GTSEZ?

The Laotian government has a 20% equity stake in the GTSEZ and benefits financially from its operations. They have little incentive to curb the illegal activities because of the economic benefits and the political alignment with China.

### What measures have been taken to address human trafficking in the GTSEZ?

The Laotian and Chinese governments have collaborated to crack down on scam centers and human trafficking in the GTSEZ. An ultimatum was issued to scam centers to leave the zone by August 25, 2024, leading to arrests and deportations.

### What is the future outlook for the GTSEZ?

The future of the GTSEZ is uncertain, but it is likely to continue expanding both within and outside its borders. The zone&apos;s lease runs until 2106, and ongoing developments, such as the construction of a port facility, will likely facilitate more illegal activities.

### How does the GTSEZ impact the surrounding countries?

The GTSEZ impacts the surrounding countries by providing a hub for illegal activities that spill over into their territories. The lack of cooperation among Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos, along with the ongoing conflict in Myanmar, makes it difficult to address these issues effectively.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Golden Triangle&apos;s &quot;Special Economic Zone&quot; (For Crime)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WSiZn-LJWbI)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b2/Our_Lady_of_Guadalupe_Cathedral_%28Dodge_City%29_from_E_1.JPG) by Ammodramus / openverse, cc0.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hashima Island: Japan&apos;s Ghost Island</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/hashima-island-japans-ghost-island</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/hashima-island-japans-ghost-island</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>In today&apos;s journey we will travel to a truly haunting destination, off the coasts of Southern Japan. A sliver of land, covered in the vestiges of an industrial past, emerging from the sea like a spectral warship carved in crumbling concrete.

Despite its minuscule size, this island is home to a complicated history, steeped in the prosperity of late 19th Century Japan, and the hardship brought about by its Imperial expansion. Once forgotten by the world, then rediscovered by James Bond, it has often been called &apos;Japan&apos;s Ghost Island&apos;. And in fact, even the plainest of photos of this island, taken in full daylight, can send shivers down one&apos;s back, as you imagine its ruins as being haunted by the disembodied screams of restless phantoms.

But if there are any ghosts on Hashima, they belong to an uncomfortable past. Memories which cannot find peace, torn in an endless dispute waged by regional powers.

This is the story of Hashima Island.

## Alien Archaeology

Hashima is one of 505 uninhabited islands which are part of the Nagasaki Prefecture, in the Kyushu Region, at the southern end of Japan. Hashima itself lies in the East China Sea, some 15 km to the south west of Nagasaki.

The island once claimed the title of being one of the most densely populated areas on Earth, but today it is completely uninhabited, except for a population of cats, rumoured to roam its ruins. Hashima is also tiny, stretching only 160 metres from east to west, and 480 metres from north to south. These measures correspond to a surface area of just 0.063 square km, which corresponds to almost 12 football fields.

Despite its small size, Hashima&apos;s appearance is striking. In contrast with the nearby islands, covered in greenery, this location is covered in stark tones of grey and black. The surface is entirely covered in clustered concrete buildings, as if they are fighting for space within the enclosure of a man-made sea wall.

As befits an abandoned location, most of the buildings are decaying or crumbling, most of the flat surfaces are smothered in rubble. Hashima conjures to mind how our cities might appear to archaeologists from an alien species, landing on our planet in a distant future. If these hypothetical scholars were to explore the ruins, they could find mementoes of everyday life, strewn about the debris.

Canadian author Brian Burke-Gaffney once provided a vivid description of his walk amongst rubble:

&gt; &apos;I roamed amid the brooding apartment blocks and explored the lanes and corridors, peering into rooms, turning over pieces of paper, and conjuring up images of human activity. Almost all the windows were broken, and glass crunched underfoot everywhere I walked … The island was strewn with old-fashioned electrical appliances … It was like a folk museum of the sixties. In the barber shop, tarnished scissors were still laying on the counter … and the walls were plastered with archaic movie posters.&apos;

Our alien archaeologists might be surprised to discover that the inhabited centre extends for hundreds of metres under the surface, in a network of deep shafts and tunnels. And probably our future friends would be left scratching their giant grey heads, wondering what was the purpose of such deep excavations.

Those underground structures were the very reason why Hashima was once inhabited by thousands of hard-working humans, busy at extracting what was once the Earth&apos;s main source of energy: coal.

## Shafted

The history of Hashima is, indeed, strictly linked to coal mining. Everything that happened on its surface, even the darkest corners of its past, are strictly linked to the wealth underneath it.

To better understand the story of Hashima, however, we have to move to a nearby, larger island, Takashima. For centuries, prior to the 1700s, the inhabitants of Takashima fueled their furnaces and household fires by using coal, collected from &apos;beds&apos; conveniently exposed to the surface.

When Japan&apos;s transportation networks improved in the 18th and 19th centuries, the good people of Takashima took to selling their surplus coal to salt makers on the mainland&apos;s coast. Saltmakers extracted salt from sea water, and they needed a reliable fuel source to bring that sweet H2O to boiling point. When local pine forests were depleted, and firewood became scarce, coal made for a great substitute!

At the time, Takashima belonged to the feudal domain of the Fukahori family, who immediately smelled the sweet, burnt scent of business. The Fukahoris asserted their management rights over the coal beds, employed the islanders as a labour force, and increased exploitation of the local resources.

By the late 1850s, Japan had opened its markets to the rest of the world, and Nagasaki became one of the most important ports of the country, a convenient stopover for American and European merchantmen sailing to and from China. Around the same area, steam ships started replacing sailing vessels, making coal an even more profitable commodity.

Enter Nabeshima Naomasa, head of the Nabeshima clan, of which the Fukahoris were a branch. Nabeshima must have heard a symphony of cash registers in his head, as he took over operations and asked the islanders to expand the collection of coal.

Very quickly, the exposed coal beds neared depletion, which prompted Nabeshima to turn to an expert to modernise his mining concern, Scottish merchant Thomas B. Glover. Glover hired a team of British engineers, and with their mining equipment they drilled the first shaft on Takashima. In April 1869, Glover struck gold — or we should say &apos;coal&apos;, at a depth of 45 metres.

The discovery kicked off Japan&apos;s first modern coal mine, producing large quantities of combustible rock. Customers were initially dubious of its quality, though, so Glover reassured them by comparing it to British coal:

&gt; &apos;For slow, or expansive steaming, Takashima coal is equal in every respect to the average run of Welsh and much better than North Country or any other coal I have burned on this station … It produces less ashes, clinker and soot.&apos;

Quite the marketing guru.

The success of the Takashima mine inspired the Nabeshima Clan to survey nearby islands for more coal, delegating the task to the Fukahori family.

In 1887, the Fukahoris hit the jackpot on Hashima, installing the first of its mine shafts. In 1890, the family received an offer from the Mitsubishi Corporation: 100,000 Yen for the island! Established as a shipping firm in 1870, the group had quickly expanded into other areas, sensing a big opportunity in coal mining.

The Fukahoris accepted the offer and ceded Hashima to Mitsubishi. Now, we don&apos;t know if 100,000 Yen was a good price, or if the Fukahoris had been shafted. What did get shafted, literally, was the island.

Japan had entered its Meiji era, a period of major political and economic expansion. The country was becoming an industrial power, with a military to match. In 1894 Japan went to war against China, and in 1904 against Russia. Factories, trains and warships needed tons of coal, and government contractors such as Mitsubishi had to meet those demands.

Thus, in 1895, the corporation excavated a second shaft, almost 200 metres deep, to access a rich coal bed under the bottom of the sea. Two more would follow, one in 1898, the other in 1925.

As the Mitsubishi engineers bore deep underground, and as miners extracted more and more material, they also brought to the surface tons of &apos;slag&apos; and other debris which they put to good use. If Hashima is tiny today, back then it was even tinier.

By using the byproduct of their mining operations, Mitsubishi were able to expand the land area over six successive land reclamation projects, from 1897 to 1931. Surface area was almost doubled, allowing builders to erect industrial facilities and housing for the workers. Then, to protect the infrastructures from waves and typhoons, engineers completed a sea wall, all around Hashima&apos;s perimeters.

Years later, a journalist would notice that Hashima&apos;s stark, elongated shape and smoking chimneys gave it the appearance of a battleship. Hence the island&apos;s unofficial name, Gunkanjima — Battleship Island.

By 1916, Battleship Island was producing 150,000 tons of coal every year, which required the constant presence of 3,000 Mitsubishi clerical employees, miners, and their families. Hashima had essentially become a &apos;company town&apos;.

Until then, most of the resident workforce had been living in wooden accommodation, which wasn&apos;t great, especially when typhoons struck the island. To remediate the problem, Mitsubishi built a six-story reinforced concrete apartment block, the largest in Japan at the time.

Living inside the concrete block was OK … if the alternative was being blown off by a typhoon, that is! Living conditions were extremely cramped, as each apartment included only one small bedroom and one small vestibule. Kitchens, toilets and bath houses were communal! Natural light was also a luxury, as each unit only had one window, half of them facing a dingy inner courtyard. Luckily, in 1917 Mitsubishi had a submarine cable laid down, to ensure the supply of electricity.

And as more and more miners were brought on to the island, the corporation had to expand the housing capabilities. In 1918, another building sprung up, an E-shaped concrete block, nine-stories high, which offered larger flats than the 1916 condo. And then, one after the other, more gloomy yet functional blocks rose on the island, wall to wall, corner to corner, until more than thirty buildings completely covered Hashima.

By the time it was fully developed, Battleship Island was a sort of extremely concentrated version of Japanese society. Its inhabitants had access to schools, a playground, a hospital, a police station, 25 retail shops, a Buddhist temple and a Shinto shrine. Those who worked hard — all of them, actually — could also play hard, as Hashima would boast a martial arts dojo, a pachinko parlour, a movie theatre, bars, restaurants, and even a brothel. All of these premises were interconnected by a maze of walkways, corridors, passages and staircases, which islanders always traversed on foot, of course.

The Hashima society also reflected a rigid hierarchical order, in which unmarried miners and subcontractors were relegated to the one-room flats, while married workers could enjoy two-bedroom flats. Office employees could enjoy even better accommodation, with their own kitchens and toilets.

While the coal mine&apos;s manager had his own house, located on Hashima&apos;s highest point!

## Prison Island

From that sweet pad atop the hill, mine managers had to deal with soaring demand in the 1930s. Imperial Japan was on a full-on expansionist binge, first occupying Manchuria in 1931, then invading China in 1937, and trading blows with the Soviets and the Mongolians in 1939. Then, on December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The nation was now embroiled in WWII, fighting the Americans, the British and the Dutch in South East Asia. The military needed fuel, and so Hashima ramped up its productivity.

One of its shafts was excavated to a depth of 636 metres, while miners worked long hours in increasingly harsh conditions. In the 1930s, the mines suffered two fires and one gas explosion, which claimed 34 victims. In 1941, the Hashima mines reached their production peak, at 410,000 tons of coal.

To keep up with the demand, the Mitsubishi corporation, with backing from the government, relied more and more on forced labour, namely deported workers from Korea, part of the Japanese Empire.

The employment of Korean forced labour was officially divided by Japanese authorities into three phases:

- &apos;Recruitment&apos;, from September 1939 to February 1942.
- &apos;Official mediation&apos;, from March 1942 to September 1944.
- And &apos;Conscription&apos; until the end of the war in the Pacific.

During the second phase, the recruitment of labourers was delegated to the Korean Labour Association, who had to fill some pretty demanding quotas. To convince reluctant Koreans to leave their home and travel to Hashima — or other forced labour facilities — they were helped by the Japanese police.

The Korean Labour Association recruiters were often supported by supervisors sent from Hashima, such as Kosako Mayasuki. As reported by Nikolai Johnsen, writing for *The Asia-Pacific Journal*:

&gt; &apos;With the help of local colonial authorities, he rounded up 40 to 50 Koreans from each village where he went, and only the few who managed to jump off the train on its way to the Korean port were spared from slavery on Hashima.&apos;

Kosako admitted to ordinarily discriminating against Chinese or Korean workers, who were forced to perform

&gt; &apos;Labour much tougher than in the military&apos;

The former supervisor even revealed that at the end of the war

&gt; &apos;We let supervisors of Chinese, Taiwanese and Korean workers secretly escape from the island first because of the fear of revenge from Korean workers.&apos;

One of those who did NOT jump off Kosako&apos;s train was Ch&apos;oe Changsŏp, forcibly recruited in 1943, aged just 14. Changsop ended up in a dark and humid dormitory, shared with other Korean prisoners. He had to work daily shifts up to 16 hours, in hot, narrow tunnels, sustained by a meagre diet which bordered on starvation.

Changsop witnessed how the Korean miners would be whipped with rubber straps until their skin peeled off, and suffered serious injuries after a tunnel caved in. It was impossible for Changsop and his companions to leave the island, not even temporarily. Only the Korean workforce who had arrived on Hashima before 1939 was allowed to do so. The young man endured these conditions until the end of the war, when he was sent to Nagasaki for clean up operations after the Americans had dropped the atomic bomb.

All the while, Changsop had been promised the payment of a salary. But when he was finally allowed to return home, he received a single payment of 50 yen.

In the final &apos;conscription&apos; phase, the collection of forced labourers was carried out directly by the Kempeitai, the much feared Japanese military police. Korean citizens had the legal right to refuse conscription, but it was difficult to say &apos;no&apos;. True to their reputation, the Kempeitai officers employed physical violence as a &apos;recruitment&apos; tactic.

Kang Tosi belonged to this last wave of Korean unwilling miners, and reported being assigned to the most dangerous coal face at Hashima, plagued by gas leakages and flooding.

Another survivor of Hashima, Suh Jung-woo, recounted his harrowing experience in a 1983 interview:

&gt; &apos;We Koreans were lodged in buildings on the edge of the island. Seven or eight of us were put together in a tiny room, giving each person no more than a few feet of space … the interior was filthy and falling apart... We were given uniforms like rice bags to wear and forced to begin work the morning after arrival. We were constantly watched and ordered around by Japanese guards, some of whom were wearing swords.&apos;

Jung-woo reported how four or five workers died every month, lost to accidents, exhaustion, malnutrition and disease:

&gt; &apos;Our meals consisted simply of 80% bean dregs and 20% brown rice boiled together with whole sardines into a formless mush. Almost every day I suffered from diarrhoea, and my strength gradually drained away ... I don&apos;t know how many times I thought of jumping into the sea and drowning myself&apos;

According to Jung-woo, many other fellow Koreans acted on that thought, forty or fifty of whom drowned of their own volition, or while trying to swim to the coast.

&gt; &apos;It still wrings my heart to think about those other Koreans. Today people call Hashima &quot;Battleship Island,&quot; but for us it was the &quot;Prison Island&quot; of no escape.&apos;

By the end of the war, the cruel coal mines of Hashima had exacted a heavy toll on their Korean labourers. According to Brian Burke-Gaffney:

&gt; &apos;By the time the atomic bomb rattled the windows on Hashima apartment blocks … about 120 labourers had died on the island … in underground accidents [and] of illnesses related to exhaustion and malnutrition. Still others had chosen a quicker, less gruesome death by jumping over the sea wall and trying in vain to swim to the mainland.&apos;

## A Dense Place

So, during the war, Hashima Island was essentially one of many forced labour camps managed by the Japanese armed forces, the government and/or its contractors. Most Japanese sources dedicated to this location tend to ignore this chapter of its past. And, we shall learn later, there are voices who actively and strongly contest the accounts of former Korean labourers.

For the moment, let&apos;s continue with our timeline of events.

After the Japanese signed the instrument of surrender in September 1945, Battleship Island continued to operate, albeit its coal was now destined to more peaceful and industrious purposes. But nothing propels business more than armed conflict. And the onset of the Korean War, in 1950, gave a general impetus to the entire Japanese industry.

In 1956 and 1957 the inhabitants of the island had to face a string of disasters: first, a typhoon destroyed its port facilities; then, a raging fire devastated the schools, the hospital and a tenement building. But business continued to grow, and by 1959 Hashima reached its peak population at 5,259, tightly packed over the 40% of the surface area which did not slope towards the sea. This accounted for a population density of 1,391 inhabitants per hectare, equivalent to 13,910 people per square km! This may have been the highest population density ever recorded!

Mitsubishi continued to own the island. In the words of Burke-Gaffney, they managed it as

&gt; &apos;A kind of benevolent dictatorship that guaranteed job security and doled out free housing, electricity and water but demanded that residents take turns in the cleaning and maintenance of public facilities.&apos;

By all accounts, there was a strong sense of community in Hashima. Workers and their families shared happy times while enjoying the recreational facilities, and suffered together when storms cut off all supplies from the mainland. Needless to say, the island was far from self-sufficient, as produce doesn&apos;t grow easily on slabs of concrete. This issue was partially resolved with the planting campaign of 1963.

By using imported soil from the mainland, the islanders created gardens on their rooftops, planting vegetables, as well as flowers, which added a touch of colour to the endless grey of their surroundings. Around the same time, standards of living greatly improved, as Mitsubishi ensured that every flat was equipped with TV sets, refrigerators and electric rice cookers.

But just as the Hashima coal mines were reaching their zenith, they embarked on a quick decline. Japanese industry and economy were soaring, and coal was not enough to provide enough energy. The government began investing more and more on petroleum as an energy source, and coal mines started shutting down around the country.

Gradually, Mitsubishi removed much of their work force from Hashima, assigning them to other sectors of their conglomerate.

All was to come to an end. On January 15, 1974, Mitsubishi held a solemn ceremony in the island&apos;s gymnasium, where they announced the impending closure of the mine. A speedy and orderly exodus ensued, with the last resident leaving for Nagasaki on April 2.

Then, silence fell upon the completely deserted island, as the force of the elements gradually turned the efforts of planners, engineers, managers and ordinary families into a heap of crumbling, overgrown slabs of concrete.

Hashima, or Battleship Island, stood abandoned, an almost forgotten shrine to both the ingenuity and the cruelty of humankind. Throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, very few visitors walked through its maze of corridors, almost nobody climbed its many staircases.

One of those few was the already quoted Burke-Gaffney, who spotted a short poem, spray painted on one of the ruined walls:

&gt; &apos;How many decades could have passed
&gt;  Since Hashima was left to rot;
&gt;  Left to spoil, rot, disintegrate?
&gt;  Life will never return to this island.&apos;

## Melancholy and Kaijus

Author Burke-Gaffney took his visit as an inspiration to reflect on unbridled industrialisation and the depletion of natural resources:

&gt; &apos;The dead island of Hashima delivers a lively warning about the importance of foresight. It offers a view of the end result of &quot;development&quot;, the fate of a community severed from Mother Earth and engaged in a way of life disconnected from its food supply. In short, Hashima is what the world will be like when we finish urbanising and exploiting it: a ghost planet spinning through space&apos;

What the Canadian writer could not foresee, however, is that Battleship Island would not remain &apos;dead&apos; forever. Sure, permanent life would not return on its surface, but it would be at the centre of a lively trade. And in addition to being a cautionary symbol of a decaying planet, it would embody a decades old dispute between two regional powers.

But let&apos;s proceed in order.

The island and its history were rediscovered by the Japanese in the late 1980s. It was seldom visited, but its haunting landscape of modernist ruins would strike a chord with the public. Japanese audiences, after all, were attuned to a popular culture which swung between the two extremes of mournful melancholy, and the spectacle of giant lizards turning skyscrapers into rubble.

The Nagasaki Prefecture eventually opened the island to tourism in 2009, attracting the attention of international audiences. A turning point was the production of the James Bond film &apos;Skyfall&apos;, released in 2012. If you have seen the movie, you may remember the scene in which Bond confronts antagonist Silva in his headquarters, located on an abandoned island … Director Sam Mendes fell in love with Hashima, and wanted to film on location, but due to safety concerns, he had to replicate it, slab by slab, in England, at Pinewood Studios.

Regardless, the success of &apos;Skyfall&apos; catapulted Hashima into public consciousness, and tourism soared. If you want to visit the island today, you may join a guided tour in the port of Nagasaki, from which Battleship Island can be reached in 40 minutes. The local tourism board advises that individual, unaccompanied visits are not allowed, as many buildings are structurally unstable. You should also avoid showing up at the port in winter and during the typhoon season, as tours might be cancelled depending on the weather.

Hashima&apos;s rediscovery prompted UNESCO to cast a keen eye on the Hashima coal mines, as part of their evaluation of 23 significant locations linked to the Meiji Industrial Revolution. In July 2015, UNESCO finally registered Hashima and the other 22 locations as a

&gt; &apos;World Heritage Site under the grouping &apos;Sites of Japan&apos;s Meiji Industrial Revolution: Iron and Steel, Shipbuilding and Coal Mining.&apos;

To be precise, the entirety of Battleship Island is NOT a World Heritage Site, as the vast majority of its buildings were erected after the Meiji era. That designation only belongs to the actual coal mine.

Nonetheless, the UNESCO accolade further propelled the tourism trade to Hashima, a boon for the local economy. But it also fuelled another unintended consequence: controversy.

## The Battle over the Past

When UNESCO had included the Hashima mine amongst the 23 Meiji sites, it had brokered an agreement between South Korea and Japan. According to the agreement, Tokyo had pledged to properly acknowledge the history of Korean forced labour on the island. Accounts of this mobilisation should have been included in all exhibits and material related to the Hashima site.

But Japan, however democratic and constitutionally pacifist, always had some resistance in confronting its Imperialist past. And this case was no different. As reported by Yuji Hosaka, writing for *The Diplomat*:

&gt; &apos;Less than two years later, however, the Japanese government broke its promise to present the historical fact of Japan&apos;s mobilisation of Koreans for forced labour&apos;

According to the already quoted Nikolai Johnsen, Japanese authorities did acknowledge the presence of Korean labourers, but they did so only by mentioning

&gt; &apos;That Japan had a labour conscription policy from 1944 to 1945 … Narratives of Korean Hashima labourers do not differentiate between those who came by choice before the war, and those who were forcefully mobilised and forced to work in extreme conditions under Japanese government labels of &quot;recruitment&quot; and &quot;conscription&quot; between 1939–1945&apos;

In other words: the narrative attached to the Hashima site is that, sure, Koreans were conscripted into labour. But this was done according to the same regulations applied to Japanese nationals, who could be mandated by the government to conduct vital work for the war effort. In this version of events, Koreans — whose country had been annexed to Japan at the end of the 19th Century — were no different from Japanese citizens.

Anyone could be conscripted for the war effort, but they were all fairly compensated. Moreover, Koreans did not suffer neither discrimination nor harsh treatment at the hand of their Japanese employers.

According to Johnsen, this narrative is heavily influenced by the Industrial Heritage Information Centre, or IHIC, which is in turn run by the National Congress of Industrial Heritage, a government-funded foundation.

The IHIC opened to the public on June 15, 2020, showcasing an exhibition which, according to Hosaka and *The Diplomat*, features content that breaches the 2015 agreement with South Korea.

The content in question is the testimony of a former Hashima resident, a second-generation Korean Japanese, who claimed that

&gt; &apos;no discrimination occurred against Koreans. He said his father worked at the coal mine on the island and denied any bullying or finger pointing toward Koreans. He said his father was a supervisor. Koreans who had a Japanese family registry were granted the status of supervisor.&apos;

In February 2021, more former residents of Battleship Island came forward to refute allegations of slave labour. Their efforts focused on publishing a booklet to debunk the use of certain photos, cited as proof that Koreans were abused in the mines.

For example, one of said images was exhibited at the

&gt; &apos;National Memorial Museum of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Occupation&apos;

in Busan, South Korea.

Well, according to the 2021 booklet, that photo was actually taken in 1955 at a coal mine in Fukuoka Prefecture, and had nothing to do with Battleship Island. Yet another contested snap, showing an alleged Korean labourer covered in wounds, had actually been taken in 1918.

The former residents&apos; booklet may have focused only on a handful of contested documents, but it shows how the battle over the past of Hashima raged at all levels of Japanese and Korean society.

In summer of 2021, Tokyo was due to host the Olympic Games, which brought much international scrutiny on the issue of Hashima. UNESCO stepped in again, and in July of that year adopted a resolution

&gt; &apos;Calling on the Japanese government to provide sufficient and more accurate information about forced labour victims at the Industrial Heritage Information Center&apos;

The following month, UNESCO doubled down, expressing

&gt; &apos;Strong regret&apos;

Over Japan&apos;s management of the Meiji Heritage Sites, citing the case of Hashima, and the country&apos;s failure to maintain its earlier agreement to memorialise victims of wartime labour.

The IHIC is not the only foundation staunchly opposing the Korean side. You see, the controversy around Hashima had already been simmering since 2017, when South Korean director Ryoo Seung-wan released his war drama *Gunhamdo* or *Battleship Island*.

The movie is also referred to as *Escape from Gunkanjima*, and centres around a group of Korean labourers, who stage an evasion from Hashima and its hellish living conditions.

The film attracted the attention of the Society for the Dissemination of Historical Facts, a Japanese self-described volunteer organisation whose mission statement reads

&gt; &apos;For a long period of time there were frequent conflicts between Japan and her neighbours. During the conflicts, Chinese war propaganda took precedence over the objective exposition of facts in English-language literature … Painfully aware of the need to remedy this situation, we have resolved to make historical facts as they pertain to modern Japanese relations with neighbouring countries, especially China, available to English speakers&apos;

The &apos;Society&apos; thus released an article, titled

&gt; &apos;The truth about The escape from Gunkanjima&apos;

Which holds positions similar to those of IHIC. According to the article, Korean workers on Hashima had a regular contract, and thus no escape attempts were ever made. The piece quotes at length from the Chairman of the Society of Hashima Islanders, according to whom Korean labourers were well-respected in the mines, and their children frequented the local schools.

At the end of the war, the Mitsubishi management went to great lengths to charter a ship, so as to safely repatriate the 900 Koreans still present on the island.

&gt; &apos;Both Japanese and Koreans alike waved farewell, yearning for each other. When they got aboard the ship and as it was leaving Hashima, all Japanese gathered at the pier and waved to the Koreans, who waved back to us until they were gone, out of sight.&apos;

So, no ill-feelings, it appears. The Chairman even reported that, shortly afterwards, many Korean miners returned to Hashima, as they enjoyed better pay and living conditions.

The last piece of news we could find about this debate comes from Korean newspaper *Hankyoreh*, and was published in September 2023. Reporter Kim So-youn writes that, on September 14, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee had

&gt; &apos;Removed much of the criticism it had heaped on Japan two years ago, in its decision on &quot;follow-up measures&quot;, to be taken by the Japanese government regarding Hashima Island&apos;

The UNESCO decision implied that they were satisfied with Tokyo&apos;s efforts to commemorate forced labourers at the site itself. But So-youn visited the Industrial Heritage Information Centre, and realised that its exhibit still downplayed Battleship Island&apos;s dark past.

&gt; &apos;There was very little information about the horrific history of forced labour, harsh working conditions, and extreme discrimination that Korean victims of forced labour experienced on Hashima Island&apos;

## Conclusion

It is not above our pay grade to determine what is the truth about Hashima. The general consensus amongst historians is that Imperial Japan did perpetrate war crimes and crimes against humanity on par with its nefarious Axis allies, crimes included exploitation of prisoners of war and civilians as forced labourers.

Individual testimonies about conditions at Hashima appear to disagree on the topic, as you might expect in such a politically charged debate. Although we should point out that we were able to quote at least one account from a Japanese supervisor, who admitted to recruiting labour by force, and to actively discriminating against non-Japanese miners.

Will the ghosts of Hashima&apos;s past ever be put to rest? Probably not. But Hashima Island is a tangible piece of a complex history — and history, by its very nature, cannot but feed on ghosts.

## Key Takeaways

- Hashima Island, known as &apos;Battleship Island,&apos; was a densely populated coal mining site off the coast of Southern Japan.
- The island&apos;s history is marked by industrial prosperity and the hardship of Imperial Japan&apos;s expansion, including forced Korean labor.
- Hashima&apos;s coal mines were crucial during World War II, leading to harsh conditions and high fatalities among forced laborers.
- The island&apos;s decline began with the shift from coal to petroleum, leading to its abandonment in 1974.
- Hashima Island is now a UNESCO World Heritage Site, attracting tourists and sparking controversy over the acknowledgment of forced labor.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is Hashima Island known as?

Hashima Island is also known as &apos;Japan&apos;s Ghost Island&apos; and &apos;Battleship Island&apos; (Gunkanjima).

### What was the primary industry on Hashima Island?

The primary industry on Hashima Island was coal mining.

### How did Mitsubishi expand the land area of Hashima Island?

Mitsubishi expanded the land area of Hashima Island through six successive land reclamation projects using the byproduct of their mining operations.

### What was the peak population of Hashima Island?

The peak population of Hashima Island was 5,259 residents in 1959.

### What happened to the Korean laborers on Hashima Island during World War II?

During World War II, Korean laborers on Hashima Island were subjected to forced labor, harsh working conditions, and extreme discrimination. Many were recruited by force and endured long hours, malnutrition, and dangerous working conditions.

### When did Mitsubishi close the coal mine on Hashima Island?

Mitsubishi closed the coal mine on Hashima Island on January 15, 1974.

### What is the current status of Hashima Island?

Hashima Island is currently a tourist attraction. Visitors can join guided tours from the port of Nagasaki, but individual, unaccompanied visits are not allowed due to structural instability.

### What is the controversy surrounding Hashima Island&apos;s history?

The controversy surrounds the acknowledgment of forced Korean labor during World War II. Japan and South Korea have differing narratives about the treatment and conditions of Korean laborers on the island.

### What is the significance of Hashima Island&apos;s coal mine?

Hashima Island&apos;s coal mine is part of the UNESCO World Heritage Site &apos;Sites of Japan&apos;s Meiji Industrial Revolution: Iron and Steel, Shipbuilding and Coal Mining.&apos;

### What was the living situation like for residents on Hashima Island?

Residents on Hashima Island lived in cramped, concrete apartment blocks with communal facilities. Despite the harsh conditions, there was a strong sense of community among the residents.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Hashima Island: Japan&apos;s Ghost Island](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GFxZgA8t5F0)
- [https://www.hashima-island.co.uk/](https://www.hashima-island.co.uk/)
- [https://www.japan.travel/en/japans-local-treasures/hashima-battleship-island/](https://www.japan.travel/en/japans-local-treasures/hashima-battleship-island/)
- [https://en.gunkanjima-excursion.com/history/](https://en.gunkanjima-excursion.com/history/)
- [https://www.hashima-island.co.uk/_f/files/a7/FileItem-11144-HashimaTheGhostIsland.pdf](https://www.hashima-island.co.uk/_f/files/a7/FileItem-11144-HashimaTheGhostIsland.pdf)
- [https://www.hashima-island.co.uk/_f/files/d0/FileItem-11167-StudiesoftheModernBuildingsonGunkanjima.pdf](https://www.hashima-island.co.uk/_f/files/d0/FileItem-11167-StudiesoftheModernBuildingsonGunkanjima.pdf)
- [https://careforthefuture.exeter.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Future-of-Ruins-End-of-Project-Report.pdf](https://careforthefuture.exeter.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Future-of-Ruins-End-of-Project-Report.pdf)
- [https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1484/](https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1484/)
- [https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/36122/1/Johnsen%202021a%20Kat%C5%8D%20K%C5%8Dko%E2%80%99s%20Meiji%20Industrial%20Revolution%20-%20Forgetting%20forced%20labour%20to%20celebrate%20Japan%27s%20World%20Heritage%20Sites%20-%20Part%201.pdf.pdf](https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/36122/1/Johnsen%202021a%20Kat%C5%8D%20K%C5%8Dko%E2%80%99s%20Meiji%20Industrial%20Revolution%20-%20Forgetting%20forced%20labour%20to%20celebrate%20Japan%27s%20World%20Heritage%20Sites%20-%20Part%201.pdf.pdf)
- [https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Gunkanjima4.pdf](https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Gunkanjima4.pdf)
- [https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/remembering-japans-colonial-abuses-against-koreans-on-hashima-island/](https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/remembering-japans-colonial-abuses-against-koreans-on-hashima-island/)
- [https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1109544.html](https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1109544.html)
- [https://japan-forward.com/fake-images-false-claims-gunkanjima-natives-fact-check-south-korea-on-forced-labor/amp/](https://japan-forward.com/fake-images-false-claims-gunkanjima-natives-fact-check-south-korea-on-forced-labor/amp/)
- [https://www.kocis.go.kr/eng/fpcBoard/view.do?seq=1038899&amp;amp;page=5&amp;amp;pageSize=10&amp;amp;photoPageSize=6&amp;amp;totalCount=0&amp;amp;searchType=&amp;amp;searchText=](https://www.kocis.go.kr/eng/fpcBoard/view.do?seq=1038899&amp;amp;page=5&amp;amp;pageSize=10&amp;amp;photoPageSize=6&amp;amp;totalCount=0&amp;amp;searchType=&amp;amp;searchText=)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/57/Aerial_landscape_view_%282017%29.jpg) by Saga1111 / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hong Kong: Swallowed By the Chinese Dragon</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/hong-kong-swallowed-by-the-chinese-dragon</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/hong-kong-swallowed-by-the-chinese-dragon</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>The Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong has long been an anomaly within communist China. Designated as a functionally autonomous city, Hong Kong spent over two decades under the so-called &quot;One Country, Two Systems&quot; formula, a series of laws that kept China&apos;s political system and social authoritarianism largely out of this one small pocket of the country. From 1997 through the late 2010s, Hong Kong quite happily enjoyed its status as a global center of finance, and a bastion of capitalist enterprise. It was globally hailed as a moderating force on one of the world&apos;s most hardline communist regimes, a critical check and balance to a country that might otherwise have taken a sharper authoritarian turn long ago.

But all that changed in 2019, when a seemingly minor change in municipal law set off a powder keg inside the city. In a fast-growing, expansive series of protests, Hong Kong suddenly found itself in a battle for its own soul, battling against a central Chinese government that had finally lost patience with its freewheeling little sibling. And although the battles waged on Hong Kong&apos;s city streets were fierce, although Hong Kong and its people fought tooth-and-nail to preserve what they had…they lost.

On today&apos;s episode of Places, we&apos;ll be digging into Hong Kong&apos;s difficult regional history, its brief few years of triumph, and the story of how a city so globally vital could be swallowed up into the belly of the Chinese dragon.

## Hong Kong&apos;s Golden Age

Hong Kong sits on the banks of the Pearl River estuary, surrounded to the east, west, and south by the South China Sea. On its northward side, it backs up on China&apos;s Guangdong Province, specifically the city of Shenzhen, China&apos;s third-most-advanced city behind Beijing and Shanghai. Hong Kong itself sprawls across Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, and a network of other small islands and pockets of mainland territory, for a total land area of a bit over one thousand square miles. The city is nestled into a landscape of hills and low mountains, blanketed in woodland and plains, and it boasts a thriving natural ecosystem even today. Hot and humid, with a long rainy season in the summertime, Hong Kong is every bit a tropical southeast-Asian city, choked with smog, haze, and well over seven million souls.

The city has been part of China for millennia, but its history as an independent entity began much later, when in 1841, Hong Kong Island was ceded to Great Britain at the end of the First Opium War. A few years later, the Second Opium War would see British-held Hong Kong only grow bigger, tacking on part of the Kowloon Peninsula and, in 1898, 235 nearby islands along with a patch of land called the New Territories. During the late 1800s and the early 1900s, Hong Kong would enjoy its status as a growing entrepreneurial and trade center in East Asia, with foreign money streaming into the city at high rates. The city endured four years of occupation under Imperial Japan from 1941 to 1945, being overwhelmed on the same day that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. But after the war&apos;s end, Hong Kong enjoyed a steady stream of incoming migrants fleeing the Chinese Civil War, and its population boom led to major infrastructural and anti-corruption initiatives that set Hong Kong apart as a thriving, modern city of the times.

In these decades of industrial expansion, Hong Kong led the way for the so-called Four Asian Tigers, alongside Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Amidst an economic boom, the city became highly competitive as a global manufacturing player, before eventually transitioning into a new role as a financial hub in the 1990s, after rising costs pushed heavy industry elsewhere. In those same years, the city was a focal point for ongoing political discontent, as something of a contested territory around the question of mainland China and Taiwan, and questions about Hong Kong&apos;s own future outside its status as a British protectorate were equally relevant. Peaceful protest became a frequent instrument for Hong Kong&apos;s population to express their will en masse, marked by occasional, but brutal massacres when protest turned to riot.

In 1997, Britain&apos;s lease of Hong Kong formally expired, after over a decade of advance work that was meant to try and smooth the process between the British and the Chinese. China had agreed to become signatory to the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, in which China pledged to preserve Hong Kong&apos;s political and economic autonomy for another fifty years, but even before the 1997 transfer of authority took place, the people of Hong Kong openly expected a double-cross. The 1990s saw mass groups of people leave Hong Kong in anticipation of broad and potentially violent crackdowns, and the territory was forced, for a time, to be administrated by a British governor named Christopher Patten, whose rather imperialist style of rule and his clear, rather open contempt for China raised fears of a backlash when China did take command. Things only got worse following the transfer; from 1997 to 2003, Hong Kong weathered the Asian financial crisis, an outbreak of avian flu, a crash of the housing market, and a SARS epidemic and a resulting economic slump.

But in the early years under Chinese rule, the anticipated crackdowns ended up being substantially less severe than Hong Kong&apos;s people had initially feared. The &quot;One Country, Two Systems&quot; policy that China went with, allowing Hong Kong to retain most of its autonomy, had actually been offered to Taiwan all the way back in 1979, in a pitch by then-Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping to bring back the Republic of China under the CCP&apos;s leadership. When that was unsuccessful, he&apos;d pivoted that concept to Hong Kong, probably hoping to take advantage of an opportunity to model just how forgiving China was willing to be. It&apos;s a fairly simple idea: show leniency in Hong Kong, and hope that Taiwan becomes a bit less hesitant. Of course, we could sit here and poke holes in that logic all day; after all, it&apos;s not exactly difficult to put on a friendly face until both Hong Kong and Taiwan are under the CCP&apos;s control, and then lock both territories down with all the brutality Hong Kong&apos;s expatriates were scared of. But with Taiwan still strongly against coming to the negotiation table, Hong Kong was poised to spend years, and perhaps even decades, living under the CCP&apos;s leniency in order to convey a positive message.

That show of surprising tolerance, plus the added benefit of finally being rid of the British, contributed to a transition that was, in some circles, even taken favorably by the people who chose to remain in Hong Kong. As American investment banker William Overholt, who worked as a strategist in Hong Kong during the transition, described it: &quot;Local celebrations of the handover were among the best parties I have ever attended. People considered it a wonderful omen when rain drenched the ceremony on the last day of British rule but sunshine brightened the first day of Chinese rule.&quot; As Overholt described, the city&apos;s elite spent little time talking about ideas like independence or fully autonomous self-rule, preferring instead to focus on preserving the city&apos;s economic power during the tumult and trials of early Chinese rule.

Now, even from the start of Hong Kong&apos;s status as a Chinese special administrative zone, it was clear that China wasn&apos;t exactly falling over itself to make all of Hong Kong&apos;s dreams come true. China&apos;s interpretation of vaguely written laws around the city&apos;s governance, and its own vague pledges to guarantee democratic principles of self-administration, weren&apos;t ignored, but they were followed in a very literal sense, with China making it fairly clear that they intended to interpret their own writings in a way that served the CCP without going outside the language they&apos;d used. It didn&apos;t take long for these emerging patterns to start tempering the enthusiasm Hong Kong&apos;s citizens had felt at the beginning of Chinese rule, and while their goodwill didn&apos;t exactly turn into outright animosity, the goodwill itself didn&apos;t last.

By 2003, it was time for the CCP to rotate out its uppermost leadership, with Vice President Hu Jintao moving into the presidency. Hu Jintao had made his mark in the preceding years with crackdowns on Tibetan separatist movements and civilian dissenters, and he took the same tack with Hong Kong. But in the city, the &quot;dissent&quot; that Hu Jintao was so worried about mostly took the form of neat, orderly protests, ones that very rarely spiraled into anything more menacing than a stroll through a few city squares. Paranoid and touchy after dealing with separatism in the western provinces, the CCP interpreted Hong Kong&apos;s calls for increased democratization as a precursor to independence movements that simply didn&apos;t exist, and had a tendency to interpret the presence of strongly anti-China, niche political leaders in Hong Kong as an expression of the will of the average person there, instead of the fringe outliers they were. This basic lack of understanding of one of China&apos;s own territories inhibited the CCP&apos;s ability to effectively administer to Hong Kong, and the regime under Hu Jintao took no steps to rectify the situation. No committees were formed, nobody from Jintao&apos;s innermost circle came to tour the city or speak to its people, and when pro-democracy groups in the US became more active in amplifying anti-China voices in Hong Kong, often without the approval of the US government, China interpreted their involvement as an attempt to spark Tiananmen Square-style protests in Hong Kong.

These tensions all came to a head when a legislative proposal to implement so-called &quot;anti-subversion laws&quot; was introduced to the Chinese government for review. The legislation addressed a part of Hong Kong&apos;s constitution, the Basic Law, called Article 23, which is going to become very important over the rest of this story. Under Article 23, Hong Kong had agreed to enforce a series of internal laws that criminalized acts of treason, sedition, and secession against China&apos;s central government in Beijing, but in a practical sense, those commitments had gone mostly unfulfilled. The introduction of the new law, set forth in the summer of 2003, was met with immediate backlash in Hong Kong, and after half a million people took to the streets in protest, the proposal was shelved.

But even after that particular issue was dealt with, the people of Hong Kong were gearing up for broader initiatives to push back against China&apos;s perceived overreach into their territory. As the city&apos;s economy bounced back from its tough last few years, and Hong Kong&apos;s economy became more intertwined with that of China writ large, especially nearby Shenzhen, Hong Kong&apos;s political sphere began to call more and more loudly, more and more frequently, for democratic reforms. For a while, these protests were successful; Hong Kong&apos;s Legislative Council, or LegCo, was modified so that a full half of its seats were dedicated to elected representatives from geographic areas of the city, even though its other half was still selected from businesses and other economic sectors. In 2006, pro-democracy rallies in the city attracted tens of thousands of people, this time advocating a transition to full democracy, and when the then-leader of Hong Kong, Donald Tsang, was reelected a year later, he announced his own plan to push for a full, democratizing overhaul for the territory.

Now, we&apos;ve got to take a moment and examine exactly what was going on during this time, because for all Donald Tsang&apos;s talk of democratization, he actually wasn&apos;t an opposition candidate. He was selected by an electoral college that was made up of predominantly pro-Beijing electors, beating out a challenger who had been seen as even more pro-democracy, and while Tsang&apos;s commitments were, indeed, in favor of broader democratization, it was a sort of democratization that came with the express approval of the CCP. Tsang&apos;s job was to walk a tightrope, feeding Hong Kong&apos;s pro-autonomy political majority, while reconciling their wishes with the demands of Beijing and its representatives inside the city. Tsang made pledges to bring Hong Kong toward universal suffrage, he pushed toward full constitutional development, and he urged infrastructural and educational advancements along with initiatives to help low-income families. All things considered, Tsang appeared to be a promising candidate to move Hong Kong forward, and potentially improve the tenuous balance that had kept the city afloat so far.

With Tsang&apos;s arrival came good news from Beijing: in addition to the presence of this mutually agreeable leader, Hong Kong was to be granted the power to choose its own leader, rather than have its leader chosen by Beijing&apos;s handpicked electoral college, in 2017, ten years after the announcement was issued. So, too, would they get a fully self-elected legislature three years later, in 2020. A year after that 2007 announcement, Hong Kong&apos;s pro-democracy parties picked up enough seats in the territory&apos;s Legislative Council to grant themselves veto power, meaning that actively repressive legislation proposed by Beijing probably wouldn&apos;t get through. For a few years, Hong Kong was able to enjoy its status as a growing bastion of East Asian democracy; they hosted major sporting events in 2008 and 2009, including some events for the Olympics, and its financial sector, its construction sector, and its tourism sector all enjoyed a major boom.

But before long, civil unrest would grip Hong Kong again, when in 2012, the Hong Kong Education Bureau issued a proposal that pretty clearly seemed to come from Beijing. What they proposed was a new, mandatory class that was to be taken by every child enrolled in Hong Kong&apos;s public schools: Moral and National Education. Now, here in the 2020s, we&apos;re more than familiar with other, similar initiatives by the Chinese government: social credit scores, and all that. But they weren&apos;t so familiar at the time, and they sounded no less like indoctrination back in 2012 than they do now. The proposal prompted mass protests across Hong Kong, in response to curricula that would praise and whitewash what the CCP considered to be its highest achievement, and contrast them to systems of multi-party rule like the US or, well, Hong Kong, which would be derided as inferior forms of governance. The Communist Party was to be described as &quot;progressive, selfless, and united&quot;, and the many failings of China&apos;s Cultural Revolution would be glossed over or ignored outright. Hong Kong&apos;s teachers and parents took particular umbrage to the concept, condemning it outright as an attempt at brainwashing—and to be fair, that term wasn&apos;t even all theirs. In the words of one member of the pro-CCP China Civic Education Promotion Association in Hong Kong, &quot;A brain needs washing if there is a problem, just as clothes need washing if they&apos;re dirty, and a kidney needs washing if it&apos;s sick&quot;. Firstly, wow, and secondly, statements like that didn&apos;t help Beijing&apos;s case. Before long, the people of Hong Kong were successful: the proposal was dropped and the curriculum was made optional for the city&apos;s schools.

But two years later, and utterly unsurprisingly, Beijing was at it again. If you remember back to that promise we described a moment ago, that starting in 2017 Hong Kong would be able to elect its own leader…well, that promise was taken back in August of 2014, when the CCP declared a return to their prior expectation that only Beijing-backed candidates would be eligible to fill Hong Kong&apos;s top post. By now, it really should not be a surprise that Hong Kong&apos;s answer was, again, mass protest, this time in the form of the Umbrella Movement. In this particular show of strength, protesters—predominantly students—shut down government buildings, financial districts, and major roads across the city, carrying umbrellas to protect themselves from police pepper spray. In typical fashion, these protests were meant to appear exceedingly nonviolent; protesters made a habit of distributing free food and water to everyone who was participating, and keeping up with their studies and Hong Kong&apos;s recycling policies even as they took to the streets. But this time, the protesters struggled to settle on any sort of alternative to propose to Beijing—and with nothing to discuss, Beijing was all too happy to sit back and wait the protesters out. Eventually, students had to start going back to school, other protesters had to return to work, and the city grew frustrated with the economic and traffic disruptions the Umbrella Movement were causing. Seventy-nine days after the protests began, the Hong Kong police took action to remove the last protesters who remained, putting an end to the first big Hong Kong protest to basically fail outright.

Perhaps it was that last fact that emboldened Beijing—that they&apos;d proven to themselves that they could rely upon inaction long enough that all these nuisance protests would simply peter out on their own, instead of intensifying with time. When it came time for another back-and-forth with Hong Kong&apos;s citizens, this time in 2016, Beijing was eager to test that theory. In 2016, the issue at hand was unlicensed food vendors in Hong Kong, specifically people selling a snack called fishballs in the district of Mong Kok. When Beijing-backed authorities entered the district to shut down vendors who didn&apos;t have approval from the government to operate, basically on grounds of health and sanitation, it quickly turned from a dispute about snack foods into one about Hong Kong&apos;s identity—similar to trying to take Philly cheesesteaks out of Philadelphia, or take poutine out of Quebec, or, well, take all the palatable foreign food out of London. But this time, police fired warning shots at protesters, further inflaming tensions, and the situation began to get more violent than what Hong Kong had seen in recent years.

Before long, these protests morphed into a platform for Hong Kong&apos;s so-called &quot;localists&quot;—people who advocated for an expansion of Hong Kong&apos;s autonomy, or even pursuit of formal independence from China. In August of that same year, the people of Hong Kong rallied under explicit calls for independence for the first time, something that had been brewing since the Umbrella Revolution had gone south. The rallies had been set off when the city&apos;s pro-Beijing electoral commission had banned six pro-independence candidates from running for election, a reflection of the fact that all sides, including Beijing, could feel the independence question hanging heavier and heavier in the air. But they also represented a changing reality for Hong Kong: that peaceful protest was not the instrument of change that it once was, and that if Beijing was going to start tightening its grip, then Hong Kong would have to really start fighting for air.

In the years from 2017 to 2019, both sides would ratchet up the pressure, with Hong Kong&apos;s calls for independence, and the proportion of Hong Kongers who supported those calls, both swelling rapidly. At Hong Kong&apos;s annual memorials for the Tiananmen Square massacre, the only such memorials that were allowed to take place in all of China, attendance went through the roof. In response, the Beijing-backed government criminalized the Hong Kong National Party, which had previously been a major voice for independence. The international community began to take notice; in one unprecedented step, two political activists from Hong Kong were granted refugee status in Germany, implicitly acknowledging that political freedom in the city was not what it once had been. Back in Hong Kong, several booksellers who&apos;d stocked anti-CCP content were disappeared, and a well-regarded foreign journalist, Victor Mallet, was even asked to leave the territory after chairing a talk with the Hong Kong National Party&apos;s founder. Compared to what citizens in mainland China faced, this was still, by all accounts, fairly mild treatment…but for Hong Kong, it was getting to be time to really be concerned.

## When it All Went South

By this point, the cycle Hong Kong had found itself in for decades should be fairly clear. Hong Kong gets a fair amount of autonomy and self-representation for its people, Beijing continues exerting a heavier hand than Hong Kong would like, the CCP chips away at Hong Kong&apos;s autonomy in constant, small ways, and when they come in with something really out of pocket, the people of Hong Kong take to the streets and preserve their way of life. But Beijing&apos;s tightening hold, and the growing role of independence movements and civil actions in Hong Kong, were moving toward a boiling point, with international media of the time openly speculating about just how soon Hong Kong might be to falling apart.

The spark that lit the powder keg would come in February 2019. By then, former leader Donald Tsang had long since left power, and his replacement, too, had been replaced, by a lifelong civil servant named Carrie Lam. Lam had come into power in 2017, pledging to unite Hong Kong&apos;s disparate parts under clear leadership, but she was absolutely a favorite of Beijing, and she wasn&apos;t a favorite in Hong Kong. Public polling clearly showed that she was not the people&apos;s preferred candidate, and her public statements, both before and after she was sworn in, seemed to have a lot more to do with the idea of getting Hong Kongers on the same page than it did about specifying whether or not her idea of unity involved preserving Hong Kong&apos;s semi-autonomous status.

The first couple of years of Lam&apos;s leadership were more of the same: pro-democracy legislators being disqualified from their posts due to having taken their oaths of office in a way deemed insulting to Beijing, and some of their colleagues later being thrown out because of calls for self-determination. Pro-independence parties were banned and accused of sedition, important corruption investigations were closed prematurely in order to protect pro-China former politicians, and a decision to raise Hong Kong&apos;s Social Security eligibility age were predictably, and extremely, unpopular. Taken together, this series of decisions had only served to continue the ongoing rise in tensions, so when Hong Kong was faced by what came next, the city detonated all at once.

Meet Amber Poon Hiu-Wing, a twenty-year-old from Hong Kong who decided to take a vacation to Taiwan&apos;s capital city, Taipei, in February of 2018. She had traveled with her boyfriend, Chan Tong-Kai, a 19-year-old from Hong Kong&apos;s neighbor city of Shenzhen, who she&apos;d dated for about a year and a half and gotten pregnant in the process. On the night before Poon and Chan were due to fly back to Hong Kong, the young couple had a dispute over how to pack a suitcase they&apos;d bought, and over the course of the night, their arguments devolved as Poon revealed past infidelity. In a rage, Chan violently assaulted Poon, eventually killing her in their Taipei hotel room before disposing of her body amidst the shrubs in a nearby river.

The case immediately became a problem for Hong Kong authorities after Chan flew back to the city as scheduled. Although Poon&apos;s body was eventually found, and Chan confessed to killing her, Chan could not be prosecuted for any crimes relating to her death since after all, Chan hadn&apos;t committed the murder in Hong Kong. He&apos;d committed it in Taiwan, where he could have been charged for murder and illegal disposal of a human body, but since Hong Kong&apos;s federal administrator, China, and Taiwan don&apos;t keep any formal ties—and, just do a quick Google search if the reasons for that are unclear—there were no treaties or agreements in place that could have seen Chan sent back to Taiwan to face consequences.

The problem was that according to Beijing, Chan actually committed the murder on Chinese territory, since China considers Taiwan a rogue, breakaway province. As a result, Beijing would have been more than happy to prosecute Chan themselves—but that brought up another, equally thorny issue, which is that under Hong Kong&apos;s autonomy agreements, it has no obligation to hand over any person accused of a crime to China. This has been a critical element to the way that Hong Kong self-administers; put simply, it was incredibly important to the people of Hong Kong that they could not be simply sent to China for prosecution at the whims of their government. After all, the people of Hong Kong did things every day in their autonomous territory that would have seen them followed and potentially even charged in Beijing.

It was a Pandora&apos;s Box that simply could not be opened, so naturally, Beijing took a crowbar to it. Once it became clear to the CCP that the issue of Chan Tong-Kai could not be resolved through the usual back-room dealings with Hong Kong, the regime saw to it that Hong Kong&apos;s leader, Carrie Lam, would introduce a legislative proposal to change the rules. Under this new bill, Hong Kong would be granted the ability to detain and extradite people to foreign countries and territories where extradition treaties don&apos;t exist—but since this would include Taiwan, which Hong Kong&apos;s overlords in Beijing considered to be China, then it would also include China proper. It was a highly opportunistic move, one that might not have come along except for one act of violence that could then be exploited, but Beijing locked onto the situation as soon as it arose.

And for Beijing to have its way would have absolutely massive implications for Hongkongers, who could now very easily be sent to China to be prosecuted for things like, say, criticizing Xi Jinping, or speaking out against the treatment of Tibetans and Uighur Muslims. In Hong Kong, these offenses weren&apos;t punishable, but if China could be granted an extradition and then have charges waiting when a detainee arrived, then it wouldn&apos;t matter. Anybody in Hong Kong could be scooped up, detained, tried, and even potentially disappeared in communist China, just the same as anyone else in the country—and you can bet that the extradition laws were going to be applied to political activists too.

When the bill was introduced, it included only thirty-seven crimes that would open an offender to extradition, none of which were political charges—but that didn&apos;t much matter. Once the law itself was passed, amending it would be very simple, and given the loose and very clearly pro-Beijing interpretations that Hong Kong had used in the enforcement of its other laws, there was no guarantee that an amendment would even be required. By simple re-interpretations of the rules they&apos;d already written, the CCP could easily justify assigning one of those thirty-seven crimes to an action that was…well, anything but. And with decision-making power over who gets extradited resting with the hand-picked leaders Beijing had installed in Hong Kong, there was no real path to dispute any miscarriages of justice that did take place. As the people of Hong Kong saw it, this was the last step in dismantling the city&apos;s autonomous status. After all, threaten that any perceived dissenters in Hong Kong might be extradited to China, and it would rightfully become very difficult to find any Hongkonger willing to take the risk of protesting at all.

After the first organized protest against the extradition bill, the Hong Kong government began to send out signs and signals that this round of unrest wouldn&apos;t be treated so gently as the others had been. Several leaders of the Umbrella Movement were given prison sentences, including two who were sentenced to sixteen months—a small stretch of time according to some countries, but way, way beyond what any peaceful protester had ever been sentenced to in Hong Kong before. But this just seemed to inflame the protest movement more; four days after those sentences were handed down, 130,000 people rallied in the streets. A bit over a month later, a candlelight vigil for the Tiananmen Square Massacre drew a stunning turnout, and a bit over a week after that, the really large-scale protests began. On June 9, 2019, over a million people took to the streets, prompting an immediate statement from the government that, like it or not, their extradition bill would move ahead as scheduled.

Tensions boiled over three days later, when a protest of a hundred thousand surrounded Hong Kong&apos;s Legislative Council building in order to prevent a reading of the bill. From the government&apos;s perspective, this appears to have been a bridge too far; although the second reading of the bill was cancelled, police responded harshly to the protests, launching tear gas and firing rubber bullets and beanbag rounds in order to clear the area. Eighty-one protesters were injured, alongside twenty-two police, and stories began to emerge of police engaging in the deliberate assault of numerous protesters, including journalists. The Hong Kong Police Commissioner took the rare step of labeling the protesters &apos;rioters&apos;, a charge that carries a different and much more severe range of potential legal repercussions. A few days later, Carrie Lam herself would use that same term to describe the protesters—and the same night that she did, the 2019 protests got their first fatality: Marco Leung Ling-Kit, later known as the &quot;raincoat man&quot;, who fell to his death while protesting on the roof of a mall.

The day after Leung&apos;s death, two million people marched through the streets of Hong Kong, in an act that this time, police seemed to have no real will to oppose. Two days later, the protest movement issued its four demands. The Lam government would have to completely withdraw its extradition bill, investigate the Hong Kong police for their brutality against protesters, free every protester and drop the charges against them, and issue a full retraction of the statements condemning the prior June 12 protests as a &apos;riot&apos;. Although it wasn&apos;t an official fifth demand, many Hongkongers also called loudly for the resignation of Lam and the other ministers who had been involved with the government&apos;s response to the protests. Unfortunately, it should be no surprise that the government rejected each of these demands, ensuring that the protests would only continue.

With each side having drawn its line in the sand, there was nothing left for Hong Kong to do but to settle its internal differences the hard way. Protesters began targeting the city&apos;s police headquarters for their demonstrations, besieging it on multiple occasions. So, too, did several hundred protesters storm the Legislative Council building and vandalize its interior, also issuing their fifth and final demand in a speech from the floor of the chamber. The protesters were demanding full and genuine universal suffrage in Hong Kong, so that the city&apos;s people would be able to choose their own Chief Executive and their own Legislative Council. Symbols of the resistance, referred to as Lennon Walls, sprung up all across the city, and so-called &apos;district marches&apos;, featuring the local communities of each of Hong Kong&apos;s boroughs, drew crowds of over a hundred thousand in Kowloon and Sha Tin.

On July 21, the next inflection point came: a march on Hong Kong Island, attended by nearly half a million people, that intended to reach the Hong Kong government headquarters. This was the first protest in which police attempted to place restrictions on where protesters could move. Not only were those restrictions ignored, but the protesters also ended up defacing the headquarters of the mainland Chinese Communist Party building on the island, in what would be the first attack on a PRC target. It wasn&apos;t the only one to happen that night; as word of the vandalism circulated on social media, protesters across the city began to tear down PRC flags wherever they flew. But the retaliation was swift that night; by late evening, well over a hundred armed counter-protesters had massed near citizens in the Yuen Long district, attacking them with metal rods and wood sticks in an act that saw forty-five people hospitalized. Police took over half an hour to respond to the incident, and were observed having cordial conversations with the attackers while at the scene, and not a single arrest was made that evening.

It&apos;s important to note that there wasn&apos;t even an active protest in the area at the time of the attack; just ordinary Hongkongers, some of whom were no doubt supportive of the protests, but many who likely weren&apos;t involved. Regardless, it didn&apos;t take long for police to blame the whole incident on manufactured claims that protesters had provoked this armed mob into an attack. Six days later, the people of Hong Kong tried to march in protest against police inaction around the attack, but found their march banned. It was the first time that a civilian protest march had been outright prohibited by the authorities, although such bans would happen many more times in the following months. Nearly three hundred thousand people marched anyway. The following day, related to a different set of protests, forty-nine people would be arrested, and nearly all of them would be tried on riot charges.

The following weeks turned into months of the same cycle: the Hong Kong police set down new restrictions on the rights of protesters, protesters protested those restrictions, and police crackdowns grew ever harsher. Protesters began to weather attacks by police after deviating from established march routes; massive strikes led to more and more overtly threatening statements from the government; Chinese police in nearby Shenzhen staged and publicized massive anti-riot drills as a show of force; and the numbers of protest attendees continued to grow. One brief show of contrition from the Hong Kong government, an announcement by Carrie Lam that the extradition bill would be withdrawn in mid-autumn, was largely taken as too little, too late, to address the growing anti-government sentiment that all of Lam&apos;s prior decisions had allowed to fester, and after that announcement had only a minimal effect on the rate or strength of protests, police banned marches outright.

From September to December, at least ten protests would be attacked by police, even as attendee numbers remained in the multiple hundreds of thousands. More protesters were arrested on charges of rioting, and on October the first, an eighteen-year-old protester was shot in the chest at point-blank range with lethal ammunition. The young man was lucky enough to survive, and was promptly charged with rioting. Also in October, a new ordnance banned the use of facial coverings at protests, something that seemed to be done with the intent to discourage protesters from coming out under threat of identification, but instead prompted even bigger protests in response. In those protests, a fourteen-year-old boy would also be shot at close range; the next day, he was arrested and charged with rioting. On November the eighth, a 21-year-old would die after a fall under unexplained circumstances during a police clearance operation, and on the following day, seven pro-democracy members of the Legislative Council would be arrested.

In the November rounds of protests, clashes between the protesters and police grew all the fiercer, with protesters now responding en masse to the police use of tear gas and rubber bullets with their own use of bricks and petrol bombs. Protesters seized the campuses of several Hong Kong universities, and laid roadblocks all across the city. In the latter part of the month, one university would be besieged by police for twelve days, with hundreds arrested when the siege eventually broke. Elections for Hong Kong&apos;s District Council, around the same time, saw seventeen of eighteen city districts swept by pro-democracy candidates, taking over eighty-five percent of seats citywide in a stunning, unprecedented show of just how complete public support for the protests really was. The political statement seemed to chill police for a brief moment, with December&apos;s round of protests being quite a bit less eventful, but by January of 2020, both sides were back at it.

But January 2020 would also see the most major disruption to the protests yet: the emergence of the novel coronavirus. Immediately, protesters began focusing on what they felt was an inadequate government response to the threat of the virus entering Hong Kong by way of mainland China, and calling for closure of the border with the PRC. Despite public outcry, the Hong Kong government refused to heed those calls, although they&apos;d ban arrivals to Hong Kong from protester-friendly South Korea a month later. For the protesters, the arrival of coronavirus was precisely the wrong development at the wrong time, a change that strongly disincentivized the large-scale marches that had been gaining in power previously. Rather than gathering in the streets, the protest movement transitioned online, including via popular video games like Animal Crossing, which would be banned in China as a result. As they did so, prominent activists were arrested, including millionaire publisher Jimmy Lai, and the founder of Hong Kong&apos;s Democratic Party, then-81-year-old Martin Lee.

In these months, both the police and the Hong Kong government were able to consolidate their victories and reorient themselves in preparation for the inevitable return to protests when it eventually came. That moment arrived in early May, with coronavirus cases popping up only infrequently across the city, and protesters feeling comfortable in taking to the streets again. But this time, the government was quick to issue strong condemnations of the rallies, with CCP officials stating plainly that Hong Kong would &apos;pay&apos; for the actions of its protesters. Mass protests on the tenth of May led to multiple hundreds of arrests, and eleven days later, the Chinese government in Beijing proposed a National Security Law that would bypass Hong Kong&apos;s authority entirely. The law would have given Beijing the right to target acts it deemed terrorism, which very clearly could be applied to Hong Kong&apos;s protest movement, and although the law was internationally condemned as an attempt to end the One Country, Two Systems policy, it received the ringing endorsement of the Lam government inside the city. The law set off even bigger protests, reminiscent of what had taken place before the COVID-19 pandemic, but these only seemed to hasten the CCP&apos;s decision-making. One week after its national security law was introduced, the Chinese parliament approved it with overwhelming consensus: 2,878 votes for, one vote against, and six abstentions. To add insult to injury, another law was then passed, this one in Hong Kong; it banned &quot;insults to the national anthem of China&quot;.

The new legal developments in Beijing signaled that Hong Kong&apos;s protest movement had now reached the eleventh hour, a true do-or-die moment in which failure to change the government&apos;s collective mind would spell the end to the freedoms Hong Kong had enjoyed for decades. The city&apos;s annual Tiananmen Square Massacre memorial vigil was banned for the first time, although many people still came out to show support for the event, and throughout the month of June, protests cropped up in large numbers again as world powers worked overtime to try and convince Beijing to show restraint. But the National Security Law finished working itself through Beijing&apos;s bureaucracy by the 30th of June, when the Chinese National People Congress officially passed it into law, effective immediately. The full text of the law was posted online for the first time at 11:00 PM local time, June 30, 2020, and at that moment, Hong Kong&apos;s autonomous status under One Country, Two Systems functionally ceased to exist.

## Changing Times

In the hours following the National Security Law&apos;s passage, numerous prominent pro-democracy leaders withdrew from their posts or shuttered their political organizations, unwilling to take the risk that their continued peaceful leadership could land them in Chinese prison for a span of decades. The following day, tens of thousands of people attempted to protest, and were met with water cannons and nearly four hundred arrests, including ten that saw the detainees charged with offenses under the hours-old national security law. Protesters took to holding up blank sheets of paper in order to not be arrested for displaying now-outlawed slogans, while prominent activists began leaving Hong Kong en route to Europe. The Hong Kong Education Bureau mandated that schoolchildren be instructed on the new law from the age of kindergarten upward, and libraries began trimming out books and other materials that could have been perceived as violations, at the same time as schools began purging non-compliant material of their own. In perhaps the most chilling development yet, word emerged from pro-China sources that DNA samples had been collected from the first group of detainees charged with violating the new law, around the same time as the Beijing-led National Security Office set up shop inside a luxury hotel in Hong Kong&apos;s Causeway Bay.

The new law also set off a mass exodus of foreign interests from Hong Kong, with everything from prominent international banks, to press organizations, to VPN companies choosing to move their bases of operations elsewhere. Other financial organizations began to pick through their members, vetting their social media and even their personal lives to ensure that they would only hold funds for individuals deemed acceptable to the Chinese regime. A number of nations around the world ended their extradition treaties with Hong Kong, citing an unwillingness to extradite someone to Hong Kong and have them face charges under the CCP. Academics began seeking ways out of the city, as did independent writers and artists, while marches in the streets began to shrink in size. By August, a new ban on outdoor gatherings of more than two people and a resurgence of COVID in the city were enough to keep most people out of the streets.

Then, there&apos;s the matter of Jimmy Lai, a name we&apos;ve already mentioned once before in this video. A dominant tycoon in Hong Kong&apos;s media industry, Lai had spent decades as a critic of the Chinese Communist Party, and his most successful publications, the Apple Daily tabloid and Next Magazine, had a reach within the city that eclipsed what most media magnates could hope of achieving. Lai had found himself a target of Hong Kong&apos;s attention all through the protest movement, but now, he was easy pickings for the government to identify and persecute a high-profile Hongkonger who could be charged with violations of the national security law. On the tenth of August, 2020, Lai was arrested in a move that prompted forceful international condemnation, on the same day as numerous other prominent pro-democracy activists found themselves in handcuffs too. Lai would eventually be charged with allegations that he had colluded with foreign forces to endanger China&apos;s national security, with the evidence against him resting mainly on citations of his Twitter posts, and within a few months, all his assets had been frozen. Lai continued to endure more and more charges, eventually being sentenced to nearly six years in prison over one of his cases in late 2022, plus another thirty-three months for other charges, and whether that sentence will be extended further, we just can&apos;t say. In all likelihood, Beijing is doing its best to time the death of 75-year-old Lai, in order to ensure he spends his last days in prison, without handing down a sentence that would appear so unfair as to confine him for decades.

The rest of 2020 was more of the same. The few protests that did take place were met with even more harsh crackdowns than before; more and more Hongkongers began to be detained and spirited away by Chinese authorities; and overall, the city basically concluded its year of fierce resistance, accepting, however begrudgingly, that Beijing had won. As CCP control consolidated over the city, Hong Kong grew increasingly isolated from the West, with more and more companies pulling the plug on operations there, and foreigners living in the city deciding that now was the time to make a quiet exit. When New Year&apos;s Day came around in 2021, Hong Kong had no marches take place, for the first time in a decade. Several countries accepted Hong Kong protesters as refugees, and the global West began issuing sanctions and closing down their former diplomatic agreements with the city. The Canadian government, in particular, explored the possibility of mass evacuations of its 300,000 Canadian citizens living there, in what would have been an incredibly geopolitically fraught exercise if it had had to take place.

The next major affront to the autonomy Hong Kong had once enjoyed was a speech made by China&apos;s head of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, Xia Baolong, who seemingly decided that February 22, 2021 was a good day to start saying the quiet parts out loud. As Xia explained, it was the government&apos;s desire to ensure that only so-called &quot;patriots&quot; be allowed to lead Hong Kong, and if there&apos;s any confusion about what he meant by &quot;patriots&quot;, we&apos;ll let him tell you himself: &quot;Being patriotic means loving the People&apos;s Republic of China&quot;. Also in his criteria: love for the Chinese constitution, and love for the Communist Party. So, too, would members of the judiciary have to be patriots as well. For a not-so-autonomous region that had been led by Beijing&apos;s handpicked candidates for decades, it wasn&apos;t much of a surprise that this was what a party official was thinking to himself. But to have it announced so decisively was a clear indicator that the CCP no longer believed that the people of Hong Kong had the will or the ability to defend their aspirations for universal suffrage. Xia&apos;s comments were taken internationally as an indicator that the CCP had no intention of allowing opposition parties, what Xia himself referred to as &quot;anti-China troublemakers&quot;, to enter politics at all. His comments were quickly picked up by Hong Kong&apos;s leaders, including Carrie Lam herself, who provided this gem of a quote in response to concerns that dissenters may be oppressed under such a system: &quot;If we must use the word oppress, it&apos;s oppressing those who advocate Hong Kong independence, who attempted to push Hong Kong into the abyss of violence and those who forget their ancestry, do not recognise themselves as Chinese, who collude with foreign political organisations to destroy Hong Kong&quot;.

In 2022, Hong Kong learned precisely what the CCP&apos;s comments about pro-China candidates had meant. In that year, only one candidate was allowed to run for Lam&apos;s post of Chief Executive: John Lee, a former deputy police chief. In the Legislative Council, the number of directly elected members went down to twenty, with seventy members being chosen by the CCP, and when the pro-democracy movement, seeing that all was lost anyway, decided to boycott the elections, all ninety legislative council seats went to pro-Beijing candidates. In this year&apos;s upcoming 2023 district elections, the rules have been changed again, to prevent what John Lee has described as Hong Kong&apos;s electoral system being &quot;manipulated and paralyzed [by people promoting] separatism and violence&quot;. Lee&apos;s answer is apparently to reduce the number of elected district seats to twenty percent, with forty percent chosen by indirect elections, and forty percent appointed by Lee himself. It&apos;s one step short of what many international observers believe to be the Chinese government&apos;s true endgame: a future in which those remaining twenty percent of democratically elected representatives are eventually whittled down until there are none left at all.

And since Lee came into power, the story has largely been about punishments against those who made the decision to speak out in defense of Hong Kong, back when things weren&apos;t quite so dire. Since 2022, the government has been hard at work prosecuting those who are alleged of protest-related crimes, including hosts of websites that were used by protest movements, and journalists native to Hong Kong who had made their choice to stay. The Hong Kong Justice Department has also started to show another troubling tendency: if Protester X was present at, let&apos;s say, three protests, and serves a sentence for several years as a penalty for being present at the first of those three…then upon their release, they&apos;re likely looking at a pretty short countdown before they&apos;re arrested again, hauled back in, and thrown in jail for the second—and so on.

## Life in Hong Kong

In 2023, Hong Kong has been the site of a re-launch campaign, run by the city itself in order to rehabilitate its global image following years of crackdowns. After enforcing strict COVID restrictions for far longer than the rest of the world, most likely as a convenient way to prohibit gatherings in public that might otherwise have become protests, the city lifted its restrictions early in the year and announced that five hundred thousand airline tickets were up for grabs for anybody in the world who wanted to come visit. Billing itself as &quot;Asia&apos;s world city&quot;, Hong Kong and current Chief Executive John Lee opened the city for business under the &quot;Hello Hong Kong&quot; banner.

Now, we could talk about the strange launch ceremony, featuring, for some reason, a breakdancing display done by people in airline uniforms and business suits. But it&apos;s far more relevant to highlight the way that the city&apos;s ceremonies have largely harkened back to its age under late British rule, while functionally omitting the decades Hong Kong spent as an autonomous territory. For all intents and purposes, the idea of &quot;waking up&quot; Hong Kong after the COVID-19 pandemic means outright replacing the life Hongkongers knew before the crackdowns, with one that echoes the convenient narratives Beijing wishes to tell.

But &quot;Hello Hong Kong&quot; has unashamedly taken place against a backdrop of continued, and well-publicized crackdowns, including everything from the mass resignations of teachers, to the mass trials of people charged with subversion as punishment for taking part in an unofficial primary election, to streaming platforms like Disney removing content that&apos;s deemed offensive, to the city plummeting downward on international lists ranking press freedom, freedom of expression, respect for human rights, and democratic rule. All these issues are, of course, kept well-and-truly separate from the experience of a person visiting Hong Kong with their free airline tickets, but just like the governments of war-torn Syria or repressive Nicaragua can entice Instagram influencers to amplify their preferred message, the fact that China can do the same in Hong Kong doesn&apos;t mean it&apos;s not rather insidious.

In terms of political expression, the ordinary Hongkonger&apos;s rights to express opinions that don&apos;t directly align with the wishes of the CCP are sharply curtailed. The possession of pro-democracy, pro-independence, or pro-suffrage stickers, banners, tee shirts, or flags are grounds for arrest and are likely to see an offender be charged. So, too, is the possession of blank white pieces of paper, after they were adopted as symbols of resistance following bans on protest signs. Maximum penalties for acts of secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces include life imprisonment, but between how those laws are written and how they&apos;re interpreted by the CCP, they&apos;re used broadly enough that even minor affronts to Beijing are grounds for an extremely harsh sentence. By example, an organization that accepts a donation from a Western country has now opened itself to charges of collusion with foreign forces, and attending even a peaceful protest may fall under either secession or terrorism, depending on how the CCP is feeling that day.

Once a person is accused of a crime, another part of the National Security Law dictates that suspects can be moved, at the will of the authorities, to mainland China to face their charges. This allows a Hongkonger to be tried under Chinese mainland law, sentenced to serve their time in mainland Chinese prisons, and subjected to all the interrogations, torture, and forced disappearances that the Chinese justice system is known for. Detainees in mainland China do not have the right to contact their loved ones or their lawyers in some conditions, and they can be held outside the legal detention system for up to six months, during which time…all bets are off on the ill treatment they might experience while in custody. Even in Hong Kong, citizens are no longer afforded the right to withhold self-incriminating information no matter the personal cost, functionally eliminating the basic right to stay silent. And when they&apos;re investigated, it might be by Hong Kong&apos;s authorities, or it might be by the CCP&apos;s Office for Safeguarding National Security, an arm of the law that is free to operate with impunity in Hong Kong, but is not subject to any legal oversight or even basic laws of the city.

The city&apos;s schools, too, now prohibit any discussion of political issues in classes, as well as other political messaging by students or teachers alike. Reading materials have been sharply censored and otherwise restricted, and the CCP&apos;s programs of patriotic education have become widespread across the city. Beijing&apos;s interpretation of the 2019 and 2020 protests in Hong Kong has identified schools as a breeding ground for ill will toward the government, and in response, it&apos;s schools that receive a large share of scrutiny from the government. Students are taught the definitions of &quot;secession&quot;, &quot;subversion&quot;, &quot;terrorist activities&quot;, and &quot;collusion with a foreign country&quot; from a young age, and classes on &quot;citizenship and social development&quot;, functionally a primer in how to act loyally toward Hong Kong&apos;s and China&apos;s systems of authority, have become commonplace. Teachers are expected to self-censor, as well as touring China and passing an exam on national security when they qualify for their positions, and they can, and will be held responsible for any statements that are taken to be criticisms of the government—even when they&apos;re reported by their own students. And it&apos;s not just classroom teachers who are at risk; in September 2022, five speech therapists were found guilty of charges that they&apos;d published children&apos;s books deemed to be &quot;seditious&quot; by the Chinese government. In response to the changing situation, many parents in Hong Kong have sent their children abroad to study, although families that don&apos;t have the resources to do so have no other choice but to allow their children to keep studying what Beijing dictates in curriculum.

For adults online, the situation is no better. The National Security Law granted Hong Kong&apos;s law enforcement entities the right to remove online content that is deemed contrary to the regime, and access the data of individual users with no need for a warrant. Although Western platforms like Meta and Google have refused to process Hong Kong&apos;s requests for user data, not all apps—and, in fact, not all popular apps—have done the same. More broadly, Hong Kong has not yet been subsumed under China&apos;s online Great Firewall, but speculation has only grown in recent years about just how long Hong Kong has left before it, too, is subject to the firewall&apos;s controls. Until then, Hong Kong&apos;s netizens will continue to suffer the removal of increasing numbers of individual websites, especially those that monitor human rights abuses inside the territory.

And lastly, there&apos;s one more little kicker for the rest of us watching around the world: The restrictions that Hongkongers are subject to under the National Security Law don&apos;t just apply to the people of Hong Kong. In fact, the law is written in a way that applies to every person on Earth—meaning that if a non-resident of Hong Kong, who&apos;s never been to the city or any other Chinese jurisdiction, decides to set foot there for any reason, they are immediately subject to detention and prosecution like any Chinese citizen on Chinese soil. Suffice to say, neither I nor the writer for this video are going to Hong Kong anytime soon, because, well, this is exactly the sort of speech that the National Security Law is designed to curtail—so while we&apos;re at it, let&apos;s violate that anthem law we discussed earlier. Chinese Communist Party, your national anthem sucks.

## Future Under Xi Jinping&apos;s Boot

When we look at the future of Hong Kong, we&apos;ll begin with its status as a global center of trade, finance, and international culture—a status that hasn&apos;t totally gone away, but has certainly diminished. After the mass exodus of a long list of Western companies, the city has become far less of a player in the cutting-edge business innovation that it was historically known for, with initial public offerings, or IPOs, coming from the territory being slashed to well under a tenth of their normal annual worth in 2022. Put simply, the city is no longer a target for international movers and shakers in the business world, and though it&apos;ll almost certainly remain relevant as a very well-connected banking town compared to the rest of China, it&apos;s not likely to climb back to its former glory anytime soon.

Another potential long-term complication comes in the form of brain drain, a phenomenon that takes place worldwide when educated, qualified professionals from an undeveloped, less-developed, or repressive nation decide to take their education elsewhere and emigrate, rather than use it to make their own homelands better. Hong Kong is facing this problem in spades, as parents who remember what Hong Kong once was seek to send their high-performing children elsewhere for their education, and where disillusioned young professionals are all too happy to get the hell out when an opportunity arises. The city has attempted to tackle this problem; John Lee&apos;s administration has lowered property taxes and presented new visas for foreigners. But over 200,000 foreigners and locals alike have left the city since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, and those numbers are only going to grow higher as trends of emigration take root among Hong Kong&apos;s younger population.

Predictably, the city&apos;s media environment has gotten no better, and will almost certainly get worse over time. The few independent journalism outlets left in Hong Kong can, quite frankly, only be described as free press if we&apos;re feeling rather generous, and it&apos;s unclear how long those media entities are going to be able to stay afloat. In the void that Hong Kong&apos;s former free press has left behind, pro-Beijing media is filling the gap, in print, radio, television, and more. On the individual scale, a February 2023 decree that all SIM cards—new and existing—must be registered under the real name of their owners has prompted widespread concern that it&apos;ll be even easier for Hong Kong authorities to track their citizens in the future. One prediction we&apos;re more than comfortable in making is that Hong Kong will fall under the shroud of China&apos;s Great Firewall at some point in the next few years, essentially blocking out foreign social media and subjecting the people of Hong Kong to the ceaseless deluge that is mainland Chinese online discourse. So, too, do we expect China&apos;s overreaches into the personal lives of its citizens to grow ever deeper inside the city, until eventually, even that aspect of life resembles that of any other Chinese city. Whether that includes some of China&apos;s most extreme elements of social control, like its Social Credit System, remains to be seen.

On a grand scale, Beijing&apos;s slow erosion of the city of Hong Kong is directly in line with how the Chinese Communist Party does things. They&apos;re happy to play the long game if it means minimizing risk; they&apos;ll spend years to lay the groundwork for one successful week if need be; and they don&apos;t go gambling unless they&apos;ve stacked the deck in their own favor. In Xi Jinping&apos;s government, the house always wins, and over the grand view of Hong Kong&apos;s last few years, it&apos;s unmistakably obvious that that&apos;s precisely what has happened. Beijing could have marched troops into the city a decade ago, but didn&apos;t; they could have brought the hammer down harder at any one of a thousand inflection points ever since. They didn&apos;t. Instead, they chipped away at Hong Kong slowly enough that the number of lives lost is in tens rather than thousands, and the number of concrete victories for Beijing is in the thousands rather than in the tens.

As it appears from the outside, the eventual endgame in Hong Kong appears to be to just transform it into any other Chinese city. Beijing is glad to slowly force out its international residents, to accept the loss of global commerce and economic power, and even to say farewell to its own citizens if they aren&apos;t friendly to Beijing. So far as we can tell, they simply aren&apos;t interested in tolerating citizens who aren&apos;t willing to get on board with the CCP, and if those citizens decide to remove themselves rather than demanding valuable CCP time in arresting and prosecuting them…then all the better. What&apos;s left, in the aftermath, is a Hong Kong that is well-and-truly under Beijing&apos;s thumb, and within one or two generations more, the city might not even remember that it&apos;s been oppressed at all.

## Key Takeaways

- Hong Kong&apos;s autonomy under &apos;One Country, Two Systems&apos; was gradually eroded by Beijing.
- Protests in 2019 marked a significant turning point, leading to increased CCP control.
- The National Security Law, implemented in 2020, effectively ended Hong Kong&apos;s autonomy.
- Media freedom and political expression have been severely curtailed in Hong Kong.
- The future of Hong Kong involves further integration into China&apos;s political and social systems.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the &apos;One Country, Two Systems&apos; formula?

The &apos;One Country, Two Systems&apos; formula is a series of laws that allowed Hong Kong to maintain its political and economic autonomy within communist China, keeping China’s political system and social authoritarianism largely out of Hong Kong.

### When did Hong Kong become a part of China?

Hong Kong has been part of China for millennia, but its history as an independent entity began in 1841 when Hong Kong Island was ceded to Great Britain at the end of the First Opium War.

### What was the significance of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration?

The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration was an agreement where China pledged to preserve Hong Kong’s political and economic autonomy for another fifty years after the 1997 transfer of authority from Britain to China.

### What was the Umbrella Movement?

The Umbrella Movement was a series of protests in Hong Kong in 2014 where protesters, predominantly students, shut down government buildings, financial districts, and major roads to demand universal suffrage. The movement is named for the umbrellas protesters used to protect themselves from police pepper spray.

### What was the extradition bill that sparked protests in 2019?

The extradition bill proposed in 2019 would have allowed Hong Kong to detain and extradite people to foreign countries and territories where extradition treaties don’t exist, including mainland China. This raised concerns about the potential for political activists to be extradited to China for prosecution.

### What was the National Security Law passed in 2020?

The National Security Law passed in 2020 gave Beijing the right to target acts it deemed terrorism, secession, subversion, and collusion with foreign forces in Hong Kong. This law effectively ended Hong Kong’s autonomous status under the &apos;One Country, Two Systems&apos; policy.

### What is the current political situation in Hong Kong?

As of 2023, Hong Kong is under tight control by the Chinese government. Political expression is sharply curtailed, and the city has seen a mass exodus of foreign interests and residents. The government has implemented strict measures to suppress dissent, including the National Security Law.

### What is the impact of the National Security Law on Hong Kong&apos;s education system?

The National Security Law has led to strict censorship and control in Hong Kong&apos;s education system. Schools prohibit political discussions, and students are taught to be loyal to the government. Teachers are required to pass exams on national security and can be held responsible for any criticisms of the government.

### What is the future outlook for Hong Kong under Chinese rule?

The future outlook for Hong Kong under Chinese rule involves further integration into mainland China&apos;s political and social systems. The city is likely to see continued suppression of dissent, a decline in international influence, and a potential implementation of mainland China&apos;s online censorship and social control measures.

### What is the significance of the 2019 protests in Hong Kong?

The 2019 protests in Hong Kong were significant because they marked a major turning point in the city&apos;s struggle for autonomy. The protests were sparked by the extradition bill and grew into a broader movement demanding democratic reforms and resistance against Chinese government overreach.

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- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/Stonecutters_Bridge_and_Kwai_Tsing_Container_Terminals_Hong_Kong_2024_dllu.jpg) by Daniel Lu (User:dllu) / openverse, by-sa.

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      <title>How to Escape from North Korea</title>
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      <description>What do you think the best hotel in the world is?

You might say somewhere like The Plaza in New York? Or perhaps the Ritz in downtown Paris? What about the Four Seasons Resort in Bora Bora?

Well, I hate to tell you, but you&apos;re wrong.

The best hotel in the world, with an unheard of six stars, is in North Korea. I know! I can&apos;t believe it either…

Known as the Hyangsan Hotel, it promises its guests a veritable wealth of opulence totally devoid in the rest of the country. Staff waiting on patrons hand and foot, luxury amenities at the drop of a hat, and in a gorgeous scenic location.

Yes, this is clearly the best hotel in the whole wide world. Even Pyongyang says so.

Or is it?

Because after all, this is North Korea, where everything isn&apos;t quite what it seems.

And when you start to delve a little deeper, and put the Hyangsan under the microscope, the façade starts to peel away revealing the rot of the Kim regime underneath.

So what&apos;s the story here? How does a country where many of its people don&apos;t even have running water, manage to pull off something this decadent?

And can we find out what&apos;s really going on here?

## A Hotel Fit For A Kim

Ok let&apos;s break down this utterly bizarre hotel. The Hyangsan is out in the sticks of the North Korean wilderness, its right next to Mount Myohyang, also known as &quot;Mysterious Fragrance Mountain.&quot; I wonder what the &quot;mysterious fragrance&quot; (here&apos;s a hint, it&apos;s human rights violations). This is about 150 kilometres (or 93 miles) due North of the hermit kingdom&apos;s capital, Pyongyang, and just inside the region of Chagang.

And I can honestly say I&apos;ve never seen anything quite like it. Tucked away up here in a valley with mountains all around it, it&apos;s more akin to a not-so-subtle Bond villain&apos;s lair, either that; or an ancient Inca temple with its pyramid-esque structure and Stalinist architecture. It&apos;s about 15 storeys tall, with a tower in the centre and a revolving restaurant on top, much like many North Korean hotels do. But regardless its shape makes it instantly recognisable.

Outside the streets are well paved and the lawns are reasonably well-manicured even throughout the harsher winter months. Korean lettering is even landscaped into the lawn, but as I don&apos;t speak the language, feel free to let us know what it says in the comments if you do.

The landscape surrounding the hotel is veritable natural paradise. Streams, waterfalls, mountains, forests, and many guests who go there talk about just how quiet it is, so quiet in fact that you can hear the Pyongyang officials spying on you through the wall.

*For legal reasons, that&apos;s a joke.*

It&apos;s said to have 228 rooms in total comprising of both suites and standard accommodation, but as far as we could find, it&apos;s very rarely full for obvious reasons.

It actually has an almost 40-year history of catering to tourists both visiting and within the hermit kingdom. It was built all the way back in 1986 when design choices were…interesting across the board. Don&apos;t get me wrong it was still seen as the veritable height of luxury even back then, but by the mid-2000s it was clearly becoming a little dated. So Pyongyang spruced the place up a bit around 2010 to render it the kind of opulent that most North Korean citizens could only ever dream of.

As you may have seen with our videos on North Korea lately, Pyongyang is on a bit of a tourism kick right now, trying to attract new people from across the world to gawk at a cruel and repressive regime&apos;s Potemkin village-esque tourist infrastructure. That&apos;s why Russians are the only people admitted to visit since the COVID-19 total lockdown in the country half a decade ago. But the Hyangsan has actually been considered the pinnacle of North Korean tourism luxury for decades now. In a way, it, among other hotels in Pyongyang like the Ryugyong Hotel started the tourism building trend we&apos;re seeing there today. They promise the very best in luxury holiday making, just as long as you don&apos;t wander off.

And we weren&apos;t kidding when we said it&apos;s luxurious, you can kind of tell that already from the outside gardens, but look inside and it&apos;s pretty similar to many nice hotels you would find anywhere else in the world.

Take the lobby for example. White marble adorns the floors with a golden square pattern throughout, with it polished so much that you could likely use it as a mirror to shave without cutting yourself. Red carpets cascade down staircases with silver trims and bright LED lighting overhead coming from tall ceilings. You see a few pictures and you start to think &quot;this is surprisingly nice, even for North Korea.&quot; It even has one of those water features that so many fancy hotels seem to have nowadays. I mean, even looking at the old pictures of what the lobby used to look like, it was still covered with grey marble with a more Asian-style décor. And so it sticks out like a sore thumb in North Korea, not just because of its shape, but also because of the sheer contrast between how the average citizen of North Korea lives, and this land of luxury.

These kinds of contrasts exist everywhere, just look at the nicest hotels in New York for example and then travel a few streets over, you&apos;ll see something pretty similar. But only in a country like North Korea is it that contrast so starkly out in the open. It&apos;s the Kim-Jong-Elephant in the room that nobody visiting is allowed to talk about. For example, one of the main draws of the hotel according to many tourism companies who travel to North Korea is that there is hot water and electricity 24 hours a day. This is in a country where many citizens do not have indoor plumbing, electricity, or heating at all.

After all, whilst the average North Korean citizen risks starvation every year, North Korea is out here calling this monstrosity a &quot;six-star hotel.&quot; Some even call it a &quot;seven-star&quot; hotel. This is total madness when you think about it for several reasons. For starters, the star system for hotels beyond five genuinely means nothing. Many places all over the world &quot;claim&quot; to be six-star hotels, you might have even stayed in one, but they&apos;re really just fancy five-star hotels. If a hotel came one day that would blow the rest out of the water it would simply become the new five-star standard and others would be downgraded. But I digress, the other reason this is a weird label is because North Korea doesn&apos;t even use the classical star system for rating hotel luxury. So in every way possible it simply means nothing, which is pretty fitting for North Korea. Especially considering that whilst the hotel is clearly pretty nice, it is more likely a solid four-star hotel, not five. That&apos;s still pretty impressive, but just like with almost every foreign-facing aspect of North Korea, its positives are exaggerated.

Ok, so what is the average person paying for a stay in the lap of the Kim dynasty? We couldn&apos;t find lots of information on this, but one source that acts as a Chinese intermediary tourism company for North Korea put the price at around €100 euros per person per night. That&apos;s about $115 dollars. So on top of being the only real six-star hotel in the entire world, it also happens to be reasonably priced, isn&apos;t that just so kind of them! Believe it or not though this was actually after the price was increased post-renovation. So before it must have been a steal. I&apos;ll be booking my flights tomorrow.

## A Six-Star Experience?

Ok, but that&apos;s enough about what this hotel is, as in, what it really is. Let&apos;s look at it as just a hotel like any other you might go to in the world. What is it like? What amenities does it have on offer?

Well let&apos;s go back to the lobby for a bit. Beyond the glass, marble, and water features, there&apos;s also what appears to be a sit-in bar replete with comfy-looking chairs, and a marble centrepiece table once sat in the centre of the lobby with a beautiful display of what appear to be fake flowers. Lots of the greenery in the lobby appears to be fake, but we&apos;ll give them a pass on this one as this is standard in many hotels across the world. Now this appears to have been replaced with a nice-looking seating area, whilst one bar seems to have been replaced with a little gift shop so you can give some money to the regime in exchange for an &quot;I heart the supreme leader&quot; t-shirt or something. There&apos;s also a concierge desk where there are staff on hand to help you with what you need, which includes a currency exchange. I&apos;m sure the rates are just fantastic.

Ok, but any hotel can make a lobby look good, that&apos;s kind of the point, to wow you with decadence before you get to see the rest of it. What about food? How does its restaurants stack up?

This is actually on the first floor of the hotel and it&apos;s this horizontal long piece here. It used to be open to the outside with guests able to see out of windows, but this appears to have been covered up into a more enclosed space at some stage, perhaps since the remodel.

The main dining area is pretty fancy with enough white mirrored pillars and bougee lighting fixtures to even make Donald Trump say it was &quot;a bit much.&quot; Its white and blue colour scheme is pretty nice though, even if it does look like someone did a pretty impressive job of recreating a fancy hotel restaurant after only having one described to them.

But how it looks is irrelevant if the food is poor. So what does North Korea, where people routinely starve to death every year, serve to tourists?

Well it&apos;s mostly a fusion of western and Korean cuisine, usually served in three courses, but some tourism websites show up to eight different dishes being served over the course of a meal. It&apos;s a mix of potatoes, chicken soup, various fish dishes, vegetables, and more. It seems to depend what you&apos;re there for though as some tour groups stop for lunch there even without staying overnight. There is an option of a western or Korean style breakfast, and vegetarian options are available as well if fish isn&apos;t your thing.

The one thing they serve that everybody is reportedly happy to see is bread. Yep. Bread. White, fluffy, and served with delicious butter, it is apparently the best bread in the whole of the DPRK. Now the reason that this is, is because bread as we know it in the west is almost completely unheard of there. Rice and kimchi are the common staples in North Korea instead. The reality is flour and wheat come as a premium in the hermit kingdom, it is considered a luxury item by most citizens. Yes, the most basic of foods we have in the west is considered something of a status symbol in North Korea. It tells you all you need to know about the plight of the people.

Other food options are available as well. For starters there is also a semi-outdoor barbeque restaurant. But don&apos;t jump for joy thinking you&apos;re going to be seeing some prime rib, it&apos;s fish again… but this time with a fun twist!

There&apos;s an outside pool full of fish so that you can pick your dinner, and the chefs will butcher and serve it for you right then and there. This used to actually be inside the hotel pre-remodel.

But even that&apos;s not all. Because there is even a revolving restaurant perched on top of the hotel. It&apos;s the spaceship-looking thing. There&apos;s not really a whole lot known about this restaurant though. It&apos;s pretty small as revolving restaurants go, and it&apos;s rarely open to tourists, often being reserved for VIPs. We could only find one random picture inside of it from a Flickr account all the way back in 2008 on the entire internet. That&apos;s pre-remodel. So &quot;Kim-knows&quot; what it looks like now. Don&apos;t say we don&apos;t do our research. Overall the food across the hotel appears to get mixed reviews, being considered everything from luxury to inedible slop, so it seems a bit hit and miss depending on when you happen to be visiting.

Ok, so far so good. A bit strange in parts but otherwise serviceable as far as hotels go, and certainly good for a country as backwards as North Korea. How about the rooms? Where will a person actually stay when they visit this place, and what options are on offer?

Well there&apos;s two kinds of room available at the Hyangsan. Standard and suite. Let&apos;s start with the standard because there&apos;s a lot to cover here. Overall the standard rooms are pretty nice, about what you would expect for what we&apos;ve seen thus far. Western-style beds, a desk, and the single chair you find in every hotel room corner (you know what it&apos;s for, I&apos;m not going to explain it to you). Some rooms appear to have carpets, whilst others seem to stick with the same polished marble we&apos;ve seen elsewhere. Every single room has a balcony, so you can almost guarantee at least something of a view no matter where you are, although at certain times of the year its simply too cold to use them.

Then comes the rest of the standard stuff you would get in any other hotel room. Coffee table, hot drink-making facilities, and even a fridge and mini bar, although that&apos;s not included in the price. Come on now, they can&apos;t give you everything.

When it comes to technology is where there&apos;s some more interesting deviations from the norm. There is a TV in most rooms apparently capable of transmitting some local and even international channels but from what we&apos;ve seen nobody was able to get them to work. There is even an ethernet port for guests to access the sorry excuse for the North Korean intranet, but again this is apparently unreliable, needs to be requested to switch on, and very expensive to access. There&apos;s some nice quality of life stuff like apparent heated flooring (although the appearance of carpets questions whether these work either) and air conditioning too.

On the bedside tables there is whatever this strange contraption is, the likes of which I&apos;ve never seen before. It appears to be a control panel for a radio, an alarm, and lights in the room given the lack of switches nearby on the walls. It seems a bit strange compared to western hotels which don&apos;t tend to have this, but it also seems to be pretty standard in North Korean hotels.

The bathrooms are pretty normal for the most part, with Western style toilets unlike the Korean-style squat toilets you&apos;ll find everywhere else in the country. Other standards apply, shower, sink, and those tiny little bottles of shampoo that say… Shangri-La hotel on them…

Wait. What?

And yeah, the more you look at the details of things around the rooms more closely. Everything seems to say &quot;Shangri-La&quot; on it. The clock for the bedside table, the leather-bound book on the desk, and other items. Shangri-La is a multinational luxury hotel chain. They are not affiliated with North Korea in any way as far as we know. So how did this hotel, in the middle of a country with some of the strongest trade embargos on it in the world, get these items?

We&apos;re going to have to shrug our shoulders on that one, but I highly doubt it was legitimate however it was done.

The suites have a bit more going on in them. A freestanding desk, a little kitchenette with a hotplate for cooking on, a small dining area. Some also appear to have drawing rooms which look a bit creepy and bare. They appear to also have slightly larger bathrooms as well.

So that seems like an awful lot, but it doesn&apos;t even end there. There are a lot of other amenities that the Hyangsan provides. There&apos;s apparently a gym, although we couldn&apos;t find any pictures of it, but there is definitely a 25-metre-long swimming pool, alongside a plunge pool, jacuzzi, sauna and spa which costs extra to access. We can&apos;t confirm the existence of the beauty salon, the clinic, the photo studio, the dance hall, or the theatre. The photos of these things simply don&apos;t appear to be out there, although they do seem to be present on maps of the hotel. Interestingly these maps also show the 11th, 12th and 13th floors as &quot;maintenance service&quot;, which is North Korean speak for &quot;this is where we spy on you from.&quot;

We can confirm there is a karaoke room, billiards tables, table tennis tables, and outdoor tennis courts (although I wouldn&apos;t get inside a cage in North Korea if you paid me all the money in the world).

People who visit this hotel and this region can also hike nearby trails (likely under supervision of course) and visit places like the Pohyon Temple, one of the largest Buddhist temples in the DPRK. This is something of an oddity because North Korea is supposed to not have any religion other than towards the Kim dynasty. You can also see the Ryongmun Cave and the International friendship exhibition. I don&apos;t know about you, but &quot;despotic, hostile, isolationist regime&quot; and &quot;international friendship exhibition&quot; don&apos;t really go together, but that&apos;s just me. Around three kilometres west of the hotel there&apos;s even a helicopter landing pad for VIPs to fly in on.

As for staff, Hyangsan is like every other hotel you&apos;ve ever seen, except its in North Korea, so its really weird. The concierge was apparently trained at the Tourism College in Pyongyang where many of the local guides do their training to give their infamous very guided tours. The pool has a lifeguard, bellhops carry luggage, there are service staff at the bar, and purple and cream uniformed waitresses server your food.

There&apos;s no real factors that would indicate whether this is staffed by civil servants, military personnel, or anything else. It&apos;s likely to be operated by a state-owned tourism bureau with hotel-trained professionals. But some staff seem absent. In the entire research for this video we didn&apos;t once come across cleaning staff in photos or see any mentioned at any point, so who knows how the rooms get cleaned.

Ok, so on the whole this appears to be a pretty normal luxury hotel for the most part with its trademark North Korean quirks. But the existence of this hotel remains somewhat of a baffling concept to us. Are people really coming here enough to justify its existence?

Commercially? Probably not.

And that begs the question; what is this all really for?

## The Six-Star Lie

So we&apos;ve told you basically every material aspect of this hotel. But has it been a success for North Korea?

Well it depends.

From the perspective of the North Korean government, it doesn&apos;t really matter what the hotel costs, what matters is how it looks, and what tourists experience when they visit. Remember, almost everyone who enters North Korea gets a warped and highly curated experience to mask the country&apos;s horrendous human rights abuses, dictatorship, and suffering. That&apos;s why there are stadiums full of North Korean dancers and musicians performing solely for tourists, its why you can&apos;t go anywhere unsupervised, and its why hotels like Hyangsan exist.

Because if North Korea can successfully launder its image to enough tourists willing to overlook it, the horrific crimes the Kim regime has committed become that little bit more ok in the eyes of the general public, whether we like it or not.

So, as a commercial venture, what happens at Hyangsan is irrelevant, in fact for large parts of the year it appears to be eerily quiet and almost totally empty. One reviewer who had been a few times in the early 2010s stated that he was pretty sure he was the only paying lodger in the entire hotel. That doesn&apos;t exactly scream &quot;massive financial boom,&quot; and it doesn&apos;t have to. It&apos;s a Potemkin village; it&apos;s designed for you to see it how its being shown to you and nothing more.

And we can prove it.

One reviewer of the hotel took a picture of the so-called &quot;Pyongyang Times&quot; weekly newspaper which was available in the hotel to read back in 2015 or so. North Korea has never had a massive influx of English-speaking tourists. Most who go there are Chinese, or now Russian. What need is there to have an English-translated newspaper in the hotel when barely any English speakers visit it? What need is there to have an English-translated newspaper in a country with so few English-speaking visitors at all? The Russians and Chinese aren&apos;t reading it, and you know the Koreans aren&apos;t so what is it for? It&apos;s state propaganda, it&apos;s targeted for you and I, English speakers.

And the deeper that you look into the Hyangsan, the more it appears to be that way for it too. It&apos;s a touristy veneer, a simulation of what a &quot;six-star hotel&quot; is supposed to be to endear people who go there and don&apos;t know any better than to simply judge what they see in front of them. That&apos;s not a critique; that&apos;s just the slightly gullible nature of human beings.

Take the elevators for example. There&apos;s five of them, but only one ever appears to be switched on, like the other four are simply there for show, because that&apos;s what a fancy hotel &quot;should have&quot; when it&apos;s all held together with duct tape and smiles through gritted teeth for the good of the regime.

Those who visit often talk about how hot water and electricity are spotty despite claims to the contrary, which further peels back the curtain on the realities that everyday people face within the country.

There is apparently underfloor heating which appears to be temperamental, and the air conditioning only has two modes (on and off), and one temperature. And then there&apos;s all the goods from the Shangri-La brand of hotel resort. Toothbrushes, combs, writing pads, tissue box holders, obviously something illicit is going on there and even though it&apos;s only a small thing, it contributes to this distinct feeling that not everything is quite right. Before its remodelling it was known colloquially as &quot;the overlook hotel.&quot; You know, the one from the film, The Shining, because the vibe was so creepy. It was well-known for its doors counter-intuitively opening outwards, hypnotic wallpaper, spooky music, and deserted corridors. The latest remodel is simply another coat of paint, and it&apos;s no more real than the actual Overlook Hotel was. I think I&apos;m starting to realise what the &quot;mysterious fragrance&quot; really is.

**Cough* Bullshit. *Cough**

It&apos;s hard to even tell if the reviews online are real. We know what North Korea is like in terms of attempting to launder its public image and their agents are present online. Some of the more positive reviews tend to be written in broken English, that&apos;s not necessarily an indication of it being fake, but it could be. The general consensus from what we could find is summed up quite well by this anonymous reviewer, quote;

&gt; &quot;Room is very comfortable and definitely better than the hotel we stayed in Pyongyang but being NK, it is not comparable to 4- or 5-star hotels in the rest of the world.&quot;

It&apos;s also hard to shake the feeling that anybody who stays there is clearly under active surveillance and is being watched. Only in places like North Korea are several whole hotel floors blocked off for maintenance at once. Some maintenance areas in worldwide hotels are mid-building, but reports of people who have snuck around to &quot;maintenance floors&quot; in other hotels within North Korea report full on spying apparatus, propaganda posters, and staff-only residential areas seemingly built solely for surveillance. We would assume that the Hyangsan is no different in that regard.

And people need to recognise that when they visit North Korea, they&apos;re subjecting themselves to that twisted and alternate version of reality, that propaganda. It&apos;s not real, and it&apos;s designed to change your mind. It&apos;s insidious, it&apos;s sinister, and it&apos;s calculated. And whether you like it or not, if you&apos;re paying money to go, you&apos;re also financing some of the horrible things that the regime does to its people. Executions, torture, extrajudicial killing, concentration camps, the targeting of innocent family members for punishment and so much more.

Listen, we&apos;re not trying to get on our moral high horse here. At least half of us have been on holiday to countries that do awful things every day and our tourist dollars finance that. And it is still important for some people to visit, to get the facts on the ground and establish what is really going on there. We need to recognise the impact that us regular folk can have, by choosing to take away people like Kim Jong Un&apos;s ability to control the narrative about the despotic country he rules over with an iron fist.

Look, this is bigger than you and me. But you have to know that if you stay at North Korea&apos;s supposed 6-star hotel, you&apos;re not just going to a weird place for fun, you&apos;re in a small part funding the immense continued suffering of so many people. There&apos;s a responsibility there to at least own it, and recognise what you&apos;re seeing for what it is as if it were anywhere else, and to understand when you&apos;re being lied to. You have a responsibility not to get sucked in by the chandeliers and marble.

Because at the end of the day, the Hyangsan is a bit like putting a top hat on a poisonous snake.

It might look fancy, but underneath is still slimy, and it&apos;ll kill you if you get too close.

## Key Takeaways

- The Hyangsan Hotel in North Korea is marketed as a six-star hotel, but it is more likely a four-star hotel with exaggerated claims.
- The hotel&apos;s opulence contrasts starkly with the living conditions of average North Koreans, who often lack basic amenities like running water and electricity.
- The Hyangsan Hotel is part of North Korea&apos;s efforts to present a curated, luxurious image to tourists, masking the country&apos;s human rights abuses and suffering.
- The hotel&apos;s amenities and services are often unreliable, with issues like spotty hot water and electricity, and questionable internet access.
- Staying at the Hyangsan Hotel contributes to financing the North Korean regime&apos;s oppressive practices, as tourists are subject to propaganda and surveillance.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Hyangsan Hotel?

The Hyangsan Hotel is a six-star hotel located in North Korea, near Mount Myohyang. It is known for its opulence and luxury amenities, contrasting sharply with the living conditions of average North Korean citizens.

### Where is the Hyangsan Hotel located?

The Hyangsan Hotel is located near Mount Myohyang, about 150 kilometers north of Pyongyang, in the Chagang Province of North Korea.

### What kind of amenities does the Hyangsan Hotel offer?

The Hyangsan Hotel offers a range of amenities including a revolving restaurant, a gym, a 25-metre-long swimming pool, a jacuzzi, sauna, spa, karaoke room, billiards tables, table tennis tables, and outdoor tennis courts. It also has a semi-outdoor barbeque restaurant and a variety of dining options.

### How does the Hyangsan Hotel compare to other hotels in North Korea?

The Hyangsan Hotel is considered the pinnacle of North Korean tourism luxury. It started the trend of building luxurious tourist infrastructure in Pyongyang and other parts of the country.

### What is the cost of staying at the Hyangsan Hotel?

The cost of staying at the Hyangsan Hotel is approximately €100 euros per person per night, which is about $115 dollars. This price was increased post-renovation.

### What kind of food is served at the Hyangsan Hotel?

The Hyangsan Hotel serves a fusion of western and Korean cuisine, usually in three courses. The food includes potatoes, chicken soup, various fish dishes, vegetables, and bread, which is considered a luxury in North Korea.

### What are the room options at the Hyangsan Hotel?

The Hyangsan Hotel offers standard rooms and suites. Standard rooms include western-style beds, a desk, a balcony, and basic amenities. Suites have additional features like a freestanding desk, a kitchenette, and a larger bathroom.

### What is the significance of the Hyangsan Hotel for North Korea?

The Hyangsan Hotel is part of North Korea&apos;s effort to attract tourists and present a curated, luxurious image to the world, masking the country&apos;s human rights abuses and suffering. It serves as a Potemkin village to launder the regime&apos;s image.

### What are some of the unusual features of the Hyangsan Hotel?

The Hyangsan Hotel has several unusual features, including elevators that are mostly for show, spotty hot water and electricity, and mysterious Shangri-La branded items. It also has floors dedicated to surveillance and propaganda.

### What is the general consensus on the Hyangsan Hotel from reviewers?

Reviewers generally agree that while the Hyangsan Hotel is comfortable and better than other hotels in Pyongyang, it does not compare to 4- or 5-star hotels in the rest of the world. The experience is heavily curated and not entirely genuine.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: How to Escape from North Korea](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bRn7Ma8bqx0)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/81/Jungle_at_New_York_2023_%28Jon_Vasquez%29.jpg) by Elegantstickman / openverse, by.

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      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
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      <description>Pop question. If you take a car from the Hungarian capital Budapest, head west on the M1 motorway and drive for about 35 minutes, where would you end up?

Your answer would probably be &quot;in the middle of nowhere.&quot; And you would be right. But not entirely. Where you would be, unless you—understandably—get lost, would be in the village of Felcsút, population 2,000 people.

This unassuming village is not really noteworthy in its general profile. It has grocery stores, a church, schools, a town hall, and a post office. It also has a football team, founded in 2005, who are called Puskás Akadémia. And that&apos;s where Felcsút strays outside the status of just a regular village in the Hungarian wilderness.

You see, Puskás Akadémia play in the top division of the Hungarian football league, a division in which they are in first position (at the time of writing), and are on track to win their first championship title in history. A fairytale story out of Felcsút. But not exactly.

Puskás Akadémia is no ordinary club—a fact made nakedly visible by their home matches at the state-of-the-art Pancho Arena, with a seating capacity which is more than double the entire population of the village in which it sits.

## A Village Pancho-ing Above its Weight

Felcsút&apos;s football ground is named in tribute to legendary footballer Ferenc Puskás, former captain of the Hungarian national team, who won three European Cups with Spanish giants Real Madrid. &quot;Pancho&quot; was a nickname he received from adoring Madrid supporters during his eight years at the club. And in case the tribute wasn&apos;t already unmistakable, a massive bronze statue to Puskás sits on the grounds of the Pancho Arena.

It may seem an odd location to build such a grandiose tribute to the fabled footballer. Puskás was not from Felcsút and never lived there. But the location is more understandable because of another famous Hungarian who did grow up in Felcsút and maintains a sprawling estate there to this day.

That is Viktor Orbán, Hungary&apos;s Prime Minister since 2010, and the self-styled champion of &quot;illiberal democracy&quot; in Europe.

Orbán&apos;s political outlook is more than a bit controversial. His government has been called a &quot;hybrid regime of electoral autocracy,&quot; and in 2022, the European Parliament ruled that the country could no longer be called a full democracy. Orbánism has been described as a mix of Christian theocracy, economic and social conservatism, statism, and Hungarian nationalism. The latter is most relevant for this story, given that restoration of past glory and the correction of perceived injustices against Hungarians are a focal point of Orbán&apos;s posturing.

And Orbán has his sights set on raising Hungary&apos;s prestige through a focus on football. But to understand this, one needs to first know a thing or two about the once-grand footballing history of the nation.

## The Tale of the Mighty Magyars

In the 1950s, the Hungarian football team habitually ripped all opposition to pieces.

Nicknamed the &quot;Mighty Magyars&quot; or &quot;The Golden Team,&quot; the Hungarians played 69 matches, won 58, and recorded only one loss—a 3-2 defeat in the 1954 World Cup Final against West Germany. The team overcame powerful footballing nations like the Soviet Union, Brazil, Italy, as well as England: who they humbled 6-3 at Wembley in 1953, in what became known as the &quot;Match of the Century.&quot; Hungary went in with even less mercy on England in Budapest the following year, blitzing the visitors 7-1 in what remains the English team&apos;s heaviest-ever defeat. The uncontested talisman of the team was midfielder and captain Ferenc Puskás who stuffed two goals past England in both games. With 84 goals in 85 games, Puskás remains Hungary&apos;s record goalscorer and one of the most prolific international players of all time.

But the Mighty Magyars emerged at a time of rising political instability in Hungary, which cut their glory in half. Like many countries, Hungary had fallen under the control of the Soviet Union after World War II, and the Hungarian People&apos;s Republic was established in 1949.

The new reality was by no means welcomed by everyone. By 1956, the public had had enough, and a popular uprising began. But the Hungarian Revolution was brutally put down by the government with Soviet backing, and thousands of Hungarians fled into exile. Several key players of the beloved national football team went with them.

In some ways, many were no doubt left wondering what could have been. The Mighty Magyars had missed out on World Cup glory in 1954 only by faltering 3-2 to West Germany in the final, at a time when most of the key players were still very much in their prime. The team was likely eyeing even greater success at the 1958 World Cup in Sweden.

Puskás, still only 29, played his last game for Hungary in 1956 and moved to Spain—where he continued his career playing 180 matches for Real Madrid. Puskás even played a handful of matches for the Spanish national team in the early 1960s. He remains renowned in the world of football, with the coveted annual Puskás Award for the most beautiful goal named in his honour.

Another key player, 27-year-old Sándor Kocsis, also moved abroad and never played for their national team again. In some ways, the loss of Kocsis must have been particularly poignant for Hungary. A dominant striker, he had scored only ten goals fewer for his country than Puskás, despite being younger and having played seventeen fewer games. It was Kocsis (at striker) and Puskás (attacking midfield)—who ripped England to pieces in Budapest. But after 1956, Kocsis never returned to Hungary. He finished his career in Barcelona and died relatively young in 1979.

The decimated Hungarian team performed underwhelmingly at the 1958 World Cup, losing to Wales and Sweden and crashing out of the tournament. They did not achieve their heights of success again, and Hungary has failed to qualify for every World Cup since 1986.

## Felcsút and the Rebirth of Hungarian Football

Back in 1998, Felcsút was—save for the absence of one gigantic football stadium—the same unassuming place it otherwise remains today.

A quiet rural village with a church and shops, from which many locals would make the 30-minute journey into Budapest for everyday needs. But that year, Hungary would—for the first time—enter its new political era. One driven by a son of Felcsút. 35-year-old Viktor Orbán took office as Prime Minister on July 6th, 1998. After serving one term, he returned to the role in 2010, and has remained in office for the fifteen years since.

A key feature of the second Orbán era has been his plan to bulwark national identity among residents of Hungary and members of its sizable diaspora, mostly to his own gain.

Following defeat in World War I, the Kingdom of Hungary&apos;s territory was dismembered, leaving large communities of Hungarians in countries such as Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine. Those communities exist to this day, and although many have never lived in Hungary, Orbán enabled members of the diaspora to gain citizenship without much difficulty through the introduction of a 2010 ancestry law. The diaspora became a steadfast base of support for Orbán&apos;s Fidesz party: in the 2022 parliamentary elections, they received only 52% of the vote in Hungary, but a runaway 94% of mail-in votes from abroad.

His power secured, Orbán set in motion his plan to strengthen Hungary&apos;s prestige. One of those was through sports, hoping to recapture the lost glory and prestige of the Mighty Magyars.

It is no small coincidence that Orbán himself is a keen football fan. In 1999, a 36-year-old Orbán signed for an amateur club in his native Felcsút, who were at that time in the sixth division of the Hungarian league system. It is said that he would configure government meetings at such a time so that they wouldn&apos;t clash with his footballing commitments. And the club he signed for would later, along the line, change its name to Puskás Akadémia FC, in homage to the legendary Mighty Magyar captain.

But the crux of Orbán&apos;s project was to flood Hungarian football with increased investment, and the financing of grand new projects. And the centrepiece of this ambition was the Pancho Arena, built in Felcsút in 2014 as a brand new home for Puskás Akadémia.

## The Felcsút Citadel

Pancho is a hell of an arena, no doubt about it.

Featuring regularly on lists of the most beautiful stadiums of central Europe, it was built at a cost of about 12 million euros, and its features include lush wooden supports, combined with artistic lighting. Around 2,000 cubic metres of wood were glued to form the roof design, and its interior was described by stadium aggregator stadiumdb.com as offering more of a church service experience than that of a football match.

Orbán has exploited his pet project to the full. He is known to bring foreign dignitaries on visits to matches at the stadium, and it has been remarked that the best chance a journalist may have to interview him is in the Pancho bleachers. The stadium is also located only about twenty metres from his childhood home, and on land which Orbán personally bequeathed to the club.

The huge investment was just the start for Puskás Akadémia. The season before the Arena opened, the team clinched promotion to the top flight for the first time. By 2020, the team finished 3rd in the league and they have not fallen lower than 4th place in the years since. This year may yet be the cusp of their success to date.

Of course, the stadium&apos;s grandeur doesn&apos;t change the fact that Felcsút is still just a village, with nowhere near the requisite amount of residents such as to fill the arena on matchdays. *The Guardian* noted in 2018 that attendance at the Pancho Arena was only around 400 people—about half of them seated in the stadium&apos;s VIP box. As the club boomed, its attendance rose, but Puskás Akadémia&apos;s average attendance in the 2023 season was still only around 1,600 spectators—many of them visitors from the Hungarian diaspora communities, sympathetic to the spectacle of nation-building orchestrated through the project. On match day, stadium speakers blare out Hungarian pop music, and the Hungarian tricolour is displayed prominently all over the stadium&apos;s bleachers by club officials and visitors alike.

But an uncomfortable question behind the startling success of the club lies in its financing.

## The Murky Rise of Puskás Akadémia

Pancho may be the visible flagship piece of the Puskás Akadémia project, but it is far from the only piece of infrastructure attached to the club.

As the name would suggest, Puskás Akadémia is also a youth academy, intended to cultivate Hungarian footballing talent. An academy complex was built even before the stadium opened in 2014, in similar splendour to the stadium itself.

The stadium, academy and administrative buildings are built in an ornate traditional style, mimicking Central European structures of the pre-communist era. This was the work of Imre Makovecz, a decorated Hungarian architect known for his creative opposition to globalisation and corporate culture. Makovecz built a wide range of structures in Hungary and for Hungarian communities in the neighbouring countries, punctuated by Hungarian national archetypes, as well as Hungarian Art Nouveau and National Romanticism.

The sprawling Pancho complex even has a museum dedicated to— you guessed it—Hungary&apos;s most famous footballing son, Ferenc Puskás. Following the establishment of the complex, a ceremony was held in 2009 which was attended by famously corrupt footballing administrator Sepp Blatter. It was at the ceremony that Blatter announced the establishment of the annual FIFA Puskás Award for best goal. Shortly after this, Puskás reached the top division for the first time, and continued their meteoric rise against the cathedralic backdrop of their sparkling home in Felcsút.

So how was all this development financed?

Well, as a reminder, Orbán suffered two election defeats between 2002 and 2006 which kept him out of the Prime Minister&apos;s office for eight years. This allowed him to return to Felcsút and devote his energy to orchestrating the rise of his team alongside his friend, businessman Lőrinc Mészáros—one of the richest men in Hungary.

Mészáros and Orbán have been close since childhood, and Mészáros questionably benefited from a series of public procurement funds, allowing his gas-fitting business to explode… not literally. There is perhaps no quote more symbolic of the entire tale of Hungary in recent years than this admirably frank statement from Mészáros, featured on his *Forbes* profile alongside his net worth of 1.7 billion dollars:

&gt; That I have been able to come so far? God, luck and the person of Viktor Orbán have certainly played a role.

By 2010, Orbán had made his way back into the highest political office, and shortly afterwards, a new financial framework was introduced by his government, which would further boost several teams—and Puskás Akadémia in particular.

In 2011, Orbán&apos;s government introduced the so-called TAO programme—a scheme that enabled corporations to write off donations to clubs in certain sports as a tax deduction. Its effect was electrifying. According to the BBC, TAO resulted in more than 20 stadiums being built, and about 1,000 pitches being renovated or constructed from scratch. Aside from Pancho, this also resulted in the construction of a gigantic new stadium for the Hungarian national team in Budapest—perhaps unsurprisingly, titled the Ferenc Puskás Stadium.

The scheme&apos;s effects on the performances of Puskás Akadémia were just as marked, and the team sailed to pole position of the footballing pyramid within years of its establishment.

## Pancho and the Hungarian Hybrid Regime

Naturally, there is a lot of questionability in all this.

For one thing, TAO sponsorships can only be given to clubs active in certain spectacle sports, resulting in the marginalisation and stagnation of others. But of all the sports benefitting from TAO, football is the uncontested winner by quite some margin. According to one estimate, the Orbán government has spent the equivalent of 2.7 billion dollars since 2010 to revive Hungarian football, which has proved a popular move amid his nationalist base. And the lopsided distribution of the TAO funds brings us back to Felcsút and the ornate shadow of the Pancho Arena.

Per the BBC, by November 2021, Puskás Akadémia had received 36.3 billion Hungarian forints or about 94 million US dollars in funding in the previous decade. Occupying a distant second place in investment was a team called Mezőkövesd Zsóry, who&apos;d only received about 552 million Hungarian forints, or 1.5 million dollars, in the same period.

Still, other clubs did receive benefits by other means. Puskás Akadémia&apos;s rival for the title Ferencváros also received an enormous new stadium—the Groupama—in 2014. Ferencváros&apos; President is Gábor Kubatov, a Fidesz party member since 2002, party director since 2006, and one of its Vice-Presidents since 2015. Kubatov has also been a Member of Parliament for eighteen years, although he has given a parliamentary speech a grand total of once, in 2007. Most other clubs in the first division with owners close to the government received new stadiums of their own too—and it was revealed by *The Guardian* that some of their owners, as well as the head of the Hungarian Football Association, have permanent allocated parking spaces at the Pancho Arena in Felcsút.

But aside from turning the Hungarian league into one big racket, and leaving other sports to stagnate, the developments that helped create Pancho and Puskás Akadémia have left one club—quite noticeably—out in the cold.

## Puskás Akadémia and the Hungarian State Capture

Budapest Honvéd are a traditional rival of Ferencváros, and another giant of Hungarian football.

Honvéd was the only club that Ferenc Puskás played for in Hungary, doing so from age 12 until he departed Hungary in 1956. But recent years have not been kind to Honvéd. They were relegated to the second tier for only the second time in their 113-year history in 2023, and currently languish in last place in the division, hopelessly careening towards relegation to the amateur leagues.

Honvéd are clearly not in Orbán&apos;s orbit. Their chairman is Tamás Leisztinger, a physicist and member of the opposition Hungarian Socialist Party. Coincidentally, Honvéd&apos;s only previous relegation took place in 2004, during Orbán&apos;s first term in office.

It would seem a perverse tribute to the great Mighty Magyar that Orbán would apply his name to the village team of Felcsút, but allow Puskás&apos; own team, the club he played 350 matches for, to wither and die. With the relegation of Honvéd to the second tier at the end of the 2023 season, 11 of the 12 teams in the Hungarian top division were in the hands of allies or partners of Orbán and Fidesz. The final outlier was Újpest FC, which until 2024 was owned by an aristocratic family from Belgium. They won no league titles in that time, got no stadium revamp, and by the 2024 season were on the brink of relegation. But before the end of the season, Újpest were sold to MOL Group, a state-owned natural gas company, and their fortunes righted ship. They smashed Diósgyőr FC 7-0 in one of the final league games and avoided relegation. Currently they sit in a healthy position in the top flight.

Still, Újpest&apos;s fortunes pale in the shadow of the mighty Pancho Arena—not only home to the new powerhouse of Hungarian football, but a footballing tribute to the political overhaul born in Felcsút in 1998.

## Key Takeaways

- The village of Felcsút, Hungary, is home to Puskás Akadémia, a top-tier football club with a state-of-the-art stadium.
- Viktor Orbán, Hungary&apos;s Prime Minister, has significantly invested in Hungarian football to boost national prestige.
- The Pancho Arena in Felcsút, named after legendary footballer Ferenc Puskás, is a key part of Orbán&apos;s football revival project.
- Orbán&apos;s government has funneled substantial funds into football, benefiting clubs aligned with his political interests.
- The success of Puskás Akadémia is tied to Orbán&apos;s political agenda and controversial financial practices.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### Where is the Pancho Arena located?

The Pancho Arena is located in the village of Felcsut, Hungary, approximately 35 minutes west of Budapest on the M1 motorway.

### What is the seating capacity of the Pancho Arena?

The Pancho Arena has a seating capacity of more than double the entire population of the village of Felcsut, which is around 2,000 people.

### Who is the Pancho Arena named after?

The Pancho Arena is named in tribute to legendary footballer Ferenc Puskas, former captain of the Hungarian national team.

### What is the significance of the Pancho Arena to Viktor Orban?

The Pancho Arena is located near Viktor Orban&apos;s childhood home and on land which he personally bequeathed to the club. Orban often brings foreign dignitaries to matches at the stadium.

### What is the Tao programme?

The Tao programme is a scheme introduced by Orban&apos;s government in 2011 that enabled corporations to write off donations to clubs in certain sports as a tax deduction, leading to significant investments in football infrastructure.

### How much funding did Puskas Akademia receive from the Tao programme?

By November 2021, Puskas Akademia had received 36.3 billion Hungarian forints (about 94 million US dollars) in funding from the Tao programme over the previous decade.

### What is the average attendance at Puskas Akademia&apos;s matches?

The average attendance at Puskas Akademia&apos;s matches in the 2023 season was around 1,600 spectators.

### What is the historical significance of the Mighty Magyars?

The Mighty Magyars were the Hungarian football team of the 1950s, known for their dominant performances and legendary players like Ferenc Puskas. They won 58 out of 69 matches and only lost once, in the 1954 World Cup Final.

### What is the connection between Viktor Orban and Puskas Akademia?

Viktor Orban is a keen football fan and has been instrumental in the development of Puskas Akademia. He signed for an amateur club in Felcsut, which later became Puskas Akademia, and has used his political influence to support the club&apos;s growth.

### What is the architectural style of the Pancho Arena and its surrounding complex?

The Pancho Arena and its surrounding complex were designed by Imre Makovecz in an ornate traditional style, mimicking Central European structures of the pre-communist era, and incorporating Hungarian national archetypes, Art Nouveau, and National Romanticism.

## Sources

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- [https://thesefootballtimes.co/2017/06/16/sandor-kocsis-the-quiet-hungarian-who-was-as-clinical-as-puskas/](https://thesefootballtimes.co/2017/06/16/sandor-kocsis-the-quiet-hungarian-who-was-as-clinical-as-puskas/)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/11/viktor-orban-hungary-prime-minister-reckless-football-obsession](https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/11/viktor-orban-hungary-prime-minister-reckless-football-obsession)
- [https://footballgroundguide.com/news/pancho-arena-architecture-design-location-controversy.html](https://footballgroundguide.com/news/pancho-arena-architecture-design-location-controversy.html)
- [https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/articles/cekk4zp5rg8o](https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/articles/cekk4zp5rg8o)
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- [https://hungarytoday.hu/tao-money-public-funds-sports-football-support-fidesz-orban-govt-puskas/](https://hungarytoday.hu/tao-money-public-funds-sports-football-support-fidesz-orban-govt-puskas/)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/15/hungary-is-no-longer-a-full-democracy-says-european-parliament](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/15/hungary-is-no-longer-a-full-democracy-says-european-parliament)
- [https://www.rferl.org/a/hungary-treaty-of-trianon-orban-fidesz-ethnic-hungarians/32919124.html](https://www.rferl.org/a/hungary-treaty-of-trianon-orban-fidesz-ethnic-hungarians/32919124.html)
- [https://data.ipu.org/parliament/HU/HU-LC01/election/HU-LC01-E20220403/](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/HU/HU-LC01/election/HU-LC01-E20220403/)
- [https://stadiumdb.com/news/2017/10/the_top_three_most_beautiful_football_stadiums_in_the_world](https://stadiumdb.com/news/2017/10/the_top_three_most_beautiful_football_stadiums_in_the_world)
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- [https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/the-euros-havent-started-but-hungarys-viktor-orban-is-already-a-winner/](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/the-euros-havent-started-but-hungarys-viktor-orban-is-already-a-winner/)
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- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c0/Ovce_kod_Puske.jpg) by Mnalis / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Huntington, West Virginia: The Story of America&apos;s &quot;Overdose Capital&quot;</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/huntington-west-virginia-overdose-capital</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/huntington-west-virginia-overdose-capital</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>On August 15, 2016, local ambulance crews rushed around town, performing their duty with competence and courage, as usual. In addition to treating heart attacks, trauma, and other common incidents, local emergency technicians had become accustomed to resuscitating patients suffering from an opioid overdose. On that particular day, they had to rescue a total of 28 overdose patients—more than one per hour.

These figures might not appear impressive in the context of a sprawling megalopolis with millions of inhabitants. In this case, however, we are talking about a city which, at the time, counted some 48,000 inhabitants. Of which a staggering 12,000—or one in four—was addicted to prescription pills, heroin, fentanyl, or a combination of opioid and stimulant drugs.

This city became known as the &quot;overdose capital,&quot; or even the &quot;drug death capital&quot; of America, the epicenter of the tragic opioid epidemic which devastated so many lives across the nation. But while this small city may have made headlines due to the high incidence of overdosing patients, its citizens deserve attention, and credit, for the efforts they put in place to address such a widespread crisis. This is Huntington, West Virginia, and this is the story of its fall—and of its rise.

## We Are Huntington

The city of Huntington is located in the western portion of the State of West Virginia, near the border with Ohio and Kentucky. Today it is home to some 45,000 inhabitants, and it is the seat of Cabell County. Thanks to its proximity to the Ohio River, in the 19th and 20th centuries Huntington played a significant role in the economy of the region, as it was a major transport hub for Appalachian timber and coal.

Huntington is no stranger to tragedy. On November 14, 1970, a Southern Airways flight crashed against a hill just outside Huntington, resulting in the deaths of 75 passengers. Most of them were players, coaches and supporters of the local Marshall University&apos;s beloved football team. The impact on the community was devastating, so much so that citizens took to dividing Huntington&apos;s history into two eras: before, and after the crash. Nonetheless, the city came together to mourn their losses and eventually healed. Huntington&apos;s recovery from tragedy and loss was immortalized by two films, the 2000 documentary *Marshall University: Ashes to Glory*, and 2006&apos;s *We Are Marshall*.

Unfortunately, some years later the seat of Cabell County would become known nation-wide for another, much less enviable reason: being the &quot;overdose capital&quot; of America. A 2016 article by CNN described Huntington as &quot;America&apos;s drug death capital&quot; and described how &quot;One in four residents here is hooked on heroin or some other opioid, local health officials say. That&apos;s a staggering 12,000 people dealing with opioid addiction.&quot;

Huntington was not an isolated case. The suffering endured by the community was the most visible symptom of the opioid epidemic gripping large swathes of the US. An epidemic which had become particularly harrowing in West Virginia. In 2016 the State experienced the highest rate of deaths related to opioid overdose, at 40 fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants. This rate was 169% higher than the national average.

## An Opioid Tsunami

Why had the opioid crisis become so severe in West Virginia, and Cabell County in particular?

According to Sam Workman, Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Public Affairs at West Virginia University, the origin lies in two concomitant factors.

First, the local coal mining industry—or rather its decline. As the workforce was cut in half during the early 1990s, many former miners and their families were left with very little prospects, while suffering from the painful consequences of years of physically grueling jobs.

And then, the introduction of powerful opioid prescription drugs, such as oxycodone, marketed as OxyContin, and first licensed by the US Food and Drug Administration in December 1995. As stated by Workman: &quot;The physical wear and tear laid the foundation for a broader crisis. As blue-collar jobs dried up, pharmaceutical companies like Purdue Pharma started promoting new pain-relief medications like OxyContin … Four years after it was introduced, the drug was being prescribed in some West Virginia counties nearly five times more than the national average.&quot;

It was the proverbial perfect storm. On one hand, a community in dire need of effective pain relief drugs. On the other hand, pharmaceutical companies, more than willing to aggressively promote such medication.

But the pharmaceutical market does not rely entirely on supply and demand. You need an intermediary, i.e. a healthcare professional issuing a prescription. And it appeared that, since the early 2000s, healthcare professionals in West Virginia were signing millions of such scripts.

The disproportionate volume of prescriptions for oxycodone, hydrocodone and other pain killers attracted the attention of the West Virginia Bureau of Criminal Investigation. In 2001, State Police Sergeant Mike Smith first uncovered one of many &quot;pill mills&quot;: clinics, pharmacies or wellness centres, usually located in small rural towns, which cranked out hundreds of prescriptions every day, with very little supervision or due process.

Sometimes, these &quot;mills&quot; were managed by career criminals, who had spotted a winning business model: instead of dealing illegal drugs, they would make millions of dollars by peddling prescriptions for legal medicines. As reported by *The Guardian*: &quot;A group of doctors were set up by a former pimp, just out of federal prison for running a gay prostitution ring in Washington DC.&quot;

Pill mills mushroomed in Cabell County, thanks to its strategic geographic location linking three States. As a result, from 2006 to 2014, more than 81 million opioid pills made their way to Huntington and the surrounding county. At the time, Cabell&apos;s population was just short of 97,000. Which means that the area had been flooded with 837 pills for every single inhabitant.

As we shall learn later, these shipments were not managed by the manufacturers of such drugs, but by wholesale distributors, of which McKesson, AmerisourceBergen and Cardinal Health handled the majority of orders.

The effects of such an opioid tsunami on Huntington and Cabell soon became apparent. In 2015, opioid overdose became the third most frequent cause of death in the area, topped only by heart disease and cancer.

For Huntington&apos;s emergency medical services, pulling overdosing patients from the brink of death was a daily occurrence. On a particularly grueling day, August 15, 2016, ambulance crews recorded 28 cases of overdose. On later occasions, emergency personnel would report treating as many as eight overdose victims in the span of just 20 minutes!

The crisis was not limited to Huntington, of course, but had spread nationwide. Thus, in 2016, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or CDC, issued tight guidelines to restrict the prescription of opioids. But this measure turned out to be counterproductive: as locals could not access oxycodone or hydrocodone, they first turned to taking other prescription drugs such as the anticonvulsant gabapentin. And later, to buying heroin from street dealers.

Heroin addicts soon took to injecting far more potent drugs, such as fentanyl, which can be as much as 100 times stronger than morphine. Or carfentanil, initially synthesized as a tranquilizer for elephants, 10,000 times stronger than morphine. Often, they would mix all of these drugs, adding stimulants like cocaine and methamphetamine.

By 2017, Cabell County&apos;s opioid overdose death rate was soaring at 72.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, almost five times the national average.

In the ensuing years, as reported by the CDC, West Virginia would continue to top the grim leaderboard of deaths by overdose in the US. In 2022, the State experienced 1,335 deaths, a rate of 80.9 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. The vast majority of these fatal cases were concentrated in the counties of Kanawha and Cabell.

One of the most harrowing consequences of the widespread drug consumption was its effects on newborn babies. In 2016, one in ten babies born at the Cabell Huntington Hospital suffered from Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, or NAS. In other words, they experienced the symptoms of withdrawal from heroin, cocaine, alcohol, or a combination of several substances. Most babies suffering from NAS would be expected to suffer from long-lasting neurological problems, while 10% will suffer from Hepatitis C.

This phenomenon was not limited to Huntington: in 2016, West Virginia was reported as having the highest incidence of NAS in the nation, with a rate of 33.4 per 1,000 babies.

## Turning the Tide

What made Huntington stand apart, however, was its willingness to fight back, to reverse the tide by providing coordinated responses to support both the babies and their families.

A first effort came from Sarah Murray and Rhonda Edmunds, two pediatric nurses at Cabell Huntington Hospital. In 2016, the duo opened a separate facility called Lily&apos;s Place, dedicated to helping babies suffering from NAS and their young mothers. After giving birth, each mother and her newborn could spend some protected time in their own room, where specialized nurses would teach them the first, basic yet vital skills on how to look after their babies.

In 2017, the hospital launched a more wide-ranging initiative, called Healthy Connections, described as &quot;A community coalition designed to serve women struggling with substance use disorder.&quot;

A new mother suffering from substance abuse would be first put in contact with a Family Navigator, in charge of assessing her needs. The Navigator would then get the mum in touch with a peer support group of mothers facing similar challenges. Finally, the Navigator would offer the patient some options for recovery services.

The next priority would be to reach out to the baby&apos;s father and other relatives, bringing them together into a healthy support network. They will provide care and stability to the newborn, while the mother goes through her recovery process.

The mother and the baby will also be referred to the Knowledge In Developmental Steps Clinic—simply known as KIDS Clinic.

The KIDS Clinic provides convenient access to a team of specialists, including a pediatrician, a neurologist, a physical therapist, a speech pathologist, and a social worker—who will all cooperate to help babies suffering from NAS to develop healthy brains and bodies.

As babies progress through their first weeks of age, they will also be enrolled in the CARES program, which stands for Center for Addiction Research, Education, and Support. This program, specially designed for children experiencing NAS, will support their development through the first five years of age, aiming at a smooth transition into the school system.

The initiatives put in place at its hospital show that Huntington is not just the &quot;drug death capital of America.&quot; If anything, over the past two decades, the city has proved to be worthy of another, more positive title: the capital of efforts to combat drug death.

Back in November 2014, Mayor Steve Williams had first instituted the local Office of Drug Control Policy, in charge of collecting and analyzing data about drug usage, with the help of 50 specialized agencies and organizations.

In early 2015, Huntington&apos;s authorities opened West Virginia&apos;s first syringe exchange program, which in its first year in operation distributed 150,000 clean syringes to more than 1,700 people. This program did not just dispense safe paraphernalia. It also offered medical assessments and specialized referrals to addicts seeking to recover. In the same year, Huntington opened its first, dedicated, detox ward, consisting of eight beds.

In 2016, medical and emergency personnel—including police officers—were equipped with a key weapon against death by overdose: injectable or inhalable naloxone, a potent opioid antagonist which can reverse the effects of overdose. Even Mayor Williams took to carrying a naloxone injector wherever he went!

You will remember that we mentioned that on August 15, 2016, ambulance crews had to tend to a total of 28 patients overdosing. Well, on that day nobody died, thanks to the prompt intervention of Emergency Medical Technicians, and their prompt use of naloxone.

But bringing overdosing patients back from the brink of death is just one aspect of the ongoing struggle. In 2017, Huntington authorities addressed what happens after an overdose, by establishing the Quick Response Team. Within 3 days from overdosing, a patient or their family will be visited by a peer recovery coach, a paramedic, a police officer, and a faith leader. Crucially, the Quick Response Team also plays a preventative role, as family members who fear their loved ones may be at risk of overdose can contact the team, to conduct a welfare check.

This innovation clearly had an impact. In early 2017, EMT crews were called to deal with up to six overdose cases per 12-hour shift, an average of 360 per month. Following the introduction of the Quick Response Teams, the number of ambulance calls fell by 40%.

In 2020 Mayor Williams teamed up with local healthcare providers and Marshall University to design a &quot;resiliency plan,&quot; set to tackle both short- and long-term goals. Short-term objectives included expanding hospital care for overdosing patients, and providing educational resources. More importantly, in the long term the city will seek to address the underlying predictors of poor health and substance abuse, such as unemployment and lack of adequate housing.

## Distributors on Trial

In addition to addressing the problems of its community, the city of Huntington and Cabell County sought to obtain compensation from the companies held responsible for the opioid epidemic.

In April 2021, Cabell County attorney Paul Farrell filed a lawsuit against medicine wholesalers McKesson, AmerisourceBergen and Cardinal Health, accused of turning Huntington into the &quot;Ground zero of the opioid epidemic sweeping the nation.&quot;

Mr. Farrell argued that the distributors should be held responsible for recklessly flooding the community with millions of prescription painkillers. As such, they were requested to pay $2.5 billion in damages, which would be used to address the substance addiction crisis.

More precisely, the County attorney accused the defendants of causing a &quot;public nuisance,&quot; i.e. of interfering with the rights of the public through their conduct. Quoting from Article 549 of the West Virginia legal code: &quot;Such public nuisance endangers the health, safety and welfare of the community and is dangerous and detrimental to the public health, may violate the laws of the City and/or State as well as obstructs the community from reasonable and comfortable use of property.&quot;

In July 2022, US District Judge David Farber issued the verdict—which was not the one Huntington expected. The judge, in fact, exonerated the three wholesalers, stating that &quot;Plaintiffs failed to show that the volume of prescription opioids distributed in Cabell/Huntington was because of unreasonable conduct on the part of defendants.&quot; He further added that &quot;There is nothing unreasonable about distributing controlled substances to fulfill legally written prescriptions.&quot;

As mentioned earlier, investigations by the West Virginia Bureau of Criminal Investigation had shown how millions of such prescriptions had been written by &quot;pill mills.&quot; Therefore, it can be argued that those scripts were not 100% &quot;legally written.&quot;

In May 2024, Huntington and Cabell County appealed the initial verdict to West Virginia&apos;s Supreme Court. At the time of researching this episode, the Court is yet to deliver their verdict.

## The Road to Recovery

By mid-2024, the brave people of Huntington were still fighting their ongoing war against the scourge of death by overdose. Healthcare authorities opened yet more facilities to help contain the damage of substance abuse.

Karen&apos;s Place, for example, a centre dedicated to supporting mums-to-be through pregnancy, and to manage the symptoms of withdrawal in their babies. Or a detox centre, simply called Recovery Point, managed by fully recovered former addicts.

One of them, Richie Armstrong, spoke to Sky News reporter Mark Stone in the summer of 2024, stating that &quot;Huntington&apos;s recovery community is huge … On the 22nd next week, I&apos;ll have eight years of continuous sobriety. And this is all I&apos;ve done since I&apos;ve been sober, is work in the field of recovery. I had made the decision early on into sobriety that the recovery world was going to be my life. And it absolutely is 100% my life.&quot;

Thanks to the indefatigable efforts of former victims of drug abuse like Richie, of medical professionals, emergency personnel, and local authorities as a whole, Huntington is slowly clawing back terrain, reclaiming the lives of its inhabitants from the darkness of addiction and abuse.

The dark days in which ambulance crews had to attend to 28 overdose victims in a single day are hopefully gone. In August 2024, city statistics showed that the figures had declined to 10 overdoses a week, which seldom become fatal thanks to the prompt intervention and dedication of emergency personnel.

This statistic still implies a total of 520 overdose cases a year, a rate of one per 86 inhabitants. Still too many, in this city of 45,000 souls.

But it is a massive improvement, nonetheless, a testament to the dedication of local authorities, and especially of those who were snatched from the jaws of death, and are now willing to support others through their recovery pathway.

The road to total victory against the stubborn foe of widespread addiction is still long and arduous. But what the people of Huntington have proved again and again, is that they certainly do not intend to surrender.

## Key Takeaways

- Huntington, West Virginia, faced a severe opioid crisis, with 1 in 4 residents addicted to opioids in 2016.
- The city&apos;s opioid epidemic was driven by the decline of the coal industry and aggressive marketing of prescription opioids.
- Huntington implemented various initiatives, such as Lily&apos;s Place and Healthy Connections, to support families affected by opioid addiction.
- The city&apos;s efforts included distributing naloxone to emergency personnel and establishing a Quick Response Team to address overdoses.
- Despite legal setbacks, Huntington continues to fight the opioid crisis with community support and new recovery facilities.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is Huntington, West Virginia known for?

Huntington, West Virginia is known as the &apos;overdose capital&apos; or &apos;drug death capital&apos; of America due to its high incidence of opioid overdoses.

### How many people in Huntington were addicted to opioids in 2016?

In 2016, approximately 12,000 people in Huntington, which was about one in four residents, were addicted to prescription pills, heroin, fentanyl, or a combination of opioid and stimulant drugs.

### What was the opioid overdose death rate in Cabell County in 2017?

In 2017, Cabell County&apos;s opioid overdose death rate was 72.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, almost five times the national average.

### What initiatives were started by Sarah Murray and Rhonda Edmunds to help babies suffering from NAS?

Sarah Murray and Rhonda Edmunds opened Lily&apos;s Place, a facility dedicated to helping babies suffering from Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS) and their young mothers.

### What is the Quick Response Team in Huntington?

The Quick Response Team in Huntington visits patients or their families within three days of an overdose, providing support and preventative measures to reduce future overdoses.

### What was the outcome of the lawsuit filed by Cabell County against opioid distributors in 2021?

In July 2022, US District Judge David Farber exonerated the three wholesalers (McKesson, AmerisourceBergen, and Cardinal Health), stating that the plaintiffs failed to show that the volume of prescription opioids distributed was due to unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendants.

### What is the current status of the opioid crisis in Huntington as of mid-2024?

As of mid-2024, Huntington reported 10 overdoses per week, which seldom become fatal thanks to the prompt intervention of emergency personnel. This is a significant improvement from previous years.

### What is the Healthy Connections initiative in Huntington?

Healthy Connections is a community coalition designed to serve women struggling with substance use disorder, providing support and recovery services for both mothers and their babies.

### What is the role of the Office of Drug Control Policy in Huntington?

The Office of Drug Control Policy in Huntington is responsible for collecting and analyzing data about drug usage, working with 50 specialized agencies and organizations to address the opioid crisis.

### What is the CARES program in Huntington?

The CARES program (Center for Addiction Research, Education, and Support) supports the development of children experiencing Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS) through their first five years of age, aiming for a smooth transition into the school system.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Huntington, West Virginia: The Story of America&apos;s &quot;Overdose Capital&quot;](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bvkXG_id80g)
- [https://news.sky.com/story/huntington-americas-overdose-capital-where-former-addicts-are-helping-people-get-sober-13196992](https://news.sky.com/story/huntington-americas-overdose-capital-where-former-addicts-are-helping-people-get-sober-13196992)
- [https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/16/health/huntington-heroin/index.html](https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/16/health/huntington-heroin/index.html)
- [https://www.cwla.org/healthy-connections-helping-families-in-west-virginia-combat-opioid-addiction/#:~:text=But%20Huntington%2C%20West%20Virginia%2C%20labeled,services%20for%20the%20entire%20family](https://www.cwla.org/healthy-connections-helping-families-in-west-virginia-combat-opioid-addiction/#:~:text=But%20Huntington%2C%20West%20Virginia%2C%20labeled,services%20for%20the%20entire%20family)
- [https://www.news-medical.net/news/20240313/West-Virginia-city-once-battered-by-opioid-overdoses-confronts-e28098fourth-wavee28099.aspx#:~:text=From%202006%20through%202014%2C%20more,Heroin%20followed%2C%20then%20fentanyl](https://www.news-medical.net/news/20240313/West-Virginia-city-once-battered-by-opioid-overdoses-confronts-e28098fourth-wavee28099.aspx#:~:text=From%202006%20through%202014%2C%20more,Heroin%20followed%2C%20then%20fentanyl)
- [https://www.pyramid-healthcare.com/a-look-at-the-west-virginia-opioid-epidemic/#:~:text=Part%20of%20the%20drug%20problem,grueling%20nature%20of%20their%20jobs](https://www.pyramid-healthcare.com/a-look-at-the-west-virginia-opioid-epidemic/#:~:text=Part%20of%20the%20drug%20problem,grueling%20nature%20of%20their%20jobs)
- [https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7516293/#:~:text=The%20highest%20rate%20of%20opioid,deaths%20from%202015%20to%202016](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7516293/#:~:text=The%20highest%20rate%20of%20opioid,deaths%20from%202015%20to%202016)
- [https://citiesofservice.jhu.edu/resource/healthy-huntington/#:~:text=In%202008%2C%20the%20Associated%20Press,for%20diabetes%20and%20heart%20disease](https://citiesofservice.jhu.edu/resource/healthy-huntington/#:~:text=In%202008%2C%20the%20Associated%20Press,for%20diabetes%20and%20heart%20disease)
- [https://www.kff.org/statedata/mental-health-and-substance-use-state-fact-sheets/west-virginia/#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20there%20were%201%2C253,overdose%20deaths%20in%20the%20state](https://www.kff.org/statedata/mental-health-and-substance-use-state-fact-sheets/west-virginia/#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20there%20were%201%2C253,overdose%20deaths%20in%20the%20state)
- [https://harmreductionjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12954-020-00416-w](https://harmreductionjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12954-020-00416-w)
- [https://dhhr.wv.gov/BBH/DocumentSearch/SEOW/Meeting%20Docs/SEOW%202020/1.13.20%20WV%20Fatal%20Drug%20Overdoses.pdf](https://dhhr.wv.gov/BBH/DocumentSearch/SEOW/Meeting%20Docs/SEOW%202020/1.13.20%20WV%20Fatal%20Drug%20Overdoses.pdf)
- [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458653/](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458653/)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/02/opioids-west-virginia-pill-mills-pharmacies](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/02/opioids-west-virginia-pill-mills-pharmacies)
- [https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/DEA-WAS-DIR-024-17%20West%20Virginia%20Drug%20Situation%20-UNCLASSIFIED.pdf](https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/DEA-WAS-DIR-024-17%20West%20Virginia%20Drug%20Situation%20-UNCLASSIFIED.pdf)
- [https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/articlepdf/2675908/jama_Voelker_2018_mn_180012.pdf](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/articlepdf/2675908/jama_Voelker_2018_mn_180012.pdf)
- [https://americanhealth.jhu.edu/RuralOpioidsCount](https://americanhealth.jhu.edu/RuralOpioidsCount)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/may/03/us-opioid-crisis-west-virginia-drug-giants-trial](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/may/03/us-opioid-crisis-west-virginia-drug-giants-trial)
- [https://www.courtswv.gov/sites/default/pubfilesmnt/2024-11/24-166%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20American%20Public%20Health%20Association.pdf](https://www.courtswv.gov/sites/default/pubfilesmnt/2024-11/24-166%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20American%20Public%20Health%20Association.pdf)
- [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-drug-distributors-prevail-25-billion-west-virginia-opioid-case-2022-07-04/](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-drug-distributors-prevail-25-billion-west-virginia-opioid-case-2022-07-04/)
- [https://www.npr.org/2022/07/04/1109772095/a-federal-judge-sides-with-3-major-drug-distributors-in-a-landmark-opioid-lawsui](https://www.npr.org/2022/07/04/1109772095/a-federal-judge-sides-with-3-major-drug-distributors-in-a-landmark-opioid-lawsui)
- [https://wvpublic.org/huntington-cabell-file-appeal-argument-in-case-against-opioid-distributors/](https://wvpublic.org/huntington-cabell-file-appeal-argument-in-case-against-opioid-distributors/)
- [https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/wheeling/latest/wheeling_wv/0-0-0-11722](https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/wheeling/latest/wheeling_wv/0-0-0-11722)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/Ohio_River.jpg) by Angry Aspie at en.wikipedia / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Jericho: The Oldest City on Earth?</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/jericho-oldest-city-on-earth</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/jericho-oldest-city-on-earth</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>**Snap question: what do the Hebrew Bible, the Christian Old Testament and the hit Coolio song &apos;Gangsta&apos;s Paradise&apos; have in common?**

Take a moment; we&apos;ll wait.

The correct answer is the reference to &apos;walking through the Valley of the Shadow of Death&apos;, mentioned in both the opening verse of the song, and in Psalm 23 of the Christian and Jewish holy texts, alternately as Psalm 22 in Greek and Latin versions of the Old Testament.

It is believed that the Valley of the Shadow of Death refers to Wadi Qelt, a rocky gorge in the West Bank, which lies about 4 kilometres west of the town of Jericho.

Despite being a relatively small city of less than 30,000, Jericho can lay claim to one of the longest and richest histories of any city in the world, and is often held as among the oldest cities in the world.

Let&apos;s explore.

## How Old is Old?

So, first, some clarification.

There are lots of places which lay claim to the title of the oldest continuously inhabited place in the world. In many cases, there is solid evidence for this — take the Burrup Peninsula in northwestern Australia, also known natively as Murujaga. The peninsula features rock art determined to be at least 40,000 years old. If the oldest place on earth is to be understood as a site where the oldest evidence of human habitation of some kind is to be found, then it would not be Jericho, and could convincingly be Murujaga. And if the world&apos;s oldest place is to be understood instead as where the oldest man-made structures are to be found — then, equally, that would not be Jericho. It could be Tell Qaramel in modern-day Syria, where structures dating back about 12 thousand years remain standing. Candidates for the oldest site in the world are also sometimes seen as Gobekli Tepe in modern-day Turkey, and Mureybet, an ancient settlement also located in northern Syria, both of which feature structures around 11 thousand years old.

But the continuous inhabitation of these locations are all in doubt. Not much is known about the early history of the native people of Murujaga — the Jaburara — and these, sadly, became extinct in the area following a series of settler massacres in the 19th century. Tell Qaramel, Gobekli and Mureybet are all ruins, having been free of permanent habitation for centuries and largely unknown — save for some nearby populations, perhaps — until excavation in the 1900s. As a side note, this — in theory — means that the oldest site in existence may not even be discovered, with all three of these latter sites having re-emerged only within the last hundred years, while being thousands of years old.

With all this uncertainty, the oldest place on earth is a title which remains disputed — with compelling claims supporting places as far removed from one another as China, North Africa, Oceania, and the Middle East. These feature places so old that their history is — to some degree — unknown and probably unknowable: it cannot be definitively concluded whether they remained inhabited throughout all that time or just founded, abandoned, revived, abandoned again, and revived once more.

So with so many ancient sites having an obscure history by virtue of just being that old, it is hard to define a metric by which the continuous existence of a place can be judged. But there is perhaps one criterion that could be used: the presence of a defensive wall around the exterior of a settlement.

The building of a wall is a significant development in the foundation of any settlement, especially during the Age of Antiquity and before. It represents the fact that the inhabitants of the settlement site had no intention of moving anywhere else, as could otherwise be the case — and likely was — for inhabitants of many ancient sites, with some civilisations migrating elsewhere or disappearing due to factors such as drought, occupation, famine, natural disaster, or their simple destruction.

And while the walled perimeter may not be a metric accepted by everyone, there have been a number of lists published identifying candidates for the status of the world&apos;s oldest place. Jericho features on practically all of them.

As mentioned by TimeOut, whenever the world&apos;s oldest cities are discussed, Jericho is never far from the conversation — having been continuously inhabited for over 11 thousand years. Its walls date from roughly the Neolithic period, being constructed around 8,000 years BCE — although, like with some other places, there is evidence of human habitation in the area a thousand years still before this.

And unlike other ancient sites, many of them now uninhabited or with only very minor populations, Jericho — today — is very far from abandoned. It is a thriving city of about 21,000 people, with most of its ancient sites intact and visitable.

## Jericho and the Bible

Jericho features multiple times in Jewish and Christian holy texts.

The city is mentioned about 64 times in the King James Bible, the modern English version of the Bible, used by the Church of England since the 1600s. It is the third most-often referenced city, after the holy city of Jerusalem and the ancient — but abandoned — city of Babylon. Much reference to Jericho is made in the Old Testament, based primarily on the Hebrew Bible, in which it is often referred to as the &apos;city of palms&apos;.

The Old Testament names Jericho as the first city conquered by Israel after crossing the Jordan River and occupying the biblical Promised Land. In the Book of Numbers, written about 2,600 years ago, Jericho is described as a powerful Canaanite fortress used as a reference point by Moses as the Jews wandered the wilderness of the Sinai. In the New Testament — based on the accounts of the disciples of Jesus — Jericho is again mentioned, as the place of a miracle performed by Jesus when he restored sight to the blind beggar Bartimaeus.

Jericho itself is not directly mentioned in the Quran — the Holy Book of the Islamic faith — but neither is Jerusalem and instead both cities are seen to be indirectly referenced through specific sites located within or nearby both. Many local Muslims believe Nabi Musa, a shrine located about 11 kilometres south of modern-day Jericho, to be the tomb of Moses, something thought to have been revealed in a dream to the 12th-century Muslim leader Saladin — although Islamic theology declares the actual site of Moses&apos; tomb to be unknown.

## A Tale of Many Conquests

After having been occupied by both the Roman and Byzantine civilisations, the city came under Muslim conquest in the 7th century, during which time it became referred to with its contemporary name in Arabic, Ariha.

In addition to many existing Jewish and Christians sites of note in the area, one of the most important sites belonging to early Islamic history is located close to Jericho. Hisham&apos;s Palace, built by the Umayyad civilisation in the 8th century, is located about 3 kilometres north of Jericho city. Although destroyed in an earthquake only twenty years after being built, the sprawling mosaics of the palace were uncovered intact in the 1930s, and are today in process of restoration by way of a 12 million dollar donation by Japan. Seismic activity would remain a potent risk for Jericho and the wider Levant, and deadly earthquakes would strike again throughout the centuries, wreaking havoc to both human habitation and the historic riches of the region.

Following a brief conquest by the Crusaders in the 12th century, the city returned to Arab rule before becoming part of the Ottoman Empire in 1517. Although the city had become almost uniformly Muslim by now, the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent saw the return of Jewish communities to what would later be known as Palestine, a trend which would only increase at the end of the Ottoman era and with the establishment of Mandatory Palestine.

Ottoman control over Palestine lasted until 1917, when it was dispossessed during the First World War. It soon came under the control of Britain, under the terms of a 1920 proposal by the League of Nations known as the British Mandate for Palestine. The mid-war Balfour Declaration also promised a homeland in Palestine to the Jewish community in Europe, in an attempt to rally their support for the war effort. This saw Jewish immigration to Palestine rise exponentially in the 1920s, contributed to by rising antisemitism in Europe.

The new arrivals did not really get on with the local Arab population, resulting in massacre after massacre in the years following the beginning of the Mandate. Jericho, being largely free of mixed settlement, was — like Gaza — spared from such episodes of violence in the 1920s, but that did not mean it escaped destruction of any kind. In 1927, a strong earthquake shook Palestine and Transjordan, killing around 400 people, and levelling multiple buildings in Jericho, which lay close to the quake&apos;s epicentre. By this time, the city was both poor and tiny, having a population of a little under 2,000 people in 1938 — predominantly Muslim Arabs, alongside a handful of Christian Arabs.

## Recent History

Following the end of the Palestinian Mandate and the resulting Arab-Israeli War, Jericho fell into the hands of the state of Jordan, who claimed rulership of an area which became known as the West Bank. Jericho grew in size, having absorbed many Palestinian refugees fleeing from what was now the modern state of Israel, reaching around 10,000 inhabitants in 1960.

The Jordanian administration continued until 1967, when the Six-Day War saw Israel sweep into the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. Jericho was now under Israeli control.

A rapidly-conducted Israeli census the same year determined Jericho&apos;s population to have fallen to 7,000 people, as many of the displaced Palestinians from the 1948 war fled once more to other parts of the West Bank, to Jordan, or to Syria.

Jericho and the West Bank remained under Israel&apos;s direct control until 1994, when it fell under the administration of the newly-established Palestinian Authority with the signing of the Oslo Accords. The first Oslo Accord was followed by the so-called Gaza-Jericho Agreement, under the terms of which Israel promised to partly withdraw from the Jericho region and the Gaza Strip. Resultantly, Jericho became the first Palestinian city transferred to the control of the PA.

However, Israel had spent the intervening years between 1967 and the signing of the Oslo Accords building a wide variety of settlements and outposts which now dotted the West Bank landscape, and which would remain under the direct control of Tel Aviv. Jericho, being relatively isolated in the southeast of the West Bank alongside the River Jordan, found itself surrounded by settlements outside its control, hampering the movement of its inhabitants.

## A Troubled Peace in the City of Palms

In 2020, the UN voted to make Jericho a UNESCO World Heritage site, owing to its vast history and many historical treasures. However, the decision was contentious, being seen by Israel as a provocation. Israel cut ties with UNESCO only the previous year, resulting in both that the vote came at a very contentious moment, and that the city had very little chance of benefiting from its new status.

In 2024, the ancient city of Jericho remains part of the West Bank and controlled by the Palestinian Authority. And while the city has remained relatively at peace — at least when compared with cyclical violence in other cities in the West Bank and especially the Gaza Strip — that does not mean that all is rosy.

Jericho itself is almost uniformly Arab Muslim, and its population has risen to above 20,000. It is capital of the Jericho governorate, one of the West Bank&apos;s administrative divisions with a population of around 50,000 people, of whom around 14,000 live in refugee camps.

But today, Jericho is surrounded on three sides by Israel settlements: Na&apos;omi (around six kilometres to its north), Almog (six kilometres to the south), and Vered Yeriho, which is practically touching Aqabat Jabr, a refugee camp southeast of Jericho, with both of them located adjacent to the Wadi Qelt or the biblical Valley of the Shadow of Death. Further south and north are several more Israeli settlements, and practically the entirety of the thirty-kilometre route between Jericho and Jerusalem runs through yet more Israeli settlements still — including the 40,000-inhabitant Ma&apos;ale Adumim — before reaching Palestinian-majority East Jerusalem.

To Jericho&apos;s east lies the River Jordan, separating the West Bank from the state of Jordan by both a natural boundary and by one of the most stringent borders in the world, prone to occasional cross-border skirmishes and regular closures by Israel.

And the ancient city of palms, despite being largely an oasis of peace for most of the turbulence of the last few decades — at least, when compared with flashpoint sites in the West Bank such as Jenin and Nablus — has seen an increase in violence in recent years. The Aqabat Jaber refugee camp — in particular — has been the site of repeated instances of alleged militant activity and Israel Defence Force incursions, and Jericho as a whole has seen recent instances of intercommunal fighting, detentions, home demolishments, and killings.

And perhaps an equally potent problem is posed to Jericho on an economic front.

The city and surrounding area struggles with a weak economy, water scarcity and overconsumption, which — together with land loss due to settlement construction — have all contributed to a sharp decline in traditional agriculture, the city&apos;s lifeblood for millennia. According to a paper published by the International Journal of Urban Policy and Planning, the lack of water — in particular — has been a particularly biting problem, contributed to by the redirection of some surrounding water sources away from Jericho&apos;s agricultural works to the new surrounding settlements.

This problem is likely to only get worse as climate change causes droughts in the area to become more severe, and the paper also pointed out that the terms of the Oslo Accord allowed residents of PA-controlled areas to construct water wells only 150 metres deep, but those in Israel-controlled settlements had no such restrictions and could therefore access deeper reservoirs underground.

With its agricultural prospects floundering, Jericho is reliant on tourism and international donations to remain afloat, both of which can be irregular and impacted by explosions of violence in other parts of Palestine and Israel. This makes city planning exceedingly difficult to budget. Jericho is also indirectly dependent on import duties which the PA as a whole relies on, but these are collected by Israel and therefore subject to withdrawal in times of strife, choking its economy further. Given Jericho&apos;s high rate of historic and religious tourism, it has a lower rate of unemployment than the West Bank as a whole, but this remains nonetheless high — at around 15% in 2020, against a State of Palestine figure of almost 26% the same year.

So it may be that the land of the Valley of the Shadow of Death, the ancient site of many biblical miracles, may — without consistent investment and greater stability — dry out in the sun, and flounder under the weight of the tragic developments taking place nearby.

Despite its many cultural riches — Jericho could become a place devoid of prospects, and in need of a modern-day miracle of some kind once more.

## Key Takeaways

- The Valley of the Shadow of Death, mentioned in Psalm 23, is believed to be Wadi Qelt near Jericho.
- Jericho is one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities, with walls dating back to the Neolithic period.
- Jericho is frequently referenced in the Bible, appearing 64 times in the King James Bible.
- Jericho&apos;s economy struggles with water scarcity, agricultural decline, and reliance on tourism and international aid.
- Despite its rich history, Jericho faces modern challenges including violence and economic instability.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the significance of the Valley of the Shadow of Death mentioned in the article?

The Valley of the Shadow of Death refers to Wadi Qelt, a rocky gorge in the West Bank, which lies about 4 kilometers west of the town of Jericho. It is mentioned in both the opening verse of the song &apos;Gangsta’s Paradise&apos; by Coolio and in Psalm 23 of the Christian and Jewish holy texts.

### How old is Jericho and what makes it significant?

Jericho is believed to be one of the oldest cities in the world, with a history of continuous inhabitation for over 11,000 years. Its walls date from roughly the Neolithic period, constructed around 8,000 years BCE. Jericho is often considered among the oldest cities due to its defensive walls, which indicate long-term settlement intentions.

### What are some of the other ancient sites that claim to be the oldest continuously inhabited places?

Other ancient sites that claim to be the oldest continuously inhabited places include the Burrup Peninsula in northwestern Australia, Tell Qaramel in modern-day Syria, Gobekli Tepe in modern-day Turkey, and Mureybet in northern Syria. However, the continuous inhabitation of these locations is often disputed.

### How is Jericho mentioned in the Bible?

Jericho is mentioned about 64 times in the King James Bible. It is described as the first city conquered by Israel after crossing the Jordan River and occupying the biblical Promised Land. In the New Testament, Jericho is mentioned as the place where Jesus performed a miracle by restoring sight to the blind beggar Bartimaeus.

### What is the significance of Hisham’s Palace in Jericho?

Hisham’s Palace, built by the Umayyad civilization in the 8th century, is located about 3 kilometers north of Jericho city. It is one of the most important sites belonging to early Islamic history, featuring sprawling mosaics that are currently being restored.

### What is the current political status of Jericho?

As of 2024, Jericho remains part of the West Bank and is controlled by the Palestinian Authority. It is surrounded by Israeli settlements and faces economic and political challenges, including water scarcity and land loss due to settlement construction.

### What are some of the economic challenges faced by Jericho?

Jericho struggles with a weak economy, water scarcity, and overconsumption, which have contributed to a decline in traditional agriculture. The city relies on tourism and international donations, but these can be irregular and impacted by violence in the region. Additionally, Jericho is indirectly dependent on import duties collected by Israel, which can be withdrawn in times of strife.

### What is the significance of the Oslo Accords for Jericho?

The Oslo Accords, signed in 1994, transferred Jericho to the control of the newly-established Palestinian Authority. However, the terms of the accords allowed residents of PA-controlled areas to construct water wells only 150 meters deep, while those in Israel-controlled settlements had no such restrictions, exacerbating water scarcity issues in Jericho.

### What is the current population of Jericho?

As of the article, Jericho has a population of about 21,000 people. It is the capital of the Jericho governorate, which has a population of around 50,000 people, with around 14,000 living in refugee camps.

### What is the significance of the Aqabat Jaber refugee camp in Jericho?

The Aqabat Jaber refugee camp, located southeast of Jericho, has been the site of repeated instances of alleged militant activity and Israel Defence Force incursions. It is practically touching the Israeli settlement of Vered Yeriho, contributing to the complex political and security dynamics in the region.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Jericho: The Oldest City on Earth?](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mXT4-jTEjTA)
- [https://www.britannica.com/place/walls-of-Jericho](https://www.britannica.com/place/walls-of-Jericho)
- [https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/article/oldest-sites-world](https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/article/oldest-sites-world)
- [https://www.timesofisrael.com/one-of-worlds-largest-mosaics-unveiled-at-jericho-desert-castle/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/one-of-worlds-largest-mosaics-unveiled-at-jericho-desert-castle/)
- [https://www.timeout.com/travel/oldest-cities-in-the-world](https://www.timeout.com/travel/oldest-cities-in-the-world)
- [https://reliefweb.int/map/israel/jewish-settlements-west-bank](https://reliefweb.int/map/israel/jewish-settlements-west-bank)
- [https://www.islamiclandmarks.com/palestine-other/maqam-of-musa-as](https://www.islamiclandmarks.com/palestine-other/maqam-of-musa-as)
- [https://www.jewishjericho.org.il/english/thoughts/VisitingTheCityofJericho-en.html](https://www.jewishjericho.org.il/english/thoughts/VisitingTheCityofJericho-en.html)
- [https://biblescripture.net/top-10-most-frequently-mentioned-cities-in-the-bible-their-significance/](https://biblescripture.net/top-10-most-frequently-mentioned-cities-in-the-bible-their-significance/)
- [https://time.com/archive/6887340/the-middle-east-bloody-frontier/](https://time.com/archive/6887340/the-middle-east-bloody-frontier/)
- [https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/30/middleeast/jericho-west-bank-refugee-camp-intl/index.html](https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/30/middleeast/jericho-west-bank-refugee-camp-intl/index.html)
- [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275124005523#s0040](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275124005523#s0040)
- [http://www.pipa.ps/page.php?id=23b284y2339460Y23b284](http://www.pipa.ps/page.php?id=23b284y2339460Y23b284)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9b/20110226_West_Bank_0585_Jericho_%285539931365%29.jpg) by Dan Lundberg / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Kaliningrad: Why Russia Owns a Random Piece of Europe</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/kaliningrad-why-russia-owns-random-piece-europe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/kaliningrad-why-russia-owns-random-piece-europe</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Russia. It&apos;s the largest nation on planet Earth, spanning eleven time zones across two continents, sharing over-land borders with fourteen countries, and laying claim to seventeen million square kilometers across forests, mountains, and freezing Arctic tundra. Its coastline stretches nearly as far as the circumference of the Earth, it dwarfs not one, not two, but three other continents, it touches three oceans half a world apart, it&apos;s home to a quarter of the world&apos;s fresh water, and by surface area, it&apos;s the same size as the *entire dwarf planet of Pluto*.

And for a nation so vast as this one, a nation so mind-bogglingly big, it might seem as if all this space should be enough…right? Well, actually, no, because no matter how long you pore over your map of the world, staring at the gigantic Russian landmass…you&apos;re still going to miss a spot. Zoom out from Russia, head west toward Europe, and hone in on the Baltic Sea, where Finland and Sweden stretch down toward the Baltics and Poland. Look a little closer, and the three Baltic states will come into focus, but look closer than *that*…and between Lithuania and Poland, there&apos;s a little part of the map without a label. Look closer, and closer, and closer…and you&apos;ve found Kaliningrad, a 223-square-kilometer exclave that swears allegiance only to Moscow, and to the same ruler that commands the rest of Russia&apos;s great expanse.

So today we&apos;re going to try and figure out this little geographic anomaly: why it exists, why it&apos;s part of Russia instead of the rest of Europe, and how in the world a place like this can survive, when it&apos;s encircled by an alliance Russia so fears, at a time when Russia, and therefore Kaliningrad, is very much at war.

## The Forever Fortress

The land today known as Kaliningrad has changed hands several times over the course of history, but one thing has remained constant there for a millennium, and perhaps even longer. Kaliningrad, no matter its allegiance and no matter what name that territory has been called, is a fortress. Situated at the base of a small peninsula jutting out into the Baltic Sea, where the landmass of continental Europe turns a corner from the dense forests of Lithuania to the rolling plains of Poland, it&apos;s had real strategic value as a defensible position for a very long time, and as such, it&apos;s been a military installation that has morphed and changed with history…but never went away.

A thousand years ago, though, this little stretch of Baltic land didn&apos;t go by the name Kaliningrad at all. Instead, it was called Twangste, a modest fort held by a minor tribe of the Baltic people known as the Old Prussians. That minor tribe were called the Sambians, and in essence, they were Vikings, exercising control over two unique land bridges that still define Kaliningrad&apos;s surroundings to this day. Those land bridges, the Vistula Spit and the Curonian Spit, are very narrow forested shoals estimated to only be some five thousand years old themselves, protecting a northward lagoon and a southward lagoon that provided ample fishing grounds for the people who lived on their shores. The Sambians weren&apos;t the only tribe in the area, but they appeared to be among the most powerful, helped along by their control of Twangste and other forts in the area. They were leading amber traders, known to be at least relatively wealthy for the time, and with their valuable control over amber, they were able to enjoy furs, honey, and other imports that passed through their lands as Scandinavia and the Baltic tribes conducted trade with Germania.

But in the year 1255, Germania would assert itself against the Sambians in devastating fashion. The conquest of Twangste came during the Prussian Crusade, as the Teutonic Knights swept northeastward into the Baltic region in an attempt to colonize and convert the pagan population of the area. Against the might of the Teutonic Order, the Sambians were unable to stand firm, and when their fort was taken, it was converted into a military stronghold for its new captors. They would name the new citadel Königsberg Castle, and build a city around it, welcoming wave after wave of German and Polish settlers who turned the local population to a minority. From there, the Teutonic Order struck outward against pagan Lithuania, eventually conquering the territory there too. Like the Sambians before them, the Teutonic marshal and diocese in Königsberg enjoyed lucrative and far-reaching trade relationships with the surrounding kingdoms and duchies, and with the arrival of a well-respected nunnery, the city began to build its reputation as a center for education and intellectualism.

The city would trade hands a few times over the next few centuries. In 1440, it became a founding member of the Prussian Confederation, an organization to push back against the rule of the Teutonic Order and the exploitative regime it imposed. Fourteen years later, it was incorporated into Poland, with which it joined the Thirteen Years&apos; War against the old and corrupt holy order. The city was captured by the Teutonic knights, and was the site of multiple battles over the course of the conflict. After the war&apos;s end, Königsberg would become the capital of what remained of the Teutonic Order&apos;s landholdings, and in the early 1500s, as the city&apos;s religious faith shifted during the Protestant Reformation, it eventually joined the new Duchy of Prussia under the territory&apos;s coat of arms, the black Prussian eagle.

With wars and political realignments finished for a time, Königsberg became one of central Europe&apos;s great port cities. A functionally autonomous territory, Königsberg had its own currency, its own parliament, and vibrant cultures rooted in the Polish, German, *and* Lithuanian languages. Like the Sambian tribe that came before, Königsberg became a flourishing trade center, and a critical interlocutor between the kingdoms of western Europe and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As a cultural and economic bridge between the two sides of the European continent, Königsberg became a hub for intellectualism, with a city university founded in 1544, and with the next several centuries seeing Königsberg punch way above its weight when it came to churning out scientists, mathematicians, writers, and philosophers. As part of Polish Prussia, Königsberg featured prominently at times in the internal power struggles of the Prussian nobility, but it was the city, not any particular noble, that ultimately came out on top of the conflict. Poland placed firm legal protections around Königsberg&apos;s autonomy, and invested heavily in fortifying the city against potential Swedish attack.

During the Thirty Years&apos; War, Königsberg would see Prussia become independent, and although the city would deal with plague, reductions in trade, and even a brief annexation by the Russian Empire in the late 1750s, it would end the eighteenth century as the same booming city it had been at the start. During the years of the Napoleonic conquest, Königsberg would host King Frederick William III of Prussia after he fled Berlin, and it would become a critical center of the anti-Napoleon political movement. A few decades later, it became part of the German Empire when the Prussian monarchy eventually unified it, and as part of the unification, Königsberg was fortified even further. It would be surrounded by a series of fifteen lesser forts, all oriented around the city. By then, Königsberg was surrounded by three separate defensive belts, making it among the most well-defended cities in all of Europe, and easily the best-defended of the German Empire.

And unsurprisingly for a city of such military investment, it became a point of considerable strategic value when World War I broke out. With the Russians pressing in on the Germans from the east, Königsberg was the place that simply could not be lost, lest a Russian conquest of such a vital point cause a cascade into subsequent Russian victories, a morale crisis on the home front, and the means for the Tsar and his men to completely overrun Germany&apos;s other static defenses. With no other choice, the Germans resolved to stand and defend the city, and from their perspective, it was a good thing they did. Out beyond their supply lines, hungry and low in morale, the Russians walked into a trap at the Battle of Tannenberg, not far from Königsberg. 120,000 Russians would be killed, wounded, or go missing in the battle, a figure representing nearly ten for every one casualty on the German side. After that, the war didn&apos;t threaten Königsberg in any substantive way, and the fortress city notched another de-facto victory, by nature of its own survival.

The Weimar years between the World Wars saw the end of the Kingdom of Prussia, and the destruction of the German Empire. Yet Königsberg, despite being far from the heart of the lands now called Germany, wasn&apos;t relinquished to the Poles or the Russians or the Lithuanians. Along with the rest of East Prussia, it was recognized as a geographically isolated part of the German nation, separated from the rest of the nation&apos;s territory by a strip of Polish land that reached to the Baltic coast. Königsberg and the surrounding area were the site of substantial infrastructure investments, less to do with reconstruction and more to do with preparing East Prussia for its survival off on its own…but when one particular German man, with a little toothbrush mustache and a bad hairdo, started looking for axes to grind against the Weimar state, East Prussia&apos;s predicament seemed to fit the bill.

Königsberg was a prime target for Hitler&apos;s original groups of paramilitaries, even before he took power, and the city&apos;s intellectual class got the worst of it, owing to their role in the ideological side of the Weimar Republic. Jews had lived among the other residents of Königsberg peacefully for centuries, and so the city&apos;s Jewish population was a prime target for Nazi confiscations, discrimination, and, eventually, purges. When they were deported to concentration camps and death camps, Auschwitz became the most common destination once it opened in 1940. All the while, Königsberg featured prominently in Hitler&apos;s rhetoric whenever he visited or touched on East Prussia, discussing Königsberg as a perfect location for the Hitlerian ideal of agrarian settlement by small-time German farmers. When Germany invaded Poland, Poles in Königsberg were tortured and executed, at times even by guillotine in the streets. Nearly seventy thousand among their number were forced into slave labor just inside Königsberg itself, in horrific conditions where death was common.

As the Second World War drew to its conclusion, Königsberg was among the cities to be subjected to the full force of British bombing, with the vast majority of the old city, including its castle, its universities, and its economic centers, razed to the ground. Then, it was the Red Army&apos;s chance to take its turn with the city, putting it under siege in the early months of 1945. By then, the Soviets were well aware of Hitler&apos;s desire to turn Königsberg into a museum of sorts, showing off the innumerable spoils of war that Hitler thought he would secure during the Nazi invasion there. So, too, did the people of Königsberg know full well that the Soviets had committed massacres and numerous other atrocities over the course of their conquest. After three months besieging a city that most civilians had long since fled, Königsberg fell under the control of the Soviets, despite fanatical resistance from many of the Nazi troops there. Eventually, the fortress had to declare its surrender, an exceptionally rare event in its thousand-year history. Of the pre-war population of roughly 120,000 German civilians, just one in five would live to see the siege&apos;s end, with three out of every four dead killed by hunger. Over the coming few years, its remaining German population would first be whittled down via forced migration, and then the remainder would be expelled outright by 1950, written off as lifelong fascists who could never be reformed.

## Soviet Rule

When peace was finally restored on the European continent, Königsberg became a de-facto territorial holding of the Soviet Union, and eventually, it received its new name: Kaliningrad, named after a Bolshevik revolutionary called Mikhail Kalinin who had no real relation to the city. Kalinin was, by that point, a very-high-ranking Soviet leader, and the Union apparently felt he was in need of a city to honor his legacy. Actually, he needed three cities; two in the Soviet Union already bore his name. At that time, Kaliningrad was something of a legal grey area; it wouldn&apos;t be assigned to the Soviet Union formally until 1990, and although it eventually was regarded as a piece of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic or SSR, that was rather unusual. On the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, most territory that hadn&apos;t belonged to a Soviet SSR in the past was kept at least nominally independent; by example, Poland was placed under the control of a puppet government called the Polish People&apos;s Republic. Kaliningrad, though, had been an isolated pocket of a conquered nation, stuck deep in territory under Josef Stalin&apos;s control, and if Stalin decreed that it was to be part of the Russian SSR, then so it was.

But that new reality for Kaliningrad brought with it a second, and far more welcome change, for the people who lived there. Unlike Berlin or Warsaw, Kaliningrad would see little in the way of heavy-handed Soviet oversight in its early years, largely owing to the mass expulsion of Germans and a wave of Russian settlers. The Red Army stuck around for a while, but by 1948, the vast majority of the city&apos;s population hailed from Russia, Belarus, or Ukraine. Many of them were collectivist farmers who were enticed to the city by a variety of intriguing offers, from the promise of new homes, to a free cow, to tax breaks, to travel passports that were exceptionally hard for agricultural workers to come by. Those promises largely turned out to be empty, with the &apos;houses&apos; they were promised actually consisting of ruins, but in a way, that was the point. By then, they&apos;d already arrived, and so it fell to that wave of new arrivals to rebuild the city, its infrastructure, and most of all, its factories. After that wave of arrivals, the next round would come by way of assignment, shipped off by order of community leaders back in Russia. Those leaders, incentivized to get rid of the farmers who&apos;d been causing problems for their collectives and keep the ones that were productive, used cities like Kaliningrad to get rid of the poorly educated, heavy drinkers, petty criminals, the physically weak, and others who were deemed to be of lesser working value.

For Kaliningrad to be sent so many people who had been deemed castoffs from the Soviet system, wasn&apos;t exactly a great sign on where the territory was headed—but it was the sort of thing that could be overcome, with communities banding together and resolving to find ways forward despite an imperfect situation. The larger problem came from Moscow, when in the immediate post-war years, Kaliningrad was treated as little more than an afterthought. It wasn&apos;t the sort of place that got a special shout-out in the first post-war Five-Year Plan, and in fact, it wasn&apos;t even the sort of place that got budget allotments. Despite the Russian population flowing in, it was a place with not nearly enough laborers to carry out a full reconstruction and socialist reform, and nor did it have the money to do either. In Kaliningrad, that was especially frustrating; back when it was Königsberg, it was the sort of modern city that far outstripped anything the Soviet Union had on offer, and both the basic infrastructure and, before their expulsion, the German experts and engineers who could have helped to rebuild it, were right there waiting for an investment. Instead, the new wave of settlers had no clean water, only minimal electricity, and nothing more than ruins at the heart of the city.

The plans for reconstruction, drawn up in large part by the people living there, were grandiose in their imagination. The city was to be entirely de-Germanized, not just getting rid of Nazi symbolism, but dispensing of parts of the old town that had been built in the German style, or kept as architectural relics of the medieval period. The ruins of Königsberg Castle would be demolished for good in the late 1960s, by direct order of then-Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Instead, the new Kaliningrad would resemble Moscow of the 1930s: grand, wide boulevards that came out in spokes from the central square, and a great tower topped with a statue of Lenin at its peak. In reality, though, the people of the city would need several decades to rebuild the city center, and so, for a very long time, the real hub of the settlement was located out in the suburbs. What most regions of the world would consider to be a true city, Kaliningrad wouldn&apos;t resemble again for a very long time, and the million-odd people who lived in the territory by 1950 would have to make do with less. Fishing became a dominant industry, propping up the region&apos;s economy, and oceanography slowly became the leading scientific focus of the intellectual culture that still existed there.

During the Cold War, Kaliningrad was a closed city, one of a number of Soviet settlements that banned visits from foreigners, barred most Soviet citizens from entry, and functioned largely as a self-contained human ecosystem. While other such cities in the Soviet Union were closed because of the military-industrial work happening there, like in arms plants that developed new, secret Soviet capabilities and nuclear research sites that built atomic bombs, Kaliningrad&apos;s situation was a bit different. It was closed, instead, for security reasons, preserved as a stronghold that couldn&apos;t be compromised in the same way as, say, Poland or East Germany could be. It had tremendous military value to the Soviets, with its strategic location on the Baltic Sea and its ability to defend the Baltic SSRs in the event of a war with the global West. Not only that, but pro-Western Baltic residents were kept separate from the rest of Europe, courtesy of this little Russian peninsula. And beyond that strategic value, it had little else to offer, so, closed it was. And closed, it would remain, through quiet Soviet years that saw stagnation, slow reconstruction, and very little more than that.

## Federation, Isolation

Kaliningrad&apos;s dreary monotony would be broken for the first time in nearly half a century, in 1991, when the Soviet Union fractured beyond all hope of recovery, and ceased to exist. When the Union collapsed, Kaliningrad was left as an official holding of Russia, in an arrangement that Moscow had made sure to get officially finalized in 1990. In another history, Kaliningrad might have become part of Lithuania, as the Lithuanian SSR had played a key role in overseeing it, and had lent it a large proportion of the support that it did receive. But now, Kaliningrad was part of the Russian Federation, with Lithuania to the north and east, Poland to the south, Latvia and Estonia just a short coastal hop away, and Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland encircling its holdings on the Baltic Sea.

But Russia&apos;s enthusiasm to keep Kaliningrad hadn&apos;t been an accident. Although it didn&apos;t comprise the entirety of what used to be the Soviet Union, Russia would retain the vast majority of military assets and infrastructure, including a vast nuclear arsenal that still granted it strategic parity with the United States. Russia, at that time, was in no place to assert a multipolar world order, and the rest of the globe knew it, but given that they did still have those military assets, it was going to be a good idea to at least leave themselves the option to use them. In that sense, Kaliningrad was absolutely vital. Russia has very little means to access the Atlantic Ocean; its Arctic sea routes are blocked off by ice, its northernmost Atlantic seaside between Estonia and Finland is frozen for much of the year, and while it can sail ships through the Black Sea, its ability to pass from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean is granted at the pleasure of Turkey, the owner of the narrow Bosphorus Strait and a proud member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, better known as NATO, since 1952. Kaliningrad was the answer to that problem, with the territory&apos;s more southerly towns being Russia&apos;s only dependably ice-free, sovereign-held outlet to the Atlantic.

When the Russian Federation took the reins in Moscow, Kaliningrad became home to Russia&apos;s Baltic Fleet, a formidable and historically well-valued institution that had 350 warships to its name in 1991. But like everything else in Russia at that time, the fleet was in sharp decline, and four years later, not even a third of those vessels would still be operable. Though it had the firepower, on paper, to be considered a dangerous specter for the Western world, it was little more than a paper tiger in practice, at least during those years. At the same time, Russia&apos;s land forces in the area diminished in similar fashion. But even still, the amount of firepower stored up in Kaliningrad ensured that it was just as much a fortress then as it had ever been. It wasn&apos;t about to be launching any invasions of NATO countries, but nor was it worth the alliance&apos;s trouble to start a war over, with several thousand warheads still pointed in their direction. When Poland and Lithuania joined the alliance, and then the European Union, it may have represented a nominal increase in the risk that Kaliningrad faced, but in practice, the situation was fundamentally unchanged from the exclave&apos;s perspective.

Well-protected from any threat of NATO interference, Kaliningrad was all but certain to survive the coming years, but how it would thrive, was a much harder question to answer. Russia was able to secure special transit arrangements for Kaliningrad&apos;s citizens, who had to travel through the rest of Europe if they wanted to go to the rest of Russia via a land route, but those arrangements could be undone with the snap of a finger if Europe saw fit. No, Kaliningrad needed to be just as important to the Europeans as it was to Russia—and in the mid-1990s, there was a prime example of how to do just that, located halfway around the world. At that time, Hong Kong was just about to be handed back to China as a special economic zone, and under Russian then-president Boris Yeltsin, the idea of turning Kaliningrad into a Russian Hong Kong seemed to be a good one.

To that end, Russia designated Kaliningrad in 1996 as the Yantar Special Economic Zone, with &quot;yantar&quot; translating to amber in Russian, recalling the millennia-long wash of amber onto Baltic shores. Located closer to Berlin and Stockholm than it was to Moscow, Kaliningrad was a natural fit with the European economy, and Moscow sought to help that process along, implementing a customs-free zone with low corporate profit and property taxes. It even drew international praise as exactly the concept Russia had hoped, the &quot;Hong Kong on the Baltic Sea.&quot; But unfortunately, that idea turned out to be short-lived, and it would only be a couple more years before Kaliningrad was back in the mud.

There were a few reasons for failure there, all compounding at once to doom the idea. The laws that protected corporations and free trade were vague, with ample loopholes and blind spots that made international and Russian entities nervous to do business there. It didn&apos;t have very much to export, and attempts at making it into a manufacturing center largely failed, meaning that before long, it turned into an entity that basically existed to purchase German and Polish goods and send them to the rest of Russia. Then, Russia&apos;s economy crashed in 1998, just two years after the Yantar SEZ was designated, basically dooming the entire thing. Kaliningrad held that special label until 2016, but by then, it hadn&apos;t been good for much. In a practical sense, it built Kaliningrad&apos;s reputation back in Russia, because it could take goods that were produced in the EU and shipped in, and re-label them, &quot;made in Kaliningrad.&quot; Plus, tax-free status never hurt a corporation, and Kaliningrad&apos;s enterprises had very much enjoyed its perks. But the Yantar SEZ led to almost no large-scale change in Kaliningrad, and when the designation was revoked, it made little practical difference to the rest of the world.

Since then, Kaliningrad has weathered multiple ups and downs, some owing to the aftereffects of the Yantar SEZ. The Putin regime has helped in ways, after Russia&apos;s current president first came to power in the year 2000, and the regional economy did grow significantly during Putin&apos;s first two terms. In 2007, the region opened a brand-new airport terminal, at a pricetag equivalent to 45 million US dollars at that time. But broadly, Kaliningrad&apos;s economic growth has been confined to certain sectors instead of being spread across the population. Kaliningrad was unable to shake its unattractive reputation among both Russians and foreigners, as a minimally useful free-trade zone that wasn&apos;t particularly necessary, on account of how the rest of European trade was, in a broad sense, doing just fine. Not only that, but it was propped up on shaky economic foundations by routine cash injections from Moscow, with Muscovite leaders unwilling to tolerate local officials in Kaliningrad who didn&apos;t act as the Kremlin saw fit. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a major nail in the coffin, sending unemployment climbing and lowering the region&apos;s fortunes overall. In 2015, the then-governor of Kaliningrad, a man named Nikolai Tsukanov, insisted that Kaliningrad&apos;s quality of life and wages were on par with Lithuania, but the real situation was far worse. Kaliningrad&apos;s top job became a revolving door of Kremlin toadies, each of whom would come in, take a look at the territory, find out it couldn&apos;t really be helped, and then get booted out in favor of whatever optimists hadn&apos;t yet had a chance to actually look at the books—and still thought they could fix it.

And in the 21st century, Russia has taken pains to wall off Kaliningrad from Western ideology, in a move that&apos;s seen the enclave get far more insular in both intended, and unintended ways. The territory hasn&apos;t been able to grow into the sort of regional negotiation ground between Europe and Russia that it might have become; instead, it&apos;s been kept painstakingly out of European affairs by Russia. Russia&apos;s attempts to block off information about Kaliningrad&apos;s relative economic deprivation from its own people, then led to a decision by Poland to wall Kaliningrad off for a while—a change that just so happened to coincide with far lower petty crime and smuggling in Poland, after the change was made. The visits that Kaliningrad citizens routinely make to EU nations have grown more contentious, and more likely to draw suspicion. Conversely, EU nations have held it more and more at arm&apos;s length, as massive political corruption scandals have become synonymous with the exclave&apos;s leadership and money-laundering appeared to have become commonplace.

At the core of it all, seems to be Russian fears that Kaliningrad could attempt secession if it&apos;s not kept tightly within Vladimir Putin&apos;s fist. &quot;Decentralization&quot; is not a concept that Moscow has ever done particularly well with, and even less so during its twenty-some years of Putin in command. Even beyond the man himself, Putin&apos;s regime has been noted for its paranoia and its seeming certainty that it must hold Russia together with force if it&apos;s going to be held together at all. And perhaps, that&apos;s deserved; staring outward at prosperous Sweden, rising Poland, stable and peaceful Lithuania, and its other Western neighbors, it&apos;s not inconceivable that the people of Kaliningrad might long for greener pastures, even if the exclave&apos;s behavior thus far indicates that it actually quite likes being part of Russia. Yet for Moscow, letting go of Kaliningrad is the sort of fearsome prospect that must be addressed with strength—not just because of the considerable black eye that might come with losing it. Far more important, is the fact that losing Kaliningrad—now, as much as ever throughout its history—means losing a fortress.

## A Strategic Holding

We&apos;ve alluded plenty to the military value of Kaliningrad throughout this discussion so far, but it&apos;s time that we really zoom in, and examine just how much of a stronghold this little exclave really is. And in doing so, we&apos;ve got to emphasize that it hasn&apos;t been such a military powerhouse during the early years of the Russian Federation, although Russia might have wanted it to be, but in the years of turmoil and division that followed after Russia&apos;s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the territory has been built up into one of the most well-defended stretches of land in the world.

For Kaliningrad, all discussions of military might must begin with the Baltic Fleet. As of 2022, the Baltic Fleet was estimated to include a grand total of fifty-two surface warships, including no fewer than four highly potent Steregushchiy-class corvettes. These are ships that can engage in naval battles with enemy vessels, attack and defend coasts, hunt down submarines, and more. Of the nine Russia has built so far, four are assigned to the Baltic, each crewed by ninety sailors on a 343-foot-long, 104-and-a-half-meter vessel displacing some 1,800 tons of water. They&apos;ve got very powerful onboard anti-ship cruise missiles, plus anti-submarine and anti-ship torpedoes and a whole range of big guns, and they&apos;re a favorite of Russia to sail around the world in order to show off the nation&apos;s military power. Also part of the Baltic fleet are the significantly larger, Soviet-era Neustrashimy-class frigates, of which only two are still active, both of which are central to the fleet in Kaliningrad. They&apos;ve got enough offensive hardware to take down half a dozen enemy ships with direct anti-ship missile hits, or to bring down some thirty-plus enemy aircraft if their aim is particularly good, not to mention several highly potent torpedoes. The fleet also included a range of impressive landing craft, protective corvettes and minesweepers, small and stealthy missile boats, and at least one Kilo-class attack submarine. Altogether, that military force has been more than enough to directly challenge the Polish Navy through the end of the 2010s, nullify the navies of all three Baltic states and Finland, and give a very hard time to the vessels of the Swedish navy, despite that country&apos;s proud ownership of five stealth corvettes by 2015.

As of 2021, Kaliningrad also hosted Russia&apos;s 11th Army Corps, with an estimated strength at that time of anywhere between twelve and eighteen thousand troops. Along with the 11th came Russian main battle tanks, artillery pieces, and other heavy-duty warfighting equipment. They were joined by a substantial air arm, under the command of the 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade, with four squadrons&apos; worth of fighter jets to its name. Those included the modernized Su-30SM, an advanced fourth-generation aircraft roughly comparable to America&apos;s F-15E Strike Eagle, along with the Su-27 air superiority fighter and the ground-attack Su-24. At least on paper, those four squadrons would be enough to establish air superiority over all three of the Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, or cause serious trouble for the Polish Air Force of that time. Even worse for a potential military adversary, Kaliningrad at that same time was home to no fewer than four battalions of Russia&apos;s vaunted S-400 surface-to-air missile system, a number that&apos;s since climbed up to a purported total of six.

It&apos;s important to emphasize that any one-time look at what Russia had in Kaliningrad, or for that matter, what Russia has at any of its military installations, does not represent what it&apos;ll have there at any point in the future. Russia is known to move its military hardware around a fair bit, and the specifics on what a person might find in Kaliningrad, if they were to go looking, would almost certainly be a bit different from what we&apos;ve laid out here. But more important, is the sheer amount of military equipment present on this little slice of the Baltic coast. Between its aircraft, its coastal defense vessels, and its substantial number of available troops and heavy machinery on the ground, it&apos;s the sort of place where Putin himself can rest assured that NATO would never attempt to take by force—if, of course, you suppose that NATO has much interest in it at all. Not only that, but it&apos;s been regarded as a very powerful symbol of Russian offensive potency in the Baltic, a body of water that would otherwise be regarded as a &quot;NATO lake.&quot; That&apos;s been especially relevant prior to the mid-2020s, when neither Finland nor Sweden were NATO nations, and the presence of Russian forces in Kaliningrad were critical to Russia&apos;s ability to disrupt Swedish and Finnish ideas that they might, in a sense, get all the NATO defensive benefits without signing the paperwork. A snarling Russian bear on the doorstep has a certain way of disrupting those illusions.

Now, with all that being said, there has long been reason for the Western world to suspect that Russia&apos;s forces in Kaliningrad may not be quite so potent as Russia may have wanted everybody to believe. Take, by example, the flagship of the Baltic Sea, a Soviet-era destroyer that should, on paper, pose a considerable threat even by itself. Displacing some 6,600 tons, and clocking in at a length of 156 meters or 512 feet, the *Nastoychivy*, as she&apos;s known, comes with a complement of 350 crewmen operating a very dangerous arsenal of big guns, anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, and torpedoes. The only problem, though, is that she hasn&apos;t really done much since the early 2010s, and since 2019, she&apos;s been stuck in a sort of purgatory of ongoing repairs, mirroring the fate of a number of Russian vessels that the country doesn&apos;t seem to have the capacity to get back into active service.

And the asterisks around the big, scary Baltic Fleet go a good bit further than that. Take, by example, its relative lack of submarines, with its sole attack submarine having been commissioned all the way back in 1990. Its Kilo-class of submarines have seen many among their number decommissioned years ago, and it&apos;s unclear whether the sub is in fighting shape at all. For a good indicator of why it may not be, take the Russian nuclear submarine *Kazan*, which has, at the time of writing, been making international headlines for having been sailed to the coast of Cuba, and observed falling apart on the way. While the *Kazan* is a different class of submarine than the one the Baltic Fleet&apos;s got, it&apos;s also supposed to be traveling abroad as a Russian show-piece, paraded in front of an American audience for reasons of grandstanding and intimidation…and even *that* vessel is falling apart. Meanwhile, the Baltic Fleet is known to have had problems with its readiness levels in the past, with the fleet&apos;s pre-2016 commander dismissed in June of that year, along with his chief of staff, for &quot;serious training shortcomings and distortion of the real situation.&quot;

And finally, there&apos;s the simpler reality of what the Baltic Fleet comprises, as compared to Russia&apos;s three other principal fleets. Although it&apos;s certainly meant to look big and threatening, it&apos;s the smallest of the four overall, in terms of its warships and submarines—and certainly, it lacks teeth compared to the Black Sea Fleet, the Arctic Northern Fleet, and the Pacific Fleet. Its relative level of intimidation toward Europe is helped along by proximity, where its base in Kaliningrad means that it&apos;s constantly menacing NATO directly…but just how much of a menace it actually is, is a different question entirely. In an actual military engagement, it&apos;s widely expected to fill a primarily defensive role in a hypothetical conflict with NATO, doing its best to hold out until Russia can roll through the Baltics and turn it into a forward operating base once it&apos;s connected to the rest of Russia by land. The idea that it could outright win naval battles against nearby nations, only holds water as long as we forget that an attack on NATO members would trigger a massive response from all of NATO, which would include the sort of immediate retaliation that would see the Baltic Fleet wiped off the map *very* quickly. The idea that the Russian ships could ever pass the Danish strait and *escape* the Baltic in wartime, perhaps to cause havoc among North Atlantic shipping lanes, is even more laughable.

But Kaliningrad still does pose a real offensive threat to Europe, for one other military reason: its arsenal of nuclear-capable Iskander missiles, which were made permanent in 2018. A mobile ballistic-missile system, the Iskander is believed to have a range of roughly 500 kilometers, 300 or so miles, bringing Warsaw, Stockholm, and Berlin into its crosshairs. Also in range are most parts of the three Baltic states, and a large radius within Poland. Russia first deployed the missiles to Kaliningrad years prior to 2018, as a temporary measure designed to protest what Russia perceived as the buildup of NATO and US troops in the Baltic—owing largely to the installation of a ballistic-missile defense system there. According to most NATO members, the move to place Iskander missiles there at all has been perceived as an implicit threat, and making the missile placements permanent, made the threat permanent too. Per still images released in June of 2024, those missiles are still there, and while Russia doesn&apos;t disclose whether it keeps nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad at all, a site that appears to actively store nuclear weapons appears to have been conveniently renovated, just in time for the permanent Iskander deployment in 2018. Alongside the Iskander, another Russian coastal defense system, called the Bastion-P, is advertised by Russia to be so powerful that it can attack the entrance to the Baltic Sea from the Atlantic, potentially sealing off the body of water and forcing Europe to deal with Kaliningrad using only the ships it already stations around the Baltic coast.

## C&apos;mon Bro, You&apos;re Making Us Nervous

So, while the ships, aircraft, and other military assets stationed in Kaliningrad are perhaps more of a threatening show-piece than a force that could conquer the nations of the Baltic all by itself…those nations still have ample reason to be nervous when it comes to the territory. And if tensions were high in Europe as Russia was annexing Crimea and supporting a low-grade insurgency in 2014, then they rose all the higher, when it appeared as if Russia&apos;s Ukrainian ambitions might set off the first major land war in 21st-century Europe.

Around that time, in the years just before Russia&apos;s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the threat Kaliningrad posed wasn&apos;t so much that it would cause trouble by outright attacking its neighbors. Back then, Russia was expected to roll through Ukraine with authority, but even that would have been a far cry from actually opting into a land war with Europe. But what Kaliningrad could do, was meddle with other goings-on across Europe in order to occupy, distract, or deter NATO from getting involved.

One such way Kaliningrad could have done so, was to combine Russia&apos;s broader Ukraine offensive with a simultaneous, and far smaller crisis in the Baltic. By example, as we&apos;ve already mentioned, Sweden and Finland weren&apos;t NATO member nations at this time, and while landing troops on the mainland of either nation would have been a royally bad idea, those nations also happen to have a whole lot of islands. In a best-case scenario, the Baltic Fleet certainly could have pushed a few landing craft&apos;s worth of troops onto an uninhabited or sparsely populated island or two, threatening to annex it and dividing Europe&apos;s attention in the process. In a far more dangerous scenario, the Baltic Fleet probably could have occupied, say, the Swedish island of Gotland, a 3,200-square-kilometer, 1,229-square-mile island with a population of sixty-one thousand, as of 2023. Although Sweden happened to re-establish its Gotland Regiment for potential defense of the island, with the not-so-coincidental timing of the year 2018, the regiment was only expected to have a full strength of 350 soldiers by 2020, and Gotland has no known air or naval defenses to speak of. Take *that*, and the military assets of Kaliningrad would have handed Moscow a valuable bargaining chip: we&apos;ll give Sweden its island back, when you agree to recognize Russia&apos;s annexation of Ukraine. All that, without pissing off any NATO member nations directly, and without triggering an alliance-wide response.

Just as potent as an attack on other Baltic nations directly, was the Kaliningrad fleet&apos;s ability to conduct hybrid attacks undersea. While the Baltic Fleet is, as we&apos;ve established, not the most threatening naval power in practice, it&apos;s got a robust capacity to engage in all types of undersea mischief, from attacks on Internet cables and telecommunications lines, to the disruption of energy infrastructure. Highest-risk of all, is the Baltic Connector, a bi-directional natural gas pipeline that went online at the end of 2019, just as Russia&apos;s desire for Ukrainian conquest was growing increasingly overt. A 151-kilometer, 94-mile pipeline, the Baltic Connector can ship up to 2.6 billion cubic meters annually between Finland and Estonia, and it&apos;s a very important piece of infrastructure for both nations, as well as for Latvia further south. Damage the pipeline, or sever it entirely, and the Kaliningrad fleet could have caused major issues for that part of Europe. Threaten to do so, and just like with a potential Gotland invasion, Europe might have found itself somewhat more willing than usual to accept unfavorable terms for a Russian peace. Even before the Ukraine war broke out, Russia was known to be mapping out the seafloor in the Baltic, potentially in efforts to identify potential targets should they be needed.

And even if Kaliningrad didn&apos;t become a particularly active player in the coming war, it still had the capacity to be a thorn in NATO&apos;s side for the long term, as an emboldened Russia would invariably turn its attention to territory it saw as rightfully its own. That included the nations closest to Kaliningrad: the Baltics, which had been Soviet Socialist Republics during the Cold War, and Poland, where Russia had long asserted its claim of rightful leadership. Ships and aircraft based in Kaliningrad were more than capable of conducting the sort of nuisance fly-overs that can generate global headlines on a weekly basis, and the sorts of grandiose spectacle, parking warships just off NATO coasts in international waters, that contribute to perceptions of Russia as unpredictable, militarily powerful, and genuinely threatening. If NATO ever did need to use force against Russia, Kaliningrad could quickly turn into a sort of spring-loaded trap, using its military forces to burst out in all directions and cause chaos that would obstruct NATO&apos;s ability to defend Poland and the Baltics at all. Kaliningrad could very quickly go from an isolated exclave, to the linchpin of a Russian land-grab in NATO nations.

Fittingly, NATO member nations—and particularly the United States—made clear their own willingness to take out Kaliningrad&apos;s defenses and render it functionally useless, in the event that large-scale hostilities did break out. When the then-commander of US Air Forces in Europe, General Jeff Harrigian, spoke about the territory in 2019, it was by assuring Western defense reporters that the US could take Kaliningrad out, using well-practiced plans that were, as yet, unspecified. Per Harrigian, those assaults would come by air, land, sea, and cyberspace, in a lightning offensive that would see radars and communications networks brought to their knees, nullify the S-400 defense systems and Iskander missiles on Kaliningrad&apos;s territory, and open the door for large-scale bombing attacks. Mock attacks conducted by the US Air Force in 2019 saw B-52 bombers fly simulated nuclear cruise-missile attack runs, although it was expected at that time that a strike to dispatch Kaliningrad probably wouldn&apos;t involve nuclear weapons if it didn&apos;t absolutely have to.

By the start of the year 2022, Kaliningrad and Russia had enticed the nations of Europe into a Mexican standoff. Russia was pointing its guns at Ukraine, and Ukraine was pointing its guns at Russia. NATO, too, was pointing its guns at Russia proper, but also at Kaliningrad, which was pointing its own guns at all the nations of the Baltic rim. Any disruption to that fine balance, risked setting the whole thing off…and when the war eventually came, in February of that year, it risked drawing the entirety of Northern Europe into a new and massive conflict.

## Life in Kaliningrad

Luckily for all parties involved, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine did not result in a showdown between Kaliningrad and the Baltics. The fleet at Kaliningrad&apos;s naval port remained in place, and the anticipated steamrolling of Ukraine didn&apos;t go nearly as Moscow had planned it. With none of the major military success that they&apos;d anticipated, NATO was not faced with the imminent prospect of Russian tanks lining up on the border and staring down the Baltic states, nor streaming into a new, long standoff between Russian troops surged into Belarus and occupied Ukraine on one side, and Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and other NATO member nations on the other. Kaliningrad&apos;s dastardly services would, in fact, not be needed, at least not yet, and continental Europe could rest easy knowing that Ukraine was still responsible, for a time, for its collective defense.

But while the Russo-Ukrainian War didn&apos;t massively shift the state of affairs across Europe, it was a rather immediate problem for Kaliningrad, where, now that the tables were turned, the enclave was one part fortress…and one part hostage. Far from Russia&apos;s land borders, and cut off from maritime routes due to sea ice for much of the year, Kaliningrad&apos;s reliance on Poland and Lithuania for supplies became a massive issue. Because it&apos;s not nearly agriculturally productive enough to support itself, Kaliningrad could now be starved, and even if it wasn&apos;t, the threat that it *might* be was enough to grant the EU some powerful leverage of its own. Isolated and encircled, Kaliningrad had little means to resist becoming cut off from Moscow, and with the Ukraine war raging on, that&apos;s where Kaliningrad has been since the start of the conflict.

It&apos;s at about this time, that we&apos;d like to turn to the people who call Kaliningrad home today—and see what, if anything, we can glean about their lives in this profoundly unique set of circumstances. Now as ever, Kaliningrad is not an easy place for Western media to reach, but we do at least know some things, and they&apos;re worth sharing, to try and get a sense of what it&apos;s like to live in a place quietly, and informally, under siege.

First, we&apos;ll run through the basics. Kaliningrad is a region of some one million or so people, living in an area that measures a hair over 15,000 square kilometers. Kaliningrad city itself is home to some 450,000 people or thereabouts. In Kaliningrad, a person drives on the right-hand side, with a license plate starting in either 39 or 91, and they quite likely live in an urban area, rather than a rural one. A woman in Kaliningrad can expect to live to age seventy-five; for men, age sixty-six. Per capita, Kaliningrad pulls in about ten thousand US dollars for every person there annually, although the returns that locals see are a good bit lower than that. People who live there are likely to work in the fishing industry, in engineering, in paper-making, or in the lumber trade. Some, though, still may work in the amber trade, where Kaliningrad remains the world&apos;s leading producer of the stuff, with over 90 percent of the world&apos;s known deposits located there.

Over the course of the last few decades, Kaliningrad has never been an easy place to live. In the 1990s, it was a miserable place to be, with a poverty rate well over fifty percent. At that time, Kaliningrad held the dubious record of hosting the highest HIV rate in all of Russia, alongside a narcotics-centered drug abuse problem that far outstripped what most global cities had to deal with. It had been a place of economic and cultural isolation even before the fall of the Soviet Union, and with the Russian economy in shambles following the Union&apos;s breakup, Kaliningrad became a mere afterthought in the worst way. A hotbed for organized crime, Kaliningrad was used for its legal grey areas and loopholes, along with its relative obscurity and distance from Moscow, in order to do, out in the open, what would have to be done behind closed doors elsewhere. In the 2000s and 2010s, the city&apos;s attempts at an economic boom have raised the prospects of Kaliningrad Russians generally, with crime dropping down to fairly low rates, and improved, though not fantastic job prospects. Relative to the rest of Russia, quality of life and resource availability are relatively high, owing to its close proximity to Europe, and for Russians, it&apos;s generally considered to be a rather nice place to live.

Yet after the war began, Kaliningrad came under a far-reaching, but entirely predictable sanctions regime by Lithuania. As the primary nation transiting goods directly into Kaliningrad, Lithuania unilaterally announced in mid-2022 that it would put a stop to the transfer of sanctioned goods into Kaliningrad, including everything from coal to metals to luxury goods to advanced technology. The announcement drew swift condemnation from Moscow, with the Kremlin deriding it as an &quot;unprecedented and illegal&quot; move, and the leader of Russia&apos;s Security Council vowing that the sanctions would lead to major repercussions for Lithuania. Yet in Kaliningrad, the announcement wasn&apos;t taken with nearly as much concern or gravitas—not because the people there didn&apos;t believe it would have an impact, but because it didn&apos;t call for the sanctioning of critical supplies. Food and medicine would continue to enter Kaliningrad as usual. Said one Kaliningrad resident about the sanctions, when asked by EuroNews: &quot;Of course, the sanctions - as the previous ones - will leave a mark on our region... scarce goods will probably not disappear but it will be for a short time and I think the government will find a solution to this situation very quickly and everything will be resolved in the near future. We aren&apos;t panicking.&quot; Said another resident: &quot;I am not worried because everyone was already prepared for it. I don&apos;t know why the government is talking about it only now and why they are so shocked.&quot;

In some ways, Kaliningrad has proven more resilient than most Russian regions to Kremlin propaganda. The people who live there are well-accustomed to dealing with Europeans, especially Lithuanians, and the wash of spiteful coverage that Russian state media brought cascading onto Europeans after 2014&apos;s annexation of Crimea, largely fell on deaf ears. In Kaliningrad, attempts to demagogue European nations don&apos;t tend to go nearly as far as they do with Russians who&apos;ve never traveled to Europe, or have only done so a few times in their life. Import controls from inside Russia, which attempted for a long time to prohibit Kaliningrad residents from accessing many European foods, instead drove people to get well-acquainted with Polish supermarkets. This is a place where skepticism against the Putin regime is higher than almost anywhere else, and in fact, that skepticism has led to some Kaliningrad residents being relatively understanding of the sanctions imposed upon them—viewing them less as the actions of a misguided or devilish European Union, and more as a reasonable progression of a two-sided conflict.

But social control remains stringent across the exclave, especially since that 2014 annexation. Since then, local authorities in Kaliningrad have taken a far more active role in trying to tamp down on potential sources of dissent. Independent media, even that without an explicitly anti-Putin bent, have largely been run out of the exclave or otherwise shut down, while the region&apos;s political opposition has been choked to the point of non-existence. Nationalism has played more and more of a role in the region&apos;s sanctioned politics, as authorities within Kaliningrad attempt to explain their own exclave as a place increasingly forced to stand firm against a rising tide of international opposition. In the eyes of some, the story of Kaliningrad is the tragedy of Kaliningrad, a place cut off from the Russian nation to which it so rightfully belongs. The stance of Kaliningrad&apos;s skeptics, though, can be summed up nicely in a quote from a *Guardian* article, published in 2018: &quot;Ahead of trips to Moscow, people will routinely say &apos;I&apos;m going to Russia&apos;; one local laughed when I pointed out he was already there.&quot; More and more, attempts to recognize Kaliningrad&apos;s historical, political, or even geographical separation from Russia have been derided as Germanization, in reference to the Prussian heritage there that Russia so disdains—and Germanization, by Russia&apos;s same logic, is just a short step away from separatism.

Since Lithuania imposed its sanctions on Kaliningrad, the exclave does not appear to have grown more fervent in its support for Moscow. Although the sanctions regime broadened somewhat in July of 2022, expanding to include wood, alcohol, and a few other, more important goods than had been restricted before, even those changes weren&apos;t the end of the world. The sanctions were amended to allow Russia to ship significant amounts of sanctioned goods back and forth to Kaliningrad annually, including things like steel, antifreeze, and fertilizers that are, in fairness, pretty important for civilian infrastructure. And since then, they haven&apos;t been expanded, they haven&apos;t been diminished, and despite some analyst predictions that the Kaliningrad economy would begin to crumble…it largely hasn&apos;t. Unfortunately, the effect hasn&apos;t gone the opposite way, either; the EU&apos;s continued engagement with Russia over Kaliningrad has not led to much productive movement toward a fair peace settlement in Ukraine, and it&apos;s not likely to. But Kaliningrad remains a grey zone in Russia&apos;s escalating tensions with the EU, a place where the realities and implications of the war in Ukraine have the potential to very quickly change life as residents know it…but where not much has actually shifted. The status quo in Kaliningrad, despite the war, still remains constant.

## Future of the Exclave

When it comes to the future of Kaliningrad, it&apos;s critically important to understand one key detail: Peace now, does not necessarily equal stability in the future. Kaliningrad&apos;s ability to maintain a tenuous balance with the European Union, despite its status as a full-on Russian military stronghold, has been a welcome surprise for those who value peace in the Baltic region…but it&apos;s not a guarantee, and with Russian ambitions not yet sated, the potential remains for Kaliningrad&apos;s fragile peace to be upended very quickly. As we speak, the nations of NATO, particularly in the eastern half of the European continent, widely expect Russia to be ready for a full-scale war with the alliance by or before the end of this decade. Some estimates place the date by which Russia might consider a probing capture of NATO territory, to gauge a potential response, as soon as 2027. If that happens, whenever it happens, it&apos;ll place Kaliningrad back at just the same spot it was in around early 2022, a pawn in geopolitical machinations that could very well lead to major war.

Over the course of the Ukraine war, Kaliningrad has not been immune from attention around its potential military role. In October 2023, the undersea pipeline we mentioned earlier, the Baltic Connector, was indeed damaged, in a suspected sabotage attack that just so happened to come as the world was distracted by Hamas&apos; October 7 attacks in Israel, just one day prior. In that incident, the pipeline and a nearby telecoms cable were significantly damaged, in an act that investigators later described as &quot;mechanical, not an explosion.&quot; Suspicion fell quickly on the Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad, and even though the incident has since been tied to a Chinese cargo ship called the *NewNew Polar Bear*, which allegedly dragged its anchor across where the pipeline was located in a likely intentional act, it still heightened awareness of just how much of a nuisance Baltic Sea adversaries to NATO could still be.

And in the event of a future conflict, all those prospects we discussed previously around the Kaliningrad military forces are still on the table. That includes everything from an occupation of now-NATO-allied Gotland, to sabotage around the Baltic rim, to a potential delaying military defense while Russia takes other NATO nations, to even a direct attack to the strip of Polish and Lithuanian land, roughly 40 miles long, that divides Kaliningrad from Russia&apos;s close ally Belarus. As long as Kaliningrad sits on its little slice of Atlantic coast, it will remain a military inevitability in any potential Russia-NATO conflict, no matter how disinterested the actual residents of Kaliningrad may be in the prospect of war.

Yet there&apos;s also reason to believe that Kaliningrad&apos;s wartime potency may be reduced in the coming years. The 11th Army Corps, a long-time fixture of Kaliningrad&apos;s ground assets, was dispatched to Ukraine under colonel Ivan Popov, where the 12,000-strong Corps was gutted by October of that year. It&apos;s estimated to have been nearly completely destroyed, used up as cannon fodder and taking with it the hundred-or-so main battle tanks and several hundred fighting vehicles and rocket launchers that had previously protected Kaliningrad. As of 2024, the corps is still believed to be fighting Ukraine, with no replacement ground troops shifted around to compensate for Kaliningrad&apos;s exposure. On the other hand, Russia&apos;s air and naval assets in the exclave have been far luckier, generally avoiding the shift to Ukraine so far. Although several of the exclave&apos;s large landing ships have been sent to the Black Sea Fleet and at least one, the *Minsk*, was severely damaged in 2023, it&apos;s still believed to have its cruisers, its corvettes, and enough landing craft to overwhelm, say, 350 ill-equipped Swedes stationed on Gotland. Its air assets are largely thought to be intact, and while it&apos;s expected to lose some aircraft and ships in the coming years as they&apos;re phased out, it may also receive several Lada-class advanced submarines if their construction continues as planned.

As a result of its continued threat, Kaliningrad has been a primary factor in the increased militarization of nearby nations, especially Poland. Warsaw made sure to place US-made HIMARS rocket batteries close to Kaliningrad at the start of the war in Ukraine, and has kept them there, while embarking on a massive expansion of its military capabilities that&apos;s included everything from artillery to warplanes to tanks. Today, with thirty-two fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets on order, plus forty-eight advanced T-50 Golden Eagle fighters from Korea, 180 incoming Korean-made Black Panther tanks, and the expected capacity to build itself 820 more of the tanks from within Poland very soon, Warsaw is in position to steamroll Kaliningrad by itself within under a decade, while its anticipated eight total Patriot missile batteries and its existing naval fleet should be enough to prevent Kaliningrad from doing much damage in return, barring the launch of a nuclear-armed Iskander missile. The Baltic states are not quite so formidable, but the addition of better-armed Sweden and Finland to the NATO alliance has gone a long way in ensuring that if the Russian forces in Kaliningrad did try and cause major trouble, they&apos;d quickly be hemmed in and pinned down.

As Europe continues to shift into a war-ready posture, it&apos;s likely that the strategic value of Kaliningrad to Russia will diminish in the long run, rather than be elevated. As Europe re-discovers what it means to stare across a border at a dangerous and ambitious potential adversary, it&apos;s begun to disrupt the dirty little secret that enabled Kaliningrad to be such a fortress at all. Put simply: Kaliningrad has worked, and Kaliningrad *can only work*, if the relatively limited military infrastructure there can pose a real problem to the Baltic rim nations. And Kaliningrad can only pose a real problem to those nations, if those nations have taken the same lackadaisical approach to defense that they&apos;ve done over the last few decades. Now, that balance has shifted, and it&apos;s proved a lot harder for Russia to expand its forces in Kaliningrad while actively fighting a ruinous war elsewhere, than it&apos;s been for NATO nations to build their own capabilities during what is, to them, still a time of relative peace.

There are some things about Kaliningrad&apos;s value to Russia that will not change anytime soon. It&apos;s Russia&apos;s only ice-free route to the Atlantic north of Turkey, and it&apos;s still got the potential for those more minor sorts of meddling that we discussed earlier—the sabotage, the small-scale occupations, that sort of thing. But more and more, the shifting balance of power in Europe has made Kaliningrad into a strategic liability for Russia, a place that Russia is duty-bound to defend, and where there would be hell to pay among the Russian people if this relatively well-off, even prosperous part of the country were to be taken by NATO force…but as for whether Russia can actually stop that? It&apos;s far harder to say, and as NATO gets better and better at constraining Kaliningrad, the exclave will increasingly be a factor that weighs heavy on the Kremlin when considering future military action. Conduct probing attacks against NATO, and lose Kaliningrad; it might ultimately be that simple.

What that means for the people of Kaliningrad, the million or so Russians who live atop this strange geopolitical balancing act, it&apos;s tough to say. Perhaps the exclave&apos;s vulnerability will push Russia to act sooner than later, to get ahead of a cascading series of setbacks before they become too much to bear. Or perhaps it&apos;ll be the opposite, that the prospect of a NATO-occupied Kaliningrad is a powerful enough deterrent that it may motivate Moscow to avoid future conflicts, not seek them out. We certainly hope that the latter is true, and that Kaliningrad&apos;s now-reduced potency as a military stronghold, might finally clear its way to becoming something else, something better for the people who live there. But, in a continent that seems to imagine itself more and more each day to be on the precipice of war, the threat remains. If that war does come, then it may come sooner than later…and if it comes sooner than later, then it will be Kaliningrad, and its people, caught in the middle.

## Key Takeaways

- Kaliningrad is a strategically important Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea, surrounded by NATO countries.
- Historically, Kaliningrad has been a fortress, changing hands multiple times and serving as a key military stronghold.
- The region has faced economic struggles and isolation, with attempts at economic revitalization yielding mixed results.
- Kaliningrad&apos;s military capabilities include a significant Baltic Fleet and nuclear-capable Iskander missiles, posing a threat to nearby nations.
- Despite its strategic importance, Kaliningrad&apos;s future is uncertain, with potential conflicts and shifting geopolitical dynamics.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is Kaliningrad?

Kaliningrad is a 223-square-kilometer exclave that swears allegiance only to Moscow, and to the same ruler that commands the rest of Russia’s great expanse. It is situated at the base of a small peninsula jutting out into the Baltic Sea, where the landmass of continental Europe turns a corner from the dense forests of Lithuania to the rolling plains of Poland.

### What was the original name of Kaliningrad?

The land today known as Kaliningrad was originally called Twangste, a modest fort held by a minor tribe of the Baltic people known as the Old Prussians.

### What is the strategic value of Kaliningrad?

Kaliningrad has real strategic value as a defensible position for a very long time, and as such, it’s been a military installation that has morphed and changed with history but never went away.

### What is the history of Kaliningrad&apos;s name changes?

The city was originally called Königsberg Castle, then it became part of the Duchy of Prussia under the territory’s coat of arms, the black Prussian eagle. After World War II, it was renamed Kaliningrad, named after a Bolshevik revolutionary called Mikhail Kalinin.

### What is the economic situation in Kaliningrad?

Kaliningrad has weathered multiple ups and downs, with attempts at economic growth confined to certain sectors. It has been propped up by routine cash injections from Moscow, but it has struggled with economic deprivation and political corruption.

### What is the military significance of Kaliningrad?

Kaliningrad is home to Russia&apos;s Baltic Fleet, which includes a range of impressive landing craft, protective corvettes and minesweepers, small and stealthy missile boats, and at least one Kilo-class attack submarine. It also hosts the 11th Army Corps and a substantial air arm, making it one of the most well-defended stretches of land in the world.

### What is the current population of Kaliningrad?

Kaliningrad is a region of some one million or so people, living in an area that measures a hair over 15,000 square kilometers. Kaliningrad city itself is home to some 450,000 people or thereabouts.

### What is the life expectancy in Kaliningrad?

In Kaliningrad, a woman can expect to live to age seventy-five; for men, age sixty-six.

### What are the main industries in Kaliningrad?

People who live in Kaliningrad are likely to work in the fishing industry, in engineering, in paper-making, or in the lumber trade. Some still work in the amber trade, where Kaliningrad remains the world’s leading producer of the stuff, with over 90 percent of the world’s known deposits located there.

### What is the political climate in Kaliningrad?

Social control remains stringent across the exclave, especially since the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Independent media have largely been shut down, and the region’s political opposition has been choked to the point of non-existence. Nationalism has played more and more of a role in the region’s sanctioned politics.

## Sources

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- [https://www.economist.com/prospero/2019/08/29/commemorating-the-devastation-of-konigsberg](https://www.economist.com/prospero/2019/08/29/commemorating-the-devastation-of-konigsberg)
- [https://alexseev.sdsu.edu/RussiaInAsia/ZATO.htm](https://alexseev.sdsu.edu/RussiaInAsia/ZATO.htm)
- [https://ucentralasia.org/media/l2ffkgw2/uca-ippa-wp75eng.pdf](https://ucentralasia.org/media/l2ffkgw2/uca-ippa-wp75eng.pdf)
- [https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/soviet-closed-cities/](https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/soviet-closed-cities/)
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- [https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_special_no_more_kaliningrad_on_life_support_7169/](https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_special_no_more_kaliningrad_on_life_support_7169/)
- [https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kaliningrad_russias_stagnant_enclave_6052/](https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kaliningrad_russias_stagnant_enclave_6052/)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/may/31/kaliningrad-the-russian-enclave-with-a-taste-for-europe](https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/may/31/kaliningrad-the-russian-enclave-with-a-taste-for-europe)
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- [https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1FP22B/](https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1FP22B/)
- [https://www.dw.com/en/russia-deploys-nuclear-capable-missile-system-in-kaliningrad-reports/a-42474925](https://www.dw.com/en/russia-deploys-nuclear-capable-missile-system-in-kaliningrad-reports/a-42474925)
- [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-its-non-strategic-nuclear-drills-involve-iskander-missiles-2024-06-12/](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-its-non-strategic-nuclear-drills-involve-iskander-missiles-2024-06-12/)
- [https://fas.org/publication/kaliningrad/](https://fas.org/publication/kaliningrad/)
- [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-kaliningrad-territory-armed-teeth-nato-wants-crush-it-war-81716](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-kaliningrad-territory-armed-teeth-nato-wants-crush-it-war-81716)
- [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/bastion-p-mobile-anti-ship-missile-key-russias-a2ad-europe-142832](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/bastion-p-mobile-anti-ship-missile-key-russias-a2ad-europe-142832)
- [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/21/kaliningrad-lithuania-eu-blockade-russia-nato/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/21/kaliningrad-lithuania-eu-blockade-russia-nato/)
- [https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/06/23/inside-kaliningrad-russian-exclave-at-the-centre-of-ukraine-war-sanctions-row](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/06/23/inside-kaliningrad-russian-exclave-at-the-centre-of-ukraine-war-sanctions-row)
- [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/21/kaliningrad-lithuania-eu-blockade-russia-nato/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/21/kaliningrad-lithuania-eu-blockade-russia-nato/)
- [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/problems-remain-with-kaliningrad-transit-despite-eu-deal-russia-2022-08-09/](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/problems-remain-with-kaliningrad-transit-despite-eu-deal-russia-2022-08-09/)
- [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67070389](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67070389)
- [https://www.politico.eu/article/probe-into-pipeline-damage-entered-on-chinese-ship-finnish-investigators-say/](https://www.politico.eu/article/probe-into-pipeline-damage-entered-on-chinese-ship-finnish-investigators-say/)
- [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67209754](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67209754)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/11/nato-vows-to-respond-if-finland-estonia-gas-pipeline-damage-is-deliberate](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/11/nato-vows-to-respond-if-finland-estonia-gas-pipeline-damage-is-deliberate)
- [https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/06/06/is-kaliningrad-russias-exclave-surrounded-by-eu-countries-an-asset-or-a-liability](https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/06/06/is-kaliningrad-russias-exclave-surrounded-by-eu-countries-an-asset-or-a-liability)
- [https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-base/](https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-base/)
- [https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/10/27/12000-russian-troops-once-posed-a-threat-from-inside-nato-then-they-went-to-ukraine-to-die/](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/10/27/12000-russian-troops-once-posed-a-threat-from-inside-nato-then-they-went-to-ukraine-to-die/)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/48/Baltic_Sea_seen_from_Halkolaituri_in_July_2024.jpg) by JIP / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Karachay: The Deadliest Lake in the World</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/karachay-deadliest-lake-world</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/karachay-deadliest-lake-world</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Who doesn&apos;t love lakes?

For many people, a visit to a lake—especially somewhere isolated in the countryside, far away from the commotion of major cities—is a source of leisure, of rest-and-recuperation.

Lakes tend to be serene locations with fresh air, and spending time in their environs was—and remains—a ready source of treatment for individuals suffering from pulmonary illnesses throughout history, with the therapeutic value of the lakeside air seen as relief from many respiratory ailments and urban pollution.

Lakes are also a site of meditation for many people, and the serenity they provide has inspired many of the finest works of poetry and prose in various languages. The Lake District in England, for example, is seen as the inspiration for many of the most famous bodies of work in English, not least those of writers such as William Wordsworth, Samuel Coleridge, John Ruskin, Beatrix Potter, and John Cunliffe—creator of Postman Pat.

Aside from this, many people choose to visit lakes in their various localities to pursue various watersports, to go fishing, or simply to go swimming. The use of lakes for such physical activities is something which has remained consistently popular throughout history until this day, with lake activities alternating between older activities such as sailing and rowing to more modern pursuits such as zorbing and paddle-boarding. Swimming is an activity which has remained particularly present, and which remains a favoured pastime for people at lakes now as it did centuries ago.

But Lake Karachay in Russia—while no less beautiful than any other lake—is probably one of the few in which you would not go swimming under any circumstances.

That is because you would probably die.

## Background: The Soviet Nuclear Arms Drive

Lake Karachay is located in the Ural Mountains in Russia&apos;s Siberia. Admittedly, this likely already made it not really suited for swimming in the first place. The lake is located around 85 kilometres north east of the regional capital of Chelyabinsk, a city in which average temperatures in the winter are around -10 degrees celsius, and where the summer temperature has reached a record low of exactly 0 degrees—enough to cause water to freeze over entirely. The mean temperature of the water of nearby Lake Uvildy, one of the largest lakes in the Urals, is—at the height of the summer—only around 18 degrees, so significantly less than the minimum temperature of about 28 degrees recommended for immersion by the American Red Cross&apos;s Water Safety Manual.

The much smaller Lake Karachay, for its part, has a year-round average temperature of around 14 degrees. But cold discomfort is not the primary reason why one would not saunter into it to go swimming. You see, the water is completely lethal.

That is because a legacy of nuclear waste dumping into the lake by Soviet authorities changed the picturesque waters into a kind of Biblical plague, unfit for marine life or human venture. While such a practice was not uncommon in the Soviet Union—and has even been observed in other places too—the sheer amount of garbage spewed into the lake stands it apart from any other, and leads it to rank comparably to its fellow Soviet-era disaster zone of Chernobyl in the volume of nuclear radioactivity generated.

Like Chernobyl, the area around Lake Karachay was a site of Soviet nuclear activity. While the world had stood appalled at the chaotic destruction meted out by the US&apos; bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Soviet Union stood a little bit jealous. In its endeavour to build its own nuclear-grade weapons arsenal, it constructed a series of sites intended to nurture its nuclear aspirations. One of these was a planned town codenamed City-40, alternately as Chelyabinsk-40, and today known as Ozyorsk. The town was built to house the workers of a nearby nuclear facility known as Mayak, or &apos;Lighthouse&apos;, and City-40 was effectively to Mayak what Pripyat was to Chernobyl.

Mayak was built in 1948 using the forced labour of some 70,000 gulag inmates. It soon became one of the Soviet Union&apos;s most important nuclear development sites. City-40 became only the second city in the world to produce plutonium for use in atomic bombs, after Richland in the US, a town which housed workers contributing to the Manhattan Project at the nearby Hanford nuclear complex, which developed the polonium later used in the bombing of Nagasaki.

Like any nuclear power plant, Mayak produced a lot of nuclear waste. Unlike most nuclear power plants—in the West at least—the waste was not handled responsibly and was instead chucked into the rivers around City-40, exposing the inhabitants of nearby settlements to contend with it in whatever way their anatomy could. Eventually, it was decided to find a single repository in which to pool all this nuclear garbage.

That, fatefully, turned out to be the nearby reservoir of Lake Karachay.

## Lake Karachay

The name &quot;karachay&quot; means &quot;black water&quot; or &quot;black creek&quot; in several Turkic languages, such as Tatar. Karachay was not a big lake, measuring only around 0.5 square kilometres or 15 hectares at its peak, and well hidden in the vast expanses of Siberia. It was really more like a natural bog, had a maximum depth of only 1.25 metres, and the total volume of water in the lake was about 400,000 metres cubed. Both Mayak and Lake Karachay were located not only in an isolated part of Russia but also close to the frontier with Kazakhstan— itself a key location in the Soviet nuclear arms project and where the USSR&apos;s first nuclear bomb was successfully detonated—at the Semipalatinsk test site in August 1949.

Given its small size, Lake Karachay was not big enough to provide sufficient cooling water for Mayak&apos;s reactors. It was, however, right on the doorstep of the site, and therefore conveniently close enough that it could be used as a dumping ground for nuclear waste, as was the case with other rivers nearby.

The lake rapidly became incredibly contaminated, but this would reach a whole new level in 1957, eight years after the successful test of the so-called First Lightning bomb at Semipalatinsk, and with the Soviet drive to develop more nuclear capabilities in full flow. That year, the already-high contamination level of the lake went absolutely supernova with what was retrospectively known as the Kyshtym Disaster.

## The 1957 Kyshtym Disaster

The disaster took place at Mayak on the 29th of September, when unsafe and irresponsible storage of nuclear materials led to an explosion in an underground cooling tank. This sent huge amounts of nuclear waste such as ammonium nitrate and acetates skyrocketing into the air. The event is considered to be the third deadliest nuclear accident in history, after the 2011 Fukushima Disaster and the 1986 Chernobyl Disaster—which, if the disaster at Kyshtym had been responsibly investigated and learnt from, may have actually been avoided. Unfortunately, responsible oversight was exactly what wasn&apos;t on the menu, and details of the event, as well as the vast scope of consequences, were obscured by the Soviet authorities for many years after.

As the toxic plume from the explosion rose into the atmosphere, it created a radioactive cloud which moved upwards of 300 kilometres from the site of the accident, and resulted in the contamination of an area that was up to 20,000 square kilometres in size. It also resulted in the transfer of 3 billion curies of high level nuclear waste into the wells at sites all around Mayak, much of which dived head-first into Lake Karachay.

After the disaster, nuclear waste was no longer dumped into the rivers around Mayak. But there was nothing to be done about Karachay, which was by now polluted to the gills.

Despite this, the Kyshtym disaster was kept secret by Soviet authorities right up until the end of the Soviet Union, almost certainly exposing the residents of surrounding districts to radioactive contamination for all that time. Details of the extent of the disaster saw light for the first time in the late 1970s, when Russian dissident and agronomist, Zhores Medvedev, published a detailed account of the accident after having defected to the West. He did so first with *Hazards of Nuclear Power* in 1977, and later in greater depth with *The Nuclear Disaster in the Urals* in 1979.

While rates of cancer and birth defects in the Chelyabinsk region rose dramatically, the reasons which lay behind this were not common knowledge. And why would they be? After all, City-40 didn&apos;t officially exist: as a closed city, its purpose was kept hidden only to those working there—it didn&apos;t appear on any maps, and non-residents were not allowed to set foot there. Ozyorsk remains a closed city until this day, with access granted only to visitors in possession of a special pass, and likewise even its residents are only permitted to leave with a special pass of their own.

And even the name of the Kyshtym disaster in some ways symbolises the great obscurity of the entire project. Kyshtym is a relatively large town about 20 kilometres west of the reactor at Mayak—no doubt affected in some way by the explosion, but not really the epicentre as the name would suggest.

Any local residents who did think to inquire why certain select population transfers were being carried out by large groups of soldiers in the years after 1957 were met with the information that rising health problems were the result of some vague special disease, and that they should rather swiftly hush their gums on the matter.

It&apos;s generally thought that tens of thousands may have died from the health consequences of the disaster.

## Modern Day

Today, Lake Karachay is so polluted that spending 30 minutes there would result in a lethal dose of radiation (around 300 roentgen). Recall how in the hit HBO series *Chernobyl*, what was believed to be a dose of 3.6 roentgen was enough to cause vomiting, dismissed as &quot;not great, but not terrible&quot;. Yeah, a 30 minute paddle in Lake Karachay would result in a dose of around 100 times more than that. Conclusion: you&apos;d definitely die.

Even just standing next to the lake for an hour would produce the same effect. Although radiation levels are seemingly falling somewhat, it remains one of the most polluted places in the world.

Starting in the 1960s, the lake also began to dry out; its area dropped from 0.5 square kilometres to just 0.15 by the end of 1993. In 1968, a drought in the region caused radioactive dust to be carried away from the drying area of the lake, irradiating perhaps half a million people with 185 petabecquerels of radiation.

To account for its extreme pollution and volatility, between 1978 and 1986 the lake was filled with about 10,000 hollow concrete blocks to prevent sediments from shifting. The lake is now entirely covered by concrete, and inaccessible to the general public.

But even several generations later, children from the area continue to suffer health defects likely related to the mass contamination of the area. Moreover, an article by the International Atomic Energy Agency from the year 2000 stated that the risks posed by the toxic lake had not really subsided. The paper, written by Dr Aleksey Merkushkin of the Moscow Physical Engineering Institute faculty in Ozyorsk, described how a volume of polluted underground water had formed under the lake, swelling hourly. It went on to mention that contaminated water migrated with a speed of about 100 metres per year, therefore risking approaching a nearby river called the Mishelyak. Dr Merkushkin concluded that if movement of the contaminated fluid continued, radionuclides would begin to penetrate into both the Mishelyak and Techa rivers, potentially leading to further disaster for nearby human populations.

By 2016, further work had been carried out to fill in the lake with even more special concrete blocks, rock, and dirt. The water was first backfilled in November 2015, then monitored before adding another layer of rock and dirt, effectively attempting to cancel the existence of the putrid lake out entirely.

Mayak, astonishingly, remains open and operational. It is Russia&apos;s most important nuclear site to this day.

## Key Takeaways

- Lake Karachay is extremely polluted due to Soviet nuclear waste dumping.
- The 1957 Kyshtym Disaster significantly increased the lake&apos;s contamination levels.
- Spending 30 minutes near Lake Karachay results in a lethal radiation dose.
- The lake is covered in concrete and inaccessible to the public.
- Health issues persist in the area due to historical nuclear contamination.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### Why is Lake Karachay considered the deadliest lake in the world?

Lake Karachay is considered the deadliest lake in the world due to the massive amounts of nuclear waste dumped into it by Soviet authorities, making the water completely lethal.

### What is the origin of the name &apos;Karachay&apos;?

The name &apos;Karachay&apos; means &apos;black water&apos; or &apos;black creek&apos; in several Turkic languages, such as Tatar.

### What was the Kyshtym Disaster?

The Kyshtym Disaster was a nuclear accident that occurred at the Mayak nuclear facility in 1957, resulting in a massive release of nuclear waste into the environment, including Lake Karachay.

### How did the Kyshtym Disaster affect Lake Karachay?

The Kyshtym Disaster significantly increased the contamination levels in Lake Karachay, making it one of the most polluted places in the world.

### What measures have been taken to contain the pollution in Lake Karachay?

Between 1978 and 1986, the lake was filled with concrete blocks to prevent sediments from shifting. By 2016, further work was done to fill the lake with more concrete blocks, rock, and dirt to cancel its existence entirely.

### What is the current status of Mayak, the nuclear facility near Lake Karachay?

Mayak remains open and operational, serving as Russia&apos;s most important nuclear site to this day.

### What are the health risks associated with Lake Karachay?

Spending 30 minutes in Lake Karachay would result in a lethal dose of radiation. Even standing next to the lake for an hour would produce the same effect.

### How has the contamination from Lake Karachay affected nearby populations?

Children from the area continue to suffer health defects likely related to the mass contamination. There is also a risk of contaminated water migrating to nearby rivers, posing further disaster for human populations.

### What was the initial purpose of Lake Karachay?

Lake Karachay was used as a dumping ground for nuclear waste produced by the Mayak nuclear facility due to its proximity to the site.

### Why was City-40 (Ozyorsk) kept secret?

City-40 was kept secret because it was a closed city housing workers of the Mayak nuclear facility. Its purpose was hidden, and it didn&apos;t appear on any maps, with access restricted to residents and authorized visitors only.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Karachay: The Deadliest Lake in the World](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F5BLVboPEII)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2019/mar/12/how-postman-pat-changed-a-lake-district-village-archive-1994](https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2019/mar/12/how-postman-pat-changed-a-lake-district-village-archive-1994)
- [https://www.lakedistrict.gov.uk/learning/archaeologyhistory/famouswriters](https://www.lakedistrict.gov.uk/learning/archaeologyhistory/famouswriters)
- [https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/docs/Water%20Temperature%20for%20Aquatics%E2%80%94ADVISORY.pdf](https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/docs/Water%20Temperature%20for%20Aquatics%E2%80%94ADVISORY.pdf)
- [https://wldb.ilec.or.jp/Display/html/3513](https://wldb.ilec.or.jp/Display/html/3513)
- [https://www.bbc.com/reel/video/p095b019/the-huge-nuclear-disaster-hidden-by-the-soviets](https://www.bbc.com/reel/video/p095b019/the-huge-nuclear-disaster-hidden-by-the-soviets)
- [https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-leaking-nuclear-waste-dump/video-69502364](https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-leaking-nuclear-waste-dump/video-69502364)
- [https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-was-the-kyshtym-disaster.html](https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-was-the-kyshtym-disaster.html)
- [https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/32/015/32015191.pdf](https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/32/015/32015191.pdf)
- [https://www.chemeurope.com/en/encyclopedia/Lake_Karachay.html#:~:text=History,with%20185%20petabecquerels%20of%20radiation](https://www.chemeurope.com/en/encyclopedia/Lake_Karachay.html#:~:text=History,with%20185%20petabecquerels%20of%20radiation)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/jul/20/graveyard-earth-inside-city-40-ozersk-russia-deadly-secret-nuclear](https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/jul/20/graveyard-earth-inside-city-40-ozersk-russia-deadly-secret-nuclear)
- [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/europe/russia/articles/russia-closed-cities/](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/europe/russia/articles/russia-closed-cities/)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7d/Vanished_World_2024_Calendar_09.jpg) by Christian Herrmann / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Kowloon Walled City: Inside the Most Crowded Place on Earth</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/kowloon-walled-city-inside-most-crowded-place-earth</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/kowloon-walled-city-inside-most-crowded-place-earth</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>In all the world, there was no other place like it. Tucked away into a corner of British Hong Kong&apos;s Kowloon quarter, on the remnants of what had once been an old military fort, the Kowloon Walled City was not quite a city, not quite a slum, but a hive of humanity. Built haphazardly on top of itself over the course of decades, dreaded as an ungovernable nest for crime and anarchy, and so completely packed inside that not even daylight could reach its outdoor alleys at the lower levels, the Kowloon Walled City was truly one-of-a-kind. One part favela, one part living, breathing organism, the city was so tightly packed that no place on Earth—before, during, or since—has ever even come close to its sheer population density. That figure, by the way? Two million people per square kilometer.

This is a tale of two cities. We&apos;ll explore the crime den, the public monstrosity, the geographic and demographic anomaly that was Kowloon Walled City, from the outside. And we&apos;ll explore the strange mystique, the almost magnificent invention, and the fundamentally human experience that was Kowloon Walled City, from the inside.

## Finding the Walled City

To visit Kowloon Walled City today, you&apos;ll first need to arrive in Hong Kong, today still nominally a special administrative region inside China. Once you arrive at the international airport, you&apos;ll board a metro train called the Airport Express, and ride it all the way to the part of the city called Kowloon. From there, you&apos;ll hop the number-eleven bus and ride it for about ten stops, eventually arriving outside the Regal Oriental Hotel—where, if you&apos;re so inclined, we imagine you&apos;re probably welcome to book a stay. From there, walk about half a kilometer, maybe some five to seven minutes if you&apos;re taking your time, and you&apos;ll finally come to the place you&apos;ve traveled halfway across the world to reach. You round the corner, eager and ready, and finally cast your gaze outward…upon a public park.

If passers-by notice you at all, they might chuckle and tell you that you&apos;re about thirty years too late to see what you came for. These days, the best you&apos;ll get is a leisurely walk around the Kowloon Walled City Park, although you might find a couple of old landmarks and mementoes that have survived. You might also be able to enjoy a little exhibit about the walled city of old. Alas, we&apos;ve got to spoil the ending for you here; Kowloon Walled City was dismantled completely a very long time ago, before Hong Kong even became part of China in the first place.

In order to travel to the place Kowloon Walled City was born, we&apos;ve got to travel back in time, to the years immediately following the conclusion of World War II. By then, the city of Hong Kong had already been a British protectorate for just a hair over a century, ceded to the Crown at the conclusion of the First Opium War. Since then, it had become a centerpiece of Britain&apos;s holdings in Asia, and a lauded destination for foreign travelers. The local Chinese population didn&apos;t exactly have an easy few decades, but it was at least kept mostly immune from the bloodshed of China&apos;s civil war. Hong Kong had spent most of World War II under direct occupation by Japan, in a brutal and repressive few years during which many people starved. But after the war, Hong Kong bounced back far faster than mainland China, and as Britain poured resources into the territory in order to try and consolidate its strategic position in the Indo-Pacific, Hong Kong also received a second, simultaneous deluge: refugees.

The proclamation of the People&apos;s Republic of China in 1949, the political instability on the mainland, and the hardship of reconstruction-era China after World War II all drove Chinese refugees toward Hong Kong. On the one hand, this was a massive help when it came to the city&apos;s post-war revitalization; many of the refugees were intellectuals and skilled workers trying to get out ahead of the coming Communist purges, while others were rural peasants who could provide cheap labor in vast numbers. Factories popped up, local industry took off, and before long, Hong Kong turned into a powerhouse for manufacturing. Simultaneously, a tourist industry started to open up again, and high-rise apartment buildings began to spring up all over as a public-housing program kicked off.

But in one corner of the city, the situation was a little bit different. The location had been designated as a military outpost all the way back in the Song Dynasty, somewhere prior to 1279 CE, and it had been built up during the 1800s. After it was kept as a little legal exception under Chinese control after Britain was granted the rest of Hong Kong, it eventually was stormed by the British and brought into their possession too, but it languished under British authority over the following decades, used by squatters and at one point an old folks&apos; home until World War II. During the war, the stone walls of the fort had been dismantled by the Japanese in order to aid in the construction of an airport, although the informal name, &quot;Walled City&quot;, remained in the aftermath.

But after the end of the war, after the flood of refugees toward Hong Kong had started to arrive, and before public housing programs were established in force, the little fort in Kowloon was prime territory for people to try and eke out a living. By the time the British decided to do something about the people there, the fort was already taken over by thousands of mostly Cantonese-speaking refugees and immigrants, none of whom had any intention of leaving. The British colonial leadership certainly wasn&apos;t amenable to the idea of leaving the slum as it was; even the territorial governor, one Alexander Grantham, had a clear enough idea of the slum to describe it as, quote, &quot;a cesspool of iniquity, with heroin divans, brothels, and everything unsavory.&quot; In 1948, Britain attempted to push the squatters out of the fort, but they were unsuccessful, and police action at the site prompted riots from the people living there. Not only that, but the squatters&apos; plight was noticed and taken up by the mainland Chinese population. In China, a British consulate was set on fire, and official envoys were dispatched to encourage the refugees in person to keep on fighting. After some internal discussion on just what to do with the situation, Britain eventually threw up its hands and decided that the fort wasn&apos;t worth the trouble of clearing out.

Two years later, the remnants of the fort were already home to tens of thousands of people, so when disaster struck, it caused ruin on a massive scale. In January 1950, the makeshift slum was ravaged by fire, destroying some 2,500 ramshackle wooden huts and displacing some seventeen thousand people. The loss of what little these people had been able to collect was devastating. Even worse, no help was coming; the refugees there no longer had a Chinese government to advocate on their behalf, but they&apos;d also been a little too successful in getting the British territorial government in leaving them alone. Whatever was next for them, this patchwork of an informal community was going to have to go it alone—but they did have one thing going for them. Like wildfire in a forest, the fire inside their slum had devastated the sensitive ecology they&apos;d been able to build…but it had also cleared away rot, and created room for that same land to begin brewing something greater.

## Building the Walled City

Now, we&apos;ve got to be clear that even before it acquired its later reputation, the bare bones of the place that would become Kowloon Walled City was already a tough area. Even despite the refugee crisis of the late 1940s and early 1950s in Hong Kong, this little area of Kowloon was not somewhere that a person would go if they can help it. Gangs were active in the area, particularly the Chinese triads; sex work was common; and drugs were both very easy to access, and very easy to abuse. Certainly, not everybody within this pocket of Kowloon—and in fact, not even most people—were involved in illegal industry, but like any number of slums around the world, the place had a reputation. Desperate people who found themselves there had typically done what they could to avoid ending up in the slum&apos;s confines until there was literally no other place to go. Ask the British governate, and their community was a blight; ask the rest of Hong Kong&apos;s refugee population, and it was a place of misery and darkness; ask Obi-Wan Kenobi, and it was a wretched hive of scum and villainy.

We mention all this, because it&apos;s important to understand just what sort of infrastructure did exist inside the little slum when it came time to rebuild. Two sorts of work existed there: the subsistence work of food supply, medical care, basic education, and other services that sustain any community, and illicit industry. For the criminals in the slum, some of their clientele might come from within, but the vast majority was going to need to come from the rest of Hong Kong. Nobody from the rest of the city was eager to try and pour their money or their dreams into the slumland, nobody from the British governate was going to try to intervene, and even if anybody in the rest of the slum might not have agreed with the idea of becoming part of a criminal haven, what other choice did they have?

This time, the creation of the slum city was far more deliberate than in the first go-round. Instead of a constant trickle of new arrivals from China, the population was stable and knew what it had signed up for, even if there was still some growth over time. While the refugees there had nowhere near enough money to get homes elsewhere, they at least had enough saved up to purchase cheap construction materials. Those who could rely on builders from elsewhere in the city did just that; those who had no such resources, would simply have to do it themselves. Hong Kong had since given up attempting day-to-day administration of the land, and because of the complete lack of regulations, planning systems, and building standards…the people there could basically do whatever they wanted. In this place, a &quot;developer&quot; was anybody who had a little bit of concrete, a little bit of money, and an idea, and all their ideas, good and bad, were going to have to be played out in order to see how well they worked.

Construction of Kowloon Walled City took place in three basic stages: building outward, building upward, and then, building together. The first stage was the simplest to understand: residents cleared out the debris from the fires, and built new dwellings on the land that had once been the roughly six-and-a-half-acre, two-and-a-half hectare grounds of the old fort. With so many people in such a small space, the building-outward phase ended quickly, and with no more room to lounge out, the residents had to go upward. When they did, it was by throwing together whatever building materials they had, and hoping for the best, in their rough approximation of the upward construction happening in Hong Kong around them. Building foundations were comically inadequate to hold the weight they&apos;d eventually bear, support structures were lacking at best, and regardless of the risk of collapse, buildings kept on springing upward. Finally, the building process reached a third phase: building inward, into all the nooks, crannies, and empty space that didn&apos;t already have anything going on inside it. Reinforcement, when it did exist at all, often came in the act of joining multiple buildings together, practically lashing them to each other with the materials required to make a new building in the middle. On the bright side, the superstructure was incredibly creative; on the down-side, it was a bit of a death trap.

Inside, the walled city was about as ad-hoc as it gets. Electricity was wired into a web of legal and illegal connections, some of which were insulated, and some of which were lucky; water was mostly piped to the lower floors and had to be carried upward; and propane was used in canisters all around the superstructure, with so many individual little explosive cans that it&apos;s a miracle nothing catastrophic ever happened. Air circulation and fire egress, in many parts of the building, were punchlines rather than requirements. Many parts of the superstructure, even dwellings, had no access to daylight or fresh air, and waste disposal was, pun very much intended, a crapshoot. All the while, the ground beneath the behemoth was unstable, leading some buildings to settle far into the ground, while others slipped this way and that. But in an outcome one part structural, and one part metaphorical, the slipping and sliding around of all the buildings in Kowloon Walled City led many to lean and rest on each other, in so-called &quot;lover&apos;s buildings&quot;. Much like the residents of the walled city would have to do, even the buildings themselves were forced to rely on each other to avoid total collapse—and, as unlikely as it may seem, the settlement managed to reach equilibrium.

Inside the walled city, this grand, seething organism lurched into life. Alleys were built over with the floors of the buildings above, stairways were made into strange combinations of stairway and dwelling, new buildings didn&apos;t just grow upward but sideways and occasionally downward. Corridors were built to connect the upper parts of the structure, saving residents a trip down to the ground in order to see their next-door neighbor, and the rooftop, established firmly by regulations over building height to accommodate a nearby airport, was transformed into playgrounds, gathering spaces, and greenery. The walled city got a postman, with its longest-serving postal officer, Mr. Lui, working there for some fifteen years. The city&apos;s social norms flexed and bent to accommodate a living situation where property lines were both hazy and fluid, and the people of Kowloon Walled City proved their ability to do the one thing humans do better than possibly anything else: they formed a community, and a shared home, amidst this bold experiment they&apos;d stumbled their way into.

## Viewed from the Outside

With the rest of Hong Kong embracing all the trappings of an advanced, modern city, the contrast alone with a place like Kowloon Walled City was always going to give rise to disagreements. But when viewed from the outside, the lack of regulation, law enforcement, taxation, or any other intervention inside the walled city made it seem like something else entirely. There, opponents of Hong Kong&apos;s legal structure and leaders of illicit industry could very obviously find quarter. Among them, one particular sort of organization would take precedence over all others: the triads.

Anyone familiar with organized crime in East Asia today, would struggle to miss the Triads, a massive transnational crime syndicate with its base in mainland China. Present in many international Chinese communities, especially in Hong Kong, the Triads of the mid-20th-century, as well as today, worked in counterfeiting, drug trafficking, money laundering, fraud, extortion, prostitution, smuggling, and just about everything else that could earn them money from the shadows. They feature a clear leadership structure, strictly regimented internal organization, and rituals and customs like, say, the Mafia of other nations, although their specific codes of conduct are unique to them. Like the mafia organizations of Western nations, though, the Triads weren&apos;t exactly cohesive internally; different organizations and families within their ranks were all too happy to squabble or even fight directly in order to control the illegal market.

In Kowloon Walled City, there were five major triad gangs at work, all using the walled city for their own purposes. The Sun Yee On gang, one of Hong Kong&apos;s dominant organizations within the Triads, would boast thousands of members inside Hong Kong at that time, while the 14K triad, Sun Yee On&apos;s main rival, were known for direct confrontations with the British administration along with the mass production of opiates. The King Yee gang, the Wo Shing Wo gang, and the Tai Ho Choi gang were all active in and around the walled city as well.

As for what they did there…well, obviously, lots and lots of crimes. Specifically, the walled city&apos;s status as a no-go zone for the authorities made it ideal for the manufacture and sale of opiates, especially heroin. The Triads also operated a network of brothels inside the city, sold prohibited animal meats, and ran other operations, like counterfeiting and gambling, inside the walls. Not only that, but the walled city offered the Triads an opportunity to do their business in private, both when it came to peaceful matters and forceful ones. Settling scores was a whole lot easier with the guarantee that the authorities wouldn&apos;t intervene, no matter how bad the violence got. Before too long, the Triads controlled internal matters inside the walled city, as the only people with both the organization and the muscle to impose their will in what was essentially a lawless space. Landlords, employers, and every other person in a position of power inside the walled city could basically act as kings on their own territory, setting up shops and makeshift factories where the conditions, for the workers there, were not up for debate.

Hong Kong&apos;s attempts to deal with the walled city were as infrequent as they were ineffective. For the first few years of the walled city&apos;s existence, Hong Kong didn&apos;t even exercise jurisdiction over the place, something that was only established in 1959 when a murder trial established that Hong Kong did have responsibility for the slum. Police raids were intermittent and starkly limited, with most public officials more than happy to take bribes in order to look the other way. In 1963, Hong Kong tried to get rid of some shacks that were sitting at the fringes of the walled city, something that immediately prompted organization from the residents. Hong Kong provided mail delivery and water to the walled city, it provided electricity, and it could grant limited other public services, but it was impotent when it came to providing health or education services.

And all the while, Hong Kong had to play nice with the residents inside, mostly because if the territorial government wanted to start just about any fight with the population, then the logical conclusion of those disagreements would almost always end with the dismantling of the city. As much as Hong Kong&apos;s leadership might have wanted to do that, it just wasn&apos;t feasible. Hong Kong had ample reason to be frustrated when it learned that the walled city residents were digging private wells, and selling off the water they collected, with little consideration or even awareness of the problems that might cause. The walled city&apos;s electrical infrastructure wasn&apos;t just haphazard; it was outright dangerous to tamper with, especially for electricians who didn&apos;t have the luxury of understanding the whole electrical system—an understanding that was hard to acquire, when much of the city&apos;s population didn&apos;t take kindly to city workers showing up. Many of the people who&apos;d worked to build the walled city claimed that their buildings were safe and code-compliant, and while that certainly wasn&apos;t always false, one very quick look at the superstructure was enough to prove that it wasn&apos;t always true.

And that wasn&apos;t by accident. The construction process to build the walled city hadn&apos;t been managed by the people who lived inside, or at least not directly; instead, it had been done by contractors, often ones with plenty of prior experience, but no incentive to stay true to regulations in what was basically an unregulated space. If a person could build a dwelling inside the walled city, they were almost certain to find a tenant willing to put up with the conditions in order to secure low prices—and that had created a powerful financial incentive for builders to do the bare minimum to make a livable space, and then move on. Those who controlled property inside the walled city, could make a whole lot of profit while providing basically no services to their tenants, who, if they didn&apos;t like the landlord, could try their luck in the rest of Hong Kong&apos;s more expensive market. In a rare bright spot for the Hong Kong municipal government, the local fire department did establish a relationship with the walled city that allowed them to come in and check on factory conditions, but when they had advice to give out on how to make things safer, those were mere suggestions rather than instructions.

With no means to exercise power within the walled city itself, Hong Kong was left to regulate it from the outside. Humanitarian organizations were allowed in, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, and initiatives to reduce the crime rate, done in partnership with the city&apos;s younger residents, were ultimately successful. In 1973 and 1974, the police were able to step up their raids, ultimately carrying out 2,500 arrests or more and confiscating some 1,800 kilograms of drugs in the process. Over the course of decades, Hong Kong and the criminally unaffiliated residents of the walled city were able to work together and reduce the influence of the triads. But all the while, Hong Kong understood that it was best served keeping the peace, and tolerating what amounted to an anarchic, stinking trash heap in the middle of its Kowloon quarter.

All this isn&apos;t to say that the authorities in Hong Kong didn&apos;t have some sympathy for the people inside the Walled City—which, by all accounts, they did seem to. But actually acting upon that sympathy wasn&apos;t an easy ask. Many officials within the city were reluctant to invest resources in rebuilding it, for fear that investing any materials or financial wealth in the space would legitimize the claims of the residents to their homes. Realistically, the city would have much preferred to see it gone than fixed, and starting to fix it would have all but ensured that the city would have to commit to continual renovations and repairs. Not only that, but Hong Kong didn&apos;t exactly need these people to be living on this particular plot of land, either. Hong Kong&apos;s housing system, while still deeply imperfect, now had the resources that had been lacking when the walled city first rose up out of the ground. The problem had now become that disrupting or dismantling the walled city itself would mean breaking up a community, destroying a way of life for tens of thousands of people, and quite possibly forcing them to give up much of what they had in the process.

## Life on the Inside

By the time that the Kowloon Walled City had reached its prime, it had gone from improvised settlement to a massive behemoth. In some parts of the walled city, buildings rose fourteen stories high, although, to be fair, the height of a building story inside the walled city was a lot less consistent than it would be anywhere else. The entire ground level, and most of the second and third levels, were shrouded in darkness except for one central courtyard. On balance, the entire walled city was estimated to supply about seven square feet of floor space per individual person. Externally, it wasn&apos;t exactly a pretty sight, but it was certainly a memorable one, overlaid with a mess of balconies, paint jobs, cages, concrete walls, and tiny filler buildings crammed in between the larger ones that had been built earlier in the superstructure&apos;s history.

But life on the inside, while certainly tough or even dangerous at times, wasn&apos;t nearly so dark or hopeless as Hong Kongers on the outside seemed to believe. At its core, the walled city was a community organized by people with few options, but just as much humanity as might be found anywhere else. There were families there, schools, doctors and dentists, and a clear, distinct culture that was unlike anywhere else. Sure, there were plenty of caveats; those doctors and dentists, by example, were ones who preferred to operate in places where nobody was going check and see whether their papers were in order. That&apos;s not to say that they were amateurs; just that they&apos;d been trained in China but hadn&apos;t been able to take the qualifying exams that would allow them to practice from Hong Kong. But despite the many, many, many elements within the walled city that operated around the law, the place was a whole lot more than a crime den. It was a whole world unto itself.

In fact, while the Triads did maintain a strong presence inside the walled city, they were typically more than happy to share the space with other residents. Many former denizens of the walled city have explained that they only rarely saw members of the Triads, and found out what they were up to even less frequently. And besides the organized crime in the walled city, the place was a hotspot for entrepreneurship and manufacturing. In its heyday, the walled city accounted for hundreds of perfectly legitimate factories, where low rents, nonexistent labor regulations, and an abundance of people willing to work, made what a pure capitalist would call a near-perfect situation. Laborers were willing to work in appalling conditions, for long hours, with the labor force often involving children…but goddamn, it was profitable, and the productivity was incredible. Goods manufactured in the walled city were widespread around the rest of China, especially plastics, textiles, and even food, which was often grown or prepared inside the slum. As goods went out, aid organizations, religious societies, welfare groups, and more, all found their way in. People developed customs, an internal culture, and deep bonds not just to their families and neighbors, but to their home itself.

When Hong Kong had come calling in 1963, trying to tear down some of the tents at the outer fringes of the walled city, the people there didn&apos;t just respond with organized protest. They created what&apos;s called a *kaifong* organization, a society of mutual aid, that granted them a structure not just to push back against overreach from outside, but to support each other within the city walls. The organization served to provide medical care, education, vital supplies, and coverage for living expenses for the desperate inside the city, often at very low cost or even for free. Quality of life, personal safety, and the well-being of each other&apos;s neighbors, were all priorities, both for benevolent reasons and practical ones. Ensuring that illnesses didn&apos;t fester in one particular corner of the walled city, ensured that they wouldn&apos;t spread elsewhere; ensuring that everybody&apos;s homes didn&apos;t fall too deeply into disrepair, thus ensured that homes wouldn&apos;t start to collapse. Like people living anarchically in just about every instance across human history, the people of the walled city took it upon themselves to create a society, and care for those around them, even when it was difficult, expensive, or simply inconvenient to do so.

With the *kaifong*, social order soon followed. Even though Kowloon Walled City was but a blip in the much larger territory of Hong Kong, it was nonetheless a very self-contained community, and like other close-knit communities of that kind, rules of cordiality became very important for everybody there to follow. A neighbor was a neighbor, whether they were a Triad member or a factory worker or a landlord or a refugee; no matter the disputes or the profit potential of today, they&apos;d still be your neighbor tomorrow. The unwritten rules of the walled city were highly varied, sometimes hyper-specific to matters like water sharing or trash disposal in such a crowded space, and sometimes broad enough that they were simply meant to maintain decency among the community. The place was still rough, still unpleasant, but it had to be something all parties could live with, or else internal divisions inside the walled city could see the whole thing torn apart. By all accounts, the people on the inside did a very good job at avoiding those divisions as much as they possibly could.

And beyond its unique social structure, beyond its one-of-a-kind environment, testimony by many of those who&apos;d lived there speaks to a deeper allure inside the walled city. Perhaps it was a matter of its sheer uniqueness, a place where traversing lower floors meant walking with umbrellas to avoid the rain-like cascade from the pipes above, and where children growing up inside its walls could play endless make-believe in an architecture that was one part *Blade Runner*&apos;s Los Angeles, and one part *Harry Potter*&apos;s Hogwarts castle. And luckily for us in the 21st century, the legacy of the Kowloon Walled City is still fresh enough that plenty of former residents&apos; stories are still there to be found.

Take Heung Yin-King, eldest of several daughters in a family of six who&apos;d moved there in the 1960s. Telling her story to The Travel Club, Heung related what it was like to live in a seventy-square-foot room with her family, in part of a two-story flat that was shared with seven other families. Quote: &quot;We had the best times in the first house, even though the rooms were so tiny there wasn&apos;t space for a dinner table. We ate from a board laid over the knitting machine and sat on the bed. Everyone got along, and it was great to have so many kids to play with.&quot; Another former resident interviewed for the same article, one Albert Ng Kam-Po, recalled from his own childhood: &quot;We didn&apos;t know it was so dangerous. We&apos;d just play ping-pong in the hallway. The kids would go up onto the roofs and leap from building to building, or we would drag discarded mattresses to the roof and jump on them. It was a happy time.&quot; And said another former resident, Ida Shum, about the closeness of her community even despite hardship, quote: &quot;We all had very good relationships in very bad conditions. Even now, many people stay in touch with each other even though some old friends are overseas. People who lived there were always loyal to each other. In the Walled City, the sunshine always followed the rain.&quot;

Other former residents have had their tales catalogued by their relatives, after moving elsewhere. Writer Sharon Lam, authoring an article that would be published via architectural magazine *ArchDaily*, wrote about her father&apos;s recollection of the walled city: quote, &quot;A smirk broke across his face as soon as the name was mentioned, and I was surprised to learn that his primary school was just next door from this &apos;crazy&apos; mass of drugs, gangs and crime. In fact, most of our conversation focused on the food that you could find there. He describes the place as &apos;very special&apos; […] Smiling, he recalled the constant dripping of water leaks everywhere and the surreal disappearance of the sky once you entered. He also went on about the many unregulated businesses there, with special mention to the many unlicensed dentists that could operate liability-free, and also the dog meat stalls, which found success while canine cuisine was illegal in the rest of Hong Kong.&quot; Later in the same article, Lam refers to the people of Kowloon Walled City making fun of an Austrian camera crew making a film in the 1980s; quote: &quot;[…] Their attempt at shock-horror is heckled by the background Cantonese, with children wittily mocking the camera crew.&quot;

But even with all the strange, but undeniable magic of the walled city, the situation was far from perfect. While the physical infrastructure of the city was able to hold itself mostly upright, the building process still put major pressure on electrical wiring, water pipes, and more. Moisture and mold festered, water built up in places it shouldn&apos;t, and because of how haphazard the walled city&apos;s construction had originally been, it would have been a nightmare to try and refurbish. The pockets between buildings were progressively filled up with years upon years of trash, leading to both a truly incredible smell, and a biohazard problem for people living on the lower floors. While the walled city was not the miserable pit that much of the world believed it to be, it also wasn&apos;t sustainable for anybody who lived there, and the end would have to come sooner than later.

## A Sudden Demise

For Kowloon Walled City, the beginning of the end came on December the nineteenth, 1984. On that date, the governments of China and the United Kingdom had agreed on a joint declaration to return Hong Kong to China&apos;s control, as of July the first, 1997. Although it wasn&apos;t clear to the people of the walled city at the time, Britain was going to get rid of the establishment before China took over. For the decades that the walled city had been built up, it had been a consistent sore spot between Britain and China, and given that it was lagging badly behind the rest of Hong Kong in terms of sanitation and living conditions, both nations agreed that they&apos;d rather see it gone. On the fourteenth of January, 1987, Britain and China announced that they&apos;d agree that the walled city would be taken apart, and turned into a public park.

Hours after the announcement, cordons went up across all the streets and alleys that provided access to Kowloon Walled City. Four hundred representatives of the Hong Kong Housing Department entered the city, all at once, to speak to every resident there and explain the decision. The walled city was surveilled for six months, until the authorities felt they finally had an accurate head count on all the people coming in and out. During that time, they drew up their plans in secrecy, arranging for the demolition of the structure but ensuring that word about compensation didn&apos;t spread before the British were ready. Ultimately, a compensation package equivalent to nearly three billion American dollars was allotted for the walled city; each individual flat would net its inhabitants about 380,000 dollars American, just north of a million dollars in today&apos;s money. While a few hundred households would spend years negotiating and trying to hold out, the vast majority accepted the British government&apos;s terms long before that. With the money granted to them by the territorial administration, the people of Kowloon Walled City were generally able to really improve their situation, and many would begin new lives in Hong Kong or even travel around the world in the coming years.

For those who remained, the destruction of Kowloon Walled City became an inevitable process, rather than an act of cooperation. In July of 1992, riot police escorted the city&apos;s remaining residents out by force, and once they were gone, the whole thing was enveloped in a tall wire fence. The city sat empty for the better part of a year, until March 23, 1993, when, in a ceremonial occasion meant to signal the end of Kowloon Walled City, a wrecking ball was swung in one single blow against the outer shell of the superstructure. Outside the fence, foreign diplomats and members of the Hong Konger elite cheered and clapped; a few residents who had showed up in protest, voiced their displeasure. Over the coming months, Kowloon Walled City would be taken apart piece by piece, until the only thing left was a much older building, a relic of pre-British Hong Kong, that had survived across the fort&apos;s entire history.

Today, the land that was Kowloon Walled City, and the legacy of Kowloon Walled City, have taken starkly diverging paths. The land itself now comprises the Kowloon Walled City Park, opened in late 1995; there, people can visit a pavilion, play the chess-like game of Xiangqi, wander around gardens, and see the remnants of the city&apos;s South Gate. It&apos;s not a celebrated place inside Hong Kong; nor is it a particularly feared one, or even a notable one at all. Meanwhile, the walled city&apos;s legacy has taken on a new life in Western media; it served as the inspiration for a walled neighborhood in the 2005 film *Batman Begins*, and it&apos;s shown up in the video game *Call of Duty: Black Ops II*, alongside a range of books, films, games, and television shows.

Every once in a while, former residents of the walled city still visit the park. Today, there are no cramped flats to house them, no dank, halfway-flooded tunnels under tons of concrete, for them to call home. Nor is there any other place on Earth quite like the Kowloon Walled City; there never has been, and there will likely never be. For as long as it lasted, it was an anomaly, at once a bold and successful experiment in peaceful anarchy, and a reflection of the failures of British Hong Kong to give a massive group of refugees any option for relief, except the very last resort. It was one part dystopia, it was one part experiment, it was one part home, and it was truly, completely, one of a kind.

## Key Takeaways

- Kowloon Walled City was a densely populated, self-built community in Hong Kong, known for its high population density and lack of government oversight.
- The city was initially a refuge for Chinese refugees after World War II, evolving into a complex, interconnected urban environment.
- Despite its reputation for crime, the Walled City had a strong sense of community, with residents forming mutual aid societies and developing unique social norms.
- The city&apos;s infrastructure was haphazardly constructed, leading to significant safety and health issues over time.
- Kowloon Walled City was demolished in the early 1990s, replaced by a public park, and its legacy lives on in media and cultural references.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What was the population density of Kowloon Walled City?

The population density of Kowloon Walled City was approximately two million people per square kilometer.

### How did Kowloon Walled City originate?

Kowloon Walled City originated on the remnants of an old military fort in British Hong Kong&apos;s Kowloon quarter. After World War II, refugees fleeing mainland China started settling in the fort, leading to its transformation into a densely populated slum.

### What was the British government&apos;s initial response to the squatters in Kowloon Walled City?

The British government attempted to push the squatters out in 1948, but they were unsuccessful. The squatters&apos; plight was supported by the mainland Chinese population, leading Britain to decide that the fort wasn&apos;t worth the trouble of clearing out.

### What was the impact of the fire in January 1950 on Kowloon Walled City?

The fire in January 1950 destroyed about 2,500 ramshackle wooden huts and displaced around 17,000 people. It cleared away rot and created room for the land to begin brewing something greater.

### How was Kowloon Walled City constructed?

Kowloon Walled City was constructed in three stages: building outward, building upward, and then building inward. Residents cleared debris from fires and built new dwellings, then constructed buildings upward and filled in empty spaces with more structures.

### What role did the Triads play in Kowloon Walled City?

The Triads controlled internal matters inside Kowloon Walled City, operating various illegal industries such as drug trafficking, prostitution, and gambling. They were the only ones with the organization and muscle to impose their will in the lawless space.

### How did the residents of Kowloon Walled City form a community?

The residents formed a community through mutual aid and social norms that accommodated their living situation. They created a kaifong organization to provide medical care, education, and vital supplies, ensuring the well-being of each other&apos;s neighbors.

### What was the British government&apos;s final decision regarding Kowloon Walled City?

The British government decided to dismantle Kowloon Walled City and turn it into a public park. They offered a compensation package to the residents, and the demolition began in March 1993.

### What is the legacy of Kowloon Walled City today?

The legacy of Kowloon Walled City lives on in Western media, inspiring settings in films, video games, and other forms of entertainment. The land itself is now the Kowloon Walled City Park, opened in late 1995.

### What was the significance of the kaifong organization in Kowloon Walled City?

The kaifong organization was a society of mutual aid that provided medical care, education, vital supplies, and coverage for living expenses to the residents. It helped maintain social order and ensure the well-being of the community.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Kowloon Walled City: Inside the Most Crowded Place on Earth](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nupYHLkNbEY)
- [https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9708/hongkong.html](https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9708/hongkong.html)
- [https://www.jstor.org/stable/23890234](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23890234)
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- [https://www.archdaily.com/361831/infographic-life-inside-the-kowloon-walled-city](https://www.archdaily.com/361831/infographic-life-inside-the-kowloon-walled-city)
- [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/world/asia/hong-kong-triads-protests.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/world/asia/hong-kong-triads-protests.html)
- [https://www.britannica.com/topic/Triad-Chinese-secret-society](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Triad-Chinese-secret-society)
- [https://www.archdaily.com/800698/heres-what-western-accounts-of-the-kowloon-walled-city-dont-tell-you](https://www.archdaily.com/800698/heres-what-western-accounts-of-the-kowloon-walled-city-dont-tell-you)
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- [https://www.jstor.org/stable/23891943](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23891943)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Kowloon_Walled_City_South_gate_plaque_in_February_2024.jpg) by 姒姓賢寧 / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>La Mesa: The Incredible Story of Tijuana&apos;s Prison-Village</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/la-mesa-tijuana-prison-village</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/la-mesa-tijuana-prison-village</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>On May 16th 1992, Mexican singer Chalino Sánchez was concluding a performance at the Salón Bugambilias in his hometown of Culiacán, when someone from the audience handed him a note.

Sánchez read the note, paused to reflect on its content, steadied himself, and continued with his final performance of the night—a haunting rendition of the song &apos;Alma Enamorada&apos;, or &apos;A Soul in Love&apos;. Sanchez left the stage, was bundled into a car and shot dead a few hours later.

It is believed that what was placed in his hands was a death note, alerting him to his own imminent assassination. Sanchez was a singer of narcocorridos—a subgenre of Mexican music focusing on the exploits of drug traffickers in the country. His lyrics were seen as true crime ballads and had won him admiration in Mexico—but also the ire of the country&apos;s powerful drug cartels.

Yet, the voice of the man who would be remembered as the King of the Corrido was born not only of the drug violence present in his home province of Sinaloa, but within the walls of a prison in Tijuana in which he&apos;d served eight months&apos; detention for a string of petty offences.

It was in this prison that Sanchez entertained inmates with his ballads, and drew inspiration from their stories of crime and loss which later became the subject of his lyrics. After leaving prison, Sanchez went on to sign his first record and reach stardom, before his tragic murder at the age of 31. The prison which cultivated Chalino Sanchez stands in Tijuana to this day. Its official title is CERESO—or Centre for Social Reintegration—Tijuana.

However, it is even better known as La Mesa State Penitentiary. Or even more simply, La Mesa.

## Welcome to La Mesa

La Mesa was constructed in 1956, as a municipal jail for an initial population of 600 inmates.

In a curious anecdote and what would perhaps become a metaphor for what was to come, the first inmate of the prison was none other than a prison guard, who managed to accidentally lock himself into one of the newly-built cells, and went on to spend an hour in confinement inside. As time would tell, prison authorities being themselves captive in the prison would become a relative commonality—if in a less literal sense.

Perhaps unusually, La Mesa was built neither on the outskirts of a major city nor hidden in the countryside, out of view. Instead, it stands in the very center of the city of Tijuana, in a *delegación*—or borough—known as La Mesa, from which the prison also inherits its name. It is bordered on one side by a local state courthouse, and on another by the Tijuana office of the Chief Judicial Clerk of the State of Baja California. In all other directions, it is surrounded by the residential buildings of La Mesa district, one of Tijuana&apos;s most populous neighbourhoods, at around 160,000 inhabitants.

The prison&apos;s location was chosen for largely charitable reasons, to allow low-risk criminals to serve their sentences with their family members close by. Still, its central location and high walls no doubt also served as a deterrent to crime in a region grappling to contain the rising power of its drug cartels. The clamour of surrounding city life would certainly not have been lost on those condemned to the prison walls, serving as a surplus punishment and a reminder of the route which led to the detention.

But as time passed and the prison&apos;s population swelled, La Mesa began to take on an unusual character. One which meant that, for some of its prisoners, incarceration would hardly amount to punishment matching the severity of their crimes—or even much of any punishment at all.

Moreover, a number of colourful characters would pass through the gates of La Mesa in the years following its establishment. Even before Chalino Sanchez entered its gates, a different figure came to call the prison home—one who would be equally revered in Mexican society, albeit for quite different reasons.

## The Mother Theresa of La Mesa

In 1977, Sister Antonia Brenner moved into La Mesa.

The Catholic nun—who became referred to by inmates as &apos;La Mama&apos;, and adherents of her religious order as &apos;The Prison Angel&apos;—could not have been born to more different circumstances than much of the prison population.

Sister Antonia was born Mary Clarke to a wealthy Los Angeles family. She grew up in Beverly Hills, was married at age eighteen, and became mother to no fewer than seven children. But following a spiritual epiphany, Clarke found her way into religious orders at age 50 by becoming a nun. Sister Brenner—later Mother Brenner—tended to the inmates of La Mesa, and lived for decades in a 10x10-foot cell inside the prison.

In spite of the gang-dominated surroundings of the prison, Brenner lived a peaceful and austere life in La Mesa. She devoted herself to the needs of the prison&apos;s underprivileged, distributing medical supplies and blankets, as well as hygiene products for the 500-inmates of the La Mesa women&apos;s wing. Sister Brenner prayed with inmates and their families, helped raise bail money for minor thieves, and provided character testimonies for prisoners before court authorities. She gained the admiration of the incarcerated as well as the wider Mexican public, and it is even said that her influence helped quell an unfolding prison riot in 1994.

But with that said, prison riots were not really a commonality in La Mesa. This was largely due to the perverse, gang-enforced order that had begun to spawn behind the prison walls.

In the 1980s, the power of Mexico&apos;s drug cartels rose dramatically—due in part to the demise of rival cartels in Colombia and the negligence of Mexico&apos;s ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI. Not least among the emergent forces was the Tijuana Cartel, which had formed the same decade. As the Tijuana Cartel&apos;s power grew, law and order in Tijuana began to falter. Members who were arrested—often fall guys and low-level *sicarios*—wound up in a La Mesa prison soon filled not only by thieves and petty criminals, but by high-rolling members of the Cartel machine.

Some of these were accustomed to a comfortable life outside the prison, and saw no reason why this should be any different within it. For many jailed Cartel associates, life in La Mesa was, well… pretty great!

## The City Within the City

Have you ever seen Netflix&apos;s *Narcos*?

In the fictionalised series focused on Colombia&apos;s infamous druglord Pablo Escobar, an entire episode is dedicated to his brief incarceration inside a custom-built prison in the Colombian mountains—widely referred to as La Catedral.

La Mesa could be seen as Mexico&apos;s answer to La Catedral. As the prison started to be a hotbed of cartel *sicarios*, its operation came entirely under their control. Already by 1978, a La Mesa prison director and his deputy had both been assassinated, and prison staff—those that weren&apos;t already connected to the cartels—did well to avoid drawing themselves any trouble. This left room for a strange sort of society to emerge within La Mesa, where well-connected inmates would pay to make their stay more palatable. The prison soon featured townhouses within the walls, featuring rooms with cell phones, tiled bathrooms, and even jacuzzis.

In 1994, the *LA Times* published an article in which they followed a young boy around inside the prison, from prayers in the prison chapel, to tacos on the central plaza, and listening to musicians—in the guise of Chalino Sanchez—regaling gang members and drug users in the prison yards. But Mascara—as the four-year-old boy was called—was not visiting. His parents were inmates, and he lived there.

The same article estimated that of the 2,500 known residents of La Mesa at the time, 300 were the wives and children of prisoners. Some were migrants who&apos;d travelled north from Central America, but had not succeeded in crossing further north into the US. For many, life in northern Mexico was inhospitable and unforgiving, but a relative haven could be found in the La Mesa prison-village.

In the absence of a strong authority over the years, residents made their own rules. They built ramshackle houses in the plaza, and equipped themselves with microwaves, DVD players, and air conditioning. Some even had maids, cooks and bodyguards. There were street food vendors, tequila bars and a Chinese restaurant. La Mesa was a village within a city, and came to be renowned as such. It earned the nickname &quot;El Pueblo de La Mesa&quot;—translating as &apos;La Mesa village&apos;—or even more simply as &quot;El Pueblito&quot;.

But while the bizarre situation offered a measure of balance, that is not to say the prison wasn&apos;t permanently at risk of spiralling out of control. Jailed cartel leaders operated as they&apos;d done on the outside, ordering hits and directing drug trade with impunity. And the plush conditions within the prison were certainly not shared by all. Many inmates languished in squalor, living in tiny crude cells known as *caracas* while others enjoyed the frills of their cartel connections. Drugs flowed freely into the prison, which could be used to exert control over the drug-dependent members of the community. Also flowing in and out of the prison on a day-to-day basis were the prison&apos;s children, who&apos;d leave the *pueblito* to go to school, before returning to the confines of the prison in the evening.

But in spite of unequal circumstances in the prison, many of La Mesa&apos;s less fortunate knew better than to complain. Those who controlled the prison were referred to as *Maiceras*—a colloquial expression for a well-fed pig. The *Maiceras* enforced their own order in the prison with a heavy hand, and dished out cruel punishment towards troublemakers, the less fortunate and other undesirables. Those who fell foul of the cartels could be thrown into a decrepit and isolated section of the prison known as *Las Tumbas* (or &apos;the tombs&apos;) in which conditions were particularly appalling. Murders were common—and were routinely carried out with instruments other than prison shanks or garrote wires. In 1993, around 12 La Mesa inmates were executed, many of them with Uzi miniguns. By now, many of the guards were in the employ of the cartels, and bent to their will. A system of bribes and threats warded off dissent, and few were above the risk of retribution for refusal to toe the line. In 1995, a second Director of the prison was assassinated, on this occasion by hitmen stationed outside the man&apos;s home.

Something had to give—and by the early 2000s, state authorities had had enough.

## The End of &quot;El Pueblito&quot;

In the year 2000, a landmark general election broke the power of the long-dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico.

The same election saw a non-PRI President elected for the first time in 71 years. And unlike the cartel-friendly policies of the PRI (which, suspiciously, had received its single-highest body of votes in the drug-ravaged state of Sinaloa), Vicente Fox&apos;s right-wing National Action Party had the power of the gangs in its sights. In 2002, a shake-up was in store for La Mesa, one which would lead to a new order in the prison—but also lead to vicious bloodshed.

On August 20th, around 1,500 Mexican federal police and army servicemen carried out a surprise nighttime raid on the prison, and began transferring its most dangerous inmates to a different facility near the border town of Tecate. Soon after, authorities also began dismantling around 900 structures inside the prison—amongst them its many improvised shacks and stores—and also clamped down hard on drug trading between inmates. And with this, the authorities—for the first time in decades—were able to gain an accurate measure of what exactly had become of the prison.

It was determined that the prison, built for an initial 600 inmates and with an absolute capacity of 2,000, now had close to 7,000 residents. It was also found that the price of many hard drugs was actually lower in the prison than it was on the street, and that arms and prostitutes were available on-demand for detainees. Aside from the hundreds of crude pieces of improvised infrastructure, authorities estimated that the *pueblito* was home to around 150 businesses, from bars and food stores to La Mesa&apos;s aforementioned Chinese restaurant—which had taken shape after a boat of illegal Chinese immigrants docked in the city of Ensenada and its crew were promptly flung in prison for smuggling.

The prison authorities uncovered a football pitch, basketball and volleyball courts, several dry cleaning services, a domestic-appliances warehouse, a loan shark service, and even a small sewing factory. Doctors and lawyers advertised their services openly, as if it were a shopping centre. Cell phones were so common as to be sold commercially to inmates. It was even said that Mexican world boxing champion Julio Cesar Chavez had once shown up and fought an exhibition bout in the prison.

But all that came to an abrupt end, as the state wrestled back control of La Mesa. Families were shepherded out, including children—some with their toys in their hands—who&apos;d known little other than the confines of the prison their entire lives. Enterprises, amenities, and La Mesa&apos;s *caraca* cells were closed and torn down. And in their absence, a more conventional law-and-order in the prison took form.

But the changes were not welcomed by many of the residents, not least the powerful cartels.

## 2008 Riots

With their authority reestablished, officials sought to maintain a system of disciplined order inside the prison. But in 2008, brutal violence would descend upon La Mesa.

On 13th September, a riot began after a prisoner was killed by guards during a routine search for drugs and contraband. The riot raged for 12 hours, during which a further 3 inmates were killed, before being put down. But worse was to follow.

As the prison authorities struggled to contain the simmering tension over the riot, complaints of a lack of water soon turned into another mass uprising.

On September 16th, the prisoners overwhelmed the prison authorities, forcing them to withdraw outside the La Mesa compound. The army put the prison under siege, as rampaging inmates swarmed inside the walls and onto the roof, showering rocks and debris upon security forces outside. Frantic family members amassed outside, pleading for a peaceful resolution to the unrest. But their pleas fell on deaf ears.

Mexican police and state troops stormed the facility, and wrestled back control from the rioters once more. At least 19 prisoners were killed in the unrest, and around forty-three were injured during the melee. A further 250 inmates were transferred to other prisons in the cities of Tecate and Ensenada. Half of the compound was burned to the ground, and columns of black smoke billowed into the sky as the prison withered under the weight of open warfare.

But once security forces had completed their recapture of the facility, order was finally restored. An even more restrictive system of authority was introduced, this time here to stay.

## Life in La Mesa

Today, La Mesa has taken on the guise of a standard, if overcrowded, North American prison.

Inmates are subject to a strict system of oversight, being allowed out of their cells for only a few precious hours each week for yard time and monitored visits from family members. Interactions are strictly controlled to prevent assembly and gang violence, and prisoners are released from their cells only through a painstaking and laborious process, one at a time. The prison population is strictly segregated according to the degree of severity of crimes committed, with the most violent and risky prisoners occupying a cell block under the most restrictive conditions of all.

The new realities of La Mesa are hardly lost on those confined to them.

In the mid-2000s, a US television crew visited the prison, where they met Francisco Javier Villa Padilla, a notorious cartel hitman residing in one of the prison&apos;s isolated wards. Padilla reflected bitterly on the life he gave up through his imprisonment, sacrificing money, connections, his family, his wife, and his girlfriend (different people).

Today, the prison houses over 3,000 inmates, still significantly more than its intended capacity of 2,000, but far less than the 7,000-strong village that once stood on the site. Inmates are confined to cramped spaces, sometimes several to a cell, under strict and unforgiving conditions.

The reality is a far cry from the Pueblito of the 1970s to the 1990s, with longterm prisoners no doubt reflecting nostalgically on the communal dances, musical performances, and club nights once a routine feature of incarceration there.

Gone are the ballads of Chalino Sanchez which once echoed through the walls. No longer do the soothing overtones of Mother Antonia Brenner (who died in 2013) offer respite to the prison&apos;s forlorn. No more do children run through its corridors, and no longer are residents and visitors free to roam the corridors and *caracas* as they&apos;d once done.

What is left is silence and solitude of a spartan prison—broken only by the continuing clamour of the surrounding city, where time doesn&apos;t stand still as it does within the prison walls.

## Key Takeaways

- Chalino Sanchez, the King of the Corrido, was murdered after receiving a death note during a performance.
- La Mesa prison in Tijuana became a self-governed village controlled by drug cartels.
- Sister Antonia Brenner, known as &apos;The Prison Angel,&apos; lived in La Mesa and aided inmates.
- The prison featured amenities like townhouses, businesses, and even a Chinese restaurant.
- State authorities regained control of La Mesa in the early 2000s, ending its unique village-like existence.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### Who was Chalino Sánchez and what was his connection to La Mesa?

Chalino Sánchez was a Mexican singer of narcocorridos who spent eight months in La Mesa prison. He entertained inmates with his ballads and drew inspiration from their stories, which later became the subject of his lyrics. After leaving prison, he went on to sign his first record and reach stardom before his tragic murder at the age of 31.

### What is the official name of La Mesa prison?

The official title of La Mesa prison is CERESO, or Centre for Social Reintegration, Tijuana.

### When was La Mesa prison constructed and for what purpose?

La Mesa was constructed in 1956 as a municipal jail for an initial population of 600 inmates. It was built in the center of Tijuana to allow low-risk criminals to serve their sentences near their family members.

### Who was Sister Antonia Brenner and what was her role in La Mesa?

Sister Antonia Brenner, also known as &apos;La Mama&apos; and &apos;The Prison Angel,&apos; was a Catholic nun who moved into La Mesa in 1977. She tended to the inmates, distributing medical supplies and blankets, praying with inmates and their families, and helping raise bail money for minor thieves.

### What was the significance of the 2000 Mexican general election for La Mesa?

The 2000 Mexican general election marked the end of the long-dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party&apos;s power. The new administration, led by Vicente Fox, had the power of the gangs in its sights and initiated a shake-up at La Mesa in 2002, leading to a new order in the prison.

### What was the &apos;Pueblito&apos; and how did it come to be?

The &apos;Pueblito&apos; was a village within La Mesa prison that emerged due to the control of drug cartels, particularly the Tijuana Cartel. Inmates built ramshackle houses, equipped them with modern amenities, and even had businesses like tequila bars and a Chinese restaurant. The prison became a haven for some, while others lived in squalor.

### What happened during the 2008 riots at La Mesa?

The 2008 riots at La Mesa began after a prisoner was killed by guards during a routine search. The riots resulted in the deaths of at least 19 prisoners and injuries to around forty-three others. The prison was stormed by Mexican police and state troops, who restored order and introduced a more restrictive system of authority.

### What is the current state of La Mesa prison?

Today, La Mesa operates as a standard, overcrowded North American prison with strict oversight. Inmates are allowed out of their cells for a few hours each week for yard time and monitored visits. The prison population is segregated according to the severity of crimes committed, and interactions are strictly controlled to prevent gang violence.

### What was the initial capacity of La Mesa prison and how did it change over time?

La Mesa was initially built for a population of 600 inmates and had an absolute capacity of 2,000. By the early 2000s, the prison housed nearly 7,000 residents, including inmates, their families, and various businesses and amenities.

### What was the role of the Maiceras in La Mesa?

The Maiceras were well-connected inmates who enforced their own order in La Mesa with a heavy hand. They controlled the prison, dishing out cruel punishment to troublemakers and undesirables, and operated as they would on the outside, ordering hits and directing drug trade with impunity.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: La Mesa: The Incredible Story of Tijuana&apos;s Prison-Village](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQZNAKFO4eA)
- [https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/20020821/tijuana21/swift-shake-up-at-notorious-tijuana-prison](https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/20020821/tijuana21/swift-shake-up-at-notorious-tijuana-prison)
- [https://nationalterroralert.com/tijuana-mexico-3-dead-31-injured-in-la-mesa-prison-riot/](https://nationalterroralert.com/tijuana-mexico-3-dead-31-injured-in-la-mesa-prison-riot/)
- [https://eu.heraldtribune.com/story/news/2007/02/26/home-is-where-the-heart-is-even-in-prison/28535191007/](https://eu.heraldtribune.com/story/news/2007/02/26/home-is-where-the-heart-is-even-in-prison/28535191007/)
- [https://www.kqed.org/news/11904539/idolo-why-singer-chalino-sanchez-is-still-a-legend-30-years-after-his-unsolved-murder](https://www.kqed.org/news/11904539/idolo-why-singer-chalino-sanchez-is-still-a-legend-30-years-after-his-unsolved-murder)
- [https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-sep-16-me-prison16-story.html](https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-sep-16-me-prison16-story.html)
- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4Oi0f7GB1o](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4Oi0f7GB1o)
- [https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Mesa_(Tijuana](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Mesa_(Tijuana)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Mexican_general_election#By_state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Mexican_general_election#By_state)
- [https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26778862](https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26778862)
- [https://youtu.be/N41rDypgBHI?si=W4dzyXlnis3yyeAM](https://youtu.be/N41rDypgBHI?si=W4dzyXlnis3yyeAM)
- [https://youtu.be/cUUavZWxet4?si=JQIYZe59wTgnDYIr&amp;amp;t=624](https://youtu.be/cUUavZWxet4?si=JQIYZe59wTgnDYIr&amp;amp;t=624)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b5/Palmeira_-_Sal_-_Cabo_Verde_-_2025.jpg) by JeLuF / openverse, cc0.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Malacca Straits: The Most Pirate-Infested Waters in the World</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/malacca-straits-most-pirate-infested-waters-world</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/malacca-straits-most-pirate-infested-waters-world</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>If you happen to be a person living on this planet called Earth, chances are you owe a huge debt of gratitude to the merchant crews toiling for a hard-earned paycheck in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore—a stretch of sea also known as &apos;SOMS&apos;.

It is estimated that at least one third of global trade—your food, your clothes, the raw materials which will be worked into your favourite products—will have to sail through the SOMS at some point. To say nothing of 80% of the fuel keeping Japan and China alight and mobile!

So, those crews sailing through the SOMS have a lot of responsibilities on their shoulders. In addition to working long hours, and having to negotiate narrow chokepoints amidst heavy maritime traffic, these merchant sailors have incurred—and still incur—in the constant risk of being attacked, getting robbed, held at gunpoint, held hostage, or even kidnapped.

Those of the Caribbean may have taken centre stage in popular culture.

The Somalis may have attracted most headlines.

And yet, by sheer numbers alone, the dubious honour of most active, most prolific, more dangerous pirates belongs to the criminals roaming these sea lanes.

Welcome to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the most pirate-infested waters in the world.

## Sea Peoples and Pirate Princes

Let&apos;s sort out the geography first. As the name suggests, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, or SOMS, is a long and narrow waterway in South East Asia, running between the littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore, and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The SOMS is some 900 km long, but it squeezes down to a mere 1.7 km at its narrowest point. Moreover, the SOMS&apos; coastlines are littered with thousands of little islands, reefs, inlets and mangrove swamps.

All these features make sailing through this passage a very complicated affair, made even more bothersome by the insane amount of maritime traffic plodding along the Straits. Merchant crews traversing this chokepoint have a good reason to be there: this is the most direct route from India to China, and as such has been one of the busiest trade routes for centuries.

Every year, some 120,000 ships sail through these waterways, carrying 40% of all goods shipped to and from Japan, more than 60% of all maritime trade from China, and about $3.5 trillion worth of US imports and exports.

Based on those figures alone, you may realise the strategic importance of this chokepoint. Any disruption to its—literal—smooth sailing can have serious consequences on global trade, fluctuation of oil prices, even energy shortages. It would make sense for shipping companies to perhaps hedge their bets and explore other sea lanes … But any alternative would require longer travel times, implying higher costs in fuel and salaries for the crew.

That&apos;s why merchant ships stick to the SOMS, despite it being a playground for a very scary breed of occupational hazard: pirates.

Throughout the 1990s, and up to the early 2010s, the public&apos;s imagination was captured by the actions of Somali pirates, and their high visibility hijackings. And yet, during the same period, Somali raids on the high seas accounted for only 28% of all pirate attacks worldwide.

Over the same period, the pirates of the SOMS barely made it to the headlines. And yet, their marine robberies accounted for 41% of all pirate attacks, and resulted in an estimated 136 murders!

As of today, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore play backdrop to 53% of global piracy raids, making these waterways the most pirate-infested waters in the world.

It is fair to wonder what would make this environment so pirate-friendly. Luckily, we have a rather straightforward answer from Professor Barbara Watson Andaya, University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa: &apos;The geographical environment, the nature of local societies and the growth of global seaborne commerce coalesced to create a distinctive space that locates the Malacca Strait at the centre of any discussion of Asian piracy&apos;

To expand on these thoughts, we could say that the convenient location of the Straits have always attracted thousands of vessels, carrying a rich cargo. Then, the socio-political factors of the littoral states, throughout history, have encouraged many individuals to pursue piracy as a profitable business. And the very geography of the coastline, punctuated by islets and inlets, has allowed those very pirates to set up convenient hideouts.

According to Prof Watson Andaya, the earliest written mention of piracy in the Strait of Malacca dates back to the fifth century AD. These early sources clearly identify the culprits for mischief at sea: the *orang laut*, or &apos;sea people&apos;, communities living amongst the small islands, reefs and rocky outcrops which pepper the southern end of the Strait.

The *orang laut* conducted their activities according to a rigid seasonal schedule, regulated by the direction of the winds. From February to April, during the northern monsoon season, the &apos;sea people&apos; stuck to fishing, collecting seaweed and salvaging cargo from shipwrecked vessels. But from June to October, as the southern monsoon started blowing, the coastal dwellers took to piracy: carried up the Strait by the favourable winds, they attacked passing ships, before disappearing amongst thousands of natural hiding places.

In the 10th Century AD, the Song dynasty in China promoted sea trade with India, which was great news for the *orang laut*. Traffic in the Strait boomed during that period, filling the sea lanes with plenty of booty, ripe for merciless plunder. At this stage, the modus operandi of the Straits&apos; pirates was simple:

Step one: attack a ship.

Number two, murder the crew!

Next: steal their cargo. And four: Vanish!

But the rulers of local polities flanking the Straits took notice of these pirates&apos; proficiency, adding a layer of complexity. These rulers controlled competing sea lanes and ports, seeking to benefit from the India-China trade. Fair competition can only go so far, and thus these local monarchs took to hiring fleets of *orang lauts* to disrupt competitors&apos; trade routes. Thus, the once-independent pirates became privateers for hire.

In the 15th Century, they experienced another evolution, as they realised that one need not murder the crews. How humane of them. Instead, it was much better to kidnap them, and sell them into slavery! The pirates-slash-slave traders of the Straits found an eager clientele amongst the early European powers rocking up in these waters, the Portuguese first, and the Dutch later.

After the 1640s in particular the Dutch East India Company, or VOC, became the dominant power in the region, with an unquenchable thirst for slave labour in their plantations and outposts.

The pirates of *orang laut* origin, however, by this time were facing fierce competition from the *anak raja*. These were the non-first-born sons of local monarchs, especially those whose coffers could not bankroll their numerous offspring. Cut off from their dads&apos; allowances, many *anak raja* rolled up their sleeves and took to the seas for an honest career in maritime armed robbery, kidnap, and murder.

The *anak raja* were essentially &apos;Pirate Princes&apos;, with a well-defined code of conduct. For example, they had to follow royal guidelines on which ships they could or could not attack. And they had to abide to the practice of *mencari rezeki* which may be translated as &apos;To seek one&apos;s fortune&apos;

According to this practice, the *anak raja* had to devolve part of their loot to their aristocratic patrons and overlords on dry land.

The *orang laut* and *anak raja* exercised their trade pretty much undisturbed until the 1790s, when new, ruthless competitors made their appearance, attracted by the incessant procession of bountiful ships across the Straits.

These were the raiding fleets of the Iranun, a group hailing from the Sulu archipelago and the Mindanao islands, now part of the Philippines. The main aim of the Iranun pirates was to kidnap sailors to be sold into slavery, but they had no qualms in mutilating and murdering their &apos;human merchandise&apos;.

A local account of the time tells us about the fate of a merchant following an Iranun attack:

&gt; &apos;Encik Bakak resisted with all his might, but what chance did he have, a trader, against weapons of war? During the attack he was killed and his [fishing boat] plundered. He himself was strangled with his shoulder sash and left to rot. His penis was cut off and stuffed into his mouth. His companions were killed, some were beheaded and some were tied up to be sold.&apos;

Since those early, extremely violent eras, piracy may have gone dormant at times, as local and European powers increased their patrolling efforts or brought more fire-power to the area.

It may have changed modus operandi, with pirate fleets opting to exercise only the threat of violence to collect tributes in exchange for safe passage.

But pirates never really left the SOMS area. Their activities somewhere went under the radar, overshadowed by the popularity of fictional Caribbean buccaneers, and the all-too-real exploits of Somali sea raiders.

## 21st Century Pirates

The SOMS pirates really entered global consciousness only in the late 1990s, when the annual number of reported attacks at sea went from close to zero to 75. This surge may be explained by two factors.

First, the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The impact on local communities was debilitating, pushing many Indonesians and Malaysians to turn to piracy to make a living. The crisis also led to political instability and reduced government budgets, especially in Indonesia. Which in turn led to a weakening of police and naval military forces.

The increased &apos;operational tempo&apos; of the SOMS pirates eventually resulted in high profile cases, such as the hijacking of the Malaysian vessel *Petro Ranger*, in April 1998.

Which takes us to the second factor: before the *Petro Ranger*, ship owners and crews may have under-reported pirate attacks in the area, perhaps to keep insurance premiums down. But after that watershed, crews simply started to report on an issue that had been there all along!

The late-1990s, early-2000s piracy attacks fell into three main categories: the robbery of cargo from vessels; the hijacking of vessels; or kidnapping crews for a ransom.

Robberies usually took place at night or just before daybreak. A group of five to 10 pirates would board their target with grappling hooks, neutralize the crew, and then steal whatever could be seized quickly: mainly cash and high-tech navigation equipment.

Hijacking operations were conducted by larger, and much better organised crews. Pirates would first gather detailed intelligence on a ship&apos;s route and type of cargo. Next, they would pre-arrange a secure port, as well as a willing buyer for the stolen goods. Finally, the gang would take action, seize the entire ship and sail it to their safe haven, where they would unload the cargo and sell it to their buyer.

In more violent cases, pirates were known to kill entire crews, so they could repurpose their vessel as a &apos;phantom ship&apos;. After giving it a paint job, a new name, and a new set of forged documents, the ship would be ready to be re-sold at another port.

Finally, in kidnapping cases, armed pirates would temporarily seize their target vessel, abduct two or three senior crew members, and then take them ashore to hold them at ransom. Pirates would then start negotiating with the crew&apos;s employers, making initial demands up to $200,000, but eventually accepting payments between $10,000 and $20,000.

The intensity of piracy attacks reached their peak in the year 2000, prompting the international community to put pressure on Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, for them to sort out the problem. Especially Japan and the US indicated their willingness to contribute, and to participate in joint patrols of the SOMS.

In March 2004, the then commander of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, issued a proposal for a &apos;Regional Maritime Security Initiative&apos;

The initiative would involve the active participation of American naval forces. In Fargo&apos;s words:

&gt; &apos;We&apos;re looking at things like high-speed vessels, putting Special Operations Forces on high-speed vessels to conduct effective interdiction in … these sea lines of communication&apos;

Local authorities were not so thrilled. Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, commented:

&gt; &apos;I think we can look after our own area.&apos;

Both Malaysia and Indonesia saw the problem of piracy as a purely domestic one, and were adamant about defending the sovereignty of their territorial waters. Which is an absolutely legitimate concern, but in this case it became a significant hurdle towards international cooperation.

According to maritime security expert Catherine Zara Raymond, writing for the *Naval War College Review*, there were other reasons which prevented littoral states, and particularly Indonesia, from taking decisive action.

Indonesia had been particularly harmed by the impact of the 1997 financial crisis, which &apos;Manifested itself in a public denial of the reported scale of the piracy problem in Indonesian waters.&apos;

Moreover, the crisis had severely depleted the country&apos;s military budget. According to the Indonesian Navy&apos;s Chief of Staff, Admiral Slamet Soebijanto, the country&apos;s patrol fleet was only at 30% capacity. As a result, several units had resorted to illegal activities to replenish their exhausted coffers. And can you guess what was one of those activities? According to Prof Carolin Liss, writing for the *Austral Policy Forum*, well … It was piracy!

Eventually, the three littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia joined forces in the Trilateral Coordinated Patrol, or MALSINDO, launched in July 2004. The three countries&apos; navies and Coast Guards would perform patrols in a coordinated fashion, which was all fine and dandy, but there was a major glitch: the MALSINDO agreement did not include any rule on cross-border pursuit.

A pirate gang operating in Indonesian territorial waters, if pursued by the local navy, could just sail into Malaysian waters to shake those annoying patrol boats off their tails. The Indonesians could radio their Malaysian colleagues for support, sure. But what if a Malaysian naval unit was not around to help? The pirates would be free to zoom into the horizon, laughing off the MALSINDO efforts.

This is what happened on most occasions, and the initiative did not reduce the number of pirate attacks in the SOMS, with 38 raids reported in 2004.

Then, on December 26, 2004, a catastrophic event struck the area, one which made no distinction between merchant sailors, pirates, or ordinary inhabitants of the coastal areas. This was the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, a disaster which caused widespread death and destruction across 14 countries, claiming almost 230,000 victims.

In the weeks following the disaster, the number of reported pirate incidents in the Straits dropped to zero. The impact of the tsunami had devastated the coastal communities in Malaysia and Indonesia, killing thousands of inhabitants, and devastating their livelihoods—regardless if they were fishermen or pirates.

And the impact was felt throughout 2005, as the annual number of pirate attacks dropped by 68%, from 38 to just 12. Naval authorities expected piracy to return to previous levels of activities, and yet reports on raids continued to decline from 2005 to 2007.

This longer-term decline may be related to the tsunami&apos;s impact on the Indonesian province of Aceh. This region had been the theatre of a decades-long conflict between the separatist Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government. After the natural disaster, both combatants tabled talks to discuss relief operations, a step which led to a peace deal signed in August 2005.

Under its clauses, the Free Aceh Movement had to dissolve its armed units and renounce their weapons, while the Indonesian military would withdraw most of their forces from the area.

According to the already quoted Raymond:

&gt; &apos;Given that both rebels and Indonesian troops had been accused of carrying out piracy, this development may well have played a part in the reduction in the number of attacks in the Malacca Strait.&apos;

Further factors contributed to the decline in piratical actions. In September 2005, the three littoral states introduced the Eyes in the Sky plan, or simply &apos;EiS&apos;, which consisted of joint air patrols. In April 2006 the MALSINDO and EiS plans came together under a joint operation, the Malacca Strait Patrols.

In the same year, Singapore and Japan heralded the creation of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy, or ReCAAP, hosting its Information Sharing Center, the ISC. ReCAAP has been joined by 21 states as of 2025, including India, China, the Philippines, and the US among others. While the agreement is yet to be ratified by Malaysia and Singapore, both countries have been informally participating in ReCAAP&apos;s main activities: combating the threat of piracy through &apos;Information sharing, capacity building, and cooperative arrangements.&apos;

And that&apos;s ReCAAP&apos;s main weapon of choice: information, shared amongst &apos;focal points&apos; connected via a secured network. Thanks to a constant exchange of data and incident reports, both authorities and shipping companies are always made aware of the gangs&apos; activities, and can take the necessary countermeasures, from prevention to investigation and prosecution.

## A New Modus Operandi

The combined effects of the Tsunami, the Aceh peace talks, and international cooperation clearly had a positive impact. Piracy, however, was far from being eradicated. Law enforcement and naval units had partially regained control of the water, sure, but had failed to disrupt the pirates&apos; bases and support networks on land.

It was only a matter of time before the pirates returned—with a vengeance. And with a new modus operandi!

In 2010, the SOMS were the setting of only two pirate raids. But in the first half of the 2010s, attacks soared, just when the infamous Somali pirates appeared to be going out of business.

The world took notice once again of the problem by the end of 2013, when ReCAAP reported a staggering total of 125 cases of piracy.

What was worse, pirate crews appeared to be more efficient, much better organised. Their attacks were clearly planned in great detail, and did not rely on improvisation and opportunity.

Take the case of the shipping tanker *Orapin 4*. On the night of May 28, 2014, the ship was calmly sailing from Singapore to Pontianak, Indonesia, transporting a large cargo of fuel. Two hours before dawn, a speedboat approached its side, unseen and unheard. Ten men, armed with guns and machetes, burst onto the *Orapin*&apos;s deck and quickly subdued the crew. After locking them below deck, the assailants smashed the communications system, and then proceeded to change the ship&apos;s name. Or rather, they just scrubbed off the &apos;O&apos; and the &apos;N&apos;, so that the newly christened &apos;Rapi&apos; could not be identified.

This ruse was intended to buy the pirates some time—and it worked! Over the following 10 hours, another cargo, controlled by members of the same gang, was sailed close to the captured ship. The pirates then seized the loot they were after: 3,700 metric tons of fuel, which was siphoned from the *Orapin* into their own ship.

When coast guards patrols eventually came to the rescue, they found the 14 crew members still locked away, but unharmed. The pirates had long gotten away with their payday, $1.9 million worth of stolen fuel!

Two weeks later, on June 14, the tanker *Ai Maru* was quietly minding its business, steaming along some 50 km off the Malaysian coast. At 9:15 pm, a speedboat overtook the ship, and seven armed men jumped on board. Some of the pirates held the crew at gunpoint, whilst others destroyed the radio. A second tanker pulled alongside the *Ai Maru*, and the pirates got down to their main business: siphoning off 620 tons of marine gas oil.

You should have picked up a trend by now: in the early to mid-2010s the SOMS pirates had radically changed their modus operandi, specialising in well-organised, large-scale, carefully planned attacks. Rather than kidnapping the crew, attempting to steal random cargo, or the ship itself, this new breed of pirates was laser-focused on pilfering fuel from tankers.

An investigation by magazine *Time* found that this type of heists first gained prominence in 2011. By the end of 2012, there had been 14 reported attacks against tankers in the Straits. Of these, four had targeted the same company, a coincidence which led maritime experts to &apos;Suspect … a collusion between either the shipping company, or some members of the crew, and the alleged attackers.&apos;

Press agency *Reuters* confirmed this suspicion by quoting unnamed regional security officials, who warned of &apos;Armed gangs prowling the Malacca Strait [who] may be part of a syndicate that can either have links to the crew on board the hijacking target or inside knowledge about the ship and cargo.&apos;

In 2013, the fuel tanker robberies were investigated also by Karsten von Hoesslin, a special-projects manager working for Risk Intelligence, a maritime security firm. While in Pontianak, Indonesia, von Hoesslin learned how a ship&apos;s chief engineer and its captain had been selling information about an oil consignment to a local crime syndicate. With this knowledge, the gang had been able to seize the ship at the right time, and then steal the precious liquid cargo.

Having the right intelligence is key to the success of these piracy operations. According to a separate enquiry by *CNBC*, nefarious crews can obtain vital info not only from corrupt merchant officers … but even from government and military officials.

After committing their spectacular maritime heists, pirate crews have two priorities in mind: first, make a clean escape; second, make a profit off their stolen goods.

In the mid-2010s, the SOMS pirates had perfected the art of vanishing in plain view. Taking advantage of the extremely high density of merchant vessels in the Straits, they would just blend in the crowd, much like pickpockets in a busy city square.

Once they reached a safe area, crews would proceed to a meet-up with their pre-arranged buyers. This is an essential element of the entire business: without securing a willing buyer, pirates would not even lift a finger!

Very often, these buyers would have no idea that they were purchasing stolen oil from a bunch of sea-rascals. To act as legitimate merchants, often pirate crews would legally buy a small supply of oil before a heist. After stealing fuel off a tanker, they would mix both batches, and then sell them to their buyers. But why go to such trouble? The fact is that individual batches of oil can be analysed, and their origins traced back to a stolen shipment. By mixing pilfered and legit fuel, pirates could effectively cover their tracks!

## Decline and Resurgence

From 2013 to 2015 the number of similar pirate attacks rose steadily: 22 incidents in 2013, rising to 82 in 2014, and then peaking at 135 in 2015. These accounted for 44% of all pirate attacks, worldwide.

And mind you, these figures are likely marred by severe underreporting. Even so, the 2015 numbers firmly put the SOMS at the top of the world&apos;s most pirate-infested waters! In fact, at the time the notorious Somali and West African pirates were virtually out of business, handing over their mantle of infamy to their Southeast Asian colleagues.

We are sure that the pirate crews involved greatly enjoyed the ill-gained profits of their well-planned, large-scale, high-stakes raids. But while those guys were too busy counting their big bucks, they failed to realise that well-planned, large-scale, high-stakes raids also tend to attract much scrutiny and attention from every country that has a vested interest in shipping cargo through the Straits.

The spike in piratical activity contained the seeds of its own demise, as the member countries of ReCAAP dramatically increased their investment in law-enforcement activities in the area. Some countries like the US and Japan took an active role in patrolling the areas of the SOMS which did not fall within the territorial waters of the littoral states. As per Malaysia and Indonesia—whilst not part of ReCAAP—put to good use international funding to conduct additional patrols and crack downs against sea robber gangs.

In 2016, reported attacks dropped to just 21. In 2017, there were only 9 cases. The following year, pirates attacked a measly eight ships.

If today&apos;s story ended here, it would be one of success, attesting the effectiveness of the joint efforts of information exchange championed by ReCAAP, as well as the increased coastal patrols. But as of the mid-2020s, piracy in the SOMS has made a significant comeback, marking the area as a cause of concern for the littoral states and shipping companies worldwide.

According to ReCAAP reports, the Covid-19 pandemic negatively impacted the economy and livelihoods of coastal communities in Malaysia and Indonesia, leading them to pursue maritime crime to supplement their incomes. Reports of pirate raids rose steadily throughout 2020, climbing to 70 attacks in 2021, before peaking at 72 in 2022.

The number of incidents then declined in 2023 and 2024, with 63 and 62 incidents reported. Despite this decline, the SOMS still accounted for 53% of all pirate attacks worldwide. And early trends for 2025 signalled a new surge, with 35 reports filed in the first quarter of the year.

Luckily, according to ReCAAP, the vast majority of current attacks are not violent: pirates are not armed, and the merchant crews do not suffer any injuries. Moreover, the pirates appear to content themselves with stealing relatively light items of cargo, scrap metal or engine spares. All in all, these appear to be opportunistic crimes, perpetrated by loosely organised even improvised gangs, unlikely to benefit from connections with organised crime or corrupt officials.

To recap, in the latest years and months, the SOMS pirates have significantly increased the quantity of their raids, but have displayed an equally significant reduction in the intensity of their individual raids, preferring non-violent methods and low-risk, low-value targets.

Nonetheless, this resurgence is a symptom of economic decline in the area, one of the leading causes of piracy—and crime in general, for that matter.

In the analysis of Muhammad Faizal bin Abdul Rahman, Research Fellow for Cyber and Homeland Defence at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, the international community has thus far addressed only &apos;The symptoms and tactical aspects, rather than the underlying causes of [piracy in the SOMS].&apos;

Those &apos;underlying causes&apos; being the economic hardships resulting from the pandemic, whose long-term effect might aggravate security risks in the area. Until those hard-hit communities recover from such hardships, piracy might still make it to the headlines well into the third decade of the 21st century.

## Key Takeaways

- The Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) are crucial for global trade, with one-third of it passing through.
- SOMS is notorious for piracy, with 53% of global piracy raids occurring in these waters.
- Historically, pirates in SOMS have been active since the 5th century, evolving from independent raiders to organized crime syndicates.
- Piracy in SOMS surged in the late 1990s due to economic crises and political instability, peaking in 2000.
- International cooperation and increased patrols significantly reduced piracy from 2016 to 2018, but it resurged due to economic hardships from the COVID-19 pandemic.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS)?

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore, or SOMS, is a long and narrow waterway in South East Asia, running between the littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore, and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. It is approximately 900 km long but narrows to just 1.7 km at its narrowest point.

### Why is the SOMS strategically important?

The SOMS is strategically important because it is the most direct route from India to China and has been one of the busiest trade routes for centuries. It handles about one-third of global trade, including 80% of the fuel keeping Japan and China mobile.

### What makes the SOMS a hotspot for piracy?

The SOMS is a hotspot for piracy due to its geographical environment, the nature of local societies, and the growth of global seaborne commerce. The narrow waterway, heavy maritime traffic, and numerous hiding places make it an ideal location for pirate activities.

### Who were the orang laut and what role did they play in piracy?

The orang laut, or &apos;sea people,&apos; were communities living amongst the small islands and reefs in the southern end of the Strait of Malacca. They conducted piracy during the southern monsoon season, attacking passing ships and hiding amongst natural hiding places.

### What are the anak raja and how did they contribute to piracy?

The anak raja were non-first-born sons of local monarchs who took to piracy due to lack of financial support from their fathers. They followed a code of conduct and had to share part of their loot with their aristocratic patrons.

### What was the impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami on piracy in the SOMS?

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami devastated coastal communities in Malaysia and Indonesia, leading to a significant drop in pirate attacks. The number of reported incidents dropped to zero immediately after the disaster and remained low in the following years.

### What is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy (ReCAAP)?

ReCAAP is an agreement involving 21 states, including India, China, the Philippines, and the US, aimed at combating piracy through information sharing, capacity building, and cooperative arrangements. It hosts an Information Sharing Center to facilitate data exchange and incident reports.

### How did piracy in the SOMS change in the mid-2010s?

In the mid-2010s, SOMS pirates adopted a new modus operandi, focusing on well-organized, large-scale attacks on fuel tankers. They would steal fuel and blend it with legally purchased oil to cover their tracks and sell it to unsuspecting buyers.

### What factors contributed to the decline in piracy in the SOMS from 2016 to 2018?

The decline in piracy was due to increased law-enforcement activities, international cooperation through ReCAAP, and additional patrols funded by international support. These efforts disrupted pirate operations and reduced the number of attacks.

### What is the current state of piracy in the SOMS as of the mid-2020s?

As of the mid-2020s, piracy in the SOMS has resurged, with a significant increase in the number of attacks. However, these attacks are generally non-violent and target low-value items, indicating opportunistic crimes by loosely organized gangs.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Malacca Straits: The Most Pirate-Infested Waters in the World](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M0HZuKYEsoU)
- [https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/pirates-hijack-japanese-oil-tanker-malacca-strait-before-stealing-millions-litres-1445678](https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/pirates-hijack-japanese-oil-tanker-malacca-strait-before-stealing-millions-litres-1445678)
- [https://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/15/worlds-most-pirated-waters.html](https://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/15/worlds-most-pirated-waters.html)
- [https://karenwarrenauthor.com/pirates-malacca-strait.html](https://karenwarrenauthor.com/pirates-malacca-strait.html)
- [https://time.com/piracy-southeast-asia-malacca-strait/](https://time.com/piracy-southeast-asia-malacca-strait/)
- [https://tbr.ie/2024/02/02/the-forgotten-pirates-of-the-straits-of-malacca/](https://tbr.ie/2024/02/02/the-forgotten-pirates-of-the-straits-of-malacca/)
- [https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/strait-malacca-worlds-new-piracy-hotspot-n63576](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/strait-malacca-worlds-new-piracy-hotspot-n63576)
- [https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/07/19/the-persistence-of-piracy-and-armed-robbery-against-ships-in-the-straits-of-malacca-and-singapore/](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/07/19/the-persistence-of-piracy-and-armed-robbery-against-ships-in-the-straits-of-malacca-and-singapore/)
- [https://typeset.io/papers/dark-passage-the-strait-of-malacca-343eih2yfo](https://typeset.io/papers/dark-passage-the-strait-of-malacca-343eih2yfo)
- [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290981728_&apos;The_Dark_Passage&apos;_History_Piracy_and_the_Melaka_Strait](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290981728_&apos;The_Dark_Passage&apos;_History_Piracy_and_the_Melaka_Strait)
- [https://www.iias.asia/sites/default/files/2020-11/IIAS_NL36_10.pdf](https://www.iias.asia/sites/default/files/2020-11/IIAS_NL36_10.pdf)
- [https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/news/2024/Press%20release%20-%20ReCAAP%20ISC%20annual%20report%20(2024)%20-%20final.pdf](https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/news/2024/Press%20release%20-%20ReCAAP%20ISC%20annual%20report%20(2024)%20-%20final.pdf)
- [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23001550](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23001550)
- [https://maritime-mutual.com/risk-bulletins/straits-of-malacca-and-singapore-piracy-armed-robbery-attacks-continue-into-2025/](https://maritime-mutual.com/risk-bulletins/straits-of-malacca-and-singapore-piracy-armed-robbery-attacks-continue-into-2025/)
- [https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/annual/Single-sheet%20summary%20for%20Annual%20Report%202023.pdf](https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/annual/Single-sheet%20summary%20for%20Annual%20Report%202023.pdf)
- [https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/weekly/2025/ReCAAP%20ISC%20Weekly%20Report%20(1-7%20Apr%202025).pdf](https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/weekly/2025/ReCAAP%20ISC%20Weekly%20Report%20(1-7%20Apr%202025).pdf)
- [https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/MSC.4-Circ.267_Annual%20report_2022.pdf](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/MSC.4-Circ.267_Annual%20report_2022.pdf)
- [https://www.recaap.org/reports](https://www.recaap.org/reports)
- [https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1152373/Singapore-Strait-armed-robbery-wave-continues-into-2025](https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1152373/Singapore-Strait-armed-robbery-wave-continues-into-2025)
- [https://theses.ubn.ru.nl/bitstreams/732089a1-7ff6-418e-98e1-c2a11290b484/download](https://theses.ubn.ru.nl/bitstreams/732089a1-7ff6-418e-98e1-c2a11290b484/download)
- [https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1688&amp;amp;context=nwc-review](https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1688&amp;amp;context=nwc-review)
- [https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/straits-of-singapore-and-malacca-report-piracy-declines-in-2024](https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/straits-of-singapore-and-malacca-report-piracy-declines-in-2024)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bb/Lefka_Ori_underway_in_Strait_of_Rhodes_30_July_2025_%28cropped%29.jpg) by Pjotr Mahhonin / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Malawi: The Dictatorship that Nobody Noticed...</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/malawi-dictatorship-nobody-noticed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/malawi-dictatorship-nobody-noticed</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>## Introduction

It&apos;s a nation that even well-studied global citizens struggle to place on a map, a small, quiet expanse of land that ranks among the world&apos;s least developed countries on nearly every metric. But under the cover of its profound obscurity on the global stage, the small southeast-African nation of Malawi has a secret: a decades-long legacy of totalitarian rule so complete, and so oppressive, that few nations other than North Korea can even hope to match it. And if Malawi&apos;s first secret isn&apos;t shocking enough, then the second certainly is: that Malawi, after decades of devastation, found a way to survive…and come back stronger than it ever was before.

## Exploring Malawi

To find Malawi on a map, you&apos;re going to have to look closely, to locate a winding sliver of land wedged between Tanzania and Zambia on the northward side, and cupped firmly into the confines of Mozambique to the south. It&apos;s a landlocked country, and one whose geography is defined by what happens below the Earth&apos;s surface. There, the great tectonic plates under the African landmass pull apart, in a great north-to-south boundary that forms what&apos;s known as the East African Rift. On the surface, the consequences of that tectonic divergence give Malawi its two most distinctive features: the lake, and the grand plateaus that rise above the landscape.

First, there&apos;s the lake, known to other countries in the region as Lake Nyasa, and known here as Lake Malawi. In terms of the volume of water that it holds, the lake is the fourth-largest freshwater body on planet Earth; in terms of its land area, it&apos;s still in the top ten, clocking in at ninth place. Because of the powerful and ancient forces at work below the Earth&apos;s crust, the lake descends to incredible depths; Lake Malawi&apos;s deepest point is a full 706 meters, or 2,300 feet, below the water&apos;s surface, making it the second-deepest lake in Africa, and the seventh-deepest across the whole world. In its northern reaches, it&apos;s fed by the Ruhuhu River, cutting a long path across Tanzania; in its south, it flows outward to a river valley that eventually feeds the mighty Zambezi. Although Malawi is landlocked, Lake Malawi affords it a long water border with Mozambique and Tanzania, a feature that&apos;s important enough that Malawi is one of only a handful of landlocked nations to feature its own navy. It&apos;s not necessarily a spectacular naval force; instead, it fields just 220 personnel, one patrol boat, a few rigid-hulled inflatable dinghies, and a single landing craft. But, we suppose, a navy&apos;s a navy regardless.

Then, there&apos;s Malawi&apos;s highlands, running from tip to tail across the country. They&apos;re separated from Lake Malawi by the Great Rift Valley, a long but narrow lowland, before the landscape rises into plateaus many thousands of feet tall. Atop the plateaus are vast expanses of tree-less rolling hills, an abundance of flowering plants, and, toward the south, forests that have spent decades ravaged by deforestation. When it comes to wildlife, Malawi&apos;s lions, rhinoceros, and zebras still dot the landscape, while Lake Malawi hosts not only gigantic crocodiles and hippopotamus, but up to a thousand species of cichlid fish, well over half the total number of identified cichlids across the entire world. The species diversity of those fish suggests that Lake Malawi might gain at least one, and possibly several new one-of-a-kind fish species over the course of a single human lifetime.

But Malawi&apos;s fish, and the rest of its wildlife, are related only tangentially to the real story of this country and its people. Those people, known in aggregate as Malawians, are estimated to number somewhere around 21 and a half million at the time of writing. Malawi is a very young nation, with nearly half of all Malawians under the age of fifteen. The population is growing by over three percent each year, and projected to hit a number upward of forty-seven million by the year 2050. That&apos;ll be more populous than countries from modern-day Argentina to Poland to Saudi Arabia to Canada. Most people live in relatively rural areas, getting by on subsistence farming, while even the country&apos;s largest city, Lilongwe, hosts less than a million people. In fact, only five population centers in the entire country number more inhabitants than sixty thousand. Most people live in small rural villages called *mudzi*, each of which tends to organize around an extended family, although more and more in recent years, the landscape has begun to be built up toward urbanization. Despite Malawi&apos;s relative lack of cities, it&apos;s a population-dense place, and its rising population means that Malawi is rather quickly running out of room.

Across the country, most Malawians are part of at least one of four ethnic groups: the Chewa in the central and southern regions, the Lomwe in the watersheds of the southeast, the Yao in the country&apos;s eastern regions, and the Tumbuka across the northern highlands. By and large, most Malawians are Christian, with a sizeable Muslim minority and a wide range of people, across the population, who mix in traditional and animist practices to their faith as well. Traditional dance and music, mask- and wood-carving, and both poetry and literature make up important elements of Malawian culture, as does football, in a holdover from the country&apos;s days under British colonial rule. Malawians&apos; national identity, as it exists now, is that of a rather conservative and strictly nonviolent rural or pastoral population. Malawi&apos;s nickname, &quot;the Warm Heart of Africa&quot;, draws its source not from Malawi&apos;s landlocked location or its hot weather, but from the generosity and the loving nature that Malawi cultural identity prizes. Ethnic rivalries rarely spill over into violence, and while the region does have a history of ethnic conflict, that past has largely been left behind.

By and large, the Malawi of today is a lagging nation on the world stage. It battles with a decades-long HIV/AIDS crisis, it&apos;s painfully underdeveloped, many people there still get by on subsistence agriculture, and the national government is highly dependent on foreign aid. Its infrastructure to support education, healthcare, environmental protection, economic engagement, and higher-level industry all lag far behind most of the rest of the world. Take a brief glance at Malawi, and on the surface, there&apos;s not much to see: an underdeveloped nation like many others across the globe, trudging through a mess of crises, lagging indicators, and future headaches that seem, when taken together, as if they&apos;ll prove utterly unconquerable. But pull back the curtain on Malawi&apos;s history, and it quickly becomes clear that the present day, in this particular country, might not be anywhere near perfect…but it&apos;s a far cry from when Malawi used to be something much, much darker.

## A Colonial History

The first record of *Homo sapiens* in the land now called Malawi pops up in the form of fossils somewhere between four and ten millennia ago, although evidence of human culture can be dated to times tens of thousands of years earlier, and other hominid fossils have been found there, at an age of millions of years. Those ancestor cultures are thought to have settled around Lake Malawi for an exceedingly long time before an event called the Bantu Expansion, a migration of early Bantu-language-speakers across sub-Saharan Africa. The Bantu-speakers arrived in Malawi somewhere between the first and fourth centuries of the Common Era, and settled across the modern-day Malawian landscape. Who these Bantu-speakers were, and which part of the surrounding Bantu-settled landscape they came from, is hard to say. Whether they assimilated all the people who&apos;d been there before, or wiped many of them out, is tough to say, but archaeological evidence indicates that these early Bantu settlers spread their slash-and-burn farming methods and their iron tools across the land. Another wave of Bantu-speaker migration arrived between six and eight hundred years ago, integrating into the communities and cultures that had been there when they arrived, and with that new group of tenants, came a couple of major developments: an oral history, and a political structure.

During the late 15th century, today&apos;s Malawi became host to the so-called Maravi Confederacy, an arrangement of ethnolinguistic groups across southern Africa. Its name, Maravi, is thought to refer to flames, possibly because of the many kilns for iron-ore work that would have dotted the landscape in that time. The Confederacy&apos;s power center was on and around the shores of Lake Nyasa, today Lake Malawi, and was ruled over by a series of kings, who would appoint subordinates to take over and occupy new territories. The confederacy expanded outward, it formed trade relations with Portugal and the kingdoms of the Arab world, and, eventually, its component parts became more physically and ideologically distant from each other, forming the less unified, but largely peaceful ethnolinguistic landscape of modern Malawi.

But a second, hidden hand behind the collapse of the Maravi Confederacy, was a far more nefarious one: the slave trade. At first, the Confederacy trafficked in slaves on its own terms, taking advantage of their access to the African coast to trade people just like they&apos;d trade iron or ivory. The people who were trafficked around that time, could expect to work in brutal conditions on plantations in Mozambique, or endure a voyage halfway around the world to Brazil. But as a wave of incoming, northbound migration disrupted the Maravi Confederacy, courtesy of a great exodus of people fleeing the rule of Shaka Zulu, and another wave of new arrivals came from eastward across Lake Malawi, the Confederacy began to fracture. The arrivals who&apos;d come fleeing Shaka Zulu used the Zulu leader&apos;s own tactics against people previously unexposed to them, and the ones who&apos;d come across Lake Malawi first formed relationships with Confederacy rulers to trade for slaves, but eventually sought to enslave the entire Confederacy too. The people who&apos;d come from across Lake Malawi, the Yao, were for a time the only proficient users of firearms in the region, conferring an advantage upon themselves that the other groups of the region simply couldn&apos;t deal with head-on.

Over the following decades during the 1800s, tens of thousands of people each year were taken from their homes in modern-day Malawian territory and enslaved. While some still went to the Portuguese, most went to the then Arab-ruled archipelago of Zanzibar, where powerful sultans ruled up and down much of the east coast of the African continent. Resistance by the Maravi was occasionally successful, but usually fruitless. During these same years, missionaries started to arrive from the British isles, and before long, traders and hunters began to follow. As the culture of the region began shifting, and many of the local tribes started converting to Christianity, the influence of the slave trade eventually diminished. The ethnic Yao population in the area, which read and wrote in Arabic and have continued to practice Islam to this day, would end up fighting against the British during the Crown&apos;s early attempts to establish colonial rule, and they&apos;d be left out of the resulting English-language literacy projects and other colonial initiatives in education. That cultural divide, between the Yao and the rest of Malawi, still exists to this day.

By the late 1880s, the area around Lake Malawi—again, at this time, known as Lake Nyasa—was under the direct authority of the British crown. Not only had much of the region been converted to Christianity, but a trade-and-transport operation, known at that time as the African Lakes Company Limited, had built a thriving commercial economy in and around the lake in order to both secure major resources, and offset the economic influence of the slave trade. In 1889, fearing that Portugal might occupy the land around Lake Malawi that was, at that time, under British control, British officials on the territory decided to declare it a British protectorate. When Portuguese soldiers did, indeed, make a push through part of that informal protectorate, the local officials made it bigger, and though their whole designation had been carried out without the approval of the British Foreign Office, it was recognized by the Foreign Office anyhow. As for why…well, the British had very recently found a channel that allowed them access to the Zambezi River without going through Portuguese territory, and this new, unofficial protectorate that Britain apparently had, just so happened to cover it. This led to a bit of a diplomatic spat with Portugal, and more broadly, many of the tribes living on this same land didn&apos;t take particularly kindly to being informed that they were now under British authority, but by the turn of the twentieth century, Britain had largely consolidated control. The area would become known as the Nyasaland Protectorate in 1907.

Unlike other African and global British protectorates, the British colonial structure in Nyasaland had very little intention of working collaboratively with the locals. Instead, Britain ruled the area predominantly through imposition of military force, and several major and minor uprisings were crushed in the early years. Plantations began to crop up across Nyasaland, growing coffee, tea, tobacco, and cotton, and British taxation models were designed to push more and more locals into work directly under the plantations. While slavery was outlawed under British rule, black workers on the plantations faced frequent beatings and persistent, even proud discrimination by European settlers. The local plantations encouraged manual labor by the locals as a form of rent, a system that allowed them to very easily blur the lines between consensual and forced labor using the local families&apos; own homes as leverage. When World War I kicked off in 1914, the situation only got worse, as massive numbers of black Africans were recruited to work as porters in support of the Allied war effort. Not only were those porters forced into despicable living situations in which disease and death were commonplace, but the departure of so many working-age men placed incredible strain on Nyasaland&apos;s already-strained plantation economy.

Enter one John Chilembwe, a man whose mission would lead to seismic change in Malawi, and ultimately bring about both the freedom, and the dictatorship, of the decades to come. Born in or around Nyasaland well before it was called Nyasaland at all, Chilembwe was a Baptist church minister who&apos;d spent time in the United States, learning that nation&apos;s lessons of its own post-Civil-War, post-Abolition years. Chilembwe disdained the institution of British Nyasaland, after well over a decade working to build a fair and equitable landowning estate for African workers to escape the British system. By the time the Great War kicked off, he was already deeply embittered against the British, and the recruitment of the people of Nyasaland, into a war that Chilembwe deeply felt had nothing to do with them, was a bridge too far. His overtures to the colonial government not to recruit black porters went un-heard, and by the end of 1914, Chilembwe and his followers had their plan for an uprising.

The revolt came in the late night hours between the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of January, 1915. Chilembwe delivered a speech, urging his followers not to expect that they would survive the violence and reprisals to come, but emphasizing that their sacrifice was, as he believed, the only way to begin the long process of destabilizing the colonial order. Then, Chilembwe&apos;s rebel forces spread out across the countryside, attacking several targets, but most importantly, one plantation called Magomero, where thousands of locals were subject to the same rent-based forced labor system we mentioned previously. They lived under a particularly harsh regime, one where the plantation managers were known for their underpayment of workers and their physically brutal repression. The attack on the plantation saw both the main manager and the estate official killed, although their families were spared, and reportedly, treated with care. Other colonists were killed during the attack, and a second rebel raid saw Chilembwe&apos;s followers capture several rifles, adding to an arsenal that previously included only melee weapons. A couple of days later, a group of rebels would attack a Catholic mission, resulting in one guard of the mission and one young girl killed.

By and large, that was the end of the revolt; follow-on uprisings failed to materialize, and nearby tribes that had said they&apos;d join in, ultimately decided not to. Within a day of the first attack, colonial reservists and British military units were marching to respond, and by the twenty-fifth, they began launching counterattacks. Chilembwe eventually fled to Mozambique, and his attempts to solicit help from Germany went unanswered—probably for the best, as Germany had a well-known reputation among the people of Nyasaland as being just as oppressive as the British. He would be shot dead just over a week past the start of the uprising, by members of the Nyasaland Police force. The reprisals, as Chilembwe had expected, were brutal; hundreds of rebels would be imprisoned, dozens executed, and perhaps fifty more killed extrajudicially, during the counter-raids of the colonial military. The local population of plantation workers was punished en masse, many by the burning-down of their homes and the levying of new taxes against all residents. Non-British religious organizations were banned or tightly restricted, public gatherings were outlawed, and the effects rippled across other British colonies, where locals were pre-emptively repressed in retaliation for revolts they hadn&apos;t yet started.

But in the long view, the brief revolt had exactly the impact that Chilembwe had foreseen. Despite the brutal reprisals, the revolt also led to talk of reform among the British, who began to pivot toward methods of indirect rule in which local tribes could, once again, wield power. Africans across Nyasaland began to more actively pursue a range of individual and collective rights, and internalized a growing animosity toward the colonial system. An inquiry after the fact led Britain to condemn the systemic discrimination and lack of respect for the locals that had contributed to such poor conditions on the plantations, and although its attempts to abolish the rent-leveraging system were unsuccessful, the next generation of Nyasaland intellectuals and anti-colonial activists used Chilembwe&apos;s uprising as an emblem of continued resistance.

The inter-war years passed quietly in Nyasaland, with local tribes able to benefit from a somewhat loosened colonial grip, but still broadly enmeshed in the same labor-for-rent system that the British had created. Eviction without cause was a constant threat, with little land available for resettlement once a person was kicked off a plot—which, frequently, would be done in efforts to avert overcrowding. Although most of the black African population lived rurally, over ninety percent lived on lands held by the colonial government, and the territory&apos;s rural landmass was becoming quite densely populated. During the World War II years, hundreds of people evicted from the land they lived on would simply refuse to leave—not because they had any real desire to stay, but because there was no open, usable land left. The colonial system relied on individual farmers and families tending to individual plots of land, and by that time, there just weren&apos;t any more plots left. Riots would break out in both 1943, and 1945, without success.

After the war&apos;s end, a British commission on Nyasaland found that the colonial government had to address the land issues somehow. What the commission proposed, was that any plots of European-owned land that was going under-used or abandoned should be made available to African farmers. The move incensed European landowners in Nyasaland, and it would take several years to go into effect, but by the early 1950s, the change had made a real and tangible impact on the African population. By then, an organization called the Nyasaland African Congress had already secured African representation on Nyasaland&apos;s Legislative Council, and for a moment, things were looking up.

Then, catastrophe struck Nyasaland in 1953, when it was merged into a federation with the nearby British self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia. That was a major problem for the black Africans of Nyasaland, who were now subject to the far more repressive political domination exerted by Southern Rhodesia&apos;s white minority, and the expansion of Southern Rhodesia&apos;s segregation laws into Nyasaland. The federation was heralded by riots and mass protests by the black African population, and federation officials responded by gutting the already-insufficient development proposals that Britain had been intending for the territory. Fortunately for Nyasaland, the new status quo wouldn&apos;t last long; within a few years, opinions back home on the British Isles had shifted when it came to the future of Britain&apos;s territorial holdings, and because the federative government hadn&apos;t yet had enough time to squash Nyasaland&apos;s political opposition, the colony&apos;s nascent independence movement was able to take hold.

But it&apos;s here, in the course of today&apos;s story, that we&apos;ve got to stop in our tracks, and turn our focus from an entire territory, to one man who would soon come to dominate Nyasaland completely. His name was Hastings Kamuzu Banda, and he would eventually prove to be the sort of man who could warp history itself, forcing the story of this place called Malawi to be told not in terms of pre-colonial history, its colonial years, and its independence. By the time he was through with it, Malawi&apos;s story could be told only one way: Before, during, and after Hastings Banda himself.

## Meet Hastings Banda

Malawi&apos;s future despot was born sometime around the turn of the 20th century, near the modern-day town of Kasungu in what would have, at that time, still been called British Central Africa. There, no official record of his birth would ever have been documented, and later estimates on when he was born range from 1898, on the early end, to 1906, a year that Banda himself typically provided, but was almost certainly late. He grew up with his maternal grandparents, and in 1910, he was baptized into the Church of Scotland, taking the Christian name Hastings in honor of a missionary he quite liked, who&apos;d been working in and around his village when he was a boy. In 1917, he traveled to Johannesburg, South Africa, to work in a mine for a few years, but during his time there, he met an African Methodist Episcopal bishop named William Tecumseh Vernon. The bishop was an American, the son of former slaves in Missouri, and during his missionary years, he&apos;d apparently seen something in young Hastings Banda that he liked. Vernon offered Banda a deal: if Banda could get himself to the United States, then Vernon would pay tuition for him to attend a Methodist school in the US. In 1925, Banda was able to put the money down and pay for a voyage; he arrived to New York that same year.

Half a world away from the British colony he&apos;d once called home, Banda made his way to the Wilberforce Institute in Ohio, today known as Ohio&apos;s Central State University. It was an African-American college, and Banda would spend several years in the institute&apos;s high school section, graduating with a diploma a few years later. Then, he moved on to Indiana University, studying as a pre-medical student while writing about his native Chewa tribe back in Africa. He&apos;d transfer to the University of Chicago, collaborating with a linguist to build a grammar book on the Chewa language, and he&apos;d eventually graduate from UChicago, with a degree in history. He then went to Tennessee for medical school, graduating six years later, and becoming the second Malawian *ever* to receive a medical degree, twenty years after his lone predecessor, a man named Daniel Sharpe Malekebu. During his time in the United States, he received money from a wide range of benefactors, including the family responsible for Pepsodent toothpaste. He also met his wife, one Robertine Edmonds.

By the time that he finished his degree, Banda&apos;s name was already known back in his homeland, where he eventually intended to return, but he&apos;d run into a problem. In order to practice medicine across the British Empire, he needed a British medical degree, which he eventually picked up in 1941 from the University of Edinburgh. During that time, he received stipends from both the government of Nyasaland and the church of Scotland, although neither organization knew that the other was providing funding too, and he may have still been receiving funding from a third, private donor as well. He refused to be conscripted as an Army doctor during World War II, citing conscientious reasons, and instead spent four years working as a doctor in the north of England. Eventually, he moved to London, and bought a medical practice of his own. Dressing daily in a three-piece suit and a distinctive Homburg hat, Banda became popular in London, at a time when racism was often quite overt across the British Home Isles. Unusually for a black doctor at that time, he drew clientele of all races, and he grew a reputation for his way with children, his courtesy during house calls, and his willingness not just to treat poor patients for free, but even pay some of their rents when times were particularly lean.

When the Second World War ended, it seemed unlikely that Banda was going to return to Nyasaland anytime soon. He&apos;d become politically active, and made himself into a sought-after influence in Nyasaland as well as the pan-African independence movement. In London, he frequently played host to visiting leaders from across the pan-African movement, and he represented the interests of the Nyasaland African Congress, often finding his way into conversations with the British Colonial Office and with parliament members to advocate on Nyasaland&apos;s behalf. When the British government began working to create the federation we spoke about earlier, between Nyasaland and Rhodesia, Banda advocated fiercely against the plan, denouncing it as a, quote, &quot;stupid&quot; scheme to ensure that white supremacy remained in central Africa even if the British colonial government was no more. Banda was on the losing side of that particular battle, at least during the 1950s, but before the federation was eventually created, he&apos;d been critical in bringing together the chiefs and the ordinary people of Nyasaland into a consensus to act. In 1953, Banda left Britain for good, but he didn&apos;t return home right away; instead, after an adulterous scandal with his receptionist, Banda chose to travel to Ghana. A delegation from Nyasaland had come all the way to Liverpool to attempt to get him to come back to their territory right away, but he refused, and went to Ghana anyhow.

While there, Nyasaland developed something of a Hastings-Banda-fever. This American-educated doctor, long a resident of Britain, hadn&apos;t been home in so long that he would eventually need a translator to speak to his people in his native Chichewa tongue. But he had developed into a beacon of hope for Nyasaland anyhow, and his years in Ghana only made the fervor swell even more. At one time, rumors had spread that Banda was going to be on a flight to Nyasaland&apos;s Chileka Airport, drawing crowds that very nearly stormed the plane that he was supposed to be flying in on. Without ever waving hello to his countrymen, Banda had become Nyasaland&apos;s version of 2024&apos;s Taylor Swift, and while Banda didn&apos;t rush to return, he took full advantage of the incredible power and leverage his people were now trying to foist upon him. The nationalist party he ultimately crafted, operated under a clear policy of one-man rule, a degree of authority that the rest of the Nyasaland African Congress was, at that time, pleased to accept.

In 1958, Banda finally chose to return to Nyasaland, where he very quickly took over leadership of the Congress, shifting authority away from a beleaguered prior president colloquially known as TDT Banda—no relation. At this time, Nyasaland was still part of the federation Banda disdained so powerfully, and he embarked on a speaking tour across the territory to rail against the colonialists and recruit the black Africans of the region to his political movement. In those days, support for Banda&apos;s ideas and hunger for independence had grown so strong that he commanded large crowds everywhere he went, and it wasn&apos;t long until the federation government realized that he was an existential threat to their survival. Within months of Banda&apos;s arrival, Rhodesian troops were flown into Nyasaland, spreading across the countryside under a state of emergency and locking down whatever they could of the country. By March of 1959, Banda was imprisoned in what was then the city of Gwelo, in Southern Rhodesia, modern-day Zimbabwe.

Banda wouldn&apos;t spend long in prison. At this point, the mood in Britain had shifted sharply toward decolonization as the Crown found itself increasingly less able to justify its continued projects in Africa and elsewhere, and although the federation in central Africa certainly had continued economic promise for Britain, it wasn&apos;t sustainable in a rapidly evolving world order. Meanwhile, the federation government had begun to realize that there would be no peace from protest or demonstrations until, and unless, Banda was let out. He was released just over a year after he&apos;d been incarcerated to begin with, on the first of April, 1960, and from Gwelo, he went almost directly to London to take part in negotiations toward independence.

The next four years would be a whirlwind for Banda, who would play a pivotal role in the establishment of an independent nation where Nyasaland had once been. His work in rallying the people, in leading the political and intellectual conversation toward independence, and in negotiating with the Rhodesians and the British were all critical. When it came time to hold a first set of elections, still under British rule, Banda was only given the title of Minister of Land, Natural Resources and Local Government, but it was clear to all involved that he was the one who held the levers of power inside Nyasaland. He even gave the nation its new name, Malawi, after seeing the name on a French map, where it had corresponded to the lake that was so synonymous with his land. In 1963, Banda was officially granted the title of Prime Minister, a role he&apos;d informally held for quite a while already, and with his newfound authority, he set about a process of court, education, and trade reforms that laid the groundwork for a sovereign state. Even Malawi&apos;s date of official independence held personal significance for Banda, be it intentional or unintentional; that day, the sixth of July 1964, was six years, to the day, after Hastings Banda had returned to Nyasaland to set it on the course of independence. On that day, Nyasaland ceased to exist; this nation was now called Malawi, and Hastings Banda was the man holding the reins.

## Malawi Under Banda

Now, up to this point, we&apos;ve discussed Hastings Banda primarily through his education and his work—first as a doctor, and then as a political advocate toward independence. But now, it&apos;s time we discuss the man himself, because just like a whole range of dictators before and since, Banda&apos;s character and his perceptions of the world would play all too important a role in his people&apos;s lives for decades.

Banda existed at the intersection of rigid morality and moral superiority, in ways that became evident early on during his work with the independence movement in Malawi. Even while he lived abroad, Banda seemed to develop something of a superiority complex, belittling and acting imperiously toward not just Nyasaland&apos;s political leaders, but of other pan-African leaders as well. In London, he was known for his disdain of lax morals during wartime, of couples dancing together in public and consummating their affection in private. He was known to have only limited trust for his fellow Malawian politicians, preferring instead the counsel of friends from Britain, yet he seemed to relish the reputation of extremism that he had gained in the eyes of the colonialist regime. Said Banda in one article he wrote for *Africa Today*, quote: &quot;Nowhere in history did the so-called Moderates accomplish anything.&quot; In 1962, he had made it abundantly clear to his own Legislative Council that he saw himself as Malawi&apos;s sole policymaker, with every other government official being expected to faithfully make his vision into reality, without dissent or criticism. But so, too, did he prove more than willing to break the rules or even flip his views on a dime when it suited him. Starkly opposed to abortions in London, he may have run an abortion clinic in Ghana; publicly, he disdained infidelity and extramarital relations, but he and his secretary back in London had a child, who he left and refused to support throughout his life. He was, again, a proud anticolonial extremist, but he had zero qualms about cooperating closely with South Africa&apos;s apartheid government when it suited him. Call him a narcissist, call him a psychopath, call him a hypocrite…really, call him whatever you like, but whatever factors shaped his worldview and his approach to politics, they were about to become exceedingly important for every person in Malawi.

The first signs of real trouble came during the Cabinet Crisis of 1964, just seven weeks after independence. By then, Banda&apos;s reputation as an authoritarian was already well-established in his own circles; he had made it abundantly clear that disagreement or criticism of his policies would not be tolerated under any circumstance, and back in 1962, the suspicious death of a high-level official in a car crash had raised fears that Banda might have orchestrated his demise. The man in question, Dunduzu Chisiza, had written a pamphlet just before he died, arguing that after Malawi became independent, its administration should no longer submit to a single leader, and Chisiza had been the most outspoken dissenter in Banda&apos;s leadership structure at that time. Amidst a wave of violence against opposition politicians and Jehovah&apos;s Witnesses, including over 1,800 individual incidents in the first two months of 1964 alone, most of the true anti-Banda opposition had left the country by the time of its independence. Meanwhile, Banda had been floating the idea of arbitrary dismissals of his own ministers quite transparently in front of them, and had even gotten rid of one minister for, at that time, unexplained reasons. In his public speeches, he slighted and berated the members of his own cabinet, and he privately accused several of forming a secret alliance to undermine him. At the same time, he took on more and more government responsibilities for himself, to the point that his own appointed underlings—a more trusted group of loyalists, in his mind—were being assigned most of the day-to-day work of running the country.

The real trouble began around the time of independence, when the vast majority of Banda&apos;s ministers agreed that they would push Banda to sever his relationships with South Africa and Portugal, grow closer ties to other African nations, solicit aid from China, define the ministers&apos; positions, and take other actions to bring Malawi back in line with the standard for other nations. Banda was reportedly surprised by how hard his ministers pushed back at him, but while his ministers initially thought that their push had been successful, Banda had made up his mind in the opposite direction. In another meeting, Banda made his opposition to the cabinet crystal-clear, and when the cabinet attempted to force him to resign, Banda instead dismissed several of the ministers, prompting others to resign. With two cabinet ministers left, Banda railed to his parliament that his ministers had been conspiring against him, abusing their positions, and harboring true loyalties to the Chinese ambassador in the city of Dar-es-Salaam, outside of Malawi. By the end of Banda&apos;s play for power, not even the parliamentarians who were family members of the former ministers would support them; violence spilled onto the streets by supporters of both camps, and when the ex-ministers realized that they had no actual plan to resist Banda nor even a clear vision on what should be done at him, the group split up and fled the country. During the entire crisis, Banda had kept Britain&apos;s backing, with the Crown clearly preferring the idea of a pro-British autocrat over a government that might ally with communist China. In the aftermath, there was only minor violence, and most of the ministers who had fled Malawi would either never return, or come back only after Banda had died. One would be kidnapped back to Malawi, and would die after nearly eleven years in solitary confinement while awaiting execution.

In one fell swoop, Banda had devastated the political opposition inside Malawi so badly that it wouldn&apos;t rear its head again for decades. The results were precisely what one might expect. With power now fully consolidated within his grasp, it would be just a couple of years before a new Malawian constitution was passed, transforming the nation into a republic. Banda would run as the only candidate for the Malawian presidency, and install himself at the head of Malawi&apos;s only legal political party. For all intents and purposes, he wrote his dictatorship into the constitution itself, and with the support of the parliament behind him, he granted himself a wide range of executive and legislative authorities that went well beyond the scope of any non-dictatorial world leader. A few years later, parliament would make a move that was all too predictable; Banda was made His Excellency the Life President of the Republic of Malawi, and granted the title of *Ngwazi*, a word that in his native Chichewa language, can alternately mean savior, or conqueror.

With a title like that, perhaps it should be no surprise that Banda&apos;s cult of personality rose to a level rivaled only by the craziest dictators of history. Like members of the Kim regime in North Korea, every commercial building in Malawi was required to hang a picture of Banda on the wall, displayed higher up than any clock, any other picture, any piece of artwork, or anything else deemed decorative. Banda insisted that all films screened in Malawi be preceded by a movie trailer of sorts, playing the national anthem while showing footage of Banda waving to an adoring crowd. When he flew into any of Malawi&apos;s airports, he expected to be greeted by companies of dancing women, dressed in cloth that depicted Banda&apos;s own face. Discussions of his age were strictly prohibited, as were references to him that called him by any name or title other than &quot;Life President&quot;, and when he drove around the country, Malawians were expected to leave their homes, lock up behind them, and wave to the president as he drove past. Calendars bore his face, coins bore his face, stamps bore his face. Without fail, he always carried around a fly-whisk, waving it emphatically when he spoke in front of crowds. In public, he worked hard to tie his own personal mythology to the legacy of the Romans and Greeks, deliberately eschewing connections to Africa at the same time. And running through Banda&apos;s entire ethos, was his claim to absolute power. In his own words, quote: &quot;Everything is my business. Everything. Anything I say is law…literally law.&quot;

And if the personality cult was one side of the Hastings Banda coin, censorship was the other. In terms of the dress he expected of his citizens, he was practically Victorian; women couldn&apos;t wear pants or show their knees, they couldn&apos;t wear see-through clothing or sport visible cleavage, and when they were able to break those rules, like they might at a resort or at the shores of Lake Malawi, they were forbidden from letting any other person see them. Men were prohibited from growing their hair longer than collar-length, and that rule didn&apos;t just apply to Malawians; foreign nationals coming to Banda&apos;s country could expect a mandatory haircut at the airport if they arrived with hair outside the approved limits, and men found in public with long hair were liable to be grabbed by the police and given a haircut against their will. Films were censored by the national censorship board as a matter of course, with even the image of a couple kissing, being prohibited outright—and that&apos;s to say nothing of the response to deeper affronts like nudity. If a person purchased a videotape, it had to be sent to the Censorship Board to be checked out and approved before being sent back; books and magazines had pages cut out of them; and televisions were tightly controlled and were extremely difficult to get unless a person was particularly rich. For a while, the *Malawi Daily News* was the only newspaper allowed to print in the country, and just a single radio station was able to operate.

Second to his media prohibitions, education was the other bogeyman Banda seemed to fear most. Following the example of Plato, Banda seemed to actively disapprove of the idea of educating the masses, preferring the idea that most people shouldn&apos;t be allowed to know much at all, beyond what they needed to know. Literacy in Malawi remained low for the duration of his tenure, and creative speech produced by Malawi&apos;s own writers and poets was combed-through to find any trace of disobedience. Culturally, Banda instilled a sense of taboo around knowing anything about the region&apos;s history before Banda himself became a part of it, and book-burnings were common, especially for historical volumes. Foreigners who attempted to teach anything Banda didn&apos;t approve of, were liable to face deportation. The only exception was for Banda&apos;s beloved classics, for which he made substantial investments into a school modeled on England&apos;s Eton College where Malawian children were taught Greek and Latin en masse. Many graduates of the school would go on to become leaders in academia, business, and a whole range of fields inside Malawi, and some have played key roles in dismantling Banda&apos;s dictatorial legacy and rebuilding the country in his absence.

During his reign, Banda kept a stranglehold on any subordinates who even gave off a whiff of interest in the idea of opposition. Purges and internal explosions of violence were common, but none caught quite so much attention as the so-called Mwanza Four incident. In 1983, three of Banda&apos;s ministers had fallen for what may, or may not, have been a rather obvious trap laid out by the president. Banda had opened the floor for debate on multi-party democracy in Malawi, and the three ministers indicated during a cabinet meeting that they were in support of such an idea. Banda immediately dissolved his cabinet, the three were rounded up, and they, along with a parliamentarian who had stumbled upon them being tortured in a quiet area of the parliament compound, were killed and arranged in a way that suggested they&apos;d been killed in a car accident while making a mad dash to Mozambique. We&apos;d relate to you plainly how they actually died, but we&apos;d rather not be demonetized today; instead, suffice it to say that they each received the tent-stake version of an icepick lobotomy.

Finally, there was the question of Malawi&apos;s state-sponsored violence—something that was meted out by a number of brutal overseers, but none quite so often, and none quite so harshly, as the Malawi Young Pioneers. Sometimes, they were set upon religious minorities like Jehovah&apos;s Witnesses, sometimes against minority populations like Malawi&apos;s sizeable Indian community, but most of the time, they were simply out for blood wherever they could find it. Established in 1963 with the original intent of serving as a youth service program, the Young Pioneers spent their early days building up rural villages, teaching and rehearsing political doctrine to their pupils, and providing basic military training. During those years, instructors would keep an eye out for pupils who showed promise, sending them to Youth Pioneers bases for more extensive instruction during the school vacation months. But before long, the organization grew into a paramilitary and secret-police force, and as its utility to the regime grew, so did its size.

In its heyday, the Young Pioneers organization framed itself within an Israeli-style kibbutz model, forming intentional communities of regime loyalists in each of Malawi&apos;s then-24 districts. In each district, the Young Pioneers bases would train recruits in everything from agriculture and carpentry, to business, to politics, even drawing on technical instructors sent directly from the Israeli army. The organization quickly built a business apparatus, even their own airplane fleet, and ideologically, they took a sharp turn toward Kamuzuism—which was, in its proponents&apos; own words, quote: &quot;The ideology that Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, as Father and Founder of the Malawi nation, was the fount of all wisdom and always knew what was best for the nation.&quot; Once the Young Pioneers were well-established, their members spread across Malawi, building everything from physical infrastructure to commercial districts to homes and much more. The young people involved in the Pioneers were supposed to be able to return to their communities, and teach parents, older relatives, and neighbors to build stronger villages. But with that reach, came a deep level of infiltration across Malawian society, made even deeper by a network of non-Pioneer informants. They formed a network that was part secret police, part intelligence apparatus, and part militia, and they were given some pretty major weaponry by the Banda regime. They&apos;d even manage to secure a place as his most trusted bodyguards, and they&apos;d embark on a long campaign of intimidation, extrajudicial reprisal, and recruitment into forced labor across the countryside. By 1990, some three thousand youths would be trained each year at Young Pioneer bases, equipped with green-and-khaki uniforms and their own distinctive berets. It&apos;s difficult to say just how many people were killed, tortured, or arbitrarily incarcerated during the Banda years, most at the hands of the Young Pioneers, but estimates range anywhere from six thousand, for the most common numbers, to eighteen thousand, on the high end.

But despite the blatantly totalitarian nature of Hastings Banda&apos;s dictatorship, his reputation in the West was very slow to follow his actions at home. Banda was by no means unique in terms of how he was received internationally; in fact, he fit in quite nicely alongside Chile&apos;s Augusto Pinochet, Ethiopia&apos;s Haile Selassie, the Philippines&apos; Ferdinand Marcos, Iran&apos;s Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and a range of other global autocrats. Across the decades of the Cold War, he was just like them: a useful dictator, one who kept his population in line, didn&apos;t stir the pot very much outside his own borders, and could be counted on to support the United States instead of going over to the Soviets. Banda, in particular, came off as particularly harmless; he was known more for his three-piece suits, his handkerchiefs and walking sticks, and occasional reporting on his eccentricities, than for his totalitarian policies. He was even awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Massachusetts, just after being elected president in his one-candidate race, and he&apos;d return the favor to the US in kind, becoming one of the few African heads of state to support America in Vietnam.

Meanwhile, he ensured that his disdain for the rest of the world&apos;s nations, particularly communist countries, was obvious for all to see. With African nations, he was no more cordial, with one key exception: apartheid-era South Africa. While most nations of the region had no choice but to do limited business with the South African regime, usually quite unhappily, Malawi recognized the nation and kept up diplomatic relations, alongside a lucrative trade agreement. Naturally, Banda caught some massive flak for this from his fellow African leaders, but he was undeterred by their opposition. Instead, he advocated his pragmatic approach all the stronger, and called on his colleagues in other countries to try to convince South Africa through diplomatic channels that apartheid was unnecessary. Said Banda of his fellow leaders, quote: &quot;They practice disunity, not unity, while posing as the liberators of Africa. While they play in the orchestra of Pan Africanism, their own Romes are burning.&quot; For his defense of South Africa, he received significant financial incentives, in a clean quid-pro-quo that continued through the end of the apartheid era. It would later emerge that Banda had secretly lent his own support to the African National Congress, the anti-apartheid political party that ultimately saw Nelson Mandela&apos;s way clear to the head of the South African government. Closer to his own borders, Banda would also provide financial and personnel support to both sides of Mozambique&apos;s civil war during the 1980s, with Malawi&apos;s professional military backing up the government, but the Malawi Young Pioneers supporting the national resistance there.

But no attempt to understand Hastings Banda could possibly be successful, unless you also understand the people who surrounded him—and most importantly, a woman colloquially known as &quot;mama&quot;. Born Cecilia Kadzamira, &quot;Mama&quot;—alternately referred to as the Mother of the Nation—had first met Banda as a nurse working at one of his medical practices. She then became Banda&apos;s secretary, then his confidante and close friend, to the point that they became inseparable. During the later years of Banda&apos;s life, Kadzamira would exercise direct control over who the dictator spoke to, what the dictator read, what legislation passed across his desk, and what knowledge he was able to glean, even about his own country. Her &quot;mama&quot; moniker was given to her when she was assigned duties as Malawi&apos;s First Lady, although she and Banda never married. Kadzamira&apos;s uncle was one John Tembo, who&apos;d been an interpreter for Banda in his early days, but had then spent decades as a close confidant to the dictator. By the late years of Banda&apos;s dictatorship, Tembo had his own loyalists within the Malawian Secret Service, the Young Pioneers, and other armed groups, who routinely engaged in systematic incarceration and execution of anybody who stood in his way. In Banda&apos;s later life, Kadzamira would try unsuccessfully to see Tembo named his successor, but although that was a losing effort, Kadzamira—and through her, Tembo—would exert a controlling influence in Malawi for much of the 1980s and early 1990s.

As a result of Kadzamira&apos;s influence, it&apos;s difficult to determine just how much Banda really knew about the problems his citizens faced, particularly in parts of the country that were further removed from Banda&apos;s own capital city. A journalist who wrote about Banda for *The Independent*, one Caroline Alexander, related one experience she&apos;d had while living in the country, to show just how skewed Banda&apos;s picture of Malawi could sometimes be. Quote: &quot;For example, every year Banda paid a visit to the Zomba General Hospital. Normally, the hospital was so ill-equipped and overcrowded that patients lay two to a cot, head-to-toe like sardines. I once visited a friend who was recovering from a motorcycle accident and found him sharing a pillow with the swollen, gangrenous legs of his cot-mate, who was adrift in a reverie of pain. Sticking my head around the corner of the maternity ward, I saw women lying on the floor beneath the beds, as well as in them. But when a visit from Banda was imminent, the hospital was newly whitewashed, and the wards half-emptied. What he saw was a neat line of cots each tidily occupied by a single patient, while surplus patients lay heaped together in a central courtyard out of view.&quot; But regardless of how much Banda knew, or how upset he might have been about individual policy decisions, it appears highly unlikely that he would have taken umbrage to the overall situation in Malawi by the end of his reign. After all, he&apos;d done all the grand architecture himself; Kadzamira, and others, were just hammering out the fine details.

By most accounts of the period, the several-decade-long rule of Hastings Banda placed him alongside the most repressive, totalitarian dictators in the world at that time. His complete control over his country&apos;s political architecture, his systemic denial of many of even the most fundamental rights to Malawians, and his intent to cling to power until death did he and Malawi part, were certainly substantial enough evidence to support such a damning claim. But the Banda era passed without turmoil, without upheaval, without foreign intervention, and, for the most part, without ever making headlines around the world. In a period throughout history where both global superpowers—the Americans and the Soviets—were on the hunt for what amounted to &apos;good little dictators&apos;, using tactics that the superpowers didn&apos;t ask questions about while ensuring that their populations never made trouble…well, Malawi and Hastings Banda were among the best of the best. Banda was easy to ignore, he was easy to indulge, he was easy to chuckle about or dismiss as a harmless eccentric, and as a result, the world looked away from Malawi for decades, even as the people who lived there, were stuck with a situation that gave them very little up-side to speak of.

## De-Throning a President for Life

By the early 1990s, Hastings Banda was a king among men. His authority inside Malawi was fundamentally unchallenged, and while, in private, he ruled only through the filter of Cecilia Kadzamira, the political implications of that fact tended to rhyme with Banda&apos;s own views on his people—that is, what they didn&apos;t know, wouldn&apos;t hurt them. Banda exerted direct control over most of Malawi&apos;s economy, he was estimated to have amassed a fortune of several hundred million US dollars, a fleet of limousines, a private jet, and a robust enough network of enforcers, the red-shirted Young Pioneers, that any potential dissident had long since left the country. But there was just one problem: Banda didn&apos;t have a successor, and while he did use his political influence to nudge Malawian internal affairs one way or another, he seemed to take very little interest in what would happen after he was no longer Malawi&apos;s sole leading voice.

Of course, that issue probably didn&apos;t matter much to the old man; after all, he was President for Life, and whatever happened after he was gone, was going to be everybody&apos;s problem *except* for his. But Banda had made one critical miscalculation—specifically, he&apos;d failed to account for the fact that he might live long enough to see the end to the Cold War. Banda knew full well where his bread was buttered; his shrewd courtship with South Africa, the United States, and other global nations were enough to prove that. But when the Soviet Union crumbled, Banda was no longer useful to those nations. The same policymakers who&apos;d seen Banda&apos;s fervent anti-communism, and used it as justification to look past his many overreaches and send him buckets of money, now had very little use for third-world dictators, and certainly not when they came with as much baggage as dear old Hastings. Western governmental aid dried up, and even worse, nonprofit organizations and private donors finally had the leeway to tell Hastings Banda what they&apos;d probably wanted to say for decades: either reform the government to be transparent and accountable to both Malawians and the world, or Banda wasn&apos;t getting a single cent more.

With the writing on the wall that the old man&apos;s total control had been disrupted, Malawian and international groups descended on the dictator. Malawi&apos;s Catholic bishops released a letter that condemned the Banda government, while students across the country marched in protest of the dictator, and a labor unionist named Chakufwa Chihana, later called the father of Malawian democracy, held a rally at the capital city&apos;s international airport to call outright for a referendum on Malawi&apos;s future. The Young Pioneers, so recently unchallenged in their own country, now faced increasing resistance from the rest of the population, who still had reason to fear, but no longer believed that their situation was hopeless.

In the face of such fervent opposition, Banda might have considered trying the same brutal crackdowns and other repressive actions that dictators in similar spots were trying across the globe…but instead, he chose a different tack. In October of 1992, Banda agreed to a referendum on Malawi&apos;s one-party state, and when the result was a landslide vote in favor of multi-party democracy, Banda worked with the new political parties to organize a general election. When he was stripped of his President for Life title and saw most of his executive and legislative authority undone, he seemed to treat the occasion like an academic, studying the political upheaval in his country as it played out before him. And when it was time to choose Malawi&apos;s next president, Banda took part in the process. By that time, the Young Pioneers had been disarmed and dismantled, the transition to democracy was well underway, and Banda had every bit of evidence at his disposal to suggest that he wasn&apos;t about to be re-elected President…but he seemed surprised when he ended up on the wrong side of another landslide vote, this one anointing an ethnic Yao political leader to the office of the presidency. Banda would concede defeat that same day in a radio address; quoting here, &quot;I wish to congratulate him wholeheartedly, and offer him my full support and cooperation.&quot;

And, anticlimactic as it might have been…that was the end of Malawi&apos;s over-three-decades straight of Hastings Banda. The dictator, strong as he might have been in his heyday, went down without a fight. Perhaps he was too old and too tired to oversee yet another round of repression; perhaps he knew that his position was no longer strong enough to keep a hold on power; or perhaps he understood that the people around him now had too much influence over him, for him to see his own situation with any real clarity. Perhaps, as some sources on Banda have since suggested, the experience was academic for him—a real set of public-opinion data points that allowed him to see his own failed experiment in dictatorship for what it was. But no matter the truth of Banda&apos;s own experience during his overthrow, the result was the same: Malawi&apos;s President for Life, had managed to outlive his presidency.

That wasn&apos;t yet the end for the old ex-dictator; a year after losing his election, Banda would be arrested and charged with murder. The incident in question, is the same one we discussed a while ago, in which four party officials were killed by government forces, and staged as if they&apos;d all died in a car crash. As it turned out, there had been 167 witnesses who&apos;d seen or heard enough to testify, churning out a transcript of the court inquiry that ran for well over a thousand pages. But Malawi&apos;s peculiar legal system, and particularly a rule that allows the admission of hearsay evidence only when it runs contrary to the interests of the person providing it, meant that much of the testimony was inadmissible. Because of that legal reality, and because the officials involved wanted to keep close fealty to the legal system as a show of proper conduct, Banda and John Tembo would not be convicted—even though inadmissible witness statements had tied them both inextricably to the crime itself.

One other factor seemed to aid Banda in his defense: his diagnosis with an acute loss of short-term memory, along with early symptoms of Parkinson&apos;s, that a panel of doctors had assessed would prevent him from standing trial. The journalist we referenced earlier, Caroline Alexander, explained the problem succinctly while writing for *The Independent*; quote: &quot;He could not, it seemed, remember the hour or the day or the year before, though he was still capable of lucid, even elegant, conversation along carefully selected lines.&quot; By the way, Alexander&apos;s recollections of her conversations with Banda tell of long and intricate discussions about the finer points of Roman rule, demonstrating—for whatever it&apos;s worth—a pretty robust mental acuity.

What good it would have been to punish Banda, well over a decade after the incident in question and during the first years of a multi-party administration, is another matter entirely. While the families of the victims attested quite frankly to wanting to see Banda punished, the ex-dictator still drew strong support across Malawi, and punishing him too harshly for his crimes may have prompted major public backlash. If he&apos;d been found guilty of murder, the mandatory punishment—by his own judicial standard—would have been execution, but to kill an old man who was widely believed by Malawians to be sick, and more misguided than despicable, was likely to make more problems than it would have alleviated.

In his final years, Banda would stay unrepentant about his role in Malawi&apos;s history. If anything, he seemed proud of his time as dictator. He scoffed at his fellow Malawians as inexperienced, naïve, even childish when it came to politics, echoing much of the same derision he&apos;d held for them in his days as their overlord. He insisted, publicly and privately, that his people would eventually regret having decided to toss him out. Statements he offered toward reconciliation may have apologized for his impact, but not his actions; quoting from an apology statement given after his acquittal in court, &quot;During my term of office, I selflessly dedicated myself to the good cause of Mother Malawi in the fight against Poverty, Ignorance and Disease among many other issues; but if within the process, those who worked in my government or through false pretence in my name or indeed unknowingly by me, pain and suffering was caused to anybody in this country in the name of nationhood, I offer my sincere apologies.&quot; After a quiet final few months, Banda would die of respiratory failure, in an American clinic after being treated for pneumonia. At his side, of course, was Cecilia Kadzamira. In Malawi, Banda was given a funeral with full state honors and a nineteen-gun salute, in a clean, efficient, and unmissable tribute that finally closed the book on Hastings Banda, once and for all.

## A New Era for Malawi

With Banda out of office, Malawi could finally shift into a trajectory it had never known before: one of real, genuine development, and reconstruction on a nationwide scale. Now that the dictator was gone, global aid could pour in, and *was it ever* going to be necessary. By the time Banda&apos;s rule had ended, Malawi was struggling with issues from stunning levels of illiteracy, to widespread malnutrition, to a high rate of child mortality. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Doctors Without Borders, food aid organizations, legal support in drafting a new constitution, and more, were all desperately needed, if this nation was to have any future at all. Luckily, Banda&apos;s legacy hadn&apos;t included a late-stage civil war or any other act of national bloodletting at scale, but it was still well within the realm of possibility that Malawi might have fully collapsed, or otherwise passed directly to the control of a new dictator.

The man charged with averting Malawi&apos;s next crisis, was one Bakili Muluzi. Born in Malawi&apos;s days as Nyasaland in 1943, Muluzi had worked under Banda during the 1970s as a so-called &quot;minister without portfolio&quot;, but now, he&apos;d been elected as the head of Malawi&apos;s biggest opposition party. When he arrived, foreign aid immediately picked back up, to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars a year. Muluzi and his deputies instituted policies of nationwide press freedom, cost-free education, and a release of political prisoners that repopulated Malawi&apos;s intellectual and political class, to the extent that it had been able to survive at all. The country&apos;s economy was restructured, and a new constitution took the place of the old, not eliminating Hastings Banda&apos;s old political party, but placing it back on equal footing with all other political organizations in the nation.

But as optimistic as Malawi might have been, at least for a little while, reality very quickly began to set in that the transition to democracy would not be an easy one. Before long, the World Bank&apos;s attempt to open the Malawian economy had backfired; inflation went through the roof, and the local currency was devalued to barely half its Banda-era worth. Political upheaval in the next country over, Mozambique, led to a flood of weapons and displaced people into Malawi. The crime rate increased dramatically, even including one instance in which armed robbers killed a high-ranking Malawian general, and for a brief moment, the army unsuccessfully attempted a mutiny. Nor did Mother Nature make things easy; a drought in the immediate post-Banda years led to widespread hunger in the countryside, well before large-scale food aid was available to offset the impact. Even the President&apos;s own spokesman, a man named Al Osman, admitted to the *Los Angeles Times* in 1995 that things were looking bleak. Said Osman, quote: &quot;A hungry person doesn&apos;t need much encouragement to say things were better under the evil empire. People are saying, &apos;What has your democracy done for me?&apos;&quot;

Indeed, Malawi during the Bakili Muluzi years foundered rather quickly. The bold campaigns that Malawi&apos;s new leaders had envisioned, meant to root out corruption and bring Malawians up to a higher standard of living, were broadly unsuccessful. Malawi&apos;s position on the world stage did improve a good bit, especially in opening relations with other African nations and the Arab world, but there was only so much tangible impact that foreign-policy changes could make on the plight of the people. When President Muluzi ran for, and won, a second term as president in 1999, his opponent challenged the results, and the challenge set off an explosion of public discontent across the country. The election had inflamed ethnic tensions between the Muslim Yao population, of which the president was a member, and Malawi&apos;s other, mostly Christian tribes. Looting and violence went on for weeks in the aftermath, with over two hundred mosques burned to the ground, and many instances of police either using extreme force on their detainees, or carrying out extrajudicial executions. The riots called attention to Malawi&apos;s ongoing problems with arbitrary arrest and detention of citizens, and the country&apos;s difficult and often dangerous prison conditions. Not only that, but the closer that the global community began to look at Malawi, the more it found endemic issues with domestic violence, abuse of children, and child labor.

After the 1999 crisis, the world began to sour yet again on Malawi&apos;s leader, this time condemning Muluzi for what we&apos;d generously call democratic backsliding, if we accept the rather questionable premise that Malawi had reached a state of democracy by that time. His administration drew positive headlines in 2000, sending military forces into neighboring Mozambique and rescuing over a thousand people from a flooding crisis, but lost that street cred within two years, as a slow response to a severe food shortage eventually precipitated a state of famine. Even during the height of the crisis, officials were accused of selling off reserves of grain for a profit, and otherwise mismanaging the crisis for their own financial benefit. In 2004, Muluzi&apos;s chosen successor waltzed his way to the presidency, in what was generally considered to be an election that was neither free nor fair.

That particular election was going to be a turning point for Malawi, no matter which way it went. It was supposed to be the country&apos;s first-ever democratic transfer of power, and in a practical sense, it was the moment that Malawi would find out whether its future political leaders were going to keep faithful to the idea of a democracy, or start up a dictatorship of their own. When the results came in, all hope was lost; Malawi was going to return to its old ways, and the new president, Bingu wa Mutharika, was going to be the one to take it there.

Except…well, that didn&apos;t happen. Shortly after he was elected to the presidency, Mutharika left his political party behind, eventually starting his own instead. He launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign, one that seemed to actually work, and he streamlined both the government&apos;s cabinet of ministers, and its spending habits, to make it into a functional system of government. He worked to strengthen the judiciary, and quickly turned it against his own former party allies, several of whom would be arrested and prosecuted for their own corrupt acts. International aid organizations, who&apos;d gone back to holding Malawi at arm&apos;s length because of the last president&apos;s actions, saw what Mutharika was doing and came back into the fold. The political reforms of the Mutharika era led to early steps in addressing Malawi&apos;s growing HIV/AIDS crisis, finishing the educational and infrastructural reforms the last administration had started, and bringing a new generation of political leaders into the fold. Attempts to impeach Mutharika were ultimately unsuccessful, and the last president before him was arrested multiple times, including in a plot to overthrow Mutharika in 2008, and as part of a donor-embezzlement investigation in 2009. In that year, Mutharika ran against an aging and notorious figure from the Banda days, one John Tembo, who we&apos;ve already mentioned at length. But despite Mutharika&apos;s unfair advantages within Malawi&apos;s state-owned media apparatus, it was clear that the population was behind him; he coasted to a second term in an election where, even if the final vote tally might have been a bit suspect, the result certainly wasn&apos;t.

By 2009, Malawi had come leaps and bounds from where it had been just a few years earlier. The food supply was now stable in most parts of the country, and the economy was growing consistently…but yet again, things shifted for the worse. This time, it was Mutharika who was growing more autocratic, grooming his brother to be his successor, and throwing out high-ranking officials who disagreed with him. In 2011, amidst an economic downturn, anti-Mutharika demonstrations broke out; in response, the national army would kill nineteen people, and wound hundreds more. Aid organizations folded up their operations and pulled away from the country again, especially British groups, put off from supporting Malawi by a diplomatic screaming match between the two governments. To top it all off, Mutharika died of a heart attack, in April of 2012.

In death, just as he&apos;d done in life, Mutharika brought Malawi to yet another turning point, yet another critical juncture in which the struggling nation had to choose between democracy or dictatorship. By law, the presidency would pass to the Vice President, a woman named Joyce Banda—no relation to Hastings. But according to Mutharika&apos;s own inner circle, they now had a very limited time to block Joyce Banda from rising to the presidency, and a very limited set of options as to how they got that done. The result was one of the more peculiar instances of a 21st-century succession crisis. When Mutharika collapsed during a meeting, and quite clearly died in an ambulance en route to the hospital, his cabal of supporters didn&apos;t announce his death; instead, they gave numerous false statements to the press insisting that he was still alive, kept the body intubated and connected to medical equipment, and tried to fly him to South Africa via an air ambulance that had come from the nearby nation. At first, the helicopter refused to depart because the pilots lacked the clearance to transport what was obviously a corpse; then, that clearance was granted and the pilots explained that their flying hours for the day had expired; then, South Africa&apos;s High Commissioner and Zimbabwe&apos;s ambassador to Malawi descended on the airport to try and fix the situation. Eventually, Mutharika&apos;s body was flown to South Africa, and kept in a hospital emergency room for just a few minutes, before being taken to the morgue. Malawian ministers were still swearing to the people that Mutharika was alive a day after he died, and the deceased president&apos;s brother even outright suggested a military coup to an Army commander, although his suggestion was politely dismissed. Eventually, it was South Africa that forced Malawi&apos;s hand, insisting that they&apos;d announce Mutharika&apos;s death if the Malawian government didn&apos;t. Hours later, Joyce Banda was sworn into the presidency.

Malawi&apos;s second Banda era wouldn&apos;t last long; the country&apos;s first woman president had been able to navigate through the coup attempt, but she wasn&apos;t particularly well-liked at home. Abroad, she received broad acclaim for several reasons; she, herself, was seen as a personification of democracy&apos;s triumph in the country, and she was able to tamp down on corruption, get foreign NGOs and donors back on board with the country, soften Malawi&apos;s stance on homosexuality, and put the Malawian economy back together. She impressed the whole world at Nelson Mandela&apos;s funeral, where her eulogy was a highlight of the event. She&apos;d also dismiss her entire cabinet in 2013, after a leading anti-corruption official survived an assassination attempt while investigating several of Banda&apos;s own ministers. The outcome of the scandal was a major victory for Banda, but it wasn&apos;t enough; in 2014, she&apos;d come in third in a set of national elections that featured quite a few irregularities, but were generally seen as having come to a credible result. Banda attempted to annul the elections, but she was unsuccessful, and in a bit of irony that perfectly sums up the strangeness of post-dictatorship Malawi, the man who took her place was the same one who&apos;d nearly been installed as president just two years prior. That, of course, was now-dead president Mutharika&apos;s brother Peter.

The new President Mutharika offered some tangible improvements on his brother&apos;s administration. He pushed the country to diversify its agricultural crop, ran a generally technocratic government, and refrained from the sorts of brutal repression against political demonstrators that had become so common across the country. But his administration was also quite corrupt, it was a punching bag for public discontent, and it oversaw an energy shortage that further alienated the people. During his time in office, Malawi saw slow, but positive trend-lines on just about every indicator of development, but slow and steady was not what the Malawian public was looking for. Like his brother, Peter Mutharika proved willing to hold onto power using less-than-honorable methods, and in 2019, he found his way to a second term via a highly controversial election in which Mutharika&apos;s political party was broadly accused of having rigged the vote. This time, the issues were widespread and quite obvious across the country, including blatant reversal of people&apos;s votes by election commissioners and using corrective fluid to erase handwritten votes on ballots, alongside a range of other, similarly cartoonish acts. Yet again, Malawi found itself at the same crossroads it had visited time and time again, and yet again, one road led to democracy, and the other to dictatorship.

But in February of 2020, a bit over eight months after Mutharika was sworn in for a second term, the High Court of Malawi took a step that few nations in this situation would ever dare to do. Amidst widespread demonstrations and protests against the Mutharika regime, judges from Malawi&apos;s constitutional court ruled in a 500-page decision that the 2019 election would be nullified, and fresh elections would be held five months after their nullification. The decision was historic across not just Malawi, but all of Africa, in only the second instance ever of an election being nullified on the continent. In 2020, Mutharika was trounced by his political rival, Malawi&apos;s current president, Lazarus Chakwera. That would make this particular election the first in African history not just to benullified, but for the rerun to go to an opposition candidate, instead of resulting in crackdowns, coups, or any other sort of misbehavior by the regime to retain its power. So, that brings us to the present day in Malawi, where, we&apos;ve got to be very clear, things are still far from perfect. Current president Chakwera has faced criticism for appointing six people to his thirty-one member cabinet who were related to other cabinet members, including a husband and wife, a brother and sister, and a pair of in-laws. Chakwera&apos;s public service appointments have stirred up controversy because of his failure to abide by a law that demands at least forty percent of public appointees be women, and because his chosen figures largely hail from his own voter strongholds. He&apos;s even had his own anti-corruption czar arrested, in an act that&apos;s divided both his own country and the international community. But even still, Chakwera has continued the long, slow erosion of Malawi&apos;s dictatorial legacy. He&apos;s worked to trim down Malawi&apos;s executive privileges, taken steps to curtail the wanton spending of high-ranking government officials, and eased taxes for most of the population to address a budding cost-of-living crisis. While he may or may not run for a second term in 2025, he appears, at least for now, to be on track to participate in a fair and free election—although whether he can resist Malawi&apos;s seeming temptation toward autocracy until then, remains to be seen. Looking beyond the man in Malawi&apos;s highest office, the country&apos;s situation is less dire than it&apos;s been, but it&apos;s still not good. Life expectancy at birth still lags behind the global average, HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death nationwide, tuberculosis and malaria are still common, and some twenty percent of children don&apos;t complete a primary education. The nation&apos;s population is very, *very* young on average, and growing at a breakneck pace, while GDP per capita in 2022 was still as low as 645 US dollars annual. Inflation rates spike and dive from year to year, sometimes cresting as high as thirty percent, and less than a fifth of the population has consistent access to electricity, while barely half have access to reliable sanitation services. In 2023, Freedom House considered the country only partly free, and the country took serious knocks from the NGO on its ongoing corruption crisis, its politicized media and hostile environment for journalists, its relative lack of due process, and its poorly supported and often brutal policing and prison systems. The country&apos;s domestic violence, child marriage, and child labor problems have gotten slightly less abysmal, but are still a subject of serious and well-earned concern. Finally, Hastings Banda is back in vogue; now, with the dictator&apos;s memory somewhat faded, he&apos;s celebrated with a public holiday and a nostalgia that often earns him praise in Malawian media and politics. So, with such an exhaustive list of Malawi&apos;s many, many enduring problems, we can finally circle back and address how we, here on Places, presented this episode at the outset. Did we lie to you, when we said that Malawi was coming back stronger than ever, or when we said that it held the secrets to not just surviving, but overcoming a dictatorship? Well…no, actually, we said it, and we meant it. Malawi today is hardly thought of in most of the world, it&apos;s a mere bubble amidst the thrashing waves of global geopolitics, and it&apos;s got profound issues that will haunt it for generations to come. But it&apos;s also among the most distinctive, and, dare we say, impressive examples of a country that&apos;s dug its way out of dictatorship—not via a foreign intervention, not via a civil war, but with its own two hands. Malawi&apos;s path toward a better future, has been incredibly painful. At times, it&apos;s been four steps forward, and three steps stumbling back. If we might reference the classics that Hastings Banda so coveted, Malawi&apos;s tale is the Greek myth of Sisyphus, a former tyrant condemned by the gods to roll an immense boulder to the top of a hill, only to see it fall back to the bottom, every single time. But unlike Sisyphus, the real-life people of Malawi aren&apos;t trapped inside a myth. They&apos;re really doing it, administration by administration, accident after accident, power grab after power grab, sometimes getting bad results from good intentions, and sometimes getting good results, from bad intentions. If Malawi started from the bottom…then make no mistake, we *do* mean the very bottom. It&apos;s been a land exploited and enslaved, a land living under totalitarian rule, and a land fought over by modern-day leaders who can&apos;t seem to decide whether they&apos;re dictators or not. But the people of Malawi started from the bottom; now they&apos;re here…and with any luck, they&apos;ll keep on climbing, building an entire nation from the ruin, and the painful legacy that was left for them.

## Key Takeaways

- Malawi is a small, underdeveloped African nation that endured decades of totalitarian rule under Hastings Banda.,Banda&apos;s dictatorship was marked by severe repression, a cult of personality, and extensive censorship.,Despite Banda&apos;s oppressive regime, Malawi transitioned to democracy peacefully in the 1990s.,The post-Banda era has seen Malawi struggle with economic and political challenges, including corruption and democratic backsliding.,Malawi&apos;s journey highlights its resilience and efforts to build a better future after a dark past.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the capital of Malawi?

The capital of Malawi is Lilongwe.

### What is the largest lake in Malawi?

The largest lake in Malawi is Lake Malawi, also known as Lake Nyasa.

### What is the population of Malawi?

The population of Malawi is estimated to be around 21 and a half million.

### What are the major ethnic groups in Malawi?

The major ethnic groups in Malawi are the Chewa, Lomwe, Yao, and Tumbuka.

### What is the nickname of Malawi?

Malawi is known as the &quot;Warm Heart of Africa.&quot;

### What is the significance of Lake Malawi?

Lake Malawi is the fourth-largest freshwater lake by volume and the ninth-largest by area. It is also the second-deepest lake in Africa and hosts a vast number of cichlid fish species.

### What is the political history of Malawi?

Malawi gained independence from British colonial rule in 1964. It was initially led by Hastings Banda, who ruled as a dictator until 1994. Since then, Malawi has transitioned to a multi-party democracy, though it has faced challenges with corruption and political instability.

### What is the economic situation in Malawi?

Malawi is one of the world&apos;s least developed countries. It struggles with issues such as high levels of illiteracy, widespread malnutrition, and a high rate of child mortality. The economy is heavily dependent on agriculture, and the country faces significant challenges in terms of poverty and economic development.

### What is the role of the Malawi Young Pioneers?

The Malawi Young Pioneers were a paramilitary and secret-police force established by Hastings Banda. They were involved in state-sponsored violence, intimidation, and forced labor. They were disbanded after Banda&apos;s rule ended.

### What is the current political situation in Malawi?

Malawi is currently led by President Lazarus Chakwera. The country has faced challenges with corruption and political instability, but it has made progress in transitioning to a multi-party democracy. The political situation remains complex, with ongoing efforts to address corruption and strengthen democratic institutions.

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- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/Ibis_hadada_%28Bostrychia_hagedash%29%2C_parque_nacional_de_Tarangire%2C_Tanzania%2C_2024-05-24%2C_DD_23.jpg) by Diego Delso / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Story of Missouri&apos;s Toxic Ghost Town.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/missouri-toxic-ghost-town-times-beach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/missouri-toxic-ghost-town-times-beach</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Deep in Midwest Americana, just outside the city of St. Louis, lies the buried corpse of a town. What used to be a place for children to laugh and play in the pastoral waterways, amongst a thriving community of people who cared about each other, is now devoid of humanity, as it rots beneath the surface.

But this was no ordinary town. This was Times Beach, Missouri. This was a town that looked out for one another. This was a town that survived The Great Depression through hard work and community spirit. This was a town that rebuilt itself again and again.

So, what catastrophic thing could have happened here to make everyone leave it all behind?

This is a story that forces you to ask yourself, &quot;what is home?&quot; It&apos;s a story about struggle and resilience. It&apos;s a story about community, and it&apos;s a story about humanity.

Welcome to Times Beach. Population? Zero.

## Life&apos;s a Beach

To understand why this small town went from paradise to poisonous, we need to look at how it was founded, and the history will give us a feel for the human story, and the people alive today who were there when everything went wrong.

Times Beach was founded in a way that you might not expect, via a newspaper promotion. Back all the way in 1925, when it seems you could more or less just give American land away, the old *St. Louis Times*, a regional newspaper, launched an advertisement that you couldn&apos;t even conceive of happening today.

If you bought a six-month subscription to the newspaper for $67.50, a person could receive a tract of land in Times Beach, an idyllic little hamlet in the woods just 27 kilometres from the centre of St. Louis—that&apos;s about 17 miles for those of you who speak gun.

Now don&apos;t get me wrong, this is absurdly cheap for land, even when adjusted for inflation it&apos;s $1,237 dollars in 2025 money. Expensive for a newspaper subscription for half a year? Absolutely. But for land it was pretty good, although you did need two of them realistically to have enough land to build a small house or cabin. $2,500 dollars wasn&apos;t exactly easy to come by for a lot of people in 1925, but for some it was manageable when saving for a little while. Or if you wanted you could put a $10-dollar downpayment on the land and pay the rest through instalments of $2.50 per month, which was a pretty sweet deal, with lots of people taking the paper up on their offer. The paper had actually bought the land from a farmer, rebranding it as a paradise resort, a place for doctors, managers, and high society individuals from St. Louis to kick back during the summer months, catch some fish in the mighty Meramec River, and forget about the troubles of the interwar years. So, Times Beach wasn&apos;t exactly designed for permanent habitation, at least not yet. It was more of a holiday park than a settlement.

A full-page advertisement reportedly boasted:

&gt; &quot;The sweltering heat and discomfort of the city are unknown at Times Beach.&quot;

But this idyllic little slice of rural Americana would not remain this way for long. When the Great Depression hit in 1929, Missouri was devastated by the economic disaster, as much of the state was farmland. Lots of those doctors, managers, and folk who saved up to afford a little timeshare close to home, started to really struggle. Food was scarce, families suffered, across all of the United States, but here on the outskirts of Missouri, people took a chance.

Marilyn Leistner, the last ever mayor of Times Beach was interviewed by the *St. Louis Magazine* in 2017, and whilst she was not alive at the time of the great depression, she naturally knew a lot about the settlement&apos;s history, stating:

&gt; &quot;During the Depression, a lot of the people in the city moved into their homes in Times Beach to ride out the hard times.&quot;

The prices in the city were just too high, you could downsize a little to a smaller rural community where competition for money and bread was less fierce. It seemed to work for the people who relocated, but the depression was not certainly not easy for anybody. Worse yet, in the 1930s, the states were ravaged by the dust bowl, as soil erosion and high winds turned middle America into a scene out of *Mad Max*, just minus the mutants and cars. The people of Times Springs could never have known it, but the dust that would blow in from far and wide into their community would topple the first domino in a series of events leading to the town&apos;s evacuation in the early 80s. But I&apos;m getting ahead of myself.

Despite the hardship, Times Beach began to slowly grow, both in population, but also in one of the most important elements of a functioning settlement, a community spirit. Cottages on stilts, built to avoid flooding, were replaced with modular homes and even a few brick houses. There were four churches and four taverns so people could balance their sins with their faith, this was the Midwest after all. The liquor store doubled as the tackle shop, and there was even a town hall. Much to the chagrin of longtime residents, a trailer park opened in the settlement, another would follow, and it even got a 7-Eleven… fancy.

And no, it wasn&apos;t perfect, nor was it rich. Missouri and indeed Times Beach dragged itself by the fingernails out of the Great Depression, and that economic struggle remained for decades, but that sense of community, that shared struggle of what the town had been through, meant people were happy.

Between picnics in nature with your neighbours, river recreation, town dances, and that old community spirit America used to be known for before suburbs took over, it was pastoral, it was nurturing. It was a simple life, but a good life. A tiny slice of paradise, where the company you worked for wasn&apos;t nearly as valuable as the company you kept around you.

Former Mayor Leistner said:

&gt; &quot;It was like everybody was related to everybody.&quot;

Residents today tell stories of being able to leave their houses unlocked, and how everyone watched everyone else&apos;s kids to look out for them. It was a growing, but close-knit community, welcoming, homely, like a family. Eventually by 1982, the small town had grown to a population of around 2,500. And pretty much nobody in all of the United States would have heard of it, were it not for a disaster on the horizon that would cost some residents everything.

## Poisoning A Community

So far, we have a small but idyllic little town, some economic hardship, and some dust, but how did this lead to disaster among this seemingly perfect little community?

Well, it&apos;s because of a few strange circumstances actually occurring outside of the St. Louis bubble entirely. Due Southwest on highway 44, just past the city of Springfield, is a little city called Verona, and in Verona throughout the 70s was a pharmaceutical facility part-leased by the private Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company, otherwise known as NEPACCO, from the original company known as Hoffman-Taff who owned the building. Eventually NEPACCO would go under in 1976, meanwhile the facility, as well as Hoffman-Taff would be bought out by Syntex Agribusiness back in 1969.

Ok, and what were NEPACCO producing there? Well, they were producing a chemical known as &quot;Hexachlorophene.&quot; It was their main product they produced, which also just so happened to be banned in 1972, after 36 young children died in France following its use in talcum powder. It was mostly a chemical used for cosmetics at the time, as well as in things like soaps and creams, and its ban was why NEPACCO later went under. And as you can imagine, this stuff was an environmental hazard, acutely toxic in the wrong amounts.

But that&apos;s nothing compared to what Hoffman-Taff and later Syntex were making. You might have heard of it. Agent Orange, which contains very high concentrations of a kind of chemical called a dioxin.

Yes, the stuff they dropped on Vietnam for a decade under Operation Ranch Hand, this is where they were making it. As you can probably tell by how it worked out for the Vietnamese, dioxins aren&apos;t very good for you. Short term exposure to high levels of dioxins results in skin lesions and altered liver function. Long-term exposure is linked to impairment of the immune system, the developing nervous system, the endocrine system, and reproductive functions. Chronic exposure is linked to various cancers.

Ok, so that&apos;s really not great, but how does a chemical plant hundreds of kilometres away from Times Beach cause its ultimate destruction?

And the answer to that, was logistics.

These chemical plants, like all chemical plants, have waste, and most of these facilities have meticulous procedures and regulations they have to meet in how they dispose of that waste. But it seemed that the facility and those involved in such operations, were lacking to put it mildly.

And this is where we introduce the next character in this story, a businessman by the name of Russel Bliss. Bliss was a waste hauler at the time, and he was contracted to dispose of some of the chemical sludge byproduct that couldn&apos;t be used. But Bliss wasn&apos;t being completely straight with what he was doing with the waste. Some of it was stored or dumped, but the third option would be an ecological disaster for Times Beach.

Part of Bliss&apos; services as a waste hauler was the possibility of being to upcycle things people don&apos;t want into something useful. Bliss was a businessman at heart, and knew he could make more money by double dipping. He was often tasked with hauling away used motor oil, and he could use this oil to spray the roads as a dust suppressant. Remember the dust? Well, this why it&apos;s important. Bliss mixed some of the chemical waste with the used motor oil to use as part of this dust suppressant that he would then spray on anything that needed it for a fee. Roads, buildings, houses, churches farmland, you name it. But that oil was contaminated with some of the worst pollutants imaginable. And he did a whole lot of spraying in the Times Beach area.

Within a couple of days, cats, dogs, and birds in the vicinity began to drop dead. Horses became sick, and eventually, Piatt would be forced to bury more than 50 of them. Worst of all, Piatt&apos;s two young daughters, who played in the arena, later fell ill. But Hell hath no wrath like a mother scorned and Piatt all the way back in 1971 suspected that the oil sprayed by Bliss was the culprit. So, she donned her amateur detective&apos;s cap, and tailed Bliss, as well as the other drivers who worked for him. She found this connection between Bliss and the chemical plant in Verona. She would eventually win a lawsuit against both Bliss and the chemical companies. But if people had listened to her sooner, the abandonment of Times Beach could have been avoided.

In November of 1982, the city clerk received a phone call from a local reporter, asking if Times Beach residents knew that their town was highly contaminated with dioxins. They didn&apos;t. Despite Piatt&apos;s suspicions over a decade prior, nobody stopped Bliss from spreading that toxic waste all over the environment.

And under a month later, disaster would strike Times Beach yet again.

## Destroying A Community

The residents of Times beach didn&apos;t take the news lying down. If their town was contaminated, they wanted to know what with, and why. But here is where we introduce our final character, and one of the many villains of this story, the federal government, specifically the Environmental Protection Agency, or EPA. The EPA, upon themselves learning of the contamination of Times Beach, told the town that it would take a year for them to get round to testing the soil. The residents, understandably unhappy with the concept of knowingly living on top of poisonous ground for a year, didn&apos;t really appeal. So, the town&apos;s inhabitants pooled money together to have Times Beach tested themselves. The EPA magically was able to immediately test the area soon after learning this. Huh, that&apos;s funny, that might be the quickest a year has ever passed.

But something was looming on the horizon for Times Beach that was much worse than government red tape and delays. The US Army Corps of Engineers had begun warning people in the local low-lying areas that severe flooding was coming. Weather predictions had showed a very large storm on the way that could cause flooding in places that were on flood plains. Times Beach was one such place, right on the Meramec River. Some residents were evacuated, but many defiantly chose to stay. They were used to mild flooding here, the houses used to be built on stilts after all. And wherever there was a little damage this community would pull together, fix what was broken, and move on with their lives. They assumed it would be the same this time. The bank that stood between the town and the river was steep and tall, there was no way there was going to be significant flooding. Right?

Unfortunately for Times Beach residents, they were wrong.

On December the fifth, Missouri saw some of the worst flooding in its history. Torrential rains had led to the Mississippi river rising by three metres. Water poured over the top of the St. Louis Dam. The Meramec River, a tributary of the Mississippi, couldn&apos;t handle the surge, and burst its banks as water rushed into Times Beach. Before long the entire settlement was submerged under water that rose up close to the second floors of buildings. It was described as a once-in-500-years flood. Houses were ripped from foundations, vehicles and trailers were swept away by the surge, and many residents of the town were caught stuck in their homes. It took a week for the water to finally recede and for people to be able to return to the devastation and try to rebuild. Incredibly, nobody was killed.

Shortly afterwards the town was hit with a brutal one-two punch. The tests had come back, and the dioxin level was a problem. The EPA considered dioxin levels above one part per billion to be potentially hazardous. In Times Beach, the levels were more than 100 parts per billion. And it had just been washed around the ruins of people&apos;s homes, further contaminating the soil.

Upon receiving this news the town&apos;s penultimate mayor resigned, placing Marilyn Leistner in charge. She would be the one ultimately who was forced to make the hard decisions. Those who returned to the area after the EPA&apos;s tests came back were instructed to leave, and anyone who didn&apos;t come back was told to stay away due to the potentially devastating effects of the flood and poisonous landscape.

A guard and a caution sign were even posted at the entrance to the settlement, a bridge that came across from the high side of the river, to keep people out.

But the residents were conflicted and divided. People didn&apos;t know whether to try and rebuild again, or to ask for a property buyout via the EPA&apos;s superfund for disaster relief. A majority of the residents came to the grim conclusion that there was no quick way for the dioxins and God-know what other chemicals to be cleaned up. And what was the point of rebuilding homes that have already been destroyed by a flood anyway. The town had voted itself out of the National Flood Insurance Program a few years before, hindsight is 20-20 but that move proved unwise to put it mildly.

But a small number of people clung on. Perhaps through desperation, confusion, or outright denial of reality, they claimed that dioxins weren&apos;t dangerous. It had been there for decades with no harm done whatsoever. They had rebuilt before; they would rebuild again. This was their home, and they weren&apos;t going to just give it up for nothing. And this schism proved to be the canary in the coal mine for Times Beach. The debate raged, and even though it was only a small minority of people who wanted to stay, it split families and friends against each other. The literal foundations of the town had been eroded by the flooding sure, but Times Springs true foundations, its community spirit, was irreparably damaged, poisoned just like the ground beneath their feet. And as we all know, a house divided cannot stand.

Mayor Leistner had to side with the majority. She sent a petition with hundreds of signatures to President Ronald Reagan, asking for the homes of the people in Times Beach to be bought out at fair market price by the federal government, so that the residents can at least take some money with them and set up a new life somewhere else. In February of 1983, it was approved, much to the relief of many of the townsfolk. But to the holdouts, it felt like a betrayal of everything they had ever known. In May of 1983, a second flood hit the community, further compounding those who were still clinging on to the possibility that they could stay. Then the first offers came.

The federal government lowballed the residents. Leistner said:

&gt; &quot;The offers were very low, so we got organized. We would invite the press out, and we would spray-paint the prices on the homes.&quot;

Offers were made purely on square footage, which didn&apos;t feel fair to those who owned newer, nicer houses that in a regular market would go for more. There was an appeals process that could net the disgruntled a few extra dollars here and there, but it wasn&apos;t all that significant, even with the extra relocation assistance provided by the superfund. If a new house outside of Times Beach cost more their old one, the superfund program would pay part of the difference towards it. A nice sentiment, but market forces took over, making things even worse for the residents.

Sellers around the local area knew that many people would be buying houses. It wouldn&apos;t take a genius to work that out, in the wider area 18,000 people ended up being evacuated and made homeless by the flooding. Many of them could choose to rebuild if they wanted, but many chose to move. The residents of Times Beach didn&apos;t have a choice. So, the house prices in the area spiked. People were forced to buy something pretty meagre, or move further away from the only place they had ever called home. What were they to do? What could they do? They took the money and squeaked out what they could. There wouldn&apos;t be a happy ending here.

By 1985, there were only one elderly couple still living in the toxic town, a George and Lorene Klein. The final holdouts of Times Beach.

Eventually though, those who chose to stay would end up with the worst deal of all.

The properties that didn&apos;t accept the buyout offers from the EPA went into condemnation. This meant the houses would be forcibly valued and sold by the courts. The judiciary&apos;s own appraisals came back even lower than what the EPA offered, without those other benefits like the relocation assistance for example. Eventually, nobody was left. In 1986, the town was officially disbanded.

Times Beach was no more.

## Legacy, Grief, Humanity

But the story still wasn&apos;t over, even after the town was abandoned. It wouldn&apos;t be until the 90s that the state of Missouri was finally able to acquire all the property in Times Beach so they could start cleaning up a mess they did not make. The EPA decided that incineration would be the best way to decontaminate the site as much as possible. Inside the incinerator wouldn&apos;t just be the contaminated soil from Times Beach but also from dioxin sites all over the state.

In all, 265,000 tons of dirt from 27 locations would be burned. Various people opposed the idea under the suspicion that it would cause even more of an environmental issue by spreading harmful toxic fumes in a gas form far and wide across Missouri. Despite such concerns, the EPA didn&apos;t budge, and they refused to answer questions on their strategy. The incinerator would work, it would burn and destroy the dioxins completely, so you wouldn&apos;t have to worry about dioxin fumes, what was the big deal? Well people thought the scope was too narrow. What about all the other pollutants in the soil like the Hexachlorophene? Some areas had harmful chemicals never even associated with the Verona plant, what about them getting spread in fumes far and wide across Missouri? The EPA either didn&apos;t know, or they didn&apos;t want to know. They seemed ultimately more interested in finding someone to blame for this whole sorry charade.

The buck stopped with Syntex, who were made legally responsible for the cleanup and exploring the full scope of contamination. Syntex covered the cost of the cleanup and paid an additional $10 million dollars on top. The EPA weren&apos;t going to let a few people stop them from closing this loop in their books. Eventually though, after an outcry from a few committed individuals, the incinerator was shut down. But the EPA&apos;s ombudsman, an internal organisation of the EPA in charge of dealing with individual&apos;s complaints, recommended the incinerator to be retested for safety. But the retest had the same flawed parameters as the first test, and eventually the rest of the soil was burned.

In 2001, the former town was taken off the national priority list for federal cleanup. That was it, it was over.

Or was it?

Because, still all these years later there is still a legacy of the disaster that plagued Times Beach, and a pretty important one at that. This environmental disaster didn&apos;t just put a ghost town on the map, it ushered forward a new era of environmental protection standards inside the US, at least that was something. But the legacy of the town itself is also important, and that continues to live on through the people who went through this ordeal at the time.

Animosity persists amongst the former residents. Some at the federal government and their poor management of the situation, some at the chemical companies responsible for the whole ordeal, as well as for Russel Bliss who was equally culpable. Some were mad at God Himself for bringing a flood that destroyed their homes, and some are angry at former mayor Leistner, who many today feel forced them to leave their homes behind for pocket change. But she wasn&apos;t to blame. She tried what she could to get the EPA to revise its offers, she tried to get people adequately compensated, but it was an impossible position. What bargaining power did one tiny town&apos;s mayor have against an entire governmental organisation? Especially when homes were destroyed, people were homeless. And ultimately those who didn&apos;t take the deal she helped broker ended up worse off in the end. What more could she have done? Leistner said in 2017 that she had no way of controlling what the EPA offered:

&gt; &quot;I didn&apos;t have anything to do with their money.&quot;

People are still right to be bitter though. Their homes were washed away or rendered uninhabitable, the community that had been forged in the fires of the Great Depression, for some the only place they ever knew or wanted to know, was stripped away from them, and it wasn&apos;t their fault.

And what about Bliss? What happened to him after this whole disaster came to a head?

Well mostly he got sued out the wazoo. And now him and the chemical companies have spent many years playing the blame game. Bliss consistently denies having any knowledge that the materials were toxic, but the chemical companies have always maintained that they did disclose that the chemical waste was toxic. I mean it&apos;s a chemical plant, what did Bliss think he was hauling away, fruit?

But Bliss does have some evidence for his claim. He even sprayed the oil on his own property where he and his family lived. When previously questioned on the situation, he said:

&gt; &quot;If I thought it was something bad, would I spray it on my own farm where my family is? Would any human being do that?&quot;

If we view Bliss favourably here, you could see him as a naïve moron who thought he could make some easy money and ended up causing more problems for himself. But many do not believe his accounts. As a result of that lawsuit that Piatt filed from her amateur detective work in 1971, Bliss was forced to admit his waste-hauling activity and identify the dozens of sites across the state where he had dumped it. That doesn&apos;t necessarily mean he knew it was toxic, but if he didn&apos;t know it was toxic, why bury it? Why not take it to a dump or burn it like you would with regular garbage? I guess ignorance really is bliss.

Russel views himself as a victim in all of this. He was sued a lot for his actions, and there were technically no laws against what he did at the time. But he did find himself in jail in the end anyway, on tax evasion charges because he didn&apos;t report his waste disposal income to the IRS. He told CNN of the people who blame him:

&gt; &quot;I think it&apos;s unfair, unjust… All my friends say that I was a scapegoat.&quot;

Maybe he&apos;s right, who knows.

There are still scientific disagreements over dioxins today that stem from this very disaster. Scientists generally disagree how much it takes to put a person at risk, which probably depends on a whole host of factors anyway. People who claim dioxins aren&apos;t dangerous at all often take the words of Dr. Vernon Houk of the Centre for Disease Control or CDC, look at that, the third alphabet agency in this video, isn&apos;t the government great? Houk was recorded as saying that the evacuation of Times Beach was an overreaction. Although the people who carry this narrative tend to overlook the fact that Houk was the one who ordered the evacuation in the first place.

But others think the US government had an ulterior motive when they were dealing with the Times Beach situation, like Steve Taylor, co-founder of the Times Beach Action Group. He asserts that because the toxins at Times Beach were closely related to those in Agent Orange, the government may have had a vested interest in trying to minimise the Times Beach investigation, which would limit its own blame for what was happening with Agent Orange in Vietnam. Hence the EPAs lowball offer and delaying tactics for testing. After all, you would think the Environmental Protection Agency would be interested in... you know… protecting the environment.

Steve Taylor states on the matter:

&gt; &quot;The Vietnam veterans (referring to those who suffered from health complications due to Agent Orange) got a huge settlement. There are a lot of people I know who were exposed to the same stuff and more - and didn&apos;t.&quot;

And what of Times Beach today? Well, it&apos;s been transformed. The land that was once Times Beach has been turned into Route 66 State Park. The only building that remains is a former roadhouse that used to be the &quot;Bridge Head Inn&quot; in the town. It&apos;s now a museum and gift shop selling Route 66 nicknacks.

The area is plenty green, there&apos;s parking, a playground, and benches. If there&apos;s any harmful chemicals left it doesn&apos;t seem to bother the wildlife, with deer being spotted in the area, and skinny, new-growth trees are pretty common. There is a giant ash pit where the incinerator used to be, and a large mound where the contaminated houses were buried. Only the soil was burned. But generally speaking, the landscape is healing.

Every year, on the final Saturday of September, former residents of Times Beach gather on the site to see old friends, tell stories, and shed tears for their lost home. Many say they would move back in a heartbeat today.

The only real reference that a place was ever here are the ash pit, and a single display in a corner of the museum, which makes it even more suspicious, it really does seem like the US government were trying to hide the whole thing away. It feels disrespectful to the memory of the town, to the people who lived and grew up there. An entire portion of your life, boiled down to a small display in the corner of a museum somewhere.

There&apos;s still generational trauma that those who used to live there feel even today. Teachers at the time made Times Beach kids sit at the front of class, away from the rest of the students, in case they were somehow contagious of the toxins. People remember the flood, and the devastation, and the birds dying from the chemicals. Former mayor Leistner herself even felt that ostracization. She had a brand-new leather jacket that had gotten dirty in the flood, but when she took it to the dry cleaner, her business was refused. People and their children and their grandchildren still suffer from rare disorders and diseases. People can&apos;t prove it was the dioxins, as others have turned out fine, but its highly suspected.

What hits home the most for the Times Beach disaster is that there is no happy ending here. Not really. The former residents come together when they can, as with every year that passes their old home is slowly lost and forgotten to the inevitable passage of time. But that community spirit can never be what it was, the buildings can&apos;t be rebuilt, and the memories can&apos;t be visited. It was a perfect storm of malice, ignorance, incompetence, and straight up bad luck that caused huge trauma that still persists to this day among so many people, even almost half a century later. But the story of Times Beach is a very human story, about desperation, about grief, about purpose, about belonging, about corruption, about greed, about conspiracy, about banding together as a people, about making the hard decisions when there can be no winners, and ultimately about moving on.

Regardless of their home being gone, the residents of Times Beach will always be brought together by their uniquely shared experience.

And maybe one day long into the future, people will splash, swim and fish in the Meramec River at Times Beach once again.

## Key Takeaways

- Times Beach, Missouri, was a close-knit community that thrived despite economic hardships.
- The town&apos;s downfall began with the illegal dumping of toxic chemicals by a waste hauler.
- A severe flood in 1982 exacerbated the town&apos;s contamination, leading to its evacuation.
- The EPA&apos;s handling of the situation was criticized for delays and low buyout offers.
- The legacy of Times Beach includes ongoing health concerns and a transformed landscape.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What was the original purpose of Times Beach?

Times Beach was originally designed as a holiday park for doctors, managers, and high society individuals from St. Louis to enjoy during the summer months.

### How did Times Beach become a permanent settlement?

During the Great Depression, many people from the city moved into their homes in Times Beach to ride out the hard times due to the lower cost of living.

### What was the population of Times Beach at its peak?

By 1982, the population of Times Beach had grown to around 2,500 residents.

### What chemical contamination led to the evacuation of Times Beach?

The town was contaminated with dioxins, which are highly toxic chemicals, due to the spraying of contaminated oil on roads, buildings, and farmland.

### Who was responsible for the chemical contamination in Times Beach?

Russell Bliss, a waste hauler, mixed chemical waste with used motor oil and sprayed it on various surfaces in Times Beach. The chemicals originated from a pharmaceutical facility in Verona, Missouri.

### What role did the EPA play in the evacuation of Times Beach?

The EPA initially delayed testing the soil and later offered low buyout prices to residents, which caused significant conflict and division among the community.

### What happened to the residents of Times Beach after the evacuation?

Many residents accepted the buyout offers from the EPA and moved away, while a few holdouts remained until the town was officially disbanded in 1986.

### What is the current status of the Times Beach site?

The land that was once Times Beach has been transformed into Route 66 State Park, with a museum and gift shop as the only remaining building.

### What legacy does the Times Beach disaster have?

The disaster led to new environmental protection standards in the US and continues to affect the former residents, who still experience generational trauma and health issues.

### What was the impact of the flooding in Times Beach in 1982?

The flooding submerged the entire settlement, destroyed homes, and further contaminated the soil with dioxins, leading to the eventual evacuation of the town.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Story of Missouri&apos;s Toxic Ghost Town.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ElM_xAtbAY)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/57/Oblique_aerial_landscape_view_%28AM_86148-2%29.jpg) by Collins, Tudor Washington, 1898-1970, photographer / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Mount Rainier: Inching Towards Disaster.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/mount-rainier-inching-towards-disaster</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/mount-rainier-inching-towards-disaster</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Mount Rainier is the kind of mountain you see on postcards. Snow-capped, picturesque, and towering over the Pacific Northwest. It might not be the tallest peak in North America—in fact, it&apos;s not even close—but its gentle slopes dominate the region. There&apos;s something almost serene about Mount Rainier, and that&apos;s the problem.

Because Rainier isn&apos;t just a mountain—it&apos;s a volcano, an active one at that. And it&apos;s not sitting out in the wilderness, tucked away from people and property; it looms over one of the most densely populated regions on the West Coast. If it erupts—or more likely, if the ground shakes in just the wrong way—it won&apos;t be lava that kills people, it&apos;ll be mud. A thick and fast wall of mud that will tear through towns and cities like wet concrete with nowhere to go.

Most people who live nearby don&apos;t think about that. They see a mountain, not a time bomb. They go hiking, skiing, and take family photos at scenic overlooks—the danger feels distant, abstract, like the sort of thing that might happen someday, to someone else, maybe even somewhere else. But the thing is, it&apos;s not that unlikely. Mount Rainier is inches away from an American disaster the likes of which have never been seen in modern history.

## A Mountain That Kills Quietly

When most people hear the word volcano, they think lava, rivers of fire burning everything in their path, Pompeii, Vesuvius—the end of the world. But Mount Rainier doesn&apos;t work like that because its deadliest weapon isn&apos;t heat—it&apos;s ice.

Rainier is loaded with the stuff. It has 28 major glaciers and numerous smaller ice patches covering approximately 93 km² (36 square miles), and when that ice melts fast—because of an eruption, a quake, or even a landslide—it mixes with volcanic rock and soil to create something far worse than lava: a lahar.

A lahar moves like wet cement. Fast, heavy, and impossible to outrun. Entire valleys can be swallowed in minutes, and it&apos;s happened before—in precisely the same area. There is evidence of at least nine major lahars that have emanated from Mt Rainier over the last 6,000 years, an area which today includes a population of close to 100,000.

Roughly 500 years ago, one of Rainier&apos;s flanks gave way, unleashing what we now call the Electron Mudflow, which buried miles of land and left a scar still visible from the air. And to give you an idea of scale, this mudflow extended around 55 km (34 miles), covered around 34 km² (13 square miles) in the Puyallup Valley, and was more than 7.9 m (26 feet) thick at its deepest point—roughly the height of a two-story building.

If the same thing happened today, it would take out multiple towns and thousands of lives before you could even say, &quot;Wait, how do you even spell lahar?&quot; And what makes this genuinely terrifying is how quietly this can all start. It doesn&apos;t need a fiery eruption or a cataclysmic boom, just a distant rumble, and suddenly, the clock is ticking.

## The Osceola Mudflow

And that&apos;s one of the better-case scenarios—a little lahar, if you will. Mount Rainier hasn&apos;t had a significant eruption in recorded history, which, in volcanic terms at least, makes you wonder if one is just around the corner.

But 5,600 years ago, a section of the mountain collapsed—not erupted or exploded—just collapsed. That chunk of Rainier disintegrated into a roaring, suffocating slurry of rock, water, and pulverised forest. It surged more than 100 kilometres (62 miles) to the west, carving new rivers, erasing old ones, and dumping volcanic mud across what is now the Puget Sound lowlands.

That event is known as the Osceola Mudflow, and it wasn&apos;t some freak incident. At its peak, the flow was nearly 30 metres (100 feet) deep—approaching the height of a 10-storey building—and permanently changed the geography of western Washington. And if it happened now, today, it would obliterate entire communities, displace hundreds of thousands, and trigger one of the worst natural disasters in American history.

But ask most people living below Rainier, and they&apos;ve never heard of it. Why would they? It happened more than 5,000 years ago.

## The Towns Below

Tens of thousands of people live in the path of a potential future lahar, and many people don&apos;t know it—in fact, a lot of people probably wouldn&apos;t believe it if you told them.

The towns of Orting, Puyallup, Sumner, and Auburn sit directly on top of the Osceola debris. In other words, they&apos;re built where disaster has already happened once, and could again. They&apos;d be the first to go if Rainier&apos;s side gave way. Not in days or hours, but minutes.

Scientists estimate that in a worst-case scenario, a lahar could reach Orting—with a population of around 9,000—in under 60 minutes, which is barely enough time for a warning, let alone an evacuation. Sirens might go off, school buses might start moving. But for some, there wouldn&apos;t be anywhere to go fast enough.

This isn&apos;t a doomsday fantasy. It&apos;s spelled out in public hazard maps with entire communities marked in red. The government and local authorities know all about this risk—and have taken steps to put a warning system in place, which we&apos;re coming to—but if you walked through those neighbourhoods right now—past the shops, the schools, the parks—you wouldn&apos;t know that this small town lies directly in the path of viscous mud monster that could decimate the community.

Outside of Orting, several other towns lie within Mount Rainier&apos;s lahar hazard zones. Sumner is a charming commuter town with just under 10,000 people on the banks of the Puyallup River, but that same river connects it directly to the glacier-packed slopes of Rainier. In a worst-case lahar event, Sumner could be buried beneath a torrent of mud, ice, and rock within an hour.

A bit further downstream is Puyallup, a city of around 40,000. Despite its distance, it&apos;s still dangerously positioned—both the Puyallup and Carbon rivers converge near the city. Emergency management plans estimate that it could receive a warning of less than 90 minutes if a major lahar were to occur.

Then there&apos;s Fife. Closer to Tacoma, but still in the crosshairs. Its low elevation and proximity to the river delta make it especially vulnerable. A lahar here wouldn&apos;t just mean flooding—it would be a thick, fast-moving wall of debris with the force to wipe out infrastructure, homes, and lives.

Seattle is roughly 96 km (60 miles) from Mount Rainier, but it&apos;s not entirely out of reach during a major lahar. The city itself wouldn&apos;t be buried in mud—the elevation and geography protect it from direct impact—but the consequences would still be severe. Key transportation corridors, like Interstate 5 and the ports of Tacoma and Seattle, could be disrupted or even severed. That means a supply chain chokehold, economic paralysis, and potential mass displacement.

The Duwamish River Valley, home to critical industrial infrastructure and low-lying neighborhoods in South Seattle, could also experience flooding or debris flow if the lahar manages to push sediment that far downstream. Even if the mud never physically reaches the city, the ripple effects would be rapid. Evacuees from affected towns would flood north, and emergency services, hospitals, and Seattle shelters would instantly feel the strain.

## Warning Systems and False Confidence

On paper, there&apos;s a solid enough system in place. Sensors are placed all around Mount Rainier to track tremors, ground shifts, and temperature spikes. There are also sirens in some towns and emergency plans filed neatly in local government offices. Schools in high-risk towns like Orting hold annual evacuation drills while sirens are tested monthly.

On 21st March 2024, the region participated in the largest lahar drill in the world, involving some 45,000 students. And it went well, smoothly even, you might even say. Evacuation routes are posted in neighborhoods, and &quot;lahar evacuation route&quot; signs are fairly common roadside sights around the area, while communities have also built pedestrian bridges specifically for fast escapes.

That&apos;s the idea, anyway. In practice, it&apos;s a whole lot shakier. Rainier is big, the terrain is wild, and lahars might not follow predictable rules or routes. There are plenty of charts and paperwork on the most likely scenarios according to scientists, but to be honest, nobody really knows.

And if something big does go off, the fate of thousands depends on some shockingly fine margins. The systems rely on perfect timing, working tech, and fast human reaction. They also rely on people being prepared to move, knowing where to go, and not hesitating when seconds matter.

And not everyone agrees on how effective it all is. Some of the sirens are outdated or hard to hear indoors. Some evacuation routes are too narrow, and there have been debates over whether certain school buses could even make it out in time. Studies have shown that even in simulations, confusion and traffic can slow down the entire process, sometimes to a fatal degree.

False confidence is also horrendously dangerous because let&apos;s be honest, humans are inherently bad at reading risk levels. We worry more about terrorists than about driving, despite the risk factors being in entirely different leagues. And a natural disaster? Well, that&apos;s obviously never going to happen, is it? Communities around Mount Rainier have been growing for hundreds of years, and the risk of lahars is no secret, but how many people genuinely believe it could happen in their lifetime?

## What Happens When It Goes

So let&apos;s say the worst happens. Rainier&apos;s flank gives way. Maybe it&apos;s triggered by a quake, or maybe there&apos;s no warning at all—just a rumble deep inside the mountain. Within minutes, a massive chunk of glacier and rock detaches and starts sliding, accelerating fast, breaking apart, heating up, mixing with soil and melted ice until it&apos;s no longer a landslide, but a ferocious lahar. A tsunami of mud, debris, and shattered forest.

First, it&apos;ll barrel down the mountain&apos;s valleys—rivers that normally trickle or wind lazily through the forest will suddenly become supercharged death corridors. It will hit the first towns like a freight train. Orting, Sumner, Puyallup—gone. Not damaged. Gone. Flattened, drowned, buried.

If it happens at night, most people won&apos;t stand a chance. If it&apos;s during school hours, evacuation becomes a race against time. Buses get stuck in traffic, parents try to find their kids, and emergency responders are overwhelmed before they can even begin.

Bridges collapse. Roads disappear. Power lines snap. Cell towers blink out. And because lahars don&apos;t stop where the mountain ends, the destruction just keeps moving, reaching deep into the lowlands, even into parts of Tacoma. In under two hours, entire zip codes are unrecognizable.

The aftershock won&apos;t be seismic; it&apos;ll be social—mass displacement, overwhelmed hospitals, families split, businesses lost, and histories erased. And all of it will be caused not by fire and brimstone but by cold, grey mud and a volcano that everybody always thought of as a charming backdrop to their Sunday barbecues.

## Why Nothing Happens Until It Does

It&apos;s easy to ignore a danger that doesn&apos;t show itself. Rainier looks calm, even majestic. It&apos;s part of the backdrop, part of the family, almost, something you point to from a coffee shop, not something that dictates emergency plans. And that&apos;s the problem.

Every few years, there&apos;s a push for better preparedness: a new study, a fresh round of funding, or maybe an update to the evacuation maps. By all accounts, recent lahar evacuation drills went well, but they were evacuation drills. How well the area would respond if those sirens were to blare for real and the very real fear of impending disaster tore through the area is anybody&apos;s guess.

Ask local officials, and many will say they&apos;re ready. Ask emergency planners, and they&apos;ll point to drills and protocols. Ask the average resident; they probably don&apos;t think about it too much. That&apos;s not ignorance, it&apos;s just human nature. We don&apos;t prepare for disasters we can&apos;t see. You can bet people in Pompeii didn&apos;t wake up on 24th August 79 AD and ponder the likelihood of their own demise thanks to the mighty Vesuvius lying nearby. No, humans wake up, feed their kids, pack them off to school, and look ahead to their day. They think about work or what to cook for dinner. Maybe what to buy their child for their upcoming birthday, but what they don&apos;t think about is a natural disaster that could decimate their lives in a matter of hours.

And maybe that&apos;s a good thing? Do we want to walk about with apocalyptical fears swirling constantly around our minds? Probably not. A degree of blissful ignorance helps humans live a finite life that could be wiped out in an instant, and for those living in the shadow of Mount Rainier—maybe directly in the path of an ancient, cataclysmic lahar—they certainly need it.

## Key Takeaways

- Mount Rainier is an active volcano with a history of lahars, which are fast-moving mudflows.
- The towns of Orting, Puyallup, Sumner, and Auburn are at high risk of being hit by a lahar.
- Lahars from Mount Rainier can travel over 100 kilometers, causing widespread destruction and loss of life.
- While warning systems exist, their effectiveness is uncertain due to potential technical and human factors.
- Many residents are unaware of the lahar risk, leading to a false sense of security.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the primary danger posed by Mount Rainier?

The primary danger posed by Mount Rainier is not lava but lahars, which are fast-moving walls of mud that can tear through towns and cities.

### What is a lahar?

A lahar is a fast-moving mixture of volcanic rock, soil, and water that moves like wet cement, making it impossible to outrun.

### How many major lahars have occurred from Mount Rainier in the last 6,000 years?

There is evidence of at least nine major lahars that have emanated from Mount Rainier over the last 6,000 years.

### What was the Osceola Mudflow?

The Osceola Mudflow was a massive collapse of Mount Rainier&apos;s flank that occurred approximately 5,600 years ago, creating a roaring slurry of rock, water, and pulverized forest that surged over 100 kilometers to the west.

### Which towns are directly in the path of a potential lahar from Mount Rainier?

The towns of Orting, Puyallup, Sumner, and Auburn are directly in the path of a potential lahar from Mount Rainier.

### How quickly could a lahar reach Orting?

Scientists estimate that in a worst-case scenario, a lahar could reach Orting in under 60 minutes.

### What measures have been taken to prepare for a potential lahar?

Sensors are placed around Mount Rainier to track tremors, ground shifts, and temperature spikes. There are also sirens in some towns, emergency plans, annual evacuation drills, and lahar evacuation route signs.

### What challenges exist with the current warning systems?

Challenges include outdated or hard-to-hear sirens, narrow evacuation routes, potential traffic congestion, and the reliance on perfect timing and fast human reaction.

### How would a lahar impact Seattle?

While Seattle itself wouldn&apos;t be buried in mud, key transportation corridors and industrial infrastructure could be disrupted, leading to supply chain issues, economic paralysis, and potential mass displacement.

### Why do people living near Mount Rainier not think about the danger?

People living near Mount Rainier do not think about the danger because it feels distant and abstract, and they are focused on their daily lives rather than preparing for a disaster they can&apos;t see.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Mount Rainier: Inching Towards Disaster.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOQit0tDoIg)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/57/Aerial_landscape_view_%282017%29.jpg) by Saga1111 / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Nauru: How the Richest Country in the World Destroyed Itself</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/nauru-how-the-richest-country-in-the-world-destroyed-itself</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/nauru-how-the-richest-country-in-the-world-destroyed-itself</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>It feels like a scene from a climate-change dystopia. A world in which 80 percent of all land has been rendered uninhabitable by human greed—once lush forests replaced by a toxic desert. A world in which the groundwater is poisoned, and all humanity forced to live on a narrow, survivable strip between desert and ocean, even as the waves rise ever higher.

No, this isn&apos;t the synopsis for some new Netflix satire; a much-more depressing companion piece to 2021&apos;s *Don&apos;t Look Up*. The place I just described really exists. A real-life island state that today stands as a dark warning to the rest of the world.

That island&apos;s name is Nauru. And it was ground zero for an environmental apocalypse.

It wasn&apos;t meant to be this way. In the early-1980s, Nauru was—per capita—one of the richest nations on Earth. Its government oversaw a sovereign wealth fund sufficient to keep its entire population in luxury for centuries to come.

Yet these days, the nation stands as a broke, near-uninhabitable wasteland. A place of poverty and desperation.

## Paradise Lost

Picture your idea of an island paradise.

We&apos;re guessing it might be somewhere tropical, near the equator. We&apos;re guessing, also, that it&apos;ll be isolated—far from the maddening crowd. Somewhere with clear waters, white sand, and natural riches.

Somewhere, in other words, like Nauru.

A tiny speck of land a third the size of Manhattan, the Republic of Nauru sits a mere 48 km south of the equator, out in the Pacific&apos;s wild blue yonder.

Populated by a mere 12,511 people, it&apos;s over 300 km away from the nearest other island, Banaba— itself the extreme westernmost part of Kiribati. The only place its airline regularly flies to—Brisbane in Australia—is thousands of kilometers distant.

Nor is it just where isolation is concerned that Nauru seems like the perfect getaway.

A raised coral atoll ringed by white sand dotted with palm trees, Nauru from the air appears Insta-ready. The sort of place depressed office workers dream about escaping to.

But look a little closer, and you&apos;ll start to see that this is all just an illusion. A mirage created by distance and expectation.

As your plane gets closer, it&apos;ll quickly become apparent that—rather than a tropical paradise—Nauru is instead an ecological nightmare.

That ring of sand and palm trees around the island? Well, it turns out that&apos;s the only habitable part. A 274m-wide zone, where nearly all life on Nauru is forced to take place.

The bulk of the island&apos;s 21 sq km is nothing but toxic desert. A world of jagged limestone peaks and fine, irritating dust where nothing can grow.

Known as Topside, it spent decades as the source of Nauru&apos;s unmatched wealth.

Today, though, Topside is responsible for all the nation&apos;s ills. The place that contaminated much of the sparse groundwater, leaving the population reliant on a malfunctioning desalination plant. The moonscape where nothing can be cultivated, leading to locals&apos; dependence on highly-processed imported foods.

Speaking of the locals, they&apos;re thought to be some of the sickest people on Earth.

With extreme rates of obesity, Nauru is one of the world&apos;s fattest nations, as well as one with among the highest rates of smoking, diabetes, and alcoholism.

That last one in turn gives rise to high rates of domestic violence, and other antisocial behavior like drunk driving—a weirdly impressive feat when you consider the island has only a single road.

Not that the sense of sickness stops with the citizens.

*MIT Reader* ran an article in 2019 about what life is like on the island, which included the grim sentence:

&gt; &quot;Desperation seems to pervade all of Nauru.&quot;

Among other problems the article listed, were the high rate of unemployment; the crumbling houses and aging infrastructure; and the rotting garbage piled high on the roadside.

In short, the vibe on Nauru is less &quot;Pacific island getaway&quot; and more &quot;post-apocalyptic sci-fi&quot;. One where the main threat isn&apos;t zombies, but a suffocating sense of despair, caused by ecological breakdown.

Because, make no mistake, this microscopic nation didn&apos;t always look like this.

Just 40 years ago, it was the envy of the world.

In the 1980s, Nauruans were second only to Saudis in terms of wealth as GDP per capita. Locals drove luxury sports cars and used money as toilet paper. The government owned a fleet of cruise ships and a loss-making airline, and once blew $400,000 on what the *New York Times* called a &quot;floating cocktail lounge&quot;.

Citizens were guaranteed employment, with free access to healthcare, education, and opportunities to study abroad. Meanwhile, a trust fund had already amassed $400m, and was projected to reach $1 billion by the 1990s—equivalent to roughly 2.3 billion in today&apos;s money. All for a nation of barely 12,000 people.

The obvious question then, is: what happened? What caused Nauru&apos;s spectacular nosedive from the pinnacle of global wealth rankings to somewhere near the bottom?

The answer lies not in some inherent fecklessness among the locals, but in an all-too human foible: greed. Greed on the part of outsiders, on the part of corporations, and—yes—on the part of Nauruan elites.

A rapacious greed that could one day leave the rest of the world as broken and benighted as Nauru.

## After the White Gold Rush

When discussing the complexities of cause and effect, the cliche is to evoke a butterfly. Y&apos;know, that old chestnut about how a single butterfly beating its wings in China can eventually cause a tornado in Delaware, or a man&apos;s pants to unexpectedly fall down in Ireland, or something equally absurd.

Really, though, the cliche should probably evoke doorstops in Australia. Because it was the precise placing of one such doorstop in 1899 that led to Nauru becoming a wasteland.

The exact sequence of events that brought that doorstop to the Sydney office of the Pacific Islands Company, has sadly been lost to history.

What we do know is that it came from Nauru. We know, too, that whoever found it assumed it was petrified wood.

Sadly for the fate of the island, there was someone working at that Sydney office who just happened to know a whole lot about petrified wood. Someone, who was both observant enough and boring enough to be all like: &quot;mind if I borrow that doorstep to run some tests? It&apos;s not like I&apos;m doing anything else this weekend!&quot;

That observant-but-dull dude&apos;s name was Albert Fuller Ellis.

And it was his fateful encounter with that doorstop that would destroy Nauru&apos;s future more-assuredly than the beating wings of some random butterfly.

At the time Ellis was running his tests, Nauru looked very different. Closer to the perfect tropical island we discussed at the start.

Rather than a blasted desert, the interior of the island—the region known as Topside—was a place of almond and pandanus trees. A lush, green world filled with the cries of migrating birds.

So pristine was the place, that—despite being annexed by Germany—it still retained the name bestowed on it by the British man who first sighted it: Pleasant Island.

But Pleasant Island held a secret. One hinted at by the cries of those birds.

Back in the ancient past, Nauru had repeatedly risen and sunk beneath the waves. As a result, the coral at its center became covered in marine deposits. Deposits that were later added to by migrating birds emptying their bowels over it across millions of years.

Trapped between jagged spikes of coral in the island&apos;s center, those marine and bird deposits eventually formed phosphate of astonishing purity. Phosphate, a chunk of which some forgotten person had mistaken for petrified wood, and brought back to Sydney, leaving it right where Ellis would find it.

As a trained geologist, Ellis was all too aware what phosphate could be used for: as a fertilizer that produced spectacular harvests.

More to the point, he knew what it was worth. After taking a trip to Nauru and confirming the extent of the deposits, Ellis reported back that the Nauruans were living atop an island forged from the whitest of golds.

So, his colleagues did what any corporation would do in that period. They struck an agreement with Nauru&apos;s colonial overlords to exploit Topside for all it was worth.

Starting in 1905—first under German supervision and then Australian, after Canberra annexed Nauru in World War One—the newly-renamed Pacific Phosphate Company oversaw the strip-mining of Nauru&apos;s interior.

Unlike underground mining, strip mining involves removing all the rocks and soil above a deposit, turning the whole site into an open-cast pit.

The advantage of this method is that it&apos;s cheap. The disadvantage, is that it&apos;s unbelievably destructive.

On Topside, trees, ferns, and bushes that had grown there for decades were cleared. The topsoil was removed, and the phosphate below it extracted, leaving behind a wasteland that could never be used again.

As early as 1921, a visiting *National Geographic* reporter was able to write of the process:

&gt; &quot;A worked-out phosphate field is a dismal, ghastly tract of land.&quot;

Little could they have known, but Nauru&apos;s age of exploitation was only just beginning.

## Plunder and Pillage

Despite plundering Nauru for its resources, interwar-era Australians weren&apos;t total dicks about it.

As the island&apos;s new colonial masters, they paid local landowners royalties for the regions they were mining, and even set up a couple of trust funds for the Nauruan people, using profits from the sale of phosphate.

But, whilst this may have been enlightened exploitation, it was still exploitation, as can be seen in the cut of profits offered to the Nauruans. As the *MIT Reader* put it:

&gt; &quot;The mining of Nauru&apos;s phosphate was not outright theft; however, the Nauruan share was tiny considering the profits, damage, and cost of restoring mined land.&quot;

As the years passed, that damage was only growing.

With more and more foreigners taking over the island, Nauruan indigenous culture was effectively wiped out. Australian and European practices replaced traditional ones. The old Nauruan religion was replaced by Christianity.

Nor was the tiny cut of profits the islanders were receiving as big as it should&apos;ve been.

Despite exporting 200,000 tons of phosphate annually, Canberra was selling the island&apos;s reserves at well under market value—part of a plan to give its own farmers, and those of Britain and New Zealand, a competitive edge.

Again, this wasn&apos;t the worst act of colonization in history. When the Empire of Japan seized Nauru during WWII, it conducted a genocidal campaign that killed a quarter of the population.

Still, &quot;not as bad as Imperial Japan&quot; is a pretty low bar to set yourself. Which may be why pangs of conscience convinced Australia to offer the Nauruans a brand-new island to resettle in 1963.

But Nauru&apos;s people didn&apos;t want some random new island. They wanted their island. The one their people had lived on for thousands of years. The one Australia—in league with Britain and New Zealand—seemed so intent on destroying.

By now, a third of Nauru had been strip mined. A swathe of land in the island&apos;s south had disappeared, replaced by jagged limestone pillars.

Ironically, it was this destruction that would soon see Canberra lose control of its colony.

The engine for Nauru&apos;s eventual independence was local council leader Hammer deRoburt.

Educated in Australia, deRoburt was a master at speaking to the colonists in ways they could understand. Of using the example of Nauru&apos;s strip mined south to eloquently push the case for the island&apos;s independence.

By the late-1960s, it was clear the world was on his side. Rather than fight to hold onto the colony, Canberra let Nauru slip through its fingers.

At the moment Nauru stepped, blinking, into the bright light of independence in 1968, the island was the smallest republic in the world.

The only smaller countries—Monaco and Vatican City—were both monarchies. Among democracies, Nauru was uniquely tiny.

And that meant it came with a unique set of challenges. One that made many wonder if this microscopic new nation could survive.

Aside from phosphate mining, the nation had no local industry. The problem was, everyone could see that the remaining deposits would run out in a generation or so. A generation, in which the island&apos;s interior would be completely destroyed.

It&apos;s here that we get to the relevance of Nauru&apos;s story to our planet today.

Like many of us in 2023, the Nauruans in 1968 were faced with a choice. Change their behavior, and try to preserve what remained of their paradise? Or keep on as they had before, and trust that economic growth today could shield against ecological disaster tomorrow?

In the end, Hammer deRoburt and his fellow Nauruan elites chose the latter.

It was a decision that would make them fabulously rich… while also condemning their descendants to lives of desperate poverty.

## The Age of Wonders

&quot;We had money, it was like partying every day and no one thought of the future.&quot;

In 2008, this was how landowner Doneke Kepae described Nauru&apos;s boom years to the *Telegraph*.

While Kepae&apos;s reminisces were tinged with dark shades of regret, that quote gets at something essential about life on the island in the two decades post-independence.

Living through it was like taking part in the biggest, most-destructive party the world has ever thrown.

Forget 1980s New York, or Bubble-era Tokyo, or Klondike during the gold rush. Nauru in the &apos;70s and &apos;80s was a place where easy money and giddy excitement combined to create a lethal cocktail of hedonism.

First, the expensive-but-reasonable stuff. The ways the government splashed out to ensure all citizens took part in this boom.

At the Scandinavian end of the scale, this involved making all public services free. Healthcare, education, dental care… even public transport was completely subsidized.

Further up the scale, the government would also pay to put students through prestigious Australian universities. Housing was subsidized, too, with monthly rent costing a mere $15.76 in today&apos;s money!

Finally, at the top end of the scale, is the part that might almost be called &quot;socialism with money&quot;. The part where the government guaranteed a job for anyone who wanted one, and abolished all forms of income tax so people could enjoy their earnings.

As the *New York Times* put it in 1982:

&gt; &quot;Nauru comes close to being the ultimate welfare state.&quot;

But then, President deRoburt and his government could afford to be generous.

With around two million tons of phosphate being extracted every year, Nauru was raking in the equivalent in today&apos;s dollars of 2.5 billion annually. By 1975, a royalties trust designed to act as insurance against the future had crossed the one billion Australian dollars mark.

What the government didn&apos;t save, it was more than happy to spend. And it&apos;s here we come to our second tally of expenditure: the completely unreasonable things Nauru blew its money on.

Despite being a nation of only around 10,000 citizens, Nauru owned a fleet of cruise ships and overseas hotels; as well as a loss-making airline that flew all over the Pacific.

Officials blew piles of cash on luxury cars—including an infamous local police chief who imported a Lamborghini, only to realize he was too overweight to fit inside it. Hammer deRoburt, meanwhile, took a limousine to work every day.

And, just in case you&apos;d forgotten, here&apos;s a quick reminder that this is all in a country with a single road. One which covers a mere 30 km.

Questionable as these purchases were, though, they&apos;ve got nothing on the buildings.

During the boom years, the Nauruan government went on a buying spree so wild, it managed to do with real estate what Imelda Marcos once did with shoes.

Expensive hotels in Sydney and Carlton were snapped up, as were properties on Guam, Samoa, and in the Marshall Islands. An office building topped with a revolving restaurant was built in the Northern Marianas for $7m. $400,000 was blown on a floating cocktail lounge.

But the bloated cherry atop this wasteful cake has to be Nauru House in Melbourne.

Standing 50 storeys high, it was built at a cost of $45m. Speaking to the *Times*, President deRoburt proudly claimed of the buildings, airlines, and cruise ships:

&gt; &quot;These are very deliberately promoted operations that we think in the long run will pay.&quot;

Yet for all the staggering waste on display so far, perhaps nothing can compare to the West End musical.

Yes, you heard that right. Toward the end of the boom—in the early 1990s—the Nauruan government decided to spend $7m funding a musical about the life of Leonardo DaVinci.

It&apos;s at this point that the tale of Nauru can&apos;t help but descend into farce.

Written by the former roadie of a British one-hit wonder band—and featuring scenes in which DaVinci slaps the Mona Lisa on the arse to seduce her—the musical got financed after the Nauruan president&apos;s advisor played him a demo tape.

Opening in London in 1993, it was the closest real-life equivalent yet staged to *Springtime for Hitler*. The thing became a legendary bomb.

But while Mel Brooks&apos;s producers had a canny scheme for making money off a stage failure, the same sadly can&apos;t be said for Nauru&apos;s government.

Not that those in charge particularly cared.

In 1982, it was officially estimated that—by the time the phosphate ran out—the Nauruan trust fund would be holding more than a billion dollars. Enough to keep every single Nauruan family in comfort for generations.

At least, that was the official version. Unofficially, though, it was clear Nauru&apos;s savings weren&apos;t all they were claimed to be.

When the *Times* visited the island, they were told by an anonymous official that the government had (quote): &quot;a chronic cash-flow problem&quot;. Rumors were already spreading that the money hadn&apos;t been invested wisely.

Perhaps the attitude of Nauru&apos;s elites is best summed up by a quote from former finance minister James Bop, when the *Times* asked him if he wasn&apos;t worried:

&gt; &quot;It is a worry,&quot; he said, &quot;but we have a motto in Nauruan (...) It means, &apos;Tomorrow will take care of itself.&apos;&quot;

Sadly for regular Nauruans, that motto would turn out to be extremely misguided.

## The Age of Armageddon

One aspect of Nauru&apos;s boom that often gets left out of these stories, is that it didn&apos;t apply equally to everyone.

While the local elites were importing sports cars, and—in one notable instance—literally using money to wipe their asses, ordinary Nauruans saw very little of the phosphate dollars flowing through their economy.

The average income on the island was between $5,000 and $6,000 a year—or equivalent to just under $20,000 today. Nor were the government handouts enough to buy people off. There&apos;s evidence that many regular citizens could see the coming consequences of this wasteful spending, and were desperate to stop it.

The day the Leonardo musical premiered in London, for example, 100 elites were meant to fly out to watch it. But they almost didn&apos;t make it when protestors rushed the airport, demanding the government stop pissing their money away.

By this point, Hammer deRoburt was dead. Yet the government had carried on his image: still relying on the income from phosphate to survive.

The trouble was, that phosphate was about to run out.

At the end of the 1980s, Nauru had been exporting 2 million tons a year. By the end of the 1990s, that had dropped to half a million.

Come 2005, it would hit a record low of just 8,000 tons. And while investments in new equipment would soon allow harder-to-reach phosphate to be harvested, post-2005 annual exports would never exceed 45,000 tons.

As the phosphate ran out, so did the money.

With good investments, it&apos;s been estimated that Nauru&apos;s trust fund could&apos;ve been worth eight billion Australian dollars by 2004. Instead, wasteful spending, bad investments, and money lost to scams meant the trust fund&apos;s true size was under $30 million.

The price of that paltry sum? The total destruction of their homeland.

By the mid-1990s, 80 percent of Nauru had been strip mined. Where there had once been trees and wildlife there was now only a desert of jagged rocks—one on which nothing could ever again be grown or built.

You know that Joni Mitchell song, where she sings about how they paved paradise and put up a parking lot?

Well, at least the &quot;They&quot; in that song got a parking lot out of it. All Nauru got was a failed musical, and an economy based solely on resource extraction.

So, you can probably guess what happened when the resources ran out.

The end of phosphate mining did to Nauruan society what a well-aimed grenade does to the interior of a clown car. Turned what had once been amusing excess into a depressing mess.

With no money, all those free government services collapsed. Not just the transport and healthcare, but also the entire schooling system. Unemployment peaked at 90 percent.

Yet, for all the economic woes of post-boom Nauru, it was the ecological ones that really stood out.

Phosphate mining hadn&apos;t just created a desolate wasteland that could never be healed. It had also poisoned the island&apos;s waters; and left the interior covered in fine, toxic particles. Particles that get kicked up when the wind blows, and create breathing problems.

With no arable land, and nowhere to forage, it had left the entire population dependent on food imports. Imports that came in the form of highly-processed foods—contributing to the ongoing obesity and diabetes epidemics.

Imagine, for a second, how jarring this must&apos;ve been. The whiplash that must accompany a switch from &quot;second richest nation on the planet,&quot; to &quot;broke guys living in an environmental wasteland&quot;.

Not that the government didn&apos;t try to find new revenue streams.

At the saner-end of the spectrum, that involved taking Australia to court for its decades of mismanagement prior to independence.

In 1994, Canberra settled the case, agreeing to pay $57m upfront, followed by another $50m over 20 years. The UK and New Zealand each paid an additional $12m for their role as Nauru&apos;s joint custodians.

At the less-sane end, though, it involved doing some stuff that would do to Nauru&apos;s reputation what phosphate mining had done to the environment.

Utterly destroy it.

## No Exit

The term &quot;offshore banking&quot; probably conjures some specific images. Images that mix pleasant stuff like palm trees and white sand beaches, with others of extremely wealthy people laughing as they refuse to give even a penny to the taxman.

In Nauru&apos;s case, though, the government&apos;s foray into banking didn&apos;t just help the rich evade taxes. It also helped some of the nastiest, most-violent people on Earth launder colossal sums of money.

To make their state attractive to financiers, the government didn&apos;t require banks to have any physical presence on the island—not even a mailbox. Nor did it require them to keep any records.

As a result, the sort of people interested in banking on Nauru were the exact sort of people who need to hide massive transfers of money from the authorities. The Russian mafia alone is estimated to have laundered over a billion dollars through the island.

The craziest part? Russian mobsters weren&apos;t even the island&apos;s shadiest customers. That honor probably goes to al-Qaeda, who banked with Nauru in the run-up to 9/11.

Nor was it just banking services Nauru offered these criminals.

By the mid-1990s, officials were openly selling passports. Now, that&apos;s something some countries do even in this day and age—Dominica and North Macedonia, for example, will give you citizenship in exchange for large sums of money.

Nauru&apos;s government, though, didn&apos;t just sell regular passports. According to the *Guardian* it sold diplomatic passports. As in, the documents that provide immunity from prosecution to the holder.

And when a state is selling diplomatic immunity, while also courting al-Qaeda and the Russian mafia…

…well, you can see how that might be just the teeny tiniest bit worrying.

When the backlash eventually hit, it was immense. So immense, that it dwarfed even the millions of dollars a year Nauru was receiving in banking fees.

In 2002, the US declared the country a money laundering state. Sanctions were slapped on it that equaled those placed on Saddam Hussein&apos;s Iraq.

The pressure was enough to force Nauru to pass anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing laws. But, with no other source of income, enforcing those laws soon left Nauru poorer than ever.

Completely broke, the island nation was forced to watch as creditors repossessed its airplanes, cruise ships, and foreign real estate. Even the 50-storey Nauru House in Melbourne was sold off.

During this bleak period, just about the only way the government had to make money was by offering recognition to unrecognized states.

This included recognizing Russian-backed separatists in places like Abkhazia. In 2003, it also involved taking a massive bribe from China to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan… only for the government to then take money from Taipei to reestablish relations two years later.

Aside from that, Nauru&apos;s only revenue came from hosting an offshore detention center for Australia. An act that saw it receive millions of dollars per year in visa fees to house asylum seekers Canberra refused to process on its home turf.

But while &quot;millions of dollars a year&quot; might sound like a lot, the truth is that none of these activities were able to support the economy.

So, Nauru kept doing what it had always done. It kept right on mining for phosphate.

If you need a handy metaphor for pointless, self-destructive behavior, it&apos;s hard to find a better one than this. In 2018, the *Guardian* reported that Nauru was digging up enough phosphate to make $22m.

The problem? The cost of mining it was $27.5m. The government was losing over $5m a year to dig up the last remaining chunks of land that had yet to be strip mined.

Now, that&apos;s not to say phosphate will never again play a major role in Nauru&apos;s economy.

With the primary reserves of Topside gone, the country is now considering how to mine its secondary reserves. Chunks of phosphate buried so deep or so hard to get that cost-effective extraction has only recently become viable.

These secondary reserves may total as much as 20 million metric tons. Enough, perhaps, to create a mini-boom.

Yet, even if phosphate again lifts Nauru&apos;s economy, it&apos;s not a sustainable solution to the country&apos;s woes. And who knows what ecological damage it might cause to the remaining 20 percent of the island that&apos;s still inhabitable?

To give some idea of just how destructive phosphate mining has been, consider this anecdote. Since 1993, the Nauru Rehabilitation Corporation has spent $135m trying to repair land that&apos;s been strip mined.

In all that time, it&apos;s managed to revive just 10 hectares—part of an area known as Pit 6. That&apos;s a mere fraction of the 400 hectares originally planned for rehabilitation. At this rate, it&apos;ll take over 1,000 years to reach their target.

This, then, is where we began. With Nauru in poverty, and its citizens trapped on the edges of an environmental nightmare. Clinging on to the last habitable tracts of land, even as their government considers mining further.

By now, you can doubtless see why so many view Nauru&apos;s tale as a parable for humanity. A wake-up call for a species that seems determined to keep degrading its planet, even as wildfires multiply and heatwaves bring entire cities to their knees.

However, it&apos;s not climate change that we want to end talking about, but another potential ecological catastrophe. A catastrophe that could be the second great environmental disaster Nauru has been at the center of.

One that won&apos;t take place on Topside, but at the bottom of the ocean.

## First as Tragedy, Then as Farce

Were someone to place a deep-sea polymetallic nodule in your hand, chances are you&apos;d be pretty unimpressed.

About the size of a potato, these nodules are basically smooth brown rocks that exist at the bottom of the ocean. Lying on the seabed some 4 km below the surface—what Americans might call either &quot;two and a half miles&quot; or &quot;a whole bunch of football pitches&quot;.

But make no mistake. While these nodules may look small and unimpressive on the outside, it&apos;s in the same way that Mob appears a scrawny, boring middle schooler from afar.

Deep inside, both contain a spectacular secret. In Mob&apos;s case, it&apos;s ESP. In the nodules&apos; case, it&apos;s the ability to save the world.

The makeup of these nodules, see, is stuff like cobalt, nickel, and manganese. Minerals that just happen to be key to building the batteries that will dominate the green energy revolution.

This is important, because the International Energy Agency predicts a four-fold increase in demand for these minerals by 2040, as humanity struggles to quickly transition off fossil fuels. The problem, is that terrestrial mining may not be able to keep up with demand.

This is where the nodules come in. Found in rich fields on the seabed, they&apos;re particularly clustered in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone—a 4.5 million sq km slice of the Pacific.

Unfortunately for the companies that want to harvest them, though, it&apos;s not quite as simple as just buying a boat, sailing west from California, and making bare profit.

No. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the waters outside each nation&apos;s exclusive economic zone are places of &quot;common heritage&quot;.

If you want to do any industrial work there, you&apos;ll need the UN&apos;s International Seabed Authority to agree. And, to get that agreement, you must be sponsored by a recognized nation state.

A nation state like, say, a certain tiny Pacific island in desperate need of cash.

As you&apos;ll have guessed by now, the state Canada&apos;s The Metals Company (or TMC) has teamed up with to harvest these nodules is none other than Nauru.

Well, technically, it&apos;s Nauru, plus Kiribati, and Tonga.

But Nauru is especially important, and not just because it was the first nation to come onboard. It was also the nation that fired the starting gun on nodule harvesting.

The first licenses for exploiting these nodules were granted way back in 2011. But the International Seabed Authority dragged its feet on designing regulations to carry out the work—in large part because of worries about environmental damage.

But, the ISA&apos;s rules include a loophole. One which states that the body must approve official applications within two years, even in the absence of regulations.

In July of 2021, Nauru went ahead and submitted its application, triggering a 24-month countdown until mining could begin.

Since you&apos;re the sort of intelligent, dashing person who reads articles like this; you&apos;re already aware that July, 2021 was more than two years ago. So, you might reasonably ask, what happened with Nauru&apos;s application?

Well, we&apos;re going to leave you hanging, I&apos;m afraid. A little mystery to tantalize you, that we&apos;ll answer in the final chapter.

Before we do that, though, we need to grapple with the effects Nauru&apos;s application had. Why it sparked a wave of global outrage—from Fiji to France.

The very real worry, that deep sea mining may be this generation&apos;s phosphate mining.

In other words, that Nauru may have fired the starting gun on a whole additional environmental apocalypse.

## The Second Catastrophe?

The process of extracting polymetallic nodules from the seabed is relatively straightforward—to explain, if not actually to do.

Using heavy machinery, companies will hoover up a whole lot of seabed, collecting the nodules on ships which will then return them to land for processing.

But while that might sound pretty simple, it obscures a whole host of complex issues. Not least of which is the way this resource extraction might impact the ocean floor.

As the *New York Times* put it:

&gt; &quot;Scientists say that more is known about the surface of the moon than about the floor of the ocean (...) perhaps 90 percent of the species at the bottom of the Pacific remain unclassified.&quot;

That means we can&apos;t even begin to predict how removing these nodules will disturb marine ecosystems. Even if most scientists are sure that the impacts will be more than negligible.

For example, the machinery is likely to churn up sediment at a spectacular rate, potentially destroying fragile habitats.

Even if it doesn&apos;t, there&apos;s the chance that toxic metals will be among those sediments churned up. Toxic metals that may be swept upwards in plumes, dragged high into the water to poison marine lifeforms.

Others point to the potential for noise from the machinery to damage the ability of whales to communicate with one another. Something that could lead to massive disruption in their lifecycles.

Mostly, though, people are worried that we&apos;re going to just go out and start destroying something we don&apos;t really understand. And the long-term effects of that might be horrifying.

As the *New Yorker* reported last year:

&gt; &quot;Hundreds of marine scientists have signed a statement warning that this would be an ecological disaster resulting in damage &apos;irreversible on multi-generational timescales.&apos;&quot;

One of the slightly-galling things about this, is that this damage won&apos;t be happening in Nauru&apos;s waters.

Situated between Hawaii and Mexico, the Clarion-Clipperton Zone is thousands of kilometers from the barren desert of Topside. An environmental disaster here would affect many different places.

That may be why there&apos;s been a concerted push at the UN to place a moratorium on deep sea mining. A push that includes Pacific states like Fiji, Chile, Panama, Palau, Costa Rica and New Zealand; but also Atlantic nations like Ireland, France, and Sweden.

Standing against them, are countries that have already sponsored exploration contracts. Countries like China, South Korea, Russia, Jamaica, Brazil, Japan, and France.

And, yes, France absolutely appeared on both of those lists! Talk about &quot;having your baguette and eating it&quot;.

Now, we need to be clear at this point, that the potential impact on the seabed is far from settled science.

The Metals Company—the one Nauru is sponsoring—claims that nodule extraction will be less-damaging than land-based mining. The Seabed Authority, meanwhile, is at pains to stress that work will only be allowed in 60 percent of the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. A whole 1.96 million sq km will be preserved as a pristine environment.

Yet it may be the official position of Nauru itself that is the most-interesting of all.

Because, rather than an economic activity, the Nauruan government describes deep sea mining as something far more existential. A way to save the last habitable part of their damaged nation.

With climate change already underway, sea levels are expected to rise in the coming decades.

While this will suck for everyone, it will be especially awful for low-lying island nations. Although Nauru isn&apos;t as low-lying as some, the destruction of Topside means the only inhabitable parts are very close to the waves.

According to Nauru&apos;s Ambassador to the International Seabed Authority, Margo Deiye, her country is destined to vanish unless the green transition happens extremely soon. And making the world&apos;s economy green will require a gigantic increase in certain minerals.

Deep sea mining can help with that. TMC estimates that there are enough nodules down there to power 280 million electric vehicles. 280 million vehicles, that would otherwise be farting out planet-frying gases.

Or, as Margo Deiye has said:

&gt; &quot;The misunderstanding is that any human activity does not have risks – every activity has risks. But the risk of not doing anything with this current climate crisis, is much bigger for us and it&apos;s an existential threat for the Pacific.&quot;

These, then, are the two sides that stand opposed in this debate. One which believes extracting the seabed&apos;s resources could cause a catastrophe; and another that believes a bigger catastrophe is already happening right now, and we have to do everything we can to try and stop it.

As to who is in the right, we can&apos;t really say. Unlike George Costanza, we&apos;ve never claimed to be marine biologists.

But what we can say, is that the stakes are high. And, as we move into the final chapter, it&apos;s with a massive question hanging over everything.

What if we don&apos;t figure out who&apos;s right, until it&apos;s already too late?

## Watching the World Burn

When the *New York Times* did a little digging into the contract between TMC and Nauru, what they found didn&apos;t exactly paint a flattering picture.

According to their reporting, Nauru would receive a tiny fraction of the profits from deep sea mining. While the exact amount has never been disclosed, the paper did speak to a community leader from the co-sponsoring nation of Tonga, who said his country had been offered $2 a ton.

Were the same fee applied to Nauru, that would mean the island nation stands to receive less than 0.5 percent of all profits TMC makes from deep sea mining.

As former Tonga parliament member Lord Fusitu&apos;a told the paper of record:

&gt; &quot;This company set out to game the system and use a poor, developing Pacific nation as the conduit to exploit these resources.&quot;

You may not be surprised to learn that this is a claim TMC vigorously disputes. Nonetheless, such a setup leaves a bad taste in the mouth—reminiscent, as it is, of Nauru&apos;s past exploitation.

It also implies that the fight against climate change may be just a convenient fig leaf. A way for Nauru to ensure some much-needed income, in the guise of fighting the good fight.

With Australia&apos;s offshore detention centers coming to an end, the island is about to lose one of its few revenue streams.

In such a dire scenario, even a mere half a percent of whatever TMC makes would have a positive impact on the Nauruan economy.

But that&apos;s only if the mining ever gets going.

So, remember back when we said Nauru had fired the starting gun on a two-year countdown to resource extraction, back in July of 2021?

Well, despite the loophole that should&apos;ve allowed TMC to start mining by now, the International Seabed Authority managed to delay the process, giving it more time to finalize regulations.

At time of writing, it&apos;s now thought that no resource extraction will take place until early 2025. Later than the 2024 date TMC had initially penciled in, but not remarkably so.

When that date arrives, we&apos;ll finally see for certain what the truth is. Whether Nauru is today helping lead the charge toward the green energy revolution that&apos;ll save our planet… or simply playing a bit part in yet another tale of human greed and ecological disaster. A new Topside for the 21st Century.

The scary part is, we&apos;ll probably only know with hindsight.

While the destruction of Topside—the wrecking of Nauru—was a tale foretold, it was all too easy to overlook the gloomy predictions in the moment.

All too easy for first Arthur F. Ellis, then the Australian colonists, and finally the Nauruan elite to ignore the Cassandras. To quietly tell themselves that, by the time the phosphate ran out, they&apos;d have fixed the problem. That the miracles of money would allow them to escape the consequences of their shortsighted actions.

It&apos;s a tale everyone reading this will see some horrible parallels in.

As Antarctic ice levels drop and oceans overheat; as scientists sound warning alarms; how many of our leaders today act like the Nauruan elite of yore? How many shrug and say &quot;tomorrow will take care of itself,&quot; even as they ensure that tomorrow will be anything but fine.

And now here we are, with deep sea mining. Potentially standing at the edge of another catastrophe. Another moment when a narrow elite adds up the costs, and decides the benefits to them outweighs the risk to everyone else.

It&apos;s reasons like this that explain why Nauru&apos;s story resonates so strongly today. The story of how the richest country in the world destroyed itself.

Fittingly, it&apos;s a resonance the Nauruans themselves are only too aware of.

Back in 2011, then-president Marcus Stephen wrote a guest column for the *Times*, where he set out the parable of Nauru&apos;s self-inflicted apocalypse:

&gt; &quot;I am not looking for sympathy,&quot; he wrote, &quot;but rather warning you what can happen when a country runs out of options. The world is headed down a similar path with the relentless burning of coal and oil, which is altering the planet&apos;s climate, melting ice caps, making oceans more acidic and edging us ever closer to a day when no one will be able to take clean water, fertile soil or abundant food for granted (...)

&gt; I forgive you if you have never heard of Nauru — but you will not forgive yourselves if you ignore our story.&quot;

It&apos;s a story that, over 12 years later, is more relevant to our planet&apos;s future than it has ever been.

## Key Takeaways

- Nauru&apos;s wealth was built on phosphate mining, which destroyed 80% of its land.
- The island&apos;s elite squandered its resources, leading to poverty and environmental degradation.
- Nauru&apos;s experience serves as a warning about the dangers of unchecked resource exploitation.
- The island is now considering deep-sea mining, raising concerns about environmental impact.
- Nauru&apos;s story highlights the risks of prioritizing short-term gains over long-term sustainability.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the current state of Nauru&apos;s environment?

Nauru is an ecological nightmare. About 80% of the land is a toxic desert with jagged limestone peaks and fine, irritating dust where nothing can grow. The only habitable part is a 274m-wide zone around the island.

### How did Nauru become so wealthy in the 1980s?

Nauru became wealthy due to the mining of phosphate, a fertilizer that produced spectacular harvests. The island was per capita one of the richest nations on Earth in the early 1980s.

### What caused Nauru&apos;s economic downfall?

Nauru&apos;s economic downfall was caused by the depletion of its phosphate reserves and the mismanagement of its sovereign wealth fund. The government spent extravagantly and made poor investments, leading to financial ruin.

### What health issues are prevalent among Nauru&apos;s population?

Nauru has extreme rates of obesity, diabetes, smoking, and alcoholism. The population also faces high rates of domestic violence and other antisocial behaviors.

### What is the significance of the doorstop found in Sydney in 1899?

The doorstop, mistaken for petrified wood, was actually a chunk of phosphate. Its discovery led to the exploitation of Nauru&apos;s phosphate reserves, which ultimately destroyed the island&apos;s environment.

### What was the impact of phosphate mining on Nauru&apos;s environment?

Phosphate mining turned much of Nauru into a wasteland. It contaminated the groundwater, left the interior covered in toxic particles, and destroyed the island&apos;s ability to grow food or support wildlife.

### What role did Australia play in Nauru&apos;s history?

Australia annexed Nauru after World War I and oversaw the strip-mining of its phosphate reserves. While Australia paid royalties and set up trust funds, the exploitation was still destructive and left Nauru in a dire state after independence.

### What is Nauru&apos;s current economic situation?

Nauru is currently broke and near-uninhabitable. It faces high unemployment, crumbling infrastructure, and relies on highly-processed imported foods. The government has resorted to desperate measures like selling passports and hosting offshore detention centers.

### What is deep sea mining and how is Nauru involved?

Deep sea mining involves extracting polymetallic nodules from the ocean floor, which contain minerals crucial for green energy technologies. Nauru, in partnership with The Metals Company, has submitted an application to start deep sea mining, sparking global controversy.

### What are the potential environmental impacts of deep sea mining?

Deep sea mining could destroy fragile marine habitats, churn up toxic sediments, and disrupt marine life. Scientists warn that the long-term effects could be catastrophic and irreversible.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Nauru: How the Richest Country in the World Destroyed Itself](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ow3arhB18xM)
- [https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/dark-history-nauru/](https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/dark-history-nauru/)
- [https://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/07/magazine/world-s-richest-little-isle.html](https://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/07/magazine/world-s-richest-little-isle.html)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/10/a-short-history-of-nauru-australias-dumping-ground-for-refugees](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/10/a-short-history-of-nauru-australias-dumping-ground-for-refugees)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/04/corruption-incompetence-and-a-musical-naurus-riches-to-rags-tale](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/04/corruption-incompetence-and-a-musical-naurus-riches-to-rags-tale)
- [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/29/world/deep-sea-mining.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/29/world/deep-sea-mining.html)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jul/08/future-of-deep-sea-mining-hangs-in-balance-as-opposition-grows](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jul/08/future-of-deep-sea-mining-hangs-in-balance-as-opposition-grows)
- [https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/going-broke-and-sinking-nauru-wants-to-mine-the-ocean-floor-20230610-p5dfiy.html](https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/going-broke-and-sinking-nauru-wants-to-mine-the-ocean-floor-20230610-p5dfiy.html)
- [https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/7/9/nauru-prepares-to-mine-deep-seas-in-big-climate-controversy](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/7/9/nauru-prepares-to-mine-deep-seas-in-big-climate-controversy)
- [https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/earshot/the-secret-history-of-nauru-and-its-lost-wealth/7496620](https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/earshot/the-secret-history-of-nauru-and-its-lost-wealth/7496620)
- [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/fertiliser-island-scents-musical-success-first-night-leonardo-1489451.html](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/fertiliser-island-scents-musical-success-first-night-leonardo-1489451.html)
- [https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/01/03/mining-the-bottom-of-the-sea](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/01/03/mining-the-bottom-of-the-sea)
- [https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/opinion/19stephen.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/opinion/19stephen.html)
- [https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/23/us/politics/pacific-seabed-mining-delayed.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/23/us/politics/pacific-seabed-mining-delayed.html)
- [Hero image source](https://images.rawpixel.com/editor_1024/czNmcy1wcml2YXRlL3Jhd3BpeGVsX2ltYWdlcy93ZWJzaXRlX2NvbnRlbnQvbHIvdXB3azYxNjkzODU2LXdpa2ltZWRpYS1pbWFnZS1rb3dsbDVsMS5qcGc.jpg) by openverse, cc0.

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      <description>Imagine driving into a ghost town, entirely abandoned, save for a few lonely residents. As you travel down a faded road covered in graffiti, steam rises from the cracks, creating a foggy and increasingly hot atmosphere. Despite what the eerie surroundings might suggest, you haven&apos;t stumbled into Silent Hill, nor are you characters in a B-list horror movie. This little slice of hell is, in fact, Centralia. Tucked away in central Pennsylvania, about an hour northeast of Harrisburg and roughly the same distance southwest of Scranton, this small, deserted town has been home to an underground mine fire that has burned for over 60 years. Today, we&apos;re diving into the haunting story of Centralia and its never-ending inferno.

## Centralia, P.A.

To say that Pennsylvania and the coal mining industry have an intimate relationship would be an understatement. The state holds around 95% of all the anthracite coal, or hard coal, found in the United States, making it virtually the nation&apos;s sole source of this rare substance. While other countries also possess anthracite reserves, the central and northeastern regions of Pennsylvania contain the largest known deposits in the world.

Anthracite sets itself apart from other types of coal by being, quite simply, superior in nearly every way. With its high fixed carbon content and low levels of volatile matter, it burns hotter, slower, and cleaner. It&apos;s also denser and harder than other varieties, making it highly prized for industrial and heating purposes.

As of a 2022 report, Pennsylvania is home to 108 active coal mines, 80 of which are surface mines and 28 underground. In total, the state produces about 40,000 tons of coal annually. However, less than 2,500 of those tons are the rare anthracite, which is only mined in six Pennsylvania counties, including Columbia County.

Coal mining first came to the region in 1842, when large deposits of the sooty substance were discovered in the nearby Buck Mountain. Before long, both open-pit strip mines and underground operations were established, giving rise to several mining towns, including Centralia. In 1862, the Centralia Colliery was founded, formalizing mining efforts in the area. Most of the town&apos;s residents found work with the Locust Mountain Coal and Iron Company, which played a key role in Centralia&apos;s official incorporation in 1866.

In its early years, Centralia flourished. The town boasted multiple hotels, two theaters, and fourteen different stores. However, as anyone who has lived in a mining town can attest, such growth and prosperity are closely tied to the fortunes of the mining industry. When a town is built around a single market, its stability rises and falls with that industry&apos;s success.

Unfortunately for Centralia, coal usage peaked during World War I and steadily declined throughout the 20th century as the world shifted toward more cost-effective energy sources. As the demand for coal diminished, the once bustling and promising town began its slow decline. Despite boasting a population of over 2,500 residents in the 1890 census, that number had dropped to around 1,500 by the 1960s. The extensive network of underground mines was gradually sealed off, with many abandoned entirely. The open-pit strip mines, long since depleted, were left as gaping scars on the landscape, silent reminders of a potential that never fully materialized.

This is a story all too familiar throughout the Commonwealth, and, indeed, across much of the United States. In Pennsylvania alone, there are over 11,000 abandoned mines. (And yes, as a side note, Pennsylvania is one of just four U.S. states that is officially both a state and a commonwealth and either term is correct.) In these situations, there&apos;s often little that can be done. More often than not, residents are forced to seek new work and build new lives elsewhere, leaving behind the towns they once called home. Those who remain do their best to adapt, creating new forms of local economy through mining museums, unusual roadside attractions, or even by repurposing old mines for new uses.

## A Genius Idea

By 1962, the roughly 1,500 residents still living in Centralia and trying to keep the town alive began facing an entirely new problem. For decades, townspeople had been dumping their trash wherever they pleased, often in old, abandoned mines, creating multiple unregulated dumps throughout the area. This led to an infestation of rats and other vermin, and the pervasive stench became nearly impossible to escape.

The Centralia Council, responsible for making decisions for the town, agreed that something needed to be done, especially with Memorial Day festivities approaching. Although Centralia was far from a thriving city by then, many residents still felt a strong sense of community pride. In response, the council proposed a familiar solution: repurpose one of the empty mining pits as a landfill.

The pit they selected was about 75 feet wide and 50 feet deep, originally excavated around 1935, and had served the town&apos;s needs well. However, it quickly became clear that the accumulated trash was taking up more space than expected. In response, the town council decided the best course of action was to burn the garbage in the pit the same year they had started using it, in 1962.

While today we understand the dangers of burning trash, including the release of toxic fumes that can cause respiratory issues, cancer, and widespread environmental pollution, this awareness developed slowly over the latter half of the 20th century. Even now, in some rural parts of the United States, it&apos;s not uncommon for people to ignore regulations and burn whatever waste they want on their own properties. So, at the time, burning the trash didn&apos;t seem like a major concern. Unfortunately, it wasn&apos;t this act alone, but a separate and far more critical mistake that would turn a local garbage problem into something much worse.

By law, abandoned underground mining areas are required to have their entrances sealed off with a non-combustible shale barrier. This not only helps prevent the spread of contaminated water and hazardous gases into nearby or connected mines but also protects the surrounding environment. However, before the establishment of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) in 1977, oversight of the mining industry fell to the Bureau of Mines, an agency that was often underfunded, understaffed, and poorly organized compared to its successor.

As a result, the early years of mining were marked by frequent accidents, numerous fatalities, and a widespread failure to properly seal or document abandoned mine sites. In states like Pennsylvania and Utah, outdoor enthusiasts still occasionally fall into or get lost in these old, forgotten tunnels, which remain scattered across the landscape. Centralia was no exception. Near the chosen location for the town&apos;s garbage-burning pit, an overlooked, 15-foot-deep hole, left behind from earlier underground mining activity, remained open and unnoticed.

It&apos;s believed that when the garbage fire was ignited, the flames spread to nearby carbon-rich refuse and, from there, found their way into the previously overlooked open mine shaft. Once the fire reached the coal-filled underground tunnels, where a web of interconnected seams and old mining operations stretched beneath the entire town, it was too late. Unbeknownst to the citizens of Centralia, a relentless underground fire had begun to burn directly beneath their homes, driveways, churches, and businesses. Life on the surface carried on as usual, while below, the town was quite literally starting to fall apart.

## Eternal Flame

While one might assume that a situation like this would demand immediate action, mine fires like this one were, and still are, remarkably common across Pennsylvania. As a result, many are simply left to burn out on their own, since the costs and risks of extinguishing them often outweigh the potential benefits. That said, some early efforts were made to smother the fire using water, clay, and other materials. These attempts largely failed though, and with limited resources stretched thin by several more severe fires elsewhere in the state, most of these efforts were eventually abandoned. Additionally, few people anticipated just how quickly and widely the fire would spread, assuming it was relatively contained. Life above ground continued much as it always had, with many local mines even remaining open for work.

However, within a few months, on August 9th, 1962, carbon monoxide was detected in Centralia&apos;s mines, forcing the remaining ones to shut down and immediately cutting off the town&apos;s primary source of employment. Despite this, many residents chose to stay, either believing the situation would eventually be resolved or determined to keep the town alive through other means. Unfortunately, this became increasingly difficult as the fire worsened underground, continuing to spread from mine to mine beneath the town.

In 1979, the owner of a local gas station grew curious about whether, and how, the underground fires were affecting the gasoline stored beneath the property. After testing the fuel, they discovered it was 100°F (38°C) hotter than normal. While this temperature wasn&apos;t high enough to pose an immediate safety risk, it gave remaining residents a sobering glimpse into the severity of what was happening below ground. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, government officials conducted regular temperature checks on the fire itself, consistently recording readings over 1,000°F (538°C), with the highest ever recorded reaching an intense 1,300°F (704°C).

Although many residents of Centralia chose to stay, the consequences of the fire weren&apos;t confined to the mines. As local journalist David DeKok described in his 1986 book *Unseen Danger*, residents frequently dealt with:

&gt; &quot;burning eyes, the taste of sulfur, and an acrid odor accompanied by headaches, lassitude, and respiratory troubles&quot;.

But in the 1980s, the situation in Centralia worsened significantly as many of the coal seams began to burn out, undermining the ground beneath the streets and causing sinkholes to open up across the town. In 1981, one of these sinkholes nearly claimed the life of 12-year-old Todd Domboski. While running through a local yard, the ground suddenly gave way beneath him. Fortunately, Todd managed to grab onto a nearby tree root and hold on until help arrived and pulled him to safety. Although he escaped unharmed, the incident drew national attention and sparked both public concern and legislative calls for a lasting solution to Centralia&apos;s seemingly unstoppable fire.

## Eminent Domain

Between 1962 and 1983, as previously noted, a few attempts were made to extinguish or control the fire, with approximately $7 million allocated to the effort during that period, including funds for relocation assistance for residents who chose to leave. However, after Todd Dombowski&apos;s near-death experience, state officials began to take the situation more seriously and started exploring the possibility of fully extinguishing the fire.

By 1984, estimates suggested that the cost of putting out the fire would be around $660 million, equivalent to just over $2 billion today. This was a staggering sum compared to the mere $50,000 it would have cost to address the issue back in 1962, had the proper means been available at the time.

Given the overwhelming cost of a viable solution to the fire, many officials concluded that it made more sense to abandon the town entirely rather than attempt to save it. As a result, Congress passed a $42 million bill aimed at helping the remaining families relocate. Surprisingly, however, only about half of the families accepted the assistance. The rest chose to stay in Centralia, in the homes they had known their entire lives, despite the ongoing health risks. For a time, the government allowed them to remain, likely hoping the remaining residents would eventually reconsider and leave the hazardous area voluntarily.

By 1992, the state of Pennsylvania had lost patience. It declared eminent domain over the entire town of Centralia, condemning all remaining buildings and effectively rendering anyone who stayed behind a squatter. A decade later, the town&apos;s ZIP code was officially revoked, effectively unincorporating Centralia and transferring postal services to nearby Ashland. Despite the eminent domain declaration, a small group of residents remained and attempted to challenge the state&apos;s decision through legal means, to no success. Still, for more than a decade afterward, Pennsylvania chose not to enforce evictions, allowing the remaining residents to stay in Centralia despite the legal and environmental risks.

That changed in 2009, when then-Governor Ed Rendell decided enough was enough and initiated formal evictions of the remaining residents. But even this effort fell short. Despite Rendell&apos;s actions, five homes remained occupied, and the families living in them once again took legal action against the state, this time alleging they were victims of massive fraud. According to these residents, the state&apos;s true motive wasn&apos;t public safety or concern about the fire, but rather a desire to access the rare coal beneath the town. They claimed the government was using the fire as a pretext to seize their land. However, these legal challenges were ultimately unsuccessful as well, and in 2012, the courts once again ordered the remaining residents to vacate.

By 2013, the state of Pennsylvania finally acknowledged the futility of its efforts. State and local officials reached an agreement with the remaining families: they would be allowed to stay in their homes and retain ownership for the rest of their lives. However, upon their passing, the properties would revert to government ownership under the previously declared eminent domain.

## Here and Now

Today, just five people remain in a town whose underbelly has been burning for over 60 years, despite government intervention, severe health risks, and the complete absence of anything else for miles around. Surrounding this eerily haunting ghost town, visitors will find streets that remain mostly intact, save for the occasional sinkhole or fissure where steam rises ominously from the ground. A few houses still stand, alongside long-forgotten graveyards, an abandoned church, scorched patches of vegetation, and driveways that lead to empty, overgrown lots. With enough clichés to make your skin crawl, it&apos;s no surprise that many believe Centralia inspired the setting of the video game Silent Hill.

Unsurprisingly, the town has become a roadside attraction for curious passersby, drawn either by its eerie pop-culture legacy or the infamy of the underground fire. Though the fire itself remains hidden beneath the surface, the ghost town alone has been enough to lure visitors for decades. One stretch of Route 61, which cuts through Centralia and was closed in the early 1990s due to the subterranean instability, became a particular hotspot. Tourists flocked to the area, leaving behind layers of spray-painted messages and artwork, earning it the nickname &quot;Graffiti Highway.&quot; Over time, it became an attraction in its own right. But then, in 2020, officials moved to shut it down for good, covering the stretch with dirt mounds to block public access.

Although the fire isn&apos;t visible from the surface, it continues to be closely monitored by officials to this day. More than 2,000 boreholes have been drilled throughout the Centralia region to aid in surveillance, with the state conducting visual inspections on a monthly basis. Experts estimate that the underground fire, which began in a small mining pit, has spread across more than 400 surface acres and has the potential to expand to as many as 3,700 acres. However, this shouldn&apos;t be imagined as a single, massive blaze blanketing that entire area. Instead, it&apos;s a network of scattered fires burning beneath the surface. Interestingly, surface mining in the region has actually helped slow the fire&apos;s progression; by strip mining, crews remove coal deposits deep underground, effectively limiting the fuel available for the fire to spread.

Despite this, the fire is still advancing, reportedly by about 50 to 75 feet (15 to 23 meters) per year. Officials have confirmed that it has already spread several miles south, beneath the now-abandoned town of Byrnesville, and they believe it has likely extended beyond the coal bed of Buck Mountain into those of neighboring mountains. With no active efforts to extinguish the blaze, experts estimate it could continue burning for at least another century.

Yet while Centralia&apos;s fire is undoubtedly the most infamous mine fire in the United States, it may not even be the largest in Pennsylvania. In fact, it&apos;s just one of roughly 40 active mine fires across the state, some of which are believed to be even older and more expansive than Centralia&apos;s, despite its notoriety. On a global scale, underground mine fires are surprisingly common, with thousands potentially burning simultaneously around the world at any given time.

Unfortunately, this points to a much deeper issue: the consequences of reckless mining practices. When safety and sustainability are sidelined in pursuit of resources, we not only endanger the environment, but we also jeopardize human lives and waste away the very materials we sought to extract in the first place.

## Key Takeaways

- Centralia, Pennsylvania, has an underground mine fire that has burned for over 60 years.
- The fire started in 1962 when a garbage dump in an abandoned mine ignited nearby coal seams.
- Pennsylvania holds 95% of the U.S. anthracite coal, which is highly prized for industrial use.
- The fire has caused significant health issues and infrastructure damage, leading to the town&apos;s abandonment.
- Despite government efforts, the fire continues to spread and is expected to burn for another century.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Centralia mine fire?

The Centralia mine fire is an underground mine fire that has been burning beneath the town of Centralia, Pennsylvania, for over 60 years.

### How did the Centralia mine fire start?

The fire started in 1962 when the town council decided to burn trash in an abandoned mining pit. The flames spread to nearby carbon-rich refuse and entered an overlooked open mine shaft, igniting the coal-filled underground tunnels.

### What type of coal is primarily found in Pennsylvania?

Pennsylvania holds around 95% of all the anthracite coal, or hard coal, found in the United States. Anthracite is superior in nearly every way, burning hotter, slower, and cleaner than other types of coal.

### How many active coal mines are there in Pennsylvania as of 2022?

As of 2022, Pennsylvania is home to 108 active coal mines, 80 of which are surface mines and 28 underground.

### What was the population of Centralia in the 1960s?

By the 1960s, the population of Centralia had dropped to around 1,500 residents.

### What happened to the residents of Centralia after the mine fire started?

Many residents chose to stay initially, but as the fire worsened and sinkholes began to appear, the government offered relocation assistance. By 1992, the state declared eminent domain over the town, condemning all remaining buildings and eventually initiating formal evictions.

### How is the Centralia mine fire monitored today?

The fire is closely monitored by officials through more than 2,000 boreholes drilled throughout the Centralia region, with visual inspections conducted monthly.

### How fast is the Centralia mine fire spreading?

The fire is advancing by about 50 to 75 feet (15 to 23 meters) per year.

### What is the estimated lifespan of the Centralia mine fire?

Experts estimate that the underground fire could continue burning for at least another century.

### How many active mine fires are there in Pennsylvania?

There are roughly 40 active mine fires across the state of Pennsylvania.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Neverending Coal Fire of Pennsylvania](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R1WvscV1F8I)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centralia_mine_fire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centralia_mine_fire)
- [https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dep/programs-and-services/mining/abandoned-mine-reclamation/aml-program-information/centralia-mine-fire-resources.html](https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dep/programs-and-services/mining/abandoned-mine-reclamation/aml-program-information/centralia-mine-fire-resources.html)
- [https://www.britannica.com/video/coal-mine-fire-Pennsylvania-Centralia/-207717](https://www.britannica.com/video/coal-mine-fire-Pennsylvania-Centralia/-207717)
- [https://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/literary-cultural-heritage-map-pa/feature-articles/inferno-centralia-mine-fire](https://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/literary-cultural-heritage-map-pa/feature-articles/inferno-centralia-mine-fire)
- [https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/fire-in-the-hole-77895126/#:~:text=The%20Centralia%20fire%20probably%20got,times%20to%20put%20it%20out](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/fire-in-the-hole-77895126/#:~:text=The%20Centralia%20fire%20probably%20got,times%20to%20put%20it%20out)
- [https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/history-of-centralia-a-pennsylvania-ghost-town/](https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/history-of-centralia-a-pennsylvania-ghost-town/)
- [https://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/literary-cultural-heritage-map-pa/feature-articles/inferno-centralia-mine-fire](https://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/literary-cultural-heritage-map-pa/feature-articles/inferno-centralia-mine-fire)
- [https://www.history.com/articles/mine-fire-burning-more-50-years-ghost-town](https://www.history.com/articles/mine-fire-burning-more-50-years-ghost-town)
- [https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/how-much-coal-has-been-mined-in-pennsylvanias-history/#:~:text=As%20of%202022%2C%20Pennsylvania%20has,39%2C701%20short%20tons%20of%20coal](https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/how-much-coal-has-been-mined-in-pennsylvanias-history/#:~:text=As%20of%202022%2C%20Pennsylvania%20has,39%2C701%20short%20tons%20of%20coal)
- [https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-are-types-coal#:~:text=Anthracite%3A%20The%20highest%20rank%20of,coal%20between%20subbituminous%20and%20anthracite](https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-are-types-coal#:~:text=Anthracite%3A%20The%20highest%20rank%20of,coal%20between%20subbituminous%20and%20anthracite)
- [https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/history-of-centralia-a-pennsylvania-ghost-town/](https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/history-of-centralia-a-pennsylvania-ghost-town/)
- [https://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/literary-cultural-heritage-map-pa/feature-articles/inferno-centralia-mine-fire](https://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/literary-cultural-heritage-map-pa/feature-articles/inferno-centralia-mine-fire)
- [https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/fire-in-the-hole-77895126/#:~:text=The%20Centralia%20fire%20probably%20got,times%20to%20put%20it%20out](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/fire-in-the-hole-77895126/#:~:text=The%20Centralia%20fire%20probably%20got,times%20to%20put%20it%20out)
- [https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/history-of-centralia-a-pennsylvania-ghost-town/](https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/history-of-centralia-a-pennsylvania-ghost-town/)
- [https://www.history.com/articles/mine-fire-burning-more-50-years-ghost-town](https://www.history.com/articles/mine-fire-burning-more-50-years-ghost-town)
- [https://files.dep.state.pa.us/mining/Abandoned%20Mine%20Reclamation/AbandonedMinePortalFiles/Centralia/CentraliaFrequentlyAskedQuestions.pdf](https://files.dep.state.pa.us/mining/Abandoned%20Mine%20Reclamation/AbandonedMinePortalFiles/Centralia/CentraliaFrequentlyAskedQuestions.pdf)
- [https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/history-of-centralia-a-pennsylvania-ghost-town/](https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/history-of-centralia-a-pennsylvania-ghost-town/)
- [https://files.dep.state.pa.us/mining/Abandoned%20Mine%20Reclamation/AbandonedMinePortalFiles/Centralia/CentraliaFrequentlyAskedQuestions.pdf](https://files.dep.state.pa.us/mining/Abandoned%20Mine%20Reclamation/AbandonedMinePortalFiles/Centralia/CentraliaFrequentlyAskedQuestions.pdf)
- [https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/history-of-centralia-a-pennsylvania-ghost-town/](https://www.abc27.com/digital-originals/history-of-centralia-a-pennsylvania-ghost-town/)
- [https://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/literary-cultural-heritage-map-pa/feature-articles/inferno-centralia-mine-fire](https://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/literary-cultural-heritage-map-pa/feature-articles/inferno-centralia-mine-fire)
- [https://www.history.com/articles/mine-fire-burning-more-50-years-ghost-town](https://www.history.com/articles/mine-fire-burning-more-50-years-ghost-town)
- [https://files.dep.state.pa.us/mining/Abandoned%20Mine%20Reclamation/AbandonedMinePortalFiles/Centralia/CentraliaFrequentlyAskedQuestions.pdf](https://files.dep.state.pa.us/mining/Abandoned%20Mine%20Reclamation/AbandonedMinePortalFiles/Centralia/CentraliaFrequentlyAskedQuestions.pdf)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/57/Aerial_landscape_view_%282017%29.jpg) by Saga1111 / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>North Sentinel Island: The Truth Behind the World&apos;s Most Isolated Tribe</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/north-sentinel-island-truth-behind-worlds-most-isolated-tribe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/north-sentinel-island-truth-behind-worlds-most-isolated-tribe</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>In November 2018 an almost unknown island attracted the attention of the media, springing into general consciousness apparently out of nowhere.

That&apos;s when news outlets widely reported the tragic story of an American missionary who had been killed by the native population of Sentinel Island, a remote islet in the Indian Ocean. And that&apos;s also when much of the general public first heard about the Sentinelese, described as &apos;stone age savages&apos;, violent and hostile towards anyone attempting contact from the outside world.

As it is often the case, media reports were not entirely accurate, offering little clarity on the history of the Island, its population and especially the history of their contacts with outsiders.

Where did the Sentinelese originate from? Had they always been so isolated? What was the reason for their hostility? And had they always been so antagonistic and violent towards visitors?

In this article we will seek to address these complex questions, bearing in mind that there are no easy answers. In particular, there is no easy answer to the main dilemma. What is the right thing: should we just leave these remote populations alone, or seek to know them, to understand them, in the name of science?

## Island of Good Fortune

North Sentinel Island, also simply known as Sentinel Island, occupies a surface of about 60 square km, approximately the same size as Manhattan. The Island is surrounded by coral reefs, and is a western outlier of the Andaman archipelago, a group of some 500 isles stretching along a north-south axis, roughly dividing the Bay of Bengal from the Andaman Sea.

Only six of these islands are inhabited by natives, divided into four ethnic groups: the Andamanese, the Onge, the Jarawa and the Sentinelese. And while the archipelago is relatively close to the coast of Myanmar, these lands and their inhabitants are under India&apos;s jurisdiction.

As pointed out by author Adam Goodheart in his 2023 book &apos;The Last Island: A Story of the Andamans and the Most Elusive Tribe in the World&apos;, the origin of the toponym &apos;Andaman&apos; is uncertain.

For centuries, the archipelago has been known to Asian and European cartographers, but awareness of its existence has fluctuated over time, and the islands have been known under different names: Caracuffaya, Dandemos, the Islands of Man, the Islands of the Satyrs, the Naked Land or Angamanain.

Awareness of Sentinel Island in particular, and the Sentinelese, has somehow been more persistent, since ancient times. It seems that cartographers and explorers had a predilection to depict this small community as a band of primitive, extremely dangerous, even cannibalistic individuals.

The oldest maps referencing Sentinel dates to late-mediaeval times, and according to Goodheart, these charts derive from the work of a Romano-Egyptian geographer, Claudius Ptolemy, active in the 2nd Century AD.

Ptolemy chose to name the island *Insulae Bonae Fortunae* — or &apos;Island of Good Fortune&apos;. Which sounded promising. But Ptolemy saw it fit to add a warning to his map, quoted by his mediaeval fanboys: the inhabitants of the island are cannibals.

Arab travellers in the 8th Century AD held similar beliefs about the inhabitants of the entire archipelago, and preferred to brave the storms in the open seas rather than seek shelter on the sandy beaches and paradisiacal groves of the Andaman.

It is not known if these convictions were founded on truth. What is certain is that tales of flesh-eating natives may have inspired Venetian explorer Marco Polo — who never visited the archipelago — to describe as such the Andamanese in 1296:

&gt; &apos;A most brutish and savage race, having heads, eyes, and teeth like those of dogs. They are very cruel, and kill and eat every foreigner whom they can lay their hands upon.&apos;

## First Contact

For the first, documented contact, between the Sentinelese and the outside world, we have to wait until 1771.

While sailing at night in the area, an East India Company vessel named &apos;The Diligent&apos;, passed by the island, sighting several lighted bonfires along its shore. The captain did not approach to investigate, but he did sketch the outline of the island and bestowed its current name, noting how it appeared as a sentinel, guarding a broad strait.

For a more eventful encounter, we must skip to 1867. At the end of the summer monsoon season, the Indian merchantman &apos;Nineveh&apos; was wrecked on the coral reefs surrounding North Sentinel.

The crew of 20 sailors and their 86 passengers rowed to safety on the beach. But after two days of calm, they were attacked by the locals. As reported by the captain:

&gt; &apos;The savages were perfectly naked, with short hair and red painted noses, and were opening their mouth and making sounds like &apos;pa on ough&apos;; their arrows appeared to be tipped with iron&apos;

It is widely agreed that the Sentinelese have not mastered metallurgy to this day, but they may scavenge iron from flotsam washing up on their beaches. The captain had no time for such considerations, however, as he and the shipwrecked party fought back the locals with sticks and stones.

At the time the Andaman archipelago was part of the British Empire, and Great Andaman Island had been converted into a penal colony in the 1850s. Hence, the waters were patrolled by the Royal Navy, and a rescue party was already on its way. The Nineveh crew and passengers were saved on time, and there were no recorded casualties of the encounter.

On March 18, 1896, three convicts serving under the colonial Forest Department on the island of Baja-Jagda decided to bail out. They boarded a makeshift raft, and drifted for some 20 nautical miles, until they reached North Sentinel. Two of them simply vanished, probably having drowned during the voyage.

The body of the third convict was found on March 30, on the southern edge of the island. He had been pierced by several spears and arrows, and his throat had been cut.

The dead convict was found by the local colonial administrator, M.V. Portman, during a visit to the island.

According to the website of Survival International, the global movement for tribal peoples&apos; rights, Mr Portman led several expeditions to Sentinel, to try and establish contact with the locals. He took care of bringing along inhabitants of Great Andaman and members of the Onge tribes, in an effort to befriend the Sentinelese, but to no avail.

In one particular expedition, Portman&apos;s party came across abandoned camps, but the natives were nowhere to be seen. They eventually found an elderly couple and a group of children, who were forcibly taken to the regional capital of Port Blair, on Great Andaman.

The problem with completely isolated communities is that they are particularly vulnerable to the most common infectious diseases, as lack of exposure leads to lack of immune defences. Predictably, the elderly couple soon fell ill and died in Port Blair. The children were taken back to Sentinel with a load of gifts, but Survival International points out that

&gt; &apos;It&apos;s likely that the children would have passed on their diseases and the results would have been devastating. Intergenerational trauma from this experience may account for the Sentinelese&apos;s continued hostility and rejection of outsiders.&apos;

It appears that after this event, the Sentinelese adopted a policy of avoidance and retraction, making themselves scarce rather than seeking confrontation when someone visited the island.

On their side, the British administration decided to leave them alone. After all, the tiny patch of land held no strategic or commercial importance, and was protected by a ring of submerged reefs which made navigation impractical.

## In Search of Man

After India gained independence in 1947, the country took over Britain in the administration of the Andaman archipelago, as well as the Nicobar islands to its south. In 1956, the Indian government issued the Andaman and Nicobar Protection of Aboriginal Tribes Regulation, under which North Sentinel was declared as a &apos;tribal reserve&apos;.

The intention of this piece of legislation was to prevent potential violent incidents involving the locals. Most of all, it was intended to protect the Sentinelese from exposure to infectious diseases carried by unauthorised visitors.

In the spring of 1974, Sentinel was visited by an authorised party, consisting of anthropologists, police officers, a National Geographic photographer, and a film crew, shooting the documentary &apos;Man in Search of Man&apos;.

The anthropologists&apos; plan was to gain the natives&apos; trust, with friendly gestures and plenty of gifts.

As the expedition approached on a motorised dinghy, their friendly gestures did not sit well with the Sentinelese, who responded with a volley of arrows. The boat made a landing out of reach of the &apos;Sentinel Defence Force&apos;, and the policemen quickly disembarked to lay down their gifts: coconuts, a miniature car, a live pig, a doll and some aluminium pots.

Again, the reaction was not the most positive one. The Sentinelese fired more arrows, wounding the documentary director in the leg. They then speared the pig, mutilated the doll, and buried both gifts in the sand. The cookware and coconuts, however, appeared to have been well received.

The following year, an amateur anthropologist of renown was escorted by local dignitaries for a boat tour around North Sentinel. Wary of arrows fired in their direction, the officials kept at a safe distance from the beach, although a Sentinelese did aim his bow at the guest of honour.

The adventure deeply amused the amateur scholar. Whose name, by the way, was Leopold — formerly known as Leopold III, the exiled King of Belgium!

## &apos;Lives not Guaranteed&apos;

The Sentinelese would have another close encounter with the outside world in 1981. On the night of August 2nd, the Primrose, a 16,000-ton freighter registered in Panama, was sailing in the Bay of Bengal, transporting chicken feed to Australia. Shortly before midnight, a powerful storm made it run aground one of the reefs surrounding North Sentinel.

Luckily, none of the 31 crewmen was hurt during the shipwreck. But after spending two days stuck on the Primrose, the sailors on lookout spotted a group of dark, small, yet athletic men observing them with menacing intent from the nearby beach.

Thousands of miles away, in the offices of the Regent Shipping Company in Hong Kong, a radio operator received a distress call from the Primrose. The ship&apos;s captain Liu Chunglong was asking for an urgent airdrop of firearms for his crew, as they prepared to defend themselves against

&gt; &apos;Wild men, estimate more than 50, carrying various homemade weapons&apos;

Who were apparently preparing wooden boats to attack the Primrose.

&gt; &apos;Worrying they will board us at sunset. All crew members&apos; lives not guaranteed.&apos;

Apparently news of an impending battle was not taken seriously in Hong Kong. A local official commented that the Primrose captain had &apos;gone bananas&apos;, while the local press speculated that Captain Liu was about to face a band of cannibals!

The Indian Navy displayed a more level-headed approach. They issued a press release, dispelling the unfounded myth that the Sentinelese were cannibals. And then dispatched a tug boat and a helicopter to rescue the crew of the Primrose.

While waiting for the rescue party, Captain Liu and his sailors had armed themselves with axes, pipes and flare guns. But luckily the bad weather prevented the Sentinelese from approaching the wrecked ship, and no blood was shed on either side.

Well, not in August of 1981, at least. The details are nebulous, but according to Survival International, the presence of the Primrose attracted the attention of several wreckage salvagers, who visited the island in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many of them carried guns, and ended up killing an unspecified number of Sentinelese.

According to another version of the events, reported by The Economic Times, the &apos;wreckage salvagers&apos; were actually authorised scrap metal dealers, contracted by the Indian Government to dismantle the wreck of the Primrose. Apparently, the contractors and the Sentinelese bonded over a gift of bananas, and eventually the two groups worked side by side aboard the ship.

The scrap dealers got on with their job of disassembling the ship, while the Sentinelese collected bits of metal to use for their tools … and presumably their arrowheads.

## A Friendly Gesture

Throughout the 1980s government-sponsored parties regularly interacted with the locals. The visitors would land at a safe distance from groups of locals, deposit coconuts, bananas and bits of iron, and then leave almost immediately. Sometimes, the Sentinelese reacted with their usual volleys of arrows, but on other occasions they made friendly gestures.

On January 4, 1991, an anthropological expedition reached the beaches of Sentinel Island, determined to establish a durable, friendly rapport. This time, the expedition featured an unprecedented asset, a member of a particular social group thus far completely excluded from landing parties: a woman.

Anthropologist Dr Madhumala Chattopadhyay, research associate at the Anthropological Survey of India was indeed the first woman to make contact with the Sentinelese.

So, let&apos;s go back to that January 4, 1991.

At around 8am, a small team of 13 including Chattopadhyay, a medical doctor, a director of tribal welfare and support crew, reached the waters of North Sentinel aboard a small craft. Before reaching land, the team started dropping coconuts in the water, which attracted the attention of some Sentinelese men on the beach.

The locals sprinted into the water, scooping up the tasty gifts and erupting in a chant of &apos;Nariyali Jaba Jaba&apos;.

No one had ever studied in detail the Sentinelese language to that point. However, Dr Chattopadhyay, was proficient in several Andamanese languages and recognised a similarity with a dialect of the Onge tribe, also residing in the archipelago.

In the Onge dialect, the chant translated as &apos;More and more coconuts&apos;.

The Sentinelese became bolder, getting closer and closer to the boat. A rapport was being established … but there is always that one guy who has to ruin everything. In this case it was a young local man, who had been sitting on the shore.

He stood up, raised his bow and aimed it at the landing expedition. Dr Chatthopadhyay, unfazed, made eye contact with the bowman, smiling at him and gesturing to come and collect his share of coconuts.

But the hostile youth had already nocked an arrow and was about to release it. Providentially, a Sentinelese woman intervened, forcefully shoving the bowman aside. His arrow completely missed the mark and landed in the water.

The first contact could have ended in tragedy, but resulted in friendship.

Dr Chattopadhyay returned to Sentinel on February 21st, and this time her expedition was welcomed enthusiastically from the start. The locals approached the craft without hostility nor suspicion to collect their share of coconuts, and no arrows were nocked, let alone shot.

As reported by several Indian publications, the success of the expeditions in early 1991 can be ascribed to the presence of Dr Chattopadhyay, her knowledge of Andamanese dialects and her ability to establish a non-threatening rapport with the Sentinelese women, even at a distance.

The Indian government, however, did not take advantage of these successes to strike the iron while it was hot. The Andaman and Nicobar administration acknowledged the implicit risk in increasing contact with the Sentinelese: that of causing a deadly outbreak of infectious diseases unknown to the locals.

In fact, in September of 1991, the local authorities decided to severely limit any expedition to the island. Moreover, they declared a 5 km exclusion zone around Sentinel, to protect the locals from poachers, fishermen, or any unauthorised visitor. Regular gift-dropping missions continued until 1996, when the Andman and Nicobar administration decided to put an end to them.

After all, the Sentinelese appeared healthy and self-sufficient. Continuing the visits would have only increased the chances of epidemic outbreaks, or outbursts of violence from the locals.

## Poachers vs the Palaeolithic

The Indian Navy and Coast Guard remained actively engaged in ensuring the Sentinelese were undisturbed, regularly patrolling the surrounding waters.

Following the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami, on December 26, 2004, the Coast Guard flew a helicopter above Sentinel, to check if there had been any casualties.

The team realised that the tsunami had impacted the geography of the island, causing several stretches of coral reefs, submerged thus far, to rise above the surface. But the locals appeared to be alive and well, very well indeed: one of them was photographed in the act of aiming an arrow against the chopper. The pilot wisely decided not to fly any closer to the ground, but the Coast Guard team returned to base with the striking photo of a warrior from a forgotten past. As described by author Adam Goodheart:

&gt; &apos;None of his features are visible, but the man&apos;s blurred silhouette, his tensile black body poised against the stark white sand, has the timeless immediacy of a Palaeolithic cave painting&apos;

The photo was widely circulated, and Sentinel made it again to international newswires since the days of the Primrose wreck.

Barely 13 months later, on January 26, 2006, the island would become infamous again. Two Indian fishermen, Sunder Raj and Pandit Tiwari, were found dead on the shores of Sentinel, pierced by spears and arrows. The subsequent investigation found that the fishermen had braved the exclusion zone to poach in the waters around the island, but their boat had drifted onto the shore, attracting the attention of the Sentinelese.

It appeared that the presence of poaching fishermen was a common occurrence, as the Sentinel waters were, and are, rich in lobsters and sea cucumbers. Years later, in November 2014, seven Burmese fishermen were apprehended by the Coast Guard in the vicinity of the island. According to one report, at least one of them had actually made it on shore.

## Tragedy and Forgiveness

But now, let&apos;s dive into the event which cemented Sentinel Island&apos;s place into the cultural zeitgeist, the John Allen Chau incident.

On November 17, 2018, the 27-year-old US citizen John Allen Chau was reported dead on the shores of North Sentinel Island, apparently killed by a volley of arrows.

According to the Andaman and Nicobar police, Chau had illegally entered the exclusion zone with the help of local fishermen. A press release by Survival International, described his visit to the island as the result of a temporary lift on restrictions by the Indian government.

Early newspaper reports of the event stated that Chau was a Christian missionary, who had been trying to make contact with the Sentinelese on numerous, previous occasions to convert them to Christianity. However, according to Mundayat Sasikumar, writing for the Journal of the Anthropological Survey of India

&gt; &apos;Union Home Ministry sources clarified that Chau was an adventure sports enthusiast and there was no evidence of him being an evangelist&apos;

Nonetheless, his friends described him as a fervent Christian, who had done volunteer work in South Africa, Kurdistan and Burma. Thus, it appeared that John Allen Chau was a truly altruistic individual, whose motivations were rooted in a profound spiritual belief.

Chau had first visited the Andaman archipelago in 2015, but it took him three years to finally reach the shores of Sentinel. According to local police, on November 14, the young American reached the island aboard a rented boat, crewed by some fishermen. Apparently, Chau had been helped by a local contact person in his plans, identified as K.S. Alexander.

On the morning of the 15th, Chau used a foldable kayak to make a solo landing on Sentinel, carrying gifts such as fish and footballs.

According to his own diary, Chau found a population of about 250 Sentinelese, living in groups of 10 people, each into one hut. The visitor attempted to speak to them:

&gt; &apos;My name is John, I love you and Jesus loves you.&apos;

The first encounter did not go well at all. John noted in his diary that

&gt; &apos;a kid probably about 10 or so years old … shot me with an arrow-directly into my Bible which I was holding at my chest&apos;

On the morning of the 16th, Chau swam back to the rented boat, close to shore, where the fishermen were waiting for him. Apparently, he had been injured by arrows, but he refused to return home. He entrusted his diary to the fishermen, collected some fresh supplies, and then returned to Sentinel.

The following morning, the fishermen observed the locals burying a body under the sand.

The fishermen then alerted Chau&apos;s local contact, K.S. Alexander, who then alerted the victim&apos;s friends in the US. News finally reached the American embassy in Delhi and local authorities. The police quickly found out that John Allen Chau had not secured the necessary permits to visit North Sentinel, and opened two enquiries: one for murder, against unknown perpetrators on Sentinel; and another against those who had helped John in his expedition.

Eventually, the Andaman and Nicobar police decided not to prosecute the natives, in line with the Indian Government&apos;s official &apos;hands off, eyes on&apos; policy. According to this approach, the government decided to maintain a vigilant eye on Sentinel to protect the locals from the outside world — and vice versa. But at the same time, government contact and interference should be kept to a minimum.

For the same reason, the police decided not to retrieve John&apos;s body — an epidemic outbreak being their main concern.

As per John&apos;s family, they expressed the wish that all involved in the case be released.

&gt; &apos;We also ask for the release of those friends he had in Andaman Islands. He ventured out of his own free will and his local contacts need not be persecuted for his own actions&apos;

As per the murderers of their son, the Chaus wished to forgive them.

Following the killing of John Allen Chau, the Indian government made all visits to North Sentinel strictly illegal, reinforcing Coast Guard patrols around the exclusion zone. Outsiders, less than ever before, are no longer welcome.

## What Do We Know About the Sentinelese?

As you may guess, this state of affairs is particularly frustrating for anthropologists worldwide, seeking to crack the mystery of the Sentinelese. Where did they originate from? What is their social structure? What are their beliefs? How did their language evolve over thousands of years of isolation? Why do they alternate periods of hostility to openness to contact?

The already quoted M. Sasikumar perfectly describes what makes this community so fascinating and unique:

&gt; &apos;The Sentinelese are, perhaps, the only truly isolated hunter-gatherer tribal community in the world today. Their isolation is not geographic because of the inaccessible location of their habitat; it is so because they resist outsiders from landing in their island … They remained steadfast in opposition to all the efforts of the colonial and post-colonial administration to contain them with the might of their bows and arrows.&apos;

All we know about them is a collection of scattered direct observations, and inferences derived from the knowledge of other, less isolated native groups on the Andamans.

We know that the tribe on Sentinel is very small, numbering between 50 and 400 people, believed to be organised in three bands.

Most of them live in large communal huts, housing several families, but visitors have also noticed smaller shelters, erected on the beach, suitable for one family at a time. Their items of clothing appear to be limited to fibre strings, tied around their waists, necks and heads.

Observers consistently describe them as extremely fit and healthy — as you would expect from someone who lives in close contact with nature! But their small numbers could be completely wiped out by the most banal of infectious diseases, such as the seasonal flu or the common cold, as observed in other tribes of the archipelago.

According to Survival International&apos;s Director Stephe Corry, speaking in November 2014:

&gt; &apos;The Great Andamanese tribes of India&apos;s Andaman Islands were decimated by disease when the British colonised the islands in the 1800s. The most recent to be pushed into extinction was the Bo tribe, whose last member died only four years ago. The only way the Andamanese authorities can prevent the annihilation of another tribe is to ensure North Sentinel Island is protected from outsiders.&apos;

We also know that the Sentinelese sustain themselves by fishing, hunting and gathering food in the forest, which explains why men always carry spears, bows and arrows, tipped with salvaged iron. They have mastered the art of making outrigger canoes, that is canoes featuring lateral support floats. But they have not developed the use of paddles, and rather steer their crafts with punts, meaning that they cannot venture beyond shallow waters.

As a consequence, they have never even attempted contacts with other island tribes, let alone developed trade.

Based on observations dating back from 1771, we know that the Sentinelese use fire, but anthropologists speculate that they don&apos;t know how to actually make it.

All these factors have contributed to the media describing them as &apos;Stone Age savages&apos;, a description which Survival International disagrees with:

&gt; &apos;There is no reason to believe the Sentinelese have been living in the same way for the tens of thousands of years they are likely to have been in the Andaman Islands. Their ways of life will have changed and adapted many times, like all peoples.&apos;

The genetic origin of the Sentinelese has not been ascertained with certainty, although Philip Endicott, from the Henry Wellcome Ancient Biomolecules Centre, University of Oxford may have come close.

In his paper &apos;The Genetic Origins of the Andaman Islanders&apos; published in 2003, he sought to trace the origins of all groups present in the archipelago.

Endicott noted that Andaman inhabitants display an &apos;extremely distinctive phenotype, typified by a small average height, gracile build, dark pigmentation, and unusual hair morphology.&apos;

He also found that the languages spoken in the archipelago have a limited affinity with others found in Papua New Guinea and eastern Indonesia, although there isn&apos;t a widely accepted relationship between these separate linguistic families.

Endicott also reviewed the Andaman populations&apos; epigenetic data, that is the impact of behaviours and environmental factors on how genes work. Based on this, he theorised that the Andamanese tribes — including the Sentinelese — originated from either two colonisation events, or a &apos;single founding population that has been subdivided for an extended length of time.&apos;

In other words: the archipelago was either colonised on two separate occasions, by two separate ethnic groups, or a single group who landed over a long time period.

These original settlers probably may have travelled from Indonesia, Oceania or Melanesia. But based on an analysis of two specific haplotypes — or genetic determinants — Endicott ventures modern-day Bengal and other areas in the Indian subcontinent as possible places of origin.

In any case, the colonisation event happened thousands of years ago, with the oldest possible date being about 39,500 years ago.

Finally, we come to the language.

As mentioned earlier, Dr Chattopadhyay was able to establish a link between the Sentinelese and the Onge dialects.

The reality is that no one can really understand or categorise their language, and linguists agree that the Sentinelese would have to be considered &apos;unclassified&apos;.

The closest speculation that can be made is that it&apos;s a combination of the Onge and Jarawa dialects, based on the agglutination of morphemes, rather than phonemes. To clarify, this describes the process of stringing together linguistic units which refer to a meaning, rather than individual sounds.

The Sentinelese may have evolved morphemes borrowed by the Onge and Jarawa in a completely different direction, however. Back in the late 1800s, colonial administrator M.V. Portman brought along representatives of the Andamanese tribes in his expeditions to Sentinel, but the different tribal groups could not communicate with each other.

As is the case with other aspects of this mysterious community, also their speech appears unique, and linguists agree that it should be placed on its own branch of the language family tree.

## Conclusion

The history of relationships between North Sentinel Island and the outer world is a story of frustrated knowledge, misunderstanding and violence, interspersed with glimmers of hope and friendship. This takes us to the final dilemma: considering that the future may offer a similar outcome, what stance should the Indian Government and the scientific community take towards the Sentinelese?

Should the modern world seek to establish a permanent presence on the island, to study a secluded population which may provide us valuable information on our own, remote past? And maybe extend over them the long arm of our laws, bringing to justice those who killed their rare visitors?

Or should we perpetuate the current hands-off policy, and maintain the island as a tribal reservation? In other words, maintain a status quo designed to protect the last uncontaminated vestiges of a tribal way of life — and to protect intruders from iron-tipped arrows.

Brighter minds than ours have not found an answer to this conundrum.

## Key Takeaways

- The Sentinelese of North Sentinel Island have a history of hostility towards outsiders, often depicted inaccurately as &apos;stone age savages&apos; by media.
- The island&apos;s inhabitants have maintained isolation, resisting contact with the outside world since documented encounters began in 1771.
- Early interactions with the Sentinelese were marked by violence and misunderstandings, with both sides often resorting to defensive actions.
- The Indian government has implemented a &apos;hands off, eyes on&apos; policy to protect the Sentinelese from external threats and diseases.
- The Sentinelese&apos;s language and origins remain largely mysterious, with limited understanding of their social structure and beliefs.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is North Sentinel Island?

North Sentinel Island, also known as Sentinel Island, is a remote islet in the Indian Ocean with a surface area of about 60 square kilometers, roughly the size of Manhattan. It is a western outlier of the Andaman archipelago and is surrounded by coral reefs.

### Who are the Sentinelese?

The Sentinelese are the native population of North Sentinel Island, described as one of the most isolated tribes in the world. They are known for their hostility towards outsiders and have resisted contact with the outside world for centuries.

### What is the origin of the name &apos;Andaman&apos;?

The origin of the toponym &apos;Andaman&apos; is uncertain. The archipelago has been known by various names over time, including Caracuffaya, Dandemos, the Islands of Man, the Islands of the Satyrs, the Naked Land, and Angamanain.

### When was the first documented contact with the Sentinelese?

The first documented contact between the Sentinelese and the outside world occurred in 1771 when an East India Company vessel named &apos;The Diligent&apos; passed by the island and sighted several lighted bonfires along its shore.

### What happened during the encounter with the &apos;Nineveh&apos; in 1867?

In 1867, the Indian merchantman &apos;Nineveh&apos; was wrecked on the coral reefs surrounding North Sentinel. The crew and passengers were attacked by the Sentinelese after two days of calm. The crew fought back with sticks and stones and were eventually rescued by the Royal Navy.

### What is the &apos;hands off, eyes on&apos; policy?

The &apos;hands off, eyes on&apos; policy is the Indian Government&apos;s approach to the Sentinelese, maintaining a vigilant eye on Sentinel to protect the locals from the outside world and vice versa, while keeping government contact and interference to a minimum.

### What is known about the Sentinelese language?

The Sentinelese language is unclassified and unique. It is believed to be a combination of the Onge and Jarawa dialects, but it has evolved in a completely different direction. Linguists agree that it should be placed on its own branch of the language family tree.

### What is the genetic origin of the Sentinelese?

The genetic origin of the Sentinelese is not certain, but they are believed to have originated from either two colonization events or a single founding population that has been subdivided for an extended length of time. They may have traveled from Indonesia, Oceania, or Melanesia, with possible origins in modern-day Bengal and other areas in the Indian subcontinent.

### What happened to John Allen Chau?

John Allen Chau, a 27-year-old US citizen, was killed on the shores of North Sentinel Island in November 2018. He had illegally entered the exclusion zone with the help of local fishermen and was attempting to make contact with the Sentinelese. He was reportedly killed by a volley of arrows.

### What is the current policy regarding visits to North Sentinel Island?

Following the killing of John Allen Chau, the Indian government made all visits to North Sentinel strictly illegal, reinforcing Coast Guard patrols around the exclusion zone. Outsiders are no longer welcome, and the policy is to maintain a status quo designed to protect the last uncontaminated vestiges of a tribal way of life.

## Sources

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- [https://scroll.in/article/1057359/why-the-civil-world-failed-so-often-to-establish-contact-with-the-sentinelese-in-the-andamans](https://scroll.in/article/1057359/why-the-civil-world-failed-so-often-to-establish-contact-with-the-sentinelese-in-the-andamans)
- [https://theamericanscholar.org/the-last-island-of-the-savages/](https://theamericanscholar.org/the-last-island-of-the-savages/)
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- [https://www.survivalinternational.org/news/11764](https://www.survivalinternational.org/news/11764)
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- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/52/Storms_River_Mouth_and_the_Indian_Ocean_2024.jpg) by M J Hurter / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NSWC Carderock: The US Navy&apos;s Giant Indoor Ocean.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/nswc-carderock-us-navy-giant-indoor-ocean</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/nswc-carderock-us-navy-giant-indoor-ocean</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Picture—if you will—an ocean so powerful as to be host to the very worst maritime storms. From terrible typhoons to powerful lightning blasts, from monstrous waves to severe rainfall. But instead of occupying some isolated corner of the Earth, picture this ocean being located entirely within a large warehouse in the US state of Maryland.

This particular oddity is to be found at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Carderock, close to Washington DC. The site officially goes by an abject mouthful of a title: the Maneuvering and Seakeeping Basin, or MASK. But it is more commonly referred to simply as &apos;the Indoor Ocean&apos;.

This massive indoor water park is one of the sites where the US Navy tests the designs of future warships, submarines, and even underwater drones. Its purpose is therefore as unique as it is vital. Before spending billions on a ship that might buckle beneath the force of real waves, US naval engineers can stress test their models using the MASK&apos;s simulated marine chaos. If a prototype doesn&apos;t survive there, it definitely won&apos;t make it in the real ocean.

## The Man Behind the MASK

The idea of testing prototype ships in indoor basins was actually in practice for decades before the Indoor Ocean was constructed, owing largely to the work of a man named David Watson Taylor.

Taylor was a naval architect who&apos;d pioneered what were known as Experimental Model Basins, the ancestor of modern MASK basins. Following approval by President Grover Cleveland in 1896, Taylor received a grant to build his first basin at the Washington Navy Yard two years later. But as maritime technology advanced in the early 20th century, the Washington basin—on its own—could not meet the needs of the Navy. Operations were moved to Carderock in 1937, which had better access to freshwater and more available space, while still within reach of Naval headquarters in D.C.

The Carderock site belongs to a rather complex network of organizations which collectively support US naval operations. The facility&apos;s full title is Naval Surface Warfare Center—or NSWC—Carderock, previously known simply as the David Taylor Research Center.

Warfare Centers such as Carderock supply technical operations, human resources, and engineering services to help equip the Navy fleet. In total, the NSWC umbrella includes eight such facilities, with Carderock being one of two operating in the state of Maryland alone. The other, NSWC Indian Head, is located about 40 kilometres further south, and both are located in the immediate environs of Washington DC as well as the US Navy headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.

## A Site Born of Tragedy

So now you know how the Indoor Ocean came to be. But why, you might ask, is all this necessary?

Picture the scenario. The US Department of Defence has invested in a massive piece of new hardware, built to float, carry military equipment, and—above all—to ease the maritime transit of trained military personnel. But before the hardware is released to the high seas, there is much to consider. After all, one cannot exactly predict the conditions of those seas—will they be choppy? Will they be still? What kind of waves can be expected—and what kind of inclement conditions will the vessel encounter?

These are not insignificant considerations. As history has shown many times, maritime unpredictability can bring devastation upon even the sturdiest of vessels.

Consider the *Vasa*, one of the most powerful and imposing warships in the world in the 17th century, and the pride of the Swedish Empire when she launched from Stockholm in 1628. But she didn&apos;t get very far: a strong gust of wind scuppered the vessel only a few hundred metres from the harbour, and she dived straight to the floor of the Baltic Sea, remaining there for centuries.

More recently, the *Titanic* set sail from Southampton for New York in 1912, having cost her owners—the White Star Line—what was then an eye-watering 7.5 million pounds (or around 220 million dollars today). But the *Titanic* proved no match for a static iceberg in the north Atlantic and also swiftly wound up on the seafloor, this time with massive loss of no less than 1,800 human lives.

Well those historic catastrophes to one, the US Navy itself is no stranger to seafaring catastrophes. The torpedoing of the *Indianapolis* in 1945 resulted in one of the most disastrous losses of life for US servicemen in a single event during the Second World War, as around 300 sailors either drowned or were devoured by sharks in the Philippine Sea. Amidst all these nautical tragedies, one fact stood abundantly clear. Unlike overland transport, there is little that can be done for victims when a ship falls foul of the roughs. Whether in frozen or temperate waters, humans are simply not built to survive in water beyond a short period of time. If a vessel sinks, the gig for its crew is likely up.

Yet in spite of this morbid reality, maritime knowledge—for centuries—could simply not match up with the fickle nature of the sea. In the words of Arend de Groote, chief engineer behind the *Vasa*, his answer for why the ship sank was simple and straightforward: &quot;Only God knows&quot;.

Similarly, British and American inquiries bickered bitterly over how preventable the *Titanic* catastrophe had been. And unlike air travel, whose safety improved dramatically over time, seafaring had remained subject to the occasional tragedy caused by oversight or design failures. In 2000, a torpedo explosion caused by unsafe liquid fuel blew a hole in the side of the Russian nuclear submarine *Kursk* and sent it hurtling into the depths of the Barents Sea, at the cost of all 118 lives on board.

It was later determined that the *Kursk* disaster could almost certainly have been avoided—but neither the *Titanic* or *Indianapolis* disasters couldn&apos;t—and each such catastrophe made one fact ever more salient. Whether by human error or force of nature, the best chance of protecting human lives at sea was to make a vessel as impossible to sink as humanly possible.

It therefore became the policy of the US Navy to strenuously stress-test its prototype vessels on its huge indoor body of water, which can simulate some of the conditions likely to be encountered by a ship on its voyage.

So back in Carderock, the Indoor Ocean would be equipped with every possible feature designed to see that objective realised.

## The Scope of the Indoor Ocean

Now, some clarification.

While the term &apos;Indoor Ocean&apos; is commonly used to describe it, the facility is—obviously—nothing like an actual ocean, and is equivalent in size to perhaps a small lake or a gargantuan swimming pool.

Its measurements are 360 feet or 110 metres long, and about 240 feet or 73 metres wide, just a little longer and wider than a standard football pitch. Its depth ranges from 20 to 35 feet (or 6 to 10 metres), so at a maximum, about the same as a three-story building. And its total water volume is about 12 million gallons, or 45 million litres.

This doesn&apos;t make it all that big, and the ships that are tested there are—obviously—not full-size models. Instead, the facility uses &apos;scale&apos; models. These are proportionally the same as the prototype, but smaller in actual size. The model sizes vary—but are usually about as big as a canoe. Yet despite its misleading nickname, what makes the Indoor Ocean one-of-a-kind are not its measurements, but its unique hydraulic engineering and the marine effects it can simulate.

From the 1960s, the site would test the models using a pneumatic wave simulator, with 21 wave domes which could create ripple effects on the water surface. The response of the models to the artificial waves would be monitored by scientists and engineers working at the site, to identify possible deficiencies. The vessels would be tested under a number of conditions, with and without a payload, to ensure a comprehensive analysis.

However, over time it was determined that the pneumatic machines could not replicate the full range of conditions at sea, and the Indoor Ocean began to be used less. Instead, Carderock staff began hauling their models out to the coast and putting them through their paces on the sea using remote controls. However, this would require having to wait for desired weather conditions to take effect, as well as to tow the vessels back and forth. It quickly proved inefficient.

But the Indoor Ocean made a comeback in 2007. All the water was drained, and the pneumatic wave machines were withdrawn. The perimeter of the Indoor Ocean was refitted with a series of electromechanical installations known as &apos;Waveboards&apos;. These were new and improved wave simulators, each with their own motors synced to software which could create different types of waves. To install these structures was a grand effort—taking six years in total to accomplish. But by 2013, the waveboards, which move in unison somewhat resembling to the keys of a piano, were in operation. They remain in effect today, and can recreate as many as eight types of ocean conditions (from flat calm to typhoon).

This was crucial for the facility, because it has allowed the Navy to stress-test vessels for suitability in multiple types of maritime environments. The waveboards have also proved very efficient, since the Indoor Ocean saves time and energy on lugging test models back and forth to the coast. The new wavemaker can produce multi-directional and short crested seas, and simulate different sea states at various headings.

Vessels are also put through their motions in both the development and post-production stage, and are tested under a wide variety of conditions such as with and without a payload. In the case of warships, they are tested in firing and non-firing states, and also with and without a human presence on board. The various scenarios are monitored using computer technology, all of which collectively allows for as comprehensive a testing as possible of each model before they are ultimately added to the Navy fleet.

And in the case of the US Navy—perhaps even more so than others—such strenuous testing is highly desirable.

The world&apos;s seas and oceans produce conditions that are by no means uniform—and the US just happens to sit between two of the most divergent bodies of water of them all.

To the West lies the Pacific, which is known to be free of obstacles like icebergs, but which features powerful storms, strong currents, and a patchwork of rocky shorelines. The South China Sea, where the Navy conducts Freedom of Navigation voyages or FONOPS, is known to be a particularly treacherous territory of shoals, sunken reefs, atolls, and typhoons.

Meanwhile, to the east of the US sits the Atlantic, known also for strong currents and with some icebergs, such as one which famously scuppered the *Titanic*. Close to the American coast sits the Bermuda Triangle, with rogue waves and storms, and which is thick with sargassum—a hazardous and toxic form of seaweed. The Triangle has become infamous for causing ships and aircraft to vanish for centuries.

And in the northwest—also a site of US naval operations—is the Gulf of Alaska. The seas around Alaska are perhaps most treacherous of all, being known for harsh and stormy weather, strong winds and lots of icebergs—all of which have resulted in the loss of numerous ships over the years.

As such, the advanced technology of the Indoor Ocean is a more than welcome addition to the Navy&apos;s infrastructure.

## The Advanced Tech

The technology used by the facility is multiple-fold:

One of the key features is First Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulation, or CFD, used to model how water and air interact with ship and submarine hulls. It can simulate aerodynamics and propulsion system, and predicts drag, lift, cavitation, and wave resistance.

A second key element is Finite Element Analysis (FEA), which allows the engineers to judge the structural integrity of prototypes under various loads and environmental conditions, as well as the consequences of material stress, strain, and fatigue. In short, the muscle of each structure, under a variety of extreme conditions.

And a third key metric is Virtual Reality (VR) and Digital Twins. Virtual environments allow engineers to interact with prototypes before they are physically built. This enables immersive testing of ship layouts, and maintenance procedures. It also helps train sailors on operational procedures before the real vessel is deployed.

The sum of these advanced metrics is a much-improved testing of prototypes, which in turn has allowed the Navy to streamline its production. The *Smithsonian* estimated that the Indoor Ocean can now run through test scenarios that previously took months of voyaging—doing so in as little as six weeks.

## Future of the Indoor Ocean

Now, with all that said, as military tech advances, it is possible that even the advanced nature of the Indoor Ocean may one day be replaced by newer evolving tech.

The future of research and testing facilities like NSWC Carderock will be driven by advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), digital twin technology, autonomous testing, and sustainable energy solutions. Over the next few decades, these centers will become more digitized, automated, and integrated with global defense networks, ensuring that the U.S. Navy maintains a technological edge in maritime warfare.

By 2040, physical testing in facilities like the David Taylor Model Basin—by now a simple constituent of the facility—may be drastically reduced, as hyper-accurate simulations will provide nearly perfect predictions of real-world vessel behavior. Large-scale &quot;smart&quot; water basins will be able to generate real-time environmental conditions, including hurricane-level waves, deep-sea pressures, and electromagnetic interference to simulate combat scenarios for unmanned vehicles. By 2050, more than 50% of all vessel prototypes tested at NSWC Carderock will be autonomous or semi-autonomous.

Ultimately, the future of naval research lies in a seamless integration of virtual and real-world testing, ensuring that every new ship, submarine, and autonomous maritime vehicle is battle-ready before it even touches the water.

Time will tell if the Indoor Ocean retains its place at the cusp of maritime and nautical tech development.

## Key Takeaways

- The US Navy&apos;s Indoor Ocean in Maryland simulates harsh marine conditions to test warship prototypes.
- The facility, known as the Maneuvering and Seakeeping Basin, uses scale models and advanced technology to ensure vessel durability.
- Historical maritime tragedies, like the sinking of the Vasa and Titanic, highlight the need for rigorous ship testing.
- The Indoor Ocean&apos;s waveboards can recreate various ocean conditions, from calm to typhoon, for comprehensive testing.
- Future advancements in AI and digital twin technology may reduce physical testing at facilities like the Indoor Ocean.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Maneuvering and Seakeeping Basin (MASK)?

The Maneuvering and Seakeeping Basin, commonly known as the &apos;Indoor Ocean,&apos; is a massive indoor water facility at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Carderock, Maryland. It is used by the US Navy to test the designs of future warships, submarines, and underwater drones under simulated marine conditions.

### Who was the pioneer behind the concept of testing prototype ships in indoor basins?

David Watson Taylor, a naval architect, pioneered the concept of Experimental Model Basins, which are the ancestors of modern MASK basins. He received a grant to build his first basin at the Washington Navy Yard in 1898.

### Why was the Indoor Ocean constructed?

The Indoor Ocean was constructed to stress-test prototype ships before they are built in full size. This helps to ensure that the ships can withstand real-world marine conditions, reducing the risk of catastrophic failures at sea.

### What are the dimensions of the Indoor Ocean?

The Indoor Ocean is 360 feet (110 meters) long, 240 feet (73 meters) wide, and has a depth ranging from 20 to 35 feet (6 to 10 meters). It holds approximately 12 million gallons (45 million liters) of water.

### What types of conditions can the Indoor Ocean simulate?

The Indoor Ocean can simulate a variety of marine conditions, including flat calm to typhoon-level waves, using a series of electromechanical waveboards. These waveboards can create multi-directional and short-crested seas, simulating different sea states at various headings.

### What advanced technologies are used at the Indoor Ocean?

The Indoor Ocean uses several advanced technologies, including Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) for simulating water and air interactions with ship hulls, Finite Element Analysis (FEA) for assessing structural integrity, and Virtual Reality (VR) and Digital Twins for immersive testing and training.

### How does the Indoor Ocean contribute to the US Navy&apos;s operations?

The Indoor Ocean allows the US Navy to stress-test vessel prototypes under various conditions, ensuring they are battle-ready before deployment. This helps to streamline production and reduce the risk of maritime catastrophes.

### What is the future of the Indoor Ocean?

The future of the Indoor Ocean may involve increased digitization, automation, and integration with global defense networks. By 2040, physical testing may be reduced as hyper-accurate simulations provide nearly perfect predictions of real-world vessel behavior.

### What is the full title of the facility where the Indoor Ocean is located?

The facility is officially known as the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Carderock, previously called the David Taylor Research Center.

### What are some of the treacherous maritime conditions the US Navy faces?

The US Navy operates in diverse and challenging maritime environments, including the Pacific with its powerful storms and strong currents, the Atlantic with its strong currents and icebergs, the Bermuda Triangle with its rogue waves and storms, and the Gulf of Alaska with its harsh weather and icebergs.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: NSWC Carderock: The US Navy&apos;s Giant Indoor Ocean.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGo93TXmI-U)
- [https://allhands.navy.mil/Stories/Display-Story/Article/1840304/the-navys-indoor-ocean/](https://allhands.navy.mil/Stories/Display-Story/Article/1840304/the-navys-indoor-ocean/)
- [https://ipspowerfulpeople.com/the-most-tempestuous-seas-in-the-world/](https://ipspowerfulpeople.com/the-most-tempestuous-seas-in-the-world/)
- [https://www.distance.to/NSWC-Caderock-Headquarters,9500-MacArthur-Blvd,Bethesda,MD,20817,USA/Indian-Head,MD,USA](https://www.distance.to/NSWC-Caderock-Headquarters,9500-MacArthur-Blvd,Bethesda,MD,20817,USA/Indian-Head,MD,USA)
- [https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/navy-tests-ships-indoor-ocean-180952431/](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/navy-tests-ships-indoor-ocean-180952431/)
- [https://www.asme.org/wwwasmeorg/media/resourcefiles/aboutasme/who%20we%20are/engineering%20history/landmarks/197-david-taylor-model-basin-1939.pdf](https://www.asme.org/wwwasmeorg/media/resourcefiles/aboutasme/who%20we%20are/engineering%20history/landmarks/197-david-taylor-model-basin-1939.pdf)
- [https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/nmusn/explore/photography/washington-navy-yard/experimental-model-basin.html](https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/nmusn/explore/photography/washington-navy-yard/experimental-model-basin.html)
- [https://www.iflscience.com/could-sargassum-be-behind-the-myth-of-the-bermuda-triangle-70441](https://www.iflscience.com/could-sargassum-be-behind-the-myth-of-the-bermuda-triangle-70441)
- [https://www.history.com/news/what-is-the-bermuda-triangle](https://www.history.com/news/what-is-the-bermuda-triangle)
- [https://scholarworks.uno.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&amp;amp;httpsredir=1&amp;amp;article=1044&amp;amp;context=oceanwaves](https://scholarworks.uno.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&amp;amp;httpsredir=1&amp;amp;article=1044&amp;amp;context=oceanwaves)
- [https://www.britannica.com/event/Kursk-submarine-disaster](https://www.britannica.com/event/Kursk-submarine-disaster)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/25/Heiligenhafen_sunset_-_Baltic_Sea_-_2025_%2855256800673%29.jpg?utm_source=commons.wikimedia.org&amp;utm_campaign=imageinfo&amp;utm_content=original) by Karlheinz Klingbeil from Germany / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Ocean Rock That 4 Countries are Fighting Over...</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/ocean-rock-4-countries-fighting-over</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/ocean-rock-4-countries-fighting-over</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Rockall Bank is a tiny little rock in the ocean, indistinguishable from every other rock in the ocean you&apos;ve ever seen before. And yet, hundreds of kilometres into the North Atlantic, it lies at the epicentre of a decades-long political dispute. On the line are fishing rights, minerals, sovereignty, bragging rights, and most of all, pride. Peeling back the curtain reveals overlapping territorial claims, United Nations conventions, maritime law, and geopolitical threats, between four nations who refuse to give an inch. And beyond it all, there&apos;s one bizarre reason that means it might never get resolved. You&apos;ve heard of &quot;making a mountain out of a molehill?&quot; Well, this is how you make an island out of a rock.

## Sweet Rockall

So, what is Rockall Bank? No, it&apos;s not a place to store your money, it&apos;s a teeny tiny islet, just off the West coast of the British Isles and slap bang in the North Atlantic. Depending on the tide, it juts out around 17 metres above sea level, and at 25 metres across, it&apos;s miniscule. If you happened to pass by it whilst sailing in the region, you wouldn&apos;t even look at it twice. It&apos;s the rump of a piece of land known as Rockall plateau, which only emerged from the ocean thanks to a volcanic eruption over 55 million years ago. And despite SpongeBob&apos;s claims that the pioneers used to ride these babies for miles, this one has stayed put since then.

And let&apos;s be clear when we tell you that Rockall Bank has absolutely nothing going for it. No permanent population, no economic market, no arable land, there&apos;s barely enough space for a sizable flock of birds to call it home, let alone a community. As actual land goes, it is completely and utterly useless. It&apos;s a tiny scrap of zero significance in and of itself, otherwise totally inconsequential if it were placed almost anywhere else on planet earth.

But that&apos;s the point. This tiny rock, because of where it is, has garnered significant controversy, with four separate countries who all want to call it their own. This dispute has been ongoing for seven decades, it may well go on for seven more. And when you look into the history of this tiny islet, it will start to tell you why.

The first recorded mention of any nation even paying attention to Rockall Bank is in 1810, when the British Royal Navy first scrambled onto it to claim it for blighty. At least it wasn&apos;t big enough to draw borders across.

Come 1861 was the first time that it was even ever considered in terms of the potential riches laying beneath it. On page four of the *Irish Times*, it was written that it could have resources, &quot;surpassing in value the gold discoveries of California or Australia.&quot; This was because local anglers had long been pulling up tonnes and tonnes of valuable fish here for generations. If a country or an empire could one day take control over Rockall, they&apos;d have exclusive rights to the waters around it for the bountiful number of fish it could produce, which would also make whichever country that owned it a pretty penny. There was even the possibility of oil and gas fields there as well, which of course would make any country who controlled it fabulously wealthy.

In reality the disputes around Rockall aren&apos;t really centred around the rock at all, but the Rockall plateau it sits on. This underwater land includes the Hatton Bank, another formerly volcanic area to its North-West. The plateau is sometimes called the &quot;Hatton-Rockall area&quot; because of this.

Now lots of countries in the region have sailed through these waters and fished in them throughout history. But the dispute over this long-traversed region wouldn&apos;t actually ramp up until almost 100 years after that *Irish Times* article. As in 1955, two British Royal Marines landed on Rockall and hoisted the British flag in an attempt to annex it (must have been a slow day at the office). It is even rumoured that the recently coronated Queen Elizabeth the 2nd ordered the annexation herself. But this was no longer the days of empire, when you could simply plant a flag, nail a plaque to the rockface and call it a day. We were now in the era of nations, of international cooperation and peaceful disputes that get resolved through diplomacy. As such, a number of countries took exception to the British claiming Rockall, and outright denied the British crown&apos;s claim to it. These were: longstanding thorn in Britain&apos;s side, the Republic of Ireland, as well as the Kingdom of Denmark and the Northwest Atlantic nation, the Republic of Iceland. The dispute, especially over the fishing rights in the region has existed ever since.

But what actually are the claims the four countries in question have made? And how strong are their cases for ownership of Rockall bank to control those sweet cod, haddock and squid?

## Sedimental Value

Ok, let&apos;s start with the UK, seeing as they made their claim first, and theirs is the basis for other nations renouncing the British one. Britain&apos;s claim started in 1955 with the plaque and the flag, but it intensified in the 1960s and 70s as other political disputes were kicking off between Ireland and the UK. This came to a head in 1972, when the UK passed the Island of Rockall Act in an attempt to formally take control over the rock. This law claimed the islet as part of Scottish territory, specifically under the jurisdiction of the County of Inverness. In reality, nothing changed.

Now this gets even more complicated when you add in the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, a landmark international agreement that affects Britain&apos;s claim, but didn&apos;t come into force until 1994. So, generally under international law, a country&apos;s territorial waters extend up to 22 kilometres away from their coastline, and where there are overlaps there is either a median line or sharing agreement that administers joint jurisdiction. But Rockall falls well outside of that range for any of the countries claiming it, so what gives? Well, under the UN Convention, which we&apos;ll call &quot;sea law&quot; for short, countries are allowed to claim land up to 370 kilometres (that&apos;s 200 nautical miles for you &quot;metric haters&quot;) out to sea, as long as no one else claims it. This is what&apos;s known as an &quot;Extended Economic Zone&quot; or &quot;EEZ&quot;. This can be further extended up to almost 650 kilometres, but this is related exclusively to the seabed and their associated resources, or what&apos;s known as the &quot;Extended Continental Shelf&quot;, not the water above it. So, whilst that would apply for things like oil and gas, the question about fishing rights would stick to the 370-kilometre range. International law is complicated, just know that countries can claim land further out to sea than the convention says.

The basis of the UK&apos;s claim is that Rockall falls within the right range of its territory. The islands of St. Kilda on the Outer Hebrides are a little over 311 kilometres away. In fact, this is the closest landmass to Rockall Bank at all, and thus entitles the UK to a pretty strong claim over the islet and its territorial waters. Great Britain claims that the 22 kilometres surrounding Rockall itself are therefore within its own EEZ, as per maritime law, meaning that other countries should not be able to fish there.

But there are a few holes in the British claim. Namely that in 1997, the UK officially downgraded it by calling Rockall Bank, &quot;a rock&quot;. You see under sea law, &quot;Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.&quot; Which means that whilst the UK has often tried to enforce its EEZ, namely by bothering Irish fishing vessels near the rock, this 22-kilometre exclusion zone shouldn&apos;t apply under UN regulations, but the UK claims it anyway. What&apos;s more, St. Kilda is considered by most to be uninhabited other than the National Trust for Scotland staff who live there to protect the native seabird populations, as well as a permanent Ministry of Defence base. In 1930 it was evacuated and it hasn&apos;t had a real population or community living on it since, although people are welcome to visit. This calls into question the validity of using it for a point to measure from, and if St. Kilda&apos;s status in that regard was ever challenged or disqualified in a tribunal, the UK&apos;s valid territories might be further away than the other nations who claim Rockall and its surrounding area.

As the UN&apos;s rules explicitly apply to &quot;rocks which cannot sustain human habitation&quot;, there have been unsuccessful attempts to prove that Rockall is in fact an island and does not fall into that category. Back in 1985, former British SAS soldier Tom McClean spent 40 days on Rockall in an attempt to validate it as an island and make it a British territory. Others have since broken that record. Greenpeace activists protesting spent 42 days on Rockall in 1997, and in 2014 British explorer Nick Hancock occupied the rock for 45 days, the longest so far.

In 1988, the UK and Ireland agreed to delineate the areas of the continental shelf between the two nations, which would give each of them one half of the plateau, but this doesn&apos;t take into account Iceland or Denmark&apos;s claims which reject this concept outright.

Ireland&apos;s claim is a little more complicated. The Republic doesn&apos;t actually claim Rockall Bank itself, nor has the nation ever wanted to annex it, what it does claim is a stretch of the Rockall plateau owing to the proximity between it and the Irish mainland. Rockall Bank itself falls around 423 kilometres from the closest area of Ireland, Tory Island in County Donegal, but this distance is misleading as most of the plateau is well within range for Ireland&apos;s own claims under sea law, Rockall Bank itself is on the North-East quadrant. Ireland&apos;s former Foreign Affairs Minister Charlie Flanagan said on the matter that the consistent position of successive Irish governments is that rocks have no significance for establishing legal claims to minerals in the seabed or to the fishing rights around them.

Another major facet of Ireland&apos;s territorial claims because of this standpoint, is the outright rejection of the UK&apos;s attempted annexation of the rock itself. Ireland&apos;s main concern being that the UK will use ownership of the rock as an excuse to claim exclusive rights to fishing in the region. Ireland argues that Irish fishermen have used the waters around Rockall to make their living for generations, and that they have a right to fish there on historical precedent, Iceland and Denmark will argue the same for their own nations&apos; anglers. Ireland in effect doesn&apos;t care about owning some rock in the middle of the sea, they care about being able to fish where they always have, and what British claims over the rock would mean for that.

But Ireland&apos;s own claims to the plateau have their own issues, as their claim extends far beyond the almost 650-kilometre limit traditionally set by the UNCLOS to include the whole lower half of the plateau. That could be an issue, especially as they lay no claim to Rockall itself unlike the Brits. For what it&apos;s worth though, Ireland are the only country to lay claim with a song which came from Irish band The Wolfe Tones called &quot;Rock on Rockall&quot;. The chorus goes:

&gt; &quot;Oh rock on Rockall, you&apos;ll never fall to Britain&apos;s greedy hands.
&gt;  Or you&apos;ll meet the same resistance that you did in many lands.
&gt;  May the seagulls rise and pluck your eyes and the water crush your shell.
&gt;  And the natural gas will burn your ass and blow you all to hell.&quot;

Extra style points for that one guys.

Next is Denmark, and you&apos;d rightly think, with Denmark more associated with Northern Europe than it is the Atlantic, how on earth has a country so far away got any real chance of claiming Rockall? Well, it&apos;s more a technicality that it&apos;s the Danish government are claiming it at all. Travel North from Scotland and you&apos;ll soon reach the Faroe Islands, which are ultimately self-governing, but like Greenland, are officially part of the Kingdom of Denmark. The Faroe Islands are a similar distance from the northeast edge of the plateau as Ireland is to its closest section. As such, Denmark, which has jurisdiction over the Faroe Islands&apos; foreign policy and defence, is the one fighting this battle, even if the Faroese have self-governance over their fisheries and natural resources. Basically, foreign policy trumps fish, even if the foreign policy is about fish.

Denmark don&apos;t just claim part of the plateau like Ireland or the rock like Britain however; they want the whole thing. In 1985, Danish Prime Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen claimed the entirety of Rockall plateau, stating that the Faroe Islands exists as part of an underwater &quot;microcontinent&quot; formed by only the Rockall plateau and the Faroe Islands. How convenient…

And if you look at a map of the area without water, this is kind of true, you can see a series of elevated land masses that connect Rockall to the Faroe Islands. But ultimately this claim is kind of a longshot. If you follow this logic, the geography of the region would place the Faroe Islands themselves under the jurisdiction of Iceland and not Denmark. And who&apos;s really to say where at what depth underwater makes one set of landmasses intimately connected and another totally irrelevant? With the Faroe Islands 590 kilometres from Rockall Bank itself, much further than the British claim, Denmark might struggle to make a compelling argument for their case over others.

And then you have Iceland, which is, in the nicest way possible, a total basket case in terms of its claim to the Rockall-Hatton area. Much like Ireland, Iceland considers Rockall Bank itself to be irrelevant as far as delineations of EEZs and continental shelf areas are concerned. But, much like Denmark&apos;s claim, Iceland also claims pretty much the entire Rockall plateau, under the justification that it is an extension of its own continental shelf. This area goes from around 111 kilometres from the foot of the plateau all the way up to the top. To its fullest extent this is almost 1300 kilometres away from the nearest Icelandic landmass, a fraction of the distance of the British claim.

But you see, Reykjavik had a plan for that. Iceland gets extra points in our book for throwing the most shade at the claims of other nations. Despite the long history of people inhabiting St. Kilda up until the 20th century, Iceland considers it to be, quoting directly here, &quot;a miniscule, effectively uninhabited islet.&quot; Ouch. To further dismiss the British claim, it states that St. Kilda lies outside the British territorial sea limit, essentially arguing that St. Kilda is so far from the rest of Britain that it&apos;s not a fair basepoint to measure from when considering territorial claims.

Iceland also has probably done the most work in terms of surveying the ocean floor to assess its claim. In total Iceland has surveyed 1.3 million square kilometres of it, an area roughly 13 times larger than the entirety of Iceland itself. So, if you get extra credit for effort, they might be in with a shot.

But there are some major issues with Iceland&apos;s claim. For starters Iceland&apos;s claim is de facto the furthest of all four nations vying for ownership of Rockall Bank and its surrounding plateau, and it&apos;s not close, being 707 kilometres from Rockall Bank itself. The second reason however, is just bizarre. Iceland was the first Western nation to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985. Yet despite that fact, Iceland itself, whilst stating that the only way to come to a consensus on ownership would be through UN mediation, has not submitted its claim to the UN, stating that doing so would compromise its claim over the continental shelf in the area. Whilst I&apos;m no maritime lawyer, that does seem a lot like Iceland is afraid of the case going to the UN for arbitration because the result might end up not going its way. Basically, it&apos;s like four kids fighting over a toy, and Iceland doesn&apos;t want mum to decide who should get to play with it, because Reykjavik thinks she will force them all to share. That&apos;s not exactly a compelling defence.

So, what was the UN to do about all this? What would mum say? Could it end this dispute once and for all?

## A Rock and a Hard Place

All of this was supposed to come to a conclusion at the 24th session of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) when between 2009 and 2010, Denmark, Ireland and the UK submitted their claims to the CLCS over the Rockall-Hatton zone, whilst Iceland did not. And the CLCS decided… well… nothing.

And, it literally couldn&apos;t. You see, because Iceland hasn&apos;t actually submitted its claim to the CLCS over Rockall, the CLCS is unable to come to a consensus on the dispute. This is because it requires all disputing parties to have submitted their claims before a decision can be made, and that includes Iceland. So, the overall decision on who owns Rockall remains unresolved.

Essentially, the UN was forced to leave the four countries to argue between themselves into maybe finding an agreement later down the line, but other than the UK and Ireland amending their 1988 agreement in 2014 to form one maritime boundary, no consensus has been found. The UK and Ireland still claim half each, the UK&apos;s half claims the rock itself, Iceland and Denmark each claim the whole thing, Ireland&apos;s main position is that historical rights should trump legal precedents to any exclusive access, and Iceland has stopped the whole process moving forward for fear of being proven wrong. Conferences in Dublin, London, Copenhagen and Reykjavik all sought to end the dispute throughout the 2000s and 2010s but they were not successful. Basically, it&apos;s a mess.

And it only became more of a mess once the UK voted itself out of the European Union in 2016. Because whilst on paper this didn&apos;t change the dispute, in practice the UK became far more defensive over what it saw as its own fishing territories, which for it includes the 22 kilometres around Rockall Bank. The devolved Scottish and UK government have both been at loggerheads with the Irish as a result, and British ships have on occasion chased off Irish fishermen from the region. Scottish external affairs minister Fiona Hyslop warned the Irish Government in 2019 that it will deploy its vessels to protect Scottish fishing rights around Rockall.

And we have to remember that this is more than about just fishing, as Rockall could be a source of rare earth minerals, as well as oil and gas. Although surveys of the area not finding many resources, the political implications of drilling, and the bad weather, have put anyone off from starting a full drilling operation. The UK government&apos;s 2023 estimate puts the predicted number of barrels of oil equivalent at around two and a half billion. But some estimates, such as from the Geological Society in 1999, claim there could be up to 75 billion barrels of oil under the plateau, and many others land somewhere in between. But if that&apos;s even remotely true, this is going to go from a slightly amusing maritime dispute to… whatever the opposite of that is VERY quickly. If it&apos;s on the upper side of that range, the US military might even show up ready to dole out some freedom.

So, who&apos;s right? Well, it&apos;s complicated. Every nation claiming Rockall has at least a somewhat valid claim for the undersea territory, or at least a portion of it. Some countries are more aggressive with those claims than others (looking at you Iceland) and this is generally why we now get the UN to decide a winner on all of this. But there is no easy solution here. If you gave it all to Britain, for example, other nations might start claiming uninhabited islands are the point to measure from, and that opens up a whole can of worms. Split it between the UK and Ireland like they agreed in the 80s, and the Faroe Islands will feel unfairly treated, as it&apos;s barely further away from Rockall Bank than Ireland is. Throw them in the mix too and not only might the UK complain as both Ireland and the Faroe Islands are further away than St. Kilda, but you might have Iceland upset that the whole thing is theirs regardless and it&apos;s been left out. Honestly the best option might be for Rockall and its plateau to remain neutral. Nobody gets exclusivity, nobody gets the fish, the minerals, the oil, or the rock. But unless that&apos;s a formal decision from the UN, that won&apos;t stop these countries continuing to claim it regardless.

And that&apos;s because it&apos;s actually not about some rock in the ocean at all, one could argue it&apos;s not even about the plateau and its resources. There&apos;s a reason that until the UN helps resolve it, no country will give an inch. Rockall Bank itself isn&apos;t exactly special, and all of these countries continue to fish in the surrounding waters to great success, and the natural resources that could be worth billions are unproven. But there&apos;s a legal, sovereign, and territorial principle that could be considered the thin end of the wedge for other issues among the disputing nations if any country is publicly seen to be giving in to another on the international stage. The territorial implications of Rockall are simply far more important than some boulder in the North Atlantic and its resources could ever be.

Where does Rockall Bank go from here? Well until Iceland submits its claim, nowhere. But further things could complicate an already complex situation. Brexit succeeded in ramping up tensions over fishing, a one-day independent Faroe Islands would cause a stir, an independent Scotland could cause even more issues, as would the discovery of oil. But until that point, everyone seems content just to not let anyone else have it.

As long as the fish keep flowing, of course.

## Key Takeaways

- Rockall Bank is a tiny, insignificant rock in the North Atlantic, but its location makes it the center of a long-standing dispute.
- The dispute involves the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Iceland, each claiming rights over the Rockall Plateau and its resources.
- The UK&apos;s claim is based on proximity to St. Kilda, but its status as a rock complicates its legal standing.
- Ireland, Denmark, and Iceland have varying claims, with Iceland refusing to submit its claim to the UN, stalling resolution.
- The dispute is more about sovereignty and principle than the rock itself, with potential resources adding complexity.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is Rockall Bank?

Rockall Bank is a tiny islet located off the west coast of the British Isles in the North Atlantic. It is approximately 17 meters above sea level and 25 meters across. It is part of the Rockall plateau, which emerged from the ocean due to a volcanic eruption over 55 million years ago.

### Why is Rockall Bank significant despite its small size?

Rockall Bank is significant due to its strategic location, which has led to disputes over fishing rights, minerals, sovereignty, and territorial claims among four nations: the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Iceland.

### What are the main resources that countries are disputing over Rockall Bank?

The main resources in dispute include fishing rights, potential oil and gas fields, and rare earth minerals. The Rockall plateau, which includes the Hatton Bank, is believed to have significant natural resources.

### What is the UK&apos;s claim to Rockall Bank?

The UK claims Rockall Bank based on its proximity to the islands of St. Kilda, which are about 311 kilometers away. The UK argues that Rockall falls within its Extended Economic Zone (EEZ) under maritime law. However, the UK&apos;s claim has been weakened by its own designation of Rockall as a &apos;rock&apos; in 1997, which under UN regulations means it cannot sustain an EEZ.

### What is Ireland&apos;s position on Rockall Bank?

Ireland does not claim Rockall Bank itself but argues for a share of the Rockall plateau based on historical fishing rights and proximity. Ireland rejects the UK&apos;s annexation of Rockall and advocates for historical rights over legal precedents.

### Why does Denmark claim Rockall Bank?

Denmark claims Rockall Bank through its jurisdiction over the Faroe Islands, which are part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Denmark argues that the Faroe Islands and Rockall Bank are part of an underwater &apos;microcontinent,&apos; but this claim is considered a longshot due to geographical and legal complexities.

### What is Iceland&apos;s stance on Rockall Bank?

Iceland claims the entire Rockall plateau, arguing that it is an extension of its continental shelf. Iceland has surveyed a large area of the ocean floor to support its claim but has not submitted its claim to the UN, fearing that arbitration might not go in its favor.

### What role does the UN play in the dispute over Rockall Bank?

The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is involved in the dispute, but it cannot make a decision because Iceland has not submitted its claim. The UN requires all disputing parties to submit their claims before a decision can be made.

### How has Brexit affected the dispute over Rockall Bank?

Brexit has increased tensions over fishing rights, with the UK becoming more defensive about its territorial waters, including the area around Rockall Bank. This has led to confrontations between British and Irish fishing vessels.

### What are the potential future complications in the Rockall Bank dispute?

Future complications could include the discovery of significant oil reserves, changes in the political status of the Faroe Islands or Scotland, and ongoing tensions over fishing rights. These factors could further escalate the dispute.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Ocean Rock That 4 Countries are Fighting Over...](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rO9WtKEiUtQ)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/da/Meeting_of_the_North_Atlantic_Council_at_the_level_of_Heads_of_State_and_Government_-_2025_NATO_Summit_in_The_Hague.jpg) by Estonian Foreign Ministry / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Pacific Just Suffered a Mega Earthquake. Here&apos;s What Happened.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/pacific-mega-earthquake-2025-kamchatka</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/pacific-mega-earthquake-2025-kamchatka</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Here on Places, we&apos;ve discussed at some length the potential geographical hazards of residing in North America&apos;s Pacific Northwest, confusingly located in the northeast corner of the Pacific. Between the ticking time bomb that is Mount Rainier, located nearby the brooding, temperamental Cascadia Subduction Zone, there are multiple threats we&apos;ve described, any of which could—hypothetically—level all that surrounds them in a flash.

Well it seems that Mother Nature was paying attention. Because in June 2025, a colossal earthquake struck off the coast of Russia&apos;s Kamchatka peninsula, one which threatened to send a tsunami rocketing across the Pacific towards Canada, the US, and Japan. The earthquake was the sixth most-powerful in recorded history, and the strongest since the 2011 Tohoku quake, which shook Japan and caused the Fukushima nuclear disaster, as well as the deaths of around 20,000 people.

Thankfully, on this occasion, severe disaster caused by the earthquake was avoided.

But what on earth happened?

## The Land of Fire and Ice

Well, to uncover all this, let&apos;s journey to the place where the quake took place, and where—unfortunately for those living there—natural disasters are all rather run-of-the-mill.

You see, while the earth decided to spare the densely-populated areas of North America (on this occasion), anything that happens across the water around Kamchatka—a hotbed of seismic activity—can, and sometimes does, have severe effects for places on the opposite shores of the Pacific.

Kamchatka is an immense peninsula and federal subject of Russia, more than 1,200 kilometres (or 777 miles) long and located in the far eastern reaches of Siberia.

Unsurprisingly, the peninsula is not very densely-inhabitated. At a little under 300,000 people—per the 2021 Russian national census—its entire population is about equal in size to the city of Anchorage, Alaska. Its population density—at around 0.61 people per square kilometre, or 1.61 per square mile—isn&apos;t really comparable to any nation on earth: but would be about one-quarter that of Mongolia and smaller even than that of the gargantuan province of Western Australia, the second-largest territorial subdivision on earth.

The reasons for this population sparsity are rather evident. Ignoring economic and social issues, Kamchatka has a miserable climate: with a year-round average temperature of about one degree celsius (or 30 to 32 degrees Fahrenheit). It is unusually prone to heavy rain—often as much as 2,500 millimetres per year, more than twice the annual precipitation of the Canadian city of Vancouver. Kamchatka is also home to about 300 volcanoes, of which 30 remain active and erupt roughly once or twice per year, giving rise to the region&apos;s nickname: &apos;the land of fire and ice&apos;.

It also has bears. Lots and lots of bears. So many, in fact, that there is about one bear for every ten residents, and the principal city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskyy has had to introduce night patrols to fend off the wandering critters.

But aside from the poor climate, volcanoes, and the threat of bear devouring, there&apos;s yet another reason why life in Kamchatka is hardly all caviar and scenic landscapes (although it does have both). You see, Kamchatka is also one of the most earthquake-prone places on earth.

This is due to the existence of a nearby tectonic plate frontier, known as the Kuril-Kamchatka Trench. The trench effectively bisects the northwest of the Pacific, stretching thousands of kilometres from the Kamchatka Peninsula to Japan&apos;s Hokkaido Island. The Trench is the interface of the Pacific Tectonic Plate—occupying practically the full length and breadth of the Pacific Ocean—and the Okhotsk Plate, which sits beneath the Sea of Okhotsk between Kamchatka, Japan and the Russian mainland. The Pacific Plate is subducting—or moving beneath—the Okhotsk Plate, often leading to inglorious tremors that can cause the entire region to shudder. On occasion, this has resulted in some of the strongest earthquakes on record.

And when those happen, the results can be as awe-inspiring as they are terrifying.

## The Kamchatka Earthquakes

The thing is: being that they are just that routine, it&apos;s not really known how many earthquakes have taken place in the subduction zone of the Kuril-Kamchatka Trench. But at least 133 &apos;major&apos; quakes (those classed above 7 on the earthquake moment-magnitude scale) have occurred since 1900, with 12 of these being classed as &apos;great&apos;—in other words, above 8 on the same scale.

The most powerful of all occurred in the 18th century, before the introduction of modern measures for documenting seismic activity. The October 1737 Kamchatka earthquake is believed to have had a moment magnitude as high as 9.3, which would render it—theoretically—the second- or third-strongest in history. The resulting tsunami was probably around 20 metres tall, big enough to tear through any existing infrastructure in place nearby at the time. This being the 1800s, the surrounding area was largely inhabited by local indigenous populations, whose recorded histories were sparse, and with it being therefore uncertain how many people were killed in the event. Still, visiting Russian administrators described homes of wood and animal skin having been obliterated, and the quake aftershocks were so numerous that they continued into the spring of 1738.

In 1952, the Severo-Kurilsk earthquake occurred, with a moment magnitude of 9. This made it the fifth most-powerful earthquake in history, and the event caused an enormous tsunami which levelled the seaside town of Severo-Kurilsk entirely. In spite of the sparsity of Kamchatka&apos;s population, this was enough to kill more than 2,000 people, and the Soviet Union evacuated the remaining 4,000 residents of the town inland to the Russian continent immediately afterwards. Even so, Severo-Kurilsk was reconstructed on a higher elevation and stood at around 2,500 people by the end of the century, in time to be hit once more by a 7.5-magnitude quake in 2020. This time, the quake caused only minor material damage, but the threat posed by seismic activity remained as plain and obvious as ever, setting the stage for yet another quake which would finally strike five years later.

The 2025 Kamchatka peninsula quake occurred at 11:24 a.m. local time on July 30th, deep in the earth&apos;s crust at around 10-28 kilometres beneath the Kuril-Kamchatka Trench, or between 20 and 35 kilometres below sea surface level.

And it immediately led to panic.

## The Potent Force of Nature

The earthquake was preceded by a foreshock of around 7.4 on the 20th of July, occurring around 60km southwest of the subsequent quake epicentre and further along the Trench faultline.

While the magnitude of 7.4 was—by itself—more than considerable, this was not enough to generate much disruption. Being that it occurred some distance away from shore, and given the volume of such shocks in a region highly prone to them, no major evacuation efforts or earthquake warnings were carried out in Russia or elsewhere. Even so, multiple aftershocks continued in the days afterwards, a sort of precursor to the main event 10 days later.

So when the quake occurred, authorities on Kamchatka and the nearby Kuril islands acted swiftly. They had anticipated a major event for a long time, and the local population—long-drilled in quake- and volcano-related evacuations, were quickly shepherded out of their homes and inland to safety. Several injuries were reported, and a kindergarten in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskyy was damaged, but the material and human cost of the quake was otherwise minor.

Meanwhile, on the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido, around 250 kilometres south of the quake&apos;s epicentre, the tremor was also felt.

Japan has its own system of earthquake measurement—known as the Shindo Scale—which recorded a quake intensity of 2, or &apos;minor&apos;. Even so, tsunami waves were anticipated, and contingency plans were immediately rolled out. Given its experience in the past—not least the devastation of Fukushima—Japan was unwilling to leave anything to chance, even though the anticipated waves were relatively small. Rail lines were closed, and flights at Sendai Airport—severely damaged by the 2011 quake—were grounded. Japan then effected an evacuation in Hokkaido and other parts of the country: around two million people nationwide—especially those residing on the Pacific coastline—were advised to evacuate. 21 people suffered injuries, mostly heat-related illnesses due to having been shepherded to safe zones beneath the sweltering summer sun (something which certainly wasn&apos;t a concern in the permafrozen environs of Siberia). In Kumano, on Japan&apos;s southern coast, a woman drove off a cliff while evacuating herself, becoming the only known fatality of the earthquake. The nationwide alert was lifted the following day, without major damage having been sustained.

Other countries in the Pacific also leapt into action. Indonesia issued an alert on some of its northern islands—advising residents and visitors to steer away from coastal regions, although the anticipated waves were only estimated to be less than a metre in height. China issued a yellow alert to its coastal population, and Taiwan primed several rescue aircraft and naval vessels to assist in evacuation and disaster assistance—although neither proved ultimately necessary.

The US placed the states of California, Oregon, and Washington under alert, as well as Alaska&apos;s Aleutian Islands. Evacuations were ordered in Hawaii, while Mexico warned of strong currents affecting its Pacific facing region of Baja California. In the end, the highest tsunami waves affecting North America were recorded in Crescent City, California—and reached no more than around 1 metre in height. Nevertheless, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that these were enough to cause over 1 million dollars&apos; worth of damage to the harbour—displaying, once more, the destructive power of even tepid bursts of energy produced by the ocean.

By July 31st, the danger of the earthquake had largely dissipated without a fuss. Although Crescent City&apos;s harbour had eaten waves significant enough to cause substantial damage, little infrastructural chaos was otherwise caused by the powerful quake. Significant flooding was observed in Severo-Kurilsk, although this paled in comparison with the devastation wrought during the 1952 event, which—as a reminder—was not that much more powerful than the 2025 quake. Russian authorities reported that the port of the village had been damaged, and a local fishing plant was submerged. But no quake-related fatalities were reported in Russia either. As if to sound off the disaster, Kamchatka&apos;s Klyuchevskoy volcano erupted several hours later on July 30th—although this was described as unrelated to the tremors, and just another everyday blast from the peninsula&apos;s ever-active natural furnaces.

Soon, populations all around the Pacific Rim returned to their everyday lives, although an earthquake alert remains in place at the time of writing on August 1st, and the US Geological Survey declared a 59% chance of an aftershock of more than 7.0 magnitude in the following week.

But even though the earthquake&apos;s damage was—this time—minor, the awesome force of Mother Nature is evidently no force to be trifled with: waves caused by the earthquake travelled almost the full length of the Pacific, arriving on-shore in places like Japan, Hawaii, San Francisco and even French Polynesia. The disaster alerts and evacuations ordered from China to Chile displaced millions and ground economic activity grinding to a halt: even if only for a matter of hours.

The lethal threat of such an event occurring in a more built-up area cannot be understated. While the Kamchatka Trench&apos;s seismic activity does pose a consistent concern for Russia, the hazards do remain relatively minimised. Russia&apos;s principal cities are all located far away from the Pacific coast; mostly west of the Ural Mountains and in so-called European Russia. But Canada, the US, Japan and even China have much more to fear: many of their principal cities and most productive economic zones are right there on the Pacific coast, theoretically vulnerable to the unmitigated ravages of nature should a powerful event occur. The same is true—to varying degrees—of countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, Chile and others, not to mention the small island nations of the Pacific itself. With many of those countries already buckling beneath the combined effects of cyclical storms, typhoons, rising tides and more, the threat of a powerful earthquake may—one day—prove itself too much to handle.

Let us hope that day doesn&apos;t arrive soon.

## Key Takeaways

- The 2025 Kamchatka earthquake was the sixth most powerful ever recorded, but caused minimal damage.
- Kamchatka&apos;s sparse population and preparedness helped minimize the earthquake&apos;s impact on Russia.
- Tsunami warnings and evacuations were triggered across the Pacific, affecting millions.
- The earthquake highlighted the vulnerability of Pacific Rim countries to seismic activity.
- Despite the earthquake&apos;s power, the region&apos;s preparedness and the area&apos;s low population density limited the damage.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What was the magnitude of the 2025 Kamchatka earthquake?

The 2025 Kamchatka earthquake was the sixth most-powerful in recorded history, but the exact magnitude is not specified in the article.

### Where did the 2025 earthquake occur?

The 2025 earthquake occurred off the coast of Russia’s Kamchatka peninsula.

### What is the population density of Kamchatka?

The population density of Kamchatka is around 0.61 people per square kilometre, or 1.61 per square mile.

### How many active volcanoes are there in Kamchatka?

Kamchatka is home to about 300 volcanoes, of which 30 remain active and erupt roughly once or twice per year.

### What is the Kuril-Kamchatka Trench?

The Kuril-Kamchatka Trench is a tectonic plate frontier that bisects the northwest of the Pacific, stretching from the Kamchatka Peninsula to Japan’s Hokkaido Island. It is the interface of the Pacific Tectonic Plate and the Okhotsk Plate.

### How many major earthquakes have occurred in the Kuril-Kamchatka Trench since 1900?

At least 133 major earthquakes (those classed above 7 on the earthquake moment-magnitude scale) have occurred in the Kuril-Kamchatka Trench since 1900.

### What was the magnitude of the 1952 Severo-Kurilsk earthquake?

The 1952 Severo-Kurilsk earthquake had a moment magnitude of 9, making it the fifth most-powerful earthquake in history.

### What actions were taken in Japan following the 2025 Kamchatka earthquake?

Japan issued a nationwide alert, closed rail lines, grounded flights, and evacuated around two million people, especially those residing on the Pacific coastline.

### What was the highest tsunami wave height recorded in North America after the 2025 earthquake?

The highest tsunami waves affecting North America were recorded in Crescent City, California, and reached no more than around 1 metre in height.

### What is the probability of an aftershock of more than 7.0 magnitude following the 2025 earthquake?

The US Geological Survey declared a 59% chance of an aftershock of more than 7.0 magnitude in the following week after the 2025 earthquake.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Pacific Just Suffered a Mega Earthquake. Here&apos;s What Happened.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=muAvLSmh5X0)
- [https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/09/30/russias-kamchatka-launches-night-patrols-to-combat-roaming-bears-a86522](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/09/30/russias-kamchatka-launches-night-patrols-to-combat-roaming-bears-a86522)
- [https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/russias-land-of-fire-and-ice-was-largely-spared-by-earthquake-tsunami-8988438](https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/russias-land-of-fire-and-ice-was-largely-spared-by-earthquake-tsunami-8988438)
- [https://www.earthquakescanada.nrcan.gc.ca/info-gen/scales-echelles/magnitude-en.php](https://www.earthquakescanada.nrcan.gc.ca/info-gen/scales-echelles/magnitude-en.php)
- [Hero image source](https://images.rawpixel.com/editor_1024/czNmcy1wcml2YXRlL3Jhd3BpeGVsX2ltYWdlcy93ZWJzaXRlX2NvbnRlbnQvbHIvdXB3azYxNjkzODU2LXdpa2ltZWRpYS1pbWFnZS1rb3dsbDVsMS5qcGc.jpg) by openverse, cc0.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Pacific Ring of Fire: Nature&apos;s Greatest Threat</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/pacific-ring-of-fire-natures-greatest-threat</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/pacific-ring-of-fire-natures-greatest-threat</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Across the global shores of the Pacific Ocean, a great and terrible violence lurks just barely below our feet. Winding across an outline of nearly forty thousand kilometers long, stretching from the southern tip of New Zealand, through the South Pacific, across Indonesia, Japan, and Russia before stretching all the way down the American supercontinent, the world&apos;s grandest ocean is encircled. Along its shores and in its deepest waters, the Earth roils in upon itself, in a crashing, molten-hot carnage that has produced some of the greatest destruction that the world has ever seen. Of every ten earthquakes that happen across the globe, nine will happen here; among the most powerful volcanic eruptions of this epoch, nearly all of them left their mark on this very territory. Its name is the Ring of Fire, and it&apos;s produced more devastating earthquakes, more incredible volcanic eruptions, and more terrifying tsunamis than anywhere else on Planet Earth.

In this article, we&apos;ll be looking closely at the Ring of Fire, to trace its path across the globe, understand why it exists, and explore some of the most destructive terrestrial events that humanity has ever known.

## Tracing the Ring of Fire

When it comes to the Ring of Fire, we&apos;ve got to start our journey with one quick, but very important disclaimer: the Ring of Fire isn&apos;t a ring at all. While we will certainly admit that the name &quot;Ring of Fire&quot; sounds cool as hell, it also conjures up an image of a perfect, continuous ring, which—well, it isn&apos;t. Instead, it can, at best, be described as sort of a bendy horseshoe, one that&apos;s dotted with volcanoes, mountain ranges, deep ocean trenches, a whole lot of islands, and some of the most active geologic zones in the world. Instead of &quot;The Ring of Fire,&quot; a truly accurate name might be more along the lines of, say, &quot;The Horseshoe of Quakes, Shakes, and Violently Explosive Bakes.&quot; But that&apos;s a bit long, so &quot;Ring of Fire&quot; it is.

But when we actually begin zooming in at certain parts across the map, it becomes clearer and clearer that we&apos;re examining a phenomenon of truly massive scale. Although their inclusion is somewhat in dispute among geologists, we&apos;ll start our tour of the Ring of Fire all the way down in Antarctica&apos;s South Shetland Islands. There, you&apos;ll find volcanoes like Penguin Island, Melville Peak, and the almost-perfectly-circular, and incredibly steep and craggy Bridgeman Island, poking up out of the Antarctic waves and believed to have last erupted barely two hundred years ago. Also among their number is Deception Island, which, when sailing into its tranquil central harbor, might seem quite safe and almost cozy. View it from above, though, and you&apos;ll quickly recognize it as the caldera of a volcano—and that volcano, as it happens, is very much alive. Multiple scientific stations were destroyed there by eruptions in the 1960s, although it&apos;s remained sleepy since then while turning into a tourist hot-spot.

Traveling northward, the Ring of Fire runs basically along the whole length of the nation of Chile, where the Ring&apos;s Andes mountain range forms a natural land border with neighboring Argentina. Chile is a land pockmarked by volcanoes, including at least ninety that are known to have erupted since the start of the current Holocene Epoch—or, basically, in the last eleven thousand seven hundred years, after the glaciers of the Ice Age retreated from much of the Earth. Chile&apos;s coast is characteristic of a highly geologically active area, as will be a hallmark of each global area we speak about today, featuring countless little islands and practically constant underground tremors. Chile&apos;s history of earthquakes includes the single biggest in recorded history, a magnitude 9.4-to-9.6 earthquake that we will absolutely be talking about later. Twenty volcanic eruptions have happened there in the last two hundred years, and one of the country&apos;s active volcanoes, Villarrica, is one of just five on the globe to boast an active lava lake. The Lascar stratovolcano has erupted many times in recent centuries, and when it blew in 1993, its ash traveled all the way to Buenos Aires in Argentina, 1,600 kilometers or one thousand miles away.

And speaking of Argentina, while the country is located further from the nearest section of the Ring of Fire, it still has volcanoes and earthquakes of its own. Bolivia, to the north, delineates parts of its Chilean border by splitting active volcanoes between the two nations. Bolivia&apos;s vast, high plateau is lined to the west with a formation called the Cordillera Occidental, a stretch of dormant, extinct, and active volcanoes that separate it from Chile. The Ring curves around the contours of Peru, where the 19,000-foot-tall, nearly six-kilometer-tall Sabancaya volcano has been erupting continuously since 2016, and where the Ubinas volcano, Peru&apos;s now-most active peak, surprised the local population in 2006 when it roared to life after having been thought to be basically non-hazardous. Moving northward, we travel up to Ecuador, a small nation that&apos;s all but inundated with exceptionally active volcanoes relative to its size. There, the Cotopaxi volcano has erupted some fifty times in the last three centuries, while the Pichincha volcano covered the capital city of Quito with ash just a couple of decades ago. The volcano Reventador has been in a state of continuous eruption since 2008, and a few years prior to that, in 2002, it pushed out an ash plume that stretched ten and a half miles, seventeen kilometers, into the sky.

The Ring of Fire tracks along the westward edge of the American supercontinent, all through the highly geologically active Central American isthmus. Panama has logged a long series of earthquakes above a magnitude six, including several during the 2000s, while in Costa Rica, volcanoes like Turrialba and Poas like to spit very heavy rocks at nearby tourists every couple of years. In Nicaragua, the Concepcion volcano is a popular climbing destination, rising out of the waters of Lake Nicaragua right beside its sister peak, Maderas. El Salvador is similarly active, logging eight major earthquakes since 2010, including one in 2012 that produced a major tsunami. In Guatemala, the Volcan de Fuego—fantastic name for a volcano, by the way—is distinguished by its nearly constant activity, giving off puffs of gas and ash every few minutes even today, interspersed with eight more major eruptions since September of 2012. Nor is Fuego the only one; its fellow Guatemalan volcano Pacaya has been erupting quite often in recent decades, so much so that the locals now ignore evacuation orders from time to time. Also in Guatemala, the Santa Maria Volcano logged one of the 20th century&apos;s biggest volcanic eruptions in 1902, with volcanic ash traveling over four thousand kilometers, 2,500 miles, to San Francisco in the United States; by the way, that was just four years before San Francisco was nearly destroyed by a Ring of Fire event of its own, which we&apos;ll absolutely be talking about as a part of today&apos;s article.

Mexico might not have much of a reputation for tectonic cataclysms, but its history tells a different story. The Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt droops across Mexico&apos;s central regions like a waistband, including a nearly 18,000-foot, 5,400-meter-tall active stratovolcano with a name slightly beyond our ability to pronounce, that&apos;s melted off its great glaciers over the past couple of decades due to the intense geological churning inside. Another volcano, El Chichon, was thought to be extinct until it erupted in 1982, wiping out nine villages and a combined near-two-thousand inhabitants and creating a kilometer-wide acidic lake in its crater. Even further north, the American southwest is known for its frequent and occasionally major earthquakes, giving the residents of Orange County and the surrounding landscape a vigorous shake from time to time.

But that&apos;s got nothing on the region just to the north, Cascadia. The Cascade Volcanic Arc is host to some twenty-or-so major volcanoes, stretching as far south as northern California and as far north as Vancouver Island. There, the land is prone to producing incredibly powerful quakes, while volcanoes in the area, most famously Mount St. Helens, are prone to major and highly violent eruptions that we&apos;ll absolutely be discussing at length in a bit. In Western Canada, dozens of dormant and extinct volcanoes line the landscape, and several of the volcanoes and volcanic fields are believed to have the potential to go active. All the way to the north, Alaska&apos;s Aleutian Islands are a volcanic island chain, tracing a narrow pathway from the Americas to Eurasia, where magma constantly boils and bubbles just under the surface even today.

Across the Bering Sea lies the Kamchatka Peninsula of Russia, where the Pacific coastline and the inland regions are among the world&apos;s most volcanically active zones, bar none. Cresting above the landscape are over 150 volcanoes, over two dozen of which are considered active, but none quite so fascinating as the tallest among them: Klyuchevskaya Sopka. Looming at a height of nearly five kilometers, or 15,600 feet, this particular volcano is considered to be among the most beautiful around the world. Just as striking is the rate at which it rose from the ground, with most estimates placing it at just seven thousand years old. It&apos;s erupted several times in the last few years. Just as gorgeous is the Kronotsky volcano, which, according to some volcanologists, is the most visually stunning on Planet Earth. Tsunamis are common in the waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula, known as the &quot;land of fire and ice&quot; by both Russians and global visitors. The area also features frequent and often intense earthquakes, as well as plains of steam-venting geysers.

From Kamchatka, the next major stop on the Ring of Fire is Japan—and is it ever *major*. Japan accounts for some ten percent of global active volcanoes, frequently logs earthquakes major enough that they&apos;re noticeable in everyday life, and has a history speckled with some of the most devastating major earthquakes and tsunami events ever. But so, too, is its landscape defined by its geologic activity, with Mount Fuji being the most iconic of all Japan&apos;s volcanic peaks. The archipelago nation gains new islands with a relative frequency, as volcanoes climb and climb beneath the surface of the water before finally breaking into fresh air. To the southwest, the island of Formosa, making up most of modern-day Taiwan, is quite active as well, and most of Taiwan today has been designed and built up with earthquake resistance as a top priority.

And speaking of East Asian archipelago nations, we come to the Philippines, where volcanic activity and destructive earthquakes are a simple fact of life. There, Mount Pinatubo is by far the country&apos;s most recognizable feature, largely on account of a 1991 eruption that killed nearly a thousand people and left over ten thousand homeless. Elsewhere, the Mayon volcano is quite picturesque, even as it erupts near-constantly and forces evacuations every couple of years. It also features prominently in local mythology, and several festivals each year are held in its honor. The Taal volcano has been similarly active in recent years, spewing toxic gas down onto the Philippine capital city of Manila. It&apos;s been several years since the Philippines *didn&apos;t* have an earthquake that caused fatalities, and the country&apos;s infrastructure remains relatively vulnerable to earthquakes that modern construction should be able to withstand.

Finally, Indonesia boasts immensely powerful geologic forces of its own; in addition to the ancient Toba supervolcano, Indonesia features several ongoing, years-long volcanic eruptions. While most of Indonesia&apos;s active volcanoes feature a stop-and-start, staccato onslaught of individual eruptions, they&apos;re considered ready to blow, basically at all times. One, the volcano Dukono, has been continuously erupting since 1933. Indonesia&apos;s volcanoes feature heavily in the lore and mythology of locals on each of Indonesia&apos;s many islands, with some at the core of local creation legends. One, the volcano of Semeru, is even said to have been transplanted from India to create the Indonesian main island of Java. The country logs several high-magnitude quakes over the course of most years, including four quakes of magnitude seven or higher during the year 2023 alone. Not too far away, Papua New Guinea has logged several eruptions in the last few years, most prominently from the volcano Ulawun, whose volcanic plume has climbed above 15 kilometers, 49,000 feet, into the sky on two separate occasions since 2019.

From Papua New Guinea, the Ring of Fire traces a path out to sea, moving eastward into the Pacific. It includes the Solomon Islands, and the volcanic archipelago nation of Vanuatu. There, two volcanoes have been erupting on and off for the last several years, including one called Ambrym, which had a lava lake up until late 2018. The island nations of Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga host their own volcanoes, although those are largely not active, and are occasionally stirred around by major earthquakes above magnitude-8. Tonga features one of the world&apos;s newest islands, one Home Reef, which has been continually erupting for a bit and is expected to build itself into an at-least-semipermanent landmass sometime soon. Another, the Hunga Tonga–Hunga Ha&apos;apai volcano—which is mostly underwater—sent unbelievable amounts of water vapor into the atmosphere in 2022, producing a boom that could be heard ten thousand kilometers, sixty-two-hundred miles away in *Alaska*, and an atmospheric shock wave that could be detected all the way in *London*.

Finally, the Ring concludes in New Zealand, where the metropolitan area of the nation&apos;s largest city, Auckland, is spread across a volcanic field featuring over fifty dormant volcanoes—which are, by the way, expected to erupt again, albeit just at some point within the next several thousand years. The country&apos;s beautiful geography is largely a product of its volcanic geology, and it&apos;s logged several prehistoric eruptions of supervolcano size, including the world&apos;s most recent supereruption, at the country&apos;s Taupo volcano. Some of New Zealand&apos;s most popular ski slopes are on the edge of an active stratovolcano called Mount Ruapehu, which still has minor eruptions in most years. White Island, a volcano off the coast beyond Auckland, has been spewing volcanic gases continually for centuries. Earthquakes of devastating magnitude are common there, although the country is generally able to stay prepared and respond adequately; despite over a dozen earthquakes above magnitude 5.5 since 2020, there have been no fatalities on the islands as a result.

All in all, the Ring of Fire stretches along almost the entire Pacific Rim, a long and nearly continuous line of volcanoes, ground tremors, and telltale island archipelagos that indicate an ancient history in which those same islands rose up from the sea. The Ring of Fire features some incredible natural beauty, alongside a long legacy of destruction, but all of that, great and terrible as it may be, are just the aftereffects. The real power of the Ring of Fire comes from what happens not before our eyes, but beneath our feet.

## Under the Surface

It&apos;s at this moment on our journey that we&apos;re going to take off our usual geography hat for a moment, and put on our geology hat to discuss the mechanism that makes the Ring of Fire work. That is to say, it&apos;s time to talk about plate tectonics.

We&apos;re just going to discuss the entry-level today, but rest assured that there&apos;s plenty more information out there for anybody who&apos;d like to learn more. Basically, the world&apos;s crust, the outer shell of solid rock that we all live on, isn&apos;t a single piece of rock at all. Instead, it&apos;s broken into a bunch of separate pieces—not with any gaps on the surface that we can see, at least most of the time, but way below the actual ground under our feet. These pieces are called tectonic plates—tectonic, meaning related to the structure of the Earth&apos;s crust. Those tectonic plates are really, really big, even the tiny ones, and they move, albeit at a pace that we fast-living humans would call mind-numbingly slow. We&apos;re talking about a centimeter and a half, or about 0.6 inches, per year, which, according to the US&apos; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, is roughly the same growth rate as human toenails.

But even that very, very slow movement is enough to cause major destruction. To put it into perspective, consider the difference between, say, a car crash, and a train crash. While a car crash can absolutely be very bad, the car&apos;s own mass, its own momentum, and its own inertia—the force that keeps moving objects in motion—are typically the only things driving that car forward into whatever it&apos;s running into. Compare that to, say, a fifty-car freight train. If the lead engine hits something, not only is it hitting with way more mass than a car, but it&apos;s also got to deal with all of the combined momentum and inertia of the other forty-nine railcars behind it. Now, scale up again, from a train car, to an entire continent-size tectonic plate, and when that plate moves up against resistance, even at exceptionally slow speeds, the amount of force involved is on the scale of entire continents. And just like a pair of American football players, mashing their helmets together as they both try to grind forward, when one of them gives way, all that pent-up force is going to come charging in the opposite direction.

In the case of tectonic plates, the point where two plates interact is known as a fault line, and there are three basic ways that plates can interact: they can move away from each other, they can move toward each other, and they can move past each other. Moving away from each other really isn&apos;t the worst thing in the world; this is how things like rift valleys form, as the land literally pulls apart from itself at a rate so slow that there&apos;s no real way for human eyes to tell where one plate ends and another begins. Moving toward each other is a bigger problem; sometimes, this results in a situation where both plates smash against each other, creating features like mountain ranges as the plates&apos; leading edges literally pile up against each other. The rest of the time, this direct collision results in a process called subduction, where one plate gets pushed underneath the other and moves down toward Earth&apos;s molten mantle, while the other gets pushed up a bit or stays basically level. Both kinds of direct collision result in intense earthquake and volcanic activity, while subduction zones can also produce deep trenches. Finally, there&apos;s a so-called strike-slip fault, where two plates are moving past each other. If that sounds less violent, then think again, because for tectonic plates, this process is less like sliding two sheets of paper against each other, and more like putting two serrated bread knives against each other, blade on blade, and pulling away in opposite directions. There are so many irregularities along the edges of either tectonic plate, that they&apos;re bound to get snagged up on each other—creating tension, and then releasing it very quickly.

But even this doesn&apos;t tell the full story, because in the case of the Ring of Fire, it&apos;s not just one plate that&apos;s responsible for the whole region&apos;s upheaval. In fact, if the Ring of Fire traced the outline of one single tectonic plate, then there would have to be some very, very particular factors at play to cause such widespread geological activity all around the Pacific rim. After all, the plate in question would have to be moving one way or another, meaning that if it was pushing against the American supercontinent, by example, then it would be drifting away from East Asia and Oceania, making destructive events like volcanic eruptions and earthquakes less common in that region while making them more common in the Americas.

Instead, the Pacific Ocean is fractured into several tectonic plates, each pushing and pulling against a range of plates underneath the continents on either side. A total of five plates interact with the coasts of the American supercontinent, and although this may get confusing, we&apos;ll run through each of them here. The Antarctic Plate, near southern Chile, and the Nazca Plate, off most of the South American coast, strain against the South American Plate, with those plates pushing against each other directly. The Caribbean Plate and the Cocos Plate push against each other under the Central American isthmus, while the Juan de Fuca plate pushes against the North American Plate in the territory that forms the Cascadia region—which, as we mentioned before, is incredibly geologically active, from northern California in the USA to southern British Columbia, Canada. Meanwhile, the Pacific plate moves sideways against the North American plate in southern California and northern Mexico. The Pacific plate also pushes directly against the part of the North American plate that, despite its name, hosts Russia&apos;s Kamchatka peninsula and the Aleutian Islands. The North Atlantic plate, the Pacific plate, and the Filipino plate all strain against each other off the coast of Japan, while the Filipino plate, the Pacific plate, and the Australian plate all cause chaos in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Finally, the Pacific plate and the Australian plate wreak even more havoc across Oceania and New Zealand, pushing against each other directly and causing immense destruction in the process.

In terms of the actual tectonic processes involved in those areas, the Pacific rim itself is made up largely of subduction and collision zones—that is, the places where plates smash up against each other directly. The subduction zones generally feature deep undersea trenches, in addition to earthquakes and volcanoes. By example, the Peru-Chile trench, hitting a maximum depth of eight kilometers or 26,500 feet below sea level, is formed by the oceanic Nazca plate subducting beneath the South American continent. The Ryukyu trench, between Taiwan and southern Japan, hits a maximum depth of seven and a half kilometers, 24,500 feet, because of the oceanic Philippine Plate being subducted underneath the plate that holds most of continental Eurasia. Way out at sea, the Philippine plate&apos;s interactions with the Pacific plate even produce the Mariana trench, where the maximum known depth is roughly eleven kilometers under the surface of the ocean, or 36,000 feet under. Strike-slip fault lines are much less common than subduction or collision zones along the Ring of Fire, but they do happen; by example, the San Andreas fault runs along most of the coastline of California, where the Pacific plate and the North American plate move parallel to each other and often grind against each other&apos;s outermost edges.

With that rather massive dump of information, come two key takeaways. First, the Ring of Fire isn&apos;t one tectonic fault line; it&apos;s quite a lot of fault lines and shifting plates, that just so happen to be pushing outward against the continents on either side of the Pacific. The fact that those plates are arranged in such a way to create a sort of nearly-contiguous, bendy-horseshoe shape, where highly active subduction, collision, and strike-slip faults run almost the entire perimeter, is kind of a coincidence. And the second takeaway is that it&apos;s not a fully connected loop either. It has gaps, it has places where different sorts of fault lines run up against each other, and it&apos;s even quiet in some parts, where active subduction zones exist but don&apos;t produce many tremors at all. Not only that, but there&apos;s also a lot of volcanic activity within the circumference of the Ring of Fire that doesn&apos;t actually have anything to do with the Ring itself. By example, the volcanic activity of the Hawaiian islands is pretty much unrelated, and so are most of the powerful volcanoes and earthquakes of Antarctica.

And with that more complex reality, we also get to do a little bit of mythbusting: the quakes and eruptions that happen around the Ring of Fire aren&apos;t typically interconnected. Plenty of major geological events happen around the rough outline of the Pacific Ocean each year, and some of them happen at almost exactly the same time. That, rather fairly, has led to a lot of misconceptions about how, let&apos;s say, a major earthquake in Indonesia and a major quake in California could be connected. After all, they happen along that same big, scary *ring of fire*, and earthquakes in one location *can* set off more minor quakes in locations along the same fault line. But in reality, the fault lines that govern each earthquake are just about as disconnected from each other as they could possibly be—and, obviously, same for volcanoes. And sure, it&apos;s technically possible that seismic activity on one side of the Pacific could trigger seismic activity on the other side, but an event that large would probably require the Earth&apos;s entire crust to rip open—which, all things considered, doesn&apos;t seem terribly likely.

So, is the so-called Ring of Fire even real? Well…actually, no, not really! It&apos;s an effective shorthand to describe a geographic belt around the Pacific, where some geologically spicy action tends to occur, but the mechanisms that drive that seismic unrest in one area are pretty much unrelated to all the other areas. But then again…it&apos;s still *kind of* a thing, because although the plate tectonics involved don&apos;t create one single, continuous fault line, they *do* create an extremely active Pacific Rim where you can, in practice, trace a nearly continuous line of extreme seismic activity. In fact, roughly ninety percent of all global earthquakes happen along these fault lines, and they&apos;re where most of the world&apos;s active volcanoes can be found.

And while the earthquakes coming from one Ring of Fire fault line won&apos;t cause earthquakes in a far-off, second fault line, the destruction in one location can still have major repercussions elsewhere. It&apos;s here that we come to the Ring of Fire&apos;s other nasty surprise: the tsunami. These are gigantic ocean waves, caused when large-scale geological activity in one part of the ocean displaces a massive amount of water that then travels away from the epicenter of the earthquake or volcanic eruption, like ripples traveling outward from the center of a pool. While these ripples are typically quite fast-moving and hardly noticeable when they&apos;re out at sea, they become a much, much bigger problem when they approach land. As the ocean gets shallower and shallower, with the same amount of excess water still rushing toward land, these giant ripples build up into giant waves, sweeping inland with devastating effect. These walls of water can travel far onto dry land, and just like the ripples in the pool that we mentioned, there isn&apos;t just one. In a major tsunami event, coastlines will be battered by tsunami wave after tsunami wave, and quite often, the first wave that hits won&apos;t even be the biggest.

And in the Ring of Fire, that&apos;s a huge problem. Taken together, the combined coastlines of all the nations on the Pacific Rim, plus all the coastlines of all the island landmasses near the coasts or out on the open ocean, run for hundreds of thousands of miles. When a big enough seismic event takes place, anywhere along the Ring of Fire, and the conditions are right to cause a tsunami, that means that those hundreds of thousands of miles of coastline are *all* at risk of being impacted. If Chile logs a seaside earthquake that measures a 9.0 on the Richter scale, Japan&apos;s not going to have an earthquake because of it…but the people of Japan are going to want to move to higher ground, with little way to tell just how massive an incoming tsunami might ultimately be until the moment that it arrives. The Ring of Fire may not be real, geologically speaking, but when the seismic activity that happens along nearly the entire outline of the Pacific Rim has its effects spread across an entire shared ocean…we&apos;ll put it to you this way. Just because the Ring of Fire is mostly just a literary device, doesn&apos;t mean it&apos;s not a good one.

## A Land of Incredible Cataclysm

Now, we&apos;ve spoken about the Ring of Fire in broad terms, and delved into its complex subterranean mechanics. But what we haven&apos;t done, at least not yet, is to explore what it means to live along these unstable and often violent stretches of the Pacific Rim. But for better or for worse, people have had a front-row seat to the Ring of Fire for the better part of human history, and many of the largest and worst seismic events of the region have been extensively documented.

And when it comes to a tour of the real-life, historical dark side of the Ring of Fire, we&apos;re best off starting big, with the most powerful volcanic eruption ever to take place in recorded history. The volcano in question? Mount Tambora, today part of Indonesia, but in the year 1815, claimed as part of the Dutch East Indies. At the time of its eruption, Tambora had been dormant for centuries, but after a few years of gas emissions and minor temblors, it blew all at once. The sound was so loud that it was recorded on islands over a thousand kilometers away, ash would fall as far away as Borneo, and as many as 150 cubic kilometers of ash, pumice, and toxic fumes—thirty-six cubic miles—were expelled into the air over the course of a several-day eruption.

About ten thousand people would die directly because of the volcanic eruption, alongside tens of thousands of others who would die of disease and starvation because of the havoc wrought across the region. Mount Tambora would lose over 1,400 meters of its elevation, a full third of its pre-eruption height, and in exchange it would gain a gargantuan crater. Fine ash particles floating through the atmosphere led to brilliant sunsets as far away as London, put into the stratosphere by a column of ash that may have risen as high as forty-five kilometers or 148,000 feet above the surface of the Earth. But Mount Tambora&apos;s most severe effect was its role in creating the Year Without a Summer. Mount Tambora set off a global cooling effect, causing famines across Europe and Asia, sending temperatures into a dip around the world, and creating consecutive deep-freeze winters in the United States. Tambora&apos;s aftereffects would kick off a wave of American westward migration across the Ohio River, lead to a typhus outbreak across the British Isles, and even create the conditions in which Mary Shelley wrote the novel *Frankenstein* during a miserably cold summer.

But although Tambora would be the greatest global eruption in recorded history, it wouldn&apos;t gain nearly the reputation of an eruption nearly seven decades later, an order of magnitude smaller, but one that took place just as word of its destructive power could be spread rapidly by telegram lines across the globe. The volcano to go off this time would be Krakatoa, also of modern-day Indonesia and the historical Dutch East Indies. Krakatoa had been fuming for months before its grand explosion, but on August the twenty-sixth, 1883, it roared to life with devastating effect. Over the course of its long eruption, it would produce the loudest sound ever recorded in modern history, heard in Australia and even on the island of Mauritius, some 4,500 kilometers, 2,800 miles away. A pressure wave from the blast would travel around the globe three full times before it dissipated, and the ash plume from the eruption would rise eighty kilometers, fifty miles, into the sky.

On the ground, Krakatoa let loose a gargantuan pyroclastic flow, a washing mix of blocks of hot lava, volcanic ash, red-hot pumice rock, and toxic fumes charging across the ground at speeds of about eighty kilometers an hour, fifty miles an hour. The flows burned incredibly hot inside, consuming parts of the nearby islands of Java and Sumatra. The tsunamis from Krakatoa were even worse; the Indonesian province of Banten would log a wave of over forty meters, or 130 feet high, and the tsunamis caused by Krakatoa would kill some thirty-four thousand people in total, nearly all the deaths attributable to the eruption. In the years since, the Krakatoa crater has seen a new volcanic cone grow up from the ground, called Anak Krakatoa, or, the Child of Krakatoa. In 2018, Anak Krakatoa would produce one of the 21st century&apos;s most devastating volcanic eruptions, producing tsunami waves over 80 meters, 260 feet high on nearby islands, although far fewer people were killed than had been in 1883. The lessons learned by the scientific community in the wake of Krakatoa would pave the way for the modern study of volcanology.

Moving across the Pacific Ocean from Indonesia, we find ourselves in San Francisco, California, on the American West Coast, in the year 1906. In April of that year, entirely without warning, the California coast&apos;s slip-strike fault line ruptured in a magnitude-7.9 quake centered almost exactly in the city of San Francisco. While the quake wasn&apos;t accompanied by a tsunami, the quake itself did more than enough; over three thousand people died in the quake, and more than eighty percent of the city was reduced to rubble, leaving well over half of the population homeless. The fires sweeping across the city were even worse, leveling most of what the earthquake itself had left behind. Some of those fires had been caused by firefighters improperly using dynamite to create gaps in the flammable material on the ground; another fire, which quite famously consumed city hall, was started by a local resident trying to make ham and eggs for breakfast. Prior to the quake, San Francisco had been on track to become the US West Coast&apos;s most dominant major metropolis, but with San Francisco set back many years by what had happened, that population, industry, and trading potential migrated to Los Angeles. In the scientific community, the massive ruptures observed across nearly 300 miles, 475 kilometers, of the San Andreas fault would force scientists to rethink what they thought they knew about how earthquakes happened, and form the theories that still guide modern thinking to this day.

Then, we come to Japan, in the year 1923, when the Great Kanto Earthquake, magnitude 7.9, devastated Japan&apos;s central Kanto plain where the modern city of Tokyo stands today. The earthquake, and the resulting fire, would kill well over 140,000 people, a substantial portion of whom went missing and could never be found. Firestorms swept across Tokyo for two days, and thirty-eight thousand people who&apos;d attempted to take shelter at a single downtown location near the Sumida River were killed by a single, massive fire whirl. The incident was made worse by the winds of a nearby typhoon, and a resulting tsunami with ten-meter, thirty-three-foot waves devastated the nearby Izu Islands. Making this apocalyptic situation somehow even worse, rumors spread in the aftermath of the quake that ethnic Koreans were taking advantage of the disaster to loot and burn Tokyo. The true number of Koreans killed, or people mistaken to be Koreans, is unknown, but it&apos;s estimated to have run into the thousands, with most killed by angry mobs. The process of reconstruction after the quake, and the massive task of rebuilding Tokyo, would send Japan directly into its imperial rise, kicking off a cycle of expansion of Japanese society that would only truly end when a pair of atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

From Japan, it&apos;s on to the big one, the most powerful earthquake ever recorded across all of human history. The quake in question went down in 1960, with an epicenter near to the town of Lumaco, Chile, south of the Chilean capital of Santiago. The earthquake hit a magnitude of roughly 9.5, an incredibly powerful tremor that was preceded by several foreshocks above magnitude 7.0. On the 22nd of May, 1960, the Valdivia earthquake hit, so named for the port city of Valdivia, where nearly half the city&apos;s homes were leveled and hundreds of people were killed. A powerful tsunami spread outward across the Pacific Ocean, killing dozens of people in Hilo, Hawaii, over a hundred more in Japan, and impacting as far north as the Aleutian Islands and as far westward as Indonesia and Vietnam. While the earthquake was devastating for the region of Chile where it happened, the quake&apos;s location was also a stroke of luck; if a major earthquake was going to happen anywhere along the Pacific Rim in 1960, better that it happened in southern Chile where infrastructure was limited and the number of lives destroyed was in the tens of thousands. Transpose an earthquake of that size onto Tokyo, onto Los Angeles, onto Manila or Seattle or Quito, and the death toll could have been far, far worse. The fault lines around Valdivia let loose another devastating earthquake in 2010, magnitude 8.8, killing another 525 people and tying two other historical earthquakes as the sixth-strongest ever recorded.

Just a few years later, an earthquake of almost the same intensity would cause chaos on almost the opposite tip of the American supercontinent. On March 27, 1964, south-central Alaska near Anchorage sustained a magnitude-9.2 earthquake, the most powerful ever recorded in North America. According to seismic analysis, the earthquake released 500 years of built-up tectonic strain, causing the ground itself to move up to sixty feet, along a continuous fault of 600 miles or nearly a thousand kilometers. The quake would cause a sea tsunami of up to 220 feet, 67 meters, in an inlet called Shoup Bay, with the tsunami rippling all the way down to California and Hawaii. Landslides into inland bodies of water, like lakes and rivers, would cause their own tsunamis, devastating the landscape nearby. A total of 131 people would die as the result of the quake, most of them in Alaska, although several died in Oregon and California due to tsunami waves. During the quake and the subsequent devastation, one broadcast journalist, Genie Chance, would perform a continuous broadcast of over 24 hours, trying to keep the public informed, coordinate a response, reunite families, and more, while the remote Alaskan city waited desperately for relief.

In Guatemala, the general public wasn&apos;t nearly so lucky, when in 1976, the small Central American country was struck by its own catastrophe. At just a depth of five kilometers, 3.1 miles, below the surface of the Earth, along a continuous rupturing fault line of 240 kilometers or just under 150 miles, Guatemala was rocked in February of that year by a magnitude 7.5 quake. Although it was of significantly lower magnitude than either the Alaskan or the Chilean quakes of the previous decade, the death toll was far higher, in a clear example of just how destructive such earthquakes can be when they hit densely populated, unprepared areas. Although most homes in Guatemala at this time were built low to the ground, they were also made of adobe, a material that caused them to collapse very quickly once the quake began. It struck in the early hours of the morning, when most people were in their beds, and over 23,000 people would be killed, alongside 76,000 more injured, with most of the deceased already gone by the time the sun rose that morning. Over 1.2 million people were left homeless by the quake.

Four years later, it was the continental United States&apos; turn to be visited again by the geological gods, in a 1980 volcanic eruption that we&apos;d guess a fair portion of our readers have identified before we even say its name: Mount St. Helens. Not only was it a major Ring of Fire volcanic incident, but it was the first volcanic eruption in the lower forty-eight US states since a quite minor eruption in 1915. For two months prior to when Mount St. Helens blew, the volcano rattled and vented hot steam as its slopes twisted and fractured to deal with the magma below the surface. On Sunday, May the eighteenth, 1980, the entire thing blew. First, the mountain&apos;s entire north face basically slid off, in the largest sub-aerial landslide in recorded history. Then, a mix of lava, gas, and rock exploded forth from the side of the mountain, launching ash 24 kilometers, 15 miles into the air, from which point it would eventually fall in eleven US states and across much of Canada. Mudslides caused by melting glaciers on the volcano face rushed for fifty miles into the Columbia River. Fifty-seven people died in the blast and the aftermath, although luckily, over 300 loggers who might have been working on and around the mountain ended up not being present on the day of the eruption.

And if the eruption of Mount St. Helens in 1980 was bad, then the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines was far worse. Although Pinatubo&apos;s eruption lasted for months in total, the peak of that eruption came over a few days in mid-June, with several successive ash columns launched into the atmosphere during the worst of it. The highest of those ash clouds would rise 40 kilometers, or 25 miles, into the sky. Although it&apos;s impossible to say for sure, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo may have been triggered by a magnitude 7.7 earthquake a year earlier, after which time steam started venting from the volcano and earthquakes became more and more frequent. During the peak days of the eruption, Mount Pinatubo itself collapsed into a caldera, much like Mount St. Helens had done, and pyroclastic surges traveled for up to ten miles, sixteen kilometers, before layering the landscape in ash and pumice. At least sixteen commercial aircraft would be damaged by the ash cloud while in flight, and in all, the eruption released thermal energy equivalent to 70 megatons of TNT, significantly more than Mount St. Helens. It was the second-worst volcanic eruption of the 20th century, surpassed only by the eruption of Novarupta, a remote Alaskan volcano, which luckily didn&apos;t claim any lives when it erupted in 1912. The victims of Mount Pinatubo weren&apos;t so lucky; 847 people were killed, mostly by roof collapses, although the death toll almost certainly would have been higher if not for an innovative and far-reaching eruption preparedness campaign in the preceding few months.

The portion of the Ring of Fire that stretches through East Asia had yet more tragedies to dole out over the coming decades. 2004 was a year of incredible tragedy, even compared to the Ring of Fire&apos;s usual, almost entirely because of an earthquake that took place on December 26 of that year just off the coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. This earthquake was incredibly powerful, measuring somewhere between magnitude 9.1 and 9.3. Not only was it among the very largest ever recorded, but it was found to have caused the entirety of planet Earth to vibrate back and forth as much as a centimeter&apos;s distance and changed the Earth&apos;s rotation. In the 2004 quake, a full 1,000 miles, 1,600 kilometers, of fault line slipped a distance of fifteen meters or fifty feet, in an absolutely massive rupture that caused the seafloor itself to rise by several meters.

And with that change in the seafloor, came water displacement on a scale humans have only very rarely had to experience. The resulting tsunami would reach as far as Chile to the south and the Arctic circle to the north, but the real devastation would come all across the Indian Ocean, where the worst of the wave had spread. In Indonesia, 167,000 people or more were estimated to have died, swept away by tsunamis that reached as high as 30 meters, 98 feet tall in some places. Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India also saw coastal areas devastated, and the Maldives were, for a while, assessed to be in danger of being swallowed completely by the sea—although luckily this didn&apos;t happen. Even Somalia, 5,000 kilometers from the epicenter of the quake, reported hundreds of fatalities. In all, the quake and the resulting tsunami are believed to have killed nearly 228,000 people, displacing nearly two million more.

And finally, there&apos;s the quake that ravaged Japan in the year 2011, the Tohoku earthquake and the resulting tsunami. Even if many of our readers might not be old enough to remember the other earthquakes we&apos;ve discussed today as they happened, we&apos;d imagine that most are old enough to remember this one. It was a magnitude 9.1 earthquake, the strongest ever recorded in Japan&apos;s history, and the fourth-largest recorded of all time. It shifted entire portions of Japan&apos;s landmass multiple meters toward the Americas, caused a shift of the Earth&apos;s axis by between ten and twenty-five centimeters, sped up the Earth&apos;s rotation, and caused a tsunami that would crest, in some areas, an estimated forty meters high or more. Nearly twenty thousand people would die in the quake, thousands more would go missing, and hundreds of thousands would remain displaced several years later.

If all that wasn&apos;t bad enough, the tsunami would crash over sea walls and cause explosions at a nuclear power plant, Fukushima Dai-ichi, prompting a nuclear meltdown at the plant that spiked radiation levels inside the facility to one thousand times the average. Radioactive material would spill out into the ocean, would later be found in tap water, and would be found in contaminated soil across Fukushima Prefecture. While the incident wasn&apos;t quite as bad as the Chernobyl meltdown of the 1980s, it was the worst nuclear incident of the 21st century thus far—knock on wood. The cleanup, between the earthquake, the tsunami, and the nuclear meltdown, would take several years, and the Fukushima plant&apos;s radioactive water only started to be disposed of in 2021, a full decade after the quake occurred.

## The Next Big Ones

With so much undeniable potential for destruction, it&apos;s only natural to get to this point and ask what&apos;s next for the Ring of Fire. Certainly, while we don&apos;t have the sorts of omniscient powers that would allow us to predict precise seismic events, we *can* state with reasonable certainty that the Ring of Fire is not done with its devastation. This is a region exactly as it&apos;s been: awash in fault lines, subduction zones, colliding tectonic plates, active volcanoes, and a whole lot of water to create some truly massive waves. The tectonic activity at play within the Ring of Fire will not slow down for a very, very long time, and until it does, these sorts of events are bound to keep on occurring.

But there&apos;s also another side to that same coin: that while these disasters are bound to happen, it&apos;s not clear when they&apos;ll take place, or which parts of the Pacific rim they&apos;ll tear apart next. And, to be clear, the Ring of Fire is not always producing mega-disasters like it&apos;s done in its worst moments. In 2023, a year that saw many tens of thousands die in an earthquake in Turkey and thousands of others killed in quakes in Morocco and Afghanistan, the most deadly Ring of Fire earthquake happened in the Ecuadorian coastal province of Guayas; death toll, eleven. Although it logged well over a dozen earthquakes at or above magnitude 7.0, very few of those earthquakes caused deaths or major damage. But, because we know how popular-science writing works, we&apos;re going to ask the question before you all do it in the comments: Is the Ring of Fire overdue for something major?

Well…no, and moreover, that&apos;s not how anything works. While a given part of the world can track its historical earthquake record, or a given volcano can have its past eruptions written down chronologically, and while scientists and laypersons around the world *can* take rough averages and say things like, &quot;Los Angeles is way overdue for the Big One!&quot;, the reality is very different. Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions don&apos;t follow a schedule, and the subterranean points at which snagging tectonic plates result in a massive release of tension are entirely unpredictable using our current technology. Humans can calculate how likely an earthquake is to happen, in a certain place, in, let&apos;s say, a given year, but *even if those estimates are relatively decent*, they&apos;re just a matter of taking averages from past data, in ways that tell us nothing about what&apos;s actually happening beneath our feet. Now, whether you take comfort in that reality or find reasons to be fearful is up to you, but rest assured that any news article or social media headline you see saying that a certain place is overdue—and yes, we do mean *every headline*—is BS. Allegedly.

As far as what the 2020s will look like across the Ring of Fire, you guessed it, we can&apos;t predict a thing. The most devastating Ring of Fire event in this decade so far came on New Years&apos; Day 2024 on Japan&apos;s Noto peninsula. There, a magnitude 7.5 earthquake ripped across the landscape, killing 241 people in total, and displacing well over ten thousand. The resulting tsunami was, luckily, quite minor in most places, damaging seawalls, destroying a few homes, and killing at least one person, but largely avoiding the sorts of carnage that prior Ring of Fire tsunamis have caused. But what we don&apos;t know is whether this relative lack of destructive potential will be remembered as part of a generally quieter decade across the Pacific Rim, or simply a footnote in advance of a record-breaking earthquake that could happen tomorrow.

And regardless of when they happen, the massive earthquakes, the catastrophic volcanic eruptions, the terrifying tsunamis, all *will* happen sooner or later. Indonesia, Alaska, Chile, Japan—all these places are going to continue to have major seismic events. Los Angeles *will* get the next Big One someday; the only question is whether any of us will still be alive to see it, or whether it&apos;ll be our grandchildren or their grandchildren who do. Major tsunamis *will* cross the Pacific, time and time again, but trying to predict where they come from, or where they hit hardest, will be roughly as successful as trying to predict which exact day out of the next century will be the rainiest. When quakes and eruptions do happen, they&apos;ll continue to occasionally smash through records that have already been set; after all, the scales we use to measure earthquakes might have only picked up a 9.5 at worst, but *they don&apos;t stop at ten*. A whole lot of crazy tectonic action is possible that recorded history simply hasn&apos;t included yet. And lest you think that no volcanic eruptions across the Pacific Rim could possibly be greater than that of, say, Mount Tambora in 1815, think again. The United States, Mexico, Chile, Japan, Russia, Indonesia, and New Zealand all have known supervolcanoes around the Ring of Fire that modern humans have not yet seen erupt—and many of them *will* erupt again. Trying to predict when that will happen, using current technology and our current understanding of seismology, is simply not worth the effort.

One thing we can predict with at least some confidence, though, is the *faraway* future of the Ring of Fire—and specifically, how it, like all things on Earth, will eventually end. As we mentioned previously, the Ring of Fire&apos;s seismic activities are brought on by a whole range of multidirectional tectonic forces, but if there&apos;s one broader trend among those forces that&apos;s generally a decent indicator of the big picture, it&apos;s that the Eurasian supercontinent and the American supercontinent are on a collision course. Now, we&apos;ve got to specify, this is a very, very slow collision course—again, we&apos;re talking about movement that happens roughly as fast as the growth of a human toenail. And we&apos;ve also got to specify that this is just one theory, even if all the trend lines seem to point in a consistent direction. But if the theory is correct, it&apos;ll lead to the formation of a new supercontinent, one that got its name from a geologist named Christopher Scotese in the 1980s. That name? Pangaea Proxima.

It&apos;s hard to say…anything, really, about Pangaea Proxima with any level of confidence, but by this time, the world will look very different than what it looks like now. Parts of some continents will have folded onto other parts of the same continent, or gotten joined with other continents in places currently unexpected. New mountain ranges will spring up to incredible heights, Siberia will move toward the equator, Alaska will collide with Mexico&apos;s Baja California, Antarctica will break in two, and the Mediterranean will cease to exist. But the most important takeaway, for the future of the Ring of Fire itself, is that the process of closing the Pacific Ocean and joining America to Eurasia…won&apos;t actually happen. Instead, the trajectories of those continents are expected to switch around, over a hundred million years from now, with the Atlantic eventually being swallowed up, and the Pacific, thus widening to become a new global ocean. And, because people who study this sort of thing are way ahead of the rest of us, that ocean already has a name: the Neopanthalassan, which, according to geologists in the know, will take up much of the Earth&apos;s surface. So, while the tectonic plates that make up today&apos;s Ring of Fire will have most likely disappeared long before that future ultimately comes to pass, the shores of the Pacific Rim may well become the shores of a new global supercontinent…not that any of us will be around to find out.

If that&apos;s all a bit heady to end on, well, fair enough. But if there&apos;s one key takeaway in all this, it&apos;s that the Ring of Fire—even though it may not be quite the cohesive superstructure it&apos;s made out to be—is still very much a real thing, in the lives of the hundreds of millions of people who live all around the Pacific Rim. It is a land of fire and fury, a land of incredible tectonic power, and, at times, incredible devastation to go with it. It&apos;s when we look at phenomena like the Ring of Fire that we tiny humans realize just how small we really are…beholden to the power of a planet that goes far beyond anything our tiny, little mammal brains can comprehend.

## Key Takeaways

- The Ring of Fire is a 40,000-kilometer region around the Pacific Ocean known for frequent earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.
- This region is not a continuous ring but a bendy horseshoe shaped by multiple tectonic plates.
- The Ring of Fire includes subduction and collision zones, which cause intense seismic and volcanic activity.
- Historical events like the 1960 Valdivia earthquake and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami highlight the region&apos;s destructive potential.
- Future seismic events are inevitable, but predicting their timing and location remains challenging.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Pacific Ring of Fire?

The Pacific Ring of Fire is a region around the Pacific Ocean where a large number of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions occur. It stretches from the southern tip of New Zealand, through the South Pacific, across Indonesia, Japan, and Russia, and down the American supercontinent. About 90% of the world&apos;s earthquakes and most of the world&apos;s active volcanoes are located here.

### Why is the Pacific Ring of Fire so geologically active?

The Pacific Ring of Fire is geologically active due to the movement of tectonic plates. These plates interact in various ways, including moving away from each other, moving toward each other, and moving past each other. The interactions, particularly subduction zones where one plate is pushed under another, cause intense earthquake and volcanic activity.

### What are some of the most active volcanic regions within the Ring of Fire?

Some of the most active volcanic regions within the Ring of Fire include Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and the Aleutian Islands in Alaska. Indonesia, for example, has over 150 volcanoes, with more than two dozen considered active. Japan accounts for about 10% of the world&apos;s active volcanoes.

### What is the significance of the 1960 Valdivia earthquake in Chile?

The 1960 Valdivia earthquake in Chile was the most powerful earthquake ever recorded, with a magnitude of approximately 9.5. It caused significant destruction in Chile and generated a powerful tsunami that affected coastlines as far away as Japan and the Aleutian Islands.

### What was the impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami?

The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, triggered by a magnitude 9.1-9.3 earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, was one of the deadliest natural disasters in recorded history. It caused a massive tsunami that killed nearly 228,000 people across several countries, including Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India.

### What are some of the historical volcanic eruptions that have occurred within the Ring of Fire?

Some of the historical volcanic eruptions within the Ring of Fire include the 1815 eruption of Mount Tambora in Indonesia, which caused global cooling and the Year Without a Summer, and the 1883 eruption of Krakatoa, which produced the loudest sound ever recorded and a massive tsunami. More recent eruptions include the 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens in the United States and the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines.

### What is the future of the Pacific Ring of Fire?

The future of the Pacific Ring of Fire includes continued seismic activity due to the ongoing movement of tectonic plates. While it is difficult to predict specific events, it is expected that major earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis will continue to occur. Over a much longer timescale, the Pacific Ocean is expected to close, and a new supercontinent, Pangaea Proxima, may form.

### How do tsunamis form and why are they a significant threat in the Ring of Fire?

Tsunamis form when large-scale geological activity, such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, displaces a massive amount of water. As this water travels toward land, it builds into giant waves that can sweep inland with devastating effect. The Ring of Fire is particularly vulnerable to tsunamis due to its extensive coastline and frequent seismic activity.

### What is the role of plate tectonics in the formation of the Ring of Fire?

Plate tectonics play a crucial role in the formation of the Ring of Fire. The movement of tectonic plates, which interact through subduction, collision, and strike-slip faults, creates the intense seismic and volcanic activity characteristic of the region. The Pacific Ocean is fractured into several tectonic plates, each pushing and pulling against the continents on either side.

### What are some of the most devastating earthquakes that have occurred within the Ring of Fire?

Some of the most devastating earthquakes within the Ring of Fire include the 1960 Valdivia earthquake in Chile, the 1964 Alaska earthquake, the 1976 Guatemala earthquake, the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, and the 2011 Tohoku earthquake in Japan. These earthquakes caused significant loss of life and property damage, as well as generating powerful tsunamis.

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## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pakistan&apos;s Brick Kilns: Millions Trapped in Slavery</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/pakistan-brick-kilns-millions-trapped-slavery</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/pakistan-brick-kilns-millions-trapped-slavery</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Travel the Grand Trunk Road from Lahore to Islamabad, and count the chimneys—one every few kilometers, tall brick towers regularly pumping thick, dark smoke into Punjab&apos;s already polluted skies. These mark more than just sites of environmental issues, though—each one marks a place where Pakistani law largely doesn&apos;t apply.

Beneath each chimney, the scene repeats with truly industrial precision: families hunched over brick-shaped molds, packing wet clay into them over and over, from dawn to dusk. And when we say families, we mean it—children barely tall enough to see over the brick stacks work alongside their parents and grandparents whose backs are permanently bent from decades of this labor. Children as young as five years old are documented to be working nearly full-time in these conditions, spending hours wading through mud pits to mix clay with their bare hands and feet.

This is where over an estimated 3.2 million people are enslaved in debt bondage that Pakistan officially abolished in 1992—yet you wouldn&apos;t know it from the practices here. Families arrive needing a few hundred dollars to cover emergencies like medical expenses. They sign contracts with thumbprints—most can&apos;t read what they&apos;re agreeing to, if anything written is shown to them at all—and discover all too late that the terms make escape mathematically impossible. Over a million of these workers are children, inheriting debts their parents signed before they were even born.

This is the story of how Pakistan&apos;s brick industry transformed emergency loans into generational debt slavery—and why nobody with power has put a stop to it.

## The Peshgi System

These kilns occupy the peripheral zones of Pakistan&apos;s major cities for shrewd reasons. Transportation costs demand proximity to urban construction markets, and the Indus River&apos;s clay-rich plains provide raw materials on the one hand. On the other hand, being on the outskirts keeps them removed from the daily life of the city, putting them just far enough away that law enforcement are able to turn a blind eye towards what&apos;s going on here, ensuring that Pakistani labor law exists more as a theoretical framework rather than a strictly enforced reality. Half of Pakistan&apos;s kilns cluster in Punjab province, transforming the edges of Lahore, Faisalabad, and Kasur into carefully managed zones where the state&apos;s authority ends and the kiln&apos;s owners begin.

The system that traps millions today dates back to the early 20th century, and wasn&apos;t unique to the country—debt peonage was relatively common, and neighbors including India also saw this same dynamic. But what happened after 1947 belongs entirely to Pakistan: the chaos of mass migration during the partition created enormous reconstruction needs, with millions of refugees requiring shelter. The country&apos;s elites seized the opportunity to expand the kilns rapidly, and they&apos;ve maintained control over them ever since.

That expansion created the infrastructure, but the system&apos;s persistence depends on something more basic: desperate families who need cash and have nowhere else to turn. Forty-one-year-old Faisal spent 25 years learning how this trap operates from the inside, looking out. His story began in Rawalpindi with a simple fact that defines millions of Pakistani lives: his father couldn&apos;t find a job, and they needed the money to keep a roof over their head. In his own words, &quot;There is no other way for people like us to get money.&quot; Another kiln worker in the same report went on record as saying that &quot;Once you ask for a loan, you become a debtor forever.&quot;

Receiving the first loan—through a system Pakistanis call *peshgi*, or advance payment—felt like the answer to all of their problems, or at least it did at first. Cash in hand to meet immediate needs in exchange for work that required no education or connections, just strong muscle and work ethic. The deal is struck with a handshake or occasionally a thumbprint as a form of signature—used in lieu of a written one as illiteracy is widespread here. The vast majority of bonded laborers either never sign anything or have no idea what they are signing themselves up for, they just accept the owner&apos;s word that they&apos;ll work until the debt is repaid.

The advances—typically between 50,000 and 250,000 rupees, between roughly $160 and $900, occasionally ranging into a few thousand dollars—seems manageable at first, but the maths of *peshgi* ensure that escape becomes nearly impossible. Owners keep the ledgers that workers never see, and frequently add charges for coal, water, broken bricks, tools, or anything else they can think of to keep the balance growing rather than falling.

This moment of realization came later, when Faisal returned to the kiln owner to request a second advance. &quot;I didn&apos;t realize I was not a free person until I asked for a second loan from the owner,&quot; he recalls. Once you ask for a loan, you become a debtor forever.

Sharif Masih&apos;s daily reality in Faisalabad is another case study in and of itself. This forty-two-year-old worker, born into kiln debt and fully expecting to die in it, provides a window into the impossible maths that perpetuate this system across generations. Four years ago, Sharif was sold to another brick kiln owner without consultation, just uprooted and expected to move. The most financially significant thing he brought with him was the debt.

At his current kiln, Sharif&apos;s family of six produces roughly 1,000 bricks every two days, earning them 1,200 rupees—but the owner immediately claims half for debt repayment, leaving precious little to feed six mouths.

The seasonal nature of this system makes it even harder to escape from. Pakistan has extremely volatile seasons, and the monsoons make the outdoor production process next to impossible. The kilns grind to a halt and shut down for weeks at a time. Sharif and nearly everyone else in his position have zero income during these periods, and thus have to borrow even more from the kiln owner just to survive. He openly admits that he has no idea how much debt there is left to pay off.

Some workers attempt to escape through measures that only deepen the tragedy—workers have begun to sell kidneys in an attempt to clear their debt, only to find themselves still trapped in what really must be described as slavery and has transformed Pakistan into what critics refer to as a &quot;kidney bazaar&quot; where organs become currency in the economy of desperation. The fact that such desperate measures persist more than three decades after officially abolishing such a system reveals how completely the legal framework designed to end bondage has failed to penetrate the reality of the kilns.

## Political Protection and Legal Failure

Understanding why this system persists requires examining not just the economics of debt, but also the political architecture that protects it. The technological evolution of kilns over the past decade reveals how the system has truly industrialized this exploitation while simultaneously demonstrating where Pakistan&apos;s government can enforce change when it chooses to—and where it chooses not to. Between 2017 and 2020, over 7,000 kilns in Punjab converted from their traditional approach to what&apos;s called &quot;zigzag,&quot; as part of an environmental mandate to combat smog. While this change does offer substantial improvement in terms of reducing emissions by up to 60 percent, activists are concerned that this has essentially disincentivized the state from cracking down on the kilns. When they were burning bricks the old-fashioned way, it was a hazard to everyone—now, it&apos;s easier to turn a blind eye.

The contrast between environmental enforcement and labor enforcement for lower-class workers exposes the true dynamics at play. When smog from traditional kilns has negative impacts on Pakistan&apos;s urban elites—closing schools in Lahore, grounding flights, creating public health crises for the society writ large—the state suddenly found the resources and motivation to mobilize: mandatory technology upgrades, providing loans for conversions, conducting inspections to ensure compliance. Yet that same state apparatus remains seemingly absent when the victims are bonded laborers whose suffering is largely out of sight and out of mind.

The unity that kiln owners have achieved in defending their interests stems directly from their integration into the country&apos;s political class. A 2009 investigative report documents what labor activists have known for decades—that influential politicians and their relatives are well connected with the kiln owners, and in many cases actually own kilns themselves.

Fifteen years later in 2024, little had changed when a report from the UK&apos;s All-Party Parliamentary Group for Pakistani Minorities noted that &quot;too many kiln owners are power brokers and some even hold political office,&quot; which helps explain why laws remain unimplemented. This transforms what should be straightforward law enforcement into a system where the criminals write and enforce the laws, where police who should raid kilns instead collect bribes to ignore violations, where the district officials tasked with freeing bonded laborers are themselves connected to the families profiting from bondage.

This integration manifests operationally through the Brick Kilns Owners&apos; Association of Pakistan, formally recognized by the government as a trade organization in 2021. The infrastructure of impunity operates through well-documented channels: police corruption that allows violations to continue unchecked, political connections between owners and local officials that shield operators from prosecution, and the systematic failure of enforcement mechanisms despite comprehensive laws that exist on paper.

Given this political protection, the legal framework&apos;s failure to end the bondage system becomes less mysterious. Pakistan officially abolished bonded labor in 1992 through the Bonded Labor System Abolition Act, and Punjab province has since declared child labor in kilns to be illegal. Islamabad even ratified international conventions against forced labor—creating a legal framework that should have ended this system over three decades ago. The law mandated District Vigilance Committees in each district to identify and free bonded laborers, empowers magistrates to cancel debts, and even to punish offenders. There are even provisions to help freed families rebuild their lives. On paper, the tools are there.

And that&apos;s largely where they remain—tucked away in a government filing cabinet, worth little more than the paper that they&apos;re printed on. Most of Punjab&apos;s 41 district committees never inspect kilns and never take action against the owners. When international pressure demands visible actions—and that has occurred from the US and EU on a few occasions—the response is usually the same: training, task force assemblies, and a couple show raids that free a few dozen workers for international observers before operations resume unchanged.

This transcends corruption in the traditional sense—it represents the complete fusion of economic exploitation and state power, where enforcing laws against bonded labor would require those in charge to prosecute themselves and dismantle the machine that finances their elite status. The debt slavery that begins with *peshgi* advances can never be escaped when the political system protects the creditors and the legal system provides cover for both. Understanding this helps explain why millions remain trapped here—and why the next generation of Pakistanis inherit not just their parents&apos; debts but their parents&apos; jobs.

## Life at the Kilns

The brick-making process itself transforms human beings into components of an industrial machine, each stage of production demanding contributions from every family member regardless of age or physical capability. The work begins before sunrise when families arrive at the clay pit, where men dig the raw material out of the ground while women and children begin the mixing process, treading through wet clay for hours to achieve the right consistency. Once mixed, the clay moves to the molding area where families work as units in a repetitive motion that defines their entire day: pack the clay into wooden molds, scrape off the excess, flip the mold to release the brick, stack it to dry, and repeat—a thousand times between sunrise and sunset to meet the daily quota that determines whether they can eat.

The formed bricks must then be turned and moved multiple times over several days as they dry, exposed to sun that can push temperatures well above 40 degrees Celsius in the summer, the heat reflecting off clay surfaces, creating an environment that keeps workers constantly on the edge of heat stroke.

When the bricks are ready for firing, men and teenage boys load them into kilns that burn coal at temperatures between 1,000 and 1,200 degrees Celsius for 24 to 48 hours, creating furnaces that require constant attention to maintain such enormous heat. After firing, these same workers unload the finished bricks while they&apos;re still hot enough to blister skin—letting them cool all the way would simply take too much time. They&apos;re stacked for transport to construction sites across Pakistan.

The physical environment of the kilns creates hazards that manifest as lifelong disabilities for those who survive long enough to develop them. We&apos;re not being dramatic when we say that—this is not a career for the faint of heart, and accidents are all too common. The health impacts accumulate into an entire catalog of otherwise preventable suffering as the human body begins to break down under labor that it was never designed to sustain.

The most initially obvious damage comes from the sheer physical demands of the job: lifting thousands of bricks daily—each weighing approximately three kilos, which add up quickly—causes chronic back and joint pain that becomes universal by middle age. Hernias and spinal injuries are common enough to be unremarkable among workers who carry stacks of eight to ten bricks on their heads and backs repeatedly throughout fourteen-hour days. The constant bending only exacerbates all of this.

And that&apos;s only one side of it. Asthma, chronic bronchitis, tuberculosis, and other forms of lung infections are ubiquitous in this line of work, and nearly everyone exhibits some form of symptoms. Skin problems run rampant where people work in either water or mud for hours every day, developing fungal infections that spread easily through families living in close quarters. For those spared from the water side of things, prolonged exposure to coal and waste fuels causes rashes and inevitable burns that go untreated because medical care requires money these families will never have.

The intense sun exposure during the drying process causes heat stroke regularly in the summer months, and vision problems that compound over years from the reflection off of the clay. Some surveys around the kilns have found that about one in twenty families have children who have lost their eyesight completely.

Women suffer unique health burdens that layer additional suffering onto the baseline degradation that all kiln workers experience. This work is brutal enough for someone in peak physical fitness—but working through pregnancies is the expectation here, with little to no prenatal care. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the rate of miscarriages is astronomical here.

The living conditions that workers return to after their twelve-plus hour day offer little comfort. Most kiln workers live in structures that are often made of either mud or rejected bricks from their work, typically only one or two rooms where nearly three quarters of workers sleep and cook in the same space, often with little to no electricity. These shelters frequently &quot;feature&quot; leaky roofs that provide minimal protection from winter cold or summer heat, with temperatures ranging well outside what people are supposed to live in throughout the year.

The density of these living arrangements transforms basic sanitation deficits into genuine danger. Roughly 80 percent of kiln workers in surveyed sites lack running water at home entirely; without water infrastructure, most also lack toilets, forcing families to relieve themselves in open areas around their shelters and relying instead on hand pumps that draw from groundwater or nearby sources in settlements where inadequate sanitation creates high contamination risk, the unsafe water cycling waterborne diseases through communities already weakened by malnutrition and exhaustion.

When illness or injury inevitably strikes these workers weakened by constant exposure to hazards, medical care remains functionally out of reach. Since they&apos;re not registered employees, workers have no health insurance—the vast majority lack any coverage at all. The kiln owner may at best provide a small loan for medicine or send them to a cheap doctor, adding the medical costs to their debt burden. More often though, workers simply continue laboring through illnesses, using traditional remedies or no treatment at all, because seeking proper medical care means both the cost of treatment as well as the loss of income from missed work—expenses that families living on the edge like this simply cannot afford.

Amna Bhatti is another case study, having lived this experience for fifty years—she started making bricks when she was ten, and still making them at sixty for 350 rupees a day to service a debt that will outlive her. She&apos;s now paying off a different debt entirely, but it functions the same way—she had paid off portions of her original loan over the decades, only to take new advances when crises struck, when illness demanded medicine or funerals required payments, each loan resetting the clock. Half a century of shaping mud over 12-hour stretches, day in and day out, with little to show for it. She expects to die in this kiln, and if her children remain here, they&apos;ll inherit what she couldn&apos;t pay, passing the debt like a family curse to the next generation.

This baseline of suffering represents what all kiln workers endure regardless of age, gender, or background. But within this universally harsh system, certain groups face additional layers of exploitation that transform this system into something even more brutal, where the vulnerabilities of childhood, religious minority status, and womanhood become opportunities for owners to extract labor, dignity, safety, and hope itself in measures that exceed even the baseline cruelty.

## The Vulnerable

Qaiser Dad wakes before sunrise, as he has every morning for the last year, his eleven-year-old body already knowing the weight of the day ahead. The wooden trolley he&apos;ll use to collect mud mixture sits where he left it the night before, and by the time the sun crests the horizon, he&apos;ll already be knee-deep in clay, mixing it with his bare feet alongside the dozens of other children his age who used to dream of something more than extensions of the machinery that turns earth into bricks.

&quot;I liked waking up early for school, but not for this,&quot; he told *Al Jazeera*, pointing to his trolley that has replaced a backpack as his constant companion since his father fell ill and the family&apos;s survival fell onto his narrow shoulders. His dream of becoming a doctor—a dream that once seemed possible when he sat in a classroom learning to read—has been replaced by this, a routine so exhausting that by eight in the evening when his work finally draws to a close, he can barely summon the energy to eat before collapsing into bed. There&apos;s no time left to play with friends or energy for making childhood memories here.

The scale of what&apos;s happening to children like Qaiser across Pakistan is hard to wrap the mind around: between one and two million children are currently working in brick kilns. The fact that the best estimates vary by a million is a story in and of itself—and this is only in the brick kilns. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan estimates over three million children are engaged in child labor across all industries. The youngest documented workers are five years old, mixing mud with their tiny feet at kilns from Lahore&apos;s Sundar area to Sindh&apos;s Tando Hyder, while seven-year-olds carry heavy stacks of bricks on their heads, their spines already beginning to curve under the load.

The work that these children do follows a brutal hierarchy determined by age and physical capability, a system that treats human development as nothing more than a progression towards greater labor capacity. Children as young as five or six begin by mixing clay with their bare feet, treading through the mud for hours as it clings to their skin. They fetch water in containers nearly as large as themselves, turn bricks in the sun to ensure even drying, and learn through repetition and exhaustion that this process will come to define their lives—all because of a debt contract &quot;signed&quot; before they were even born.

The digging and mixing of clay, often performed by the youngest children who tread the mud with their feet for hours, leaves their skin cracked and infected, the minerals in the clay eating away at flesh that hasn&apos;t had time to toughen. Once enough has been gathered, they help their parents and other relatives with the molding process that involves flipping and moving thousands of bricks under the sun for days as they dry.

Yet childhood represents only one dimension of vulnerability that kiln owners have learned to exploit. In Punjab&apos;s kilns, another pattern reveals itself through the staggering overrepresentation of religious minorities—Christians comprise less than 2 percent of Punjab&apos;s population, and an even smaller share of Pakistan&apos;s population overall. Yet they form somewhere an estimated 60 percent of the kiln workforce. Most of Punjab&apos;s Christians descend from Dalit communities who converted to Christianity in the late nineteenth century hoping to escape caste stigma, only to find that Pakistan largely rebranded their exclusion rather than ending it. Government job advertisements until recently explicitly reserved sanitation positions for &quot;non-Muslims,&quot; which overwhelmingly in this area means Christians and Hindus would be funneled into work nobody else wants.

The mechanics of how this translates into kiln slavery are straightforward enough once you understand that Christians in Punjab are systematically land-poor, concentrated in informal settlements around Lahore, Faisalabad, Kasur, and Sheikhupura—the same cities where kilns have colonized the periphery—and locked into jobs that pay too little to ever accumulate property or savings. When crisis strikes, they often have little more than the shirts on their back.

This industry has existed long enough that many people know these contracts are a one-way deal: once you sign up, you don&apos;t come back from them. Nobody happily goes to these owners for a loan—it&apos;s only out of sheer desperation. The kiln owners recruit through these marginalized communities that sit literally adjacent to the kiln sites, ensuring that the religious composition reproduces itself without owners ever needing to explicitly target them—though they frequently admit they prefer minority workers precisely because marginalized people make complaints less often and organize resistance less effectively.

The vulnerability of these minority workers reached its horrific apex in 2014 when Shama and Shahzad, a Christian bonded couple at a Punjab kiln, were falsely accused of blasphemy and murdered by a mob—who threw them inside the kiln alive and watched them burn to death. They had reportedly wanted to leave the kiln after clearing their debt, but the owner allegedly instigated the mob using blasphemy rumors to prevent them from departing without paying an inflated debt. While some arrests were later made, the message to other Christian workers was unmistakable: even when you&apos;ve fulfilled your obligations, even when you&apos;ve paid what you owe, the combination of religious vulnerability and owner control can turn the threat of freedom into a death sentence.

In Sindh province, the pattern repeats with Hindu workers, particularly those from the so-called &quot;untouchable&quot; communities who&apos;ve performed labor like this since before Pakistan&apos;s independence. Districts like Umerkot, Tharparkar, and Sanghar—which hold Sindh&apos;s largest Hindu populations—supply steady streams of families to the kilns, rooted in generations of landlessness and generational poverty that funnels countless into the same traps as the Christians.

Comprising a similarly tiny percentage of Pakistan&apos;s population—clocking in at under 2 percent—Hindus remain politically invisible, their suffering documented in reports yet ignored widely by enforcement mechanisms.

Yet the pattern of preying on the vulnerable extends beyond religious minorities to include other groups with little protection: Afghan refugees who&apos;ve worked in the country&apos;s kilns for decades, thousands of families who fled war—some dating back to the original Soviet invasion—only to find themselves trapped in another hellscape. A 2006 survey documented thousands of Afghan brick kiln workers in Punjab province alone, often involving their children as well. Despite being born in Pakistan and never having seen Afghanistan, they lack Pakistani citizenship and are essentially stuck in a legal limbo that kiln owners understand how to exploit.

What happened earlier this year exposes something fundamental about what Pakistan&apos;s government chooses to enforce and what it chooses to ignore. Starting in April, authorities launched mass deportations of Afghans, with Lahore police leading the charge and going door-to-door. Reports vary in terms of the total number of those deported, but it is almost certainly in the tens of thousands—many of whom were kiln workers.

This shows conclusively that when properly motivated, the government can mobilize police to track down and carry out raids against such operations. Let it not be forgotten that despite its fledgling economy, this is a nuclear-armed country—they are not helpless to enforce their laws. Immigration violations are receiving increasing crackdowns, but labor violations that trap millions of Pakistani citizens are placed on a back-burner, so to speak.

## Conclusion

Amna Bhatti, sixty years old and still making bricks after fifty years for 350 rupees per day, expects to die servicing a debt that will outlive her. &quot;We are poor, and we will always stay poor,&quot; she says. &quot;When you enter this road, the only way out is death.&quot;

The cruelest twist to all of this is that the system that traps Amna and so many others has officially been illegal for over thirty years. Pakistan abolished bonded labor in 1992, banned child labor in kilns, and ratified international conventions against forced labor—yet the laws exist primarily as documents filed away in government offices that kiln owners never read and police never enforce. The reason is simple: the people who profit from bondage are the same people tasked with ending it, creating a system where enforcement would require the powerful to prosecute themselves.

What does it mean that in 2025, in a nuclear-armed nation with aspiration to regional leadership, that well over a million people can be bought and worked to death for the price of a medical emergency, their children inheriting debts left over?

The resistance exists—labor rights organizations have freed tens of thousands through decades of dangerous work, court petitions occasionally succeed, international pressure even sporadically produces action—yet 3.5 million people remain trapped in hereditary slavery in a world where people routinely ask how historical slavery was ever allowed to happen, how entire societies could have tolerated such barbarity, and why more people didn&apos;t stand up to it.

The answer, of course, is that most people never owned slaves themselves—many may have even found the institution distasteful—but they allowed it to continue because speaking up required sacrifice while looking away cost nothing, because it&apos;s remarkably easy to benefit from others&apos; suffering when it happens out of sight.

Right now, millions of people are making bricks across thousands of kilns on the edges of Pakistan&apos;s major cities, and precious few are paying attention—both domestically and internationally. Not because the information is hidden—these kilns operate in plain sight, their chimneys visible across the skyline, and they have been widely reported on in international media.

History will ask how this was allowed to continue when everyone knew it was happening, and the answer will be the same as it&apos;s always been: because looking away was easier.

## Key Takeaways

- Pakistan&apos;s brick kilns enslave over 3.2 million people in debt bondage, despite its abolition in 1992.,Children as young as five work in hazardous conditions, mixing clay and carrying bricks, inheriting debts from their parents.,The peshgi system traps families in generational debt, with owners manipulating ledgers to make escape impossible.,Political connections and corruption shield kiln owners from enforcement, allowing the system to persist.,Religious minorities and vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected, facing additional exploitation and danger.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### How many people are estimated to be trapped in debt bondage in Pakistan&apos;s brick kilns?

Over an estimated 3.2 million people are enslaved in debt bondage in Pakistan&apos;s brick kilns.

### What is the &apos;peshgi&apos; system?

The &apos;peshgi&apos; system is a debt bondage system where families receive an advance payment (peshgi) in exchange for labor, trapping them in a cycle of debt that is nearly impossible to escape.

### How do families end up in debt bondage in Pakistan&apos;s brick kilns?

Families often end up in debt bondage after taking emergency loans to cover expenses like medical bills. They sign contracts with thumbprints, agreeing to work off the debt, but the terms make escape mathematically impossible.

### What are the living conditions like for workers in Pakistan&apos;s brick kilns?

Workers in Pakistan&apos;s brick kilns live in structures made of mud or rejected bricks, often with one or two rooms where they sleep and cook. These shelters frequently have leaky roofs and lack running water and toilets, leading to high contamination risk and waterborne diseases.

### What health issues do workers in Pakistan&apos;s brick kilns face?

Workers face a range of health issues including chronic back and joint pain, hernias, spinal injuries, asthma, chronic bronchitis, tuberculosis, skin problems, heat stroke, and vision problems. Women also suffer from high rates of miscarriages due to working through pregnancies.

### How does the political system in Pakistan protect the brick kiln owners?

The political system in Pakistan protects brick kiln owners through police corruption, political connections between owners and local officials, and the systematic failure of enforcement mechanisms. Many kiln owners are influential politicians or have relatives in politics.

### What is the role of religious minorities in Pakistan&apos;s brick kiln industry?

Religious minorities, particularly Christians and Hindus, are overrepresented in Pakistan&apos;s brick kiln workforce. They often come from land-poor communities and are targeted by kiln owners due to their vulnerability and lack of political protection.

### How does the government&apos;s enforcement of environmental regulations compare to its enforcement of labor laws?

The government enforces environmental regulations more strictly, as seen in the mandatory technology upgrades for kilns to combat smog. However, labor laws are largely ignored, with little to no enforcement against bonded labor practices.

### What is the impact of the seasonal nature of the brick kiln work on workers?

The seasonal nature of the work makes it even harder to escape from debt bondage. During the monsoons, kilns shut down for weeks, leaving workers with no income and forcing them to borrow more from the kiln owner just to survive.

### How does the debt bondage system affect children in Pakistan&apos;s brick kilns?

Children as young as five years old work in the kilns, inheriting debts their parents signed before they were born. They face harsh working conditions, health issues, and are often trapped in a cycle of debt that they cannot escape.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Pakistan&apos;s Brick Kilns: Millions Trapped in Slavery](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wj_fh3c9MHE)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e7/Lahore_Skyline.png) by Ktownboy103 / openverse, cc0.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pitcairn Island: The Devastating Price of Paradise</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/pitcairn-island-devastating-price-paradise</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/pitcairn-island-devastating-price-paradise</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>More than two centuries ago, a small group of seafarers braved the South Pacific. Some were looking for a new home, others sought to escape the wrath of a powerful Empire. All of them expected to find Eden on Earth — and eventually found one!

It was a spent volcano rising from the azure waters of the vast ocean, apparently impervious to approach, but ultimately fit to welcome their small community. It was their home, their paradise, and it would remain so for generations of their descendants, all bearing the surnames of those initial settlers: the legendary mutineers of HMS Bounty!

But even the most luminous of Promised Lands is not free from shadows. Life in Paradise does not come for free, and someone has to pay the price.

This is the story of Pitcairn Island.

## The Smallest Political Entity in the World

Let&apos;s start with some basic geographical facts. The Pitcairn Islands are an archipelago located in the central South Pacific, roughly halfway between New Zealand and Chile. The closest island is Mangareva, French Polynesia, about 482 km to the north-west.

The archipelago includes four islands:

- Oeno and Ducie, tiny atolls, both uninhabited,
- Henderson, a raised coral island, at the centre of a World Heritage Site, also uninhabited.
- And Pitcairn itself, a rugged volcano island covering an area of only 5 square km, and rising 347 m above sea-level. This is the only inhabited island, hosting a population of 35, mostly concentrated in the capital city of Adamstown.

As described by Pitcairn&apos;s official immigration website:

&gt; &apos;The majority of Pitcairn Islanders are descended from the nine mutineers of His Majesty&apos;s Armed Vessel Bounty who, led by Fletcher Christian, landed on uninhabited Pitcairn Island in 1790 with six Polynesian men, twelve Polynesian women, and an infant girl. These European and Polynesian roots can be clearly seen in the faces and customs of the people of Pitcairn today.
&gt;
&gt; Into this mix have come other settlers, whether from other Pacific islands, Australasia, America or Europe, continuing a tradition dating from the island&apos;s earliest history of attracting migrants from other nations and creating a community rich and diverse in its cultural heritage.&apos;

From an administrative point of view, the Pitcairn Islands are a British Overseas Territory, the last in the South Pacific. In practice, Pitkerners pretty much rule themselves, through a 10-strong Island Council who appoint a Mayor for day-to-day administration.

The Council works in cooperation with a Commissioner based in Auckland, New Zealand, in charge of ensuring supplies and issuing stamps, a much-craved commodity by collectors worldwide.

As per the central British Government it handles instead matters of Defence, Foreign Affairs — and criminal law, as we shall see later.

All in all, Pitcairn can be defined as a &apos;quasi-state polity&apos;, and due to its minuscule population it is the smallest political entity in the world.

And the small population, alongside isolation, its location and climate, may have contributed to this archipelago becoming a tropical paradise on Earth, home to flora and fauna seldom observed elsewhere — if at all!

An ornithological expedition in 1991 and 1992 discovered 10 new species of birds, as well 80 plants which are native to the archipelago. And in 2012, a team led by Alan M. Friedlander, National Geographic Society, conducted an ecological assessment of the marine environment of the Pitcairn Islands, finding 51 new species of algae, 23 of corals, and 15 of fish!

Their findings highlighted

&gt; &apos;The uniqueness and high biodiversity value of the Pitcairn Islands as one of the least impacted in the Pacific, and suggest the need for immediate protection&apos;

In September 2016, in fact, the waters of Pitcairn became one of the world&apos;s largest marine protected areas, covering a surface of 832,000 square km — which is about two Californias!

## A Bountiful Mutiny

The history of Pitcairn is inextricably linked to that of HMS Bounty and its mutiny. But the island had been first inhabited some six centuries earlier …

The first settlers on Pitcairn island were Polynesian peoples, daring seafarers and explorers of the Pacific Ocean. The first parties landed some time in the 11th Century A.D., occupying Pitcairn, nearby Henderson and Mangareva, a larger island some 540 km to the northwest.

This Polynesian society thrived for some three centuries, as attested by the presence of votive statues, burial sites, ovens, tools and carvings representing human and animal figures. According to the Auckland Museum, the Pitcairn settlers depended heavily on trade with their Mangareva friends for sustenance.

In turn, the Mangareva inhabitants relied on the local natural resources. Perhaps a tad too much, as the island suffered intensive deforestation. As resources dwindled, in the 14th Century A.D. the Mangarevans engaged in a civil war, which disrupted trade routes with Pitcairn and Henderson. Cut off from their main supply lines, the societies on Pitcairn and Henderson eventually fell extinct.

Pitcairn and its neighbours remained uninhabited for centuries. For sure, they were completely devoid of human presence in 1606, when they were spotted by Portuguese explorer Pedro Fernandes de Queirós. The sailor recorded the existence of the islands, but did not settle them.

More than one century later, on July 17, 1767, British Royal Navy vessel &apos;HMS Swallow&apos; sailed into the area, claiming the re-discovery of today&apos;s destination. Captain Philip Carteret recorded in his log:

&gt; &apos;It is so high that we saw it at a distance of more than fifteen leagues, and it having been discovered by a young gentleman, son to Major Pitcairn of the marines, we called it Pitcairn&apos;s Island&apos;

The young gentleman was midshipman Robert Pitcairn, by the way, and was just 15 at the time. Three years later, he received a promotion on board an East India Company vessel, but the poor lad disappeared during a storm in the Indian Ocean.

But back to Carteret. After spotting the island, his crew attempted a landing, but the high cliffs and violent surf prevented them from making an approach. Carteret&apos;s report sparked the interest of none other than Captain James Cook. The famous explorer searched for Pitcairn, but an outbreak of scurvy prevented him from reaching his destination.

It was the age of sail and Empires, however. It was only a matter of years before some Brit showed up, took a look, and said &quot;Yeah, I like this patch of land!&quot;. Normally, said Brit would do so in the name of the Crown and/or some mammoth trading corporation.

But in the case of Pitcairn, a group of desperate, mutinous sailors, would claim the island as a home for themselves — and themselves only.

HMS Bounty had left England in October 1787, under the leadership of acting-Captain William Bligh, and his deputy, acting-Lieutenant Fletcher Christian. Their mission: collecting breadfruit plants from Tahiti, and taking them to the West Indies. There was nothing bellicose about this Deliveroo-style mission, but Captain Bligh had good reason to enforce a military-like discipline on his crew, due to the length of the journey, and the ever present risks of malnutrition, alcohol consumption and disease outbreaks.

After an exhausting, one-year long trip, the crew landed in Tahiti on October 26, 1788. During the ensuing months, Bligh&apos;s men proceeded to acquire and store hundreds of breadfruit trees, all the while making an important discovery: Tahiti was — and is — awesome! A veritable garden of Eden, blessed with delicious food, covered in luscious vegetation and inhabited by friendly locals. Some of the sailors in particular became very, very friendly with the local ladies: at least 18 of them had to seek treatment for venereal diseases. Among them was Lieutenant Christian, who formed a stable relationship with a Polynesian woman called Mauatua.

The pleasures of Tahiti led to a gradual decline in discipline, which Bligh suppressed with harshness. By early April 1789 it was time to leave, and the Bounty set sail towards the West Indies. But Fletcher Christian and 24 other sailors were not thrilled at the idea of leaving their slice of heaven behind …

On April 28th, Christian staged the notorious mutiny, arresting Captain Bligh and 18 sailors who were not part of the plot. The 19 men were forced to drift away on a small boat with scant provisions, but Bligh was an excellent navigator, and was able to sail the tiny launch to safety.

As per Christian and his rebels, they returned to Tahiti, where they split into two factions. Sixteen of them wished to stay on the island, but Christian and other eight men feared the inevitable arrival of a British punitive expedition.

If they wished to remain free, they had to board HMS Bounty once again and sail off in search of their very own new paradise. And so they did, accompanied by 19 Tahitians, of which 12 women, six men and an infant girl.

After exploring the Cooks and Fiji islands, Fletcher Christian had an inspiration: how about settling on that small, remote island once sighted by some teenager serving with Captain Carteret?

And so, on January 15, 1790, Christian&apos;s sailing party reached Pitcairn, and were delighted to find it empty and fertile. They set anchor in what is today Bounty Bay, and then unloaded its cargo of pigs, chickens and sweet potatoes, hauling it up an incredibly steep slope, aptly named Hill of Difficulty. Finally, to eliminate any sightable trace of their presence, they set the Bounty on fire.

The small community set to work to build their new homeland, under the leadership of Fletcher Christian. According to all reports, the former Lieutenant was

&gt; &apos;Mild, generous and sincere&apos;

And well-educated, too, as he had been a schoolmate of poet William Wordsworth! Under his direction, the Pitcairn community built the village which would later become Adamstown, and started to thrive. But for heaven to flourish on such a small, isolated speck of land, somebody had to pay the price: in this case, the outnumbered and outgunned Tahitian men, treated almost as slaves by the nine mutineers.

A small but violent revolt eventually broke out in 1793, which ended in the deaths of the six Tahitian men and five mutineers, including Fletcher Christian. During this period, two of the Tahitian women also died, but the causes are not recorded. If we were to consider Pitcairn as an independent country at this stage, we may consider this as the most lethal civil war in history, as it killed off 73% of the male population!

Christian&apos;s mantle as leader of the community was picked up by former Midshipman Edward Young, now in charge of a community which included three further mutineers, ten women, and up to 23 babies and toddlers. Because of course, the islanders had kept themselves busy … The oldest of those children was Thursday October Christian, by the way, son of Fletcher, and the first baby to be born on Pitcairn!

Pitcairn remained casualty-free for about five years, until mutineer McCoy made a life-changing discovery: the roots of the local &apos;ti plant&apos;, or *Cordyline terminalis* could be brewed into a potent liquor! McCoy enjoyed the brew so much that he eventually fell off a cliff while intoxicated, and drowned!

It was now down to three survivors of the Bounty: Young, John Adams, and Matthew Quintal. One day, the latter attacked the other two following a dispute, and was thus killed in self-defence. Then it was time for Edward Young to go, lost to a bout of asthma in 1800.

## Children of Heaven

Now John Adams was the only man in a community of ten women and 23 children. And while not as educated as his predecessors, he proved to be a competent and fair administrator of island life. Adams laid out plans to rationalise the future Adamstown, styling it after an English village, but with Polynesian architectural elements. Likewise, clothing, implements and cuisine evolved in a peculiar Pitcairn style, mingling Tahitian and British influences.

In 1808, the Pitcairn community was discovered by Mayhew Folger, captain of an American sealing ship. His report, however, was ignored by Britain, preoccupied with a little nuisance called Napoleon Bonaparte.

In September 1814, two Royal Navy vessels stumbled upon Pitcairn by total chance. According to the Official Website of the Government of the Pitcairn Islands:

&gt; &apos;The astonished British commanders were charmed by the physique, simplicity and piety of the islanders. Favourably impressed by Adams and the example he set, they agreed it would be &quot;an act of great cruelty and inhumanity&quot; to arrest him&apos;

From then on, Pitcairn became a regular stop for British vessels sailing the South Pacific, a connection to the wider world which greatly benefitted the locals. Every moored ship presented an opportunity to barter food in exchange of tools, clothes, even weapons and Bibles. One day in 1823, a ship dropped something more than just goods, it was two more inhabitants: John Buffett and John Evans, who settled in pretty well. They both had families with local women, and Buffett took on the roles of schoolteacher and pastor.

By now, population had risen to 66, and Adams was concerned about deforestation and dwindling local resources. The land had paid its toll, and Adams&apos; flock was at serious risk of starvation. That&apos;s why the ageing &apos;Father&apos; of Pitcairn filed a request with the colonial authorities in London, asking for his community to be relocated to Australia.

As he awaited a reply, in 1828 he welcomed a new addition to the island: George Nobbs, missionary and veteran of the British and Chilean Navies, who took over from Buffett as teacher and vicar.

Then, on March 5, 1829, John Adams died at the age of 62. The reply he had been waiting for from London arrived only two years later, when the Pitcairn Islanders — by now 77 in total — were offered to relocate. Not to Australia, but to Tahiti.

The descendants of the Bounty mutineers and of the Tahitian women were given a warm welcome in March 1831, but the heavenly island of their ancestors proved lethal. Years of isolation had made the Pitkerners vulnerable to infectious diseases: in the span of two months, 12 of them died, including Thursday October Christian.

The Tahitians were sympathetic to their plight, and immediately sought solutions to repatriate the 65 remaining Pitkerners. American whaling captain William Driver offered to take them back home, but he demanded a charge of $500, that&apos;s $18,000 in 2024 value. The Tahitians stepped in once again, helping their guests in raising the necessary funds: by September 1831, they had all returned to Pitcairn Island.

This misadventure was followed by a period of lawlessness, as the locals indulged too much in drinking. Missionary George Nobbs attempted to establish his authority as leader, but was not accepted as such by the population. In October 1832, a British Government envoy, Joshua Hill, landed on the island, with the appointment of President of the &apos;Commonwealth&apos; of Pitcairn.

Hill soon abolished the distilling of liquor and re-established order, but in doing so imposed a set of draconian punishments for the smallest of infractions. Nobbs attempted to contest his rule, but he was expelled from Pitcairn, alongside other opposers. Essentially, Hill had established his own mini-dictatorship on the island!

Dissent grew, until in 1838 a scandal erupted: it appeared that Joshua Hill had no official appointment from London, and was little more than a conman! The islanders removed him from Pitcairn, and recalled Nobbs as pastor, schoolmaster, and overall leader.

The bad experience with Hill led the islanders to a conclusion: they needed protection. And for the sake of protection, they were willing to forego their independence and join the British Empire.

In November 1838, Pitcairn leaders enlisted help from Captain Eliott of HMS Fly to draw up their constitution. This body included some pretty advanced concepts, never seen before in British legislation. For example, the island was to be ruled by a Chief Magistrate, to be elected annually

&gt; &apos;By the free votes of every native born on the island, male or female, who shall have attained the age of eighteen years&apos;

For context, universal suffrage for voters aged 18 and above, was introduced in the UK only in 1969.

The new constitution was signed into effect on November 30, 1838, thus formally incorporating Pitcairn into the British Empire.

By 1856, the colony had largely expanded to 194 islanders, and resources became again a concern. A new relocation was organised, this time to an uninhabited island, to avoid a repeat of the Tahitian experience. The choice fell on Norfolk Island, almost 6,300 km to the West of Pitcairn.

Thus, George Nobbs led the entirety of Pitcairn&apos;s population to their new home, which most found to their liking. As a former penal colony, Norfolk enjoyed a decent level of infrastructure, arable land and herds of domestic animals.

But it was not Pitcairn.

Five families, amongst them the Christians and the Youngs, suffered the pangs of nostalgia, and by 1864 had returned to their ancestral seat at Adamstown. The population had now dwindled to 43, and suffered a period of intense isolation. In the previous decades, Pitcairn had been frequently visited by whaling ships, up to 40 a year, which presented an opportunity to exchange goods and, you know, see some new faces once in a while! But the heyday of whaling in the South Pacific was now gone, and Pitkerners were lucky if they could sight a dozen ships a year!

These vessels included the occasional Royal Navy ship, whose reports helped keep alive the legend of the descendants of the Bounty amongst Victorian society. The children of Pitcairn were depicted almost as angel-like, uncorrupted by the civilised world, whilst living according to the pious teachings of the Church of England.

Their peculiar way of life also attracted the attention of Seventh Day Adventist missionaries, who saw an opportunity to spread their teaching to the South Pacific.

The first contact took place in 1876, when missionaries James White and John Loughborough sent a box of Adventist literature to Pitcairn, which left a deep impression. This book delivery was followed by the visit of Adventist layman John I. Tay, who spent five weeks on the island in October and November 1886.

Most locals had been converted, and an enthusiastic Tay returned home to California, to organise a second expedition. The General Conference of the Adventist church funded the building of a brand new ship, the &apos;Pitcairn&apos;, which reached its namesake island on November 25, 1890. This was another success, with 82 Adventist baptisms being recorded. From then on, the Adventist church continued its mission across the South Pacific, while one of its ministers, Edward Harmon Gates stayed on Pitcairn to found a school dedicated to the study of history, grammar, and the Bible.

According to Senior Pastor Alexander S. Currie, writing for the periodical &apos;Spectrum&apos;, the introduction of Adventism had a positive influence on the small island community, providing a moral structure and a sense of purpose to daily life.

But reports of naval officers in the late 19th century spoke of social deterioration, lawlessness, and even cited one case of murder in 1897. According to the Official Website of the Government of the Pitcairn Islands, order was restored through the initiative of James Russell McCoy, great-grandson of the mutineer who had, well, drunk himself to death:

&gt; &apos;McCoy had spent some time both in London and Liverpool and, autocrat though he was also, in a real sense, a link between the old Pitcairn and the new. By the turn of the century he had restored purpose to the community by enforcing the recently revived laws of public work; and his personal courage and example, which won him respect if not popularity, secured improvement until he began to spend much of his time overseas on missionary work.&apos;

On August 15, 1914 the Panama canal was officially opened, and all ships sailing through the waterway and on to New Zealand would make a stop at Pitcairn. Isolation was a thing of the past now, and islanders would welcome at least one ship a week. This was a boon for the economy, but more and more young men became attracted by the wider world: seeking passage on the visiting ships, they relocated to New Zealand or Australia.

The island was not vacated for a third time, however, and those who remained seemed to enjoy themselves! H.L. Shapiro, Assistant Curator of Physical Anthropology, American Museum visited Pitcairn in 1928, writing an idyllic account. Men and women enjoyed total equality when it came to voting and owning property, education was compulsory until the age of 16, and all inhabitants contributed to a communal fund for food. Moreover:

&gt; &apos;The social life of the islanders is very hearty and informal. Moonlight picnics, garden parties, and other gatherings of a social nature are always hilarious. A strong love of music is common, and one of the most generally attended organisations is the choral society.&apos;

In 1956, the island was visited by another scholar, EN Ferdon, writing for journal Geographical Review. Also his assessment of Pitcairn and its inhabitants was glowing:

&gt; &apos;if Pitcairn homes reflect a disinterest in general comfort and spick-and-span shelter, the people themselves demonstrate the fundamental character of the town. This is, like the islander himself, clear and simple: the Lord has provided all the necessary material goods of life, and the most important thing left is to get along with one another. No doors have locks, and no one is ever turned away [. . .] For us Pitcairn Island was a succession of lovely pictures, and it was made more delightful by what are probably the friendliest people in the world.&apos;

## Serpents in Paradise

Those &apos;friendliest people&apos;, however, had been hiding certain dark habits from the outer world.

As reported by William Prochnau and Laura Parker, writing for Vanity Fair, it appears that British colonial authorities had known about the &apos;moral degeneracy&apos; of Pitkerners since the 1920s, but had failed to act.

Magistrates on Pitcairn filed complaints in 1921 and 1938, their main concern being the support of the numerous illegitimate children. As no help came from colonial authorities, local magistrates accepted the fact that widespread adultery contributed to repopulating Pitcairn:

&gt; &apos;These children of the night might have saved the island.&apos;

During WWII, a pastor on the island filed another complaint with the High Commissioner in New Zealand, reporting how prostitution and adultery were now commonplace. Which is all OK, if consenting adults are involved.

But the pastor reported a new detail: the only ambition of young Pitcairn men was to &quot;break in&quot; the young girls, with the most ambitious wanting to

&gt; &apos;Break in all the girls on the island&apos;

Such reports were largely ignored or forgotten until 1997, when the British Government assigned a police officer to Pitcairn, whose mission was to train the local constable. It became almost immediately obvious that local laws were lacking when it came to sexual crimes. In fact, they completely lacked any mention of sexual assault, and allowed for adults to have sex with children as young as 12.

The British officer discovered that sex with underage girls had been tolerated as a traditional value, and started collecting allegations of sexual assault. Social workers were also sent to the Island, submitting shocking reports back to London. Quoting again from Prochnau and Parker, they

&gt; &apos;Began to untangle a society in which sex permeated everything: childhood sex games were commonplace, as were pregnancies and abortions among young, unmarried girls&apos;

Even more disturbing:

&gt; &apos;Early sexual manipulation for comforting babies has been a feature of life for many years&apos;

One social worker&apos;s conclusions described Pitcairn as

&gt; &apos;The most dysfunctional community on the face of the planet&apos;.

More allegations followed, as British, Australian and New Zealander officers conducted further investigations from 1999 to 2001. Detectives interviewed every woman who had lived on Pitcairn in the previous 20 years, as well as several men who had been living on the island or had moved abroad.

As a result, prosecutors were able to charge a total of 13 men at the Pitcairn Island Sexual Assault Trials, held in Auckland in 2004. Seven of the defendants still lived on Pitcairn at the time, representing one third of the island&apos;s male population. Among them was Steve Christian, descendant of mutiny leader Fletcher Christian, and Mayor of Pitcairn.

The defendants and their sympathisers argued that sexual acts with underage girls were part of traditional values, and thus acceptable on Pitcairn. At the time, such custom was even defended by the best-selling author of &apos;The Thorn Birds&apos;: Colleen McCullough, married to a Pitcairn descendant. According to Prochnau and Parker, she stated: &apos;It&apos;s Polynesian to break your girls in at 12.&apos;

The defendants also maintained that London had no jurisdiction on the island, as the Bounty mutineers had renounced their status as British citizens. Hence, Pitcairn was not a British territory! Conspiracy-minded locals even claimed that the whole trial was just a British plot to depopulate the island. All the while, the same locals — including some women — put pressure on the victims, for them to withdraw charges.

But the prosecution pressed on, bringing to light horrific details, such as how an 11-year-old girl was assaulted by multiple men, or how instances of sexual assault were often accompanied by violent fights. One victim stated:

&gt; &apos;I have seen some of the fights. All I&apos;ve associated with sex on Pitcairn is violence&apos;

The trials concluded with the conviction of all but one of the defendants. Other two, showing remorse, were sentenced to community service. The remaining defendants received prison terms from two to six years.

All in all, very lenient penalties. As reported by the British High Commission in New Zealand, these prison tariffs were

&gt; &apos;Tailored specifically to Pitcairn and accounted for its unique isolation and population size.&apos;

What had happened in the small, and apparently &apos;friendliest&apos; island community? Had the isolation of this Paradise gradually pushed its population towards abhorrent sexual practices?

The unique and puzzling case of Pitcairn was analysed by Prof John Scott, School of Justice, Queensland University of Technology, and by Dr Zoe Staines, School of Social Science, University of Queensland, Australia. Their findings were compiled in the paper

&apos;Charting the place of islands in criminology: On isolation, integration and insularity&apos;

Published in March 2020, by journal Theoretical Criminology.

The authors highlighted how Pitcairn&apos;s community displayed a

&gt; &apos;Strong bonding capital within what might be described as a closed social network&apos;

A feature which normally has a strong role in preventing crime:

&gt; &apos;Much research in criminology has suggested that smaller, often rural communities, have an abundance of bonding capital and are cohesive and friendly places with low levels of crime. As such, they are considered relatively safe.&apos;

But there is a dark side to social cohesion, as an emerging body of research suggests that remote and rural communities may be plagued by high rates of interpersonal violence. Quoting again:

&gt; &apos;This research suggests that the ecology of rural places and more broadly, remote and isolated places, can be criminogenic.&apos;

Or, in other words: the high-density social network tying the Pitcairn islanders together was supportive of crime.

This explains how a tight-knit community may be conducive to condoning, perpetrating and concealing an already established criminal practice. In this case: sexual assault and underage sex. But how did those criminal practices first emerge, and how did they become part of the norm?

Scott and Staines argue that the

&gt; &apos;Isolation of the Island … provided fertile soil for the subversion of British constructions of crime, as well as Christian constructions of faith.&apos;

British law and Christian morals were replaced by a different, stronger force, much needed for the Pitcairn society to survive:

&gt; &apos;Sex was not highly regulated because of an apparent need to procreate and maintain the Island&apos;s population.&apos;

## Conclusion

Visiting Pitcairn today is a logistical challenge, due to the lack of airstrips and its remoteness. But with a decline in revenue from collectors&apos; stamps, the island government is investing heavily on tourism. If you would like to visit what is arguably one of the planet&apos;s most peculiar places, make sure you head to visitpitcairn.pn, for sailing schedules and accommodation details.

Back in 2022, the islanders even hired a marketing consultant to help &apos;sell&apos; Pitcairn, who in turn recruited travel writer Brandon Presser to describe life on the island. As reported by The New York Post, however, most locals are still wary of outsiders, following the negative attention brought upon them by the 2004 trials.

&gt; &apos;Within minutes of his arrival on Pitcairn, Presser was accosted at the town deck by an angry local.
&gt;
&gt; &quot;I don&apos;t want you talking to me, coming up to me, or even looking at me while you&apos;re here,&quot; the man railed. &quot;Got it?&quot;&apos;

The islanders explained to Presser their approach to hospitality, which they call &quot;hypocriting&quot; or

&gt; &apos;Acting sociable and welcoming without really meaning it.&apos;

Entrepreneur and travel blogger Christoph Heuermann, however, reported spending a largely enjoyable time on Pitcairn, as he was hosted by one of the men convicted at the trial.

It is clear, however, how the repercussions of the scandal are still lingering over the small community. According to The Telegraph, back in June 2019, there were only three primary school-age children on the island. One of them, a girl, was never left alone with island men.

The same article reports how, in November 2018, Pitkerners had sought to

&gt; &apos;Draw a symbolic line under what happened&apos;

By unveiling a &apos;reconciliation plaque&apos;. The commemorative text reads:

&gt; &apos;To say we&apos;re sorry does not seek punishment or blame, it doesn&apos;t say they were right and we were wrong, just that we have learnt and understand the error of our ways.&apos;

## Key Takeaways

- Pitcairn Island is a British Overseas Territory, the smallest political entity in the world, with a population of 35.
- The island&apos;s history is tied to the HMS Bounty mutiny, with descendants of the mutineers still living there.
- Pitcairn&apos;s isolation and small population have contributed to unique biodiversity and a tropical paradise environment.
- The island faced severe social issues, including widespread sexual assault and underage sex, leading to trials in 2004.
- Despite efforts to promote tourism, the community remains wary of outsiders due to past scandals.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the population of Pitcairn Island?

The population of Pitcairn Island is 35, mostly concentrated in the capital city of Adamstown.

### Who are the original settlers of Pitcairn Island?

The original settlers of Pitcairn Island were Polynesian peoples who landed on the island around the 11th Century A.D.

### What is the significance of HMS Bounty in the history of Pitcairn Island?

HMS Bounty is significant because a group of mutineers from the ship, led by Fletcher Christian, settled on Pitcairn Island in 1790, seeking a new home and escape from the British Empire.

### What is the administrative status of Pitcairn Island?

Pitcairn Island is a British Overseas Territory, the last in the South Pacific. It is a &apos;quasi-state polity&apos; with a 10-strong Island Council who appoint a Mayor for day-to-day administration.

### What are the unique ecological features of Pitcairn Island?

Pitcairn Island is home to unique flora and fauna, including 10 new species of birds, 80 native plants, 51 new species of algae, 23 of corals, and 15 of fish discovered during various expeditions.

### What is the history of the Pitcairn Island Sexual Assault Trials?

The Pitcairn Island Sexual Assault Trials, held in Auckland in 2004, resulted in the conviction of 12 men for sexual offenses involving underage girls. The trials highlighted deep-seated issues within the island&apos;s community.

### What is the current approach of Pitcairn Islanders towards tourism?

Pitcairn Islanders are investing in tourism due to a decline in revenue from collectors&apos; stamps. However, many locals remain wary of outsiders following the negative attention from the 2004 trials.

### What is the significance of the &apos;reconciliation plaque&apos; on Pitcairn Island?

The &apos;reconciliation plaque&apos; was unveiled in November 2018 to symbolically draw a line under the past sexual abuse scandals. The plaque reads: &apos;To say we’re sorry does not seek punishment or blame, it doesn’t say they were right and we were wrong, just that we have learnt and understand the error of our ways.&apos;

### What is the unique social structure of Pitcairn Island?

Pitcairn Island has a strong bonding capital within a closed social network, which has both supportive and criminogenic aspects. The isolation and need to maintain the population led to unique social norms and practices.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Pitcairn Island: The Devastating Price of Paradise](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpPL-O4d3NU)
- [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/B9780081008539000427](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/B9780081008539000427)
- [https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0100142](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0100142)
- [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/924474](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/924474)
- [https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/monochap/book/9781529220346/ch006.xml](https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/monochap/book/9781529220346/ch006.xml)
- [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340016333_Charting_the_place_of_islands_in_criminology_On_isolation_integration_and_insularity](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340016333_Charting_the_place_of_islands_in_criminology_On_isolation_integration_and_insularity)
- [https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/01/pitcairn200801](https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/01/pitcairn200801)
- [https://www.naturalhistorymag.com/htmlsite/master.html?https://www.naturalhistorymag.com/htmlsite/editors_pick/1928_05-06_pick.html](https://www.naturalhistorymag.com/htmlsite/master.html?https://www.naturalhistorymag.com/htmlsite/editors_pick/1928_05-06_pick.html)
- [https://www.andrews.edu/library/car/cardigital/Periodicals/Spectrum/1987_Vol_18/22253204.READER_062.pdf](https://www.andrews.edu/library/car/cardigital/Periodicals/Spectrum/1987_Vol_18/22253204.READER_062.pdf)
- [https://www.government.pn/history](https://www.government.pn/history)
- [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/secrets-pitcairn-tropical-island-covered-child-sex-scandal/](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/secrets-pitcairn-tropical-island-covered-child-sex-scandal/)
- [https://nypost.com/2022/03/05/current-day-island-life-of-mutiny-on-the-bounty-descendants/](https://nypost.com/2022/03/05/current-day-island-life-of-mutiny-on-the-bounty-descendants/)
- [https://christoph.today/pitcairn-polynesia/](https://christoph.today/pitcairn-polynesia/)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fe/Tang_Paradise_2024_01.jpg) by xiquinhosilva / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pripyat: The City Completely Abandoned in Three Hours.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/pripyat-city-completely-abandoned-three-hours</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/pripyat-city-completely-abandoned-three-hours</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>If you&apos;ve ever watched the hit HBO series *Chernobyl*, you&apos;ll be at least some way familiar with the northern Ukrainian city of Pripyat.

The lauded miniseries brought to life the circumstances of the disastrous nuclear accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986, as well as the mass relocation of the 50,000-strong population of Pripyat, which lay just next door.

With that said, the series wasn&apos;t actually filmed in the city or its environs, and the reasons for that are fairly understandable. Even to this day, to spend more than a minimal amount of the time in Pripyat would be to expose oneself to significant levels of toxic radiation.

But people visit anyway, and the abandoned city has become a draw for adventure tourists and thrillseekers alike. Those who visit would witness not only the extraordinary spectacle of a once-thriving city abandoned in a flash, but also the realities of what life in a former Soviet city—now indeterminably stuck in time—would have looked like.

## The Day the Sky Fell

Now, if you&apos;ve followed this channel for some time, you will have seen several videos we&apos;ve made about the legacy of Soviet nuclear misadventures. From Semipalatinsk to the toxic sludge which is the water of Lake Karachay, there is no shortage of USSR-attributable deformities sitting on the earth&apos;s surface.

But those are footnotes when contrasted with what took place in the northern Ukrainian SSR in the early morning of the 26th of April, 1986.

On the morning in question, the operators of Reactor No. 4 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant inadvertently wrote themselves into history. It all started with a safety test, one which involved switching off practically all of the safety mechanisms in the reactor. What resulted was a sudden nuclear fireworks display that nobody asked for. In short, the reactor exploded.

We won&apos;t delve too much into the facts surrounding the explosion itself, not least because these are complicated and subject—even today—to some debate, but suffice to say that they were the culmination of irresponsible and unrealistic expectations by plant management, as well as a quintessentially-Soviet disregard for safety in the reactor&apos;s design.

What followed was one of the most catastrophic man-made accidents in history. The roof of the reactor blew off, radioactive smoke billowed into the sky, and everyone living within a reasonable distance of Chernobyl was now in great danger.

With that said, &apos;reasonable distance&apos; is another term which—in the context of the disaster—remains contested to this day. Anyone who&apos;s seen the HBO series will recall how holding a piece of reactor core graphite was enough to cause a firefighter&apos;s hand to melt only moments later. But Russia created its own film about the event about a year after HBO, which starkly contrasted with the facts of the disaster as presented in the American series. In Russia&apos;s narration—entitled *Chernobyl 86*—the protagonist, who is also a firefighter, is unironically depicted swimming in the poisonous water of the submerged reactor—twice—before finally succumbing to the effects of radiation sickness.

But while the scale of the disaster may be contested, what everybody could agree on was two things: one, that the firefighters and other first-responders—collectively known as liquidators—who helped contain the disaster showed profound levels of bravery. Second, that one group of people put quite incontestably in grave danger by the disaster were the inhabitants of Pripyat: a city around 3 kilometres away from the Chernobyl plant and within view of the now-devastated Reactor 4.

So following the explosion, after some dithering, it was determined that the 49,000 people who called Pripyat home would have to be removed. Fast.

## The Opulent City in Chernobyl&apos;s Shadow

In spite of devastation occurring at Chernobyl in the 36 hours after the explosion, the people of nearby Pripyat initially went about their lives as normal.

Having been established in 1970, Pripyat was one of a string of so-called nuclear cities—or *atomgrads*—in the Soviet Union. And like other *atomgrads*, it was built primarily for the employees of a single major nuclear facility—in this case, Chernobyl—and their families. But perhaps unlike many industrial cities in the USSR, the experience of living there must have been generally, well, rather nice.

Keep in mind, the city—located about 95 kilometres due north of Kyiv and close to the Belorussian border—wasn&apos;t built as any kind of prison site or for everyday members of the proletarian public. It housed engineers, scientists, physicists and some prominent higher-ups of the Communist Party (along with their families). Many of these were not from Pripyat or even the Ukrainian SSR, and had been brought there specially to work on the facility. Thus, a degree of comfort was in order.

Pripyat featured a large string of amenities typical of a modern Soviet town: schools, hospitals, cultural centers, and sports facilities were aplenty. The city boasted over twenty-five stores and malls, and there was even a supermarket—a rarity in the USSR. It had an Olympic-sized swimming pool, several gyms, an entire stack of shooting ranges, a cinema, a library, and multiple parks and outdoor recreation centres.

What is more, the architecture and layout of Pripyat reflected what one might call the Soviet Dream. Its wide boulevards and cultural landmarks were designed to foster a close-knit community of workers and their families. Its housing emphasised functionality and communal living, with an (uncommon) degree of comfort. Its high-rise apartment buildings had balconies offering stunning views of lush forests and… well, Chernobyl.

Pripyat was also a young city—something reflected in its great abundance of kindergartens and school gymnasiums. It had also just about completed construction of a new amusement park, which was scheduled to open for the International Workers&apos; Day celebrations on the 1st of May, just days after the disaster. In fact, the holiday—alternately known as May Day—was one of the most important in the Soviet calendar, and there would have no doubt been a general cheeriness in the air in Pripyat as the day approached. It has also been alleged that the safety test had been deliberately offset from the daytime, so as not to risk upsetting the city&apos;s power supply, amidst preparations for the holiday.

But the explosion on the morning of April 26th put paid to all of that.

From the outset, the inhabitants of Pripyat were blissfully unaware of the great danger they now found themselves in. People carried on as normal, kids played outside, and the May Day prep continued. Some folks were infamously alleged to have gathered on a bridge to watch the strange lights coming from the reactor, and the bridge was later nicknamed &quot;Bridge of Death&quot; owing to the supposed premature deaths of those who&apos;d done so. While certainly not an appealing name as a hangout spot (although top-drawer for later adventure tourism) this has generally been classed as a misnomer. It isn&apos;t believed that the individuals who gathered there later died prematurely (as some locals claimed), or even that any locals actually gathered there to watch the fallout at all.

But the lull did not—by any means—mean that tell-tale signs of the disaster fallout were not immediately present in the city—not least in hospital Number 126. Like other facilities in the city, the hospital was a fine facility, with a 410-bed capacity. But it wasn&apos;t built to deal with the deluge of contaminated plant employees and liquidators who began to arrive on the morning of the accident. It was determined by a later UN report that more than 200 people were admitted to the hospital with radiation sickness in the days after the explosion. 28 died, and many were flown for treatment to Moscow, which had the only hospital in the Soviet Union capable of treating severe radiation injuries.

The Pripyat hospital would also be abandoned in the wake of the evacuation, and today sits as a dilapidated husk, its empty corridors contrasting starkly with the flurry of chaotic activity that would have taken place there in the early hours of the morning of 26th April, 1986.

## The Evacuation

Still, away from the hospital, life went on without immediate disruption in Pripyat. But the Soviet authorities behind the scenes were quickly beginning to get frantic.

Admittedly, this wasn&apos;t because the safety of the people living in the city was on their minds…much. As mentioned, it wasn&apos;t until 36 hours later that the authorities even ordered an evacuation. But in that time, the rest of the world was beginning to sit up and take notice, and denying the extent of the explosion was becoming difficult for the Kremlin. A power plant as far away as Sweden had begun to sniff some unexplained radiation in the air, and began to put together a map which correlated wind patterns. Within days, they&apos;d traced the release to somewhere in the Soviet Union. The West was beginning to realise something had gone terribly wrong.

And the signs of the release would only go on to be even more unignorable. Within weeks, radioactive caesium and iodine were being found in meat products produced in Wales. The blowback would be a major problem on its own for the image-conscious USSR: but in the immediate period, there were 49,000 people they needed to clear away from the smouldering wreck of Chernobyl, quickly.

And so, at 11am on the morning of the 27th of April, the order to evacuate rang out on speakers across the city.

Residents were assured that the evacuation would be temporary, and they would be returned to their homes in a few days. As such, they were instructed to pack lightly, and to board a long sequence of around 1,200 buses that appeared in the city. The buses showed up at 2pm the same afternoon, and the city&apos;s entire population were shepherded on board. Within three hours, the entire population was evacuated.

And they weren&apos;t the only ones. In the days that followed, every single soul residing within a 30-kilometre radius of Reactor 4 (some 135,000 people in total, including on the other side of the border in Belarus) was evacuated. The liquidators set to work, scrubbing down streets and buildings, removing contaminated soil, suppressing dust, and cleaning roads and water supplies. The decontamination process was exhaustive, and some liquidators had the unenviable job of tracking down wild animals and livestock and shooting them, to prevent the spread of the radiation.

But the promise to return was never fulfilled. The evacuation turned Pripyat into a frozen snapshot of Soviet life in the mid-1980s, with belongings left behind and public spaces abandoned.

In the following decades, the threat posed by the leaking reactor core subsided. It didn&apos;t subside entirely, however, and this warranted the construction of a gigantic sarcophagus, an effective concrete sleeve fit over the site to keep the reactor&apos;s remains in check.

What was once a vibrant community built to serve the workers of the nearby Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant became uninhabited wasteland, and Pripyat continues to have a permanent population of zero to this day. As such, the city remains a ghostly reminder of the devastating power of human error and its enduring consequences.

## The Ghost City Today

Decades after the disaster, Pripyat remains an eerie ghost town, preserved in a state of decay. The would-be amusement park, with its rusting Ferris wheel and bumper cars, has become one of the most photographed symbols of the tragedy. Buildings are now covered in vegetation, as nature slowly reclaims the city. Inside homes and schools, slogans and propaganda posters provide glimpses into the lives of the people who once lived there, as well of an era now long gone by. The amusement park sits derelict, as does the overgrown 5,000-capacity Avanhard Stadium, once home to the city&apos;s football team. Personal effects continue to adorn the desktops and floors of the city&apos;s various amenities, abandoned as they were in the flash of an eye as the liquidators arrived to spirit the locals to safety. This includes Middle School number 3, home to a sinister collection of discarded gas masks, which were standard issue for schoolkids in the USSR at the time.

With that said, Pripyat has since become a hub for curiosity tourism. The city offers the ultimate off-the-grid experience: no Wi-Fi, no cell service, just silence and the whispers of a place that went from vibrant to vacant in a matter of hours. Guided tours provide Geiger counters as standard issue—both a trendy accessory and a crucial tool to navigate the hazardous remains of the site. The city also features a number of geographical oddities: not least the so-called &apos;Red Forest&apos;—a pine forest dyed ginger-brown by the ionising radiation of the fallout. The local wildlife, however, seems to be thriving. Wolves, foxes, and even Przewalski&apos;s horses have moved in, undisturbed by any human habitation nearby.

Today, Pripyat lies within the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, a 30-kilometer radius established around the site of the disaster. But while the city itself remains uninhabited due to high radiation levels, that is not to say that the Exclusion Zone is uninhabited—in fact, much to the contrary. Many communities continue to live within the 30-kilometre radius of Chernobyl: having either moved back as the catastrophe subsided, or later as the Soviet Union crumbled. Some flat-out refused to leave in the first place. The returnees were largely elderly people, as it remained strictly forbidden for children to inhabit the zone.

Those who continued to live in the contaminated areas were given compensation by authorities and offered free annual medical examinations. In the following years, a further 220,000 people were resettled into less contaminated areas, and the initial Exclusion Zone was extended to cover a total of 4300 square kilometres, or around 2700 miles. Residents of the less contaminated areas are also provided with medical monitoring, according to doses received. Agricultural products produced in the area are also restricted.

Yet even so, life has gone on. It may surprise people to know that—even today—people continue to work in the shell that once was the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

Many of these reside in the settlement of Slavutych, located on the other side of the Dnieper river, about 30 kilometres from Pripyat and close to the major city of Chernihiv. Slavutych was built in 1986 to house the displaced employees of Chernobyl, and its foundation was laid using fresh, contaminated soil brought in especially for this purpose. Architects and construction workers were also hauled in from other Soviet republics, each one each tasked with creating one of the city&apos;s eight districts. As a result, the city features a curious patchwork of distinctive cultural and ethnic features: decorative Georgian designs sitting in tandem with an austere Russian next door to it.

Perhaps surprisingly, many of those displaced workers continue to be transported to Chernobyl for work daily: mostly as essential workers whose job is to monitor the unpredictable radiation levels.

## A Story Not Yet Finished?

Pripyat&apos;s story serves as a stark reminder of the risks and responsibilities associated with nuclear power.

It underscored the importance of transparency, safety, and the far-reaching consequences of human decisions. Nobody was more keenly-aware of this than the Soviet authorities: since the disaster proved the most expensive disaster caused by human error in history, at an estimated cost equivalent to more than 70 billion dollars today (just for the initial containment) and possibly as much as 700 billion dollars in total. Mikhail Gorbachev later stated that Chernobyl was a more important factor in the fall of the USSR than his liberalising policy of Perestroika.

And while wildlife has returned in droves to parts of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, Pripyat itself remains—not least through its lonely Ferris Wheel—a poignant memory of one of history&apos;s most infamous disasters.

Still, the city continues to dispose of human visitation through its tourism, which reached a high of 125,000 visitors in 2019. Building off the success of the HBO series, it was projected to climb sharply to about 1 million visitors per year by 2025, but this was offset by first the pandemic, and later the Russian invasion. That said, the region&apos;s locals benefit from at least some economic activity due to the tourism: something by no means a given for disused former Soviet sites. Many such sites entered ruin after the state collapsed, and basically remain as such today. Those who watched our Semipalatinsk video will recall that economic activity in the area went about as far as people wandering around inside to steal scrap metal.

Pripyat and its former power plant—their fates by now inexorably intertwined by history—returned to headlines in 2022. In the early stages of the War in Ukraine, Russian forces surged across the border from Belarus and captured the hazardous facility. For several weeks, the Russians held the site and its essential workers captive, in the knowledge that for the Ukrainians to open fire upon the wreckage would be lunacy. This led to panic, and fears of a new Chernobyl, another catastrophic blowout which would render even more sites vulnerable to the kind of fate of Pripyat. In the end, the situation subsided as Russia&apos;s Kyiv offensive was abandoned. The site returned to Ukrainian hands, and on this occasion, disaster was averted.

But for many, the case was no doubt a reminder that one of the world&apos;s most deadly sites remains there—watching, waiting, and always at risk of catastrophic repeat.

## Key Takeaways

- The HBO series &apos;Chernobyl&apos; popularized the story of Pripyat, a city evacuated after the 1986 nuclear disaster.
- Pripyat was a model Soviet city with modern amenities, built for Chernobyl plant workers and their families.
- The city&apos;s evacuation was delayed due to Soviet authorities&apos; initial denial and global detection of radiation.
- Today, Pripyat is a ghost town, attracting tourists who explore its decaying infrastructure and high radiation levels.
- The Chernobyl disaster had profound economic and political impacts, contributing to the fall of the USSR.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What caused the evacuation of Pripyat?

The evacuation of Pripyat was caused by the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant on April 26, 1986. The explosion and subsequent radioactive fallout put the city&apos;s 49,000 residents in grave danger, leading to their evacuation within three hours on April 27, 1986.

### How long did it take to evacuate Pripyat?

The entire population of Pripyat was evacuated within three hours after the order was given at 11 am on April 27, 1986.

### What amenities did Pripyat have before the evacuation?

Pripyat featured a large number of amenities typical of a modern Soviet town, including schools, hospitals, cultural centers, sports facilities, over twenty-five stores and malls, an Olympic-sized swimming pool, several gyms, shooting ranges, a cinema, a library, and multiple parks and outdoor recreation centers.

### What is the &apos;Bridge of Death&apos; in Pripyat?

The &apos;Bridge of Death&apos; is a bridge in Pripyat where some locals allegedly gathered to watch the strange lights coming from the reactor after the explosion. However, it is generally considered a misnomer, as there is no evidence that those who gathered there later died prematurely.

### What happened to the hospital in Pripyat after the evacuation?

The hospital in Pripyat was abandoned after the evacuation and now sits as a dilapidated husk. It was not equipped to handle the number of contaminated plant employees and liquidators who arrived after the explosion, leading to many being flown to Moscow for treatment.

### What is the current status of Pripyat?

Pripyat remains an eerie ghost town, preserved in a state of decay. It is part of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone and has a permanent population of zero. The city has become a hub for curiosity tourism, with guided tours offering visitors a glimpse into the abandoned city.

### What is the &apos;Red Forest&apos; in Pripyat?

The &apos;Red Forest&apos; is a pine forest near Pripyat that was dyed ginger-brown by the ionizing radiation from the Chernobyl disaster. It is one of the geographical oddities found within the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone.

### How did the Chernobyl disaster affect the Soviet Union?

The Chernobyl disaster is considered one of the most expensive disasters caused by human error in history, with initial containment costs estimated at over 70 billion dollars today. It also played a significant role in the fall of the USSR, according to Mikhail Gorbachev.

### What is the significance of the Ferris wheel in Pripyat?

The Ferris wheel in Pripyat is a symbol of the tragedy. It was part of an amusement park that was scheduled to open for the International Workers&apos; Day celebrations just days after the disaster but was abandoned along with the rest of the city.

### What is the current tourism situation in Pripyat?

Pripyat has become a hub for curiosity tourism, with guided tours offering visitors a unique experience. The number of visitors reached a high of 125,000 in 2019, but this was affected by the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The region&apos;s locals benefit economically from this tourism.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Pripyat: The City Completely Abandoned in Three Hours.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=euoTckz29DU)
- [https://www.distance.to/Kiev/Chernobyl](https://www.distance.to/Kiev/Chernobyl)
- [https://www.un.org/en/observances/chernobyl-remembrance-day/background#:~:text=No%20reports%20were%20released%20until,somewhere%20in%20the%20](https://www.un.org/en/observances/chernobyl-remembrance-day/background#:~:text=No%20reports%20were%20released%20until,somewhere%20in%20the%20)
- [https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_28303/chernobyl-chapter-iii-reactions-of-national-authorities](https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_28303/chernobyl-chapter-iii-reactions-of-national-authorities)
- [https://www.chernobyl.one/pripyat-city-hospital/](https://www.chernobyl.one/pripyat-city-hospital/)
- [https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/mar/07/chernobyl-30-years-residents-life-ghost-city-pripyat](https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/mar/07/chernobyl-30-years-residents-life-ghost-city-pripyat)
- [https://chernobylx.com/chernobyl-unveiled-debunking-the-myths/](https://chernobylx.com/chernobyl-unveiled-debunking-the-myths/)
- [https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-13/the-polygon-a-nuclear-guide-to-the-kazakhstan-steppe/6694834](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-13/the-polygon-a-nuclear-guide-to-the-kazakhstan-steppe/6694834)
- [https://www.statista.com/statistics/1231428/number-of-tourists-in-chernobyl-exclusion-zone/](https://www.statista.com/statistics/1231428/number-of-tourists-in-chernobyl-exclusion-zone/)
- [https://edition.cnn.com/travel/ukraine-kyiv-tourists-chernobyl-conflict/index.html](https://edition.cnn.com/travel/ukraine-kyiv-tourists-chernobyl-conflict/index.html)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c0/Chernobyl_Nuclear_Power_Plant_confinement_after_drone_strike%2C_2025-02-14_%2813%29.jpg) by Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Prison Where Jeffrey Epstein Met His End.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/prison-where-jeffrey-epstein-met-his-end</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/prison-where-jeffrey-epstein-met-his-end</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>We&apos;ve covered the island. We&apos;ve covered the mansion in Manhattan. We&apos;ve looked at the Paris apartment and the waterfront villa in Palm Beach. We&apos;ve also described the ranch in Mexico, where the bodies are allegedly buried. And we wish that was just a metaphor.

Now let&apos;s talk about the prison where it all ended.

That would be *this* far-from-pleasant-looking building, found on the same New York block as the Southern District Attorney&apos;s Office, a building belonging to the US Department of Justice, a pretty nice church, and the Thurgood Marshall Courthouse — where some of the most important cases in the United States have been tried.

The building is the Metropolitan Correctional Center New York, located in Manhattan and only seven miles from Epstein&apos;s former mansion on East 71st Street. And it&apos;s the place where, on August 10th, 2019, he was found dead in a six-by-nine foot cell.

That was officially ruled a suicide, but it remains one of the most contested deaths in modern American history — and yes, we will talk about why that is.

But first, we&apos;re going to look at that building: what it was, how it functioned, what happened during Epstein&apos;s final weeks, and why so many questions still linger.

## The Tower in the City

The Metropolitan Correctional Center New York opened in 1975.

The neighbourhood in which it is located, by the way, has a name: the Civic Center. It is home to all the previously mentioned judicial buildings, as well as the New York City Hall, One Police Plaza, various smaller courthouses, as well as this monstrosity, home to a field office of the FBI. The Civic Center district is bordered by Tribeca to the northwest, the Manhattan Financial district to the southwest, Chinatown to the northeast, and the Brooklyn bridge immediately to the south.

Now, unlike many sprawling prison complexes you might picture — with ringed fences and razor wire — MCC New York is a little bit unusual. Its blocky, brutalist style makes it look more like an office space from the 1970s, with its twelve stories rising vertically into the Manhattan skyline (although dwarfed by the monumental skyscrapers located all around).

And it was also unusual in its purpose. You see, many prisons are built far out of sight and out of mind, not in the centre of one of New York&apos;s most desirable districts. But the choice of location was no accident. Federal planners built the prison in order to keep short-term and pretrial detainees in the city (near courts, lawyers, and families), rather than warehousing them away to the wilderness. And because of its proximity to one of the country&apos;s most high-profile courthouses — the aforementioned Thurgood Marshall building, located on the same block — MCC New York just so happened to hold some of the most high-profile defendants in the entire country.

One of its earliest and most infamous residents was John Gotti, mafia boss and head of the Gambino crime family. Gotti was arrested in 1990 after years of judicial acquittals, and was held at MCC throughout his 1992 racketeering trial. He was convicted, and transferred to USP Marion, where he tried to buy protection from the Aryan Brotherhood. Probably wise, since even during his time at MCC, he was reportedly held under tight security (for his own sake).

Another famous resident was Omar Abdel-Rahman, alias the &quot;Blind Sheikh.&quot; He was arrested in 1993 for his role in a terror plot that included the first World Trade Center bombing, and was housed at MCC during pretrial proceedings. He was joined there by another Islamist terrorist, Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the same bombing as well as the notorious Bojinka Plot (among other notorious attacks). Bernard Madoff, arrested in December 2008 for orchestrating the largest financial Ponzi scheme in history, remained in custody at MCC during his trial — where he was reportedly bullied by other inmates. Viktor Bout — the so-called Merchant of Death whose greatest claim to fame may have been being portrayed by Nicolas Cage in *Lord of War* — was kept at the prison not long after Madoff, before — like many others — he was sent to serve 25 years at USP Marion. And perhaps the most well-known inmate until Epstein was one Joaquin Guzman Loera — alias &apos;El Chapo&apos; — who spent two years at MCC before he joined America&apos;s most dangerous convicts at ADX Florence in 2019.

Still, arguably none of the above names were *quite* as notorious as the man who passed through the prison&apos;s doors in July 2019, and never left. That is, of course, Jeffrey Epstein.

## From Manhattan to Manhattan

Jeffrey Epstein was arrested on July 6th, 2019, at Teterboro Airport in New Jersey after having arrived in the US onboard his plane — the Lolita Express — from Paris.

The task force that apprehended him included agents from both the FBI and the NYPD, acting under the Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Republican Geoffrey Berman. The next day, Berman publicly announced the charges against Epstein, which were: sex trafficking of minors, and conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. Only one day later still, Epstein appeared in Manhattan federal court. Unlike his previous — somewhat farcically conducted — trial in 2008, proceedings against him moved quickly. New York police raided Epstein&apos;s 71st Street mansion, where they reportedly found photographs of young girls, CDs labeled with names and dates, large sums of cash, and a passport belonging to Epstein but with a Saudi address.

By that time, Epstein had already made MCC New York his new home.

Interestingly, after his arrival on July 6th (the day of his arrest) Epstein was at first placed into the prison&apos;s genpop, as staff had not yet been informed of his notoriety and high-profile status. Officials quickly recognised the security risks this posed, and within a day he&apos;d been transferred to the Special Housing Unit (SHU): a secure, segregated unit designed to protect high-risk detainees from violent inmates.

On July 8, 2019, Epstein pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. The same day, he was moved by MCC staff to psychological observation in order to assess his mental state. By July 10th, the shrinks had cleared him for return to the SHU, where he was given a cellmate and housed under standard protocol. This included regular counts and checks every 30 minutes. Epstein&apos;s lawyers put forward an application for bail, which included a 100 million dollar bond, home confinement, and private security guards.

Things in the courthouse continued moving quickly. On July 15th, still little over a week post-arrest, Epstein attended a detention hearing where his request for bail was flatly denied. Judge Richard Berman (no relation to District Attorney Geoffrey Berman), called the 100 million dollar bail offer &quot;irredeemably inadequate&quot;, and in his order to remand, noted that Epstein continued to remain a threat to potential victims. Prosecutors also called Epstein a flight risk, noting that he owned two private jets and had traveled more than 20 times abroad in the most recent few months. Not insignificantly, one of Epstein&apos;s properties was in France — a country which had consistently refused to hand over another famous, convicted sex offender (Roman Polanski) to justice in the US. Prosecutors also feared he might try to obstruct justice if free, accusing him of tampering in a previous case by paying hush money to witnesses. Judge Berman agreed, and Epstein was remanded in custody.

He didn&apos;t take to his new environment all that well.

On July 23rd, 2019, guards responded to Epstein in his cell with marks on his neck, indicating a suicide attempt. He was removed from the SHU and placed on suicide watch in the hospital wing, with constant observation. Two sources told New York&apos;s NBC news that Epstein had tried to hang himself, while a third suggested that he may simply have been trying to garner sympathy in order to be moved. But perhaps most significantly, a fourth source suggested he was assaulted by a cellmate, and named Nicholas Tartaglione — Epstein&apos;s cellmate, and a former police officer accused of killing four men — as the alleged perpetrator. Either way, after about 24 hours in hospital, Epstein was shifted back to psychological observation before being returned to the SHU (now without a cellmate).

This was now the 30th of July.

Evidently, Epstein was a risk. But this — theoretically — shouldn&apos;t have been an issue at MCC. The prison was run by the Federal Bureau of Prisons — and its security protocols were, on paper, pretty extensive.

The entire 12-story building was designed to keep movement controllable and predictable: detainees were housed in self-contained units, with layered access control between public entry points, staff corridors, elevator/stair access, and inmate housing areas. The SHU — where Epstein was being kept — should have been an even tighter security environment: being built around maximum control of contact, property, and movement. Safeguards there included frequent officer rounds, greater use of restraints during out-of-cell movement, stricter control of cell access, and heightened suicide-risk awareness.

But by the late 2010s, reports surfaced that MCC was deeply troubled. It had staff shortages, poor maintenance and — perhaps most significantly — malfunctioning cameras. In early 2019, the jail had been put under scrutiny for a partial power outage that left inmates without heat for days (in winter). It was not, by most accounts, actually a well-run facility.

Pretty soon, its failures would become big news.

## 10th August 2019

At 6.30am on August 10th, 2019, Jeffrey Epstein was found unresponsive in his cell in the SHU. He was discovered in a kneeling position with a strip of bedsheet wrapped around his neck, fastened to the top of his bunk. After being rushed to the New York-Presbyterian Lower Manhattan Hospital, less than a mile from the prison, he was pronounced dead. It was later announced that he&apos;d already been dead for two hours by the time he was found.

The official cause of death, as determined by New York City&apos;s Chief Medical Examiner, was suicide by hanging. But almost immediately, questions began to surface.

Only a few days before, on the 5th of August, Epstein was told that a bail appeal would be filed with the Second Circuit court. He was generally described as being in good spirits and — save for the incident on the 23rd of July — had not really given an indication that he was a suicide risk. He&apos;d also passed several in-house psychological assessments, after all.

And yet, US Attorney General William Barr soon described the circumstances surrounding Epstein&apos;s death as &quot;a perfect storm of screw-ups&quot;.

The two correctional officers assigned to Epstein&apos;s unit reportedly fell asleep during parts of their shift. Tova Noel and Michael Thomas were later federally charged with making false records and conspiring to falsify records, having claimed they&apos;d conducted required checks (every 30 minutes) when of course they had not. And it soon turned out that footage of Epstein&apos;s cell was nowhere to be found. Two of the security cameras that would have captured anybody entering or leaving his cell were offline and had remained so for some time. A third — even more bizarrely — had footage that was found to be &quot;unusable&quot;. And while an autopsy conducted by New York City&apos;s Chief Medical Examiner Barbara Sampson supported the suicide claim, this was quickly contested by Epstein&apos;s lawyers. They had hired forensic pathologist Michael Baden to observe the autopsy, although he was then himself bound by gag orders filed by Sampson&apos;s office and Epstein&apos;s estate, and unable to comment on the autopsy directly.

But in the time thereafter, Baden was vocal in his skepticism of the official cause of Epstein&apos;s demise. In October 2019, he declared that Epstein&apos;s neck injuries were much more consistent with &quot;homicidal strangulation&quot; than suicide, and that the autopsy pointed to murder. He added that Epstein&apos;s hyoid bone was broken in a way indicative of strangulation from behind — although this was disputed by other medical practitioners, many of whom noted that Epstein&apos;s injuries could indeed be consistent with hanging.

Nevertheless, there was footage from one camera, which quickly became a matter of great interest. FBI Director Kash Patel told Joe Rogan in June 2025 that the video footage would be made available — and that there was nobody visible in it but Epstein, with no further incriminating evidence to suggest foul play. But when the 11-hour video was finally released a few weeks later, it was torn to shreds by YouTuber Coffeezilla. The footage was mostly inconclusive, but seemed to show inmates walking about after lockdown, contradicting Patel&apos;s statement that nobody was visible but Epstein. There was also a gap in the video time sequencing — with an entire minute of footage missing around midnight on the night of Epstein&apos;s death. Coffee added that in the vicinity of the cell, there were not four, but no less than eleven cameras that should have been recording that night — but only two actually were, and only one of those resulted in the footage released to the public (which was full of holes). Perhaps the biggest hole of all: the footage wasn&apos;t even of Epstein&apos;s cell area, but rather of a guard station area nearby.

Critics argued that the discrepancy between the assertions by Kash Patel and FBI Deputy Director Dan Bongino, and the eventual release, should only deepen public suspicion. The camera angle failed to provide an unobstructed view not just of the cell door but even the staircase leading to it, leaving key moments open to interpretation, and basically made the long-awaited release practically useless.

Meanwhile, defenders of the official account countered that surveillance systems in older facilities often overwrite or segment files automatically, which can create apparent gaps without implying tampering. Still, the combination of missing minutes, unclear movements in the corridor, and the absence of secondary footage kept debate alive across social media and independent investigative channels. Debate has continued to rage also about the nature of the postmortem injuries found, and former inmates from the prison later chimed in to add that there was no physical way to hang oneself — in the way Epstein had supposedly done — within the confines of such a cell.

Does all of this prove that Epstein&apos;s death was the result of foul play? Hard to say. But it all seemed a bit fishy.

A few months after the video release, Dan Bongino stepped down from his role as FBI Deputy Director after less than a year. According to Trump, he wanted to return to doing podcasts. …okay then.

## MCC After Epstein

Obviously, given all that had transpired and the sequence of peculiar security failures, the internet was soon rife with questions and theories as to what happened that night at the Special Housing Unit. And all this made the MCC look… not very competent.

The prison did not succeed in recovering its reputation. In the period after Epstein&apos;s death, reports also emerged of horrendous conditions at the facility. MCC, built in the 1970s to hold a maximum of 460 inmates, was described as now holding more than 750. David Patton, executive director of Federal Defenders of New York, lambasted its conditions, describing — amongst other things — the plumbing as atrocious, the site as infested with rats and cockroaches, that raw sewage had once spilt into the women&apos;s wing, and that there was a general lack of care for inmates. Mental health services were described as particularly faltering… which doesn&apos;t seem all that surprising.

And so in 2021, the Bureau of Prisons announced that MCC New York would be permanently closed due to &quot;ongoing structural and operational issues.&quot; Inmates were shipped out and transferred to other facilities — mostly the Metropolitan Detention Center in nearby Brooklyn.

The building — once one of the most important federal detention centers in the country — was effectively shuttered. Since its closure almost five years ago at the time of writing, the facility has remained inactive, with zero inmates held inside. The Bureau of Prisons has not set a reopening date, and efforts to secure sufficient funding for necessary repairs have stalled, leaving the long-term future of the building uncertain.

In the meantime, Epstein&apos;s death halted the criminal case against him. And whatever secrets were known only to him were forever taken by the financier to the grave.

But his death — as you know — did not end the broader reckoning. In fact, the suspicious nature of his demise may have only contributed to the ongoing scrutiny of all that he&apos;d done — and those who&apos;d been in some way involved. One year after Epstein&apos;s death, Ghislaine Maxwell was arrested, and later tried and convicted on federal charges related to sex trafficking. The U.S. Virgin Islands pursued civil claims against Epstein&apos;s estate on Little Saint James. In France, Jean-Luc Brunel was arrested in December 2020, on charges including rape of minors, human trafficking and related crimes. He denied all wrongdoing before ultimately hanging himself on the night of the 18th of February 2022. And with the release of incriminating files in late 2025 and early 2026, yet more revelations about the involvement of other famous people have continued to surface.

The reckoning has continued. Let us see if the story which seemingly ended in Metropolitan Correctional Center New York on the 10th of August 2019 may yet have an epilogue that could bring justice to all that were victimised along the way.

## Key Takeaways

- Jeffrey Epstein was found dead in his cell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan.
- Epstein&apos;s death was officially ruled a suicide, but many questions and controversies remain.
- The prison had significant security and operational issues, including malfunctioning cameras and staff shortages.
- Epstein&apos;s final weeks in the prison were marked by a suicide attempt and unusual security lapses.
- The Metropolitan Correctional Center was permanently closed in 2021 due to ongoing structural and operational problems.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### Where did Jeffrey Epstein die?

Jeffrey Epstein was found dead in his cell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center New York on August 10th, 2019.

### What charges was Jeffrey Epstein facing when he was arrested in 2019?

Jeffrey Epstein was charged with sex trafficking of minors and conspiracy to commit sex trafficking.

### What was the official cause of Jeffrey Epstein&apos;s death?

The official cause of Jeffrey Epstein&apos;s death was ruled as suicide by hanging.

### What were some of the security issues at the Metropolitan Correctional Center New York?

The prison had staff shortages, poor maintenance, malfunctioning cameras, and a partial power outage that left inmates without heat for days.

### What happened to the correctional officers assigned to Jeffrey Epstein&apos;s unit?

The two correctional officers, Tova Noel and Michael Thomas, were charged with making false records and conspiring to falsify records for not conducting required checks.

### What was the condition of the Metropolitan Correctional Center New York after Epstein&apos;s death?

The prison was described as having horrendous conditions, including overcrowding, poor plumbing, infestations, and a lack of care for inmates, particularly in mental health services.

### What happened to the Metropolitan Correctional Center New York after Epstein&apos;s death?

The Bureau of Prisons announced that MCC New York would be permanently closed due to ongoing structural and operational issues in 2021.

### What was the significance of the video footage released after Epstein&apos;s death?

The released video footage was inconclusive and had gaps, leading to further speculation and debate about the circumstances surrounding Epstein&apos;s death.

### What was the outcome of the criminal case against Jeffrey Epstein after his death?

The criminal case against Jeffrey Epstein was halted after his death, but the broader reckoning continued with the arrest and conviction of Ghislaine Maxwell and other related investigations.

### What was the reaction to the conditions at the Metropolitan Correctional Center New York?

David Patton, executive director of Federal Defenders of New York, described the conditions as atrocious, with issues such as raw sewage spills and a lack of care for inmates.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: The Prison Where Jeffrey Epstein Met His End.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBO6wGSCZ9A)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/54/One_Night_Only_at_Hamilton_Terrace%2C_Manhattan_outdoor_setup_2.jpg) by SWinxy / openverse, by.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Red Village: The Last Shtetl in the World.</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/red-village-last-shtetl-world</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/red-village-last-shtetl-world</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Have you ever watched *Fiddler on the Roof*?

If you&apos;ve seen the 1971 musical classic, you&apos;ll be familiar with the whimsical life of Tevye in the tight-knit town of Anatevka. You&apos;ll recall how Tevye struggled to eke out a living as a dairyman, within a Jewish community itself struggling beneath the yoke of Imperial Russia. You&apos;ll remember the traditions so important to him and his wife, and the close bond between the family and their neighbours.

What you&apos;ll have been looking at was life in a Shtetl — Jewish settlements once common across Central and Eastern Europe in what was historically known as the Pale of Settlement — until the Second World War.

And with the Second World War, this way of life died. Most of the inhabitants of such villages were slaughtered, and the survivors wound up either integrating into surrounding societies or emigrating away. What remained of the Shtetl way of life went with them.

But not entirely.

There remains one village where this way of life is preserved. One where the tight-knit community of Jews lives on as it has done for centuries, in a manner once common in Europe.

And it is found…in Azerbaijan.

## The Red Village

The world&apos;s last Shtetl does not — at first glance — look anything out of the ordinary.

Officially known in Azerbaijani as &quot;Qirmizi Qesebe&quot; or simply &quot;Qirmizi&quot;, the settlement is located in the Caucasus Mountains, around 180 kilometres north of Azerbaijan&apos;s capital Baku, and less than 40 kilometres from the border with Russia. Qirmizi Qesebe is more commonly referred to by its Russian name, &apos;Krasnaya Sloboda&apos;, with both names translating to English as &apos;Red Village&apos; — a nod to the Soviet Union, under which the settlement&apos;s name was changed from &apos;Yevreyskaya Sloboda&apos;, or &apos;Jewish Village&apos;. But the name could easily — as some have surmised — also be a reference to the prominent red roofs which adorn the village skyline.

Other than this, there isn&apos;t much which appears to visibly separate Qirmizi from any other struggling village in the poor, rural provinces of the Caucasus. It has the same nondescript buildings, and a withering population peaking at around 3,500, significantly less than its height of 18,000 in 1991. It is thought that much of its population resides in the village only seasonally, with the population falling to as low as 500 permanent residents in the winter months. The general profile of Qirmizi also largely resembles that of surrounding settlements in other ways too. Village elders pass their time in the local *chaykhanas* — or traditional Azeri tea houses — often playing backgammon, a common pastime across the Caucasus. The village is dotted by a few former factories, now in disuse after the passage of time saw their industries decline.

But the first key distinction is in the demographic profile. In contrast to the region&apos;s Shia Muslim majority, the locals of Qirmizi overwhelmingly belong to the so-called Mountain Jewish community, a subgroup of Mizrahi Jews which is believed to number up to 50,000 people in Azerbaijan, and some 150,000 in Israel. The Mountain Jews have a presence in present-day Azerbaijan going back 1,000 years, although many arrived during waves of persecution in Iran during the 18th century, at which time the village was established. To this day, the population of the village speak Juhuri or &quot;Judeo-Tat&quot;, a member of the Iranian branch of languages related to Persian and, especially, to a language spoken by another minority in Azerbaijan, known as Tat. Perhaps due to the close relation between the two, it is said that Jews in the North Caucasus city of Nalchik managed to survive Nazi occupation by pretending to belong to the Tat community, and successfully concealing their true identity.

And knowledge of other languages is also common, as a means of communication not only with outsiders, but also between the Mountain Jewish majority and small Georgian Jewish and Ashkenazi populations — both of which arrived in the town in the 19th and 20th centuries. The collective Jewish population of Qirmizi live a largely undisturbed existence, in peace with other local ethnicities — many of whom belong to either the Tat or Lezgin minorities — in addition to the wider Azeri majority.

But if you look a little closer, there are a few other ways by which Qirmizi contrasts starkly from the village and ethnicities which surround it. One of those is a quite spectacular mountain of wealth — but we&apos;ll get to that in a little bit.

## The Shtetl Life

Now, one of the things that made living in a Shtetl different from any other type of settlement was not so much its buildings or physical features, but more so its culture, something equally true of Qirmizi as of the prewar European Shtetls.

The Shtetl way of life was eloquently described in the writings of Sholem Aleichem, a nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Jewish writer hailing from what is now Ukraine. In *Tevye and his Seven Daughters* (Aleichem&apos;s story which was later adapted for the stage as &apos;Fiddler on the Roof&apos;), the principal character resides in the village of Boyberik — today known as Boyarka — a Jewish-inhabited settlement on the outskirts of Yehupetz, which was in turn a semi-fictionalized rendering of Kyiv. In other words, the shtetl existed side-by-side with a major non-Jewish urban settlement, with whose inhabitants the Jews interacted regularly, often for commercial reasons. The same is more or less true of Qirmizi, which lies adjacent to the town of Quba, the principal city of the Quba district of Azerbaijan, with the two settlements located on opposite banks of the Kudyal river.

And like Boyberik — whose inhabitants earned a living as labourers and artisans — the traditional industries of Qirmizi also historically centred around craftsmanship. Carpet weaving is a common traditional activity in the Quba area generally — something which is no different in its outlying shtetl.

For centuries, the populations of European Shtetls predominantly spoke their own language — which for Ashkenazi Jews was Yiddish, a derivative of medieval German. For the Mountain Jews, this is the aforementioned Juhuri dialect still in use by many. Still, many European Jews would have been competent in the predominant language of commerce of the areas they lived in — often Russian or German — and this, again, is no different in contemporary Qirmizi. Most locals speak Russian, which — especially during the Communist era — was the lingua franca used for interethnic communication by communities across the Soviet Union. As described by *The Times of Israel*, the use of Russian in the village surpasses the use of Azerbaijani even to this day. Even so, some inhabitants are trilingual, speaking competent Azerbaijani and Russian, as well as their native Judeo-Tat.

Historically, the Ashkenazi Jews in Europe lived a mostly piecemeal existence, being cyclically banned from merchanting and other professions by discriminatory laws, and being precluded from yet others by their own faith. This helped cultivate an integral and self-sufficient community punctuated by the influence of religion. Well just like in European Shtetls, the Mountain Jews adhere strongly to traditional Jewish customs. Little business is conducted on Saturdays — the Jewish Sabbath — and prayer times are strictly observed. Endogamy — or marriage within the community — is predominant, divorce is regarded as a tragedy and is very rare, and Qirmizi even has its own matchmaker — who was also the village postman.

## The Jerusalem of the Caucasus

In 2020, Orthodox Jewish vlogger Shloime Zionce paid a visit to Qirmizi Qesebe.

While the Orthodox movement — something born largely out of Ashkenazi Judaism — was not especially prevalent amongst the local population in their routines and attire, what Zionce found was a community nonetheless keenly adhering to its Jewish faith.

Morning prayers — or *Shachras* — could be observed in one of the many synagogues in the town — as could Jewish traditional education at both the village *Yeshiva* and its *Beit Midrash*, or study hall. The village also features a *mikvah* or ritual bath complex, in addition to a wedding hall and a museum dedicated to the history of the Mountain Jews. On a hilltop above Qirmizi, several cemeteries with gravestones marked in Hebrew overlook both the Red Village itself and its sister town Quba, on the other side of the river.

Given its unusual status as a Shtetl which outlived not only the passage of time, but the threat of the Nazis and the restrictions of the Soviet era, Qirmizi has been the focus of great intrigue by Jewish communities abroad. Suppression by the Soviets saw local rabbis sent to gulags, and all remaining religious expression forced into secrecy. As a result, by the time communism fell, the spiritual devotion of the locals was at an all-time low, and so Jewish clerics — especially those belonging to the Orthodox Chabad sect — have since been sent by authorities in Israel to steer the flock back towards their traditions. But outside influence has seen form in other ways too.

The synagogues have been refurbished, and other religious institutions in Qirmizi have also been established or renovated. Generous donations from wealthy benefactors from the Mountain Jewish community in Russia have allowed the regeneration of the village. The village has received support from the Azerbaijani government and also from Lev Leviev, an Israeli businessman and diamond magnate, and major benefactor of the Chabad movement. Leviev also became well-known when con artist Shimon Hayut pulled on his surname and earned infamy as the Tinder Swindler, but his charitable donations have helped upkeep ailing Jewish communities abroad, with Qirmizi amongst them.

## A Shtetl Like Any Other (But Not Quite)

Now, as you will have gathered, the features of life in Qirmizi — in many ways — quite obviously resemble the Shtetls of old. But there are two areas in which this Shtetl — and the people who come from it — are quite radically different.

For one thing, Qirmizi has a strong military history. Like many other communities in the Caucasus, the Mountain Jews were ready to take up arms to defend themselves in the case of an external threat. This somewhat contrasted the community with the Ashkenazim of Europe, who were often forced to adopt a more pragmatic approach towards the world around them, and who generally chose neutrality as conflicts in Europe raged. While European Jews did participate individually in such conflicts — and often with distinction — a unified military front was largely eschewed to ensure survival across centuries of routine upheaval. But when the Second World War found its way to the Caucasus, as many as 500 village boys from Qirmizi joined the ranks of the Soviets to fight the Nazis. Of these, only 200 returned.

More recently, a member of the community received the honour of National Hero of Azerbaijan, for his role as a tank driver in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Albert Agarunov was killed by sniper fire on the front in 1992, while attempting to recover the bodies of his comrades during the fall of Shusha. A bronze statue was later erected in Baku in his honour, in the wake of the successful Azerbaijani offensive which reclaimed most of the same territory. Other Mountain Jewish community figures became the subject of deliberate focus by the Azerbaijani media during the same conflict. This included David Sadiyev, a soldier who was profiled in several state news pieces, and Rabbi Zamir Isayev, who publicly declared his pride in the dozens of Jewish soldiers serving with the Azerbaijani army.

But the second — and today, more significant — distinction is on an economic front.

You see, impoverishment was a common feature of Shtetls across Europe before the war. As mentioned, the Jewish populations were largely tradespeople, artisans, carpenters and small-time traders. Many wouldn&apos;t have worked on Saturdays, and some young men would devote themselves — above all — to full-time study of the Torah. Added to that were the discriminatory practices to which they were subjected, and that the Jews were often made to establish their communities on fallow and unproductive parcels of land, which rendered agriculture difficult. Unsurprisingly, the Shtetls were often rife with poverty.

Well, this is a little different in Qirmizi Qesebe.

It&apos;s not that all the village people are particularly wealthy. But what does make the village highly unusual is the population of billionaires who originated from there.

God Nisanov was born in Qirmizi and — like many from his community — pursued further education in Baku. He later opened a consignment shop in his native village, before moving to Russia where he made his fortune. Today, Nisanov is one of the wealthiest people in the world, with an estimated fortune of 3.1 billion US dollars, according to *Forbes*.

He&apos;s not the only one. Nisanov gained his wealth through business interests initially in the field of real estate, alongside his partner and fellow Qirmizi native, Zarakh Iliev. Iliev, like Nisanov, is estimated to have a personal fortune above 3 billion dollars. And if two billionaires from a town which barely tops three and a half thousand people weren&apos;t enough, German Zakharyayev is another local who made it big in Russia. Zakharyayev arrived in Russia in 1992, and made his fortune in trade with his brothers. Along with his childhood friends Nisanov and Iliev, Zakharyayev is believed to belong to the world&apos;s 3,000 or so billionaires.

But the recent generation of so-called &quot;Quba Jew&quot; billionaires is still not necessarily unique. Before Nisanov, Iliev and the Zakharyayevs, a Qirmizi family known as the Gilalovs also made it big in Russia, largely in commerce and construction. The family business was started by patriarch Talhum and later led by his sons Zaur and Akif Gilalov, who collectively also founded STMEGI, the International Charitable Foundation of Mountain Jews.

This — in theory — would offer Qirmizi the twin distinction of being not only the last remaining Shtetl, but also one of the locations with the greatest concentration of billionaires in the world.

As a local resident joked to Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*:

&gt; The town is 1 kilometer long. It is probably the richest kilometer in the world.

## The Billionaires&apos; Shtetl

All three Qirmizi billionaires are active in Jewish affairs, and the cumulative influence of the sons of the Red Village has led to an outsized presence of the Mountain Jews in major Jewish organisations.

God Nisanov was elected Vice President of the World Jewish Congress in 2014, and left the position eight years later, after the U.S. placed him on a sanctions list. Zakharyayev is Vice-President of the Russian Jewish Congress, on whose board Nisanov also sits as a member. And Zakharyayev, Nisanov, and Iliev alike have all contributed to the establishment or restoration of Jewish schools, synagogues and other cultural institutions in Russia.

German Zakharyayev is currently President of the International Charitable Foundation of Mountain Jews, founded and initially led by founder Zaur Gilalov, but who was murdered in Moscow in a suspected business-related killing in 2004.

The eminence of the tycoons has benefited their home village in several ways. Iliev and Nisanov helped establish the aforementioned Museum of Mountain Jews, which opened in Qirmizi in 2020. Several new mansions have been constructed in the place of older village houses, and synagogues and schools have seen quite extraordinary improvements. In his visit to the village, Shloime Zionce noted the splendid interior of the Synagogue, despite its flock visibly only amounting to a small handful of worshippers. According to Zionce, this particular synagogue was also only in use during the barren winter months, and a much larger synagogue would be used in the summer months when the population increased. He noticed the splendid Persian carpets which cloaked the Winter Synagogue&apos;s interior, of which he counted fifteen and revealed each one cost around 2,000 dollars.

The Qirmizi billionaires have erected mansions in their hometown, which have welcomed some rather noteworthy names to the small and unassuming village. Among those who&apos;ve paid a visit to the Shtetl in recent years include Patriarch Kirill, Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as Azerbaijan&apos;s President Ilham Aliyev, Israeli playwright Iddo Netanyahu (brother of Benjamin), and famous Turkish singer Ibrahim Tatlises, who arrived to perform a private concert at the birthday of one of the billionaires&apos; sons.

The illustrious connections of its natives also play a role in safeguarding the high status of the community. The close ties of the Quba billionaires to authorities in Russia and Azerbaijan&apos;s authoritarian President have led to investments benefitting the settlement&apos;s schools and other infrastructure. And the contentment of the locals has in turn paid dividends to Aliyev, being able to hold up the Mountain Jewish community as an example of tolerance in what is otherwise one of the region&apos;s most repressive states. Through the favourable discourse of Azerbaijan&apos;s Jews, Aliyev has managed to draw attention away from often extreme state rhetoric against Armenians and — to a lesser degree — against the Talysh, a Persian ethnic group who&apos;ve long complained of discrimination and the suppression of language and cultural rights. As described by Israeli media outlet *Haaretz*:

&gt; Sponsoring and supporting its small and unthreatening Jewish community — particularly with the aid of the region&apos;s wealthy Jewish businessmen — is a key part of advancing the narrative (…) that Azerbaijan is a tolerant and anti-Semitism-free country fighting for its survival.

The same narrative has also contributed to the military ties between Israel and Azerbaijan, which procured and used Israeli arms in its successful assault on the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020.

## An Uncertain Future

Yet despite its relative grandeur and polish, the future of Red Village is uncertain.

Extreme wealth of some of its natives to one side, Qirmizi and the surrounding area are not abundant with economic prospects, and many young people leave the village for life in bigger cities or abroad — understandably so, given the path trodden by their forebears in Russia. Qirmizi&apos;s economic turmoil is something it shares with many villages and towns nearby. The once-prominent textile industry in Quba has collapsed, factories have shut, development funds have been divested away, and many of the rich and wealthy have moved to Baku.

The main inhabitants of the Shtetl are now the elderly and young children. Aside from Russia, Qirmizi&apos;s inhabitants have left for Israel and the United States, in particular the Mountain Jewish enclaves in Brooklyn and the Mediterranean city of Tyre. Many of these send remittances back to their hometown, and periodically return in the summer season. Even so, the permanent population continues to decline, as it has done consistently since the fall of the Soviet Union. And with a weak local economy and few jobs, those who remain are largely dependent on family and benefactors abroad.

This must be a bitter reality, given that Qirmizi remains a village of great illustriousness. Aside from its native billionaires and the famous soldier Albert Agarunov, the town is renowned for being the home of other figures including physician Gavriil Ilizarov — who pioneered several advances in reconstructive surgery — as well as no less than seven recipients of the prestigious Hero of Socialist Labour, which was issued during the Soviet Era.

But its standing and recent features do not change reality. Jobs remain sparse, and while the Museum of the Mountain Jews and a newly-built visitor centre are welcome additions, as pointed out by one local resident, the two sites collectively employ only five people.

As the profile of the world&apos;s last Shtetl increases and curious visitors arrive, there is a possibility that Qirmizi&apos;s decline may be stayed by tourism. Such is the hope of many locals. But if not, the village may follow its predecessors in Europe into obscurity, its young population left in search of greener pastures, and a receding settlement left in its wake.

The Red Village left rusting in the Caucasus.

## Key Takeaways

- Qirmizi, Azerbaijan, is the last remaining Shtetl, preserving Jewish life from pre-World War II Europe.
- The village, known as the Red Village, is home to a tight-knit Mountain Jewish community.
- Qirmizi contrasts with typical Shtetls by having a significant population of billionaires.
- The village&apos;s economy struggles, leading many young people to leave for better opportunities.
- Qirmizi&apos;s future is uncertain, with hopes for tourism to revitalize the declining population.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Red Village?

The Red Village, officially known as Qirmizi Qesebe or Qirmizi in Azerbaijani, is the last remaining Shtetl in the world. It is located in the Caucasus Mountains, around 180 kilometers north of Baku, Azerbaijan.

### What is a Shtetl?

A Shtetl is a small town with a large Jewish population, historically common across Central and Eastern Europe. The term is often associated with the Jewish communities that lived in these towns before the Second World War.

### How did the Red Village survive the Second World War?

The Red Village survived the Second World War due to its remote location in the Caucasus Mountains and the fact that it was part of the Soviet Union, which had a different experience of the war compared to Eastern Europe.

### What languages are spoken in the Red Village?

The primary language spoken in the Red Village is Juhuri or Judeo-Tat, a member of the Iranian branch of languages related to Persian. Many residents also speak Russian and some speak Azerbaijani.

### What is the population of the Red Village?

The population of the Red Village peaks at around 3,500 during the warmer months but can drop to as low as 500 permanent residents in the winter.

### What is the economic situation in the Red Village?

The Red Village faces economic challenges similar to other rural areas in the Caucasus. Many young people leave for better opportunities in cities or abroad, leading to a declining permanent population. The village&apos;s economy is supported by remittances from emigrants and benefactors.

### Who are some notable figures from the Red Village?

Notable figures from the Red Village include billionaires God Nisanov, Zarakh Iliev, and German Zakharyayev, as well as physician Gavriil Ilizarov and soldier Albert Agarunov, who was honored as a National Hero of Azerbaijan.

### What role do the billionaires from the Red Village play in the community?

The billionaires from the Red Village have contributed significantly to the regeneration of the village, establishing and renovating religious institutions, schools, and cultural sites. They also have influential roles in Jewish organizations and maintain strong ties with authorities in Russia and Azerbaijan.

### What is the future outlook for the Red Village?

The future of the Red Village is uncertain due to economic challenges and a declining permanent population. While tourism and the influence of wealthy benefactors may help, the village faces the risk of following the path of European Shtetls into obscurity.

### What is the significance of the Red Village to Azerbaijan?

The Red Village is significant to Azerbaijan as an example of religious tolerance and diversity. The Azerbaijani government uses the Mountain Jewish community to promote a narrative of tolerance and anti-Semitism-free country, which also strengthens military ties with Israel.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Red Village: The Last Shtetl in the World.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ynW_xwMl6uc)
- [https://www.travelaze.com/red-town/](https://www.travelaze.com/red-town/)
- [https://newlinesmag.com/essays/how-the-mountain-jews-of-azerbaijan-endure/](https://newlinesmag.com/essays/how-the-mountain-jews-of-azerbaijan-endure/)
- [https://youtu.be/tAg_gT73UPE?si=5f_meQ5ZjnKJzjfG](https://youtu.be/tAg_gT73UPE?si=5f_meQ5ZjnKJzjfG)
- [https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/krasnaya-sloboda-qirmizi-q-s-b](https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/krasnaya-sloboda-qirmizi-q-s-b)
- [https://azertag.az/en/xeber/first_museum_of_mountain_jews_in_red_settlement_of_azerbaijans_guba_district-2086685](https://azertag.az/en/xeber/first_museum_of_mountain_jews_in_red_settlement_of_azerbaijans_guba_district-2086685)
- [https://www.trend.az/life/socium/3337159.html](https://www.trend.az/life/socium/3337159.html)
- [https://jweekly.com/2021/01/20/in-azerbaijan-patriotic-jewish-soldiers-are-poster-children-of-the-war-with-armenia/](https://jweekly.com/2021/01/20/in-azerbaijan-patriotic-jewish-soldiers-are-poster-children-of-the-war-with-armenia/)
- [https://www.forbes.com/profile/god-nisanov/](https://www.forbes.com/profile/god-nisanov/)
- [https://www.forbes.com/profile/zarakh-iliev/](https://www.forbes.com/profile/zarakh-iliev/)
- [https://azertag.az/ru/xeber/nashi_sootechestvenniki_god_nisanov_i_zarah_iliev_sozdayut_v_azerbaidzhane_pervyi_v_mire_muzei_gorskih_evreev-1324141](https://azertag.az/ru/xeber/nashi_sootechestvenniki_god_nisanov_i_zarah_iliev_sozdayut_v_azerbaidzhane_pervyi_v_mire_muzei_gorskih_evreev-1324141)
- [https://www.jta.org/2004/03/07/lifestyle/mountain-jewish-leader-killed-in-moscow](https://www.jta.org/2004/03/07/lifestyle/mountain-jewish-leader-killed-in-moscow)
- [https://www.timesofisrael.com/a-glimpse-into-azerbaijans-hidden-all-jewish-town/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/a-glimpse-into-azerbaijans-hidden-all-jewish-town/)
- [http://www.visions.az/en/news/386/ad48cd0/](http://www.visions.az/en/news/386/ad48cd0/)
- [https://amnesty.ca/urgent-actions/azerbaijan-academics-face-up-to-20-years-in-prison-for-speaking-out/](https://amnesty.ca/urgent-actions/azerbaijan-academics-face-up-to-20-years-in-prison-for-speaking-out/)
- [https://apnews.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-weapons-israel-6814437bcd744acc1c4df0409a74406c](https://apnews.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-weapons-israel-6814437bcd744acc1c4df0409a74406c)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gavriil_Ilizarov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gavriil_Ilizarov)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Agarunov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Agarunov)
- [https://www.hadassahmagazine.org/2008/01/14/feature-mountain-jews-brooklyn/](https://www.hadassahmagazine.org/2008/01/14/feature-mountain-jews-brooklyn/)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/97/A_New_Dawn_for_Central_Asia_Ivanishvili%2C_Ilham_Aliyev.jpg) by Remy Steinegger/World Economic Forum / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Red Zones, Northern France: The Lasting Scars of World War I</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/red-zones-northern-france-lasting-scars-world-war-i</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/red-zones-northern-france-lasting-scars-world-war-i</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>The lingering effects of war never truly disappear. Those who engage in armed conflict, be it on the winning or losing side, more often than not will have to live with its consequences, long after the fighting is over. Physical wounds, disabilities and post-traumatic stress disorder can remain as permanent stigmata of horrors that can never truly be forgotten.

The world was introduced to such lasting effects on a scale never experienced before, following the end of the Great War, the supposed war to end all wars. Science and technology applied to mass killing on an industrial scale left the world in shock, and scattered the seeds for an even deadlier conflict 20 years later.

A conflict of such magnitude was bound to leave its scars not only on individuals, but on entire populations, nations and even on territories. The land itself did not escape the constant torture meted out by raining artillery shells, nor the creeping clouds of chemical weapons. And when the fighting was over, the very ground would be contaminated by the toxins seeping out from unspent instruments of death, and even from the dead bodies of an entire generation, trapped in no man&apos;s land by schemes they could not comprehend.

There is an area in North-Eastern France, along the border with Belgium, where the land was martyred and later poisoned to such an extent, that the government realised that no human activity could ever be resumed. Even today, more than a century after the last shot was fired, those once fertile lands have not experienced a single harvest—for all it could be harvested is dormant death, encased in rusted metal shells.

Welcome to the unhealed scars of the Great War.

Welcome to the Red Zones.

## Storm of Steel

The Red Zones, sometimes simply &apos;the Red Zone&apos;, comprise several patches of land in North Eastern France, along the border with Belgium. They follow a roughly crescent shape, with the western-mostly tip being located near Lille. The crescent then moves southwards, snaking its way past Lens, Arras, Cambrai and Compiegne, before heading eastwards towards Verdun and finally Nancy.

Military history enthusiasts may have recognised this area as the one of heaviest fighting on the WWI&apos;s Western Front, where the trenches dug by the Imperial German Army faced those manned by France and her allies. From 1914 to 1918, this region was the backdrop to some of the most violent battles experienced by humankind to that day: the Battle of the Somme, Vimy Ridge, and especially the Battle of Verdun.

In 1919, after the end of WWI, the Red Zones covered an area of 1,800 square km, roughly two and a half times the surface of New York City. We will explore later how the red zones were defined and designated.

By 1927, the areas with a &apos;red zone designation&apos; had considerably shrunk, to a surface of 490 square km, that&apos;s three fifths of New York City.

As of today, the Red Zones have been further reduced to an &apos;archipelago&apos; of patches of land, dispersed along the crescent I described earlier. This constellation of off-limits areas adds up to roughly 120 square km, one third of New York City. Or, to keep with a French theme, we are talking of an area slightly larger than the surface of Paris!

So, throughout the past century, the size of the Red Zones has changed considerably, but not their essence. These are swathes, or patches of land, so destroyed, so contaminated by the incessant shelling and chemical warfare of WWI, that all human activity has ceased to exist. Entire villages were either severely damaged or entirely wiped out off the map. Thousands of residents were relocated. Agriculture was completely abandoned. Even today, access to the remaining Red Zones is severely limited and controlled.

The theoretical process of transforming the barren landscape of a planet into a new, hospitable Earth is called terraforming.

What happened here was the opposite: the very practical process of turning a once productive countryside into a hostile, alien, moon-like landscape, devoid of vegetation and littered with craters.

Allow me to introduce a new term: &apos;luna-forming&apos;.

To better understand how this &apos;luna-forming&apos; process took place, let&apos;s take Verdun as an example.

Before the start of WWI, Verdun was home to a peace-time garrison of 66,000 troops. In addition to the civilian population, these thousands of young men with robust appetites needed to be fed with the best that the French countryside had to offer.

Thus, the surrounding region was intensively farmed. The soil was fertile, and local produce sustained the economy of the area.

At the same time, those 66,000 troops needed to have a tactical advantage against potential invaders. Amongst several other factors, such advantage could be derived from the presence of forests.

That&apos;s right, pre-WWI French military doctrine placed great importance in thickly wooded areas!

After the defeat against Prussia in the war of 1870, the Ministry of War, in cooperation with the Water and Forestry Administration created a dedicated forest corps comprising more than 6,000 troops. In 1875 this new corps set about planting trees in the plains around Verdun, creating a new forest intended to protect the road leading from the border to Paris.

The idea made quite a lot of sense. Dense formations of trees made for very good cover for infantry troops, they could hinder the efforts of artillery spotters and break down the momentum of cavalry charges. More simplistically, a few troops armed with sharp axes could quickly gather enough material to erect fortifications and trenches. In the words of writer Jean-Paul Amat, author of &apos;The Forests of the Great War&apos;:

&gt; &apos;The forest … had become, in 1914, an element of the defense system, permanent and immediately mobilizable in its structures&apos;

The concept of trees against invaders may have been sound at the times of &apos;good-old fashioned warfare&apos;, if you allow me the term. You know, the kind were battles were mostly conducted by means of inaccurate artillery and bayonet charges.

But then came June 1914. An adolescent shot an archduke in Sarajevo and Europe reacted by committing suicide.

In early August 1914, Germany invaded Belgium and then France. The initial advance was halted, and battle lines stabilised along the Western Front, inaugurating that theatre of horrors known as trench warfare, a spectacle enlivened by those special effects known as artillery barrages, and later, chemical and gas warfare.

More than 34,300 square km of land were completely devastated in France and Belgium. To put this into context: that&apos;s an area larger than the state of Hawaii, or almost twice the size of Wales.

Across France and Belgium, 5,168 towns and villages, for a total of almost 1 million houses and farms, had to be rebuilt, or were abandoned, after the war.

This destruction was most evident at the Battle of Verdun, from February to December 1916. Both sides fired a total of 60 million artillery shells, of which 15 million were left on the ground, unexploded. Those that did go off, completely destroyed the top layer in the affected area, carving large shell craters which exposed the limestone bedrock.

By the end of 1916, some 100 square km once covered by farmed fields, gardens, prairies and woods had been completely erased from existence. As described by historian Christina Holstein:

&gt; &apos;The ground was just completely churned up. Any trees were smashed, and men took shelter where they could, in shell holes and in holes in the ground&apos;

Author Jean-Paul Amat described how the impact of the constant fighting, shelling, machine-gun strafing

&gt; &apos;compromised or exhausted wood resources, disrupted the grounds.&apos;

To the point that

&gt; &apos;The thermal or kinetic energies released … were such that they caused the total mineralization of the environment.&apos;

In other words, where the fury of the bombardments was fiercest, all that remained of the soil was the mineral layer.

Such a storm of metal could not but turn the battle into a meat grinder. The French and German armies suffered a total of 300,000 dead and 400,000 wounded—and these are conservative estimates!

Despite all the best efforts of the respective armies, up to one third of the killed in action are believed to still lay on the battlefield, waiting to be found and identified.

## &apos;Human Life Impossible&apos;

Hostilities concluded with the November 11, 1918 armistice. And in early 1919, the newly constituted French Ministry for the Liberated Territories set about to rebuild the regions affected by Verdun and other battles on the Western Front.

The Ministry divided the areas into three zones:

Green Zones, which had suffered minimal damage.

Yellow Zones, where damage was heavy, but still limited.

And the Red Zones, closest to the front lines, where destruction was almost complete. An official post-war report described them as

&gt; &apos;Completely devastated. Damage to properties: 100%. Damage to agriculture: 100%. Impossible to clean. Human life impossible&apos;

So, while the Green and Yellow Zones returned to civilian use relatively quickly, the Red Zones were closed off to the general population. On April 17, 1919, a law transferred ownership to the State of such areas, which would be prohibited from human activities.

The first order of business for the government was to clean the ground from unexploded ordnance, debris and, sadly, human and animal remains. This task was conducted by local labourers, German PoWs, workers imported from as far as China, or even Quaker volunteers.

The search for ammunition was conducted superficially, due to the lack of metal detection technology at the time. Labourers were able to retrieve only the debris and shells found in the topmost layers of the soil, most of which were dumped into the ocean. Today we know that most unexploded artillery remained untrieved, resting as deep as 15 metres under the surface of the earth.

This workforce also had the grim task of collecting unidentified human remains, mostly bones, which continued throughout the 1920s. After 1926, the exhumed remains were taken to the National Necropolis at Fleury-devant-Douaumont.

The construction of this sprawling cemetery began in 1923, not far from one of the villages destroyed and later abandoned following the Battle of Verdun. From August 1925, soldiers buried in smaller cemeteries in the region were exhumed and transferred to this city of the fallen. By the time it was inaugurated, on June 23, 1929, the lawns of Douaumont were lined by 16,142 white graves belonging to Christian, Muslim and Jewish soldiers.

As mentioned, authorities transported to the necropolis the thousands of dead unearthed within the Red Zones, up to 500 per month. Eventually, the remains of 130,000 French and German soldiers were buried at the monumental Ossuary within the necropolis. About half of them were identified, and their families had their names engraved on the stones of the lower vault.

Underneath it, another underground pit contains the bones of those who remained nameless.

And many, many more, will remain without formal identification, as tens of thousands of bodies are still waiting to be found in the Red Zones.

Since the early 1920s, French authorities realised that these masses of decaying bodies were responsible for the contamination of aquifers and other bodies of water for human consumption. Thus, the authorities had to heavily chlorinate these waters, a process which became known in France as &apos;Verdun-ization&apos;.

By the early 1920s, associations of farmers gradually re-took ownership of some of the reclaimed areas. Although, as we shall see later, these were not, nor would never be, entirely cleared.

As per the most damaged lands, the government realised that their efforts of recovery for agricultural use were futile. The cost would have far outweighed the economic value of the land. But leaving the land to its own devices carried the risk of soil erosion and flash floods in case of heavy rains.

A solution came from the French Agricultural Engineering Corps and the Waters and Forests Service. These authorities proposed to convert the &apos;luna-formed&apos; zones into heavily forested areas, which would have performed three functions:

First, prevent locals from farming the Red Zones, an activity which carried the ever present risk of death by explosion or poisoning.

Second, stave off erosion.

And Third, preserve the memory of the fallen through the very presence of these new woodlands.

Thus, almost 36 million trees were planted in the 1920s and 1930s.

While the soil may have been contaminated, apparently its top layer, broken by shelling, made it easy for new trees to penetrate into the friable earth. And the experts in charge made the right choice of trees to plant: resilient conifers, such as spruce and black pine.

By the 1970s, conifers had been gradually and naturally replaced by deciduous trees, such as beech. It appeared that over time, the flora reintroduced by man had taken over its own destiny, and had evolved by itself.

## An Iron Harvest

It is now time to spell out exactly what is to be found in the areas still designated as Red Zones.

If you were to take a stroll in those zones—which you absolutely should not—you may be able to spot visual mementoes of the raging battles of the Western Front: shrapnel from artillery, unexploded ordnance, or even shells once used for chemical weapons.

According to a 2014 *Le Monde* newspaper article, the areas around Verdun were littered with 200,000 shells belonging to the French and German chemical arsenals.

Unexploded conventional and chemical shells are a constant danger to those who venture in the current Red Zones, or who farm the land in the former Red Zones. That is why, twice a year, during the planting and sowing seasons, local farmers pay extra attention to any bit of metal which may protrude from their fields.

According to Joseph Hupy, a geographer at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire:

&gt; &apos;I heard several stories of where people were ploughing and a shell went off. They weren&apos;t killed, but they had cowbells ringing in their heads from the shell going off.&apos;

Not everybody has been so lucky. Since the end of WWI, at least 900 people have died due to old shells suddenly blowing up. Again, according to Hupy:

&gt; &apos;The people who die in the munitions removal, they don&apos;t really die from the explosive ones. They die from gas shells.&apos;

Any piece of unexploded ordnance is reported to a specialised mine-clearing brigade in Metz, for them to collect it safely. This recurring cycle has eventually given birth to an annual event, known as &apos;Iron Harvest&apos;—an appropriate title!

Depending on sources, the annual yield of such harvest varies from 30 to 900 tons of ammunition. Two percent of these are chemical warfare shells, still containing mustard gas, phosgene and diphosgene.

This is the only kind of harvest one would wish to diminish every year, but unfortunately that might not be the case.

According to Christian Cléret, head of the mine-clearing brigade, to achieve a complete clean up,

&gt; &apos;It will still take at least tens of years&apos;

Historian Christina Holstein is even more pessimistic. According to her, it may take an estimated 300 years before the battlefield of Verdun is completely cleared. And that is only one of the remaining Red Zones!

Besides the visible presence of ammunition, what makes the Red Zones particularly dangerous is the presence of a constant, unseen threat. The contamination caused by cartridges, bullets, bombs, as well as the bacteria resulting from the decomposition of animal and human bodies.

In 2007, Tobias Bausinger and Johannes Preuss, researchers at Gutenberg University in Mainz, Germany, followed a paper trail dating back to 1928, looking for a site where French authorities had incinerated unexploded chemical shells, left over from the Battle of Verdun. Their research took them inside an oak forest, north-east of Verdun, where they discovered a vast circle, 70 metres wide, where more than 200,000 chemical shells may have been burned by authorities.

Dubbed the &apos;Gas Square&apos; by the Mainz researchers, this circle was still covered in ash and charcoal, and was surrounded by a sickly vegetation of moss and lichens. Needless to say, the ground underneath and around &apos;Gas Square&apos; was heavily contaminated.

In the same year, Bausinger, Preuss and the French National Forestry Office published a more comprehensive analysis of the soil in the Red Zone close to Verdun. They found that the ground was replete with metals such as mercury, copper, zinc and lead, but most of all with arsenic and ammonium perchlorate, a compound used in the detonation devices of artillery shells.

Mushrooms, game meat and other food foraged or hunted in current and former Red Zones might be heavily laden with toxins. The livers of wild boars for example, have been found to contain abnormally high levels of lead. Wine-makers are particularly encouraged to verify the provenance of the wood used to make their barrels. If they are made from oak harvested in former Red Zones, they might contaminate the wine with lead!

Arsenic concentration is particularly worrying, at 1,000 to 10,000 times higher than average. In some locations, arsenic constitutes up to 17.6% of the soil. The presence of this element can prevent the normal growth of healthy vegetation, if any at all! And it can easily permeate the local aquifers, thus endangering the health of even those who live far removed from the Red Zone.

The same can be said of ammonium perchlorate. In Autumn of 2012, the drinking water of some 500 towns and villages in north-eastern France was declared as not fit for consumption, due to abnormally high rates of this compound. Local authorities did not specify the origin of the pollution, but in 2014 newspaper *Le Monde* speculated that contamination from old ordnance was responsible.

One century after the start of the water, civilians still incurred the risk of being poisoned by the lingering ghosts of weapons, silent, but still deadly.

## Nature Resurgent

I realised that the picture I painted so far is extremely apocalyptic. But there is evidence supporting the idea that the once &apos;luna-formed&apos; areas have bounced back to life, thanks to the afforestation efforts in the 1920s and 1930s, and to the absence of a certain species with enormous potential for good, as well as the tendency to behave like the most toxic parasite, i.e. *homo sapiens*.

In November 2018, exactly one hundred years after the armistice, the BBC visited nine &apos;ghost villages&apos; within the Red Zone, referred by the local press as

&gt; &apos;Morts pour la France&apos;

Or &apos;Dead for the sake of France&apos;.

Well, to be fair, three out of nine settlements were at least partially rebuilt, which means that six remain technically &apos;dead&apos;—and they were kept this way on purpose, as an involuntary monument to the sacrifices endured by civilians during the war.

But what BBC reporter Melissa Banigan could not help but notice, was that these villages were not exactly dead. The houses built by man, and later destroyed by man, had been taken over by the unrelenting march of nature, namely oaks, horse chestnuts and Austrian pines. Interestingly, the latter were donated by Germany&apos;s ally, Austria, as part of their war reparations.

Olivier Gérard, director of the Douaumont Ossuary commented:

&gt; &apos;Nature and life always find a way.&apos;

Indeed, nature had found a way. It appears that over the course of the decades, the millions of planted trees had absorbed enough contaminants from the toxic soil to allow unique species of flora and fauna to thrive.

Back in 2013, the French National Forests Office, commissioned an aerial survey of the forest growing in the Verdun Red Zone. A small plane flew over the area, equipped with a laser emitting constant near-infrared pulses. This methodology, known as &apos;light detection and ranging&apos;, or LIDAR, allowed the Forests Office to map with utmost precision the forest&apos;s vegetation, as well as the remnants of the battlefield, such as old trenches, bunkers and shell holes. This initial survey allowed the Forests Office to conduct further research, thus determining that new flora, and even new fauna, had gradually taken over what once was no man&apos;s land.

In particular, researchers found that shell craters had become very popular with wildlife, as they were frequently flooded by rainfall, and made for a protected ecological niche. New settlers in these craters include yellow-bellied toads, several species of newts and even rare orchids—a rare sight indeed amongst the forests of northern France!

Underground shelters, dug up by both German and French troops, have been conquered instead by 15 different species of bats. The entrances to these dug outs are guarded by plants found nowhere else in France, such as horsetails, ferns and *Sisyrinchium*, or blue-eyed grass.

The latter is actually a blue flowering plant, normally found in the Americas.

It is possible that the blue-eyed grass was likely unwittingly brought to France by the &apos;doughboys&apos;, the soldiers of the American expeditionary force who reached the Western Front in 1918.

It is comforting to know that their unmarked graves away from home—or the graves of any other soldier fallen in the Red Zones—would never be left without flowers.

## From the Hands of an Undeserving Kind

The metaphorical scars left by conflicts across the world are unpredictable. Sometimes, nations are able to move on surprisingly quickly, and past enemies learn how to cooperate for the future good of the next generations. Far too often, the shockwaves planted decades ago still reverberate around past battlefields, ebbing and flowing in intensity, yet never allowing for old wounds to fully heal.

The same unpredictability can be applied to the physical scars left upon the innocent and unwitting earth, always the defeated party, regardless of who is the victor. Will the scars of France&apos;s Red Zones ever heal? Will those areas ever recover, and return to their past, pre-war state? The simple answer appears to be &apos;no&apos;. The complex answer would be &apos;maybe, dependent on three further centuries of concerted clean-up effort&apos;. But one might answer with another question: does it really matter? As we have learned from the previous section, nature appears to have moved on, to have reclaimed a land from the hands of an undeserving kind. Nature has moved on, following an agenda of her own.

I will conclude by quoting again Prof Hupy, the geographer from University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire:

&gt; &apos;I have done lots of work in the Zone Rouge. I looked at how soils developed in that landscape afterwards. Basically what I wanted to see was &apos;Did this landscape recover?&apos; The word &apos;recover&apos; is not the right word.
&gt;
&gt; It got set off on a different trajectory of development.&apos;

## Key Takeaways

- The Red Zones in France are areas heavily damaged by WWI, with lingering contamination from unexploded ordnance and chemical weapons.
- These zones, initially covering 1,800 square km, have shrunk but remain hazardous, with ongoing &apos;Iron Harvests&apos; of unexploded shells.
- Nature has begun to reclaim the Red Zones, with unique flora and fauna thriving in the contaminated soil.
- The Red Zones are a stark reminder of the enduring impact of war on both people and the environment.
- Despite efforts to clean and reforest the areas, full recovery may take centuries due to deep contamination.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What are the Red Zones in Northern France?

The Red Zones are areas in North-Eastern France, along the border with Belgium, that were so severely damaged and contaminated during World War I that they were deemed unfit for human activity. These zones follow a crescent shape and have been reduced over time but still cover roughly 120 square km.

### Why were the Red Zones created?

The Red Zones were created because the land was so destroyed and contaminated by the incessant shelling and chemical warfare of WWI that all human activity had to cease. The French government designated these areas as off-limits to prevent further harm to civilians.

### What is the &apos;Iron Harvest&apos;?

The &apos;Iron Harvest&apos; refers to the annual collection of unexploded ordnance and other metal debris from the Red Zones. This occurs twice a year during the planting and sowing seasons, with yields varying from 30 to 900 tons of ammunition, including chemical warfare shells.

### How were the Red Zones defined and designated?

In 1919, the French Ministry for the Liberated Territories divided the affected areas into three zones: Green Zones (minimal damage), Yellow Zones (heavy but limited damage), and Red Zones (almost complete destruction). The Red Zones were closed off to the general population and transferred to state ownership.

### What is the &apos;Gas Square&apos;?

The &apos;Gas Square&apos; is a 70-metre-wide circle in an oak forest north-east of Verdun where French authorities incinerated over 200,000 chemical shells left over from the Battle of Verdun. The area is heavily contaminated with toxins and surrounded by sickly vegetation.

### What is the National Necropolis at Fleury-devant-Douaumont?

The National Necropolis at Fleury-devant-Douaumont is a large cemetery built to honor the soldiers who died in the Battle of Verdun. It contains the remains of 130,000 French and German soldiers, with about half identified and the rest buried in an underground pit.

### How has nature reclaimed the Red Zones?

Despite the contamination, nature has reclaimed the Red Zones through afforestation efforts and the absence of human interference. Unique species of flora and fauna have thrived, including rare orchids, yellow-bellied toads, and various species of bats.

### What is the significance of the &apos;blue-eyed grass&apos; found in the Red Zones?

The &apos;blue-eyed grass&apos; is a blue flowering plant normally found in the Americas. It is believed to have been unwittingly brought to France by American soldiers during World War I, symbolizing the enduring presence of nature even in the most devastated areas.

### What is the current status of the Red Zones?

The Red Zones have been reduced to an &apos;archipelago&apos; of patches of land dispersed along a crescent shape in North-Eastern France. Access is severely limited and controlled, and the areas remain contaminated with unexploded ordnance and toxins.

### What is the &apos;luna-forming&apos; process mentioned in the article?

The &apos;luna-forming&apos; process refers to the transformation of once productive countryside into a hostile, alien, moon-like landscape devoid of vegetation and littered with craters due to the intense shelling and chemical warfare during World War I.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Red Zones, Northern France: The Lasting Scars of World War I](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkZOrTkN8vg)
- [Hero image source](https://images.rawpixel.com/editor_1024/czNmcy1wcml2YXRlL3Jhd3BpeGVsX2ltYWdlcy93ZWJzaXRlX2NvbnRlbnQvbHIvdXB3azYxNjkzODU2LXdpa2ltZWRpYS1pbWFnZS1rb3dsbDVsMS5qcGc.jpg) by openverse, cc0.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Semipalatinsk: The USSR&apos;s Eerie Nuclear Test Site</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/semipalatinsk-ussr-nuclear-test-site</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/semipalatinsk-ussr-nuclear-test-site</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>In 1949, the Soviet Union accomplished a keen ambition: the detonation of its first atomic bomb.

Known as RDS-1, the bomb produced a mushroom cloud which obliterated the surrounding landscape. With an explosive yield of 22 kilotonnes, it released a cloud of radioactive particles into the air, contaminating the surrounding area, and registering radioactive particles which triggered the attention of a nearby US spy plane.

Luckily, the bomb was tested in the arid steppes of Kazakhstan, therefore there were no human beings around to be affected by the Soviet nuclear plans.

But of course there were.

Today, we will be unravelling the details of this particular project, and exploring just what the ramifications of it were for the people living around the test site of Semipalatinsk in the northeastern Kazakh SSR — both then, and even today.

## Background

Given the destructive power of the US&apos; Fat Man bomb, which levelled the stubborn Japanese resistance in the latter stages of World War II, the world quickly took notice of the weapon. Perhaps most interested were Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union, who decided to throw everything they had into developing a nuclear bomb of their own.

And so Lavrentiy Beria, the monstrous head of the NKVD, set up a number of sites in isolated (but not that isolated) parts of the vast USSR, in order to rapidly unearth the secrets of the supercharged new invention.

This led to the establishment of Chelyabinsk-40 in rural Siberia, a city which later became infamous due to nuclear waste fed into the nearby waters of Lake Karachay from a nuclear facility known as &apos;Mayak&apos;. Karachay became the deadliest lake in the world, and the cost to surrounding flora, fauna, and humans was likely immeasurable: not least because to spend anything more than a few moments near the lake today would result in an irreversible dose of death.

Aside from this, the Soviet nuclear project came with a significant number of accidents and disasters. Most famous was Chernobyl in 1986, which could have — and in some places did — have irreversible consequences for millions of people. Kyshtym was another, earlier example. Covered up by the Soviet authorities for years, the September 1957 accident, which took place at Mayak, saw toxic waste spew straight into Lake Karachay and the surrounding area, resulting in an untold number of cancer cases in the following years. Chernobyl and Kyshtym were not the only such examples in the USSR. In fact, astonishingly, two more deadly accidents occurred at Mayak alone around the same time — one just a few months before Kyshtym, in May 1957, and another about six months after, in February 1958. Both accidents resulted immediately in worker deaths, but it can be presumed that toxic releases were generated which came at the expense of more lives elsewhere. And in 1968, yet another accident took place at Mayak, when improperly handled plutonium resulted in one worker dying and another having three limbs amputated.

Keep in mind, these are only the accidents we know about. The Soviet nuclear project — much like the state in general — carried out its aims in strict secrecy. Many of its experiments took place in mysterious and far-flung test sites, or in closed cities whose existence was sometimes unknown even to people living a few miles down the road. On occasions where a disaster took place, they were generally hushed up, and many of the documents pertaining to Soviet-era nuclear activities were bundled away or destroyed as the period ended. We may never know the full extent of what the Soviets got up to, the extent of the accidents they caused by misadventure or negligence, or what the human toll — not to mention environmental — was to all of this.

Anyway, back to Semipalatinsk. The rural town in east Kazakhstan was chosen by Beria in 1947 in the search for a nuclear-grade weapon. Beria had claimed the surrounding steppe was uninhabited (which, of course, it wasn&apos;t), and nuclear test facilities were established there using Gulag labour. Scientists were hauled in, and nuclear development and testing quickly got underway.

And so rose the infamous Semipalatinsk Test Site, a sprawling 18,000 square kilometre facility also known also by its codename Semipalatinsk-21 — or more commonly still its nickname, &apos;The Polygon&apos;.

## The Polygon

The Polygon got off the ground with vigour. Over the next four decades, the bombs detonated at Semipalatinsk released energy around 2,500 times greater than the one dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

Already by 1949, the nuclear project had borne fruit. RDS-1, known in the West as Joe-1 and the USSR&apos;s first atomic bomb, was successfully tested on the 29th of August that year. The test was the culmination of an initiative known as First Lightning, which united all existing arms of the Soviet nuclear structure. RDS-1 was designed by the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, one of whose later deputy directors was Valery Legasov, the man tasked with the response to the Chernobyl Disaster and who was portrayed by Jared Harris in the 2019 HBO series *Chernobyl*. Plutonium for RDS-1 was produced in Chelyabinsk-40, home to the Mayak power plant, which would later spew the same element into the bodies of its workers and into the serene waters of Lake Karachay.

The West quickly realised that the Soviet Union had acquired the bomb, a fact announced by US President Harry S. Truman in September 1949. The following month, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued significant awards to groups of leading researchers, designers, and engineers involved with the project. Several were issued the State Stalin Prize, and the leaders of the project were issued the title of Heroes of Socialist Labour. This included its lead developer, physicist Yulii Khariton, who went on to become one of only sixteen people to be issued the prestigious award three separate times.

Following the success, the Polygon pressed forward with more nuclear projects. It remained in operation for the next forty years, during which time as many as 456 test detonations were carried out at the site.

116 of these were atmospheric nuclear explosions that took place between 1949 and 1962, and which were no doubt responsible for the vast bulk of radioactive bleed to which nearby residents were exposed. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world to the brink of an all-out nuclear war in 1962, an agreement on nuclear test reduction was signed by the Soviet Union, the US, and more than a hundred other countries. However, the so-called Limited Test Ban Treaty didn&apos;t end nuclear testing outright — and explosions at the Polygon continued with pace, just now underground in boreholes and caves. A further 340 nuclear explosions were carried out at Semipalatinsk by 1989.

The full impact of radiation exposure was hidden for many years by Soviet authorities. Some came to light after the Polygon ceased operations and the site was inherited by Kazakhstan in 1991. However, much of the site&apos;s data sits in sealed archives in Moscow, which includes details about the nature of the testing and the consequences for those exposed to it.

However, the effects were clear as day to those who looked close enough.

## Nuclear Fallout

Among all the problems related to the tests at the Polygon, perhaps the greatest can be traced back to Beria&apos;s claim, at the outset of the project, that the steppe was uninhabited.

He was lying. At least 500,000 people lived in areas close to the site during the Soviet era, according to Radio Free Europe. Most of these had no idea about the nature of the work happening at the Polygon, save for their suspicions.

Of course, it didn&apos;t really take a detective to have an inkling of what the authorities were up to. This was probably fairly clear given the oddly-coloured explosions which would cause the ground to uncontrollably shake, and the Soviet authorities&apos; coincidental announcement of having unlocked the secret to the most destructive weapon known to man.

So while the Soviet public may not have been aware of the extreme risks of nuclear radiation, the people of the area probably knew that some murky business was happening on their doorstep.

Not that being more aware would have done them much good. The Soviets were certainly not about to let the population of Kazakhstan pack up and move away, not unless they were forced to do so. Generally, moving people out of Kazakhstan was not within the USSR&apos;s playbook, and more common was to instead dump undesirable populations there, to fend for themselves in the open expanses of the steppe. This included large populations of Germans, Chechens, Ingush, and Ukrainians — populations which remain significant in Kazakhstan until this day.

Exile to Kazakhstan was even a punitive tactic used against highly-ranked Soviet officials who&apos;d fallen out of favour. Georgy Malenkov, who succeeded Stalin as Premier of the Soviet Union in 1953, was a notable recipient of this treatment. After losing a power struggle to Nikita Khrushchev in the mid-1950s, he led a failed coup d&apos;état in 1957, after which he was labelled an Anti-Party agent by Khrushchev and expelled from the Politburo. He was then, humiliatingly, sent to assume a managerial role at a hydroelectric plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, about 180 kilometres east of Semipalatinsk. Malenkov remained there for thirty years, suffered severe depression, and ultimately died in obscurity three years before the fall of the Soviet Union.

Of course, some locals were a little more aware of what was going on at the Polygon because they were there to support its volatile and poorly-contained work. This included cleaners, maintenance workers and other fringe staff — who lived and worked in the area for decades without being closely informed of the nature of the work conducted there. Many of these concluded their employment with little other than a small pension and early retirement, going on to suffer poor health in the following years and only becoming aware of the nature of the site as the project was unravelled post-1989.

And even those who weren&apos;t at the epicentre of the Polygon&apos;s radioactive perimeter could be affected by the fallout. The strong winds of the steppe blew the nuclear debris and radioactive dust far and wide, negatively affecting hundreds of thousands of people.

According to estimates from Kazakh experts, 1.5 million people were exposed to fallout over the years.

## End of Operations and Legacy

As the fall of the Soviet Union approached, the activities at Semipalatinsk were wound down and ultimately ended in November 1989.

The military soon pulled out and returned to Russia, taking with them scientific data about the Polygon&apos;s activities and also most of the modern medical equipment from Semipalatinsk&apos;s hospital. In December 1991, Kazakhstan seceded from the Soviet Union. It was the last former Soviet Republic to gain independence, four days after even the Russian Federation did so — meaning that for a very brief moment, Kazakhstan was the USSR.

By that time, Soviet activities had transformed the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic into a rather peculiar place, something left to the nascent Republic of Kazakhstan to figure out. The country was now a patchwork of a wide variety of ethnicities: Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Ukrainians, Koreans, Poles, Tatars, Turks, and about four million Russians. It was also now home to some of the most toxic places on the planet — not least the Polygon, which Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev permanently closed down as the Soviet Union folded in August 1991. Today, the site falls under the jurisdiction of the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan, or NNCRK.

Unfortunately, the effects of the site lingered on — and remain pronounced to this day.

The number of miscarriages and stillbirths in the area surrounding Semipalatinsk (since renamed Semey) is much higher than in the rest of the country. Many children in the area have been described as being born with physical or neurological defects. In short, Kazakhstan inherited not only the decaying site, but also the task of dealing with its inglorious fallout.

According to Aleksei Konovalov, head of the Semey Independent Social Center, more than 40 percent of the Semey region&apos;s population suffers from various radiation-related illnesses. Many suffer from suspected Chronic Radiation Syndrome (CRS), a collection of various medical complaints such as anaemia, chronic fatigue, joint pain, and brittle bones disease. A large number of these were identified in a 2016 study at a regional town close to the site — a town which ironically retains the name &apos;Kurchatov&apos; until this day.

Rates of cancer in the area are also very high, with *The Independent* noting that the cancer ward at Semey&apos;s regional hospital treats up to 40,000 people every year.

And the risk of exposure to the smouldering nuclear site remains very present. As pointed out by *Foreign Policy*, while most of the underground tunnels in which testing took place are sealed-off, the general area remains generally accessible. There is no perimeter fence around the site, possibly due to — at 18,000 square kilometres — its rather hefty size. Economic hardship in the area following the fall of the USSR resulted in the radioactive site being overrun by metal scavengers even before nuclear threat reduction work was carried out. Kazakhstan later revealed evidence of illegal scavenging operations in the underground tunnels of the Polygon, the same tunnels within which more than 300 nuclear tests had been carried out, but which contained easily recoverable plutonium for illegal trading. This illicit trade became an uncomfortable trend for Central Asian countries to have to contend with. By 2009, Kazakhstan and four neighbouring states signed and ratified the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (CANWFZ) to contain the issue — although the wording of the treaty was seen as opaque, and illicit trading remains an issue until today.

Meanwhile, locals regularly swim and fish in the test site&apos;s lakes, which includes Lake Chagan, located on the Polygon&apos;s perimeter. Chagan was the site of one of the Soviet Union&apos;s largest underground tests in 1965, and much of the generated waste was absorbed directly by the water of the lake. It has since been referred to as &apos;Atomic Lake&apos;, and its water has been found to have 100 times more radionuclides than standard drinking water until today.

In addition, local livestock are also allowed to roam and graze on the ruined terrain of plains in and around the test site. There are no checkpoints or signs warning that the surrounding territory remains radioactive. And while the test site was ultimately closed to visitors, this was only in 2019, and it is suspected that this was only because Russia wrestled back some control over the area from Kazakhstan.

## Future

The legacy of the test site at Semipalatinsk remains a lingering headache for Kazakhstan to try and contain, something which it has, to some degree, done — but only with significant outside help.

In 2012, a joint initiative between the United States, Kazakhstan, and Russia helped secure the site. The United States provided funds and project management, and Russia — begrudgingly, and probably after some incentive was provided by the US — provided scientific and historical information. The project — which lasted 17 years and cost 150 million dollars — offered a measure of sanitary security perimeters to the most exposed parts of the site. However, many analysts have stated that the Polygon will continue to require close oversight over years to come, due to its volatile nature.

Separately, Kazakhstan has had to try to deal with the health defects suffered by its population. The government has officially recognized more than 1 million people as being negatively affected by the tests, entitling them to social benefits such as financial aid, higher pensions, and free or subsidised health care.

But local residents say those benefits are provided to people who have obtained a certificate proving their status as a radiation victim, something attained only through meticulous paperwork supporting an applicant&apos;s residency in the affected provinces between 1949 and 1990.

It is thought that as many as half of the affected population have no such paperwork, and therefore no entitlement to such benefits — which are relatively meagre in any case.

The financial support package is thought to equal about 40 US dollars per year per person. According to Konovalov, about 63 percent of aid beneficiaries don&apos;t receive paid leave, more than 90 percent don&apos;t have access to subsidised health care, and practically nobody receives discounted medicines for their health conditions.

The trouble is, Russia has continued to wield the destructive capacities of nuclear weapons as a threat in its warfaring.

With the war in Ukraine not going terribly well, Russian authorities have regularly made ominous statements with regard to nuclear testing. As recently as September, military representatives declared that they would be willing to resume testing on Russia&apos;s new testing site in the Arctic in the event that the West provided Ukraine long-range arms which could strike Russian targets — which they did, in November.

Rear Admiral Andrei Sinitsyn, the head of the facility on the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya, declared in an interview with Russian government newspaper *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, that:

&gt; &quot;The test site is ready for resumption of full-scale testing activities. (...) Laboratory and testing facilities are ready. The personnel are ready. If the order comes, we can start testing at any moment.&quot;

With the Russians faltering in Kursk, and with the order to equip Ukraine with long-range missiles having been now confirmed by President Biden, who knows if this order will now be followed through upon.

But on November 19th, a few days after the US permitted Ukraine to use its long-range missiles and landmines, Putin approved changes to Russia&apos;s nuclear doctrine. The new doctrine ominously states that an attack from a non-nuclear state, if backed by a nuclear power, will be treated as a joint assault on Russia.

According to the BBC, the changes mean that a large attack on Russia could now meet the criteria for a nuclear response.

## Key Takeaways

- The Soviet Union&apos;s first atomic bomb test in 1949 contaminated the Kazakh steppes, affecting local residents.
- Despite claims of an uninhabited test site, at least 500,000 people lived near Semipalatinsk during Soviet nuclear tests.
- The Semipalatinsk Test Site conducted 456 nuclear detonations over four decades, exposing 1.5 million people to fallout.
- Kazakhstan faces ongoing health issues and environmental contamination from the Semipalatinsk nuclear tests.
- Russia&apos;s recent nuclear threats and Kazakhstan&apos;s struggles highlight the enduring legacy of Soviet nuclear testing.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### When did the Soviet Union successfully test its first atomic bomb?

The Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic bomb, known as RDS-1, on August 29, 1949.

### What was the yield of the RDS-1 bomb?

The RDS-1 bomb had an explosive yield of 22 kilotonnes.

### Where was the Semipalatinsk Test Site located?

The Semipalatinsk Test Site was located in the arid steppes of Kazakhstan.

### How many nuclear test detonations were carried out at the Semipalatinsk Test Site?

As many as 456 test detonations were carried out at the Semipalatinsk Test Site over four decades.

### What was the impact of the nuclear tests on the local population?

An estimated 1.5 million people were exposed to fallout over the years, leading to high rates of miscarriages, stillbirths, physical and neurological defects, and radiation-related illnesses.

### When did the operations at the Semipalatinsk Test Site end?

The activities at Semipalatinsk were wound down and ultimately ended in November 1989.

### What is the current status of the Semipalatinsk Test Site?

The site falls under the jurisdiction of the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan and was permanently closed in August 1991.

### What is the legacy of the Semipalatinsk Test Site for Kazakhstan?

Kazakhstan inherited the task of dealing with the fallout from the nuclear tests, including high rates of radiation-related illnesses and environmental contamination.

### What measures have been taken to secure the Semipalatinsk Test Site?

In 2012, a joint initiative between the United States, Kazakhstan, and Russia helped secure the site by providing sanitary security perimeters to the most exposed parts.

### What benefits are provided to those affected by the nuclear tests in Kazakhstan?

The Kazakh government has recognized over 1 million people as negatively affected by the tests, entitling them to social benefits such as financial aid, higher pensions, and free or subsidised health care.

## Sources

- [Original Places video: Semipalatinsk: The USSR&apos;s Eerie Nuclear Test Site](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Tgkrz95tIQ)
- [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-nuclear-test-chief-says-moscow-is-ready-resume-testing-at-any-moment-2024-09-17/](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-nuclear-test-chief-says-moscow-is-ready-resume-testing-at-any-moment-2024-09-17/)
- [https://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2008/11-80076_Report_2008_Annex_C.pdf](https://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2008/11-80076_Report_2008_Annex_C.pdf)
- [https://www.distance.to/Semey,Aba%C4%B1-oblysy,KAZ/Ust-Kamenogorsk,East-Kazakhstan-Region,KAZ](https://www.distance.to/Semey,Aba%C4%B1-oblysy,KAZ/Ust-Kamenogorsk,East-Kazakhstan-Region,KAZ)
- [https://www.rferl.org/a/victims-of-kazakhstan-s-soviet-era-nuclear-tests-feel-abandoned-by-government/30288299.html](https://www.rferl.org/a/victims-of-kazakhstan-s-soviet-era-nuclear-tests-feel-abandoned-by-government/30288299.html)
- [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-worlds-worst-radiation-hotspot-1784502.html](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-worlds-worst-radiation-hotspot-1784502.html)
- [https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/199116.htm](https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/199116.htm)
- [https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/28/nuclear-bombs-weapons-soviet-union-russia-kazakhstan-polygon-semipalatinsk/](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/28/nuclear-bombs-weapons-soviet-union-russia-kazakhstan-polygon-semipalatinsk/)
- [https://www.amusingplanet.com/2014/03/lake-chagan-atomic-lake-filled-with.html](https://www.amusingplanet.com/2014/03/lake-chagan-atomic-lake-filled-with.html)
- [https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/central-asia-nuclear-terrorism-nexus](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/central-asia-nuclear-terrorism-nexus)
- [https://www.nationalgeographic.com/photography/article/nuclear-ghosts-kazakhstan](https://www.nationalgeographic.com/photography/article/nuclear-ghosts-kazakhstan)
- [https://www.historytoday.com/archive/behind-times/kazakhstans-nuclear-nightmare](https://www.historytoday.com/archive/behind-times/kazakhstans-nuclear-nightmare)
- [https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619493](https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619493)
- [https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj4v0rey0jzo](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj4v0rey0jzo)
- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/57/Aerial_landscape_view_%282017%29.jpg) by Saga1111 / openverse, by-sa.

## Related Coverage</description>
      <dc:creator>Simon Whistler</dc:creator>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>South Africa: the World&apos;s Most Unequal Place...</title>
      <link>https://places.site/article/south-africa-worlds-most-unequal-place</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://places.site/article/south-africa-worlds-most-unequal-place</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>South Africa, the Rainbow Nation.

On the 24th of June 1995, the nation&apos;s rugby team, the Springboks, overcame the powerful All Blacks of New Zealand to win the third-ever Rugby World Cup. The nation&apos;s first, in what was their team&apos;s first-ever appearance at the tournament.

The country exploded in celebration, celebrating the landmark success in South Africa&apos;s most-popular sport. More than a simple sporting victory, the tournament — also held in South Africa — represented the symbolic rebirth of the country as one with equal rights for its inhabitants. The notorious Apartheid system had been abolished only a year earlier, and the Springboks had been excluded from the previous Rugby World Cups on account of the discriminatory policy, which had been in place since 1948.

The jubilation which accompanied the victory came alongside hopes for an equitable future for the country, and a banishment of the bitter past. The tournament and period was documented in the 2008 book *Playing the Enemy* by author John Carlin, which was in turn converted into a 2009 film called *Invictus*, directed by Clint Eastwood.

South Africa&apos;s President, Nelson Mandela, had targeted success in the World Cup as a symbolic way to heal the wounds and division caused by decades of separation. And in June 1995, it seemed that this had paid off.

But while the brutal system had been overhauled, almost miraculously without a major outbreak of violence, this did — and does not — mean that economic and political equality has come to South Africa.

Let&apos;s explore.

## South Africa&apos;s Inequality

One thing that probably most know about South Africa — and which is important in the context of today&apos;s video — is that the country is incredibly diverse.

South Africa has no fewer than 11 official languages, ranging from those of the Bantu family such as Xhosa, Zulu, and Venda, to Indo-European languages such as English and the Dutch-derived Afrikaans. A further 11 languages have recognition or support of some kind, and more still are spoken by smaller communities among the vast 60 million-person population.

In terms of ethnicity, South Africa is very unique. It has large populations of Asian or Indian South Africans, White South Africans, and so-called Coloureds, in addition to the Black African majority and large immigrant populations from other countries. These groups can be broken down further still, with Black South Africans alone divisible into dozens of different tribes and ethnic groups — most with their own language and customs. These ethnicities can be separated into four overall subgroups: the Nguni (including the Xhosa and Zulu people), the Shangana-Tsonga, the Sotho-Tswana, and the Venda — all including a range of different languages, traditions, beliefs, and customs.

Some South African ethnic groups actually have a degree of cultural or administrative autonomy. The Zulu have their own king, and others have customary laws. There even exists a National House of Traditional Leaders, a body of 23 members which advises the President of South Africa on their customary laws.

Even the European-origin South Africans are relatively diverse, separated into the minority Anglo-Africans — who are of British origin and natively English-Speaking — and the mostly Dutch- and French Huguenot-descended Afrikaners, who constitute the majority of white South Africans, and speak the Afrikaans language natively. There are also White South Africans who belong to neither group, many of them descended from immigrants who arrived during the Apartheid era, and some of whom played a role in the most significant political developments of the period. Noteworthy examples include Greek-Mozambican Dimitri Tsafendas — who assassinated Hendrik Verwoerd, the architect of Apartheid, in the South African Parliament in 1966 — as well as Janusz Waluś, a Polish-born man who assassinated civil rights activist Chris Hani in 1993.

Given its vast array of languages, ethnicities, races, religions, cultures and traditions, it is hardly a mystery why South Africa was dubbed &apos;the Rainbow Nation&apos; by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Desmond Tutu in 1994.

But it is also the many racial or ethnic classifications of the Rainbow Nation which were the basis for the political and economic manipulation of Apartheid — in terms of discrimination and privilege alike.

For example, Asian South Africans suffered discriminatory measures — but less severely than the Coloureds. White people were at the top of the system, though Afrikaners marginally more so than Anglo-Africans. Black South Africans — often collectively referred to as &apos;Bantu&apos; peoples — were dead last, and suffered by far the most discrimination, sometimes even at the hands of other discriminated racial groups. In fact, the inhuman racial classifications of Apartheid led to a general sectarianism and deterioration of relations between many of the categorised groups. In 1949, huge unrest broke out between the Black South African and Asian South African communities of the city of Durban. The so-called Durban Riots lasted three days, left 142 people dead, and remain one of the worst episodes of violence in South African history.

In many ways, it is the legacy of Apartheid which underlines the inequality present in South Africa today, as we shall see later in this video.

Although discriminatory practices — in theory — no longer officially exist, the economic status of South Africa&apos;s population remains skewed along ethnic lines. This imbalance is so great that it has resulted in South Africa remaining the most unequal country in the world — according to several independent metrics — to this day.

In 2024, Swiss bank UBS released their annual Global Wealth Report, highlighting where wealth inequalities have grown the furthest. South Africa uncontestedly topped the list, scoring 82 out of 100 on the inequality index. In doing so, it edged out Brazil (at 81) as well as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia — both at 77.

Another common metric used to judge income inequality is the famous Gini coefficient, introduced by Italian statistician Corrado Gini in 1912. The Gini scale ranges from 0 (or lowest inequality) to 1 (highest). If one person earned all the income in a nation and the rest earned exactly nothing, the Gini coefficient score would be 1.

Well, South Africa has a Gini score of 0.65, the highest in the world, and the second-highest ranking was found to be Namibia at 0.59 — a state which was administratively part of South Africa until 1990.

So how did all this come to be — and what, if anything, is to be done about it?

## Apartheid

Although this notorious political system is well-known, what is perhaps not as well-known is the rigid structures it put in place, alongside other features which contributed to the massive inequality which exists to this day.

In fact, although Apartheid was introduced in the mid-20th century, restrictions on Black South Africans&apos; freedoms long preceded it.

In 1905, while South Africa was still controlled by the United Kingdom, a piece of legislation known as the General Pass Regulations Act denied Black Africans the right to vote, and limited them to living in fixed regions. After South Africa became a dominion in 1910, the Native Land Act was passed, which further prevented Black people in most of South Africa from buying land outside certain reserves. Next, the Urban Areas Act of 1923 introduced segregation in mixed areas. Further legislation then resulted in restrictions on the freedoms of other South African minorities — mostly Asian South Africans and so-called Coloureds, an Afrikaans-speaking ethnic group mostly residing in the Cape region of western South Africa.

Apartheid was introduced after the Second World War by the right-wing Nationalist Party of Hendrik Verwoerd. It remained in place for more than forty years. Apartheid was based on a political philosophy known as Baasskap, which advocated for the domination of the state by the white minority — especially Afrikaners — and a strict control over the presence of the Black majority in the labour force.

Its first law was to prohibit the intermarriage of whites and non-whites, followed by a ban on all sexual relations between them. In 1950, the infamous Population Registration Act was passed, which classified people into one of four races: White, Indian, Coloured, and Black. The classification would be carried out according to a set of measures, which included ancestry and physical features. But it also included very arbitrary elements like socioeconomic status, knowledge of the Afrikaans language, and even drinking habits.

Keeping in mind that the Indian South African included a significant merchant class, and the Coloureds were at least predominantly Afrikaans-speaking, this left the Black South Africans to bear the unmitigated brunt of the oppressive classification. As a matter of fact, despite the many diverse ethnicities and tribes mentioned previously, they were the only of the four groups not to be sub-categorised further under the Act.

So while the Indian and Coloured South Africans were broken down into Cape Coloureds, Cape Malays, Indians, Chinese, and so on, the vast Black population shared one simple designation: Black.

Over time, Apartheid sanctioned severe segregation and discrimination against South Africa&apos;s non-white majority population, which resulted in the widespread forced resettlement of millions of Black South Africans. By the time Apartheid was repealed in the 1990s, Black populations had lived for generations in various overcrowded districts, many of which had become ghettos. The social and economic repercussions of the discriminatory policy persisted, therefore, long beyond its abolishment.

A noteworthy example is the massive settlement of Soweto.

Shorthand for &apos;South West Townships&apos;, and located adjacent to the city of Johannesburg, Soweto was established in the 1930s as the separation of racial communities got underway. Over time, people poured into the settlement, which quickly became densely populated and rife with poverty. Today, some one million people live there, making it the largest township in the country. Its population is predominantly Black South Africans, and it was here that many of the anti-Apartheid movements took hold. Nelson Mandela resided in Soweto for many years, as did current President Cyril Ramaphosa, who was born there. The township became a hub of political activism, and in 1976, it saw one of the most traumatic losses of life of the Apartheid era.

It had recently been announced that local schools would be forced to teach in English and Afrikaans, the latter of which led to particular outrage. While many Black South Africans saw utility in English, Afrikaans was considered as the language of their oppressor, and was spoken by almost nobody natively in Soweto. Moreover, non-Afrikaans-speaking white populations would not be subject to the measure. The outrage quickly turned into the Soweto Uprising, which was viciously put down by authorities. It is thought that up to seven hundred people may have been killed.

The Apartheid era also saw South Africa establish so-called Bantustans for Black Africans. These were de-facto separate states, usually in arid and undeveloped regions, into which Black Africans were herded, losing their South African citizenship in the process. Between 1960 and 1980, some 3.5 million black South Africans were deported to resettlement camps in the Bantustans — which were recognised by nobody but South Africa, and were roundly criticised by the international community. Nevertheless, at one time there were twenty of them in South Africa and modern-day Namibia, and their existence led to a concentration of Black populations in certain regions, which continued beyond the fall of the system. After 1994, the Bantustans were reabsorbed into South Africa and a reconfiguration of its provinces took place.

What this meant was that practically the remainder of South African land was free to purchase by the privileged few, leading to not only oversaturated and impoverished urban areas, but the lopsided land distribution which continues today.

## Mandela and the Transition to Freedom

Eventually, years of domestic and international pressure led to the fall of Apartheid.

South Africa had increasingly become a sort of pariah in the international sphere, being boycotted by multiple countries and excluded from sporting tournaments by the 1970s and 1980s. At home, the situation was not much better, as civil rights movements and left-wing organisations rallied for an end to the system. Even before the horrific Soweto Uprising, another anti-Apartheid protest in the township of Sharpeville had been brutally put down by state police, resulting in 91 deaths. Many of the dead were shot as they fled, and the total number of victims was hidden by the state for many years.

The Sharpeville Massacre led to the rise of what became known as the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). The movement advocated greater solidarity amongst Black South Africans, Coloureds, and Indians. It rejected apartheid, and also rejected what it saw as the patronising attitudes of white liberals and anti-Apartheid activists towards Black culture.

The BCM was suppressed heavily by the state, and its leader, Stephen Bantu Biko, was arrested and beaten to death in a police station in 1977. The rise of the movement coincided with some more aggressive opposition groups to Apartheid, most famously the uMkhonto we Sizwe, a paramilitary organisation which became the armed wing of the African National Congress. The ANC was the most major African nationalist political party, established all the way back in 1912, but it had been banned after Sharpeville and remained underground throughout Apartheid. One of the most noteworthy figures of uMkhonto we Sizwe was its founder, Nelson Mandela, who was convicted of terrorism in 1964 and spent 27 years in prison, having narrowly escaped the death penalty.

During his lengthy imprisonment, Mandela abandoned violent means to overcome the regime, and became the leading voice for a peaceful transfer of power. He was released in 1990, and soon became the leader of the ANC, and later one of the most celebrated statesmen in history. His release coincided with the weakening of the system, and the ground was eventually set for its downfall.

Eventually, a referendum on the abolishment of Apartheid was called in 1992, open only to white voters. The referendum passed with 68% in favour, which led to the fall of the system in 1994. Mandela was elected President of South Africa the same year.

With that said, the end of the repressive system brought a period of significant instability to South Africa.

Between 1990 and the repeal of the system in 1994, 14,000 people died in political killings. Only 7,000 people had died in known political killings in the Apartheid era, so this represented a significant surge — although it later emerged that many state-sanctioned killings had been covered up or denied by Apartheid governments.

Still, as the system waned, fears of a race war rose.

A stand-off took place in Pretoria in 1993, when a conservative organisation known as the Afrikaner Volksfront amassed and threatened to ignite a conflict, but were ultimately stood down by their leader, Constand Viljoen. Another dissident rightwing group, the ultranationalist AWB, along with some members of the Volksfront, staged another standoff in 1994 in the Bantustan of Bophuthatswana. Eventually, this too subsided after a short conflict, which claimed the lives of four AWB members and 67 civilians.

Generally, although individual instances of violence, retribution, and terrorism took place, the race war that many feared — and some hoped for — did not take place. 14,000 lives were lost, but a brittle peace was secured, which allowed for the phasing out of the system and the beginning of a new era in South Africa.

Mandela brought into place the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1996, which exposed but generally pardoned crimes committed during the period. While hardly ideal, since it allowed many participants in the brutal system to escape without punishment, it did at least allow some closure to affected families and helped avoid a violent reaction from the minority population as power was transferred away from them.

By the mid-1990s, free elections had taken place, and — as expected — the ANC stormed to power, assuming 252 of an available 400 seats in the National Assembly. The ANC have remained in power ever since, as the preferred party of the majority population.

With that said, their rule has not been without criticism, controversy, corruption and internal divisions.

## The ANC

Now, before moving on, it is important to understand the oftentimes precarious political landscape in South Africa, which has been seen by some as upholding or — at least — permitting the great inequality which has persisted since Apartheid.

The ANC, following its legalisation in 1990 and rise to power in 1994, has dominated South African politics in the period since. For six years in the 1990s, it was led by Mandela, and was later by his deputy, Thabo Mbeki, then Jacob Zuma, and finally current President Cyril Ramaphosa.

During its successful 1994 campaign, the ANC ran on the slogan &quot;a better life for all&quot;, and promised expanded access to housing, healthcare, education, and the economy.

However, the ANC&apos;s record on actually delivering on these promises in the thirty years since has been dismissed by some observers as dismal. It has largely failed to address impoverishment, the land and property ownership imbalance, and skyrocketing crime. The ANC has also been subject to many claims of corruption and profiteering, and Jacob Zuma — its leader for ten years — was in 2021 convicted for benefitting from a controversial arms deal while President of South Africa. Another former President, Mandela&apos;s successor Thabo Mbeki, has also been accused of profiting from the same deal.

Resultantly, trust in the ANC has plummeted, something reflected at the ballot box. Although it remains South Africa&apos;s single largest party, the ANC now holds just 159 seats in the National Assembly, from a high of 252 in 1994. It remains in government, but only in coalition with the second-placed Democratic Alliance and other parties — a coalition which collectively holds 71% of seats in what has become a highly fractured legislative chamber.

## South Africa of the &apos;Born-Free&apos; Generation

In 2024, South Africa remains troubled by its massive inequality, amid a string of other pressing issues.

Perhaps surprisingly, the wealth disparity has only been increasing since Apartheid fell, although the imbalance can, no doubt, be traced to the oppressive system which dominated the country for so long.

With that said, it is not that no progress has been made. The Black middle class has grown significantly — being now numerically greater in size than the White middle class. Basic human rights are guaranteed to all citizens, access to education has improved, and South Africa&apos;s GDP per capita remains relatively high. At 5,700 dollars, it ranks among the highest in Africa and nearly three times that of either Nigeria or Kenya. Moreover, the share of farmland owned by Black South Africans — according to the government — has risen to 25%, the highest in history.

But for the many — including South Africa&apos;s poorest — the situation remains dire.

According to the IMF, in 2017 the wealthiest 20% of South Africa&apos;s population held around 70% of the country&apos;s income. Further, the wealth of South Africa was found to be overwhelmingly concentrated in the major urban hubs, with the inhabitants of the province of Gauteng, home to the country&apos;s administrative capital Pretoria and most populous city Johannesburg, being almost twice as wealthy (on average) as the inhabitants of the rural region of Limpopo and the Eastern Cape. Furthermore, according to CNN, South Africa&apos;s wealthiest 10% held about 71% of the nation&apos;s total wealth in 2018, and the bottom 60% held just 7%. South Africa&apos;s richest households were about 10 times as wealthy as poor households.

Central to the question of economic inequality is land ownership, which remains predominantly in the hands of the white minority. A government audit in 2018 revealed that 72% of South Africa&apos;s farmland was owned by the white minority, which at that time constituted less than a tenth of the population — although as mentioned before (and if government figures are to be believed), this share has since fallen.

The Black majority remains by far the most economically deprived, and constitute the majority of South Africa&apos;s high unemployment rate — which is 32%, according to government figures.

A Black South African was found to be four times as likely to be unemployed as a White South African. It was also found that about half of South Africa&apos;s population lived below the poverty threshold in 2018, judged at around 83 US dollars in income per month. Around 64% of the people falling into this category were found to be Black South Africans, around 41% Coloureds, 6% Indian or Asian South Africans, and just one percent White.

In terms of income, the same CNN report determined — using the economic classification on which Apartheid relied — that the average White South African earned the equivalent of about 844 dollars per month and Asian South Africans earned around 823. Coloureds earned on average around 334, and Black South Africans only around 305.

The great wealth disparity in South Africa is in some places visible to the naked eye, with lavish suburban neighbourhoods in provinces like Gauteng and the Western Cape existing directly adjacent to poor, overcrowded slums and temporary housing. Swimming pools sit beside shantytowns, paved roads run parallel to dirt tracks.

And amidst the vast economic imbalance, demands for reparations and redistribution of wealth have remained a hotly-contested topic.

Some have proposed the abolishment of inheritance — effectively meaning that the property of a deceased person would either have to either be bought at full price by the inheritor, or would be placed on the market. Others have proposed a higher inheritance tax, resulting in at least some bequeathed properties being made available to a new buyer.

In South Africa, inheritance tax — referred to as &apos;Estate Duty&apos; — is applied to estates above a certain value threshold. Currently, the state charges a 20% tax on estates worth between 3.5 and 30 million South African Rand (so between 190,000 and 1.7 million US dollars), and 25% on any estate valued above this. However, to remove inheritance or to increase the Estate Duty would almost certainly affect all economic groups — including the growing Black middle class. And to instead implement a measure specifically targeting certain racial groups would come with its own problems — and probably several lawsuits.

But there are those who&apos;ve proposed a more radical solution still, one which comes with even more pronounced risks. This is the idea of a simple expropriation of assets or land without compensation, something supported by several activist groups.

## The Economic Freedom Fighters

Perhaps the most aggressive exponent of this rapid solution to the issue in post-Apartheid South Africa is a party which emerged in the 2010s, known as the Economic Freedom Fighters.

The Economic Freedom Fighters or EFF were established in 2013 in Soweto, by dissidents who&apos;d broken away from the ANC. At the centre was the party&apos;s founder and leader, Julius Malema Sello.

Malema has been accused of running the EFF with an iron fist, purging uncooperative members and critics. He has also been accused of money laundering, threats to journalists, and has twice been convicted of hate speech.

Many elements of the EFF&apos;s styling are peculiar, if not downright amusing. The group and its officials wear red overalls — including in parliament — including berets which parody revolutionary organisations from across the world in the 20th century. Their rallies often resemble concerts, or sports events or perhaps some kind of megachurch service, with thousands of red-clad supporters dancing in tandem to African music and chants.

However, its positions are far from amusing.

A central theme in its programme is the swift redistribution of South African land assets, something visible in its rather uncreative party slogan, *Our land and jobs, now!*.

The EFF released a memorandum on its plan for land expropriation without compensation in 2020, and has bitterly argued in favour of the divisive plan, which gained momentum following the government&apos;s 2018 land ownership audit. Following some support from the ANC, the question gained enough traction such as to gain the attention of then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 2020, who declared it would be &apos;disastrous&apos; for South Africa and its economy.

Now, with the EFF, it is difficult to separate political bluster from genuine ideological positions. Its rhetoric is often bellicose and violent, and it has been accused of several instances of race-based incitement, particularly against White and Asian South Africans. The party has nevertheless seen success at the ballot box, becoming the fourth-largest party in South Africa. It has a membership of more than one million, and occupies around ten percent of seats in the National Assembly, the directly-elected house of the South African parliament.

Just like its leader, the EFF has faced other controversies, having been accused of corruption, media intimidation, tampering with the judiciary, pseudo-militaristic posturing, and repeated instances of racism. Amidst allegations of anti-white and anti-Indian racism, Malema has come in for particular scrutiny. He received notoriety for his retweeting of ominous statements by Robert Mugabe, which included the quote:

&gt; The only white man you can trust is a dead white man.

He has also led a number of controversial chants at his energetic EFF rallies, most infamously the Xhosa-language *Dubul&apos; ibhunu*, generally translated as &apos;Kill the Farmer&apos;.

Now, some have defended the use of the song, arguing it is a traditional rallying cry and not a literal call to violence against farmers. However, given the high rate of farm attacks in South Africa, the use of the chant has been labelled by many as yet another example of hate speech.

Malema has virulently insisted he will continue to use the song at his rallies, in spite of the backlash.

## Ethnic Separatism and the Volkstaat

Amidst the militant rhetoric of groups such as the EFF and factions of the ANC, the land-owning classes of South Africa have looked on with some nervousness.

And their fears are not entirely unfounded. As the discourse regarding land ownership and redistribution of South Africa&apos;s assets has raged on, multiple high-profile killings and farm attacks have taken place which have thrown fuel to the fire of expropriation without compensation but by violent means. One of the most notable cases was the 2010 killing of Eugene Terreblanche, founder and leader of the ultranationalist AWB, who was hacked to death by labourers at his farm in the townland of Ventersdorp.

It&apos;s not exactly that wealthy South Africans have to look far to see an example of chaotic landgrabs put in practice. Such was the case in neighbouring Zimbabwe in the early 2000s, when the Zanu-PF party under Robert Mugabe permitted the reclamation of white-owned farms by Black Africans, resulting in a string of violent acts and the flight of many White Zimbabweans to Britain, Australia, and to South Africa.

For many, it would appear that the insidious rhetoric of Malema would mirror the actions of Mugabe and the Zanu-PF, especially since the EFF has been linked to several instances of arson and violence, and with Malema&apos;s regular repetition of Mugabe&apos;s slogans on Twitter.

This had led to an under-siege sentiment among some in South Africa, exacerbated by combined with a volatile domestic crime landscape, which has included many killings of South African farmers in their homes. The suspicion which accompanied the end of apartheid, the difficult transition to democracy, and the lingering distrust have resulted in some rather peculiar resolutions.

Some have advocated for the establishment of a separate homeland for the Afrikaner people, the predominant white population of South Africa. The so-called Volkstaat idea rose around the end of Apartheid, deriving from historic self-determination plans by the Boers. Some fringe groups continue to actively support the idea, which is also sympathised with by the Freedom Front Plus, the largest party representing Afrikaner interests.

In fact, the Volkstaat idea has extended as far as the establishment of planned communities. In the years since 1994, settlements such as Orania and Kleinfontein have been built, gated communities inhabited exclusively by ethnic Afrikaners. Orania — in particular — has gained fame and some notoriety for its seemingly exclusionary residency policy, mandating that only ethnic Afrikaners may settle there — and that after a screening by the town council. Despite negative attention, its town council has argued that the settlement is above all a cultural project intended to preserve Afrikaner heritage, the Afrikaans language, and to provide a safe haven from South Africa&apos;s rising high crime rate.

But it doesn&apos;t help Orania&apos;s image that one of its features is a prominent statue of Hendrik Verwoerd, or that the area on which it was built was subject to one of the last evictions of the Apartheid era, when 64 Black African families were resettled in a town around 160 kilometres away only a few months before the town was established in 1991. Given its image, and many years of negative press, many have questioned why a town like Orania, with its strict and exclusionary residency criteria, is even allowed to exist. However, the right to Afrikaner self-determination was something enshrined in South Africa&apos;s constitution amidst the transfer of power in 1994. Moreover, the right to self-determination is guaranteed and exercised by multiple groups in South Africa, not least the Zulus, with their own King.

And some even look at places like Orania — with agricultural self-sufficiency and its own power sources — as a sort of inspiration amid the woes of the nation elsewhere. High crime rates and the failing energy system have resulted in the town&apos;s population having dramatically risen from a handful of families in the 1990s, to around 3,000 by 2024.

Efforts to mitigate the crime surge are also occurring elsewhere. Private security firms have taken off in South Africa, especially in its major cities. According to NPR, there are more than 2.7 million registered private security officers in the country, making South Africa&apos;s security industry one of the largest in the world, and far outnumbering its estimated 150,000 police officers. Many of these firms patrol wealthy gated communities in the suburbs of cities like Cape Town and Johannesburg. Heavily armed personnel also patrol exposed or vulnerable farmland communities, many of which have installed rigid perimeter fences and security systems, alongside the rise of volunteer neighbourhood watch movements.

Some groups of disaffected farmers and landowners have even formed what amount to self-defence militias. This includes the Suidlanders, an ethnonationalist group which believes in an impending race war or pogrom, and which pursues self-sufficiency and survival training to prepare accordingly.

## Analysis — A Problem Too Big to Solve?

Returning to the central question of South Africa&apos;s great wealth inequality, it is difficult to foresee a satisfactory resolution to the problem.

You see, aside from the legality or morality of land expropriation without compensation, it is likely that this would lead not only to great instability, but perhaps also to the flight of landowning communities abroad. The wealthiest South Africans are — like in many countries — the most well-educated, and the possibility of their emigration, a resulting Brain Drain, and the collapse of some of South Africa&apos;s industries may be swift in the event of the rapid redistribution of assets.

Such was the case in nearby Zimbabwe — when Mugabe&apos;s controversial expropriations, while popular with many, caused the collapse of the economy and an astronomical level of inflation. This ultimately killed the country&apos;s currency, and actually exacerbated its dire economic prospects even further.

South Africa even had a taste of such a development itself. In the years after Apartheid, around one-fifth of the white population emigrated abroad. That led to skills shortages which hampered South Africa&apos;s economy to the extent that it was forced to introduce curbs on capital export and cuts to pension payments, and its tax revenues declined.

And South Africa really cannot afford to tank its own economy. The country has been beset by myriad problems in recent years, which some link to poor governance and corruption by the ruling ANC. This has included high crime, high unemployment, health problems, and political instability.

But that&apos;s not all. South Africa&apos;s infrastructure is also teetering. The country has suffered electrical power shortages for years, being beset by rolling blackouts affecting much of the country, and which are locally referred to as &apos;load-shedding&apos;. Gang violence has also risen dramatically, especially in the poor townships of major cities and the Cape Town hinterland, known as the Cape Flats. South Africa now has one of the highest murder rates in the world, and also suffers from a HIV/AIDS epidemic and high rates of drug abuse — all this in addition to its aforementioned high rates of poverty and inequality.

To upset the fragile economy risks adding another major problem to the country, aside from the threat of political instability and fracturing of the fragile racial harmony in place.

The state has an even more recent case-in-point to relate what sudden instability could look like.

Allegations of corruption led to the 2021 arrest of Jacob Zuma, former President of the ANC and South Africa. But massive protests by his supporters led to widespread looting and rioting that summer, amidst a general dissatisfaction with high crime, inequality, and unemployment — all of which had been worsened by the Covid-19 pandemic. 354 people died in the course of a summer of unrest.

With this in mind, it could be argued that the South African government does not have the time or means to take on the huge question of how to resolve inequality, especially given more short-term problems, as well as the responses such a move could entail.

And some analysts have claimed that the legacy of Apartheid does not even fully explain that massive inequality, and that to target the predominantly-white landowning population would provide all the instability for little benefit.

You see, part of the reason why the country&apos;s problems and the poverty rate of Black South Africans has grown so much is because of a runaway demographic growth, with the South African population having risen sharply since 1994. At the end of Apartheid, South Africa had around 43 million people, of whom the white population constituted around 10%, at some 4.5 million people. That population is now 60 million, and although the white population has remained more or less the same, it has proportionally fallen to around 7% of the population — with the Black and Coloured populations having grown exponentially in that time.

This has led to even more overpopulation in poor districts, and a rise in the number of people born to — and living in — great poverty — despite the legal and economic entitlements of the black community not having fallen in that time.

Moreover, if the assets of the wealthy were redistributed, the question would follow: to whom should they be given?

The Zimbabwean example showed just how fraught this question could be. Mugabe and the Zanu-PF seized the land of around 4,000 white farmers, which were redistributed to around one million Black Africans — however, this resulted in most people benefitting only fractionally, and came with the complete disruption of Zimbabwe&apos;s agricultural industry. Given the corruption that both the ANC and the EFF — the most vocal advocates of land reappropriation — have been accused, it is highly likely that any such redistribution would be carried out equitably, and seized assets would simply end up in the hands of party cronies, rather than impoverished communities.

With time running out for the ANC, it is clear that some solution needs to be found to at least some of South Africa&apos;s problems.

If they fail, who knows what would follow.

## Key Takeaways

- South Africa&apos;s rugby victory in 1995 symbolized national unity post-Apartheid.
- Despite the end of Apartheid, economic inequality persists along ethnic lines.
- The ANC&apos;s rule has been marked by corruption and failure to address inequality.
- The Economic Freedom Fighters advocate for land expropriation without compensation.
- High crime rates and political instability pose significant challenges to South Africa.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the significance of the 1995 Rugby World Cup victory for South Africa?

The 1995 Rugby World Cup victory was more than just a sporting achievement; it symbolized the rebirth of South Africa as a nation with equal rights for all its inhabitants. It marked a significant moment in the country&apos;s healing process after the abolition of the Apartheid system.

### How many official languages does South Africa have?

South Africa has 11 official languages, including Xhosa, Zulu, Venda, English, and Afrikaans. Additionally, 11 more languages have some form of recognition or support.

### What is the Gini coefficient, and what is South Africa&apos;s score?

The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality, ranging from 0 (lowest inequality) to 1 (highest inequality). South Africa has a Gini score of 0.65, the highest in the world.

### What was the Population Registration Act of 1950?

The Population Registration Act of 1950 classified people into one of four races: White, Indian, Coloured, and Black. The classification was based on ancestry, physical features, socioeconomic status, knowledge of the Afrikaans language, and even drinking habits.

### What is the significance of Soweto in South African history?

Soweto, short for &apos;South West Townships,&apos; is a large settlement adjacent to Johannesburg. It became a hub of political activism during the Apartheid era and was the site of the 1976 Soweto Uprising, where hundreds of people were killed during protests against forced education in Afrikaans.

### What are Bantustans, and how did they contribute to inequality?

Bantustans were de-facto separate states for Black Africans, established by the Apartheid government. They were often in arid and undeveloped regions, and Black Africans were forced to live there, losing their South African citizenship. This led to a concentration of Black populations in certain regions and contributed to the lopsided land distribution that persists today.

### What is the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party, and what are its main goals?

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is a political party established in 2013. Its main goals include the swift redistribution of South African land assets and the slogan &apos;Our land and jobs, now!&apos; The party advocates for land expropriation without compensation.

### What is the Volkstaat idea, and how is it related to the Afrikaner community?

The Volkstaat idea advocates for the establishment of a separate homeland for the Afrikaner people. It has led to the creation of gated communities like Orania and Kleinfontein, which are inhabited exclusively by ethnic Afrikaners. These communities aim to preserve Afrikaner heritage and provide a safe haven from South Africa&apos;s high crime rate.

### What is the current unemployment rate in South Africa, and how does it affect different racial groups?

The current unemployment rate in South Africa is 32%. Black South Africans are four times as likely to be unemployed as White South Africans, highlighting the ongoing economic disparities in the country.

### What is the significance of the 2021 protests in South Africa?

The 2021 protests in South Africa were sparked by the arrest of former President Jacob Zuma. The protests led to widespread looting and rioting, resulting in 354 deaths. The unrest was fueled by dissatisfaction with high crime, inequality, and unemployment, exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic.

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- [Hero image source](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/81/Cape_Town_%28ZA%29%2C_Parliament_of_South_Africa_--_2024_--_3487.jpg) by Dietmar Rabich / openverse, by-sa.

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